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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm: swap: remove duplicate nr_swap_pages decrement in" failed to apply to 6.17-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.17-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.17.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x f5e31a196edcd1f1bb44f26b6f9299b9a5b9b3c4 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025120121-fifteen-liver-792b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.17.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From f5e31a196edcd1f1bb44f26b6f9299b9a5b9b3c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Youngjun Park <youngjun.park(a)lge.com> Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2025 17:24:56 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] mm: swap: remove duplicate nr_swap_pages decrement in get_swap_page_of_type() After commit 4f78252da887, nr_swap_pages is decremented in swap_range_alloc(). Since cluster_alloc_swap_entry() calls swap_range_alloc() internally, the decrement in get_swap_page_of_type() causes double-decrementing. As a representative userspace-visible runtime example of the impact, /proc/meminfo reports increasingly inaccurate SwapFree values. The discrepancy grows with each swap allocation, and during hibernation when large amounts of memory are written to swap, the reported value can deviate significantly from actual available swap space, misleading users and monitoring tools. Remove the duplicate decrement. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251102082456.79807-1-youngjun.park@lge.com Fixes: 4f78252da887 ("mm: swap: move nr_swap_pages counter decrement from folio_alloc_swap() to swap_range_alloc()") Signed-off-by: Youngjun Park <youngjun.park(a)lge.com> Acked-by: Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Barry Song <baohua(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kairui Song <kasong(a)tencent.com> Acked-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs(a)gmail.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng(a)huaweicloud.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.17+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c index 10760240a3a2..a1b4b9d80e3b 100644 --- a/mm/swapfile.c +++ b/mm/swapfile.c @@ -2005,10 +2005,8 @@ swp_entry_t get_swap_page_of_type(int type) local_lock(&percpu_swap_cluster.lock); offset = cluster_alloc_swap_entry(si, 0, 1); local_unlock(&percpu_swap_cluster.lock); - if (offset) { + if (offset) entry = swp_entry(si->type, offset); - atomic_long_dec(&nr_swap_pages); - } } put_swap_device(si); }

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Seeking Long-Term Supplier Partnership

by Suzanne

2 days

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[PATCH] usb: dwc3: keep susphy enabled during exit to avoid controller faults

by Udipto Goswami

On some platforms, switching USB roles from host to device can trigger controller faults due to premature PHY power-down. This occurs when the PHY is disabled too early during teardown, causing synchronization issues between the PHY and controller. Keep susphy enabled during dwc3_host_exit() and dwc3_gadget_exit() ensures the PHY remains in a low-power state capable of handling required commands during role switch. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6d735722063a ("usb: dwc3: core: Prevent phy suspend during init") Suggested-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen(a)synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Udipto Goswami <udipto.goswami(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 2 +- drivers/usb/dwc3/host.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c index 321361288935..34c5a4de612e 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c @@ -4804,7 +4804,7 @@ void dwc3_gadget_exit(struct dwc3 *dwc) if (!dwc->gadget) return; - dwc3_enable_susphy(dwc, false); + dwc3_enable_susphy(dwc, true); usb_del_gadget(dwc->gadget); dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints(dwc); usb_put_gadget(dwc->gadget); diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/host.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/host.c index 1c513bf8002e..0c171118bd55 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/host.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/host.c @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ void dwc3_host_exit(struct dwc3 *dwc) if (dwc->sys_wakeup) device_init_wakeup(&dwc->xhci->dev, false); - dwc3_enable_susphy(dwc, false); + dwc3_enable_susphy(dwc, true); platform_device_unregister(dwc->xhci); dwc->xhci = NULL; } -- 2.34.1

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] can: rcar_canfd: Fix CAN-FD mode as default" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6d849ff573722afcf5508d2800017bdd40f27eb9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025120156-taunt-paternity-aa16@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6d849ff573722afcf5508d2800017bdd40f27eb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Biju Das <biju.das.jz(a)bp.renesas.com> Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 12:39:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] can: rcar_canfd: Fix CAN-FD mode as default The commit 5cff263606a1 ("can: rcar_canfd: Fix controller mode setting") has aligned with the flow mentioned in the hardware manual for all SoCs except R-Car Gen3 and RZ/G2L SoCs. On R-Car Gen4 and RZ/G3E SoCs, due to the wrong logic in the commit[1] sets the default mode to FD-Only mode instead of CAN-FD mode. This patch sets the CAN-FD mode as the default for all SoCs by dropping the rcar_canfd_set_mode() as some SoC requires mode setting in global reset mode, and the rest of the SoCs in channel reset mode and update the rcar_canfd_reset_controller() to take care of these constraints. Moreover, the RZ/G3E and R-Car Gen4 SoCs support 3 modes compared to 2 modes on the R-Car Gen3. Use inverted logic in rcar_canfd_reset_controller() to simplify the code later to support FD-only mode. [1] commit 45721c406dcf ("can: rcar_canfd: Add support for r8a779a0 SoC") Fixes: 5cff263606a1 ("can: rcar_canfd: Fix controller mode setting") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Biju Das <biju.das.jz(a)bp.renesas.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118123926.193445-1-biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> diff --git a/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c b/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c index 45d36adb51b7..4c0d7d26df9f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c @@ -709,6 +709,11 @@ static void rcar_canfd_set_bit_reg(void __iomem *addr, u32 val) rcar_canfd_update(val, val, addr); } +static void rcar_canfd_clear_bit_reg(void __iomem *addr, u32 val) +{ + rcar_canfd_update(val, 0, addr); +} + static void rcar_canfd_update_bit_reg(void __iomem *addr, u32 mask, u32 val) { rcar_canfd_update(mask, val, addr); @@ -755,25 +760,6 @@ static void rcar_canfd_set_rnc(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv, unsigned int ch, rcar_canfd_set_bit(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GAFLCFG(w), rnc); } -static void rcar_canfd_set_mode(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv) -{ - if (gpriv->info->ch_interface_mode) { - u32 ch, val = gpriv->fdmode ? RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_FDOE - : RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_CLOE; - - for_each_set_bit(ch, &gpriv->channels_mask, - gpriv->info->max_channels) - rcar_canfd_set_bit_reg(&gpriv->fcbase[ch].cfdcfg, val); - } else { - if (gpriv->fdmode) - rcar_canfd_set_bit(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GRMCFG, - RCANFD_GRMCFG_RCMC); - else - rcar_canfd_clear_bit(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GRMCFG, - RCANFD_GRMCFG_RCMC); - } -} - static int rcar_canfd_reset_controller(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv) { struct device *dev = &gpriv->pdev->dev; @@ -806,6 +792,16 @@ static int rcar_canfd_reset_controller(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv) /* Reset Global error flags */ rcar_canfd_write(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GERFL, 0x0); + /* Set the controller into appropriate mode */ + if (!gpriv->info->ch_interface_mode) { + if (gpriv->fdmode) + rcar_canfd_set_bit(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GRMCFG, + RCANFD_GRMCFG_RCMC); + else + rcar_canfd_clear_bit(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GRMCFG, + RCANFD_GRMCFG_RCMC); + } + /* Transition all Channels to reset mode */ for_each_set_bit(ch, &gpriv->channels_mask, gpriv->info->max_channels) { rcar_canfd_clear_bit(gpriv->base, @@ -823,10 +819,23 @@ static int rcar_canfd_reset_controller(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv) dev_dbg(dev, "channel %u reset failed\n", ch); return err; } - } - /* Set the controller into appropriate mode */ - rcar_canfd_set_mode(gpriv); + /* Set the controller into appropriate mode */ + if (gpriv->info->ch_interface_mode) { + /* Do not set CLOE and FDOE simultaneously */ + if (!gpriv->fdmode) { + rcar_canfd_clear_bit_reg(&gpriv->fcbase[ch].cfdcfg, + RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_FDOE); + rcar_canfd_set_bit_reg(&gpriv->fcbase[ch].cfdcfg, + RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_CLOE); + } else { + rcar_canfd_clear_bit_reg(&gpriv->fcbase[ch].cfdcfg, + RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_FDOE); + rcar_canfd_clear_bit_reg(&gpriv->fcbase[ch].cfdcfg, + RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_CLOE); + } + } + } return 0; }

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[PATCH v3 2/2] hfsplus: ensure sb->s_fs_info is always cleaned up

by Mehdi Ben Hadj Khelifa

When hfsplus was converted to the new mount api a bug was introduced by changing the allocation pattern of sb->s_fs_info. If setup_bdev_super() fails after a new superblock has been allocated by sget_fc(), but before hfsplus_fill_super() takes ownership of the filesystem-specific s_fs_info data it was leaked. Fix this by freeing sb->s_fs_info in hfsplus_kill_super(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 432f7c78cb00 ("hfsplus: convert hfsplus to use the new mount api") Reported-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Tested-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mehdi Ben Hadj Khelifa <mehdi.benhadjkhelifa(a)gmail.com> --- fs/hfsplus/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/hfsplus/super.c b/fs/hfsplus/super.c index 16bc4abc67e0..8734520f6419 100644 --- a/fs/hfsplus/super.c +++ b/fs/hfsplus/super.c @@ -328,8 +328,6 @@ static void hfsplus_put_super(struct super_block *sb) hfs_btree_close(sbi->ext_tree); kfree(sbi->s_vhdr_buf); kfree(sbi->s_backup_vhdr_buf); - call_rcu(&sbi->rcu, delayed_free); - hfs_dbg("finished\n"); } @@ -629,7 +627,6 @@ static int hfsplus_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) out_unload_nls: unload_nls(sbi->nls); unload_nls(nls); - kfree(sbi); return err; } @@ -688,10 +685,18 @@ static int hfsplus_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) return 0; } +static void hfsplus_kill_super(struct super_block *sb) +{ + struct hfsplus_sb_info *sbi = HFSPLUS_SB(sb); + + kill_block_super(sb); + call_rcu(&sbi->rcu, delayed_free); +} + static struct file_system_type hfsplus_fs_type = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = "hfsplus", - .kill_sb = kill_block_super, + .kill_sb = hfsplus_kill_super, .fs_flags = FS_REQUIRES_DEV, .init_fs_context = hfsplus_init_fs_context, }; -- 2.52.0

2 days

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] can: rcar_canfd: Fix CAN-FD mode as default" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6d849ff573722afcf5508d2800017bdd40f27eb9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025120155-wrench-aching-b242@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6d849ff573722afcf5508d2800017bdd40f27eb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Biju Das <biju.das.jz(a)bp.renesas.com> Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 12:39:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] can: rcar_canfd: Fix CAN-FD mode as default The commit 5cff263606a1 ("can: rcar_canfd: Fix controller mode setting") has aligned with the flow mentioned in the hardware manual for all SoCs except R-Car Gen3 and RZ/G2L SoCs. On R-Car Gen4 and RZ/G3E SoCs, due to the wrong logic in the commit[1] sets the default mode to FD-Only mode instead of CAN-FD mode. This patch sets the CAN-FD mode as the default for all SoCs by dropping the rcar_canfd_set_mode() as some SoC requires mode setting in global reset mode, and the rest of the SoCs in channel reset mode and update the rcar_canfd_reset_controller() to take care of these constraints. Moreover, the RZ/G3E and R-Car Gen4 SoCs support 3 modes compared to 2 modes on the R-Car Gen3. Use inverted logic in rcar_canfd_reset_controller() to simplify the code later to support FD-only mode. [1] commit 45721c406dcf ("can: rcar_canfd: Add support for r8a779a0 SoC") Fixes: 5cff263606a1 ("can: rcar_canfd: Fix controller mode setting") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Biju Das <biju.das.jz(a)bp.renesas.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118123926.193445-1-biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> diff --git a/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c b/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c index 45d36adb51b7..4c0d7d26df9f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c @@ -709,6 +709,11 @@ static void rcar_canfd_set_bit_reg(void __iomem *addr, u32 val) rcar_canfd_update(val, val, addr); } +static void rcar_canfd_clear_bit_reg(void __iomem *addr, u32 val) +{ + rcar_canfd_update(val, 0, addr); +} + static void rcar_canfd_update_bit_reg(void __iomem *addr, u32 mask, u32 val) { rcar_canfd_update(mask, val, addr); @@ -755,25 +760,6 @@ static void rcar_canfd_set_rnc(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv, unsigned int ch, rcar_canfd_set_bit(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GAFLCFG(w), rnc); } -static void rcar_canfd_set_mode(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv) -{ - if (gpriv->info->ch_interface_mode) { - u32 ch, val = gpriv->fdmode ? RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_FDOE - : RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_CLOE; - - for_each_set_bit(ch, &gpriv->channels_mask, - gpriv->info->max_channels) - rcar_canfd_set_bit_reg(&gpriv->fcbase[ch].cfdcfg, val); - } else { - if (gpriv->fdmode) - rcar_canfd_set_bit(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GRMCFG, - RCANFD_GRMCFG_RCMC); - else - rcar_canfd_clear_bit(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GRMCFG, - RCANFD_GRMCFG_RCMC); - } -} - static int rcar_canfd_reset_controller(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv) { struct device *dev = &gpriv->pdev->dev; @@ -806,6 +792,16 @@ static int rcar_canfd_reset_controller(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv) /* Reset Global error flags */ rcar_canfd_write(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GERFL, 0x0); + /* Set the controller into appropriate mode */ + if (!gpriv->info->ch_interface_mode) { + if (gpriv->fdmode) + rcar_canfd_set_bit(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GRMCFG, + RCANFD_GRMCFG_RCMC); + else + rcar_canfd_clear_bit(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GRMCFG, + RCANFD_GRMCFG_RCMC); + } + /* Transition all Channels to reset mode */ for_each_set_bit(ch, &gpriv->channels_mask, gpriv->info->max_channels) { rcar_canfd_clear_bit(gpriv->base, @@ -823,10 +819,23 @@ static int rcar_canfd_reset_controller(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv) dev_dbg(dev, "channel %u reset failed\n", ch); return err; } - } - /* Set the controller into appropriate mode */ - rcar_canfd_set_mode(gpriv); + /* Set the controller into appropriate mode */ + if (gpriv->info->ch_interface_mode) { + /* Do not set CLOE and FDOE simultaneously */ + if (!gpriv->fdmode) { + rcar_canfd_clear_bit_reg(&gpriv->fcbase[ch].cfdcfg, + RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_FDOE); + rcar_canfd_set_bit_reg(&gpriv->fcbase[ch].cfdcfg, + RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_CLOE); + } else { + rcar_canfd_clear_bit_reg(&gpriv->fcbase[ch].cfdcfg, + RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_FDOE); + rcar_canfd_clear_bit_reg(&gpriv->fcbase[ch].cfdcfg, + RCANFD_GEN4_FDCFG_CLOE); + } + } + } return 0; }

2 days, 1 hour

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[PATCH v3] tpm2-sessions: address out-of-range indexing

by Jarkko Sakkinen

'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID, which could lead into memory corruption at worst. Address the issue by only processing known values and returning -EINVAL for unrecognized values. Make also 'tpm_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible so that errors are detected before causing any spurious TPM traffic. End also the authorization session on failure in both of the functions, as the session state would be then by definition corrupted. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v3: - Add two missing 'tpm2_end_auth_session' calls to the fallback paths of 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session'. - Rewrote the commit message. - End authorization session on failure in 'tpm2_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session'. v2: There was spurious extra field added to tpm2_hash by mistake. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 23 +++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 131 +++++++++++++++------- include/linux/tpm.h | 6 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 29 ++++- 4 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5b6ccf901623..4473b81122e8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -187,7 +187,11 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, } if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); @@ -202,8 +206,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } - if (!disable_pcr_integrity) - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); if (!disable_pcr_integrity) rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); @@ -261,7 +271,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (err) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return err; + } + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 6d03c224e6b2..33ad0d668e1a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -144,16 +144,24 @@ struct tpm2_auth { /* * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) */ -static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +static int name_size(const u8 *name) { - static u8 size_map[] = { - [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, - }; - u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); - return size_map[alg] + 2; + u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA384: + return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA512: + return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SM3_256: + return SM3256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + } + + return -EINVAL; } static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) @@ -161,6 +169,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + int ret; u32 val; /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ @@ -172,9 +181,15 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) return -EINVAL; offset += val; /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (val != ret) return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); /* forget the rest */ return 0; @@ -221,46 +236,70 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. + * + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; int slot; + int ret; #endif if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); - return; + return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } auth = chip->auth; - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session += 4; if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (!name) { + ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (ret) + goto err; + } } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + if (name) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); + if (name) { + ret = name_size(name); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret); + } +#endif + return 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); #endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -533,11 +572,9 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, * encryption key and encrypts the first parameter of the command * buffer with it. * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { u32 cc, handles, val; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; @@ -549,9 +586,12 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_ctx sctx; struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx; + int ret; - if (!auth) - return; + if (!auth) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -560,9 +600,10 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); if (i < 0) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); - return; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; } + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); @@ -576,9 +617,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", - i); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; } } /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ @@ -609,12 +650,14 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset_s += len; } if (offset_s != offset_p) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; } if (!hmac) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; } /* encrypt before HMAC */ @@ -646,8 +689,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], - name_size(auth->name[i])); + ret = name_size(auth->name[i]); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret); } else { __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); @@ -668,6 +714,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, &auth->attrs, 1); hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, hmac); + return 0; + +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 0e9e043f728c..1a59f0190eb3 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -528,8 +528,8 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif } -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index e165b117bbca..7672a4376dad 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -283,7 +283,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -331,7 +334,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc) @@ -438,7 +444,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -450,7 +459,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (!rc) @@ -497,7 +509,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; if (!options->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, @@ -522,7 +536,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL, 0); } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); -- 2.52.0

2 days, 1 hour

1
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[PATCH 2/4] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks

by Jarkko Sakkinen

'tpm2_read_public' has some rudimentary range checks but the function does not ensure that the response buffer has enough bytes for the full TPMT_HA payload. Re-implement the function with necessary checks and validation. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 3 ++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 4473b81122e8..58a8477cda85 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -11,8 +11,11 @@ * used by the kernel internally. */ +#include "linux/dev_printk.h" +#include "linux/tpm.h" #include "tpm.h" #include <crypto/hash_info.h> +#include <linux/unaligned.h> static bool disable_pcr_integrity; module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 33ad0d668e1a..afbca03f639e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -164,54 +164,59 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name) return -EINVAL; } -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name) { - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); - int ret; - u32 val; - - /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ - tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - - /* skip public */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val > tot_len) - return -EINVAL; - offset += val; - /* name */ - - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc, rc2; - if (val != ret) + if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE && + mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) return -EINVAL; - memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); - /* forget the rest */ - return 0; -} - -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); if (rc) return rc; tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); - if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) - rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "TPM2_ReadPublic"); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); + } - return rc; + /* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */ + offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + + /* + * Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of + * TPMT_HA (the extra four bytes). + */ + if (offset + 4 > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + rc2 = name_size(&buf.data[offset]); + + if (rc2 < 0) + return rc2; + + if (rc != rc2) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + if (offset + rc > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + memcpy(name, &buf.data[offset], rc); + return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ -- 2.52.0

2 days, 1 hour

1
0
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[PATCH 1/4] tpm2-sessions: address out-of-range indexing

by Jarkko Sakkinen

'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID, which could lead into memory corruption at worst. Address the issue by only processing known values and returning -EINVAL for unrecognized values. Make also 'tpm_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible so that errors are detected before causing any spurious TPM traffic. End also the authorization session on failure in both of the functions, as the session state would be then by definition corrupted. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 23 +++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 131 +++++++++++++++------- include/linux/tpm.h | 6 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 29 ++++- 4 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5b6ccf901623..4473b81122e8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -187,7 +187,11 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, } if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); @@ -202,8 +206,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } - if (!disable_pcr_integrity) - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); if (!disable_pcr_integrity) rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); @@ -261,7 +271,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (err) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return err; + } + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 6d03c224e6b2..33ad0d668e1a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -144,16 +144,24 @@ struct tpm2_auth { /* * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) */ -static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +static int name_size(const u8 *name) { - static u8 size_map[] = { - [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, - }; - u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); - return size_map[alg] + 2; + u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA384: + return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA512: + return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SM3_256: + return SM3256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + } + + return -EINVAL; } static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) @@ -161,6 +169,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + int ret; u32 val; /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ @@ -172,9 +181,15 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) return -EINVAL; offset += val; /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (val != ret) return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); /* forget the rest */ return 0; @@ -221,46 +236,70 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. + * + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; int slot; + int ret; #endif if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); - return; + return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } auth = chip->auth; - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session += 4; if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (!name) { + ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (ret) + goto err; + } } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + if (name) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); + if (name) { + ret = name_size(name); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret); + } +#endif + return 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); #endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -533,11 +572,9 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, * encryption key and encrypts the first parameter of the command * buffer with it. * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { u32 cc, handles, val; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; @@ -549,9 +586,12 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_ctx sctx; struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx; + int ret; - if (!auth) - return; + if (!auth) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -560,9 +600,10 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); if (i < 0) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); - return; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; } + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); @@ -576,9 +617,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", - i); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; } } /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ @@ -609,12 +650,14 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset_s += len; } if (offset_s != offset_p) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; } if (!hmac) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; } /* encrypt before HMAC */ @@ -646,8 +689,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], - name_size(auth->name[i])); + ret = name_size(auth->name[i]); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret); } else { __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); @@ -668,6 +714,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, &auth->attrs, 1); hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, hmac); + return 0; + +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 0e9e043f728c..1a59f0190eb3 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -528,8 +528,8 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif } -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index e165b117bbca..7672a4376dad 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -283,7 +283,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -331,7 +334,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc) @@ -438,7 +444,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -450,7 +459,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (!rc) @@ -497,7 +509,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; if (!options->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, @@ -522,7 +536,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL, 0); } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); -- 2.52.0

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: fix memory leak in cifs_construct_tcon()" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3184b6a5a24ec9ee74087b2a550476f386df7dc2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025120144-dismiss-quilt-863b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3184b6a5a24ec9ee74087b2a550476f386df7dc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara <pc(a)manguebit.org> Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2025 17:00:36 -0300 Subject: [PATCH] smb: client: fix memory leak in cifs_construct_tcon() When having a multiuser mount with domain= specified and using cifscreds, cifs_set_cifscreds() will end up setting @ctx->domainname, so it needs to be freed before leaving cifs_construct_tcon(). This fixes the following memory leak reported by kmemleak: mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o domain=ZELDA,multiuser,... su - testuser cifscreds add -d ZELDA -u testuser ... ls /mnt/1 ... umount /mnt echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak unreferenced object 0xffff8881203c3f08 (size 8): comm "ls", pid 5060, jiffies 4307222943 hex dump (first 8 bytes): 5a 45 4c 44 41 00 cc cc ZELDA... backtrace (crc d109a8cf): __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x572/0x710 kstrdup+0x3a/0x70 cifs_sb_tlink+0x1209/0x1770 [cifs] cifs_get_fattr+0xe1/0xf50 [cifs] cifs_get_inode_info+0xb5/0x240 [cifs] cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x2d1/0x470 [cifs] cifs_getattr+0x28e/0x450 [cifs] vfs_getattr_nosec+0x126/0x180 vfs_statx+0xf6/0x220 do_statx+0xab/0x110 __x64_sys_statx+0xd5/0x130 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x380 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: f2aee329a68f ("cifs: set domainName when a domain-key is used in multiuser") Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc(a)manguebit.org> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jay Shin <jaeshin(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-cifs(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> diff --git a/fs/smb/client/connect.c b/fs/smb/client/connect.c index 55cb4b0cbd48..2f94d93b95e9 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/connect.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/connect.c @@ -4451,6 +4451,7 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, kuid_t fsuid) out: kfree(ctx->username); + kfree(ctx->domainname); kfree_sensitive(ctx->password); kfree(origin_fullpath); kfree(ctx);

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