- Linux-stable-mirror - lists.linaro.org

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mptcp: pm: ignore unknown endpoint flags" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0ace3297a7301911e52d8195cb1006414897c859 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122922-cedar-reapply-f9d1@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0ace3297a7301911e52d8195cb1006414897c859 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 19:55:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] mptcp: pm: ignore unknown endpoint flags Before this patch, the kernel was saving any flags set by the userspace, even unknown ones. This doesn't cause critical issues because the kernel is only looking at specific ones. But on the other hand, endpoints dumps could tell the userspace some recent flags seem to be supported on older kernel versions. Instead, ignore all unknown flags when parsing them. By doing that, the userspace can continue to set unsupported flags, but it has a way to verify what is supported by the kernel. Note that it sounds better to continue accepting unsupported flags not to change the behaviour, but also that eases things on the userspace side by adding "optional" endpoint types only supported by newer kernel versions without having to deal with the different kernel versions. A note for the backports: there will be conflicts in mptcp.h on older versions not having the mentioned flags, the new line should still be added last, and the '5' needs to be adapted to have the same value as the last entry. Fixes: 01cacb00b35c ("mptcp: add netlink-based PM") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-19-rc1-v1-1-9e4781… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mptcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/mptcp.h index 04eea6d1d0a9..72a5d030154e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/mptcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/mptcp.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_FULLMESH _BITUL(3) #define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_IMPLICIT _BITUL(4) #define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_LAMINAR _BITUL(5) +#define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAGS_MASK GENMASK(5, 0) struct mptcp_info { __u8 mptcpi_subflows; diff --git a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c index d5b383870f79..7aa42de9c47b 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +++ b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c @@ -119,7 +119,8 @@ int mptcp_pm_parse_entry(struct nlattr *attr, struct genl_info *info, } if (tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_FLAGS]) - entry->flags = nla_get_u32(tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_FLAGS]); + entry->flags = nla_get_u32(tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_FLAGS]) & + MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAGS_MASK; if (tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_PORT]) entry->addr.port = htons(nla_get_u16(tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_PORT]));

16 hours, 54 minutes

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mptcp: pm: ignore unknown endpoint flags" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0ace3297a7301911e52d8195cb1006414897c859 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122921-regress-overhand-2900@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0ace3297a7301911e52d8195cb1006414897c859 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 19:55:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] mptcp: pm: ignore unknown endpoint flags Before this patch, the kernel was saving any flags set by the userspace, even unknown ones. This doesn't cause critical issues because the kernel is only looking at specific ones. But on the other hand, endpoints dumps could tell the userspace some recent flags seem to be supported on older kernel versions. Instead, ignore all unknown flags when parsing them. By doing that, the userspace can continue to set unsupported flags, but it has a way to verify what is supported by the kernel. Note that it sounds better to continue accepting unsupported flags not to change the behaviour, but also that eases things on the userspace side by adding "optional" endpoint types only supported by newer kernel versions without having to deal with the different kernel versions. A note for the backports: there will be conflicts in mptcp.h on older versions not having the mentioned flags, the new line should still be added last, and the '5' needs to be adapted to have the same value as the last entry. Fixes: 01cacb00b35c ("mptcp: add netlink-based PM") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-19-rc1-v1-1-9e4781… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mptcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/mptcp.h index 04eea6d1d0a9..72a5d030154e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/mptcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/mptcp.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_FULLMESH _BITUL(3) #define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_IMPLICIT _BITUL(4) #define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_LAMINAR _BITUL(5) +#define MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAGS_MASK GENMASK(5, 0) struct mptcp_info { __u8 mptcpi_subflows; diff --git a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c index d5b383870f79..7aa42de9c47b 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +++ b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c @@ -119,7 +119,8 @@ int mptcp_pm_parse_entry(struct nlattr *attr, struct genl_info *info, } if (tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_FLAGS]) - entry->flags = nla_get_u32(tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_FLAGS]); + entry->flags = nla_get_u32(tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_FLAGS]) & + MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAGS_MASK; if (tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_PORT]) entry->addr.port = htons(nla_get_u16(tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_PORT]));

16 hours, 54 minutes

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122907-stream-lasso-ba6e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 15:38:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks tpm2_read_public() has some rudimentary range checks but the function does not ensure that the response buffer has enough bytes for the full TPMT_HA payload. Re-implement the function with necessary checks and validation, and return name and name size for all handle types back to the caller. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index be4a9c7f2e1a..34e3599f094f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -11,8 +11,11 @@ * used by the kernel internally. */ +#include "linux/dev_printk.h" +#include "linux/tpm.h" #include "tpm.h" #include <crypto/hash_info.h> +#include <linux/unaligned.h> static bool disable_pcr_integrity; module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 385014dbca39..3f389e2f6f58 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -163,53 +163,61 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name) } } -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name) { - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); - int ret; - u32 val; - - /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ - tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - - /* skip public */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val > tot_len) - return -EINVAL; - offset += val; - /* name */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - if (val != ret) - return -EINVAL; - - memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); - /* forget the rest */ - return 0; -} - -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) -{ + int rc, name_size_alg; struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; + + if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE && + mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32)); + return sizeof(u32); + } rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); if (rc) return rc; tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); - if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) - rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "TPM2_ReadPublic"); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); + } - return rc; + /* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */ + offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + + /* + * Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of + * TPMT_HA (the extra four bytes). + */ + if (offset + 4 > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + name_size_alg = name_size(&buf.data[offset]); + + if (name_size_alg < 0) + return name_size_alg; + + if (rc != name_size_alg) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + if (offset + rc > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + memcpy(name, &buf.data[offset], rc); + return name_size_alg; } #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ @@ -243,6 +251,7 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; + u16 name_size_alg; int slot; int ret; #endif @@ -273,8 +282,10 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { if (!name) { ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); - if (ret) + if (ret < 0) goto err; + + name_size_alg = ret; } } else { if (name) { @@ -286,13 +297,8 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) { - ret = name_size(name); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; - - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret); - } + if (name) + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size_alg); #endif return 0;

16 hours, 55 minutes

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6e9722e9a7bfe1bbad649937c811076acf86e1fd # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122957-risotto-carnage-e13f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6e9722e9a7bfe1bbad649937c811076acf86e1fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2025 21:07:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size 'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID, which could lead into memory corruption at worst. Address the issue by only processing known values and returning -EINVAL for unrecognized values. Make also 'tpm_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible so that errors are detected before causing any spurious TPM traffic. End also the authorization session on failure in both of the functions, as the session state would be then by definition corrupted. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index dd502322f499..be4a9c7f2e1a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -199,7 +199,11 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, } if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); @@ -214,8 +218,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } - if (!disable_pcr_integrity) - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); if (!disable_pcr_integrity) rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); @@ -273,7 +283,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (err) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return err; + } + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 6d03c224e6b2..385014dbca39 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -144,16 +144,23 @@ struct tpm2_auth { /* * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) */ -static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +static int name_size(const u8 *name) { - static u8 size_map[] = { - [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, - }; - u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); - return size_map[alg] + 2; + u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA384: + return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA512: + return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + default: + pr_warn("tpm: unsupported name algorithm: 0x%04x\n", hash_alg); + return -EINVAL; + } } static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) @@ -161,6 +168,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + int ret; u32 val; /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ @@ -173,8 +181,13 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset += val; /* name */ val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (val != ret) return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); /* forget the rest */ return 0; @@ -221,46 +234,72 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. + * + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; int slot; + int ret; #endif if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); - return; + return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } auth = chip->auth; - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session += 4; if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (!name) { + ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (ret) + goto err; + } } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + if (name) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "handle 0x%08x does not use a name\n", + handle); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); + if (name) { + ret = name_size(name); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret); + } +#endif + return 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); #endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -533,11 +572,9 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, * encryption key and encrypts the first parameter of the command * buffer with it. * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { u32 cc, handles, val; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; @@ -549,9 +586,12 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_ctx sctx; struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx; + int ret; - if (!auth) - return; + if (!auth) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -560,9 +600,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); if (i < 0) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "command 0x%08x not found\n", cc); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); @@ -576,9 +618,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", - i); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } } /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ @@ -609,12 +651,14 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset_s += len; } if (offset_s != offset_p) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } if (!hmac) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } /* encrypt before HMAC */ @@ -646,8 +690,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], - name_size(auth->name[i])); + ret = name_size(auth->name[i]); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret); } else { __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); @@ -668,6 +715,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, &auth->attrs, 1); hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, hmac); + return 0; + +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 3d8f7d1ce2b8..aa816b144ab3 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -529,8 +529,8 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif } -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); @@ -577,10 +577,13 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf) + +static inline int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm_buf *buf) { + return 0; } + static inline int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 8bc6efa8accb..5b205279584b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -268,7 +268,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -316,7 +319,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc) @@ -427,7 +433,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -439,7 +448,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (!rc) @@ -484,7 +496,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; if (!options->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, @@ -509,7 +523,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL, 0); } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);

16 hours, 55 minutes

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/huge_memory: merge uniform_split_supported() and" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 8a0e4bdddd1c998b894d879a1d22f1e745606215 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122926-sizably-bountiful-a98b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 8a0e4bdddd1c998b894d879a1d22f1e745606215 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2025 03:41:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] mm/huge_memory: merge uniform_split_supported() and non_uniform_split_supported() uniform_split_supported() and non_uniform_split_supported() share significantly similar logic. The only functional difference is that uniform_split_supported() includes an additional check on the requested @new_order. The reason for this check comes from the following two aspects: * some file system or swap cache just supports order-0 folio * the behavioral difference between uniform/non-uniform split The behavioral difference between uniform split and non-uniform: * uniform split splits folio directly to @new_order * non-uniform split creates after-split folios with orders from folio_order(folio) - 1 to new_order. This means for non-uniform split or !new_order split we should check the file system and swap cache respectively. This commit unifies the logic and merge the two functions into a single combined helper, removing redundant code and simplifying the split support checking mechanism. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251106034155.21398-3-richard.weiyang@gmail.com Fixes: c010d47f107f ("mm: thp: split huge page to any lower order pages") Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com> Cc: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com> Cc: "David Hildenbrand (Red Hat)" <david(a)kernel.org> Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Barry Song <baohua(a)kernel.org> Cc: Dev Jain <dev.jain(a)arm.com> Cc: Lance Yang <lance.yang(a)linux.dev> Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Cc: Nico Pache <npache(a)redhat.com> Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/include/linux/huge_mm.h b/include/linux/huge_mm.h index b74708dc5b5f..19d4a5f52ca2 100644 --- a/include/linux/huge_mm.h +++ b/include/linux/huge_mm.h @@ -374,10 +374,8 @@ int __split_huge_page_to_list_to_order(struct page *page, struct list_head *list unsigned int new_order, bool unmapped); int min_order_for_split(struct folio *folio); int split_folio_to_list(struct folio *folio, struct list_head *list); -bool uniform_split_supported(struct folio *folio, unsigned int new_order, - bool warns); -bool non_uniform_split_supported(struct folio *folio, unsigned int new_order, - bool warns); +bool folio_split_supported(struct folio *folio, unsigned int new_order, + enum split_type split_type, bool warns); int folio_split(struct folio *folio, unsigned int new_order, struct page *page, struct list_head *list); @@ -408,7 +406,7 @@ static inline int split_huge_page_to_order(struct page *page, unsigned int new_o static inline int try_folio_split_to_order(struct folio *folio, struct page *page, unsigned int new_order) { - if (!non_uniform_split_supported(folio, new_order, /* warns= */ false)) + if (!folio_split_supported(folio, new_order, SPLIT_TYPE_NON_UNIFORM, /* warns= */ false)) return split_huge_page_to_order(&folio->page, new_order); return folio_split(folio, new_order, page, NULL); } diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c index 4118f330c55e..d79a4bb363de 100644 --- a/mm/huge_memory.c +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c @@ -3593,8 +3593,8 @@ static int __split_unmapped_folio(struct folio *folio, int new_order, return 0; } -bool non_uniform_split_supported(struct folio *folio, unsigned int new_order, - bool warns) +bool folio_split_supported(struct folio *folio, unsigned int new_order, + enum split_type split_type, bool warns) { if (folio_test_anon(folio)) { /* order-1 is not supported for anonymous THP. */ @@ -3602,48 +3602,41 @@ bool non_uniform_split_supported(struct folio *folio, unsigned int new_order, "Cannot split to order-1 folio"); if (new_order == 1) return false; - } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS) && - !mapping_large_folio_support(folio->mapping)) { - /* - * No split if the file system does not support large folio. - * Note that we might still have THPs in such mappings due to - * CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS. But in that case, the mapping - * does not actually support large folios properly. - */ - VM_WARN_ONCE(warns, - "Cannot split file folio to non-0 order"); - return false; - } - - /* Only swapping a whole PMD-mapped folio is supported */ - if (folio_test_swapcache(folio)) { - VM_WARN_ONCE(warns, - "Cannot split swapcache folio to non-0 order"); - return false; - } - - return true; -} - -/* See comments in non_uniform_split_supported() */ -bool uniform_split_supported(struct folio *folio, unsigned int new_order, - bool warns) -{ - if (folio_test_anon(folio)) { - VM_WARN_ONCE(warns && new_order == 1, - "Cannot split to order-1 folio"); - if (new_order == 1) - return false; - } else if (new_order) { + } else if (split_type == SPLIT_TYPE_NON_UNIFORM || new_order) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS) && !mapping_large_folio_support(folio->mapping)) { + /* + * We can always split a folio down to a single page + * (new_order == 0) uniformly. + * + * For any other scenario + * a) uniform split targeting a large folio + * (new_order > 0) + * b) any non-uniform split + * we must confirm that the file system supports large + * folios. + * + * Note that we might still have THPs in such + * mappings, which is created from khugepaged when + * CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled. But in that + * case, the mapping does not actually support large + * folios properly. + */ VM_WARN_ONCE(warns, "Cannot split file folio to non-0 order"); return false; } } - if (new_order && folio_test_swapcache(folio)) { + /* + * swapcache folio could only be split to order 0 + * + * non-uniform split creates after-split folios with orders from + * folio_order(folio) - 1 to new_order, making it not suitable for any + * swapcache folio split. Only uniform split to order-0 can be used + * here. + */ + if ((split_type == SPLIT_TYPE_NON_UNIFORM || new_order) && folio_test_swapcache(folio)) { VM_WARN_ONCE(warns, "Cannot split swapcache folio to non-0 order"); return false; @@ -3711,11 +3704,7 @@ static int __folio_split(struct folio *folio, unsigned int new_order, if (new_order >= old_order) return -EINVAL; - if (split_type == SPLIT_TYPE_UNIFORM && !uniform_split_supported(folio, new_order, true)) - return -EINVAL; - - if (split_type == SPLIT_TYPE_NON_UNIFORM && - !non_uniform_split_supported(folio, new_order, true)) + if (!folio_split_supported(folio, new_order, split_type, /* warn = */ true)) return -EINVAL; is_hzp = is_huge_zero_folio(folio);

16 hours, 56 minutes

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] block: Remove queue freezing from several sysfs store" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 935a20d1bebf6236076785fac3ff81e3931834e9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122946-opt-excuse-6662@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 935a20d1bebf6236076785fac3ff81e3931834e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2025 13:04:07 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] block: Remove queue freezing from several sysfs store callbacks Freezing the request queue from inside sysfs store callbacks may cause a deadlock in combination with the dm-multipath driver and the queue_if_no_path option. Additionally, freezing the request queue slows down system boot on systems where sysfs attributes are set synchronously. Fix this by removing the blk_mq_freeze_queue() / blk_mq_unfreeze_queue() calls from the store callbacks that do not strictly need these callbacks. Add the __data_racy annotation to request_queue.rq_timeout to suppress KCSAN data race reports about the rq_timeout reads. This patch may cause a small delay in applying the new settings. For all the attributes affected by this patch, I/O will complete correctly whether the old or the new value of the attribute is used. This patch affects the following sysfs attributes: * io_poll_delay * io_timeout * nomerges * read_ahead_kb * rq_affinity Here is an example of a deadlock triggered by running test srp/002 if this patch is not applied: task:multipathd Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x8c1/0x1bf0 schedule+0xdd/0x270 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x1c/0x30 __mutex_lock+0xb89/0x1650 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 dm_table_set_restrictions+0x823/0xdf0 __bind+0x166/0x590 dm_swap_table+0x2a7/0x490 do_resume+0x1b1/0x610 dev_suspend+0x55/0x1a0 ctl_ioctl+0x3a5/0x7e0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0x12/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x1a0 x64_sys_call+0xe2b/0x17d0 do_syscall_64+0x96/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> task:(udev-worker) Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x8c1/0x1bf0 schedule+0xdd/0x270 blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xf2/0x140 blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x23/0x30 queue_ra_store+0x14e/0x290 queue_attr_store+0x23e/0x2c0 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3b2/0x630 vfs_write+0x4fd/0x1390 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x276/0x17d0 do_syscall_64+0x96/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Cc: Nilay Shroff <nilay(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Wilck <mwilck(a)suse.com> Cc: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: af2814149883 ("block: freeze the queue in queue_attr_store") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> diff --git a/block/blk-sysfs.c b/block/blk-sysfs.c index 76c47fe9b8d6..8684c57498cc 100644 --- a/block/blk-sysfs.c +++ b/block/blk-sysfs.c @@ -143,21 +143,22 @@ queue_ra_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page, size_t count) { unsigned long ra_kb; ssize_t ret; - unsigned int memflags; struct request_queue *q = disk->queue; ret = queue_var_store(&ra_kb, page, count); if (ret < 0) return ret; /* - * ->ra_pages is protected by ->limits_lock because it is usually - * calculated from the queue limits by queue_limits_commit_update. + * The ->ra_pages change below is protected by ->limits_lock because it + * is usually calculated from the queue limits by + * queue_limits_commit_update(). + * + * bdi->ra_pages reads are not serialized against bdi->ra_pages writes. + * Use WRITE_ONCE() to write bdi->ra_pages once. */ mutex_lock(&q->limits_lock); - memflags = blk_mq_freeze_queue(q); - disk->bdi->ra_pages = ra_kb >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 10); + WRITE_ONCE(disk->bdi->ra_pages, ra_kb >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 10)); mutex_unlock(&q->limits_lock); - blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(q, memflags); return ret; } @@ -375,21 +376,18 @@ static ssize_t queue_nomerges_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page, size_t count) { unsigned long nm; - unsigned int memflags; struct request_queue *q = disk->queue; ssize_t ret = queue_var_store(&nm, page, count); if (ret < 0) return ret; - memflags = blk_mq_freeze_queue(q); blk_queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_NOMERGES, q); blk_queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_NOXMERGES, q); if (nm == 2) blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_NOMERGES, q); else if (nm) blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_NOXMERGES, q); - blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(q, memflags); return ret; } @@ -409,7 +407,6 @@ queue_rq_affinity_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page, size_t count) #ifdef CONFIG_SMP struct request_queue *q = disk->queue; unsigned long val; - unsigned int memflags; ret = queue_var_store(&val, page, count); if (ret < 0) @@ -421,7 +418,6 @@ queue_rq_affinity_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page, size_t count) * are accessed individually using atomic test_bit operation. So we * don't grab any lock while updating these flags. */ - memflags = blk_mq_freeze_queue(q); if (val == 2) { blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_SAME_COMP, q); blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_SAME_FORCE, q); @@ -432,7 +428,6 @@ queue_rq_affinity_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page, size_t count) blk_queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_SAME_COMP, q); blk_queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_SAME_FORCE, q); } - blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(q, memflags); #endif return ret; } @@ -446,11 +441,9 @@ static ssize_t queue_poll_delay_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page, static ssize_t queue_poll_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page, size_t count) { - unsigned int memflags; ssize_t ret = count; struct request_queue *q = disk->queue; - memflags = blk_mq_freeze_queue(q); if (!(q->limits.features & BLK_FEAT_POLL)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -459,7 +452,6 @@ static ssize_t queue_poll_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page, pr_info_ratelimited("writes to the poll attribute are ignored.\n"); pr_info_ratelimited("please use driver specific parameters instead.\n"); out: - blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(q, memflags); return ret; } @@ -472,7 +464,7 @@ static ssize_t queue_io_timeout_show(struct gendisk *disk, char *page) static ssize_t queue_io_timeout_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page, size_t count) { - unsigned int val, memflags; + unsigned int val; int err; struct request_queue *q = disk->queue; @@ -480,9 +472,7 @@ static ssize_t queue_io_timeout_store(struct gendisk *disk, const char *page, if (err || val == 0) return -EINVAL; - memflags = blk_mq_freeze_queue(q); blk_queue_rq_timeout(q, msecs_to_jiffies(val)); - blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(q, memflags); return count; } diff --git a/include/linux/blkdev.h b/include/linux/blkdev.h index 2fff8a80dbd2..cb4ba09959ee 100644 --- a/include/linux/blkdev.h +++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ struct request_queue { */ unsigned long queue_flags; - unsigned int rq_timeout; + unsigned int __data_racy rq_timeout; unsigned int queue_depth;

16 hours, 58 minutes

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122958-ambitious-prenatal-99c2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2025 19:04:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options() strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed: strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Call Trace: <TASK> __fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039 strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline] sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline] parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline] __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline] ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline] path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63 characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a non-NUL-term string here. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 8ecb790ea8c3 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251101160430.222297-1-pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 7de15249e826..d1ba894c0e0a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fs_context *m_ctx) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - char s_mount_opts[65]; + char s_mount_opts[64]; struct ext4_fs_context *s_ctx = NULL; struct fs_context *fc = NULL; int ret = -ENOMEM; @@ -2484,7 +2484,8 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, if (!sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0]) return 0; - strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts); + if (strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts) < 0) + return -E2BIG; fc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc)

16 hours, 59 minutes

1
0
0 0

Re: Patch "printk: Avoid scheduling irq_work on suspend" has been added to the 6.18-stable tree

by John Ogness

Hi Greg, On 2025-12-29, <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled > > printk: Avoid scheduling irq_work on suspend > > to the 6.18-stable tree which can be found at: > http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… > > The filename of the patch is: > printk-avoid-scheduling-irq_work-on-suspend.patch > and it can be found in the queue-6.18 subdirectory. > > If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, > please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. This patch should be accompanied with the preceeding commit: d01ff281bd9b ("printk: Allow printk_trigger_flush() to flush all types") and the later commit: 66e7c1e0ee08 ("printk: Avoid irq_work for printk_deferred() on suspend") in order to completely avoid irq_work triggering during suspend for all possible call paths. John Ogness

17 hours

2
1
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] xhci: dbgtty: fix device unregister" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1f73b8b56cf35de29a433aee7bfff26cea98be3f # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025120110-coastal-litigator-8952@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1f73b8b56cf35de29a433aee7bfff26cea98be3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?=C5=81ukasz=20Bartosik?= <ukaszb(a)chromium.org> Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 21:29:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] xhci: dbgtty: fix device unregister MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When DbC is disconnected then xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device() is called. However if there is any user space process blocked on write to DbC terminal device then it will never be signalled and thus stay blocked indifinitely. This fix adds a tty_vhangup() call in xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device(). The tty_vhangup() wakes up any blocked writers and causes subsequent write attempts to DbC terminal device to fail. Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Fixes: dfba2174dc42 ("usb: xhci: Add DbC support in xHCI driver") Signed-off-by: Łukasz Bartosik <ukaszb(a)chromium.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119212910.1245694-1-ukaszb@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c index b7f95565524d..57cdda4e09c8 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c @@ -550,6 +550,12 @@ static void xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device(struct xhci_dbc *dbc) if (!port->registered) return; + /* + * Hang up the TTY. This wakes up any blocked + * writers and causes subsequent writes to fail. + */ + tty_vhangup(port->port.tty); + tty_unregister_device(dbc_tty_driver, port->minor); xhci_dbc_tty_exit_port(port); port->registered = false;

17 hours, 7 minutes

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] arm64: qcom: sm8750: Fix BAM DMA probing

by Krzysztof Kozlowski

Bindings always required "qcom,num-ees" and "num-channels" properties, as reported by dtbs_check: sm8750-mtp.dtb: dma-controller@1dc4000 (qcom,bam-v1.7.4): 'anyOf' conditional failed, one must be fixed: 'qcom,powered-remotely' is a required property 'num-channels' is a required property 'qcom,num-ees' is a required property 'clocks' is a required property 'clock-names' is a required property However since commit 5068b5254812 ("dmaengine: qcom: bam_dma: Fix DT error handling for num-channels/ees") missing properties are actually fatal and BAM does not probe: bam-dma-engine 1dc4000.dma-controller: num-channels unspecified in dt bam-dma-engine 1dc4000.dma-controller: probe with driver bam-dma-engine failed with error -22 Fixes: eeb0f3e4ea67 ("arm64: dts: qcom: sm8750: Add QCrypto nodes") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm8750.dtsi | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm8750.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm8750.dtsi index 3040c02fb6e4..bd555ec9e04a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm8750.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm8750.dtsi @@ -2076,6 +2076,8 @@ cryptobam: dma-controller@1dc4000 { <&apps_smmu 0x481 0>; qcom,ee = <0>; + qcom,num-ees = <4>; + num-channels = <20>; qcom,controlled-remotely; }; -- 2.51.0

17 hours, 19 minutes

2
1
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror