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+ mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm/kasan: fix incorrect unpoisoning in vrealloc for KASAN has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> Subject: mm/kasan: fix incorrect unpoisoning in vrealloc for KASAN Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 19:15:14 +0800 Syzkaller reported a memory out-of-bounds bug [1]. This patch fixes two issues: 1. In vrealloc, we were missing the KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC flag when unpoisoning the extended region. This flag is required to correctly associate the allocation with KASAN's vmalloc tracking. Note: In contrast, vzalloc (via __vmalloc_node_range_noprof) explicitly sets KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC and calls kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() with it. vrealloc must behave consistently �� especially when reusing existing vmalloc regions �� to ensure KASAN can track allocations correctly. 2. When vrealloc reuses an existing vmalloc region (without allocating new pages), KASAN previously generated a new tag, which broke tag-based memory access tracking. We now add a 'reuse_tag' parameter to __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() to preserve the original tag in such cases. A new helper kasan_unpoison_vralloc() is introduced to handle this reuse scenario, ensuring consistent tag behavior during reallocation. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251128111516.244497-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=997752115a851cb0cf36 [1] Fixes: a0309faf1cb0 ("mm: vmalloc: support more granular vrealloc() sizing") Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> Reported-by: syzbot+997752115a851cb0cf36(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68e243a2.050a0220.1696c6.007d.GAE@google.com/T/ Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/kasan.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 4 ++-- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 6 ++++-- mm/vmalloc.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/kasan.h~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan +++ a/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -596,13 +596,23 @@ static inline void kasan_release_vmalloc #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size, - kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags); + kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags, bool reuse_tag); + +static __always_inline void *kasan_unpoison_vrealloc(const void *start, + unsigned long size, + kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags) +{ + if (kasan_enabled()) + return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(start, size, flags, true); + return (void *)start; +} + static __always_inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size, kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags) { if (kasan_enabled()) - return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(start, size, flags); + return __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(start, size, flags, false); return (void *)start; } @@ -629,6 +639,13 @@ static inline void kasan_release_vmalloc unsigned long free_region_end, unsigned long flags) { } +static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vrealloc(const void *start, + unsigned long size, + kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags) +{ + return (void *)start; +} + static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size, kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags) --- a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan +++ a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ static void init_vmalloc_pages(const voi } void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size, - kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags) + kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags, bool reuse_tag) { u8 tag; unsigned long redzone_start, redzone_size; @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const voi return (void *)start; } - tag = kasan_random_tag(); + tag = reuse_tag ? get_tag(start) : kasan_random_tag(); start = set_tag(start, tag); /* Unpoison and initialize memory up to size. */ --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan +++ a/mm/kasan/shadow.c @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long } void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size, - kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags) + kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags, bool reuse_tag) { /* * Software KASAN modes unpoison both VM_ALLOC and non-VM_ALLOC @@ -648,7 +648,9 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const voi !(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL)) return (void *)start; - start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag()); + if (!reuse_tag) + start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag()); + kasan_unpoison(start, size, false); return (void *)start; } --- a/mm/vmalloc.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan +++ a/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -4175,8 +4175,8 @@ void *vrealloc_node_align_noprof(const v * We already have the bytes available in the allocation; use them. */ if (size <= alloced_size) { - kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(p + old_size, size - old_size, - KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL); + kasan_unpoison_vrealloc(p, size, + KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL | KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC); /* * No need to zero memory here, as unused memory will have * already been zeroed at initial allocation time or during _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev are mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan.patch mm-vmscan-skip-increasing-kswapd_failures-when-reclaim-was-boosted.patch

5 days, 17 hours

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[PATCH v3] net/handshake: restore destructor on submit failure

by caoping

handshake_req_submit() replaces sk->sk_destruct but never restores it when submission fails before the request is hashed. handshake_sk_destruct() then returns early and the original destructor never runs, leaking the socket. Restore sk_destruct on the error path. Fixes: 3b3009ea8abb ("net/handshake: Create a NETLINK service for handling handshake requests") Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: caoping <caoping(a)cmss.chinamobile.com> --- net/handshake/request.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/handshake/request.c b/net/handshake/request.c index 274d2c89b6b2..89435ed755cd 100644 --- a/net/handshake/request.c +++ b/net/handshake/request.c @@ -276,6 +276,8 @@ int handshake_req_submit(struct socket *sock, struct handshake_req *req, out_unlock: spin_unlock(&hn->hn_lock); out_err: + /* Restore original destructor so socket teardown still runs on failure */ + req->hr_sk->sk_destruct = req->hr_odestruct; trace_handshake_submit_err(net, req, req->hr_sk, ret); handshake_req_destroy(req); return ret; base-commit: 4a26e7032d7d57c998598c08a034872d6f0d3945 -- 2.47.3

5 days, 18 hours

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[PATCH] usb: renesas_usbhs: Fix a resource leak in usbhs_pipe_malloc()

by Haoxiang Li

usbhsp_get_pipe() set pipe's flags to IS_USED. In error paths, usbhsp_put_pipe() is required to clear pipe's flags to prevent pipe exhaustion. Fixes: f1407d5c6624 ("usb: renesas_usbhs: Add Renesas USBHS common code") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com> --- drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/pipe.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/pipe.c b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/pipe.c index 75fff2e4cbc6..56fc3ff5016f 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/pipe.c +++ b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/pipe.c @@ -713,11 +713,13 @@ struct usbhs_pipe *usbhs_pipe_malloc(struct usbhs_priv *priv, /* make sure pipe is not busy */ ret = usbhsp_pipe_barrier(pipe); if (ret < 0) { + usbhsp_put_pipe(pipe); dev_err(dev, "pipe setup failed %d\n", usbhs_pipe_number(pipe)); return NULL; } if (usbhsp_setup_pipecfg(pipe, is_host, dir_in, &pipecfg)) { + usbhsp_put_pipe(pipe); dev_err(dev, "can't setup pipe\n"); return NULL; } -- 2.25.1

5 days, 19 hours

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[PATCH 0/2] PCI: dwc: Fix missing iATU setup when ECAM is enabled

by Krishna Chaitanya Chundru

When ECAM is enabled, the driver skipped calling dw_pcie_iatu_setup() before configuring ECAM iATU entries. This left IO and MEM outbound windows unprogrammed, resulting in broken IO transactions. Additionally, dw_pcie_config_ecam_iatu() was only called during host initialization, so ECAM-related iATU entries were not restored after suspend/resume, leading to failures in configuration space access. To resolve these issues, the ECAM iATU configuration is moved into dw_pcie_setup_rc(). At the same time, dw_pcie_iatu_setup() is invoked when ECAM is enabled. Signed-off-by: Krishna Chaitanya Chundru <krishna.chundru(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- Krishna Chaitanya Chundru (2): PCI: dwc: Correct iATU index increment for MSG TLP region PCI: dwc: Fix missing iATU setup when ECAM is enabled drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-host.c | 37 ++++++++++++++--------- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware.c | 3 ++ drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 3f9f0252130e7dd60d41be0802bf58f6471c691d change-id: 20251203-ecam_io_fix-6e060fecd3b8 Best regards, -- Krishna Chaitanya Chundru <krishna.chundru(a)oss.qualcomm.com>

5 days, 19 hours

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[PATCH] drm/i915/dmc: fix an unlikely NULL pointer deference at probe

by Jani Nikula

intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count() oopses when DMC hasn't been initialized, and dmc is thus NULL. That would be the case when the call path is intel_power_domains_init_hw() -> {skl,bxt,icl}_display_core_init() -> gen9_set_dc_state() -> intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count(), as intel_power_domains_init_hw() is called *before* intel_dmc_init(). However, gen9_set_dc_state() calls intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count() conditionally, depending on the current and target DC states. At probe, the target is disabled, but if DC6 is enabled, the function is called, and an oops follows. Apparently it's quite unlikely that DC6 is enabled at probe, as we haven't seen this failure mode before. Add NULL checks and switch the dmc->display references to just display. Fixes: 88c1f9a4d36d ("drm/i915/dmc: Create debugfs entry for dc6 counter") Cc: Mohammed Thasleem <mohammed.thasleem(a)intel.com> Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.16+ Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula(a)intel.com> --- Rare case, but this may also throw off the rc6 counting in debugfs when it does happen. --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c index 2fb6fec6dc99..169bbbc91f6d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c @@ -1570,10 +1570,10 @@ void intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count(struct intel_display *display, struct intel_dmc *dmc = display_to_dmc(display); u32 dc5_cur_count; - if (DISPLAY_VER(dmc->display) < 14) + if (!dmc || DISPLAY_VER(display) < 14) return; - dc5_cur_count = intel_de_read(dmc->display, DG1_DMC_DEBUG_DC5_COUNT); + dc5_cur_count = intel_de_read(display, DG1_DMC_DEBUG_DC5_COUNT); if (!start_tracking) dmc->dc6_allowed.count += dc5_cur_count - dmc->dc6_allowed.dc5_start; @@ -1587,7 +1587,7 @@ static bool intel_dmc_get_dc6_allowed_count(struct intel_display *display, u32 * struct intel_dmc *dmc = display_to_dmc(display); bool dc6_enabled; - if (DISPLAY_VER(display) < 14) + if (!dmc || DISPLAY_VER(display) < 14) return false; mutex_lock(&power_domains->lock); -- 2.47.3

5 days, 19 hours

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[PATCH 5.10.y] HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits

by jetlan9＠163.com

From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> [ Upstream commit a6b87bfc2ab5bccb7ad953693c85d9062aef3fdd ] Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit quantity to a 0-bit quantity. Ideally this should never occur, but there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size set to zero; we shouldn't reject the report or the device just because of that. Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-by: syzbot+b63d677d63bcac06cf90(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/68753a08.050a0220.33d347.0008.GAE@google.… Tested-by: syzbot+b63d677d63bcac06cf90(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: dde5845a529f ("[PATCH] Generic HID layer - code split") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/613a66cd-4309-4bce-a4f7-2905f9bce0c9@rowland.harva… Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss(a)kernel.org> [ s32ton() was moved by c653ffc28340 ("HID: stop exporting hid_snto32()"). Minor context change fixed. ] Signed-off-by: Wenshan Lan <jetlan9(a)163.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c index 89aa7a0e51de..e789452181fe 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c @@ -1349,7 +1349,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_snto32); static u32 s32ton(__s32 value, unsigned n) { - s32 a = value >> (n - 1); + s32 a; + + if (!value || !n) + return 0; + + a = value >> (n - 1); if (a && a != -1) return value < 0 ? 1 << (n - 1) : (1 << (n - 1)) - 1; return value & ((1 << n) - 1); -- 2.43.0

5 days, 19 hours

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[PATCH 5.15.y] HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits

by jetlan9＠163.com

From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> [ Upstream commit a6b87bfc2ab5bccb7ad953693c85d9062aef3fdd ] Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit quantity to a 0-bit quantity. Ideally this should never occur, but there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size set to zero; we shouldn't reject the report or the device just because of that. Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-by: syzbot+b63d677d63bcac06cf90(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/68753a08.050a0220.33d347.0008.GAE@google.… Tested-by: syzbot+b63d677d63bcac06cf90(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: dde5845a529f ("[PATCH] Generic HID layer - code split") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/613a66cd-4309-4bce-a4f7-2905f9bce0c9@rowland.harva… Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss(a)kernel.org> [ s32ton() was moved by c653ffc28340 ("HID: stop exporting hid_snto32()"). Minor context change fixed. ] Signed-off-by: Wenshan Lan <jetlan9(a)163.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c index a6c2c55daebb..d49a8c458206 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c @@ -1349,7 +1349,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_snto32); static u32 s32ton(__s32 value, unsigned n) { - s32 a = value >> (n - 1); + s32 a; + + if (!value || !n) + return 0; + + a = value >> (n - 1); if (a && a != -1) return value < 0 ? 1 << (n - 1) : (1 << (n - 1)) - 1; return value & ((1 << n) - 1); -- 2.43.0

5 days, 19 hours

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[PATCH v3 1/2] hfs: ensure sb->s_fs_info is always cleaned up

by Mehdi Ben Hadj Khelifa

When hfs was converted to the new mount api a bug was introduced by changing the allocation pattern of sb->s_fs_info. If setup_bdev_super() fails after a new superblock has been allocated by sget_fc(), but before hfs_fill_super() takes ownership of the filesystem-specific s_fs_info data it was leaked. Fix this by freeing sb->s_fs_info in hfs_kill_super(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: ffcd06b6d13b ("hfs: convert hfs to use the new mount api") Reported-by: syzbot+ad45f827c88778ff7df6(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ad45f827c88778ff7df6 Tested-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mehdi Ben Hadj Khelifa <mehdi.benhadjkhelifa(a)gmail.com> --- fs/hfs/mdb.c | 35 ++++++++++++++--------------------- fs/hfs/super.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/hfs/mdb.c b/fs/hfs/mdb.c index 53f3fae60217..f28cd24dee84 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/mdb.c +++ b/fs/hfs/mdb.c @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ int hfs_mdb_get(struct super_block *sb) /* See if this is an HFS filesystem */ bh = sb_bread512(sb, part_start + HFS_MDB_BLK, mdb); if (!bh) - goto out; + return -EIO; if (mdb->drSigWord == cpu_to_be16(HFS_SUPER_MAGIC)) break; @@ -102,13 +102,14 @@ int hfs_mdb_get(struct super_block *sb) * (should do this only for cdrom/loop though) */ if (hfs_part_find(sb, &part_start, &part_size)) - goto out; + return -EIO; } HFS_SB(sb)->alloc_blksz = size = be32_to_cpu(mdb->drAlBlkSiz); if (!size || (size & (HFS_SECTOR_SIZE - 1))) { pr_err("bad allocation block size %d\n", size); - goto out_bh; + brelse(bh); + return -EIO; } size = min(HFS_SB(sb)->alloc_blksz, (u32)PAGE_SIZE); @@ -125,14 +126,16 @@ int hfs_mdb_get(struct super_block *sb) brelse(bh); if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, size)) { pr_err("unable to set blocksize to %u\n", size); - goto out; + return -EIO; } bh = sb_bread512(sb, part_start + HFS_MDB_BLK, mdb); if (!bh) - goto out; - if (mdb->drSigWord != cpu_to_be16(HFS_SUPER_MAGIC)) - goto out_bh; + return -EIO; + if (mdb->drSigWord != cpu_to_be16(HFS_SUPER_MAGIC)) { + brelse(bh); + return -EIO; + } HFS_SB(sb)->mdb_bh = bh; HFS_SB(sb)->mdb = mdb; @@ -174,7 +177,7 @@ int hfs_mdb_get(struct super_block *sb) HFS_SB(sb)->bitmap = kzalloc(8192, GFP_KERNEL); if (!HFS_SB(sb)->bitmap) - goto out; + return -EIO; /* read in the bitmap */ block = be16_to_cpu(mdb->drVBMSt) + part_start; @@ -185,7 +188,7 @@ int hfs_mdb_get(struct super_block *sb) bh = sb_bread(sb, off >> sb->s_blocksize_bits); if (!bh) { pr_err("unable to read volume bitmap\n"); - goto out; + return -EIO; } off2 = off & (sb->s_blocksize - 1); len = min((int)sb->s_blocksize - off2, size); @@ -199,12 +202,12 @@ int hfs_mdb_get(struct super_block *sb) HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_EXT_CNID, hfs_ext_keycmp); if (!HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree) { pr_err("unable to open extent tree\n"); - goto out; + return -EIO; } HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_CAT_CNID, hfs_cat_keycmp); if (!HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree) { pr_err("unable to open catalog tree\n"); - goto out; + return -EIO; } attrib = mdb->drAtrb; @@ -229,12 +232,6 @@ int hfs_mdb_get(struct super_block *sb) } return 0; - -out_bh: - brelse(bh); -out: - hfs_mdb_put(sb); - return -EIO; } /* @@ -359,8 +356,6 @@ void hfs_mdb_close(struct super_block *sb) * Release the resources associated with the in-core MDB. */ void hfs_mdb_put(struct super_block *sb) { - if (!HFS_SB(sb)) - return; /* free the B-trees */ hfs_btree_close(HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree); hfs_btree_close(HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree); @@ -373,6 +368,4 @@ void hfs_mdb_put(struct super_block *sb) unload_nls(HFS_SB(sb)->nls_disk); kfree(HFS_SB(sb)->bitmap); - kfree(HFS_SB(sb)); - sb->s_fs_info = NULL; } diff --git a/fs/hfs/super.c b/fs/hfs/super.c index 47f50fa555a4..df289cbdd4e8 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/super.c +++ b/fs/hfs/super.c @@ -431,10 +431,18 @@ static int hfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) return 0; } +static void hfs_kill_super(struct super_block *sb) +{ + struct hfs_sb_info *hsb = HFS_SB(sb); + + kill_block_super(sb); + kfree(hsb); +} + static struct file_system_type hfs_fs_type = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = "hfs", - .kill_sb = kill_block_super, + .kill_sb = hfs_kill_super, .fs_flags = FS_REQUIRES_DEV, .init_fs_context = hfs_init_fs_context, }; -- 2.52.0

5 days, 20 hours

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Loan and Investment offer/ Account Reprofilling

by Gerald Johnson

5 days, 20 hours

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[PATCH] soc: mediatek: SVS: Fix a reference leak bug in svs_add_device_link()

by Haoxiang Li

svs_get_subsys_device() increases the reference count of the returned device, if error happens, put_device() is required to drop the device reference. Fixes: 681a02e95000 ("soc: mediatek: SVS: introduce MTK SVS engine") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com> --- drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-svs.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-svs.c b/drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-svs.c index f45537546553..c8f15bb139c6 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-svs.c +++ b/drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-svs.c @@ -2155,12 +2155,15 @@ static struct device *svs_add_device_link(struct svs_platform *svsp, sup_link = device_link_add(svsp->dev, dev, DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER); if (!sup_link) { + put_device(dev); dev_err(svsp->dev, "sup_link is NULL\n"); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } - if (sup_link->supplier->links.status != DL_DEV_DRIVER_BOUND) + if (sup_link->supplier->links.status != DL_DEV_DRIVER_BOUND) { + put_device(dev); return ERR_PTR(-EPROBE_DEFER); + } return dev; } -- 2.25.1

5 days, 21 hours

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