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[PATCH] ALSA: wavefront: Fix integer overflow in sample size validation

by moonafterrain＠outlook.com

From: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> The wavefront_send_sample() function has an integer overflow issue when validating sample size. The header->size field is u32 but gets cast to int for comparison with dev->freemem Fix by using unsigned comparison to avoid integer overflow. Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> --- sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c b/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c index cd5c177943aa..4a8c507eae71 100644 --- a/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c +++ b/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c @@ -950,9 +950,9 @@ wavefront_send_sample (snd_wavefront_t *dev, if (header->size) { dev->freemem = wavefront_freemem (dev); - if (dev->freemem < (int)header->size) { + if ((unsigned int)dev->freemem < header->size) { dev_err(dev->card->dev, - "insufficient memory to load %d byte sample.\n", + "insufficient memory to load %u byte sample.\n", header->size); return -ENOMEM; } -- 2.51.1.dirty

1 week, 1 day

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[PATCH v2] ALSA: wavefront: use scnprintf for longname construction

by moonafterrain＠outlook.com

From: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> Replace sprintf() calls with scnprintf() and a new scnprintf_append() helper function when constructing card->longname. This improves code readability and provides bounds checking for the 80-byte buffer. While the current parameter ranges don't cause overflow in practice, using safer string functions follows kernel best practices and makes the code more maintainable. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> --- Changes in v2: - Replace sprintf() calls with scnprintf() and a new scnprintf_append() - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ME2PR01MB3156CEC4F31F253C9B540FB7AFFDA@ME2PR01M… --- sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront.c b/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront.c index 07c68568091d..047dd54f77d4 100644 --- a/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront.c +++ b/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront.c @@ -333,6 +333,19 @@ static int snd_wavefront_card_new(struct device *pdev, int dev, return 0; } +__printf(3, 4) static int scnprintf_append(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + size_t len = strlen(buf); + + if (len >= size) + return len; + va_start(args, fmt); + len = vscnprintf(buf + len, size - len, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + return len; +} + static int snd_wavefront_probe (struct snd_card *card, int dev) { @@ -492,26 +505,27 @@ snd_wavefront_probe (struct snd_card *card, int dev) length restrictions */ - sprintf(card->longname, "%s PCM 0x%lx irq %d dma %d", - card->driver, - chip->port, - cs4232_pcm_irq[dev], - dma1[dev]); + scnprintf(card->longname, sizeof(card->longname), + "%s PCM 0x%lx irq %d dma %d", + card->driver, + chip->port, + cs4232_pcm_irq[dev], + dma1[dev]); if (dma2[dev] >= 0 && dma2[dev] < 8) - sprintf(card->longname + strlen(card->longname), "&%d", dma2[dev]); - - if (cs4232_mpu_port[dev] > 0 && cs4232_mpu_port[dev] != SNDRV_AUTO_PORT) { - sprintf (card->longname + strlen (card->longname), - " MPU-401 0x%lx irq %d", - cs4232_mpu_port[dev], - cs4232_mpu_irq[dev]); - } - - sprintf (card->longname + strlen (card->longname), - " SYNTH 0x%lx irq %d", - ics2115_port[dev], - ics2115_irq[dev]); + scnprintf_append(card->longname, sizeof(card->longname), + "&%d", dma2[dev]); + + if (cs4232_mpu_port[dev] > 0 && cs4232_mpu_port[dev] != SNDRV_AUTO_PORT) + scnprintf_append(card->longname, sizeof(card->longname), + " MPU-401 0x%lx irq %d", + cs4232_mpu_port[dev], + cs4232_mpu_irq[dev]); + + scnprintf_append(card->longname, sizeof(card->longname), + " SYNTH 0x%lx irq %d", + ics2115_port[dev], + ics2115_irq[dev]); return snd_card_register(card); } -- 2.51.1.dirty

1 week, 1 day

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[PATCH] amba: tegra-ahb: fix device leak on smmu enable

by Johan Hovold

Make sure to drop the reference taken to the ahb platform device when looking up its driver data while enabling the smmu. Note that holding a reference to a device does not prevent its driver data from going away. Fixes: 89c788bab1f0 ("ARM: tegra: Add SMMU enabler in AHB") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 3.5 Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/amba/tegra-ahb.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/amba/tegra-ahb.c b/drivers/amba/tegra-ahb.c index c0e8b765522d..f23c3ed01810 100644 --- a/drivers/amba/tegra-ahb.c +++ b/drivers/amba/tegra-ahb.c @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ int tegra_ahb_enable_smmu(struct device_node *dn) if (!dev) return -EPROBE_DEFER; ahb = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + put_device(dev); val = gizmo_readl(ahb, AHB_ARBITRATION_XBAR_CTRL); val |= AHB_ARBITRATION_XBAR_CTRL_SMMU_INIT_DONE; gizmo_writel(ahb, val, AHB_ARBITRATION_XBAR_CTRL); -- 2.49.1

1 week, 1 day

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[PATCH] e1000: fix OOB in e1000_tbi_should_accept()

by Guangshuo Li

In e1000_tbi_should_accept() we read the last byte of the frame via 'data[length - 1]' to evaluate the TBI workaround. If the descriptor- reported length is zero or larger than the actual RX buffer size, this read goes out of bounds and can hit unrelated slab objects. The issue is observed from the NAPI receive path (e1000_clean_rx_irq): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888014114e54 by task sshd/363 CPU: 0 PID: 363 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x74 print_address_description+0x7b/0x440 print_report+0x101/0x200 kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0 e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790 e1000_clean_rx_irq+0xa8c/0x1110 e1000_clean+0xde2/0x3c10 __napi_poll+0x98/0x380 net_rx_action+0x491/0xa20 __do_softirq+0x2c9/0x61d do_softirq+0xd1/0x120 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xfe/0x130 ip_finish_output2+0x7d5/0xb00 __ip_queue_xmit+0xe24/0x1ab0 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1bcb/0x3340 tcp_write_xmit+0x175d/0x6bd0 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x7b/0x280 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e4f/0x32d0 tcp_sendmsg+0x24/0x40 sock_write_iter+0x322/0x430 vfs_write+0x56c/0xa60 ksys_write+0xd1/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f511b476b10 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 88 d3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d f9 2b 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 8e 9b 01 00 48 89 04 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffc9211d4e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000004024 RCX: 00007f511b476b10 RDX: 0000000000004024 RSI: 0000559a9385962c RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000559a9383a400 R08: fffffffffffffff0 R09: 0000000000004f00 R10: 0000000000000070 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc9211d57f R14: 0000559a9347bde7 R15: 0000000000000003 </TASK> Allocated by task 1: __kasan_krealloc+0x131/0x1c0 krealloc+0x90/0xc0 add_sysfs_param+0xcb/0x8a0 kernel_add_sysfs_param+0x81/0xd4 param_sysfs_builtin+0x138/0x1a6 param_sysfs_init+0x57/0x5b do_one_initcall+0x104/0x250 do_initcall_level+0x102/0x132 do_initcalls+0x46/0x74 kernel_init_freeable+0x28f/0x393 kernel_init+0x14/0x1a0 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888014114000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 1620 bytes to the right of 2048-byte region [ffff888014114000, ffff888014114800] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0000504400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14110 head:ffffea0000504400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1) raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888013442000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected ================================================================== This happens because the TBI check unconditionally dereferences the last byte without validating the reported length first: u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1); Fix by rejecting the frame early if the length is zero, or if it exceeds adapter->rx_buffer_len. This preserves the TBI workaround semantics for valid frames and prevents touching memory beyond the RX buffer. Fixes: 2037110c96d5 ("e1000: move tbi workaround code into helper function") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c index 3f5feb55cfba..2d2ed5e2c3c8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c @@ -4090,6 +4090,12 @@ static bool e1000_tbi_should_accept(struct e1000_adapter *adapter, u8 status, u8 errors, u32 length, const u8 *data) { + /* Guard against OOB on data[length - 1] */ + if (unlikely(!length)) + return false; + /* Upper bound: length must not exceed rx_buffer_len */ + if (unlikely(length > adapter->rx_buffer_len)) + return false; struct e1000_hw *hw = &adapter->hw; u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1); -- 2.43.0

1 week, 1 day

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[PATCH net V2] virtio_net: fix alignment for virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash

by Jason Wang

From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst(a)redhat.com> Changing alignment of header would mean it's no longer safe to cast a 2 byte aligned pointer between formats. Use two 16 bit fields to make it 2 byte aligned as previously. This fixes the performance regression since commit ("virtio_net: enable gso over UDP tunnel support.") as it uses virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel which embeds virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash. Pktgen in guest + XDP_DROP on TAP + vhost_net shows the TX PPS is recovered from 2.4Mpps to 4.45Mpps. Fixes: 56a06bd40fab ("virtio_net: enable gso over UDP tunnel support.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> --- Changes since V1: - Fix build issues of virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- include/linux/virtio_net.h | 3 ++- include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index 8e8a179aaa49..e6e650bc3bc3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -2539,6 +2539,13 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable(struct net_device *dev, return NULL; } +static inline u32 +virtio_net_hash_value(const struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash *hdr_hash) +{ + return __le16_to_cpu(hdr_hash->hash_value_lo) | + (__le16_to_cpu(hdr_hash->hash_value_hi) << 16); +} + static void virtio_skb_set_hash(const struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash *hdr_hash, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -2565,7 +2572,7 @@ static void virtio_skb_set_hash(const struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash *hdr_hash, default: rss_hash_type = PKT_HASH_TYPE_NONE; } - skb_set_hash(skb, __le32_to_cpu(hdr_hash->hash_value), rss_hash_type); + skb_set_hash(skb, virtio_net_hash_value(hdr_hash), rss_hash_type); } static void virtnet_receive_done(struct virtnet_info *vi, struct receive_queue *rq, @@ -3311,6 +3318,10 @@ static int xmit_skb(struct send_queue *sq, struct sk_buff *skb, bool orphan) pr_debug("%s: xmit %p %pM\n", vi->dev->name, skb, dest); + /* Make sure it's safe to cast between formats */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(*hdr) != __alignof__(hdr->hash_hdr)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(*hdr) != __alignof__(hdr->hash_hdr.hdr)); + can_push = vi->any_header_sg && !((unsigned long)skb->data & (__alignof__(*hdr) - 1)) && !skb_header_cloned(skb) && skb_headroom(skb) >= hdr_len; @@ -6750,7 +6761,7 @@ static int virtnet_xdp_rx_hash(const struct xdp_md *_ctx, u32 *hash, hash_report = VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_NONE; *rss_type = virtnet_xdp_rss_type[hash_report]; - *hash = __le32_to_cpu(hdr_hash->hash_value); + *hash = virtio_net_hash_value(hdr_hash); return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h index 4d1780848d0e..b673c31569f3 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb(const struct sk_buff *skb, if (!tnl_hdr_negotiated) return -EINVAL; - vhdr->hash_hdr.hash_value = 0; + vhdr->hash_hdr.hash_value_lo = 0; + vhdr->hash_hdr.hash_value_hi = 0; vhdr->hash_hdr.hash_report = 0; vhdr->hash_hdr.padding = 0; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h index 8bf27ab8bcb4..1db45b01532b 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -193,7 +193,8 @@ struct virtio_net_hdr_v1 { struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash { struct virtio_net_hdr_v1 hdr; - __le32 hash_value; + __le16 hash_value_lo; + __le16 hash_value_hi; #define VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_NONE 0 #define VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_IPv4 1 #define VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_TCPv4 2 -- 2.31.1

1 week, 1 day

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Ready to Grow? We Can Help.

by sales＠d5-cloud.ink

Hello, If you’re considering expanding your business, we are here to help with straightforward funding options. Reach out to discover what’s possible for your business. Sincerely, Ebrahim Bin Mohamed. Business Development Director.

1 week, 1 day

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[PATCH 6.12.y] usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix epfile null pointer access after ep enable.

by guhuinan

From: Owen Gu <guhuinan(a)xiaomi.com> [ Upstream commit cfd6f1a7b42f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix epfile null pointer access after ep enable.") ] A race condition occurs when ffs_func_eps_enable() runs concurrently with ffs_data_reset(). The ffs_data_clear() called in ffs_data_reset() sets ffs->epfiles to NULL before resetting ffs->eps_count to 0, leading to a NULL pointer dereference when accessing epfile->ep in ffs_func_eps_enable() after successful usb_ep_enable(). The ffs->epfiles pointer is set to NULL in both ffs_data_clear() and ffs_data_close() functions, and its modification is protected by the spinlock ffs->eps_lock. And the whole ffs_func_eps_enable() function is also protected by ffs->eps_lock. Thus, add NULL pointer handling for ffs->epfiles in the ffs_func_eps_enable() function to fix issues Signed-off-by: Owen Gu <guhuinan(a)xiaomi.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250915092907.17802-1-guhuinan@xiaomi.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c index 08a251df20c4..04058261cdd0 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c @@ -2407,7 +2407,12 @@ static int ffs_func_eps_enable(struct ffs_function *func) ep = func->eps; epfile = ffs->epfiles; count = ffs->eps_count; - while(count--) { + if (!epfile) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto done; + } + + while (count--) { ep->ep->driver_data = ep; ret = config_ep_by_speed(func->gadget, &func->function, ep->ep); @@ -2431,6 +2436,7 @@ static int ffs_func_eps_enable(struct ffs_function *func) } wake_up_interruptible(&ffs->wait); +done: spin_unlock_irqrestore(&func->ffs->eps_lock, flags); return ret; -- 2.43.0

1 week, 1 day

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[PATCH v4 1/5] vfat: fix missing sb_min_blocksize() return value checks

by Yongpeng Yang

From: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng(a)xiaomi.com> When emulating an nvme device on qemu with both logical_block_size and physical_block_size set to 8 KiB, but without format, a kernel panic was triggered during the early boot stage while attempting to mount a vfat filesystem. [95553.682035] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.684326] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.686501] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.696448] ISOFS: unsupported/invalid hardware sector size 8192 [95553.697117] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [95553.697567] kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:1582! [95553.697984] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [95553.698602] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7212 Comm: mount Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2+ #38 PREEMPT(voluntary) [95553.699511] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [95553.700534] RIP: 0010:folio_alloc_buffers+0x1bb/0x1c0 [95553.701018] Code: 48 8b 15 e8 93 18 02 65 48 89 35 e0 93 18 02 48 83 c4 10 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 90 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f [95553.702648] RSP: 0018:ffffd1b0c676f990 EFLAGS: 00010246 [95553.703132] RAX: ffff8cfc4176d820 RBX: 0000000000508c48 RCX: 0000000000000001 [95553.703805] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [95553.704481] RBP: ffffd1b0c676f9c8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [95553.705148] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [95553.705816] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: fffff8bc8257e800 R15: 0000000000000000 [95553.706483] FS: 000072ee77315840(0000) GS:ffff8cfdd2c8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [95553.707248] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [95553.707782] CR2: 00007d8f2a9e5a20 CR3: 0000000039d0c006 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [95553.708439] PKRU: 55555554 [95553.708734] Call Trace: [95553.709015] <TASK> [95553.709266] __getblk_slow+0xd2/0x230 [95553.709641] ? find_get_block_common+0x8b/0x530 [95553.710084] bdev_getblk+0x77/0xa0 [95553.710449] __bread_gfp+0x22/0x140 [95553.710810] fat_fill_super+0x23a/0xfc0 [95553.711216] ? __pfx_setup+0x10/0x10 [95553.711580] ? __pfx_vfat_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [95553.712014] vfat_fill_super+0x15/0x30 [95553.712401] get_tree_bdev_flags+0x141/0x1e0 [95553.712817] get_tree_bdev+0x10/0x20 [95553.713177] vfat_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [95553.713550] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100 [95553.713910] vfs_cmd_create+0x62/0xf0 [95553.714273] __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4e7/0x660 [95553.714669] __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.715062] x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.715453] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x670 [95553.715816] ? __fs_parse+0x65/0x1e0 [95553.716172] ? fat_parse_param+0x103/0x4b0 [95553.716587] ? vfs_parse_fs_param_source+0x21/0xa0 [95553.717034] ? __do_sys_fsconfig+0x3d9/0x660 [95553.717548] ? __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.717957] ? x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.718360] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.718734] ? __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.719141] ? x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.719545] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.719922] ? x64_sys_call+0x1405/0x26a0 [95553.720317] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.720702] ? __x64_sys_close+0x3e/0x90 [95553.721080] ? x64_sys_call+0x1b5e/0x26a0 [95553.721478] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.721841] ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 [95553.722211] ? exc_page_fault+0x90/0x1b0 [95553.722681] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [95553.723166] RIP: 0033:0x72ee774f3afe [95553.723562] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 0a 33 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 af 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d da 32 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [95553.725188] RSP: 002b:00007ffe97148978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001af [95553.725892] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005dcfe53d0080 RCX: 000072ee774f3afe [95553.726526] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000003 [95553.727176] RBP: 00007ffe97148ac0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000072ee775e7ac0 [95553.727818] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [95553.728459] R13: 00005dcfe53d04b0 R14: 000072ee77670b00 R15: 00005dcfe53d1a28 [95553.729086] </TASK> The panic occurs as follows: 1. logical_block_size is 8KiB, causing {struct super_block *sb}->s_blocksize is initialized to 0. vfat_fill_super - fat_fill_super - sb_min_blocksize - sb_set_blocksize //return 0 when size is 8KiB. 2. __bread_gfp is called with size == 0, causing folio_alloc_buffers() to compute an offset equal to folio_size(folio), which triggers a BUG_ON. fat_fill_super - sb_bread - __bread_gfp // size == {struct super_block *sb}->s_blocksize == 0 - bdev_getblk - __getblk_slow - grow_buffers - grow_dev_folio - folio_alloc_buffers // size == 0 - folio_set_bh //offset == folio_size(folio) and panic To fix this issue, add proper return value checks for sb_min_blocksize(). Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.15 Fixes: a64e5a596067bd ("bdev: add back PAGE_SIZE block size validation for sb_set_blocksize()") Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng(a)xiaomi.com> --- v4: - split the changes into 5 patches v3: - remove the unnecessary blocksize variable definition v2: - add the __must_check mark to sb_min_blocksize() and include the Fixes tag --- fs/fat/inode.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fat/inode.c b/fs/fat/inode.c index 9648ed097816..9cfe20a3daaf 100644 --- a/fs/fat/inode.c +++ b/fs/fat/inode.c @@ -1595,8 +1595,12 @@ int fat_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc, setup(sb); /* flavour-specific stuff that needs options */ + error = -EINVAL; + if (!sb_min_blocksize(sb, 512)) { + fat_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize"); + goto out_fail; + } error = -EIO; - sb_min_blocksize(sb, 512); bh = sb_bread(sb, 0); if (bh == NULL) { fat_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read boot sector"); -- 2.43.0

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[to-be-updated] kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch This patch was dropped because an updated version will be issued ------------------------------------------------------ From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2025 14:49:48 +0000 A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in the following points: 1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk. 2. Chunk's base address has a tag. 3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits the tag of the first chunk. 4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the first chunk. 5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to match that of the first chunk. Unpoison all vm_structs after allocating them for the percpu allocator. Use the same tag to resolve the pcpu chunk address mismatch. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cf8fe0ffcdbf54e06d9df26c8473b123c4065f02.17622670… Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS") Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/kasan/common.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag +++ a/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -584,12 +584,20 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr return true; } +/* + * A tag mismatch happens when calculating per-cpu chunk addresses, because + * they all inherit the tag from vms[0]->addr, even when nr_vms is bigger + * than 1. This is a problem because all the vms[]->addr come from separate + * allocations and have different tags so while the calculated address is + * correct the tag isn't. + */ void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) { int area; for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) { kasan_poison(vms[area]->addr, vms[area]->size, - arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[area]->addr), false); + arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[0]->addr), false); + arch_kasan_set_tag(vms[area]->addr, arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[0]->addr)); } } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are

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[to-be-updated] kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: kasan: unpoison pcpu chunks with base address tag has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch This patch was dropped because an updated version will be issued ------------------------------------------------------ From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Subject: kasan: unpoison pcpu chunks with base address tag Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2025 14:49:08 +0000 Patch series "kasan: vmalloc: Fix incorrect tag assignment with multiple vm_structs". A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly resulting in a kernel panic, can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. Initially it was only noticed on x86 [1] but later a similar issue was also reported on arm64 [2]. Specifically the problem is related to how vm_structs interact with pcpu_chunks - both when they are allocated, assigned and when pcpu_chunk addresses are derived. When vm_structs are allocated they are tagged if vmalloc support is enabled along the KASAN mode. Later when first pcpu chunk is allocated it gets its 'base_addr' field set to the first allocated vm_struct. With that it inherits that vm_struct's tag. When pcpu_chunk addresses are later derived (by pcpu_chunk_addr(), for example in pcpu_alloc_noprof()) the base_addr field is used and offsets are added to it. If the initial conditions are satisfied then some of the offsets will point into memory allocated with a different vm_struct. So while the lower bits will get accurately derived the tag bits in the top of the pointer won't match the shadow memory contents. The solution (proposed at v2 of the x86 KASAN series [3]) is to tag the vm_structs the same when allocating them for the per cpu allocator (in pcpu_get_vm_areas()). Originally these patches were part of the x86 KASAN series [4]. This patch (of 2): A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in the following points: 1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk. 2. Chunk's base address has a tag. 3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits the tag of the first chunk. 4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the first chunk. 5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to match that of the first chunk. Refactor code by moving it into a helper in preparation for the actual fix. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/821677dd824d003cc5b7a77891db4723e23518ea.17622670… Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e7e04692866d02e6d3b32bb43b998e5d17092ba4.173868… [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aMUrW1Znp1GEj7St@MiWiFi-R3L-srv/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAPAsAGxDRv_uFeMYu9TwhBVWHCCtkSxoWY4xmFB_vowMbi… [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1761763681.git.m.wieczorretman@pm.me/ [4] Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS") Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++++++ mm/kasan/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/kasan.h~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -614,6 +614,13 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison __kasan_poison_vmalloc(start, size); } +void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms); +static __always_inline void kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ + if (kasan_enabled()) + __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms); +} + #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, @@ -638,6 +645,9 @@ static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmall static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size) { } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ } + #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ #if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \ --- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" @@ -582,3 +583,13 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr } return true; } + +void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ + int area; + + for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) { + kasan_poison(vms[area]->addr, vms[area]->size, + arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[area]->addr), false); + } +} --- a/mm/vmalloc.c~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -4870,9 +4870,7 @@ retry: * With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for * non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(). */ - for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++) - vms[area]->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(vms[area]->addr, - vms[area]->size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL); + kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms); kfree(vas); return vms; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch

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