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by sales＠d5-cloud.ink

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1 week, 2 days

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[PATCH 6.12.y] usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix epfile null pointer access after ep enable.

by guhuinan

From: Owen Gu <guhuinan(a)xiaomi.com> [ Upstream commit cfd6f1a7b42f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix epfile null pointer access after ep enable.") ] A race condition occurs when ffs_func_eps_enable() runs concurrently with ffs_data_reset(). The ffs_data_clear() called in ffs_data_reset() sets ffs->epfiles to NULL before resetting ffs->eps_count to 0, leading to a NULL pointer dereference when accessing epfile->ep in ffs_func_eps_enable() after successful usb_ep_enable(). The ffs->epfiles pointer is set to NULL in both ffs_data_clear() and ffs_data_close() functions, and its modification is protected by the spinlock ffs->eps_lock. And the whole ffs_func_eps_enable() function is also protected by ffs->eps_lock. Thus, add NULL pointer handling for ffs->epfiles in the ffs_func_eps_enable() function to fix issues Signed-off-by: Owen Gu <guhuinan(a)xiaomi.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250915092907.17802-1-guhuinan@xiaomi.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c index 08a251df20c4..04058261cdd0 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c @@ -2407,7 +2407,12 @@ static int ffs_func_eps_enable(struct ffs_function *func) ep = func->eps; epfile = ffs->epfiles; count = ffs->eps_count; - while(count--) { + if (!epfile) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto done; + } + + while (count--) { ep->ep->driver_data = ep; ret = config_ep_by_speed(func->gadget, &func->function, ep->ep); @@ -2431,6 +2436,7 @@ static int ffs_func_eps_enable(struct ffs_function *func) } wake_up_interruptible(&ffs->wait); +done: spin_unlock_irqrestore(&func->ffs->eps_lock, flags); return ret; -- 2.43.0

1 week, 2 days

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[PATCH v4 1/5] vfat: fix missing sb_min_blocksize() return value checks

by Yongpeng Yang

From: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng(a)xiaomi.com> When emulating an nvme device on qemu with both logical_block_size and physical_block_size set to 8 KiB, but without format, a kernel panic was triggered during the early boot stage while attempting to mount a vfat filesystem. [95553.682035] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.684326] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.686501] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.696448] ISOFS: unsupported/invalid hardware sector size 8192 [95553.697117] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [95553.697567] kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:1582! [95553.697984] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [95553.698602] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7212 Comm: mount Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2+ #38 PREEMPT(voluntary) [95553.699511] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [95553.700534] RIP: 0010:folio_alloc_buffers+0x1bb/0x1c0 [95553.701018] Code: 48 8b 15 e8 93 18 02 65 48 89 35 e0 93 18 02 48 83 c4 10 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 90 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f [95553.702648] RSP: 0018:ffffd1b0c676f990 EFLAGS: 00010246 [95553.703132] RAX: ffff8cfc4176d820 RBX: 0000000000508c48 RCX: 0000000000000001 [95553.703805] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [95553.704481] RBP: ffffd1b0c676f9c8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [95553.705148] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [95553.705816] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: fffff8bc8257e800 R15: 0000000000000000 [95553.706483] FS: 000072ee77315840(0000) GS:ffff8cfdd2c8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [95553.707248] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [95553.707782] CR2: 00007d8f2a9e5a20 CR3: 0000000039d0c006 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [95553.708439] PKRU: 55555554 [95553.708734] Call Trace: [95553.709015] <TASK> [95553.709266] __getblk_slow+0xd2/0x230 [95553.709641] ? find_get_block_common+0x8b/0x530 [95553.710084] bdev_getblk+0x77/0xa0 [95553.710449] __bread_gfp+0x22/0x140 [95553.710810] fat_fill_super+0x23a/0xfc0 [95553.711216] ? __pfx_setup+0x10/0x10 [95553.711580] ? __pfx_vfat_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [95553.712014] vfat_fill_super+0x15/0x30 [95553.712401] get_tree_bdev_flags+0x141/0x1e0 [95553.712817] get_tree_bdev+0x10/0x20 [95553.713177] vfat_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [95553.713550] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100 [95553.713910] vfs_cmd_create+0x62/0xf0 [95553.714273] __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4e7/0x660 [95553.714669] __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.715062] x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.715453] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x670 [95553.715816] ? __fs_parse+0x65/0x1e0 [95553.716172] ? fat_parse_param+0x103/0x4b0 [95553.716587] ? vfs_parse_fs_param_source+0x21/0xa0 [95553.717034] ? __do_sys_fsconfig+0x3d9/0x660 [95553.717548] ? __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.717957] ? x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.718360] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.718734] ? __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.719141] ? x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.719545] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.719922] ? x64_sys_call+0x1405/0x26a0 [95553.720317] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.720702] ? __x64_sys_close+0x3e/0x90 [95553.721080] ? x64_sys_call+0x1b5e/0x26a0 [95553.721478] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.721841] ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 [95553.722211] ? exc_page_fault+0x90/0x1b0 [95553.722681] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [95553.723166] RIP: 0033:0x72ee774f3afe [95553.723562] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 0a 33 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 af 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d da 32 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [95553.725188] RSP: 002b:00007ffe97148978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001af [95553.725892] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005dcfe53d0080 RCX: 000072ee774f3afe [95553.726526] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000003 [95553.727176] RBP: 00007ffe97148ac0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000072ee775e7ac0 [95553.727818] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [95553.728459] R13: 00005dcfe53d04b0 R14: 000072ee77670b00 R15: 00005dcfe53d1a28 [95553.729086] </TASK> The panic occurs as follows: 1. logical_block_size is 8KiB, causing {struct super_block *sb}->s_blocksize is initialized to 0. vfat_fill_super - fat_fill_super - sb_min_blocksize - sb_set_blocksize //return 0 when size is 8KiB. 2. __bread_gfp is called with size == 0, causing folio_alloc_buffers() to compute an offset equal to folio_size(folio), which triggers a BUG_ON. fat_fill_super - sb_bread - __bread_gfp // size == {struct super_block *sb}->s_blocksize == 0 - bdev_getblk - __getblk_slow - grow_buffers - grow_dev_folio - folio_alloc_buffers // size == 0 - folio_set_bh //offset == folio_size(folio) and panic To fix this issue, add proper return value checks for sb_min_blocksize(). Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.15 Fixes: a64e5a596067bd ("bdev: add back PAGE_SIZE block size validation for sb_set_blocksize()") Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng(a)xiaomi.com> --- v4: - split the changes into 5 patches v3: - remove the unnecessary blocksize variable definition v2: - add the __must_check mark to sb_min_blocksize() and include the Fixes tag --- fs/fat/inode.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fat/inode.c b/fs/fat/inode.c index 9648ed097816..9cfe20a3daaf 100644 --- a/fs/fat/inode.c +++ b/fs/fat/inode.c @@ -1595,8 +1595,12 @@ int fat_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc, setup(sb); /* flavour-specific stuff that needs options */ + error = -EINVAL; + if (!sb_min_blocksize(sb, 512)) { + fat_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize"); + goto out_fail; + } error = -EIO; - sb_min_blocksize(sb, 512); bh = sb_bread(sb, 0); if (bh == NULL) { fat_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read boot sector"); -- 2.43.0

1 week, 2 days

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[to-be-updated] kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch This patch was dropped because an updated version will be issued ------------------------------------------------------ From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2025 14:49:48 +0000 A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in the following points: 1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk. 2. Chunk's base address has a tag. 3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits the tag of the first chunk. 4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the first chunk. 5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to match that of the first chunk. Unpoison all vm_structs after allocating them for the percpu allocator. Use the same tag to resolve the pcpu chunk address mismatch. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cf8fe0ffcdbf54e06d9df26c8473b123c4065f02.17622670… Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS") Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/kasan/common.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag +++ a/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -584,12 +584,20 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr return true; } +/* + * A tag mismatch happens when calculating per-cpu chunk addresses, because + * they all inherit the tag from vms[0]->addr, even when nr_vms is bigger + * than 1. This is a problem because all the vms[]->addr come from separate + * allocations and have different tags so while the calculated address is + * correct the tag isn't. + */ void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) { int area; for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) { kasan_poison(vms[area]->addr, vms[area]->size, - arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[area]->addr), false); + arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[0]->addr), false); + arch_kasan_set_tag(vms[area]->addr, arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[0]->addr)); } } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are

1 week, 2 days

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[to-be-updated] kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: kasan: unpoison pcpu chunks with base address tag has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch This patch was dropped because an updated version will be issued ------------------------------------------------------ From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Subject: kasan: unpoison pcpu chunks with base address tag Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2025 14:49:08 +0000 Patch series "kasan: vmalloc: Fix incorrect tag assignment with multiple vm_structs". A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly resulting in a kernel panic, can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. Initially it was only noticed on x86 [1] but later a similar issue was also reported on arm64 [2]. Specifically the problem is related to how vm_structs interact with pcpu_chunks - both when they are allocated, assigned and when pcpu_chunk addresses are derived. When vm_structs are allocated they are tagged if vmalloc support is enabled along the KASAN mode. Later when first pcpu chunk is allocated it gets its 'base_addr' field set to the first allocated vm_struct. With that it inherits that vm_struct's tag. When pcpu_chunk addresses are later derived (by pcpu_chunk_addr(), for example in pcpu_alloc_noprof()) the base_addr field is used and offsets are added to it. If the initial conditions are satisfied then some of the offsets will point into memory allocated with a different vm_struct. So while the lower bits will get accurately derived the tag bits in the top of the pointer won't match the shadow memory contents. The solution (proposed at v2 of the x86 KASAN series [3]) is to tag the vm_structs the same when allocating them for the per cpu allocator (in pcpu_get_vm_areas()). Originally these patches were part of the x86 KASAN series [4]. This patch (of 2): A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in the following points: 1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk. 2. Chunk's base address has a tag. 3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits the tag of the first chunk. 4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the first chunk. 5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to match that of the first chunk. Refactor code by moving it into a helper in preparation for the actual fix. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/821677dd824d003cc5b7a77891db4723e23518ea.17622670… Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e7e04692866d02e6d3b32bb43b998e5d17092ba4.173868… [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aMUrW1Znp1GEj7St@MiWiFi-R3L-srv/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAPAsAGxDRv_uFeMYu9TwhBVWHCCtkSxoWY4xmFB_vowMbi… [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1761763681.git.m.wieczorretman@pm.me/ [4] Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS") Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++++++ mm/kasan/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/kasan.h~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -614,6 +614,13 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison __kasan_poison_vmalloc(start, size); } +void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms); +static __always_inline void kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ + if (kasan_enabled()) + __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms); +} + #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, @@ -638,6 +645,9 @@ static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmall static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size) { } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ } + #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ #if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \ --- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" @@ -582,3 +583,13 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr } return true; } + +void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ + int area; + + for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) { + kasan_poison(vms[area]->addr, vms[area]->size, + arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[area]->addr), false); + } +} --- a/mm/vmalloc.c~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -4870,9 +4870,7 @@ retry: * With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for * non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(). */ - for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++) - vms[area]->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(vms[area]->addr, - vms[area]->size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL); + kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms); kfree(vas); return vms; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch

1 week, 2 days

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[PATCH v3] fscrypt: fix left shift underflow when inode->i_blkbits > PAGE_SHIFT

by Eric Biggers

From: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng(a)xiaomi.com> When simulating an nvme device on qemu with both logical_block_size and physical_block_size set to 8 KiB, an error trace appears during partition table reading at boot time. The issue is caused by inode->i_blkbits being larger than PAGE_SHIFT, which leads to a left shift of -1 and triggering a UBSAN warning. [ 2.697306] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2.697309] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c:336:37 [ 2.697311] shift exponent -1 is negative [ 2.697315] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 274 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2+ #34 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 2.697317] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 2.697320] Call Trace: [ 2.697324] <TASK> [ 2.697325] dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 [ 2.697340] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 2.697342] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e3/0x390 [ 2.697351] bh_get_inode_and_lblk_num.cold+0x12/0x94 [ 2.697359] fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx_bh+0x44/0x90 [ 2.697365] submit_bh_wbc+0xb6/0x190 [ 2.697370] block_read_full_folio+0x194/0x270 [ 2.697371] ? __pfx_blkdev_get_block+0x10/0x10 [ 2.697375] ? __pfx_blkdev_read_folio+0x10/0x10 [ 2.697377] blkdev_read_folio+0x18/0x30 [ 2.697379] filemap_read_folio+0x40/0xe0 [ 2.697382] filemap_get_pages+0x5ef/0x7a0 [ 2.697385] ? mmap_region+0x63/0xd0 [ 2.697389] filemap_read+0x11d/0x520 [ 2.697392] blkdev_read_iter+0x7c/0x180 [ 2.697393] vfs_read+0x261/0x390 [ 2.697397] ksys_read+0x71/0xf0 [ 2.697398] __x64_sys_read+0x19/0x30 [ 2.697399] x64_sys_call+0x1e88/0x26a0 [ 2.697405] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x670 [ 2.697410] ? __x64_sys_newfstat+0x15/0x20 [ 2.697414] ? x64_sys_call+0x204a/0x26a0 [ 2.697415] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [ 2.697417] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x2e/0x2a0 [ 2.697420] ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 [ 2.697421] ? exc_page_fault+0x90/0x1b0 [ 2.697422] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 2.697425] RIP: 0033:0x75054cba4a06 [ 2.697426] Code: 5d e8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 75 19 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 11 e8 26 ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <48> 8b 5d f8 c9 c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 08 [ 2.697427] RSP: 002b:00007fff973723a0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 2.697430] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005ea9a2c02760 RCX: 000075054cba4a06 [ 2.697432] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 000075054c190000 RDI: 000000000000001b [ 2.697433] RBP: 00007fff973723c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.697434] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 2.697434] R13: 00005ea9a2c027c0 R14: 00005ea9a2be5608 R15: 00005ea9a2be55f0 [ 2.697436] </TASK> [ 2.697436] ---[ end trace ]--- This situation can happen for block devices because when CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE is enabled, the maximum logical_block_size is 64 KiB. set_init_blocksize() then sets the block device inode->i_blkbits to 13, which is within this limit. File I/O does not trigger this problem because for filesystems that do not support the FS_LBS feature, sb_set_blocksize() prevents sb->s_blocksize_bits from being larger than PAGE_SHIFT. During inode allocation, alloc_inode()->inode_init_always() assigns inode->i_blkbits from sb->s_blocksize_bits. Currently, only xfs_fs_type has the FS_LBS flag, and since xfs I/O paths do not reach submit_bh_wbc(), it does not hit the left-shift underflow issue. Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng(a)xiaomi.com> Fixes: 47dd67532303 ("block/bdev: lift block size restrictions to 64k") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org [EB: use folio_pos() and consolidate the two shifts by i_blkbits] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)kernel.org> --- This patch is targeting the fscrypt/for-current tree fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c index 5dee7c498bc8..ed6e926226b5 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +++ b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c @@ -331,12 +331,11 @@ static bool bh_get_inode_and_lblk_num(const struct buffer_head *bh, if (!mapping) return false; inode = mapping->host; *inode_ret = inode; - *lblk_num_ret = ((u64)folio->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits)) + - (bh_offset(bh) >> inode->i_blkbits); + *lblk_num_ret = (folio_pos(folio) + bh_offset(bh)) >> inode->i_blkbits; return true; } /** * fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx_bh() - prepare a file contents bio for inline base-commit: 6146a0f1dfae5d37442a9ddcba012add260bceb0 -- 2.51.2

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NEW PO 33443 Wednesday, November 5, 2025 at 01:26:03 AM

by Procurement 34870

Hi Stable, Please provide a quote for your products: Include: 1.Pricing (per unit) 2.Delivery cost & timeline 3.Quote expiry date Deadline: October Thanks! Danny Peddinti Noble alliance trade

1 week, 2 days

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[PATCH v2 1/1] mm: swap: remove duplicate nr_swap_pages decrement in get_swap_page_of_type()

by Youngjun Park

After commit 4f78252da887, nr_swap_pages is decremented in swap_range_alloc(). Since cluster_alloc_swap_entry() calls swap_range_alloc() internally, the decrement in get_swap_page_of_type() causes double-decrementing. Remove the duplicate decrement. Fixes: 4f78252da887 ("mm: swap: move nr_swap_pages counter decrement from folio_alloc_swap() to swap_range_alloc()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.17-rc1 Signed-off-by: Youngjun Park <youngjun.park(a)lge.com> Acked-by: Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Barry Song <baohua(a)kernel.org> --- v1 -> v2: - Collect Acked-by from Chris - thank you! - Collect Reviewed-by from Barry - thank you! - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20251101134158.69908-1-youngjun.park@lge.c… mm/swapfile.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c index 543f303f101d..66a502cd747b 100644 --- a/mm/swapfile.c +++ b/mm/swapfile.c @@ -2020,10 +2020,8 @@ swp_entry_t get_swap_page_of_type(int type) local_lock(&percpu_swap_cluster.lock); offset = cluster_alloc_swap_entry(si, 0, 1); local_unlock(&percpu_swap_cluster.lock); - if (offset) { + if (offset) entry = swp_entry(si->type, offset); - atomic_long_dec(&nr_swap_pages); - } } put_swap_device(si); } -- 2.34.1

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+ kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2025 14:49:48 +0000 A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in the following points: 1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk. 2. Chunk's base address has a tag. 3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits the tag of the first chunk. 4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the first chunk. 5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to match that of the first chunk. Unpoison all vm_structs after allocating them for the percpu allocator. Use the same tag to resolve the pcpu chunk address mismatch. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cf8fe0ffcdbf54e06d9df26c8473b123c4065f02.17622670… Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS") Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/kasan/common.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag +++ a/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -584,12 +584,20 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr return true; } +/* + * A tag mismatch happens when calculating per-cpu chunk addresses, because + * they all inherit the tag from vms[0]->addr, even when nr_vms is bigger + * than 1. This is a problem because all the vms[]->addr come from separate + * allocations and have different tags so while the calculated address is + * correct the tag isn't. + */ void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) { int area; for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) { kasan_poison(vms[area]->addr, vms[area]->size, - arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[area]->addr), false); + arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[0]->addr), false); + arch_kasan_set_tag(vms[area]->addr, arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[0]->addr)); } } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch

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+ kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: kasan: unpoison pcpu chunks with base address tag has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Subject: kasan: unpoison pcpu chunks with base address tag Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2025 14:49:08 +0000 Patch series "kasan: vmalloc: Fix incorrect tag assignment with multiple vm_structs". A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly resulting in a kernel panic, can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. Initially it was only noticed on x86 [1] but later a similar issue was also reported on arm64 [2]. Specifically the problem is related to how vm_structs interact with pcpu_chunks - both when they are allocated, assigned and when pcpu_chunk addresses are derived. When vm_structs are allocated they are tagged if vmalloc support is enabled along the KASAN mode. Later when first pcpu chunk is allocated it gets its 'base_addr' field set to the first allocated vm_struct. With that it inherits that vm_struct's tag. When pcpu_chunk addresses are later derived (by pcpu_chunk_addr(), for example in pcpu_alloc_noprof()) the base_addr field is used and offsets are added to it. If the initial conditions are satisfied then some of the offsets will point into memory allocated with a different vm_struct. So while the lower bits will get accurately derived the tag bits in the top of the pointer won't match the shadow memory contents. The solution (proposed at v2 of the x86 KASAN series [3]) is to tag the vm_structs the same when allocating them for the per cpu allocator (in pcpu_get_vm_areas()). Originally these patches were part of the x86 KASAN series [4]. This patch (of 2): A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in the following points: 1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk. 2. Chunk's base address has a tag. 3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits the tag of the first chunk. 4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the first chunk. 5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to match that of the first chunk. Refactor code by moving it into a helper in preparation for the actual fix. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/821677dd824d003cc5b7a77891db4723e23518ea.17622670… Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e7e04692866d02e6d3b32bb43b998e5d17092ba4.173868… [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aMUrW1Znp1GEj7St@MiWiFi-R3L-srv/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAPAsAGxDRv_uFeMYu9TwhBVWHCCtkSxoWY4xmFB_vowMbi… [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1761763681.git.m.wieczorretman@pm.me/ [4] Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS") Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++++++ mm/kasan/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/kasan.h~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -614,6 +614,13 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison __kasan_poison_vmalloc(start, size); } +void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms); +static __always_inline void kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ + if (kasan_enabled()) + __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms); +} + #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, @@ -638,6 +645,9 @@ static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmall static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size) { } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ } + #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ #if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \ --- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" @@ -582,3 +583,13 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr } return true; } + +void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) +{ + int area; + + for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) { + kasan_poison(vms[area]->addr, vms[area]->size, + arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[area]->addr), false); + } +} --- a/mm/vmalloc.c~kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag +++ a/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -4870,9 +4870,7 @@ retry: * With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for * non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(). */ - for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++) - vms[area]->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(vms[area]->addr, - vms[area]->size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL); + kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms); kfree(vas); return vms; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are kasan-unpoison-pcpu-chunks-with-base-address-tag.patch kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch

1 week, 2 days

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