The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x d3a8c28426fc1fb3252753a9f1db0d691ffc21b0
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021803-frugally-entity-330b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From d3a8c28426fc1fb3252753a9f1db0d691ffc21b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Selvarasu Ganesan <selvarasu.g(a)samsung.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2025 22:09:02 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] usb: dwc3: Fix timeout issue during controller enter/exit
from halt state
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
There is a frequent timeout during controller enter/exit from halt state
after toggling the run_stop bit by SW. This timeout occurs when
performing frequent role switches between host and device, causing
device enumeration issues due to the timeout. This issue was not present
when USB2 suspend PHY was disabled by passing the SNPS quirks
(snps,dis_u2_susphy_quirk and snps,dis_enblslpm_quirk) from the DTS.
However, there is a requirement to enable USB2 suspend PHY by setting of
GUSB2PHYCFG.ENBLSLPM and GUSB2PHYCFG.SUSPHY bits when controller starts
in gadget or host mode results in the timeout issue.
This commit addresses this timeout issue by ensuring that the bits
GUSB2PHYCFG.ENBLSLPM and GUSB2PHYCFG.SUSPHY are cleared before starting
the dwc3_gadget_run_stop sequence and restoring them after the
dwc3_gadget_run_stop sequence is completed.
Fixes: 72246da40f37 ("usb: Introduce DesignWare USB3 DRD Driver")
Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Selvarasu Ganesan <selvarasu.g(a)samsung.com>
Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen(a)synopsys.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250201163903.459-1-selvarasu.g@samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
index d27af65eb08a..ddd6b2ce5710 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
@@ -2629,10 +2629,38 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_run_stop(struct dwc3 *dwc, int is_on)
{
u32 reg;
u32 timeout = 2000;
+ u32 saved_config = 0;
if (pm_runtime_suspended(dwc->dev))
return 0;
+ /*
+ * When operating in USB 2.0 speeds (HS/FS), ensure that
+ * GUSB2PHYCFG.ENBLSLPM and GUSB2PHYCFG.SUSPHY are cleared before starting
+ * or stopping the controller. This resolves timeout issues that occur
+ * during frequent role switches between host and device modes.
+ *
+ * Save and clear these settings, then restore them after completing the
+ * controller start or stop sequence.
+ *
+ * This solution was discovered through experimentation as it is not
+ * mentioned in the dwc3 programming guide. It has been tested on an
+ * Exynos platforms.
+ */
+ reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0));
+ if (reg & DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_SUSPHY) {
+ saved_config |= DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_SUSPHY;
+ reg &= ~DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_SUSPHY;
+ }
+
+ if (reg & DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_ENBLSLPM) {
+ saved_config |= DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_ENBLSLPM;
+ reg &= ~DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_ENBLSLPM;
+ }
+
+ if (saved_config)
+ dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0), reg);
+
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL);
if (is_on) {
if (DWC3_VER_IS_WITHIN(DWC3, ANY, 187A)) {
@@ -2660,6 +2688,12 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_run_stop(struct dwc3 *dwc, int is_on)
reg &= DWC3_DSTS_DEVCTRLHLT;
} while (--timeout && !(!is_on ^ !reg));
+ if (saved_config) {
+ reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0));
+ reg |= saved_config;
+ dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0), reg);
+ }
+
if (!timeout)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x d3a8c28426fc1fb3252753a9f1db0d691ffc21b0
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021802-sharply-case-0286@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From d3a8c28426fc1fb3252753a9f1db0d691ffc21b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Selvarasu Ganesan <selvarasu.g(a)samsung.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2025 22:09:02 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] usb: dwc3: Fix timeout issue during controller enter/exit
from halt state
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
There is a frequent timeout during controller enter/exit from halt state
after toggling the run_stop bit by SW. This timeout occurs when
performing frequent role switches between host and device, causing
device enumeration issues due to the timeout. This issue was not present
when USB2 suspend PHY was disabled by passing the SNPS quirks
(snps,dis_u2_susphy_quirk and snps,dis_enblslpm_quirk) from the DTS.
However, there is a requirement to enable USB2 suspend PHY by setting of
GUSB2PHYCFG.ENBLSLPM and GUSB2PHYCFG.SUSPHY bits when controller starts
in gadget or host mode results in the timeout issue.
This commit addresses this timeout issue by ensuring that the bits
GUSB2PHYCFG.ENBLSLPM and GUSB2PHYCFG.SUSPHY are cleared before starting
the dwc3_gadget_run_stop sequence and restoring them after the
dwc3_gadget_run_stop sequence is completed.
Fixes: 72246da40f37 ("usb: Introduce DesignWare USB3 DRD Driver")
Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Selvarasu Ganesan <selvarasu.g(a)samsung.com>
Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen(a)synopsys.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250201163903.459-1-selvarasu.g@samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
index d27af65eb08a..ddd6b2ce5710 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
@@ -2629,10 +2629,38 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_run_stop(struct dwc3 *dwc, int is_on)
{
u32 reg;
u32 timeout = 2000;
+ u32 saved_config = 0;
if (pm_runtime_suspended(dwc->dev))
return 0;
+ /*
+ * When operating in USB 2.0 speeds (HS/FS), ensure that
+ * GUSB2PHYCFG.ENBLSLPM and GUSB2PHYCFG.SUSPHY are cleared before starting
+ * or stopping the controller. This resolves timeout issues that occur
+ * during frequent role switches between host and device modes.
+ *
+ * Save and clear these settings, then restore them after completing the
+ * controller start or stop sequence.
+ *
+ * This solution was discovered through experimentation as it is not
+ * mentioned in the dwc3 programming guide. It has been tested on an
+ * Exynos platforms.
+ */
+ reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0));
+ if (reg & DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_SUSPHY) {
+ saved_config |= DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_SUSPHY;
+ reg &= ~DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_SUSPHY;
+ }
+
+ if (reg & DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_ENBLSLPM) {
+ saved_config |= DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_ENBLSLPM;
+ reg &= ~DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_ENBLSLPM;
+ }
+
+ if (saved_config)
+ dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0), reg);
+
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL);
if (is_on) {
if (DWC3_VER_IS_WITHIN(DWC3, ANY, 187A)) {
@@ -2660,6 +2688,12 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_run_stop(struct dwc3 *dwc, int is_on)
reg &= DWC3_DSTS_DEVCTRLHLT;
} while (--timeout && !(!is_on ^ !reg));
+ if (saved_config) {
+ reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0));
+ reg |= saved_config;
+ dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0), reg);
+ }
+
if (!timeout)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 60b8f711143de7cd9c0f55be0fe7eb94b19eb5c7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021821-bullseye-travel-f568@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 60b8f711143de7cd9c0f55be0fe7eb94b19eb5c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 13:41:32 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] tracing: Have the error of __tracing_resize_ring_buffer()
passed to user
Currently if __tracing_resize_ring_buffer() returns an error, the
tracing_resize_ringbuffer() returns -ENOMEM. But it may not be a memory
issue that caused the function to fail. If the ring buffer is memory
mapped, then the resizing of the ring buffer will be disabled. But if the
user tries to resize the buffer, it will get an -ENOMEM returned, which is
confusing because there is plenty of memory. The actual error returned was
-EBUSY, which would make much more sense to the user.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250213134132.7e4505d7@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: 117c39200d9d7 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 1496a5ac33ae..25ff37aab00f 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -5977,8 +5977,6 @@ static int __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(struct trace_array *tr,
ssize_t tracing_resize_ring_buffer(struct trace_array *tr,
unsigned long size, int cpu_id)
{
- int ret;
-
guard(mutex)(&trace_types_lock);
if (cpu_id != RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
@@ -5987,11 +5985,7 @@ ssize_t tracing_resize_ring_buffer(struct trace_array *tr,
return -EINVAL;
}
- ret = __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(tr, size, cpu_id);
- if (ret < 0)
- ret = -ENOMEM;
-
- return ret;
+ return __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(tr, size, cpu_id);
}
static void update_last_data(struct trace_array *tr)
The patch below does not apply to the 6.13-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.13.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 60b8f711143de7cd9c0f55be0fe7eb94b19eb5c7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021820-swinger-shopping-6edb@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.13.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 60b8f711143de7cd9c0f55be0fe7eb94b19eb5c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 13:41:32 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] tracing: Have the error of __tracing_resize_ring_buffer()
passed to user
Currently if __tracing_resize_ring_buffer() returns an error, the
tracing_resize_ringbuffer() returns -ENOMEM. But it may not be a memory
issue that caused the function to fail. If the ring buffer is memory
mapped, then the resizing of the ring buffer will be disabled. But if the
user tries to resize the buffer, it will get an -ENOMEM returned, which is
confusing because there is plenty of memory. The actual error returned was
-EBUSY, which would make much more sense to the user.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250213134132.7e4505d7@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: 117c39200d9d7 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 1496a5ac33ae..25ff37aab00f 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -5977,8 +5977,6 @@ static int __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(struct trace_array *tr,
ssize_t tracing_resize_ring_buffer(struct trace_array *tr,
unsigned long size, int cpu_id)
{
- int ret;
-
guard(mutex)(&trace_types_lock);
if (cpu_id != RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
@@ -5987,11 +5985,7 @@ ssize_t tracing_resize_ring_buffer(struct trace_array *tr,
return -EINVAL;
}
- ret = __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(tr, size, cpu_id);
- if (ret < 0)
- ret = -ENOMEM;
-
- return ret;
+ return __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(tr, size, cpu_id);
}
static void update_last_data(struct trace_array *tr)
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 8802766324e1f5d414a81ac43365c20142e85603
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021856-apostle-aggregate-3dc4@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 8802766324e1f5d414a81ac43365c20142e85603 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence(a)gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2025 13:46:46 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] io_uring/kbuf: reallocate buf lists on upgrade
IORING_REGISTER_PBUF_RING can reuse an old struct io_buffer_list if it
was created for legacy selected buffer and has been emptied. It violates
the requirement that most of the field should stay stable after publish.
Always reallocate it instead.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Pumpkin Chang <pumpkin(a)devco.re>
Fixes: 2fcabce2d7d34 ("io_uring: disallow mixed provided buffer group registrations")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
diff --git a/io_uring/kbuf.c b/io_uring/kbuf.c
index 04bf493eecae..8e72de7712ac 100644
--- a/io_uring/kbuf.c
+++ b/io_uring/kbuf.c
@@ -415,6 +415,13 @@ void io_destroy_buffers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
}
}
+static void io_destroy_bl(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_buffer_list *bl)
+{
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &ctx->mmap_lock)
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(xa_erase(&ctx->io_bl_xa, bl->bgid) != bl);
+ io_put_bl(ctx, bl);
+}
+
int io_remove_buffers_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
{
struct io_provide_buf *p = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_provide_buf);
@@ -636,12 +643,13 @@ int io_register_pbuf_ring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg)
/* if mapped buffer ring OR classic exists, don't allow */
if (bl->flags & IOBL_BUF_RING || !list_empty(&bl->buf_list))
return -EEXIST;
- } else {
- free_bl = bl = kzalloc(sizeof(*bl), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!bl)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ io_destroy_bl(ctx, bl);
}
+ free_bl = bl = kzalloc(sizeof(*bl), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bl)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
mmap_offset = (unsigned long)reg.bgid << IORING_OFF_PBUF_SHIFT;
ring_size = flex_array_size(br, bufs, reg.ring_entries);
The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 409f45387c937145adeeeebc6d6032c2ec232b35
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021858-default-pledge-8039@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 409f45387c937145adeeeebc6d6032c2ec232b35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra(a)amd.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 22:54:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Fix broken SNP support with KVM module built-in
Fix issues with enabling SNP host support and effectively SNP support
which is broken with respect to the KVM module being built-in.
SNP host support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() which is invoked as
device_initcall(). SNP check on IOMMU is done during IOMMU PCI init
(IOMMU_PCI_INIT stage). And for that reason snp_rmptable_init() is
currently invoked via device_initcall() and cannot be invoked via
subsys_initcall() as core IOMMU subsystem gets initialized via
subsys_initcall().
Now, if kvm_amd module is built-in, it gets initialized before SNP host
support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() :
[ 10.131811] kvm_amd: TSC scaling supported
[ 10.136384] kvm_amd: Nested Virtualization enabled
[ 10.141734] kvm_amd: Nested Paging enabled
[ 10.146304] kvm_amd: LBR virtualization supported
[ 10.151557] kvm_amd: SEV enabled (ASIDs 100 - 509)
[ 10.156905] kvm_amd: SEV-ES enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99)
[ 10.162256] kvm_amd: SEV-SNP enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99)
[ 10.171508] kvm_amd: Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE supported
[ 10.177052] kvm_amd: Virtual GIF supported
...
...
[ 10.201648] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu
And then svm_x86_ops->enable_virtualization_cpu()
(svm_enable_virtualization_cpu) programs MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA as following:
wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, sd->save_area_pa);
So VM_HSAVE_PA is non-zero before SNP support is enabled on all CPUs.
snp_rmptable_init() gets invoked after svm_enable_virtualization_cpu()
as following :
...
[ 11.256138] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu
...
[ 11.264918] SEV-SNP: in snp_rmptable_init
This triggers a #GP exception in snp_rmptable_init() when snp_enable()
is invoked to set SNP_EN in SYSCFG MSR:
[ 11.294289] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010010 (tried to write 0x0000000003fc0000) at rIP: 0xffffffffaf5d5c28 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30)
...
[ 11.294404] Call Trace:
[ 11.294482] <IRQ>
[ 11.294513] ? show_stack_regs+0x26/0x30
[ 11.294522] ? ex_handler_msr+0x10f/0x180
[ 11.294529] ? search_extable+0x2b/0x40
[ 11.294538] ? fixup_exception+0x2dd/0x340
[ 11.294542] ? exc_general_protection+0x14f/0x440
[ 11.294550] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30
[ 11.294557] ? __pfx_snp_enable+0x10/0x10
[ 11.294567] ? native_write_msr+0x8/0x30
[ 11.294570] ? __snp_enable+0x5d/0x70
[ 11.294575] snp_enable+0x19/0x20
[ 11.294578] __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x9c/0x3a0
[ 11.294586] generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x17/0x20
[ 11.294589] __sysvec_call_function+0x20/0x90
[ 11.294596] sysvec_call_function+0x80/0xb0
[ 11.294601] </IRQ>
[ 11.294603] <TASK>
[ 11.294605] asm_sysvec_call_function+0x1f/0x30
...
[ 11.294631] arch_cpu_idle+0xd/0x20
[ 11.294633] default_idle_call+0x34/0xd0
[ 11.294636] do_idle+0x1f1/0x230
[ 11.294643] ? complete+0x71/0x80
[ 11.294649] cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40
[ 11.294652] start_secondary+0x12d/0x160
[ 11.294655] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[ 11.294662] </TASK>
This #GP exception is getting triggered due to the following errata for
AMD family 19h Models 10h-1Fh Processors:
Processor may generate spurious #GP(0) Exception on WRMSR instruction:
Description:
The Processor will generate a spurious #GP(0) Exception on a WRMSR
instruction if the following conditions are all met:
- the target of the WRMSR is a SYSCFG register.
- the write changes the value of SYSCFG.SNPEn from 0 to 1.
- One of the threads that share the physical core has a non-zero
value in the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR.
The document being referred to above:
https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/revisi…
To summarize, with kvm_amd module being built-in, KVM/SVM initialization
happens before host SNP is enabled and this SVM initialization
sets VM_HSAVE_PA to non-zero, which then triggers a #GP when
SYSCFG.SNPEn is being set and this will subsequently cause
SNP_INIT(_EX) to fail with INVALID_CONFIG error as SYSCFG[SnpEn] is not
set on all CPUs.
Essentially SNP host enabling code should be invoked before KVM
initialization, which is currently not the case when KVM is built-in.
Add fix to call snp_rmptable_init() early from iommu_snp_enable()
directly and not invoked via device_initcall() which enables SNP host
support before KVM initialization with kvm_amd module built-in.
Add additional handling for `iommu=off` or `amd_iommu=off` options.
Note that IOMMUs need to be enabled for SNP initialization, therefore,
if host SNP support is enabled but late IOMMU initialization fails
then that will cause PSP driver's SNP_INIT to fail as IOMMU SNP sanity
checks in SNP firmware will fail with invalid configuration error as
below:
[ 9.723114] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled
[ 9.727602] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled
[ 9.732527] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[ 9.739098] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: no command queues available
[ 9.745167] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: psp enabled
[ 9.805337] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV-SNP: failed to INIT rc -5, error 0x3
[ 9.866426] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV API:1.53 build:5
Fixes: c3b86e61b756 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature")
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Co-developed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com>
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra(a)amd.com>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de>
Message-ID: <138b520fb83964782303b43ade4369cd181fdd9c.1739226950.git.ashish.kalra(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 5d9685f92e5c..1581246491b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { }
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void);
+int snp_rmptable_init(void);
int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level);
void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address);
int psmash(u64 pfn);
@@ -541,6 +542,7 @@ void kdump_sev_callback(void);
void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void);
#else
static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
+static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; }
static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address) {}
static inline int psmash(u64 pfn) { return -ENODEV; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 1dcc027ec77e..42e74a5a7d78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -505,19 +505,19 @@ static bool __init setup_rmptable(void)
* described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP
* firmware ABI spec.
*/
-static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
+int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
{
unsigned int i;
u64 val;
- if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
- return 0;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)))
+ return -ENOSYS;
- if (!amd_iommu_snp_en)
- goto nosnp;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!amd_iommu_snp_en))
+ return -ENOSYS;
if (!setup_rmptable())
- goto nosnp;
+ return -ENOSYS;
/*
* Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
/* Zero out the RMP bookkeeping area */
if (!clear_rmptable_bookkeeping()) {
free_rmp_segment_table();
- goto nosnp;
+ return -ENOSYS;
}
/* Zero out the RMP entries */
@@ -562,17 +562,8 @@ static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
crash_kexec_post_notifiers = true;
return 0;
-
-nosnp:
- cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
- return -ENOSYS;
}
-/*
- * This must be called after the IOMMU has been initialized.
- */
-device_initcall(snp_rmptable_init);
-
static void set_rmp_segment_info(unsigned int segment_shift)
{
rmp_segment_shift = segment_shift;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
index c5cd92edada0..2fecfed75e54 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
@@ -3194,7 +3194,7 @@ static bool __init detect_ivrs(void)
return true;
}
-static void iommu_snp_enable(void)
+static __init void iommu_snp_enable(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
@@ -3219,6 +3219,14 @@ static void iommu_snp_enable(void)
goto disable_snp;
}
+ /*
+ * Enable host SNP support once SNP support is checked on IOMMU.
+ */
+ if (snp_rmptable_init()) {
+ pr_warn("SNP: RMP initialization failed, SNP cannot be supported.\n");
+ goto disable_snp;
+ }
+
pr_info("IOMMU SNP support enabled.\n");
return;
@@ -3318,6 +3326,19 @@ static int __init iommu_go_to_state(enum iommu_init_state state)
ret = state_next();
}
+ /*
+ * SNP platform initilazation requires IOMMUs to be fully configured.
+ * If the SNP support on IOMMUs has NOT been checked, simply mark SNP
+ * as unsupported. If the SNP support on IOMMUs has been checked and
+ * host SNP support enabled but RMP enforcement has not been enabled
+ * in IOMMUs, then the system is in a half-baked state, but can limp
+ * along as all memory should be Hypervisor-Owned in the RMP. WARN,
+ * but leave SNP as "supported" to avoid confusing the kernel.
+ */
+ if (ret && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) &&
+ !WARN_ON_ONCE(amd_iommu_snp_en))
+ cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
+
return ret;
}
@@ -3426,18 +3447,23 @@ void __init amd_iommu_detect(void)
int ret;
if (no_iommu || (iommu_detected && !gart_iommu_aperture))
- return;
+ goto disable_snp;
if (!amd_iommu_sme_check())
- return;
+ goto disable_snp;
ret = iommu_go_to_state(IOMMU_IVRS_DETECTED);
if (ret)
- return;
+ goto disable_snp;
amd_iommu_detected = true;
iommu_detected = 1;
x86_init.iommu.iommu_init = amd_iommu_init;
+ return;
+
+disable_snp:
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+ cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
}
/****************************************************************************
The patch below does not apply to the 6.13-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.13.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 409f45387c937145adeeeebc6d6032c2ec232b35
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021856-heave-blade-985e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.13.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 409f45387c937145adeeeebc6d6032c2ec232b35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra(a)amd.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 22:54:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Fix broken SNP support with KVM module built-in
Fix issues with enabling SNP host support and effectively SNP support
which is broken with respect to the KVM module being built-in.
SNP host support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() which is invoked as
device_initcall(). SNP check on IOMMU is done during IOMMU PCI init
(IOMMU_PCI_INIT stage). And for that reason snp_rmptable_init() is
currently invoked via device_initcall() and cannot be invoked via
subsys_initcall() as core IOMMU subsystem gets initialized via
subsys_initcall().
Now, if kvm_amd module is built-in, it gets initialized before SNP host
support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() :
[ 10.131811] kvm_amd: TSC scaling supported
[ 10.136384] kvm_amd: Nested Virtualization enabled
[ 10.141734] kvm_amd: Nested Paging enabled
[ 10.146304] kvm_amd: LBR virtualization supported
[ 10.151557] kvm_amd: SEV enabled (ASIDs 100 - 509)
[ 10.156905] kvm_amd: SEV-ES enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99)
[ 10.162256] kvm_amd: SEV-SNP enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99)
[ 10.171508] kvm_amd: Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE supported
[ 10.177052] kvm_amd: Virtual GIF supported
...
...
[ 10.201648] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu
And then svm_x86_ops->enable_virtualization_cpu()
(svm_enable_virtualization_cpu) programs MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA as following:
wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, sd->save_area_pa);
So VM_HSAVE_PA is non-zero before SNP support is enabled on all CPUs.
snp_rmptable_init() gets invoked after svm_enable_virtualization_cpu()
as following :
...
[ 11.256138] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu
...
[ 11.264918] SEV-SNP: in snp_rmptable_init
This triggers a #GP exception in snp_rmptable_init() when snp_enable()
is invoked to set SNP_EN in SYSCFG MSR:
[ 11.294289] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010010 (tried to write 0x0000000003fc0000) at rIP: 0xffffffffaf5d5c28 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30)
...
[ 11.294404] Call Trace:
[ 11.294482] <IRQ>
[ 11.294513] ? show_stack_regs+0x26/0x30
[ 11.294522] ? ex_handler_msr+0x10f/0x180
[ 11.294529] ? search_extable+0x2b/0x40
[ 11.294538] ? fixup_exception+0x2dd/0x340
[ 11.294542] ? exc_general_protection+0x14f/0x440
[ 11.294550] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30
[ 11.294557] ? __pfx_snp_enable+0x10/0x10
[ 11.294567] ? native_write_msr+0x8/0x30
[ 11.294570] ? __snp_enable+0x5d/0x70
[ 11.294575] snp_enable+0x19/0x20
[ 11.294578] __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x9c/0x3a0
[ 11.294586] generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x17/0x20
[ 11.294589] __sysvec_call_function+0x20/0x90
[ 11.294596] sysvec_call_function+0x80/0xb0
[ 11.294601] </IRQ>
[ 11.294603] <TASK>
[ 11.294605] asm_sysvec_call_function+0x1f/0x30
...
[ 11.294631] arch_cpu_idle+0xd/0x20
[ 11.294633] default_idle_call+0x34/0xd0
[ 11.294636] do_idle+0x1f1/0x230
[ 11.294643] ? complete+0x71/0x80
[ 11.294649] cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40
[ 11.294652] start_secondary+0x12d/0x160
[ 11.294655] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[ 11.294662] </TASK>
This #GP exception is getting triggered due to the following errata for
AMD family 19h Models 10h-1Fh Processors:
Processor may generate spurious #GP(0) Exception on WRMSR instruction:
Description:
The Processor will generate a spurious #GP(0) Exception on a WRMSR
instruction if the following conditions are all met:
- the target of the WRMSR is a SYSCFG register.
- the write changes the value of SYSCFG.SNPEn from 0 to 1.
- One of the threads that share the physical core has a non-zero
value in the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR.
The document being referred to above:
https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/revisi…
To summarize, with kvm_amd module being built-in, KVM/SVM initialization
happens before host SNP is enabled and this SVM initialization
sets VM_HSAVE_PA to non-zero, which then triggers a #GP when
SYSCFG.SNPEn is being set and this will subsequently cause
SNP_INIT(_EX) to fail with INVALID_CONFIG error as SYSCFG[SnpEn] is not
set on all CPUs.
Essentially SNP host enabling code should be invoked before KVM
initialization, which is currently not the case when KVM is built-in.
Add fix to call snp_rmptable_init() early from iommu_snp_enable()
directly and not invoked via device_initcall() which enables SNP host
support before KVM initialization with kvm_amd module built-in.
Add additional handling for `iommu=off` or `amd_iommu=off` options.
Note that IOMMUs need to be enabled for SNP initialization, therefore,
if host SNP support is enabled but late IOMMU initialization fails
then that will cause PSP driver's SNP_INIT to fail as IOMMU SNP sanity
checks in SNP firmware will fail with invalid configuration error as
below:
[ 9.723114] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled
[ 9.727602] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled
[ 9.732527] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[ 9.739098] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: no command queues available
[ 9.745167] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: psp enabled
[ 9.805337] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV-SNP: failed to INIT rc -5, error 0x3
[ 9.866426] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV API:1.53 build:5
Fixes: c3b86e61b756 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature")
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Co-developed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com>
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra(a)amd.com>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de>
Message-ID: <138b520fb83964782303b43ade4369cd181fdd9c.1739226950.git.ashish.kalra(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 5d9685f92e5c..1581246491b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { }
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void);
+int snp_rmptable_init(void);
int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level);
void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address);
int psmash(u64 pfn);
@@ -541,6 +542,7 @@ void kdump_sev_callback(void);
void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void);
#else
static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
+static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; }
static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address) {}
static inline int psmash(u64 pfn) { return -ENODEV; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 1dcc027ec77e..42e74a5a7d78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -505,19 +505,19 @@ static bool __init setup_rmptable(void)
* described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP
* firmware ABI spec.
*/
-static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
+int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
{
unsigned int i;
u64 val;
- if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
- return 0;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)))
+ return -ENOSYS;
- if (!amd_iommu_snp_en)
- goto nosnp;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!amd_iommu_snp_en))
+ return -ENOSYS;
if (!setup_rmptable())
- goto nosnp;
+ return -ENOSYS;
/*
* Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
/* Zero out the RMP bookkeeping area */
if (!clear_rmptable_bookkeeping()) {
free_rmp_segment_table();
- goto nosnp;
+ return -ENOSYS;
}
/* Zero out the RMP entries */
@@ -562,17 +562,8 @@ static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
crash_kexec_post_notifiers = true;
return 0;
-
-nosnp:
- cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
- return -ENOSYS;
}
-/*
- * This must be called after the IOMMU has been initialized.
- */
-device_initcall(snp_rmptable_init);
-
static void set_rmp_segment_info(unsigned int segment_shift)
{
rmp_segment_shift = segment_shift;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
index c5cd92edada0..2fecfed75e54 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
@@ -3194,7 +3194,7 @@ static bool __init detect_ivrs(void)
return true;
}
-static void iommu_snp_enable(void)
+static __init void iommu_snp_enable(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
@@ -3219,6 +3219,14 @@ static void iommu_snp_enable(void)
goto disable_snp;
}
+ /*
+ * Enable host SNP support once SNP support is checked on IOMMU.
+ */
+ if (snp_rmptable_init()) {
+ pr_warn("SNP: RMP initialization failed, SNP cannot be supported.\n");
+ goto disable_snp;
+ }
+
pr_info("IOMMU SNP support enabled.\n");
return;
@@ -3318,6 +3326,19 @@ static int __init iommu_go_to_state(enum iommu_init_state state)
ret = state_next();
}
+ /*
+ * SNP platform initilazation requires IOMMUs to be fully configured.
+ * If the SNP support on IOMMUs has NOT been checked, simply mark SNP
+ * as unsupported. If the SNP support on IOMMUs has been checked and
+ * host SNP support enabled but RMP enforcement has not been enabled
+ * in IOMMUs, then the system is in a half-baked state, but can limp
+ * along as all memory should be Hypervisor-Owned in the RMP. WARN,
+ * but leave SNP as "supported" to avoid confusing the kernel.
+ */
+ if (ret && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) &&
+ !WARN_ON_ONCE(amd_iommu_snp_en))
+ cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
+
return ret;
}
@@ -3426,18 +3447,23 @@ void __init amd_iommu_detect(void)
int ret;
if (no_iommu || (iommu_detected && !gart_iommu_aperture))
- return;
+ goto disable_snp;
if (!amd_iommu_sme_check())
- return;
+ goto disable_snp;
ret = iommu_go_to_state(IOMMU_IVRS_DETECTED);
if (ret)
- return;
+ goto disable_snp;
amd_iommu_detected = true;
iommu_detected = 1;
x86_init.iommu.iommu_init = amd_iommu_init;
+ return;
+
+disable_snp:
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+ cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
}
/****************************************************************************
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 46d6c6f3ef0eaff71c2db6d77d4e2ebb7adac34f
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021837-volumes-twig-2514@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 46d6c6f3ef0eaff71c2db6d77d4e2ebb7adac34f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2025 17:08:25 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Enter guest mode before initializing nested NPT
MMU
When preparing vmcb02 for nested VMRUN (or state restore), "enter" guest
mode prior to initializing the MMU for nested NPT so that guest_mode is
set in the MMU's role. KVM's model is that all L2 MMUs are tagged with
guest_mode, as the behavior of hypervisor MMUs tends to be significantly
different than kernel MMUs.
Practically speaking, the bug is relatively benign, as KVM only directly
queries role.guest_mode in kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots() and
kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(), which SVM doesn't use, and in paths
that are optimizations (mmu_page_zap_pte() and
shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_pages()).
And while the role is incorprated into shadow page usage, because nested
NPT requires KVM to be using NPT for L1, reusing shadow pages across L1
and L2 is impossible as L1 MMUs will always have direct=1, while L2 MMUs
will have direct=0.
Hoist the TLB processing and setting of HF_GUEST_MASK to the beginning
of the flow instead of forcing guest_mode in the MMU, as nothing in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() between the old and new locations touches
TLB flush requests or HF_GUEST_MASK, i.e. there's no reason to present
inconsistent vCPU state to the MMU.
Fixes: 69cb877487de ("KVM: nSVM: move MMU setup to nested_prepare_vmcb_control")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130010825.220346-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 74c20dbb92da..d4ac4a1f8b81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -5540,7 +5540,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0,
union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role;
/* NPT requires CR0.PG=1. */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct || !cpu_role.base.guest_mode);
root_role = cpu_role.base;
root_role.level = kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index d77b094d9a4d..04c375bf1ac2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
u32 pause_count12;
u32 pause_thresh12;
+ nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu);
+
+ /* Enter Guest-Mode */
+ enter_guest_mode(vcpu);
+
/*
* Filled at exit: exit_code, exit_code_hi, exit_info_1, exit_info_2,
* exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, next_rip, insn_len, insn_bytes.
@@ -762,11 +767,6 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
}
}
- nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu);
-
- /* Enter Guest-Mode */
- enter_guest_mode(vcpu);
-
/*
* Merge guest and host intercepts - must be called with vcpu in
* guest-mode to take effect.
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 46d6c6f3ef0eaff71c2db6d77d4e2ebb7adac34f
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021824-strict-motivator-41ae@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 46d6c6f3ef0eaff71c2db6d77d4e2ebb7adac34f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2025 17:08:25 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Enter guest mode before initializing nested NPT
MMU
When preparing vmcb02 for nested VMRUN (or state restore), "enter" guest
mode prior to initializing the MMU for nested NPT so that guest_mode is
set in the MMU's role. KVM's model is that all L2 MMUs are tagged with
guest_mode, as the behavior of hypervisor MMUs tends to be significantly
different than kernel MMUs.
Practically speaking, the bug is relatively benign, as KVM only directly
queries role.guest_mode in kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots() and
kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(), which SVM doesn't use, and in paths
that are optimizations (mmu_page_zap_pte() and
shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_pages()).
And while the role is incorprated into shadow page usage, because nested
NPT requires KVM to be using NPT for L1, reusing shadow pages across L1
and L2 is impossible as L1 MMUs will always have direct=1, while L2 MMUs
will have direct=0.
Hoist the TLB processing and setting of HF_GUEST_MASK to the beginning
of the flow instead of forcing guest_mode in the MMU, as nothing in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() between the old and new locations touches
TLB flush requests or HF_GUEST_MASK, i.e. there's no reason to present
inconsistent vCPU state to the MMU.
Fixes: 69cb877487de ("KVM: nSVM: move MMU setup to nested_prepare_vmcb_control")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130010825.220346-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 74c20dbb92da..d4ac4a1f8b81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -5540,7 +5540,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0,
union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role;
/* NPT requires CR0.PG=1. */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct || !cpu_role.base.guest_mode);
root_role = cpu_role.base;
root_role.level = kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index d77b094d9a4d..04c375bf1ac2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
u32 pause_count12;
u32 pause_thresh12;
+ nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu);
+
+ /* Enter Guest-Mode */
+ enter_guest_mode(vcpu);
+
/*
* Filled at exit: exit_code, exit_code_hi, exit_info_1, exit_info_2,
* exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, next_rip, insn_len, insn_bytes.
@@ -762,11 +767,6 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
}
}
- nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu);
-
- /* Enter Guest-Mode */
- enter_guest_mode(vcpu);
-
/*
* Merge guest and host intercepts - must be called with vcpu in
* guest-mode to take effect.
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021815-protract-greasily-cdea@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2025 17:18:33 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering
.vcpu_run() loop
Move the conditional loading of hardware DR6 with the guest's DR6 value
out of the core .vcpu_run() loop to fix a bug where KVM can load hardware
with a stale vcpu->arch.dr6.
When the guest accesses a DR and host userspace isn't debugging the guest,
KVM disables DR interception and loads the guest's values into hardware on
VM-Enter and saves them on VM-Exit. This allows the guest to access DRs
at will, e.g. so that a sequence of DR accesses to configure a breakpoint
only generates one VM-Exit.
For DR0-DR3, the logic/behavior is identical between VMX and SVM, and also
identical between KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED (userspace debugging the guest)
and KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT (guest using DRs), and so KVM handles loading
DR0-DR3 in common code, _outside_ of the core kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run() loop.
But for DR6, the guest's value doesn't need to be loaded into hardware for
KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED, and SVM provides a dedicated VMCB field whereas
VMX requires software to manually load the guest value, and so loading the
guest's value into DR6 is handled by {svm,vmx}_vcpu_run(), i.e. is done
_inside_ the core run loop.
Unfortunately, saving the guest values on VM-Exit is initiated by common
x86, again outside of the core run loop. If the guest modifies DR6 (in
hardware, when DR interception is disabled), and then the next VM-Exit is
a fastpath VM-Exit, KVM will reload hardware DR6 with vcpu->arch.dr6 and
clobber the guest's actual value.
The bug shows up primarily with nested VMX because KVM handles the VMX
preemption timer in the fastpath, and the window between hardware DR6
being modified (in guest context) and DR6 being read by guest software is
orders of magnitude larger in a nested setup. E.g. in non-nested, the
VMX preemption timer would need to fire precisely between #DB injection
and the #DB handler's read of DR6, whereas with a KVM-on-KVM setup, the
window where hardware DR6 is "dirty" extends all the way from L1 writing
DR6 to VMRESUME (in L1).
L1's view:
==========
<L1 disables DR interception>
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640961: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
A: L1 Writes DR6
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640963: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff1
B: CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640967: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT intr_info 0x800000ec
D: L1 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640969: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640976: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
L2 reads DR6, L1 disables DR interception
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640980: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L2 detects failure
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640987: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason HLT
L1 reads DR6 (confirms failure)
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640990: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L0's view:
==========
L2 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
L2 => L1 nested VM-Exit
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason: DR_ACCESS ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
L1 writes DR7, L0 disables DR interception
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000007
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6)
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
A: <L1 writes DR6 = 1, no interception, arch.dr6 is still '0'>
B: CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason PREEMPTION_TIMER
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
C: L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6)
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L1 => L2 nested VM-Enter
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005616: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMRESUME
L0 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
Reported-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com>
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANDhNCq5_F3HfFYABqFGCA1bPd_%2BxgNj-iDQhH4tDk%2Bw…
Fixes: 375e28ffc0cf ("KVM: X86: Set host DR6 only on VMX and for KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT")
Fixes: d67668e9dd76 ("KVM: x86, SVM: isolate vcpu->arch.dr6 from vmcb->save.dr6")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com>
Tested-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250125011833.3644371-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index c35550581da0..823c0434bbad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(set_idt)
KVM_X86_OP(get_gdt)
KVM_X86_OP(set_gdt)
KVM_X86_OP(sync_dirty_debug_regs)
+KVM_X86_OP(set_dr6)
KVM_X86_OP(set_dr7)
KVM_X86_OP(cache_reg)
KVM_X86_OP(get_rflags)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index b15cde0a9b5c..0b7af5902ff7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1696,6 +1696,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*get_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void (*set_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void (*sync_dirty_debug_regs)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ void (*set_dr6)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value);
void (*set_dr7)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value);
void (*cache_reg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
unsigned long (*get_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7640a84e554a..a713c803a3a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1991,11 +1991,11 @@ static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
svm->asid = sd->next_asid++;
}
-static void svm_set_dr6(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long value)
+static void svm_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value)
{
- struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb;
- if (svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected)
+ if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
return;
if (unlikely(value != vmcb->save.dr6)) {
@@ -4247,10 +4247,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
* Run with all-zero DR6 unless needed, so that we can get the exact cause
* of a #DB.
*/
- if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
- svm_set_dr6(svm, vcpu->arch.dr6);
- else
- svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
+ if (likely(!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)))
+ svm_set_dr6(vcpu, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
clgi();
kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
@@ -5043,6 +5041,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.set_idt = svm_set_idt,
.get_gdt = svm_get_gdt,
.set_gdt = svm_set_gdt,
+ .set_dr6 = svm_set_dr6,
.set_dr7 = svm_set_dr7,
.sync_dirty_debug_regs = svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
.cache_reg = svm_cache_reg,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 2427f918e763..43ee9ed11291 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
.get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
.set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
+ .set_dr6 = vmx_set_dr6,
.set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
.sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
.cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f72835e85b6d..6c56d5235f0f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5648,6 +5648,12 @@ void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6);
}
+void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+ set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
+}
+
void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
{
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val);
@@ -7417,10 +7423,6 @@ fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
}
- /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */
- if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
- set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
-
/* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
* corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
* vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index ce3295a67c04..430773a5ef8e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val);
void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val);
void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 8e77e61d4fbd..02159c967d29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10961,6 +10961,9 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3);
+ /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */
+ if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
+ kvm_x86_call(set_dr6)(vcpu, vcpu->arch.dr6);
} else if (unlikely(hw_breakpoint_active())) {
set_debugreg(0, 7);
}
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021812-candied-hamper-7f08@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2025 17:18:33 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering
.vcpu_run() loop
Move the conditional loading of hardware DR6 with the guest's DR6 value
out of the core .vcpu_run() loop to fix a bug where KVM can load hardware
with a stale vcpu->arch.dr6.
When the guest accesses a DR and host userspace isn't debugging the guest,
KVM disables DR interception and loads the guest's values into hardware on
VM-Enter and saves them on VM-Exit. This allows the guest to access DRs
at will, e.g. so that a sequence of DR accesses to configure a breakpoint
only generates one VM-Exit.
For DR0-DR3, the logic/behavior is identical between VMX and SVM, and also
identical between KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED (userspace debugging the guest)
and KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT (guest using DRs), and so KVM handles loading
DR0-DR3 in common code, _outside_ of the core kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run() loop.
But for DR6, the guest's value doesn't need to be loaded into hardware for
KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED, and SVM provides a dedicated VMCB field whereas
VMX requires software to manually load the guest value, and so loading the
guest's value into DR6 is handled by {svm,vmx}_vcpu_run(), i.e. is done
_inside_ the core run loop.
Unfortunately, saving the guest values on VM-Exit is initiated by common
x86, again outside of the core run loop. If the guest modifies DR6 (in
hardware, when DR interception is disabled), and then the next VM-Exit is
a fastpath VM-Exit, KVM will reload hardware DR6 with vcpu->arch.dr6 and
clobber the guest's actual value.
The bug shows up primarily with nested VMX because KVM handles the VMX
preemption timer in the fastpath, and the window between hardware DR6
being modified (in guest context) and DR6 being read by guest software is
orders of magnitude larger in a nested setup. E.g. in non-nested, the
VMX preemption timer would need to fire precisely between #DB injection
and the #DB handler's read of DR6, whereas with a KVM-on-KVM setup, the
window where hardware DR6 is "dirty" extends all the way from L1 writing
DR6 to VMRESUME (in L1).
L1's view:
==========
<L1 disables DR interception>
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640961: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
A: L1 Writes DR6
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640963: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff1
B: CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640967: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT intr_info 0x800000ec
D: L1 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640969: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640976: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
L2 reads DR6, L1 disables DR interception
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640980: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L2 detects failure
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640987: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason HLT
L1 reads DR6 (confirms failure)
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640990: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L0's view:
==========
L2 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
L2 => L1 nested VM-Exit
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason: DR_ACCESS ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
L1 writes DR7, L0 disables DR interception
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000007
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6)
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
A: <L1 writes DR6 = 1, no interception, arch.dr6 is still '0'>
B: CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason PREEMPTION_TIMER
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
C: L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6)
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L1 => L2 nested VM-Enter
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005616: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMRESUME
L0 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
Reported-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com>
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANDhNCq5_F3HfFYABqFGCA1bPd_%2BxgNj-iDQhH4tDk%2Bw…
Fixes: 375e28ffc0cf ("KVM: X86: Set host DR6 only on VMX and for KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT")
Fixes: d67668e9dd76 ("KVM: x86, SVM: isolate vcpu->arch.dr6 from vmcb->save.dr6")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com>
Tested-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250125011833.3644371-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index c35550581da0..823c0434bbad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(set_idt)
KVM_X86_OP(get_gdt)
KVM_X86_OP(set_gdt)
KVM_X86_OP(sync_dirty_debug_regs)
+KVM_X86_OP(set_dr6)
KVM_X86_OP(set_dr7)
KVM_X86_OP(cache_reg)
KVM_X86_OP(get_rflags)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index b15cde0a9b5c..0b7af5902ff7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1696,6 +1696,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*get_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void (*set_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void (*sync_dirty_debug_regs)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ void (*set_dr6)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value);
void (*set_dr7)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value);
void (*cache_reg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
unsigned long (*get_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7640a84e554a..a713c803a3a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1991,11 +1991,11 @@ static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
svm->asid = sd->next_asid++;
}
-static void svm_set_dr6(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long value)
+static void svm_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value)
{
- struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb;
- if (svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected)
+ if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
return;
if (unlikely(value != vmcb->save.dr6)) {
@@ -4247,10 +4247,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
* Run with all-zero DR6 unless needed, so that we can get the exact cause
* of a #DB.
*/
- if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
- svm_set_dr6(svm, vcpu->arch.dr6);
- else
- svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
+ if (likely(!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)))
+ svm_set_dr6(vcpu, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
clgi();
kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
@@ -5043,6 +5041,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.set_idt = svm_set_idt,
.get_gdt = svm_get_gdt,
.set_gdt = svm_set_gdt,
+ .set_dr6 = svm_set_dr6,
.set_dr7 = svm_set_dr7,
.sync_dirty_debug_regs = svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
.cache_reg = svm_cache_reg,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 2427f918e763..43ee9ed11291 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
.get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
.set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
+ .set_dr6 = vmx_set_dr6,
.set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
.sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
.cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f72835e85b6d..6c56d5235f0f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5648,6 +5648,12 @@ void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6);
}
+void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+ set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
+}
+
void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
{
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val);
@@ -7417,10 +7423,6 @@ fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
}
- /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */
- if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
- set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
-
/* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
* corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
* vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index ce3295a67c04..430773a5ef8e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val);
void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val);
void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 8e77e61d4fbd..02159c967d29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10961,6 +10961,9 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3);
+ /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */
+ if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
+ kvm_x86_call(set_dr6)(vcpu, vcpu->arch.dr6);
} else if (unlikely(hw_breakpoint_active())) {
set_debugreg(0, 7);
}
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021809-census-mammal-224b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2025 17:18:33 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering
.vcpu_run() loop
Move the conditional loading of hardware DR6 with the guest's DR6 value
out of the core .vcpu_run() loop to fix a bug where KVM can load hardware
with a stale vcpu->arch.dr6.
When the guest accesses a DR and host userspace isn't debugging the guest,
KVM disables DR interception and loads the guest's values into hardware on
VM-Enter and saves them on VM-Exit. This allows the guest to access DRs
at will, e.g. so that a sequence of DR accesses to configure a breakpoint
only generates one VM-Exit.
For DR0-DR3, the logic/behavior is identical between VMX and SVM, and also
identical between KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED (userspace debugging the guest)
and KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT (guest using DRs), and so KVM handles loading
DR0-DR3 in common code, _outside_ of the core kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run() loop.
But for DR6, the guest's value doesn't need to be loaded into hardware for
KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED, and SVM provides a dedicated VMCB field whereas
VMX requires software to manually load the guest value, and so loading the
guest's value into DR6 is handled by {svm,vmx}_vcpu_run(), i.e. is done
_inside_ the core run loop.
Unfortunately, saving the guest values on VM-Exit is initiated by common
x86, again outside of the core run loop. If the guest modifies DR6 (in
hardware, when DR interception is disabled), and then the next VM-Exit is
a fastpath VM-Exit, KVM will reload hardware DR6 with vcpu->arch.dr6 and
clobber the guest's actual value.
The bug shows up primarily with nested VMX because KVM handles the VMX
preemption timer in the fastpath, and the window between hardware DR6
being modified (in guest context) and DR6 being read by guest software is
orders of magnitude larger in a nested setup. E.g. in non-nested, the
VMX preemption timer would need to fire precisely between #DB injection
and the #DB handler's read of DR6, whereas with a KVM-on-KVM setup, the
window where hardware DR6 is "dirty" extends all the way from L1 writing
DR6 to VMRESUME (in L1).
L1's view:
==========
<L1 disables DR interception>
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640961: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
A: L1 Writes DR6
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640963: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff1
B: CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640967: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT intr_info 0x800000ec
D: L1 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640969: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640976: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
L2 reads DR6, L1 disables DR interception
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640980: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L2 detects failure
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640987: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason HLT
L1 reads DR6 (confirms failure)
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640990: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L0's view:
==========
L2 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
L2 => L1 nested VM-Exit
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason: DR_ACCESS ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
L1 writes DR7, L0 disables DR interception
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000007
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6)
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
A: <L1 writes DR6 = 1, no interception, arch.dr6 is still '0'>
B: CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason PREEMPTION_TIMER
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
C: L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6)
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L1 => L2 nested VM-Enter
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005616: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMRESUME
L0 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
Reported-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com>
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANDhNCq5_F3HfFYABqFGCA1bPd_%2BxgNj-iDQhH4tDk%2Bw…
Fixes: 375e28ffc0cf ("KVM: X86: Set host DR6 only on VMX and for KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT")
Fixes: d67668e9dd76 ("KVM: x86, SVM: isolate vcpu->arch.dr6 from vmcb->save.dr6")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com>
Tested-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250125011833.3644371-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index c35550581da0..823c0434bbad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(set_idt)
KVM_X86_OP(get_gdt)
KVM_X86_OP(set_gdt)
KVM_X86_OP(sync_dirty_debug_regs)
+KVM_X86_OP(set_dr6)
KVM_X86_OP(set_dr7)
KVM_X86_OP(cache_reg)
KVM_X86_OP(get_rflags)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index b15cde0a9b5c..0b7af5902ff7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1696,6 +1696,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*get_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void (*set_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void (*sync_dirty_debug_regs)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ void (*set_dr6)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value);
void (*set_dr7)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value);
void (*cache_reg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
unsigned long (*get_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7640a84e554a..a713c803a3a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1991,11 +1991,11 @@ static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
svm->asid = sd->next_asid++;
}
-static void svm_set_dr6(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long value)
+static void svm_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value)
{
- struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb;
- if (svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected)
+ if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
return;
if (unlikely(value != vmcb->save.dr6)) {
@@ -4247,10 +4247,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
* Run with all-zero DR6 unless needed, so that we can get the exact cause
* of a #DB.
*/
- if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
- svm_set_dr6(svm, vcpu->arch.dr6);
- else
- svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
+ if (likely(!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)))
+ svm_set_dr6(vcpu, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
clgi();
kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
@@ -5043,6 +5041,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.set_idt = svm_set_idt,
.get_gdt = svm_get_gdt,
.set_gdt = svm_set_gdt,
+ .set_dr6 = svm_set_dr6,
.set_dr7 = svm_set_dr7,
.sync_dirty_debug_regs = svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
.cache_reg = svm_cache_reg,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 2427f918e763..43ee9ed11291 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
.get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
.set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
+ .set_dr6 = vmx_set_dr6,
.set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
.sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
.cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f72835e85b6d..6c56d5235f0f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5648,6 +5648,12 @@ void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6);
}
+void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+ set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
+}
+
void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
{
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val);
@@ -7417,10 +7423,6 @@ fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
}
- /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */
- if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
- set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
-
/* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
* corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
* vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index ce3295a67c04..430773a5ef8e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val);
void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val);
void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 8e77e61d4fbd..02159c967d29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10961,6 +10961,9 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3);
+ /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */
+ if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
+ kvm_x86_call(set_dr6)(vcpu, vcpu->arch.dr6);
} else if (unlikely(hw_breakpoint_active())) {
set_debugreg(0, 7);
}
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x a8de7f100bb5989d9c3627d3a223ee1c863f3b69
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021851-nautical-buffoon-d8b1@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From a8de7f100bb5989d9c3627d3a223ee1c863f3b69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 16:34:51 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Reject Hyper-V's SEND_IPI hypercalls if local APIC
isn't in-kernel
Advertise support for Hyper-V's SEND_IPI and SEND_IPI_EX hypercalls if and
only if the local API is emulated/virtualized by KVM, and explicitly reject
said hypercalls if the local APIC is emulated in userspace, i.e. don't rely
on userspace to opt-in to KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID.
Rejecting SEND_IPI and SEND_IPI_EX fixes a NULL-pointer dereference if
Hyper-V enlightenments are exposed to the guest without an in-kernel local
APIC:
dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd
__kasan_report.cold+0x34/0x84
kasan_report+0x3a/0x50
__apic_accept_irq+0x3a/0x5c0
kvm_hv_send_ipi.isra.0+0x34e/0x820
kvm_hv_hypercall+0x8d9/0x9d0
kvm_emulate_hypercall+0x506/0x7e0
__vmx_handle_exit+0x283/0xb60
vmx_handle_exit+0x1d/0xd0
vcpu_enter_guest+0x16b0/0x24c0
vcpu_run+0xc0/0x550
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x170/0x6d0
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20
__se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160
do_syscal1_64+0x30/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
Note, checking the sending vCPU is sufficient, as the per-VM irqchip_mode
can't be modified after vCPUs are created, i.e. if one vCPU has an
in-kernel local APIC, then all vCPUs have an in-kernel local APIC.
Reported-by: Dongjie Zou <zoudongjie(a)huawei.com>
Fixes: 214ff83d4473 ("KVM: x86: hyperv: implement PV IPI send hypercalls")
Fixes: 2bc39970e932 ("x86/kvm/hyper-v: Introduce KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250118003454.2619573-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index 6a6dd5a84f22..6ebeb6cea6c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -2226,6 +2226,9 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc)
u32 vector;
bool all_cpus;
+ if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+ return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+
if (hc->code == HVCALL_SEND_IPI) {
if (!hc->fast) {
if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest(kvm, hc->ingpa, &send_ipi,
@@ -2852,7 +2855,8 @@ int kvm_get_hv_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
ent->eax |= HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED;
ent->eax |= HV_X64_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED;
ent->eax |= HV_X64_RELAXED_TIMING_RECOMMENDED;
- ent->eax |= HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED;
+ if (!vcpu || lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+ ent->eax |= HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED;
ent->eax |= HV_X64_EX_PROCESSOR_MASKS_RECOMMENDED;
if (evmcs_ver)
ent->eax |= HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED;
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x a8de7f100bb5989d9c3627d3a223ee1c863f3b69
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021850-exes-cabana-e868@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From a8de7f100bb5989d9c3627d3a223ee1c863f3b69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 16:34:51 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Reject Hyper-V's SEND_IPI hypercalls if local APIC
isn't in-kernel
Advertise support for Hyper-V's SEND_IPI and SEND_IPI_EX hypercalls if and
only if the local API is emulated/virtualized by KVM, and explicitly reject
said hypercalls if the local APIC is emulated in userspace, i.e. don't rely
on userspace to opt-in to KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID.
Rejecting SEND_IPI and SEND_IPI_EX fixes a NULL-pointer dereference if
Hyper-V enlightenments are exposed to the guest without an in-kernel local
APIC:
dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd
__kasan_report.cold+0x34/0x84
kasan_report+0x3a/0x50
__apic_accept_irq+0x3a/0x5c0
kvm_hv_send_ipi.isra.0+0x34e/0x820
kvm_hv_hypercall+0x8d9/0x9d0
kvm_emulate_hypercall+0x506/0x7e0
__vmx_handle_exit+0x283/0xb60
vmx_handle_exit+0x1d/0xd0
vcpu_enter_guest+0x16b0/0x24c0
vcpu_run+0xc0/0x550
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x170/0x6d0
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20
__se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160
do_syscal1_64+0x30/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
Note, checking the sending vCPU is sufficient, as the per-VM irqchip_mode
can't be modified after vCPUs are created, i.e. if one vCPU has an
in-kernel local APIC, then all vCPUs have an in-kernel local APIC.
Reported-by: Dongjie Zou <zoudongjie(a)huawei.com>
Fixes: 214ff83d4473 ("KVM: x86: hyperv: implement PV IPI send hypercalls")
Fixes: 2bc39970e932 ("x86/kvm/hyper-v: Introduce KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250118003454.2619573-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index 6a6dd5a84f22..6ebeb6cea6c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -2226,6 +2226,9 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc)
u32 vector;
bool all_cpus;
+ if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+ return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+
if (hc->code == HVCALL_SEND_IPI) {
if (!hc->fast) {
if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest(kvm, hc->ingpa, &send_ipi,
@@ -2852,7 +2855,8 @@ int kvm_get_hv_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
ent->eax |= HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED;
ent->eax |= HV_X64_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED;
ent->eax |= HV_X64_RELAXED_TIMING_RECOMMENDED;
- ent->eax |= HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED;
+ if (!vcpu || lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+ ent->eax |= HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED;
ent->eax |= HV_X64_EX_PROCESSOR_MASKS_RECOMMENDED;
if (evmcs_ver)
ent->eax |= HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED;
The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e977499820782ab1c69f354d9f41b6d9ad1f43d9
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021815-sublease-unneeded-0077@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e977499820782ab1c69f354d9f41b6d9ad1f43d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nirmoy Das <nirmoy.das(a)intel.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 15:36:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drm/xe: Carve out wopcm portion from the stolen memory
The top of stolen memory is WOPCM, which shouldn't be accessed. Remove
this portion from the stolen memory region for discrete platforms.
This was already done for integrated, but was missing for discrete
platforms.
This also moves get_wopcm_size() so detect_bar2_dgfx() and
detect_bar2_integrated can use the same function.
v2: Improve commit message and suitable stable version tag(Lucas)
Fixes: d8b52a02cb40 ("drm/xe: Implement stolen memory.")
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com>
Cc: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi(a)intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.11+
Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi(a)intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250210143654.2076747-1-nirm…
Signed-off-by: Nirmoy Das <nirmoy.das(a)intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2c7f45cc7e197a792ce5c693e56ea48f60b312da)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ttm_stolen_mgr.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ttm_stolen_mgr.c
index 423856cc18d4..d414421f8c13 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ttm_stolen_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ttm_stolen_mgr.c
@@ -57,38 +57,6 @@ bool xe_ttm_stolen_cpu_access_needs_ggtt(struct xe_device *xe)
return GRAPHICS_VERx100(xe) < 1270 && !IS_DGFX(xe);
}
-static s64 detect_bar2_dgfx(struct xe_device *xe, struct xe_ttm_stolen_mgr *mgr)
-{
- struct xe_tile *tile = xe_device_get_root_tile(xe);
- struct xe_mmio *mmio = xe_root_tile_mmio(xe);
- struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(xe->drm.dev);
- u64 stolen_size;
- u64 tile_offset;
- u64 tile_size;
-
- tile_offset = tile->mem.vram.io_start - xe->mem.vram.io_start;
- tile_size = tile->mem.vram.actual_physical_size;
-
- /* Use DSM base address instead for stolen memory */
- mgr->stolen_base = (xe_mmio_read64_2x32(mmio, DSMBASE) & BDSM_MASK) - tile_offset;
- if (drm_WARN_ON(&xe->drm, tile_size < mgr->stolen_base))
- return 0;
-
- stolen_size = tile_size - mgr->stolen_base;
-
- /* Verify usage fits in the actual resource available */
- if (mgr->stolen_base + stolen_size <= pci_resource_len(pdev, LMEM_BAR))
- mgr->io_base = tile->mem.vram.io_start + mgr->stolen_base;
-
- /*
- * There may be few KB of platform dependent reserved memory at the end
- * of vram which is not part of the DSM. Such reserved memory portion is
- * always less then DSM granularity so align down the stolen_size to DSM
- * granularity to accommodate such reserve vram portion.
- */
- return ALIGN_DOWN(stolen_size, SZ_1M);
-}
-
static u32 get_wopcm_size(struct xe_device *xe)
{
u32 wopcm_size;
@@ -112,6 +80,44 @@ static u32 get_wopcm_size(struct xe_device *xe)
return wopcm_size;
}
+static s64 detect_bar2_dgfx(struct xe_device *xe, struct xe_ttm_stolen_mgr *mgr)
+{
+ struct xe_tile *tile = xe_device_get_root_tile(xe);
+ struct xe_mmio *mmio = xe_root_tile_mmio(xe);
+ struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(xe->drm.dev);
+ u64 stolen_size, wopcm_size;
+ u64 tile_offset;
+ u64 tile_size;
+
+ tile_offset = tile->mem.vram.io_start - xe->mem.vram.io_start;
+ tile_size = tile->mem.vram.actual_physical_size;
+
+ /* Use DSM base address instead for stolen memory */
+ mgr->stolen_base = (xe_mmio_read64_2x32(mmio, DSMBASE) & BDSM_MASK) - tile_offset;
+ if (drm_WARN_ON(&xe->drm, tile_size < mgr->stolen_base))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Carve out the top of DSM as it contains the reserved WOPCM region */
+ wopcm_size = get_wopcm_size(xe);
+ if (drm_WARN_ON(&xe->drm, !wopcm_size))
+ return 0;
+
+ stolen_size = tile_size - mgr->stolen_base;
+ stolen_size -= wopcm_size;
+
+ /* Verify usage fits in the actual resource available */
+ if (mgr->stolen_base + stolen_size <= pci_resource_len(pdev, LMEM_BAR))
+ mgr->io_base = tile->mem.vram.io_start + mgr->stolen_base;
+
+ /*
+ * There may be few KB of platform dependent reserved memory at the end
+ * of vram which is not part of the DSM. Such reserved memory portion is
+ * always less then DSM granularity so align down the stolen_size to DSM
+ * granularity to accommodate such reserve vram portion.
+ */
+ return ALIGN_DOWN(stolen_size, SZ_1M);
+}
+
static u32 detect_bar2_integrated(struct xe_device *xe, struct xe_ttm_stolen_mgr *mgr)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(xe->drm.dev);
There are some issues with the enetc driver, some of which are specific
to the LS1028A platform, and some of which were introduced recently when
i.MX95 ENETC support was added, so this patch set aims to clean up those
issues.
Wei Fang (8):
net: enetc: fix the off-by-one issue in enetc_map_tx_buffs()
net: enetc: correct the tx_swbd statistics
net: enetc: correct the xdp_tx statistics
net: enetc: VFs do not support HWTSTAMP_TX_ONESTEP_SYNC
net: enetc: update UDP checksum when updating originTimestamp field
net: enetc: add missing enetc4_link_deinit()
net: enetc: remove the mm_lock from the ENETC v4 driver
net: enetc: correct the EMDIO base offset for ENETC v4
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c | 53 +++++++++++++++----
.../net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc4_hw.h | 3 ++
.../net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc4_pf.c | 2 +-
.../ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_ethtool.c | 7 ++-
.../freescale/enetc/enetc_pf_common.c | 10 +++-
5 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--
2.34.1
From: Ge Yang <yangge1116(a)126.com>
Since the introduction of commit b65d4adbc0f0 ("mm: hugetlb: defer freeing
of HugeTLB pages"), which supports deferring the freeing of HugeTLB pages,
the allocation of contiguous memory through cma_alloc() may fail
probabilistically.
In the CMA allocation process, if it is found that the CMA area is occupied
by in-use hugepage folios, these in-use hugepage folios need to be migrated
to another location. When there are no available hugepage folios in the
free HugeTLB pool during the migration of in-use HugeTLB pages, new folios
are allocated from the buddy system. A temporary state is set on the newly
allocated folio. Upon completion of the hugepage folio migration, the
temporary state is transferred from the new folios to the old folios.
Normally, when the old folios with the temporary state are freed, it is
directly released back to the buddy system. However, due to the deferred
freeing of HugeTLB pages, the PageBuddy() check fails, ultimately leading
to the failure of cma_alloc().
Here is a simplified call trace illustrating the process:
cma_alloc()
->__alloc_contig_migrate_range() // Migrate in-use hugepage
->unmap_and_move_huge_page()
->folio_putback_hugetlb() // Free old folios
->test_pages_isolated()
->__test_page_isolated_in_pageblock()
->PageBuddy(page) // Check if the page is in buddy
To resolve this issue, we have implemented a function named
wait_for_hugepage_folios_freed(). This function ensures that the hugepage
folios are properly released back to the buddy system after their migration
is completed. By invoking wait_for_hugepage_folios_freed() following the
migration process, we guarantee that when test_pages_isolated() is
executed, it will successfully pass.
Fixes: b65d4adbc0f0 ("mm: hugetlb: defer freeing of HugeTLB pages")
Signed-off-by: Ge Yang <yangge1116(a)126.com>
---
include/linux/hugetlb.h | 5 +++++
mm/hugetlb.c | 7 +++++++
mm/migrate.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/hugetlb.h b/include/linux/hugetlb.h
index 6c6546b..c39e0d5 100644
--- a/include/linux/hugetlb.h
+++ b/include/linux/hugetlb.h
@@ -697,6 +697,7 @@ bool hugetlb_bootmem_page_zones_valid(int nid, struct huge_bootmem_page *m);
int isolate_or_dissolve_huge_page(struct page *page, struct list_head *list);
int replace_free_hugepage_folios(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn);
+void wait_for_hugepage_folios_freed(struct hstate *h);
struct folio *alloc_hugetlb_folio(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr, bool cow_from_owner);
struct folio *alloc_hugetlb_folio_nodemask(struct hstate *h, int preferred_nid,
@@ -1092,6 +1093,10 @@ static inline int replace_free_hugepage_folios(unsigned long start_pfn,
return 0;
}
+static inline void wait_for_hugepage_folios_freed(struct hstate *h)
+{
+}
+
static inline struct folio *alloc_hugetlb_folio(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr,
bool cow_from_owner)
diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c
index 30bc34d..64cae39 100644
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c
+++ b/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -2955,6 +2955,13 @@ int replace_free_hugepage_folios(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
return ret;
}
+void wait_for_hugepage_folios_freed(struct hstate *h)
+{
+ WARN_ON(!h);
+
+ flush_free_hpage_work(h);
+}
+
typedef enum {
/*
* For either 0/1: we checked the per-vma resv map, and one resv
diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c
index fb19a18..5dd1851 100644
--- a/mm/migrate.c
+++ b/mm/migrate.c
@@ -1448,6 +1448,7 @@ static int unmap_and_move_huge_page(new_folio_t get_new_folio,
int page_was_mapped = 0;
struct anon_vma *anon_vma = NULL;
struct address_space *mapping = NULL;
+ unsigned long size;
if (folio_ref_count(src) == 1) {
/* page was freed from under us. So we are done. */
@@ -1533,9 +1534,20 @@ static int unmap_and_move_huge_page(new_folio_t get_new_folio,
out_unlock:
folio_unlock(src);
out:
- if (rc == MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS)
+ if (rc == MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS) {
+ size = folio_size(src);
folio_putback_hugetlb(src);
- else if (rc != -EAGAIN)
+
+ /*
+ * Due to the deferred freeing of HugeTLB folios, the hugepage 'src' may
+ * not immediately release to the buddy system. This can lead to failure
+ * in allocating memory through the cma_alloc() function. To ensure that
+ * the hugepage folios are properly released back to the buddy system,
+ * we invoke the wait_for_hugepage_folios_freed() function to wait for
+ * the release to complete.
+ */
+ wait_for_hugepage_folios_freed(size_to_hstate(size));
+ } else if (rc != -EAGAIN)
list_move_tail(&src->lru, ret);
/*
--
2.7.4
From: Stefan Eichenberger <stefan.eichenberger(a)toradex.com>
The current solution for powering off the Apalis iMX6 is not functioning
as intended. To resolve this, it is necessary to power off the
vgen2_reg, which will also set the POWER_ENABLE_MOCI signal to a low
state. This ensures the carrier board is properly informed to initiate
its power-off sequence.
The new solution uses the regulator-poweroff driver, which will power
off the regulator during a system shutdown.
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4eb56e26f92e ("ARM: dts: imx6q-apalis: Command pmic to standby for poweroff")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Eichenberger <stefan.eichenberger(a)toradex.com>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/nxp/imx/imx6qdl-apalis.dtsi | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/nxp/imx/imx6qdl-apalis.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/nxp/imx/imx6qdl-apalis.dtsi
index 1c72da417011..614b65821995 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/nxp/imx/imx6qdl-apalis.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/nxp/imx/imx6qdl-apalis.dtsi
@@ -108,6 +108,11 @@ lvds_panel_in: endpoint {
};
};
+ poweroff {
+ compatible = "regulator-poweroff";
+ cpu-supply = <&vgen2_reg>;
+ };
+
reg_module_3v3: regulator-module-3v3 {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-always-on;
@@ -236,10 +241,6 @@ &can2 {
status = "disabled";
};
-&clks {
- fsl,pmic-stby-poweroff;
-};
-
/* Apalis SPI1 */
&ecspi1 {
cs-gpios = <&gpio5 25 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
@@ -527,7 +528,6 @@ &i2c2 {
pmic: pmic@8 {
compatible = "fsl,pfuze100";
- fsl,pmic-stby-poweroff;
reg = <0x08>;
regulators {
--
2.45.2
The desired clock frequency was correctly set to 400MHz in the device tree
but was lowered by the driver to 300MHz breaking 4K 60Hz content playback.
Fix the issue by removing the driver call to clk_set_rate(), which reduce
the amount of board specific code.
Fixes: 003afda97c65 ("media: verisilicon: Enable AV1 decoder on rk3588")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dufresne <nicolas.dufresne(a)collabora.com>
---
This patch fixes user report of AV1 4K60 decoder not being fast enough
on RK3588 based SoC. This is a break from Hantro original authors
habbit of coding the frequencies in the driver instead of specifying this
frequency in the device tree. The other calls to clk_set_rate() are left
since this would require modifying many dtsi files, which would then be
unsuitable for backport.
---
Changes in v2:
- Completely remove the unused init function, the driver is null-safe
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217-b4-hantro-av1-clock-rate-v1-1-65b91132c5…
---
drivers/media/platform/verisilicon/rockchip_vpu_hw.c | 9 ---------
1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/verisilicon/rockchip_vpu_hw.c b/drivers/media/platform/verisilicon/rockchip_vpu_hw.c
index 964122e7c355934cd80eb442219f6ba51bba8b71..842040f713c15e6ff295771bc9fa5a7b66e584b2 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/verisilicon/rockchip_vpu_hw.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/verisilicon/rockchip_vpu_hw.c
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
#define RK3066_ACLK_MAX_FREQ (300 * 1000 * 1000)
#define RK3288_ACLK_MAX_FREQ (400 * 1000 * 1000)
-#define RK3588_ACLK_MAX_FREQ (300 * 1000 * 1000)
#define ROCKCHIP_VPU981_MIN_SIZE 64
@@ -440,13 +439,6 @@ static int rk3066_vpu_hw_init(struct hantro_dev *vpu)
return 0;
}
-static int rk3588_vpu981_hw_init(struct hantro_dev *vpu)
-{
- /* Bump ACLKs to max. possible freq. to improve performance. */
- clk_set_rate(vpu->clocks[0].clk, RK3588_ACLK_MAX_FREQ);
- return 0;
-}
-
static int rockchip_vpu_hw_init(struct hantro_dev *vpu)
{
/* Bump ACLK to max. possible freq. to improve performance. */
@@ -807,7 +799,6 @@ const struct hantro_variant rk3588_vpu981_variant = {
.codec_ops = rk3588_vpu981_codec_ops,
.irqs = rk3588_vpu981_irqs,
.num_irqs = ARRAY_SIZE(rk3588_vpu981_irqs),
- .init = rk3588_vpu981_hw_init,
.clk_names = rk3588_vpu981_vpu_clk_names,
.num_clocks = ARRAY_SIZE(rk3588_vpu981_vpu_clk_names)
};
---
base-commit: 2014c95afecee3e76ca4a56956a936e23283f05b
change-id: 20250217-b4-hantro-av1-clock-rate-e5497f1499df
Best regards,
--
Nicolas Dufresne <nicolas.dufresne(a)collabora.com>
Our CI built linux-stable-rc.git queue/6.1 at commit eef4a8a45ba1
("btrfs: output the reason for open_ctree() failure").
(built for arm and arm64, albeit I don't think it matters.)
Building perf produced 2 build errors which I wanted to report
even before the RC1 is out.
| ...tools/perf/util/namespaces.c:247:27: error: invalid type argument of '->' (have 'int')
| 247 | RC_CHK_ACCESS(nsi)->in_pidns = true;
| | ^~
introduced by commit 93520bacf784 ("perf namespaces: Introduce
nsinfo__set_in_pidns()"). The RC_CK_ACCSS macro was introduced in 6.4.
Removing the macro made this go away ( nsi->in_pidns = true; ).
Second perf build error:
| ld: ...tools/perf/util/machine.c:1176: undefined reference to `kallsyms__get_symbol_start'
Introduced by commits:
710c2e913aa9 perf machine: Don't ignore _etext when not a text symbol
69a87a32f5cd perf machine: Include data symbols in the kernel map
These two use the function kallsyms__get_symbol_start added with:
f9dd531c5b82 perf symbols: Add kallsyms__get_symbol_start()
So f9dd531c5b82 would additionally be needed.
The kernel itself built fine, due to the perf error we don't have runtime
testresults.
Best regards
Max
I'm announcing the release of the 6.12.15 kernel.
This is ONLY needed for users of the XFS filesystem. If you do not use
XFS, no need to upgrade. If you do use XFS, please upgrade.
The updated 6.12.y git tree can be found at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux-6.12.y
and can be browsed at the normal kernel.org git web browser:
https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git;a=summary
thanks,
greg k-h
------------
Makefile | 2 +-
fs/xfs/xfs_quota.h | 5 +++--
fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c | 10 +++-------
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Darrick J. Wong (1):
xfs: don't lose solo dquot update transactions
Greg Kroah-Hartman (1):
Linux 6.12.15
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm: pgtable: fix incorrect reclaim of non-empty PTE pages
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-pgtable-fix-incorrect-reclaim-of-non-empty-pte-pages.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Subject: mm: pgtable: fix incorrect reclaim of non-empty PTE pages
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 15:26:25 +0800
In zap_pte_range(), if the pte lock was released midway, the pte entries
may be refilled with physical pages by another thread, which may cause a
non-empty PTE page to be reclaimed and eventually cause the system to
crash.
To fix it, fall back to the slow path in this case to recheck if all pte
entries are still none.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250211072625.89188-1-zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com
Fixes: 6375e95f381e ("mm: pgtable: reclaim empty PTE page in madvise(MADV_DONTNEED)")
Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250207-anbot-bankfilialen-acce9d79a2c7@braune…
Reported-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs(a)gmx.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/152296f3-5c81-4a94-97f3-004108fba7be@gmx.com/
Tested-by: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david(a)fromorbit.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memory.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/memory.c~mm-pgtable-fix-incorrect-reclaim-of-non-empty-pte-pages
+++ a/mm/memory.c
@@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ static unsigned long zap_pte_range(struc
pmd_t pmdval;
unsigned long start = addr;
bool can_reclaim_pt = reclaim_pt_is_enabled(start, end, details);
- bool direct_reclaim = false;
+ bool direct_reclaim = true;
int nr;
retry:
@@ -1734,8 +1734,10 @@ retry:
do {
bool any_skipped = false;
- if (need_resched())
+ if (need_resched()) {
+ direct_reclaim = false;
break;
+ }
nr = do_zap_pte_range(tlb, vma, pte, addr, end, details, rss,
&force_flush, &force_break, &any_skipped);
@@ -1743,11 +1745,20 @@ retry:
can_reclaim_pt = false;
if (unlikely(force_break)) {
addr += nr * PAGE_SIZE;
+ direct_reclaim = false;
break;
}
} while (pte += nr, addr += PAGE_SIZE * nr, addr != end);
- if (can_reclaim_pt && addr == end)
+ /*
+ * Fast path: try to hold the pmd lock and unmap the PTE page.
+ *
+ * If the pte lock was released midway (retry case), or if the attempt
+ * to hold the pmd lock failed, then we need to recheck all pte entries
+ * to ensure they are still none, thereby preventing the pte entries
+ * from being repopulated by another thread.
+ */
+ if (can_reclaim_pt && direct_reclaim && addr == end)
direct_reclaim = try_get_and_clear_pmd(mm, pmd, &pmdval);
add_mm_rss_vec(mm, rss);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com are
arm-pgtable-fix-null-pointer-dereference-issue.patch
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm,madvise,hugetlb: check for 0-length range after end address adjustment
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mmmadvisehugetlb-check-for-0-length-range-after-end-address-adjustment.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Ricardo Ca��uelo Navarro <rcn(a)igalia.com>
Subject: mm,madvise,hugetlb: check for 0-length range after end address adjustment
Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2025 08:52:06 +0100
Add a sanity check to madvise_dontneed_free() to address a corner case in
madvise where a race condition causes the current vma being processed to
be backed by a different page size.
During a madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) call on a memory region registered with a
userfaultfd, there's a period of time where the process mm lock is
temporarily released in order to send a UFFD_EVENT_REMOVE and let
userspace handle the event. During this time, the vma covering the
current address range may change due to an explicit mmap done concurrently
by another thread.
If, after that change, the memory region, which was originally backed by
4KB pages, is now backed by hugepages, the end address is rounded down to
a hugepage boundary to avoid data loss (see "Fixes" below). This rounding
may cause the end address to be truncated to the same address as the
start.
Make this corner case follow the same semantics as in other similar cases
where the requested region has zero length (ie. return 0).
This will make madvise_walk_vmas() continue to the next vma in the range
(this time holding the process mm lock) which, due to the prev pointer
becoming stale because of the vma change, will be the same hugepage-backed
vma that was just checked before. The next time madvise_dontneed_free()
runs for this vma, if the start address isn't aligned to a hugepage
boundary, it'll return -EINVAL, which is also in line with the madvise
api.
From userspace perspective, madvise() will return EINVAL because the start
address isn't aligned according to the new vma alignment requirements
(hugepage), even though it was correctly page-aligned when the call was
issued.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250203075206.1452208-1-rcn@igalia.com
Fixes: 8ebe0a5eaaeb ("mm,madvise,hugetlb: fix unexpected data loss with MADV_DONTNEED on hugetlbfs")
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ca��uelo Navarro <rcn(a)igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Cc: Florent Revest <revest(a)google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)surriel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/madvise.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/madvise.c~mmmadvisehugetlb-check-for-0-length-range-after-end-address-adjustment
+++ a/mm/madvise.c
@@ -933,7 +933,16 @@ static long madvise_dontneed_free(struct
*/
end = vma->vm_end;
}
- VM_WARN_ON(start >= end);
+ /*
+ * If the memory region between start and end was
+ * originally backed by 4kB pages and then remapped to
+ * be backed by hugepages while mmap_lock was dropped,
+ * the adjustment for hugetlb vma above may have rounded
+ * end down to the start address.
+ */
+ if (start == end)
+ return 0;
+ VM_WARN_ON(start > end);
}
if (behavior == MADV_DONTNEED || behavior == MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED)
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from rcn(a)igalia.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm/zswap: fix inconsistency when zswap_store_page() fails
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-zswap-fix-inconsistency-when-zswap_store_page-fails.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo(a)gmail.com>
Subject: mm/zswap: fix inconsistency when zswap_store_page() fails
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2025 19:08:44 +0900
Commit b7c0ccdfbafd ("mm: zswap: support large folios in zswap_store()")
skips charging any zswap entries when it failed to zswap the entire folio.
However, when some base pages are zswapped but it failed to zswap the
entire folio, the zswap operation is rolled back. When freeing zswap
entries for those pages, zswap_entry_free() uncharges the zswap entries
that were not previously charged, causing zswap charging to become
inconsistent.
This inconsistency triggers two warnings with following steps:
# On a machine with 64GiB of RAM and 36GiB of zswap
$ stress-ng --bigheap 2 # wait until the OOM-killer kills stress-ng
$ sudo reboot
The two warnings are:
in mm/memcontrol.c:163, function obj_cgroup_release():
WARN_ON_ONCE(nr_bytes & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
in mm/page_counter.c:60, function page_counter_cancel():
if (WARN_ONCE(new < 0, "page_counter underflow: %ld nr_pages=%lu\n",
new, nr_pages))
zswap_stored_pages also becomes inconsistent in the same way.
As suggested by Kanchana, increment zswap_stored_pages and charge zswap
entries within zswap_store_page() when it succeeds. This way,
zswap_entry_free() will decrement the counter and uncharge the entries
when it failed to zswap the entire folio.
While this could potentially be optimized by batching objcg charging and
incrementing the counter, let's focus on fixing the bug this time and
leave the optimization for later after some evaluation.
After resolving the inconsistency, the warnings disappear.
[42.hyeyoo(a)gmail.com: refactor zswap_store_page()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250131082037.2426-1-42.hyeyoo@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250129100844.2935-1-42.hyeyoo@gmail.com
Fixes: b7c0ccdfbafd ("mm: zswap: support large folios in zswap_store()")
Co-developed-by: Kanchana P Sridhar <kanchana.p.sridhar(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kanchana P Sridhar <kanchana.p.sridhar(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo(a)gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev>
Acked-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/zswap.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/zswap.c~mm-zswap-fix-inconsistency-when-zswap_store_page-fails
+++ a/mm/zswap.c
@@ -1445,9 +1445,9 @@ resched:
* main API
**********************************/
-static ssize_t zswap_store_page(struct page *page,
- struct obj_cgroup *objcg,
- struct zswap_pool *pool)
+static bool zswap_store_page(struct page *page,
+ struct obj_cgroup *objcg,
+ struct zswap_pool *pool)
{
swp_entry_t page_swpentry = page_swap_entry(page);
struct zswap_entry *entry, *old;
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ static ssize_t zswap_store_page(struct p
entry = zswap_entry_cache_alloc(GFP_KERNEL, page_to_nid(page));
if (!entry) {
zswap_reject_kmemcache_fail++;
- return -EINVAL;
+ return false;
}
if (!zswap_compress(page, entry, pool))
@@ -1483,13 +1483,17 @@ static ssize_t zswap_store_page(struct p
/*
* The entry is successfully compressed and stored in the tree, there is
- * no further possibility of failure. Grab refs to the pool and objcg.
- * These refs will be dropped by zswap_entry_free() when the entry is
- * removed from the tree.
+ * no further possibility of failure. Grab refs to the pool and objcg,
+ * charge zswap memory, and increment zswap_stored_pages.
+ * The opposite actions will be performed by zswap_entry_free()
+ * when the entry is removed from the tree.
*/
zswap_pool_get(pool);
- if (objcg)
+ if (objcg) {
obj_cgroup_get(objcg);
+ obj_cgroup_charge_zswap(objcg, entry->length);
+ }
+ atomic_long_inc(&zswap_stored_pages);
/*
* We finish initializing the entry while it's already in xarray.
@@ -1510,13 +1514,13 @@ static ssize_t zswap_store_page(struct p
zswap_lru_add(&zswap_list_lru, entry);
}
- return entry->length;
+ return true;
store_failed:
zpool_free(pool->zpool, entry->handle);
compress_failed:
zswap_entry_cache_free(entry);
- return -EINVAL;
+ return false;
}
bool zswap_store(struct folio *folio)
@@ -1526,7 +1530,6 @@ bool zswap_store(struct folio *folio)
struct obj_cgroup *objcg = NULL;
struct mem_cgroup *memcg = NULL;
struct zswap_pool *pool;
- size_t compressed_bytes = 0;
bool ret = false;
long index;
@@ -1564,20 +1567,14 @@ bool zswap_store(struct folio *folio)
for (index = 0; index < nr_pages; ++index) {
struct page *page = folio_page(folio, index);
- ssize_t bytes;
- bytes = zswap_store_page(page, objcg, pool);
- if (bytes < 0)
+ if (!zswap_store_page(page, objcg, pool))
goto put_pool;
- compressed_bytes += bytes;
}
- if (objcg) {
- obj_cgroup_charge_zswap(objcg, compressed_bytes);
+ if (objcg)
count_objcg_events(objcg, ZSWPOUT, nr_pages);
- }
- atomic_long_add(nr_pages, &zswap_stored_pages);
count_vm_events(ZSWPOUT, nr_pages);
ret = true;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from 42.hyeyoo(a)gmail.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: lib/iov_iter: fix import_iovec_ubuf iovec management
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
lib-iov_iter-fix-import_iovec_ubuf-iovec-management.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence(a)gmail.com>
Subject: lib/iov_iter: fix import_iovec_ubuf iovec management
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2025 14:13:15 +0000
import_iovec() says that it should always be fine to kfree the iovec
returned in @iovp regardless of the error code. __import_iovec_ubuf()
never reallocates it and thus should clear the pointer even in cases when
copy_iovec_*() fail.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/378ae26923ffc20fd5e41b4360d673bf47b1775b.17383324…
Fixes: 3b2deb0e46da ("iov_iter: import single vector iovecs as ITER_UBUF")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
lib/iov_iter.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/lib/iov_iter.c~lib-iov_iter-fix-import_iovec_ubuf-iovec-management
+++ a/lib/iov_iter.c
@@ -1428,6 +1428,8 @@ static ssize_t __import_iovec_ubuf(int t
struct iovec *iov = *iovp;
ssize_t ret;
+ *iovp = NULL;
+
if (compat)
ret = copy_compat_iovec_from_user(iov, uvec, 1);
else
@@ -1438,7 +1440,6 @@ static ssize_t __import_iovec_ubuf(int t
ret = import_ubuf(type, iov->iov_base, iov->iov_len, i);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
- *iovp = NULL;
return i->count;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from asml.silence(a)gmail.com are
The patch titled
Subject: hwpoison, memory_hotplug: lock folio before unmap hwpoisoned folio
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
hwpoison-memory_hotplug-lock-folio-before-unmap-hwpoisoned-folio.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com>
Subject: hwpoison, memory_hotplug: lock folio before unmap hwpoisoned folio
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 09:43:29 +0800
Commit b15c87263a69 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to
be offlined) add page poison checks in do_migrate_range in order to make
offline hwpoisoned page possible by introducing isolate_lru_page and
try_to_unmap for hwpoisoned page. However folio lock must be held before
calling try_to_unmap. Add it to fix this problem.
Warning will be produced if folio is not locked during unmap:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/swapops.h:400!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00016-g3c434c7ee82a-dirty #41
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c
lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c
Call trace:
try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c (P)
try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L)
rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8
rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58
try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90
unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8
do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568
offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670
memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374
memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78
device_offline+0xa4/0xd0
state_store+0x8c/0xf0
dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c
sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8
vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc
ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8
__arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Code: f9407be0 b5fff320 d4210000 17ffff97 (d4210000)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217014329.3610326-4-mawupeng1@huawei.com
Fixes: b15c87263a69 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined")
Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memory_hotplug.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c~hwpoison-memory_hotplug-lock-folio-before-unmap-hwpoisoned-folio
+++ a/mm/memory_hotplug.c
@@ -1832,8 +1832,11 @@ static void do_migrate_range(unsigned lo
(folio_test_large(folio) && folio_test_has_hwpoisoned(folio))) {
if (WARN_ON(folio_test_lru(folio)))
folio_isolate_lru(folio);
- if (folio_mapped(folio))
+ if (folio_mapped(folio)) {
+ folio_lock(folio);
unmap_poisoned_folio(folio, pfn, false);
+ folio_unlock(folio);
+ }
goto put_folio;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from mawupeng1(a)huawei.com are
mm-memory-failure-update-ttu-flag-inside-unmap_poisoned_folio.patch
mm-memory-hotplug-check-folio-ref-count-first-in-do_migrate_range.patch
hwpoison-memory_hotplug-lock-folio-before-unmap-hwpoisoned-folio.patch
The patch titled
Subject: mm: memory-hotplug: check folio ref count first in do_migrate_range
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
mm-memory-hotplug-check-folio-ref-count-first-in-do_migrate_range.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com>
Subject: mm: memory-hotplug: check folio ref count first in do_migrate_range
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 09:43:28 +0800
If a folio has an increased reference count, folio_try_get() will acquire
it, perform necessary operations, and then release it. In the case of a
poisoned folio without an elevated reference count (which is unlikely for
memory-failure), folio_try_get() will simply bypass it.
Therefore, relocate the folio_try_get() function, responsible for checking
and acquiring this reference count at first.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217014329.3610326-3-mawupeng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memory_hotplug.c | 20 +++++++-------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c~mm-memory-hotplug-check-folio-ref-count-first-in-do_migrate_range
+++ a/mm/memory_hotplug.c
@@ -1822,12 +1822,12 @@ static void do_migrate_range(unsigned lo
if (folio_test_large(folio))
pfn = folio_pfn(folio) + folio_nr_pages(folio) - 1;
- /*
- * HWPoison pages have elevated reference counts so the migration would
- * fail on them. It also doesn't make any sense to migrate them in the
- * first place. Still try to unmap such a page in case it is still mapped
- * (keep the unmap as the catch all safety net).
- */
+ if (!folio_try_get(folio))
+ continue;
+
+ if (unlikely(page_folio(page) != folio))
+ goto put_folio;
+
if (folio_test_hwpoison(folio) ||
(folio_test_large(folio) && folio_test_has_hwpoisoned(folio))) {
if (WARN_ON(folio_test_lru(folio)))
@@ -1835,14 +1835,8 @@ static void do_migrate_range(unsigned lo
if (folio_mapped(folio))
unmap_poisoned_folio(folio, pfn, false);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (!folio_try_get(folio))
- continue;
-
- if (unlikely(page_folio(page) != folio))
goto put_folio;
+ }
if (!isolate_folio_to_list(folio, &source)) {
if (__ratelimit(&migrate_rs)) {
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from mawupeng1(a)huawei.com are
mm-memory-failure-update-ttu-flag-inside-unmap_poisoned_folio.patch
mm-memory-hotplug-check-folio-ref-count-first-in-do_migrate_range.patch
hwpoison-memory_hotplug-lock-folio-before-unmap-hwpoisoned-folio.patch
The patch titled
Subject: mm: memory-failure: update ttu flag inside unmap_poisoned_folio
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
mm-memory-failure-update-ttu-flag-inside-unmap_poisoned_folio.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com>
Subject: mm: memory-failure: update ttu flag inside unmap_poisoned_folio
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 09:43:27 +0800
Patch series "mm: memory_failure: unmap poisoned folio during migrate
properly", v3.
Fix two bugs during folio migration if the folio is poisoned.
This patch (of 3):
Commit 6da6b1d4a7df ("mm/hwpoison: convert TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON to
TTU_HWPOISON") introduce TTU_HWPOISON to replace TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON in
order to stop send SIGBUS signal when accessing an error page after a
memory error on a clean folio. However during page migration, anon folio
must be set with TTU_HWPOISON during unmap_*(). For pagecache we need
some policy just like the one in hwpoison_user_mappings to set this flag.
So move this policy from hwpoison_user_mappings to unmap_poisoned_folio to
handle this warning properly.
Warning will be produced during unamp poison folio with the following log:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 365 at mm/rmap.c:1847 try_to_unmap_one+0x8fc/0xd3c
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 365 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00018-gacdb4bbda7ab #42
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : try_to_unmap_one+0x8fc/0xd3c
lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c
Call trace:
try_to_unmap_one+0x8fc/0xd3c (P)
try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L)
rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8
rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58
try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90
unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8
do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568
offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670
memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374
memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78
device_offline+0xa4/0xd0
state_store+0x8c/0xf0
dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c
sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8
vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc
ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8
__arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217014329.3610326-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217014329.3610326-2-mawupeng1@huawei.com
Fixes: 6da6b1d4a7df ("mm/hwpoison: convert TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON to TTU_HWPOISON")
Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/internal.h | 5 ++-
mm/memory-failure.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
mm/memory_hotplug.c | 3 +-
3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/internal.h~mm-memory-failure-update-ttu-flag-inside-unmap_poisoned_folio
+++ a/mm/internal.h
@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ static inline int find_next_best_node(in
* mm/memory-failure.c
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
-void unmap_poisoned_folio(struct folio *folio, enum ttu_flags ttu);
+int unmap_poisoned_folio(struct folio *folio, unsigned long pfn, bool must_kill);
void shake_folio(struct folio *folio);
extern int hwpoison_filter(struct page *p);
@@ -1138,8 +1138,9 @@ unsigned long page_mapped_in_vma(const s
struct vm_area_struct *vma);
#else
-static inline void unmap_poisoned_folio(struct folio *folio, enum ttu_flags ttu)
+static inline int unmap_poisoned_folio(struct folio *folio, unsigned long pfn, bool must_kill)
{
+ return -EBUSY;
}
#endif
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c~mm-memory-failure-update-ttu-flag-inside-unmap_poisoned_folio
+++ a/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -1556,8 +1556,34 @@ static int get_hwpoison_page(struct page
return ret;
}
-void unmap_poisoned_folio(struct folio *folio, enum ttu_flags ttu)
+int unmap_poisoned_folio(struct folio *folio, unsigned long pfn, bool must_kill)
{
+ enum ttu_flags ttu = TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK | TTU_SYNC | TTU_HWPOISON;
+ struct address_space *mapping;
+
+ if (folio_test_swapcache(folio)) {
+ pr_err("%#lx: keeping poisoned page in swap cache\n", pfn);
+ ttu &= ~TTU_HWPOISON;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate the dirty bit from PTEs to struct page first, because we
+ * need this to decide if we should kill or just drop the page.
+ * XXX: the dirty test could be racy: set_page_dirty() may not always
+ * be called inside page lock (it's recommended but not enforced).
+ */
+ mapping = folio_mapping(folio);
+ if (!must_kill && !folio_test_dirty(folio) && mapping &&
+ mapping_can_writeback(mapping)) {
+ if (folio_mkclean(folio)) {
+ folio_set_dirty(folio);
+ } else {
+ ttu &= ~TTU_HWPOISON;
+ pr_info("%#lx: corrupted page was clean: dropped without side effects\n",
+ pfn);
+ }
+ }
+
if (folio_test_hugetlb(folio) && !folio_test_anon(folio)) {
struct address_space *mapping;
@@ -1572,7 +1598,7 @@ void unmap_poisoned_folio(struct folio *
if (!mapping) {
pr_info("%#lx: could not lock mapping for mapped hugetlb folio\n",
folio_pfn(folio));
- return;
+ return -EBUSY;
}
try_to_unmap(folio, ttu|TTU_RMAP_LOCKED);
@@ -1580,6 +1606,8 @@ void unmap_poisoned_folio(struct folio *
} else {
try_to_unmap(folio, ttu);
}
+
+ return folio_mapped(folio) ? -EBUSY : 0;
}
/*
@@ -1589,8 +1617,6 @@ void unmap_poisoned_folio(struct folio *
static bool hwpoison_user_mappings(struct folio *folio, struct page *p,
unsigned long pfn, int flags)
{
- enum ttu_flags ttu = TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK | TTU_SYNC | TTU_HWPOISON;
- struct address_space *mapping;
LIST_HEAD(tokill);
bool unmap_success;
int forcekill;
@@ -1613,29 +1639,6 @@ static bool hwpoison_user_mappings(struc
if (!folio_mapped(folio))
return true;
- if (folio_test_swapcache(folio)) {
- pr_err("%#lx: keeping poisoned page in swap cache\n", pfn);
- ttu &= ~TTU_HWPOISON;
- }
-
- /*
- * Propagate the dirty bit from PTEs to struct page first, because we
- * need this to decide if we should kill or just drop the page.
- * XXX: the dirty test could be racy: set_page_dirty() may not always
- * be called inside page lock (it's recommended but not enforced).
- */
- mapping = folio_mapping(folio);
- if (!(flags & MF_MUST_KILL) && !folio_test_dirty(folio) && mapping &&
- mapping_can_writeback(mapping)) {
- if (folio_mkclean(folio)) {
- folio_set_dirty(folio);
- } else {
- ttu &= ~TTU_HWPOISON;
- pr_info("%#lx: corrupted page was clean: dropped without side effects\n",
- pfn);
- }
- }
-
/*
* First collect all the processes that have the page
* mapped in dirty form. This has to be done before try_to_unmap,
@@ -1643,9 +1646,7 @@ static bool hwpoison_user_mappings(struc
*/
collect_procs(folio, p, &tokill, flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED);
- unmap_poisoned_folio(folio, ttu);
-
- unmap_success = !folio_mapped(folio);
+ unmap_success = !unmap_poisoned_folio(folio, pfn, flags & MF_MUST_KILL);
if (!unmap_success)
pr_err("%#lx: failed to unmap page (folio mapcount=%d)\n",
pfn, folio_mapcount(folio));
--- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c~mm-memory-failure-update-ttu-flag-inside-unmap_poisoned_folio
+++ a/mm/memory_hotplug.c
@@ -1833,7 +1833,8 @@ static void do_migrate_range(unsigned lo
if (WARN_ON(folio_test_lru(folio)))
folio_isolate_lru(folio);
if (folio_mapped(folio))
- unmap_poisoned_folio(folio, TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK);
+ unmap_poisoned_folio(folio, pfn, false);
+
continue;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from mawupeng1(a)huawei.com are
mm-memory-failure-update-ttu-flag-inside-unmap_poisoned_folio.patch
mm-memory-hotplug-check-folio-ref-count-first-in-do_migrate_range.patch
hwpoison-memory_hotplug-lock-folio-before-unmap-hwpoisoned-folio.patch
The patch titled
Subject: arm: pgtable: fix NULL pointer dereference issue
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
arm-pgtable-fix-null-pointer-dereference-issue.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Subject: arm: pgtable: fix NULL pointer dereference issue
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 10:49:24 +0800
When update_mmu_cache_range() is called by update_mmu_cache(), the vmf
parameter is NULL, which will cause a NULL pointer dereference issue in
adjust_pte():
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000030 when read
Hardware name: Atmel AT91SAM9
PC is at update_mmu_cache_range+0x1e0/0x278
LR is at pte_offset_map_rw_nolock+0x18/0x2c
Call trace:
update_mmu_cache_range from remove_migration_pte+0x29c/0x2ec
remove_migration_pte from rmap_walk_file+0xcc/0x130
rmap_walk_file from remove_migration_ptes+0x90/0xa4
remove_migration_ptes from migrate_pages_batch+0x6d4/0x858
migrate_pages_batch from migrate_pages+0x188/0x488
migrate_pages from compact_zone+0x56c/0x954
compact_zone from compact_node+0x90/0xf0
compact_node from kcompactd+0x1d4/0x204
kcompactd from kthread+0x120/0x12c
kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38
Exception stack(0xc0d8bfb0 to 0xc0d8bff8)
To fix it, do not rely on whether 'ptl' is equal to decide whether to hold
the pte lock, but decide it by whether CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS is
enabled. In addition, if two vmas map to the same PTE page, there is no
need to hold the pte lock again, otherwise a deadlock will occur. Just
add the need_lock parameter to let adjust_pte() know this information.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217024924.57996-1-zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com
Fixes: fc9c45b71f43 ("arm: adjust_pte() use pte_offset_map_rw_nolock()")
Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Reported-by: Ezra Buehler <ezra.buehler(a)husqvarnagroup.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAM1KZSmZ2T_riHvay+7cKEFxoPgeVpHkVFTzVVEQ1BO0c…
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickens <hughd(a)google.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Cc: Russel King <linux(a)armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c~arm-pgtable-fix-null-pointer-dereference-issue
+++ a/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int do_adjust_pte(struct vm_area_
}
static int adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
- unsigned long pfn, struct vm_fault *vmf)
+ unsigned long pfn, bool need_lock)
{
spinlock_t *ptl;
pgd_t *pgd;
@@ -99,12 +99,11 @@ again:
if (!pte)
return 0;
- /*
- * If we are using split PTE locks, then we need to take the page
- * lock here. Otherwise we are using shared mm->page_table_lock
- * which is already locked, thus cannot take it.
- */
- if (ptl != vmf->ptl) {
+ if (need_lock) {
+ /*
+ * Use nested version here to indicate that we are already
+ * holding one similar spinlock.
+ */
spin_lock_nested(ptl, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
if (unlikely(!pmd_same(pmdval, pmdp_get_lockless(pmd)))) {
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
@@ -114,7 +113,7 @@ again:
ret = do_adjust_pte(vma, address, pfn, pte);
- if (ptl != vmf->ptl)
+ if (need_lock)
spin_unlock(ptl);
pte_unmap(pte);
@@ -123,9 +122,10 @@ again:
static void
make_coherent(struct address_space *mapping, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long pfn,
- struct vm_fault *vmf)
+ unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long pfn)
{
+ const unsigned long pmd_start_addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PMD_SIZE);
+ const unsigned long pmd_end_addr = pmd_start_addr + PMD_SIZE;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *mpnt;
unsigned long offset;
@@ -142,6 +142,14 @@ make_coherent(struct address_space *mapp
flush_dcache_mmap_lock(mapping);
vma_interval_tree_foreach(mpnt, &mapping->i_mmap, pgoff, pgoff) {
/*
+ * If we are using split PTE locks, then we need to take the pte
+ * lock. Otherwise we are using shared mm->page_table_lock which
+ * is already locked, thus cannot take it.
+ */
+ bool need_lock = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS);
+ unsigned long mpnt_addr;
+
+ /*
* If this VMA is not in our MM, we can ignore it.
* Note that we intentionally mask out the VMA
* that we are fixing up.
@@ -151,7 +159,12 @@ make_coherent(struct address_space *mapp
if (!(mpnt->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE))
continue;
offset = (pgoff - mpnt->vm_pgoff) << PAGE_SHIFT;
- aliases += adjust_pte(mpnt, mpnt->vm_start + offset, pfn, vmf);
+ mpnt_addr = mpnt->vm_start + offset;
+
+ /* Avoid deadlocks by not grabbing the same PTE lock again. */
+ if (mpnt_addr >= pmd_start_addr && mpnt_addr < pmd_end_addr)
+ need_lock = false;
+ aliases += adjust_pte(mpnt, mpnt_addr, pfn, need_lock);
}
flush_dcache_mmap_unlock(mapping);
if (aliases)
@@ -194,7 +207,7 @@ void update_mmu_cache_range(struct vm_fa
__flush_dcache_folio(mapping, folio);
if (mapping) {
if (cache_is_vivt())
- make_coherent(mapping, vma, addr, ptep, pfn, vmf);
+ make_coherent(mapping, vma, addr, ptep, pfn);
else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
__flush_icache_all();
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com are
mm-pgtable-fix-incorrect-reclaim-of-non-empty-pte-pages.patch
arm-pgtable-fix-null-pointer-dereference-issue.patch
The patch titled
Subject: mm/hwpoison: fix incorrect "not recovered" report for recovered clean pages
has been added to the -mm mm-unstable branch. Its filename is
mm-hwpoison-fix-incorrect-not-recovered-report-for-recovered-clean-pages.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai(a)linux.alibaba.com>
Subject: mm/hwpoison: fix incorrect "not recovered" report for recovered clean pages
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 14:33:34 +0800
When an uncorrected memory error is consumed there is a race between the
CMCI from the memory controller reporting an uncorrected error with a UCNA
signature, and the core reporting and SRAR signature machine check when
the data is about to be consumed.
If the CMCI wins that race, the page is marked poisoned when
uc_decode_notifier() calls memory_failure(). For dirty pages,
memory_failure() invokes try_to_unmap() with the TTU_HWPOISON flag,
converting the PTE to a hwpoison entry. As a result,
kill_accessing_process():
- call walk_page_range() and return 1 regardless of whether
try_to_unmap() succeeds or fails,
- call kill_proc() to make sure a SIGBUS is sent
- return -EHWPOISON to indicate that SIGBUS is already sent to the
process and kill_me_maybe() doesn't have to send it again.
However, for clean pages, the TTU_HWPOISON flag is cleared, leaving the
PTE unchanged and not converted to a hwpoison entry. Conversely, for
clean pages where PTE entries are not marked as hwpoison,
kill_accessing_process() returns -EFAULT, causing kill_me_maybe() to send
a SIGBUS.
Console log looks like this:
Memory failure: 0x827ca68: corrupted page was clean: dropped without side effects
Memory failure: 0x827ca68: recovery action for clean LRU page: Recovered
Memory failure: 0x827ca68: already hardware poisoned
mce: Memory error not recovered
To fix it, return 0 for "corrupted page was clean", preventing an
unnecessary SIGBUS.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217063335.22257-5-xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 046545a661af ("mm/hwpoison: fix error page recovered but reported "not recovered"")
Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai(a)linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Acked-by:Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang(a)linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Jane Chu <jane.chu(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)kernel.org>
Cc: linmiaohe <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Ruidong Tian <tianruidong(a)linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memory-failure.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c~mm-hwpoison-fix-incorrect-not-recovered-report-for-recovered-clean-pages
+++ a/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -881,12 +881,17 @@ static int kill_accessing_process(struct
mmap_read_lock(p->mm);
ret = walk_page_range(p->mm, 0, TASK_SIZE, &hwpoison_walk_ops,
(void *)&priv);
+ /*
+ * ret = 1 when CMCI wins, regardless of whether try_to_unmap()
+ * succeeds or fails, then kill the process with SIGBUS.
+ * ret = 0 when poison page is a clean page and it's dropped, no
+ * SIGBUS is needed.
+ */
if (ret == 1 && priv.tk.addr)
kill_proc(&priv.tk, pfn, flags);
- else
- ret = 0;
mmap_read_unlock(p->mm);
- return ret > 0 ? -EHWPOISON : -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret > 0 ? -EHWPOISON : 0;
}
/*
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from xueshuai(a)linux.alibaba.com are
x86-mce-collect-error-message-for-severities-below-mce_panic_severity.patch
x86-mce-dump-error-msg-from-severities.patch
x86-mce-add-ex_type_efault_reg-as-in-kernel-recovery-context-to-fix-copy-from-user-operations-regression.patch
mm-hwpoison-fix-incorrect-not-recovered-report-for-recovered-clean-pages.patch
mm-memory-failure-move-return-value-documentation-to-function-declaration.patch
The patch titled
Subject: x86/mce: add EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG as in-kernel recovery context to fix copy-from-user operations regression
has been added to the -mm mm-unstable branch. Its filename is
x86-mce-add-ex_type_efault_reg-as-in-kernel-recovery-context-to-fix-copy-from-user-operations-regression.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai(a)linux.alibaba.com>
Subject: x86/mce: add EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG as in-kernel recovery context to fix copy-from-user operations regression
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 14:33:33 +0800
Commit 4c132d1d844a ("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage") introduced a new
extable fixup type, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, and later patches updated the
extable fixup type for copy-from-user operations, changing it from
EX_TYPE_UACCESS to EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG.
Specifically, commit 99641e094d6c ("x86/uaccess: Remove .fixup usage")
altered the extable fixup type for the get_user family, while commit
4c132d1d844a ("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage") addressed the futex
operations. This change inadvertently caused a regression where the error
context for some copy-from-user operations no longer functions as an
in-kernel recovery context, leading to kernel panics with the message:
"Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel."
To fix the regression, add EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG as a in-kernel recovery
context for copy-from-user operations.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217063335.22257-4-xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai(a)linux.alibaba.com>
Fixes: 4c132d1d844a ("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Acked-by:Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang(a)linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Jane Chu <jane.chu(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)kernel.org>
Cc: linmiaohe <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Ruidong Tian <tianruidong(a)linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c~x86-mce-add-ex_type_efault_reg-as-in-kernel-recovery-context-to-fix-copy-from-user-operations-regression
+++ a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
+#include <linux/extable.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -285,7 +286,8 @@ static bool is_copy_from_user(struct pt_
*/
static noinstr int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- int fixup_type;
+ const struct exception_table_entry *e;
+ int fixup_type, imm;
bool copy_user;
if ((m->cs & 3) == 3)
@@ -294,9 +296,14 @@ static noinstr int error_context(struct
if (!mc_recoverable(m->mcgstatus))
return IN_KERNEL;
+ e = search_exception_tables(m->ip);
+ if (!e)
+ return IN_KERNEL;
+
/* Allow instrumentation around external facilities usage. */
instrumentation_begin();
- fixup_type = ex_get_fixup_type(m->ip);
+ fixup_type = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_TYPE_MASK, e->data);
+ imm = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_IMM_MASK, e->data);
copy_user = is_copy_from_user(regs);
instrumentation_end();
@@ -304,9 +311,13 @@ static noinstr int error_context(struct
case EX_TYPE_UACCESS:
if (!copy_user)
return IN_KERNEL;
- m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN;
- fallthrough;
-
+ m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN | MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
+ return IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
+ case EX_TYPE_IMM_REG:
+ if (!copy_user || imm != -EFAULT)
+ return IN_KERNEL;
+ m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN | MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
+ return IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
case EX_TYPE_FAULT_MCE_SAFE:
case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE:
m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from xueshuai(a)linux.alibaba.com are
x86-mce-collect-error-message-for-severities-below-mce_panic_severity.patch
x86-mce-dump-error-msg-from-severities.patch
x86-mce-add-ex_type_efault_reg-as-in-kernel-recovery-context-to-fix-copy-from-user-operations-regression.patch
mm-hwpoison-fix-incorrect-not-recovered-report-for-recovered-clean-pages.patch
mm-memory-failure-move-return-value-documentation-to-function-declaration.patch
The patch titled
Subject: m68k: sun3: add check for __pgd_alloc()
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
m68k-sun3-add-check-for-__pgd_alloc.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com>
Subject: m68k: sun3: add check for __pgd_alloc()
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 00:00:17 +0800
Add check for the return value of __pgd_alloc() in pgd_alloc() to prevent
null pointer dereference.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217160017.2375536-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com
Fixes: a9b3c355c2e6 ("asm-generic: pgalloc: provide generic __pgd_{alloc,free}")
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert(a)linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky(a)arm.com>
Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Cc: Sam Creasey <sammy(a)sammy.net>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
arch/m68k/include/asm/sun3_pgalloc.h | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/sun3_pgalloc.h~m68k-sun3-add-check-for-__pgd_alloc
+++ a/arch/m68k/include/asm/sun3_pgalloc.h
@@ -44,8 +44,10 @@ static inline pgd_t * pgd_alloc(struct m
pgd_t *new_pgd;
new_pgd = __pgd_alloc(mm, 0);
- memcpy(new_pgd, swapper_pg_dir, PAGE_SIZE);
- memset(new_pgd, 0, (PAGE_OFFSET >> PGDIR_SHIFT));
+ if (likely(new_pgd != NULL)) {
+ memcpy(new_pgd, swapper_pg_dir, PAGE_SIZE);
+ memset(new_pgd, 0, (PAGE_OFFSET >> PGDIR_SHIFT));
+ }
return new_pgd;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from haoxiang_li2024(a)163.com are
m68k-sun3-add-check-for-__pgd_alloc.patch
The patch titled
Subject: selftests/damon/damos_quota_goal: handle minimum quota that cannot be further reduced
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
selftests-damon-damos_quota_goal-handle-minimum-quota-that-cannot-be-further-reduced.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org>
Subject: selftests/damon/damos_quota_goal: handle minimum quota that cannot be further reduced
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 10:23:04 -0800
damos_quota_goal.py selftest see if DAMOS quota goals tuning feature
increases or reduces the effective size quota for given score as expected.
The tuning feature sets the minimum quota size as one byte, so if the
effective size quota is already one, we cannot expect it further be
reduced. However the test is not aware of the edge case, and fails since
it shown no expected change of the effective quota. Handle the case by
updating the failure logic for no change to see if it was the case, and
simply skips to next test input.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217182304.45215-1-sj@kernel.org
Fixes: f1c07c0a1662b ("selftests/damon: add a test for DAMOS quota goal")
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang(a)intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202502171423.b28a918d-lkp@intel.com
Cc: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah(a)kernel.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.10.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/damon/damos_quota_goal.py | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/damon/damos_quota_goal.py~selftests-damon-damos_quota_goal-handle-minimum-quota-that-cannot-be-further-reduced
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/damon/damos_quota_goal.py
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ def main():
if last_effective_bytes != 0 else -1.0))
if last_effective_bytes == goal.effective_bytes:
+ # effective quota was already minimum that cannot be more reduced
+ if expect_increase is False and last_effective_bytes == 1:
+ continue
print('efective bytes not changed: %d' % goal.effective_bytes)
exit(1)
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from sj(a)kernel.org are
selftests-damon-damos_quota_goal-handle-minimum-quota-that-cannot-be-further-reduced.patch
mm-madvise-split-out-mmap-locking-operations-for-madvise.patch
mm-madvise-split-out-madvise-input-validity-check.patch
mm-madvise-split-out-madvise-behavior-execution.patch
mm-madvise-remove-redundant-mmap_lock-operations-from-process_madvise.patch
mm-damon-avoid-applying-damos-action-to-same-entity-multiple-times.patch
mm-damon-core-unset-damos-walk_completed-after-confimed-set.patch
mm-damon-core-do-not-call-damos_walk_control-walk-if-walk-is-completed.patch
mm-damon-core-do-damos-walking-in-entire-regions-granularity.patch
In mii_nway_restart() during the line:
bmcr = mii->mdio_read(mii->dev, mii->phy_id, MII_BMCR);
The code attempts to call mii->mdio_read which is ch9200_mdio_read().
ch9200_mdio_read() utilises a local buffer, which is initialised
with control_read():
unsigned char buff[2];
However buff is conditionally initialised inside control_read():
if (err == size) {
memcpy(data, buf, size);
}
If the condition of "err == size" is not met, then buff remains
uninitialised. Once this happens the uninitialised buff is accessed
and returned during ch9200_mdio_read():
return (buff[0] | buff[1] << 8);
The problem stems from the fact that ch9200_mdio_read() ignores the
return value of control_read(), leading to uinit-access of buff.
To fix this we should check the return value of control_read()
and return early on error.
Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00(a)gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+3361c2d6f78a3e0892f9(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+3361c2d6f78a3e0892f9(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3361c2d6f78a3e0892f9
Fixes: 4a476bd6d1d9 ("usbnet: New driver for QinHeng CH9200 devices")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/net/mii.c | 2 ++
drivers/net/usb/ch9200.c | 7 +++++--
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/mii.c b/drivers/net/mii.c
index 37bc3131d31a..e305bf0f1d04 100644
--- a/drivers/net/mii.c
+++ b/drivers/net/mii.c
@@ -464,6 +464,8 @@ int mii_nway_restart (struct mii_if_info *mii)
/* if autoneg is off, it's an error */
bmcr = mii->mdio_read(mii->dev, mii->phy_id, MII_BMCR);
+ if (bmcr < 0)
+ return bmcr;
if (bmcr & BMCR_ANENABLE) {
bmcr |= BMCR_ANRESTART;
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/ch9200.c b/drivers/net/usb/ch9200.c
index f69d9b902da0..e32d3c282dc1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/ch9200.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/ch9200.c
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ static int ch9200_mdio_read(struct net_device *netdev, int phy_id, int loc)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(netdev);
unsigned char buff[2];
+ int ret;
netdev_dbg(netdev, "%s phy_id:%02x loc:%02x\n",
__func__, phy_id, loc);
@@ -185,8 +186,10 @@ static int ch9200_mdio_read(struct net_device *netdev, int phy_id, int loc)
if (phy_id != 0)
return -ENODEV;
- control_read(dev, REQUEST_READ, 0, loc * 2, buff, 0x02,
- CONTROL_TIMEOUT_MS);
+ ret = control_read(dev, REQUEST_READ, 0, loc * 2, buff, 0x02,
+ CONTROL_TIMEOUT_MS);
+ if (ret != 2)
+ return ret < 0 ? ret : -EINVAL;
return (buff[0] | buff[1] << 8);
}
--
2.39.5
Christoph reports that their rk3399 system dies since we merged
773c05f417fa1 ("irqchip/gic-v3: Work around insecure GIC
integrations").
It appears that some rk3399 have some secure payloads, and that
the firmware sets SCR_EL3.FIQ==1. Obivously, disabling security
in that configuration leads to even more problems.
Let's revisit the workaround by:
- making it rk3399 specific
- checking whether Group-0 is available, which is a good proxy
for SCR_EL3.FIQ being 0
- either apply the workaround if Group-0 is available, or disable
pseudo-NMIs if not
Note that this doesn't mean that the secure side is able to receive
interrupts anyway, as we make all interrupts non-secure anyway.
Clearly, nobody ever tested secure interrupts on this platform.
With that, Christoph is able to use their rk3399.
Reported-by: Christoph Fritz <chf.fritz(a)googlemail.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Fritz <chf.fritz(a)googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 773c05f417fa1 ("irqchip/gic-v3: Work around insecure GIC integrations")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b1266652fb64857246e8babdf268d0df8f0c36d9.camel@go…
---
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
index 76dce0aac2465..270d7a4d85a6d 100644
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static u8 dist_prio_nmi __ro_after_init = GICV3_PRIO_NMI;
#define FLAGS_WORKAROUND_GICR_WAKER_MSM8996 (1ULL << 0)
#define FLAGS_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_38539 (1ULL << 1)
#define FLAGS_WORKAROUND_ASR_ERRATUM_8601001 (1ULL << 2)
+#define FLAGS_WORKAROUND_INSECURE (1ULL << 3)
#define GIC_IRQ_TYPE_PARTITION (GIC_IRQ_TYPE_LPI + 1)
@@ -83,6 +84,8 @@ static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(supports_deactivate_key);
#define GIC_LINE_NR min(GICD_TYPER_SPIS(gic_data.rdists.gicd_typer), 1020U)
#define GIC_ESPI_NR GICD_TYPER_ESPIS(gic_data.rdists.gicd_typer)
+static bool nmi_support_forbidden;
+
/*
* There are 16 SGIs, though we only actually use 8 in Linux. The other 8 SGIs
* are potentially stolen by the secure side. Some code, especially code dealing
@@ -163,21 +166,27 @@ static void __init gic_prio_init(void)
{
bool ds;
- ds = gic_dist_security_disabled();
- if (!ds) {
- u32 val;
-
- val = readl_relaxed(gic_data.dist_base + GICD_CTLR);
- val |= GICD_CTLR_DS;
- writel_relaxed(val, gic_data.dist_base + GICD_CTLR);
+ cpus_have_group0 = gic_has_group0();
- ds = gic_dist_security_disabled();
- if (ds)
- pr_warn("Broken GIC integration, security disabled");
+ ds = gic_dist_security_disabled();
+ if ((gic_data.flags & FLAGS_WORKAROUND_INSECURE) && !ds) {
+ if (cpus_have_group0) {
+ u32 val;
+
+ val = readl_relaxed(gic_data.dist_base + GICD_CTLR);
+ val |= GICD_CTLR_DS;
+ writel_relaxed(val, gic_data.dist_base + GICD_CTLR);
+
+ ds = gic_dist_security_disabled();
+ if (ds)
+ pr_warn("Broken GIC integration, security disabled\n");
+ } else {
+ pr_warn("Broken GIC integration, pNMI forbidden\n");
+ nmi_support_forbidden = true;
+ }
}
cpus_have_security_disabled = ds;
- cpus_have_group0 = gic_has_group0();
/*
* How priority values are used by the GIC depends on two things:
@@ -209,7 +218,7 @@ static void __init gic_prio_init(void)
* be in the non-secure range, we program the non-secure values into
* the distributor to match the PMR values we want.
*/
- if (cpus_have_group0 & !cpus_have_security_disabled) {
+ if (cpus_have_group0 && !cpus_have_security_disabled) {
dist_prio_irq = __gicv3_prio_to_ns(dist_prio_irq);
dist_prio_nmi = __gicv3_prio_to_ns(dist_prio_nmi);
}
@@ -1922,6 +1931,18 @@ static bool gic_enable_quirk_arm64_2941627(void *data)
return true;
}
+static bool gic_enable_quirk_rk3399(void *data)
+{
+ struct gic_chip_data *d = data;
+
+ if (of_machine_is_compatible("rockchip,rk3399")) {
+ d->flags |= FLAGS_WORKAROUND_INSECURE;
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
static bool rd_set_non_coherent(void *data)
{
struct gic_chip_data *d = data;
@@ -1996,6 +2017,12 @@ static const struct gic_quirk gic_quirks[] = {
.property = "dma-noncoherent",
.init = rd_set_non_coherent,
},
+ {
+ .desc = "GICv3: Insecure RK3399 integration",
+ .iidr = 0x0000043b,
+ .mask = 0xff000fff,
+ .init = gic_enable_quirk_rk3399,
+ },
{
}
};
@@ -2004,7 +2031,7 @@ static void gic_enable_nmi_support(void)
{
int i;
- if (!gic_prio_masking_enabled())
+ if (!gic_prio_masking_enabled() || nmi_support_forbidden)
return;
rdist_nmi_refs = kcalloc(gic_data.ppi_nr + SGI_NR,
--
2.39.2
The desired clock frequency was correctly set to 400MHz in the device tree
but was lowered by the driver to 300MHz breaking 4K 60Hz content playback.
Fix the issue by removing the driver call to clk_set_rate(), which reduce
the amount of board specific code.
Fixes: 003afda97c65 ("media: verisilicon: Enable AV1 decoder on rk3588")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dufresne <nicolas.dufresne(a)collabora.com>
---
This patch fixes user report of AV1 4K60 decoder not being fast enough
on RK3588 based SoC. This is a break from Hantro original authors
habbit of coding the frequencies in the driver instead of specifying this
frequency in the device tree. The other calls to clk_set_rate() are left
since this would require modifying many dtsi files, which would then be
unsuitable for backport.
---
drivers/media/platform/verisilicon/rockchip_vpu_hw.c | 5 +----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/verisilicon/rockchip_vpu_hw.c b/drivers/media/platform/verisilicon/rockchip_vpu_hw.c
index 964122e7c355934cd80eb442219f6ba51bba8b71..9d8eab33556d62733ec7ec6b5e685c86ba7086e4 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/verisilicon/rockchip_vpu_hw.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/verisilicon/rockchip_vpu_hw.c
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
#define RK3066_ACLK_MAX_FREQ (300 * 1000 * 1000)
#define RK3288_ACLK_MAX_FREQ (400 * 1000 * 1000)
-#define RK3588_ACLK_MAX_FREQ (300 * 1000 * 1000)
#define ROCKCHIP_VPU981_MIN_SIZE 64
@@ -440,10 +439,9 @@ static int rk3066_vpu_hw_init(struct hantro_dev *vpu)
return 0;
}
+/* TODO just remove, the CLK are defined correctly in the DTS */
static int rk3588_vpu981_hw_init(struct hantro_dev *vpu)
{
- /* Bump ACLKs to max. possible freq. to improve performance. */
- clk_set_rate(vpu->clocks[0].clk, RK3588_ACLK_MAX_FREQ);
return 0;
}
@@ -807,7 +805,6 @@ const struct hantro_variant rk3588_vpu981_variant = {
.codec_ops = rk3588_vpu981_codec_ops,
.irqs = rk3588_vpu981_irqs,
.num_irqs = ARRAY_SIZE(rk3588_vpu981_irqs),
- .init = rk3588_vpu981_hw_init,
.clk_names = rk3588_vpu981_vpu_clk_names,
.num_clocks = ARRAY_SIZE(rk3588_vpu981_vpu_clk_names)
};
---
base-commit: 2014c95afecee3e76ca4a56956a936e23283f05b
change-id: 20250217-b4-hantro-av1-clock-rate-e5497f1499df
Best regards,
--
Nicolas Dufresne <nicolas.dufresne(a)collabora.com>
damos_quota_goal.py selftest see if DAMOS quota goals tuning feature
increases or reduces the effective size quota for given score as
expected. The tuning feature sets the minimum quota size as one byte,
so if the effective size quota is already one, we cannot expect it
further be reduced. However the test is not aware of the edge case, and
fails since it shown no expected change of the effective quota. Handle
the case by updating the failure logic for no change to see if it was
the case, and simply skips to next test input.
Fixes: f1c07c0a1662b ("selftests/damon: add a test for DAMOS quota goal")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.10.x
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang(a)intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202502171423.b28a918d-lkp@intel.com
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/damon/damos_quota_goal.py | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/damon/damos_quota_goal.py b/tools/testing/selftests/damon/damos_quota_goal.py
index 18246f3b62f7..f76e0412b564 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/damon/damos_quota_goal.py
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/damon/damos_quota_goal.py
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ def main():
if last_effective_bytes != 0 else -1.0))
if last_effective_bytes == goal.effective_bytes:
+ # effective quota was already minimum that cannot be more reduced
+ if expect_increase is False and last_effective_bytes == 1:
+ continue
print('efective bytes not changed: %d' % goal.effective_bytes)
exit(1)
base-commit: 20017459916819f8ae15ca3840e71fbf0ea8354e
--
2.39.5
From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org>
commit 07137e925fa951646325762bda6bd2503dfe64c6 upstream
Quota counter updates are tracked via incore objects which hang off the
xfs_trans object. These changes are then turned into dirty log items in
xfs_trans_apply_dquot_deltas just prior to commiting the log items to
the CIL.
However, updating the incore deltas do not cause XFS_TRANS_DIRTY to be
set on the transaction. In other words, a pure quota counter update
will be silently discarded if there are no other dirty log items
attached to the transaction.
This is currently not the case anywhere in the filesystem because quota
updates always dirty at least one other metadata item, but a subsequent
bug fix will add dquot log item precommits, so we actually need a dirty
dquot log item prior to xfs_trans_run_precommits. Also let's not leave
a logic bomb.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.35
Fixes: 0924378a689ccb ("xfs: split out iclog writing from xfs_trans_commit()")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong(a)kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
---
fs/xfs/xfs_quota.h | 5 +++--
fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c | 10 +++-------
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_quota.h b/fs/xfs/xfs_quota.h
index 23d71a55bbc006..032f3a70f21ddd 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_quota.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_quota.h
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ extern void xfs_trans_free_dqinfo(struct xfs_trans *);
extern void xfs_trans_mod_dquot_byino(struct xfs_trans *, struct xfs_inode *,
uint, int64_t);
extern void xfs_trans_apply_dquot_deltas(struct xfs_trans *);
-extern void xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(struct xfs_trans *);
+void xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(struct xfs_trans *tp,
+ bool already_locked);
int xfs_trans_reserve_quota_nblks(struct xfs_trans *tp, struct xfs_inode *ip,
int64_t dblocks, int64_t rblocks, bool force);
extern int xfs_trans_reserve_quota_bydquots(struct xfs_trans *,
@@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ static inline void xfs_trans_mod_dquot_byino(struct xfs_trans *tp,
{
}
#define xfs_trans_apply_dquot_deltas(tp)
-#define xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(tp)
+#define xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(tp, a)
static inline int xfs_trans_reserve_quota_nblks(struct xfs_trans *tp,
struct xfs_inode *ip, int64_t dblocks, int64_t rblocks,
bool force)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c
index ee46051db12dde..39cd11cbe21fcb 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c
@@ -840,6 +840,7 @@ __xfs_trans_commit(
*/
if (tp->t_flags & XFS_TRANS_SB_DIRTY)
xfs_trans_apply_sb_deltas(tp);
+ xfs_trans_apply_dquot_deltas(tp);
error = xfs_trans_run_precommits(tp);
if (error)
@@ -868,11 +869,6 @@ __xfs_trans_commit(
ASSERT(tp->t_ticket != NULL);
- /*
- * If we need to update the superblock, then do it now.
- */
- xfs_trans_apply_dquot_deltas(tp);
-
xlog_cil_commit(log, tp, &commit_seq, regrant);
xfs_trans_free(tp);
@@ -898,7 +894,7 @@ __xfs_trans_commit(
* the dqinfo portion to be. All that means is that we have some
* (non-persistent) quota reservations that need to be unreserved.
*/
- xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(tp);
+ xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(tp, true);
if (tp->t_ticket) {
if (regrant && !xlog_is_shutdown(log))
xfs_log_ticket_regrant(log, tp->t_ticket);
@@ -992,7 +988,7 @@ xfs_trans_cancel(
}
#endif
xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb(tp);
- xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(tp);
+ xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(tp, false);
if (tp->t_ticket) {
xfs_log_ticket_ungrant(log, tp->t_ticket);
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c
index b368e13424c4f4..b92eeaa1a2a9e7 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c
@@ -602,6 +602,24 @@ xfs_trans_apply_dquot_deltas(
ASSERT(dqp->q_blk.reserved >= dqp->q_blk.count);
ASSERT(dqp->q_ino.reserved >= dqp->q_ino.count);
ASSERT(dqp->q_rtb.reserved >= dqp->q_rtb.count);
+
+ /*
+ * We've applied the count changes and given back
+ * whatever reservation we didn't use. Zero out the
+ * dqtrx fields.
+ */
+ qtrx->qt_blk_res = 0;
+ qtrx->qt_bcount_delta = 0;
+ qtrx->qt_delbcnt_delta = 0;
+
+ qtrx->qt_rtblk_res = 0;
+ qtrx->qt_rtblk_res_used = 0;
+ qtrx->qt_rtbcount_delta = 0;
+ qtrx->qt_delrtb_delta = 0;
+
+ qtrx->qt_ino_res = 0;
+ qtrx->qt_ino_res_used = 0;
+ qtrx->qt_icount_delta = 0;
}
}
}
@@ -638,7 +656,8 @@ xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots_hook(
*/
void
xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(
- struct xfs_trans *tp)
+ struct xfs_trans *tp,
+ bool already_locked)
{
int i, j;
struct xfs_dquot *dqp;
@@ -667,10 +686,12 @@ xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(
* about the number of blocks used field, or deltas.
* Also we don't bother to zero the fields.
*/
- locked = false;
+ locked = already_locked;
if (qtrx->qt_blk_res) {
- xfs_dqlock(dqp);
- locked = true;
+ if (!locked) {
+ xfs_dqlock(dqp);
+ locked = true;
+ }
dqp->q_blk.reserved -=
(xfs_qcnt_t)qtrx->qt_blk_res;
}
@@ -691,7 +712,7 @@ xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_dquots(
dqp->q_rtb.reserved -=
(xfs_qcnt_t)qtrx->qt_rtblk_res;
}
- if (locked)
+ if (locked && !already_locked)
xfs_dqunlock(dqp);
}
Hello,
This bug report was raised on an IOMMU regression found recently:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219499
This has been fixed by the following commit in v6.14-rc3:
commit ef75966abf95 ("iommu/amd: Expicitly enable CNTRL.EPHEn bit in
resume path")
I confirmed it backports cleanly to the LTS 6.12.y kernel. Can we
please have it backported there and to 6.13.y?
Thanks!
Hi, all.
recently met an issue: tc-flower not worked when configured dst_port
and src_port range in one rule.
detailed like this:
$ tc qdisc add dev ens38 ingress
$ tc filter add dev ens38 ingress protocol ip flower ip_proto udp \
dst_port 5000 src_port 2000-3000 action drop
I try to find the root cause in kernel source code:
1. FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS and FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE flag of
mask->dissector were set
in fl_classify from flow_dissector.c.
2. then skb_flow_dissect -> __skb_flow_dissect -> __skb_flow_dissect_ports.
3. FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS handled and FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE
not handled
in __skb_flow_dissect_ports, so tp_range.tp.src was 0 here expected
the actual skb source port.
By the way, __skb_flow_bpf_to_target function may has the same issue.
Please help confirm and fix it, thank you.
source code of __skb_flow_dissect_ports in flow_dissector.c as below:
static void
__skb_flow_dissect_ports(const struct sk_buff *skb,
struct flow_dissector *flow_dissector,
void *target_container, const void *data,
int nhoff, u8 ip_proto, int hlen)
{
enum flow_dissector_key_id dissector_ports = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_MAX;
struct flow_dissector_key_ports *key_ports;
if (dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector, FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS))
dissector_ports = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS;
else if (dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE))
dissector_ports = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE;
if (dissector_ports == FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_MAX)
return;
key_ports = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
dissector_ports,
target_container);
key_ports->ports = __skb_flow_get_ports(skb, nhoff, ip_proto,
data, hlen);
}
Best regards.
Currently memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) can produce decrypted/shared mapping:
memremap(MEMREMAP_WB)
arch_memremap_wb()
ioremap_cache()
__ioremap_caller(.encrytped = false)
In such cases, the IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED flag on the memory will determine
if the resulting mapping is encrypted or decrypted.
Creating a decrypted mapping without explicit request from the caller is
risky:
- It can inadvertently expose the guest's data and compromise the
guest.
- Accessing private memory via shared/decrypted mapping on TDX will
either trigger implicit conversion to shared or #VE (depending on
VMM implementation).
Implicit conversion is destructive: subsequent access to the same
memory via private mapping will trigger a hard-to-debug #VE crash.
The kernel already provides a way to request decrypted mapping
explicitly via the MEMREMAP_DEC flag.
Modify memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) to produce encrypted/private mapping by
default unless MEMREMAP_DEC is specified or if the kernel runs on
a machine with SME enabled.
It fixes the crash due to #VE on kexec in TDX guests if CONFIG_EISA is
enabled.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.11+
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra(a)amd.com>
Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro(a)orcam.me.uk>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
index ed580c7f9d0a..1a0dc2b2bf5b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ extern void __iomem *ioremap_prot(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size, un
extern void __iomem *ioremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size);
#define ioremap_encrypted ioremap_encrypted
+void *arch_memremap_wb(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size, unsigned long flags);
+#define arch_memremap_wb arch_memremap_wb
+
/**
* ioremap - map bus memory into CPU space
* @offset: bus address of the memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 8d29163568a7..a4b23d2e92d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -503,6 +503,14 @@ void iounmap(volatile void __iomem *addr)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iounmap);
+void *arch_memremap_wb(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if ((flags & MEMREMAP_DEC) || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ return (void __force *)ioremap_cache(phys_addr, size);
+
+ return (void __force *)ioremap_encrypted(phys_addr, size);
+}
+
/*
* Convert a physical pointer to a virtual kernel pointer for /dev/mem
* access
--
2.47.2
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 1aaf8c122918aa8897605a9aa1e8ed6600d6f930
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021008-recharger-fastball-ffab@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 1aaf8c122918aa8897605a9aa1e8ed6600d6f930 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zhaoyang Huang <zhaoyang.huang(a)unisoc.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 10:01:59 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] mm: gup: fix infinite loop within __get_longterm_locked
We can run into an infinite loop in __get_longterm_locked() when
collect_longterm_unpinnable_folios() finds only folios that are isolated
from the LRU or were never added to the LRU. This can happen when all
folios to be pinned are never added to the LRU, for example when
vm_ops->fault allocated pages using cma_alloc() and never added them to
the LRU.
Fix it by simply taking a look at the list in the single caller, to see if
anything was added.
[zhaoyang.huang(a)unisoc.com: move definition of local]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250122012604.3654667-1-zhaoyang.huang@unisoc.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250121020159.3636477-1-zhaoyang.huang@unisoc.com
Fixes: 67e139b02d99 ("mm/gup.c: refactor check_and_migrate_movable_pages()")
Signed-off-by: Zhaoyang Huang <zhaoyang.huang(a)unisoc.com>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard(a)nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Aijun Sun <aijun.sun(a)unisoc.com>
Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple(a)nvidia.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index 9aaf338cc1f4..3883b307780e 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -2320,13 +2320,13 @@ static void pofs_unpin(struct pages_or_folios *pofs)
/*
* Returns the number of collected folios. Return value is always >= 0.
*/
-static unsigned long collect_longterm_unpinnable_folios(
+static void collect_longterm_unpinnable_folios(
struct list_head *movable_folio_list,
struct pages_or_folios *pofs)
{
- unsigned long i, collected = 0;
struct folio *prev_folio = NULL;
bool drain_allow = true;
+ unsigned long i;
for (i = 0; i < pofs->nr_entries; i++) {
struct folio *folio = pofs_get_folio(pofs, i);
@@ -2338,8 +2338,6 @@ static unsigned long collect_longterm_unpinnable_folios(
if (folio_is_longterm_pinnable(folio))
continue;
- collected++;
-
if (folio_is_device_coherent(folio))
continue;
@@ -2361,8 +2359,6 @@ static unsigned long collect_longterm_unpinnable_folios(
NR_ISOLATED_ANON + folio_is_file_lru(folio),
folio_nr_pages(folio));
}
-
- return collected;
}
/*
@@ -2439,11 +2435,9 @@ static long
check_and_migrate_movable_pages_or_folios(struct pages_or_folios *pofs)
{
LIST_HEAD(movable_folio_list);
- unsigned long collected;
- collected = collect_longterm_unpinnable_folios(&movable_folio_list,
- pofs);
- if (!collected)
+ collect_longterm_unpinnable_folios(&movable_folio_list, pofs);
+ if (list_empty(&movable_folio_list))
return 0;
return migrate_longterm_unpinnable_folios(&movable_folio_list, pofs);
The xHC resources allocated for USB devices are not released in correct order after resuming in case when while suspend device was reconnected.
This issue has been detected during the fallowing scenario:
- connect hub HS to root port
- connect LS/FS device to hub port
- wait for enumeration to finish
- force DUT to suspend
- reconnect hub attached to root port
- wake DUT
For this scenario during enumeration of USB LS/FS device the Cadence xHC reports completion error code for xHCi commands because the devices was not property disconnected and in result the xHC resources has not been correct freed.
XHCI specification doesn't mention that device can be reset in any order so, we should not treat this issue as Cadence xHC controller bug.
Similar as during disconnecting in this case the device should be cleared starting form the last usb device in tree toward the root hub.
To fix this issue usbcore driver should disconnect all USB devices connected to hub which was reconnected while suspending.
Fixes: 3d82904559f4 ("usb: cdnsp: cdns3 Add main part of Cadence USBSSP DRD Driver")
cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawel Laszczak <pawell(a)cadence.com>
---
drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c index 0cd44f1fd56d..2473cbf317a8 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -3627,10 +3627,12 @@ static int finish_port_resume(struct usb_device *udev)
* the device will be rediscovered.
*/
retry_reset_resume:
- if (udev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_RESET)
+ if (udev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_RESET) {
status = -ENODEV;
- else
+ } else {
+ hub_disconnect_children(udev);
status = usb_reset_and_verify_device(udev);
+ }
}
/* 10.5.4.5 says be sure devices in the tree are still there.
--
2.43.0
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021722-poplar-spoilage-a69f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrick Bellasi <derkling(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 14:04:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit
In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a
better separation of concerns:
- ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry only
- IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VM-Exit only
and the Retbleed mitigations have been updated to match this new
semantics.
Commit [2] was merged shortly before [1], and their interaction was not
handled properly. This resulted in IBPB not being triggered on VM-Exit
in all SRSO mitigation configs requesting an IBPB there.
Specifically, an IBPB on VM-Exit is triggered only when
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is set. However:
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set for "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb",
because before [1] having X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB was enough. Hence,
an IBPB is triggered on entry but the expected IBPB on VM-exit is
not.
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set also when
"spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit" if X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB is
already set.
That's because before [1] this was effectively redundant. Hence, e.g.
a "retbleed=ibpb spec_rstack_overflow=bpb-vmexit" config mistakenly
reports the machine still vulnerable to SRSO, despite an IBPB being
triggered both on entry and VM-Exit, because of the Retbleed selected
mitigation config.
- UNTRAIN_RET_VM won't still actually do anything unless
CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY is set.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", enable IBPB on both entry and VM-Exit
and clear X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT which is made superfluous by
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. This effectively makes this mitigation
option similar to the one for 'retbleed=ibpb', thus re-order the code
for the RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB option to be less confusing by having
all features enabling before the disabling of the not needed ones.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit", guard this mitigation setting
with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to ensure UNTRAIN_RET_VM sequence is
effectively compiled in. Drop instead the CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO guard,
since none of the SRSO compile cruft is required in this configuration.
Also, check only that the required microcode is present to effectively
enabled the IBPB on VM-Exit.
Finally, update the KConfig description for CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
to list also all SRSO config settings enabled by this guard.
Fixes: 864bcaa38ee4 ("x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM") [1]
Fixes: d893832d0e1e ("x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT") [2]
Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Bellasi <derkling(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: stable(a)kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 87198d957e2f..be2c311f5118 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2599,7 +2599,8 @@ config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
default y
help
- Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
+ Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and
+ spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations.
config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5a505aa65489..a5d0998d7604 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1115,6 +1115,8 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
+ mitigate_smt = true;
/*
* IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
@@ -1124,9 +1126,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
- mitigate_smt = true;
-
/*
* There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
* all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
@@ -2646,6 +2645,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
/*
@@ -2655,6 +2655,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
*/
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+ * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+ * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
@@ -2663,8 +2670,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
ibpb_on_vmexit:
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
@@ -2676,8 +2683,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
- }
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+ }
break;
default:
break;
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021721-brunch-mankind-56c2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrick Bellasi <derkling(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 14:04:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit
In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a
better separation of concerns:
- ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry only
- IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VM-Exit only
and the Retbleed mitigations have been updated to match this new
semantics.
Commit [2] was merged shortly before [1], and their interaction was not
handled properly. This resulted in IBPB not being triggered on VM-Exit
in all SRSO mitigation configs requesting an IBPB there.
Specifically, an IBPB on VM-Exit is triggered only when
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is set. However:
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set for "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb",
because before [1] having X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB was enough. Hence,
an IBPB is triggered on entry but the expected IBPB on VM-exit is
not.
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set also when
"spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit" if X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB is
already set.
That's because before [1] this was effectively redundant. Hence, e.g.
a "retbleed=ibpb spec_rstack_overflow=bpb-vmexit" config mistakenly
reports the machine still vulnerable to SRSO, despite an IBPB being
triggered both on entry and VM-Exit, because of the Retbleed selected
mitigation config.
- UNTRAIN_RET_VM won't still actually do anything unless
CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY is set.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", enable IBPB on both entry and VM-Exit
and clear X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT which is made superfluous by
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. This effectively makes this mitigation
option similar to the one for 'retbleed=ibpb', thus re-order the code
for the RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB option to be less confusing by having
all features enabling before the disabling of the not needed ones.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit", guard this mitigation setting
with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to ensure UNTRAIN_RET_VM sequence is
effectively compiled in. Drop instead the CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO guard,
since none of the SRSO compile cruft is required in this configuration.
Also, check only that the required microcode is present to effectively
enabled the IBPB on VM-Exit.
Finally, update the KConfig description for CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
to list also all SRSO config settings enabled by this guard.
Fixes: 864bcaa38ee4 ("x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM") [1]
Fixes: d893832d0e1e ("x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT") [2]
Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Bellasi <derkling(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: stable(a)kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 87198d957e2f..be2c311f5118 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2599,7 +2599,8 @@ config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
default y
help
- Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
+ Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and
+ spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations.
config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5a505aa65489..a5d0998d7604 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1115,6 +1115,8 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
+ mitigate_smt = true;
/*
* IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
@@ -1124,9 +1126,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
- mitigate_smt = true;
-
/*
* There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
* all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
@@ -2646,6 +2645,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
/*
@@ -2655,6 +2655,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
*/
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+ * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+ * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
@@ -2663,8 +2670,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
ibpb_on_vmexit:
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
@@ -2676,8 +2683,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
- }
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+ }
break;
default:
break;
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021719-composure-nimble-a2a1@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrick Bellasi <derkling(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 14:04:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit
In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a
better separation of concerns:
- ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry only
- IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VM-Exit only
and the Retbleed mitigations have been updated to match this new
semantics.
Commit [2] was merged shortly before [1], and their interaction was not
handled properly. This resulted in IBPB not being triggered on VM-Exit
in all SRSO mitigation configs requesting an IBPB there.
Specifically, an IBPB on VM-Exit is triggered only when
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is set. However:
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set for "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb",
because before [1] having X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB was enough. Hence,
an IBPB is triggered on entry but the expected IBPB on VM-exit is
not.
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set also when
"spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit" if X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB is
already set.
That's because before [1] this was effectively redundant. Hence, e.g.
a "retbleed=ibpb spec_rstack_overflow=bpb-vmexit" config mistakenly
reports the machine still vulnerable to SRSO, despite an IBPB being
triggered both on entry and VM-Exit, because of the Retbleed selected
mitigation config.
- UNTRAIN_RET_VM won't still actually do anything unless
CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY is set.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", enable IBPB on both entry and VM-Exit
and clear X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT which is made superfluous by
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. This effectively makes this mitigation
option similar to the one for 'retbleed=ibpb', thus re-order the code
for the RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB option to be less confusing by having
all features enabling before the disabling of the not needed ones.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit", guard this mitigation setting
with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to ensure UNTRAIN_RET_VM sequence is
effectively compiled in. Drop instead the CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO guard,
since none of the SRSO compile cruft is required in this configuration.
Also, check only that the required microcode is present to effectively
enabled the IBPB on VM-Exit.
Finally, update the KConfig description for CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
to list also all SRSO config settings enabled by this guard.
Fixes: 864bcaa38ee4 ("x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM") [1]
Fixes: d893832d0e1e ("x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT") [2]
Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Bellasi <derkling(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: stable(a)kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 87198d957e2f..be2c311f5118 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2599,7 +2599,8 @@ config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
default y
help
- Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
+ Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and
+ spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations.
config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5a505aa65489..a5d0998d7604 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1115,6 +1115,8 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
+ mitigate_smt = true;
/*
* IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
@@ -1124,9 +1126,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
- mitigate_smt = true;
-
/*
* There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
* all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
@@ -2646,6 +2645,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
/*
@@ -2655,6 +2655,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
*/
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+ * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+ * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
@@ -2663,8 +2670,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
ibpb_on_vmexit:
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
@@ -2676,8 +2683,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
- }
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+ }
break;
default:
break;
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021718-puzzle-prenatal-af0e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrick Bellasi <derkling(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 14:04:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit
In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a
better separation of concerns:
- ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry only
- IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VM-Exit only
and the Retbleed mitigations have been updated to match this new
semantics.
Commit [2] was merged shortly before [1], and their interaction was not
handled properly. This resulted in IBPB not being triggered on VM-Exit
in all SRSO mitigation configs requesting an IBPB there.
Specifically, an IBPB on VM-Exit is triggered only when
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is set. However:
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set for "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb",
because before [1] having X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB was enough. Hence,
an IBPB is triggered on entry but the expected IBPB on VM-exit is
not.
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set also when
"spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit" if X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB is
already set.
That's because before [1] this was effectively redundant. Hence, e.g.
a "retbleed=ibpb spec_rstack_overflow=bpb-vmexit" config mistakenly
reports the machine still vulnerable to SRSO, despite an IBPB being
triggered both on entry and VM-Exit, because of the Retbleed selected
mitigation config.
- UNTRAIN_RET_VM won't still actually do anything unless
CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY is set.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", enable IBPB on both entry and VM-Exit
and clear X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT which is made superfluous by
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. This effectively makes this mitigation
option similar to the one for 'retbleed=ibpb', thus re-order the code
for the RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB option to be less confusing by having
all features enabling before the disabling of the not needed ones.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit", guard this mitigation setting
with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to ensure UNTRAIN_RET_VM sequence is
effectively compiled in. Drop instead the CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO guard,
since none of the SRSO compile cruft is required in this configuration.
Also, check only that the required microcode is present to effectively
enabled the IBPB on VM-Exit.
Finally, update the KConfig description for CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
to list also all SRSO config settings enabled by this guard.
Fixes: 864bcaa38ee4 ("x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM") [1]
Fixes: d893832d0e1e ("x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT") [2]
Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Bellasi <derkling(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: stable(a)kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 87198d957e2f..be2c311f5118 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2599,7 +2599,8 @@ config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
default y
help
- Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
+ Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and
+ spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations.
config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5a505aa65489..a5d0998d7604 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1115,6 +1115,8 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
+ mitigate_smt = true;
/*
* IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
@@ -1124,9 +1126,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
- mitigate_smt = true;
-
/*
* There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
* all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
@@ -2646,6 +2645,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
/*
@@ -2655,6 +2655,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
*/
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+ * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+ * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
@@ -2663,8 +2670,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
ibpb_on_vmexit:
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
@@ -2676,8 +2683,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
- }
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+ }
break;
default:
break;
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021717-pelt-wick-0392@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrick Bellasi <derkling(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 14:04:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit
In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a
better separation of concerns:
- ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry only
- IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VM-Exit only
and the Retbleed mitigations have been updated to match this new
semantics.
Commit [2] was merged shortly before [1], and their interaction was not
handled properly. This resulted in IBPB not being triggered on VM-Exit
in all SRSO mitigation configs requesting an IBPB there.
Specifically, an IBPB on VM-Exit is triggered only when
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is set. However:
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set for "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb",
because before [1] having X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB was enough. Hence,
an IBPB is triggered on entry but the expected IBPB on VM-exit is
not.
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set also when
"spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit" if X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB is
already set.
That's because before [1] this was effectively redundant. Hence, e.g.
a "retbleed=ibpb spec_rstack_overflow=bpb-vmexit" config mistakenly
reports the machine still vulnerable to SRSO, despite an IBPB being
triggered both on entry and VM-Exit, because of the Retbleed selected
mitigation config.
- UNTRAIN_RET_VM won't still actually do anything unless
CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY is set.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", enable IBPB on both entry and VM-Exit
and clear X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT which is made superfluous by
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. This effectively makes this mitigation
option similar to the one for 'retbleed=ibpb', thus re-order the code
for the RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB option to be less confusing by having
all features enabling before the disabling of the not needed ones.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit", guard this mitigation setting
with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to ensure UNTRAIN_RET_VM sequence is
effectively compiled in. Drop instead the CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO guard,
since none of the SRSO compile cruft is required in this configuration.
Also, check only that the required microcode is present to effectively
enabled the IBPB on VM-Exit.
Finally, update the KConfig description for CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
to list also all SRSO config settings enabled by this guard.
Fixes: 864bcaa38ee4 ("x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM") [1]
Fixes: d893832d0e1e ("x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT") [2]
Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Bellasi <derkling(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: stable(a)kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 87198d957e2f..be2c311f5118 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2599,7 +2599,8 @@ config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
default y
help
- Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
+ Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and
+ spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations.
config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5a505aa65489..a5d0998d7604 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1115,6 +1115,8 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
+ mitigate_smt = true;
/*
* IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
@@ -1124,9 +1126,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
- mitigate_smt = true;
-
/*
* There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
* all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
@@ -2646,6 +2645,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
/*
@@ -2655,6 +2655,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
*/
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+ * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+ * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
@@ -2663,8 +2670,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
ibpb_on_vmexit:
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
@@ -2676,8 +2683,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
- }
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+ }
break;
default:
break;
From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org>
commit 96cfeb0389530ae32ade8a48ae3ae1ac3b6c009d upstream.
It should wait all existing dio write IOs before block removal,
otherwise, previous direct write IO may overwrite data in the
block which may be reused by other inode.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9(a)foxmail.com>
---
fs/f2fs/file.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c
index 9ecf39c2b47d..81ebbc1d37a6 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -957,6 +957,13 @@ int f2fs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
return err;
}
+ /*
+ * wait for inflight dio, blocks should be removed after
+ * IO completion.
+ */
+ if (attr->ia_size < old_size)
+ inode_dio_wait(inode);
+
down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE]);
down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
@@ -1777,6 +1784,12 @@ static long f2fs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
if (ret)
goto out;
+ /*
+ * wait for inflight dio, blocks should be removed after IO
+ * completion.
+ */
+ inode_dio_wait(inode);
+
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) {
if (offset >= inode->i_size)
goto out;
--
2.43.0
From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org>
commit 96cfeb0389530ae32ade8a48ae3ae1ac3b6c009d upstream.
It should wait all existing dio write IOs before block removal,
otherwise, previous direct write IO may overwrite data in the
block which may be reused by other inode.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9(a)foxmail.com>
---
fs/f2fs/file.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c
index b38ce5a7a2ef..685a14309406 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -965,6 +965,13 @@ int f2fs_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
return err;
}
+ /*
+ * wait for inflight dio, blocks should be removed after
+ * IO completion.
+ */
+ if (attr->ia_size < old_size)
+ inode_dio_wait(inode);
+
down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE]);
filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping);
@@ -1790,6 +1797,12 @@ static long f2fs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
if (ret)
goto out;
+ /*
+ * wait for inflight dio, blocks should be removed after IO
+ * completion.
+ */
+ inode_dio_wait(inode);
+
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) {
if (offset >= inode->i_size)
goto out;
--
2.43.0
From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org>
commit 96cfeb0389530ae32ade8a48ae3ae1ac3b6c009d upstream.
It should wait all existing dio write IOs before block removal,
otherwise, previous direct write IO may overwrite data in the
block which may be reused by other inode.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9(a)foxmail.com>
---
fs/f2fs/file.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c
index 3bab52d33e80..5e2a0cb8d24d 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -1048,6 +1048,13 @@ int f2fs_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
return err;
}
+ /*
+ * wait for inflight dio, blocks should be removed after
+ * IO completion.
+ */
+ if (attr->ia_size < old_size)
+ inode_dio_wait(inode);
+
f2fs_down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE]);
filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping);
@@ -1880,6 +1887,12 @@ static long f2fs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
if (ret)
goto out;
+ /*
+ * wait for inflight dio, blocks should be removed after IO
+ * completion.
+ */
+ inode_dio_wait(inode);
+
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) {
if (offset >= inode->i_size)
goto out;
--
2.43.0
After devm_request_irq() fails with error in
pci_endpoint_test_request_irq(), pci_endpoint_test_free_irq_vectors() is
called assuming that all IRQs have been released.
However some requested IRQs remain unreleased, so there are still
/proc/irq/* entries remaining and we encounters WARN() with the following
message:
remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'irq/30', leaking at
least 'pci-endpoint-test.0'
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 202 at fs/proc/generic.c:719 remove_proc_entry
+0x190/0x19c
And show the call trace that led to this issue:
[ 12.050005] Call trace:
[ 12.051226] remove_proc_entry+0x190/0x19c (P)
[ 12.053448] unregister_irq_proc+0xd0/0x104
[ 12.055541] free_desc+0x4c/0xd0
[ 12.057155] irq_free_descs+0x68/0x90
[ 12.058984] irq_domain_free_irqs+0x15c/0x1bc
[ 12.061161] msi_domain_free_locked.part.0+0x184/0x1d4
[ 12.063728] msi_domain_free_irqs_all_locked+0x64/0x8c
[ 12.066296] pci_msi_teardown_msi_irqs+0x48/0x54
[ 12.068604] pci_free_msi_irqs+0x18/0x38
[ 12.070564] pci_free_irq_vectors+0x64/0x8c
[ 12.072654] pci_endpoint_test_ioctl+0x870/0x1068
[ 12.075006] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xb0/0xe8
[ 12.076967] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
[ 12.078841] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe8
[ 12.081192] do_el0_svc+0x20/0x2c
[ 12.082848] el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
[ 12.084376] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x144/0x168
[ 12.086553] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
[ 12.088383] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
To solve this issue, set the number of remaining IRQs to test->num_irqs
and release IRQs in advance by calling pci_endpoint_test_release_irq().
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e03327122e2c ("pci_endpoint_test: Add 2 ioctl commands")
Signed-off-by: Kunihiko Hayashi <hayashi.kunihiko(a)socionext.com>
---
drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c b/drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c
index d5ac71a49386..bbcccd425700 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c
@@ -259,6 +259,9 @@ static int pci_endpoint_test_request_irq(struct pci_endpoint_test *test)
break;
}
+ test->num_irqs = i;
+ pci_endpoint_test_release_irq(test);
+
return ret;
}
--
2.25.1
Add locking to `vf610_gpio_direction_input|output()` functions. Without
this locking, a race condition exists between concurrent calls to these
functions, potentially leading to incorrect GPIO direction settings.
To verify the correctness of this fix, a `trylock` patch was applied,
where after a couple of reboots the race was confirmed. I.e., one user
had to wait before acquiring the lock. With this patch the race has not
been encountered. It's worth mentioning that any type of debugging
(printing, tracing, etc.) would "resolve"/hide the issue.
Fixes: 659d8a62311f ("gpio: vf610: add imx7ulp support")
Signed-off-by: Johan Korsnes <johan.korsnes(a)remarkable.no>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Haibo Chen <haibo.chen(a)nxp.com>
Cc: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl(a)bgdev.pl>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
v3
- Use guards from cleanup.h for spinlock
- Added linux-stable to cc
- Added Fixes: tags
v2
- Added description on correcctness to commit text
- Added Reviewed-by from Walleij and Haibo
---
drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c
index c4f34a347cb6..c36a9dbccd4d 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct vf610_gpio_port {
struct clk *clk_port;
struct clk *clk_gpio;
int irq;
+ spinlock_t lock; /* protect gpio direction registers */
};
#define GPIO_PDOR 0x00
@@ -124,6 +125,7 @@ static int vf610_gpio_direction_input(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned int gpio)
u32 val;
if (port->sdata->have_paddr) {
+ guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&port->lock);
val = vf610_gpio_readl(port->gpio_base + GPIO_PDDR);
val &= ~mask;
vf610_gpio_writel(val, port->gpio_base + GPIO_PDDR);
@@ -142,6 +144,7 @@ static int vf610_gpio_direction_output(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned int gpio
vf610_gpio_set(chip, gpio, value);
if (port->sdata->have_paddr) {
+ guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&port->lock);
val = vf610_gpio_readl(port->gpio_base + GPIO_PDDR);
val |= mask;
vf610_gpio_writel(val, port->gpio_base + GPIO_PDDR);
@@ -297,6 +300,7 @@ static int vf610_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return -ENOMEM;
port->sdata = device_get_match_data(dev);
+ spin_lock_init(&port->lock);
dual_base = port->sdata->have_dual_base;
--
2.43.0
It is observed that on some systems an initial PPM reset during the boot
phase can trigger a timeout:
[ 6.482546] ucsi_acpi USBC000:00: failed to reset PPM!
[ 6.482551] ucsi_acpi USBC000:00: error -ETIMEDOUT: PPM init failed
Still, increasing the timeout value, albeit being the most straightforward
solution, eliminates the problem: the initial PPM reset may take up to
~8000-10000ms on some Lenovo laptops. When it is reset after the above
period of time (or even if ucsi_reset_ppm() is not called overall), UCSI
works as expected.
Moreover, if the ucsi_acpi module is loaded/unloaded manually after the
system has booted, reading the CCI values and resetting the PPM works
perfectly, without any timeout. Thus it's only a boot-time issue.
The reason for this behavior is not clear but it may be the consequence
of some tricks that the firmware performs or be an actual firmware bug.
As a workaround, increase the timeout to avoid failing the UCSI
initialization prematurely.
Fixes: b1b59e16075f ("usb: typec: ucsi: Increase command completion timeout value")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <boddah8794(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com>
---
Add Heikki's Reviewed-by tag.
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c
index 0fe1476f4c29..7a56d3f840d7 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
* difficult to estimate the time it takes for the system to process the command
* before it is actually passed to the PPM.
*/
-#define UCSI_TIMEOUT_MS 5000
+#define UCSI_TIMEOUT_MS 10000
/*
* UCSI_SWAP_TIMEOUT_MS - Timeout for role swap requests
--
2.48.1
The infra-iommu node in mt8195.dtsi was triggering a CHECK_DTBS error due
to an excessively long 'interrupts' property. The error message was:
infra-iommu@10315000: interrupts: [[0, 795, 4, 0], [0, 796, 4, 0],
[0, 797, 4, 0], [0, 798, 4, 0], [0, 799, 4, 0]]
is too long
To address this issue, update the compatbile matching rule for
'interrupts' property. This change allows flexibility in the number
of interrupts for new SoCs like MT8195.
The purpose of these 5 interrupts is also added into description.
Fixes: bca28426805d ("dt-bindings: iommu: mediatek: Convert IOMMU to DT schema")
Signed-off-by: Macpaul Lin <macpaul.lin(a)mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh(a)kernel.org>
---
.../bindings/iommu/mediatek,iommu.yaml | 28 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Changes for v2:
- commit message: re-formatting and add a description of adding 5 interrupts.
- add 'description' and 'maxItems: 5' for 'interrupt' property of
'mt8195-iommu-infra'
- others keeps 'maxItems: 1'
Changes for v3:
- Refine the description for 'interrupts' property and fixes the compatible
matching rules.
- Refine commit message.
Changes for v4:
- add missing 'minItems: 5' to 'mediatek,mt8195-iommu-infra'.
Thanks the explanation from Conor and Krzysztof.
Changes for v5:
- Repharse the description for interrupts property of MT8195.
Changes for v6:
- Remove maxItems for mt8195-iommu-infra.
- Add 'Reviewed-by' tag from Rob. Thanks for the review.
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iommu/mediatek,iommu.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iommu/mediatek,iommu.yaml
index ea6b0f5f24de..eeb39f5acf7e 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iommu/mediatek,iommu.yaml
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iommu/mediatek,iommu.yaml
@@ -96,7 +96,16 @@ properties:
maxItems: 1
interrupts:
- maxItems: 1
+ description: |
+ Usually, the IOMMU requires only one interrupt.
+
+ The infra IOMMU in MT8195 has five banks: each features one set
+ of APB registers. One for the normal world (set 0), three for the
+ protected world (sets 1-3), and one for the secure world (set 4).
+ and each set has its own interrupt. Therefore, five interrupts
+ are needed.
+ minItems: 1
+ maxItems: 5
clocks:
items:
@@ -210,6 +219,23 @@ allOf:
required:
- mediatek,larbs
+ - if:
+ properties:
+ compatible:
+ contains:
+ enum:
+ - mediatek,mt8195-iommu-infra
+
+ then:
+ properties:
+ interrupts:
+ minItems: 5
+
+ else:
+ properties:
+ interrupts:
+ maxItems: 1
+
additionalProperties: false
examples:
--
2.45.2
Hi,
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Sr. Demand Generation
If you do not wish to receive this newsletter reply “Not interested”
Hi all,
This set unifies the AMD MCA interrupt handlers with common MCA code.
The goal is to avoid duplicating functionality like reading and clearing
MCA banks.
Based on feedback, this revision also include changes to the MCA init
flow.
Patches 1-4:
General fixes and cleanups.
Patches 5-10:
Add BSP-only init flow and related changes.
Patches 11-15:
Updates from v1 set.
Patch 16:
Interrupt storm handling rebased on current set.
Thanks,
Yazen
---
Changes in v2:
- Add general cleanup pre-patches.
- Add changes for BSP-only init.
- Add interrupt storm handling for AMD.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523155641.2805411-1-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
---
Borislav Petkov (1):
x86/mce: Cleanup bank processing on init
Smita Koralahalli (1):
x86/mce: Handle AMD threshold interrupt storms
Yazen Ghannam (14):
x86/mce: Don't remove sysfs if thresholding sysfs init fails
x86/mce/amd: Remove return value for mce_threshold_create_device()
x86/mce/amd: Remove smca_banks_map
x86/mce/amd: Put list_head in threshold_bank
x86/mce: Remove __mcheck_cpu_init_early()
x86/mce: Define BSP-only init
x86/mce: Define BSP-only SMCA init
x86/mce: Do 'UNKNOWN' vendor check early
x86/mce: Separate global and per-CPU quirks
x86/mce: Move machine_check_poll() status checks to helper functions
x86/mce: Unify AMD THR handler with MCA Polling
x86/mce: Unify AMD DFR handler with MCA Polling
x86/mce/amd: Enable interrupt vectors once per-CPU on SMCA systems
x86/mce/amd: Support SMCA Corrected Error Interrupt
arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h | 7 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c | 391 +++++++++++++-----------------------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 322 ++++++++++++++---------------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/intel.c | 15 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h | 8 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/threshold.c | 3 +
7 files changed, 332 insertions(+), 415 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: b36de8b904b8ff2095ece7af6b3cfff8c73c2fb1
change-id: 20250210-wip-mca-updates-bed2a67c9c57
Once device_register() failed, we should call put_device() to
decrement reference count for cleanup. Or it could cause memory leak.
device_register() includes device_add(). As comment of device_add()
says, 'if device_add() succeeds, you should call device_del() when you
want to get rid of it. If device_add() has not succeeded, use only
put_device() to drop the reference count'.
Found by code review.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 37d6a0a6f470 ("PCI: Add pci_register_host_bridge() interface")
Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
Changes in v2:
- modified the patch description.
---
drivers/pci/probe.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/probe.c b/drivers/pci/probe.c
index b6536ed599c3..03dc65cf48f1 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/probe.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/probe.c
@@ -1017,8 +1017,10 @@ static int pci_register_host_bridge(struct pci_host_bridge *bridge)
name = dev_name(&bus->dev);
err = device_register(&bus->dev);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ put_device(&bus->dev);
goto unregister;
+ }
pcibios_add_bus(bus);
--
2.25.1
Once device_register() failed, we should call put_device() to
decrement reference count for cleanup. Or it could cause memory leak.
As comment of device_register() says, 'NOTE: _Never_ directly free
@dev after calling this function, even if it returned an error! Always
use put_device() to give up the reference initialized in this function
instead.'
Found by code review.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
Changes in v5:
- modified the bug description as suggestions;
Changes in v4:
- deleted the redundant initialization;
Changes in v3:
- modified the patch as suggestions;
Changes in v2:
- modified the patch as suggestions.
---
arch/arm/common/locomo.c | 13 +++++--------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/common/locomo.c b/arch/arm/common/locomo.c
index cb6ef449b987..45106066a17f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/common/locomo.c
+++ b/arch/arm/common/locomo.c
@@ -223,10 +223,8 @@ locomo_init_one_child(struct locomo *lchip, struct locomo_dev_info *info)
int ret;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct locomo_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!dev) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!dev)
+ return -ENOMEM;
/*
* If the parent device has a DMA mask associated with it,
@@ -254,10 +252,9 @@ locomo_init_one_child(struct locomo *lchip, struct locomo_dev_info *info)
NO_IRQ : lchip->irq_base + info->irq[0];
ret = device_register(&dev->dev);
- if (ret) {
- out:
- kfree(dev);
- }
+ if (ret)
+ put_device(&dev->dev);
+
return ret;
}
--
2.25.1
If device_add() fails, do not use device_unregister() for error
handling. device_unregister() consists two functions: device_del() and
put_device(). device_unregister() should only be called after
device_add() succeeded because device_del() undoes what device_add()
does if successful. Change device_unregister() to put_device() call
before returning from the function.
As comment of device_add() says, 'if device_add() succeeds, you should
call device_del() when you want to get rid of it. If device_add() has
not succeeded, use only put_device() to drop the reference count'.
Found by code review.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 53d2a715c240 ("phy: Add Tegra XUSB pad controller support")
Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
Changes in v2:
- modified the bug description as suggestions.
---
drivers/phy/tegra/xusb.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb.c b/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb.c
index 79d4814d758d..c89df95aa6ca 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb.c
@@ -548,16 +548,16 @@ static int tegra_xusb_port_init(struct tegra_xusb_port *port,
err = dev_set_name(&port->dev, "%s-%u", name, index);
if (err < 0)
- goto unregister;
+ goto put_device;
err = device_add(&port->dev);
if (err < 0)
- goto unregister;
+ goto put_device;
return 0;
-unregister:
- device_unregister(&port->dev);
+put_device:
+ put_device(&port->dev);
return err;
}
--
2.25.1
Fix two issues when cross-building userprogs with clang.
Reproducer, using nolibc to avoid libc requirements for cross building:
$ tail -2 init/Makefile
userprogs-always-y += test-llvm
test-llvm-userccflags += -nostdlib -nolibc -static -isystem usr/ -include $(srctree)/tools/include/nolibc/nolibc.h
$ cat init/test-llvm.c
int main(void)
{
return 0;
}
$ make ARCH=arm64 LLVM=1 allnoconfig headers_install init/
Validate that init/test-llvm builds and has the correct binary format.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh(a)linutronix.de>
---
Thomas Weißschuh (2):
kbuild: userprogs: fix bitsize and target detection on clang
kbuild: userprogs: use lld to link through clang
Makefile | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 2014c95afecee3e76ca4a56956a936e23283f05b
change-id: 20250213-kbuild-userprog-fixes-4f07b62ae818
Best regards,
--
Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh(a)linutronix.de>
On xiaomi-beryllium and oneplus-enchilada audio does not work reliably
with the in-kernel pd-mapper. Deferring the probe solves these issues.
Specifically, audio only works reliably with the in-kernel pd-mapper, if
the probe succeeds when remoteproc3 triggers the first successful probe.
I.e., probes from remoteproc0, 1, and 2 need to be deferred until
remoteproc3 has been probed.
Introduce a device specific quirk that lists the first auxdev for which
the probe must be executed. Until then, defer probes from other auxdevs.
Fixes: 1ebcde047c54 ("soc: qcom: add pd-mapper implementation")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Frank Oltmanns <frank(a)oltmanns.dev>
---
The in-kernel pd-mapper has been causing audio issues on sdm845
devices (specifically, xiaomi-beryllium and oneplus-enchilada). I
observed that Stephan’s approach [1] - which defers module probing by
blocklisting the module and triggering a later probe - works reliably.
Inspired by this, I experimented with delaying the probe within the
module itself by returning -EPROBE_DEFER in qcom_pdm_probe() until a
certain time (13.9 seconds after boot, based on ktime_get()) had
elapsed. This method also restored audio functionality.
Further logging of auxdev->id in qcom_pdm_probe() led to an interesting
discovery: audio only works reliably with the in-kernel pd-mapper when
the first successful probe is triggered by remoteproc3. In other words,
probes from remoteproc0, 1, and 2 must be deferred until remoteproc3 has
been probed.
To address this, I propose introducing a quirk table (which currently
only contains sdm845) to defer probing until the correct auxiliary
device (remoteproc3) initiates the probe.
I look forward to your feedback.
Thanks,
Frank
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-msm/Zwj3jDhc9fRoCCn6@linaro.org/
---
drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_pd_mapper.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_pd_mapper.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_pd_mapper.c
index 154ca5beb47160cc404a46a27840818fe3187420..34b26df665a888ac4872f56e948e73b561ae3b6b 100644
--- a/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_pd_mapper.c
+++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_pd_mapper.c
@@ -46,6 +46,11 @@ struct qcom_pdm_data {
struct list_head services;
};
+struct qcom_pdm_probe_first_dev_quirk {
+ const char *name;
+ u32 id;
+};
+
static DEFINE_MUTEX(qcom_pdm_mutex); /* protects __qcom_pdm_data */
static struct qcom_pdm_data *__qcom_pdm_data;
@@ -526,6 +531,11 @@ static const struct qcom_pdm_domain_data *x1e80100_domains[] = {
NULL,
};
+static const struct qcom_pdm_probe_first_dev_quirk first_dev_remoteproc3 = {
+ .id = 3,
+ .name = "pd-mapper"
+};
+
static const struct of_device_id qcom_pdm_domains[] __maybe_unused = {
{ .compatible = "qcom,apq8016", .data = NULL, },
{ .compatible = "qcom,apq8064", .data = NULL, },
@@ -566,6 +576,10 @@ static const struct of_device_id qcom_pdm_domains[] __maybe_unused = {
{},
};
+static const struct of_device_id qcom_pdm_defer[] __maybe_unused = {
+ { .compatible = "qcom,sdm845", .data = &first_dev_remoteproc3, },
+ {},
+};
static void qcom_pdm_stop(struct qcom_pdm_data *data)
{
qcom_pdm_free_domains(data);
@@ -637,6 +651,25 @@ static struct qcom_pdm_data *qcom_pdm_start(void)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
+static bool qcom_pdm_ready(struct auxiliary_device *auxdev)
+{
+ const struct of_device_id *match;
+ struct device_node *root;
+ struct qcom_pdm_probe_first_dev_quirk *first_dev;
+
+ root = of_find_node_by_path("/");
+ if (!root)
+ return true;
+
+ match = of_match_node(qcom_pdm_defer, root);
+ of_node_put(root);
+ if (!match)
+ return true;
+
+ first_dev = (struct qcom_pdm_probe_first_dev_quirk *) match->data;
+ return (auxdev->id == first_dev->id) && !strcmp(auxdev->name, first_dev->name);
+}
+
static int qcom_pdm_probe(struct auxiliary_device *auxdev,
const struct auxiliary_device_id *id)
@@ -647,6 +680,15 @@ static int qcom_pdm_probe(struct auxiliary_device *auxdev,
mutex_lock(&qcom_pdm_mutex);
if (!__qcom_pdm_data) {
+ if (!qcom_pdm_ready(auxdev)) {
+ pr_debug("%s: Deferring probe for device %s (id: %u)\n",
+ __func__, auxdev->name, auxdev->id);
+ ret = -EPROBE_DEFER;
+ goto probe_stop;
+ }
+ pr_debug("%s: Probing for device %s (id: %u), starting pdm\n",
+ __func__, auxdev->name, auxdev->id);
+
data = qcom_pdm_start();
if (IS_ERR(data))
@@ -659,6 +701,7 @@ static int qcom_pdm_probe(struct auxiliary_device *auxdev,
auxiliary_set_drvdata(auxdev, __qcom_pdm_data);
+probe_stop:
mutex_unlock(&qcom_pdm_mutex);
return ret;
---
base-commit: 7f048b202333b967782a98aa21bb3354dc379bbf
change-id: 20250205-qcom_pdm_defer-3dc1271d74d9
Best regards,
--
Frank Oltmanns <frank(a)oltmanns.dev>
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
The pages_touched field represents the number of subbuffers in the ring
buffer that have content that can be read. This is used in accounting of
"dirty_pages" and "buffer_percent" to allow the user to wait for the
buffer to be filled to a certain amount before it reads the buffer in
blocking mode.
The persistent buffer never updated this value so it was set to zero, and
this accounting would take it as it had no content. This would cause user
space to wait for content even though there's enough content in the ring
buffer that satisfies the buffer_percent.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250214123512.0631436e@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: 5f3b6e839f3ce ("ring-buffer: Validate boot range memory events")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
---
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index 0419d41a2060..bb6089c2951e 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -1850,6 +1850,11 @@ static void rb_meta_validate_events(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
cpu_buffer->cpu);
goto invalid;
}
+
+ /* If the buffer has content, update pages_touched */
+ if (ret)
+ local_inc(&cpu_buffer->pages_touched);
+
entries += ret;
entry_bytes += local_read(&head_page->page->commit);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->head_page->entries, ret);
--
2.47.2
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
When trying to mmap a trace instance buffer that is attached to
reserve_mem, it would crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe97bd00025c8
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 2862f3067 P4D 2862f3067 PUD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP PTI
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 981 Comm: mmap-rb Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-test-00003-g7f1a5e3fbf9e-dirty #233
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:validate_page_before_insert+0x5/0xb0
Code: e2 01 89 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 <48> 8b 46 08 a8 01 75 67 66 90 48 89 f0 8b 50 34 85 d2 74 76 48 89
RSP: 0018:ffffb148c2f3f968 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff9fa5d3322000 RBX: ffff9fa5ccff9c08 RCX: 00000000b879ed29
RDX: ffffe97bd00025c0 RSI: ffffe97bd00025c0 RDI: ffff9fa5ccff9c08
RBP: ffffb148c2f3f9f0 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000200 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f16a18d5000 R14: ffff9fa5c48db6a8 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f16a1b54740(0000) GS:ffff9fa73df00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffe97bd00025c8 CR3: 00000001048c6006 CR4: 0000000000172ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x1f
? __die+0x2e/0x40
? page_fault_oops+0x157/0x2b0
? search_module_extables+0x53/0x80
? validate_page_before_insert+0x5/0xb0
? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops.isra.0+0x5f/0x70
? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16e/0x1b0
? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
? do_kern_addr_fault+0x77/0x90
? exc_page_fault+0x22b/0x230
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x2b/0x30
? validate_page_before_insert+0x5/0xb0
? vm_insert_pages+0x151/0x400
__rb_map_vma+0x21f/0x3f0
ring_buffer_map+0x21b/0x2f0
tracing_buffers_mmap+0x70/0xd0
__mmap_region+0x6f0/0xbd0
mmap_region+0x7f/0x130
do_mmap+0x475/0x610
vm_mmap_pgoff+0xf2/0x1d0
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x166/0x200
__x64_sys_mmap+0x37/0x50
x64_sys_call+0x1670/0x1d70
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The reason was that the code that maps the ring buffer pages to user space
has:
page = virt_to_page((void *)cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids[s]);
And uses that in:
vm_insert_pages(vma, vma->vm_start, pages, &nr_pages);
But virt_to_page() does not work with vmap()'d memory which is what the
persistent ring buffer has. It is rather trivial to allow this, but for
now just disable mmap() of instances that have their ring buffer from the
reserve_mem option.
If an mmap() is performed on a persistent buffer it will return -ENODEV
just like it would if the .mmap field wasn't defined in the
file_operations structure.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250214115547.0d7287d3@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: e645535a954ad ("tracing: Add option to use memmapped memory for trace boot instance")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
---
kernel/trace/trace.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 25ff37aab00f..0e6d517e74e0 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -8279,6 +8279,10 @@ static int tracing_buffers_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
struct trace_iterator *iter = &info->iter;
int ret = 0;
+ /* Currently the boot mapped buffer is not supported for mmap */
+ if (iter->tr->flags & TRACE_ARRAY_FL_BOOT)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
ret = get_snapshot_map(iter->tr);
if (ret)
return ret;
--
2.47.2
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
The meta data for a mapped ring buffer contains an array of indexes of all
the subbuffers. The first entry is the reader page, and the rest of the
entries lay out the order of the subbuffers in how the ring buffer link
list is to be created.
The validator currently makes sure that all the entries are within the
range of 0 and nr_subbufs. But it does not check if there are any
duplicates.
While working on the ring buffer, I corrupted this array, where I added
duplicates. The validator did not catch it and created the ring buffer
link list on top of it. Luckily, the corruption was only that the reader
page was also in the writer path and only presented corrupted data but did
not crash the kernel. But if there were duplicates in the writer side,
then it could corrupt the ring buffer link list and cause a crash.
Create a bitmask array with the size of the number of subbuffers. Then
clear it. When walking through the subbuf array checking to see if the
entries are within the range, test if its bit is already set in the
subbuf_mask. If it is, then there is duplicates and fail the validation.
If not, set the corresponding bit and continue.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250214102820.7509ddea@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: c76883f18e59b ("ring-buffer: Add test if range of boot buffer is valid")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
---
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index 07b421115692..0419d41a2060 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -1672,7 +1672,8 @@ static void *rb_range_buffer(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer, int idx)
* must be the same.
*/
static bool rb_meta_valid(struct ring_buffer_meta *meta, int cpu,
- struct trace_buffer *buffer, int nr_pages)
+ struct trace_buffer *buffer, int nr_pages,
+ unsigned long *subbuf_mask)
{
int subbuf_size = PAGE_SIZE;
struct buffer_data_page *subbuf;
@@ -1680,6 +1681,9 @@ static bool rb_meta_valid(struct ring_buffer_meta *meta, int cpu,
unsigned long buffers_end;
int i;
+ if (!subbuf_mask)
+ return false;
+
/* Check the meta magic and meta struct size */
if (meta->magic != RING_BUFFER_META_MAGIC ||
meta->struct_size != sizeof(*meta)) {
@@ -1712,6 +1716,8 @@ static bool rb_meta_valid(struct ring_buffer_meta *meta, int cpu,
subbuf = rb_subbufs_from_meta(meta);
+ bitmap_clear(subbuf_mask, 0, meta->nr_subbufs);
+
/* Is the meta buffers and the subbufs themselves have correct data? */
for (i = 0; i < meta->nr_subbufs; i++) {
if (meta->buffers[i] < 0 ||
@@ -1725,6 +1731,12 @@ static bool rb_meta_valid(struct ring_buffer_meta *meta, int cpu,
return false;
}
+ if (test_bit(meta->buffers[i], subbuf_mask)) {
+ pr_info("Ring buffer boot meta [%d] array has duplicates\n", cpu);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ set_bit(meta->buffers[i], subbuf_mask);
subbuf = (void *)subbuf + subbuf_size;
}
@@ -1889,17 +1901,22 @@ static void rb_meta_init_text_addr(struct ring_buffer_meta *meta)
static void rb_range_meta_init(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int nr_pages)
{
struct ring_buffer_meta *meta;
+ unsigned long *subbuf_mask;
unsigned long delta;
void *subbuf;
int cpu;
int i;
+ /* Create a mask to test the subbuf array */
+ subbuf_mask = bitmap_alloc(nr_pages + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ /* If subbuf_mask fails to allocate, then rb_meta_valid() will return false */
+
for (cpu = 0; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; cpu++) {
void *next_meta;
meta = rb_range_meta(buffer, nr_pages, cpu);
- if (rb_meta_valid(meta, cpu, buffer, nr_pages)) {
+ if (rb_meta_valid(meta, cpu, buffer, nr_pages, subbuf_mask)) {
/* Make the mappings match the current address */
subbuf = rb_subbufs_from_meta(meta);
delta = (unsigned long)subbuf - meta->first_buffer;
@@ -1943,6 +1960,7 @@ static void rb_range_meta_init(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int nr_pages)
subbuf += meta->subbuf_size;
}
}
+ bitmap_free(subbuf_mask);
}
static void *rbm_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
--
2.47.2
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Currently if __tracing_resize_ring_buffer() returns an error, the
tracing_resize_ringbuffer() returns -ENOMEM. But it may not be a memory
issue that caused the function to fail. If the ring buffer is memory
mapped, then the resizing of the ring buffer will be disabled. But if the
user tries to resize the buffer, it will get an -ENOMEM returned, which is
confusing because there is plenty of memory. The actual error returned was
-EBUSY, which would make much more sense to the user.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250213134132.7e4505d7@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: 117c39200d9d7 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
---
kernel/trace/trace.c | 8 +-------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 1496a5ac33ae..25ff37aab00f 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -5977,8 +5977,6 @@ static int __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(struct trace_array *tr,
ssize_t tracing_resize_ring_buffer(struct trace_array *tr,
unsigned long size, int cpu_id)
{
- int ret;
-
guard(mutex)(&trace_types_lock);
if (cpu_id != RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
@@ -5987,11 +5985,7 @@ ssize_t tracing_resize_ring_buffer(struct trace_array *tr,
return -EINVAL;
}
- ret = __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(tr, size, cpu_id);
- if (ret < 0)
- ret = -ENOMEM;
-
- return ret;
+ return __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(tr, size, cpu_id);
}
static void update_last_data(struct trace_array *tr)
--
2.47.2
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Memory mapping the tracing ring buffer will disable resizing the buffer.
But if there's an error in the memory mapping like an invalid parameter,
the function exits out without re-enabling the resizing of the ring
buffer, preventing the ring buffer from being resized after that.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250213131957.530ec3c5@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: 117c39200d9d7 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
---
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index b8e0ae15ca5b..07b421115692 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -7126,6 +7126,7 @@ int ring_buffer_map(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu,
kfree(cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids);
cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids = NULL;
rb_free_meta_page(cpu_buffer);
+ atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
}
unlock:
--
2.47.2
commit e4b9852a0f4afe40604afb442e3af4452722050a upstream.
Below two paths could overlap each other if we power off a drive quickly
after powering it on. There are multiple races in nvme_setup_io_queues()
because of shutdown_lock missing and improper use of NVMEQ_ENABLED bit.
nvme_reset_work() nvme_remove()
nvme_setup_io_queues() nvme_dev_disable()
... ...
A1 clear NVMEQ_ENABLED bit for admin queue lock
retry: B1 nvme_suspend_io_queues()
A2 pci_free_irq() admin queue B2 nvme_suspend_queue() admin queue
A3 pci_free_irq_vectors() nvme_pci_disable()
A4 nvme_setup_irqs(); B3 pci_free_irq_vectors()
... unlock
A5 queue_request_irq() for admin queue
set NVMEQ_ENABLED bit
...
nvme_create_io_queues()
A6 result = queue_request_irq();
set NVMEQ_ENABLED bit
...
fail to allocate enough IO queues:
A7 nvme_suspend_io_queues()
goto retry
If B3 runs in between A1 and A2, it will crash if irqaction haven't
been freed by A2. B2 is supposed to free admin queue IRQ but it simply
can't fulfill the job as A1 has cleared NVMEQ_ENABLED bit.
Fix: combine A1 A2 so IRQ get freed as soon as the NVMEQ_ENABLED bit
gets cleared.
After solved #1, A2 could race with B3 if A2 is freeing IRQ while B3
is checking irqaction. A3 also could race with B2 if B2 is freeing
IRQ while A3 is checking irqaction.
Fix: A2 and A3 take lock for mutual exclusion.
A3 could race with B3 since they could run free_msi_irqs() in parallel.
Fix: A3 takes lock for mutual exclusion.
A4 could fail to allocate all needed IRQ vectors if A3 and A4 are
interrupted by B3.
Fix: A4 takes lock for mutual exclusion.
If A5/A6 happened after B2/B1, B3 will crash since irqaction is not NULL.
They are just allocated by A5/A6.
Fix: Lock queue_request_irq() and setting of NVMEQ_ENABLED bit.
A7 could get chance to pci_free_irq() for certain IO queue while B3 is
checking irqaction.
Fix: A7 takes lock.
nvme_dev->online_queues need to be protected by shutdown_lock. Since it
is not atomic, both paths could modify it using its own copy.
Co-developed-by: Yuanyuan Zhong <yzhong(a)purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Chen <cachen(a)purestorage.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
[noahm(a)debian.org: backported to 5.10]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/20210707211432.29536-1-cachen@purestorag…
Signed-off-by: Noah Meyerhans <noahm(a)debian.org>
---
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
index 875ebef6adc7..ae04bdce560a 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c
@@ -1563,6 +1563,28 @@ static void nvme_init_queue(struct nvme_queue *nvmeq, u16 qid)
wmb(); /* ensure the first interrupt sees the initialization */
}
+/*
+ * Try getting shutdown_lock while setting up IO queues.
+ */
+static int nvme_setup_io_queues_trylock(struct nvme_dev *dev)
+{
+ /*
+ * Give up if the lock is being held by nvme_dev_disable.
+ */
+ if (!mutex_trylock(&dev->shutdown_lock))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ /*
+ * Controller is in wrong state, fail early.
+ */
+ if (dev->ctrl.state != NVME_CTRL_CONNECTING) {
+ mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int nvme_create_queue(struct nvme_queue *nvmeq, int qid, bool polled)
{
struct nvme_dev *dev = nvmeq->dev;
@@ -1591,8 +1613,11 @@ static int nvme_create_queue(struct nvme_queue *nvmeq, int qid, bool polled)
goto release_cq;
nvmeq->cq_vector = vector;
- nvme_init_queue(nvmeq, qid);
+ result = nvme_setup_io_queues_trylock(dev);
+ if (result)
+ return result;
+ nvme_init_queue(nvmeq, qid);
if (!polled) {
result = queue_request_irq(nvmeq);
if (result < 0)
@@ -1600,10 +1625,12 @@ static int nvme_create_queue(struct nvme_queue *nvmeq, int qid, bool polled)
}
set_bit(NVMEQ_ENABLED, &nvmeq->flags);
+ mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock);
return result;
release_sq:
dev->online_queues--;
+ mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock);
adapter_delete_sq(dev, qid);
release_cq:
adapter_delete_cq(dev, qid);
@@ -2182,7 +2209,18 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
if (nr_io_queues == 0)
return 0;
- clear_bit(NVMEQ_ENABLED, &adminq->flags);
+ /*
+ * Free IRQ resources as soon as NVMEQ_ENABLED bit transitions
+ * from set to unset. If there is a window to it is truely freed,
+ * pci_free_irq_vectors() jumping into this window will crash.
+ * And take lock to avoid racing with pci_free_irq_vectors() in
+ * nvme_dev_disable() path.
+ */
+ result = nvme_setup_io_queues_trylock(dev);
+ if (result)
+ return result;
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(NVMEQ_ENABLED, &adminq->flags))
+ pci_free_irq(pdev, 0, adminq);
if (dev->cmb_use_sqes) {
result = nvme_cmb_qdepth(dev, nr_io_queues,
@@ -2198,14 +2236,17 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
result = nvme_remap_bar(dev, size);
if (!result)
break;
- if (!--nr_io_queues)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!--nr_io_queues) {
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
} while (1);
adminq->q_db = dev->dbs;
retry:
/* Deregister the admin queue's interrupt */
- pci_free_irq(pdev, 0, adminq);
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(NVMEQ_ENABLED, &adminq->flags))
+ pci_free_irq(pdev, 0, adminq);
/*
* If we enable msix early due to not intx, disable it again before
@@ -2214,8 +2255,10 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
result = nvme_setup_irqs(dev, nr_io_queues);
- if (result <= 0)
- return -EIO;
+ if (result <= 0) {
+ result = -EIO;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
dev->num_vecs = result;
result = max(result - 1, 1);
@@ -2229,8 +2272,9 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
*/
result = queue_request_irq(adminq);
if (result)
- return result;
+ goto out_unlock;
set_bit(NVMEQ_ENABLED, &adminq->flags);
+ mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock);
result = nvme_create_io_queues(dev);
if (result || dev->online_queues < 2)
@@ -2239,6 +2283,9 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
if (dev->online_queues - 1 < dev->max_qid) {
nr_io_queues = dev->online_queues - 1;
nvme_disable_io_queues(dev);
+ result = nvme_setup_io_queues_trylock(dev);
+ if (result)
+ return result;
nvme_suspend_io_queues(dev);
goto retry;
}
@@ -2247,6 +2294,9 @@ static int nvme_setup_io_queues(struct nvme_dev *dev)
dev->io_queues[HCTX_TYPE_READ],
dev->io_queues[HCTX_TYPE_POLL]);
return 0;
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock);
+ return result;
}
static void nvme_del_queue_end(struct request *req, blk_status_t error)
--
2.39.5
The patch titled
Subject: Revert "selftests/mm: remove local __NR_* definitions"
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: John Hubbard <jhubbard(a)nvidia.com>
Subject: Revert "selftests/mm: remove local __NR_* definitions"
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 19:38:50 -0800
This reverts commit a5c6bc590094a1a73cf6fa3f505e1945d2bf2461.
The general approach described in commit e076eaca5906 ("selftests: break
the dependency upon local header files") was taken one step too far here:
it should not have been extended to include the syscall numbers. This is
because doing so would require per-arch support in tools/include/uapi, and
no such support exists.
This revert fixes two separate reports of test failures, from Dave
Hansen[1], and Li Wang[2]. An excerpt of Dave's report:
Before this commit (a5c6bc590094a1a73cf6fa3f505e1945d2bf2461) things are
fine. But after, I get:
running PKEY tests for unsupported CPU/OS
An excerpt of Li's report:
I just found that mlock2_() return a wrong value in mlock2-test
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/dc585017-6740-4cab-a536-b12b37a7582d@intel.com
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/CAEemH2eW=UMu9+turT2jRie7+6ewUazXmA6kL+VBo3cGDGU6RA…
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250214033850.235171-1-jhubbard@nvidia.com
Fixes: a5c6bc590094 ("selftests/mm: remove local __NR_* definitions")
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard(a)nvidia.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Li Wang <liwang(a)redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin(a)google.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen(a)google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum(a)collabora.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias(a)libc.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/mm/hugepage-mremap.c | 2 -
tools/testing/selftests/mm/ksm_functional_tests.c | 8 +++++-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/memfd_secret.c | 14 ++++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/mkdirty.c | 8 +++++-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/mlock2.h | 1
tools/testing/selftests/mm/protection_keys.c | 2 -
tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-common.c | 4 +++
tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-stress.c | 15 +++++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c | 14 ++++++++++-
9 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/hugepage-mremap.c~revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/hugepage-mremap.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
-#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h> /* Definition of O_* constants */
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/ksm_functional_tests.c~revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/ksm_functional_tests.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
-#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ unmap:
munmap(map, size);
}
+#ifdef __NR_userfaultfd
static void test_unmerge_uffd_wp(void)
{
struct uffdio_writeprotect uffd_writeprotect;
@@ -429,6 +430,7 @@ close_uffd:
unmap:
munmap(map, size);
}
+#endif
/* Verify that KSM can be enabled / queried with prctl. */
static void test_prctl(void)
@@ -684,7 +686,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
exit(test_child_ksm());
}
+#ifdef __NR_userfaultfd
tests++;
+#endif
ksft_print_header();
ksft_set_plan(tests);
@@ -696,7 +700,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
test_unmerge();
test_unmerge_zero_pages();
test_unmerge_discarded();
+#ifdef __NR_userfaultfd
test_unmerge_uffd_wp();
+#endif
test_prot_none();
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/memfd_secret.c~revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/memfd_secret.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
#define pass(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_pass(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define skip(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_skip(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#ifdef __NR_memfd_secret
+
#define PATTERN 0x55
static const int prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
@@ -332,3 +334,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
ksft_finished();
}
+
+#else /* __NR_memfd_secret */
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ printf("skip: skipping memfd_secret test (missing __NR_memfd_secret)\n");
+ return KSFT_SKIP;
+}
+
+#endif /* __NR_memfd_secret */
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/mkdirty.c~revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/mkdirty.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
*/
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ munmap:
munmap(mmap_mem, mmap_size);
}
+#ifdef __NR_userfaultfd
static void test_uffdio_copy(void)
{
struct uffdio_register uffdio_register;
@@ -322,6 +323,7 @@ munmap:
munmap(dst, pagesize);
free(src);
}
+#endif /* __NR_userfaultfd */
int main(void)
{
@@ -334,7 +336,9 @@ int main(void)
thpsize / 1024);
tests += 3;
}
+#ifdef __NR_userfaultfd
tests += 1;
+#endif /* __NR_userfaultfd */
ksft_print_header();
ksft_set_plan(tests);
@@ -364,7 +368,9 @@ int main(void)
if (thpsize)
test_pte_mapped_thp();
/* Placing a fresh page via userfaultfd may set the PTE dirty. */
+#ifdef __NR_userfaultfd
test_uffdio_copy();
+#endif /* __NR_userfaultfd */
err = ksft_get_fail_cnt();
if (err)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/mlock2.h~revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/mlock2.h
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
static int mlock2_(void *start, size_t len, int flags)
{
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/protection_keys.c~revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/protection_keys.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <setjmp.h>
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-common.c~revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-common.c
@@ -673,7 +673,11 @@ int uffd_open_dev(unsigned int flags)
int uffd_open_sys(unsigned int flags)
{
+#ifdef __NR_userfaultfd
return syscall(__NR_userfaultfd, flags);
+#else
+ return -1;
+#endif
}
int uffd_open(unsigned int flags)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-stress.c~revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-stress.c
@@ -33,10 +33,11 @@
* pthread_mutex_lock will also verify the atomicity of the memory
* transfer (UFFDIO_COPY).
*/
-#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
+
#include "uffd-common.h"
uint64_t features;
+#ifdef __NR_userfaultfd
#define BOUNCE_RANDOM (1<<0)
#define BOUNCE_RACINGFAULTS (1<<1)
@@ -471,3 +472,15 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
nr_pages, nr_pages_per_cpu);
return userfaultfd_stress();
}
+
+#else /* __NR_userfaultfd */
+
+#warning "missing __NR_userfaultfd definition"
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ printf("skip: Skipping userfaultfd test (missing __NR_userfaultfd)\n");
+ return KSFT_SKIP;
+}
+
+#endif /* __NR_userfaultfd */
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c~revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c
@@ -5,11 +5,12 @@
* Copyright (C) 2015-2023 Red Hat, Inc.
*/
-#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
#include "uffd-common.h"
#include "../../../../mm/gup_test.h"
+#ifdef __NR_userfaultfd
+
/* The unit test doesn't need a large or random size, make it 32MB for now */
#define UFFD_TEST_MEM_SIZE (32UL << 20)
@@ -1558,3 +1559,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
return ksft_get_fail_cnt() ? KSFT_FAIL : KSFT_PASS;
}
+#else /* __NR_userfaultfd */
+
+#warning "missing __NR_userfaultfd definition"
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ printf("Skipping %s (missing __NR_userfaultfd)\n", __file__);
+ return KSFT_SKIP;
+}
+
+#endif /* __NR_userfaultfd */
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from jhubbard(a)nvidia.com are
revert-selftests-mm-remove-local-__nr_-definitions.patch
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra(a)amd.com>
This patch-set fixes the current SNP host enabling code and effectively SNP
which is broken with respect to the KVM module being built-in.
Essentially SNP host enabling code should be invoked before KVM
initialization, which is currently not the case when KVM is built-in.
SNP host support is currently enabled in snp_rmptable_init() which is
invoked as a device_initcall(). Here device_initcall() is used as
snp_rmptable_init() expects AMD IOMMU SNP support to be enabled prior
to it and the AMD IOMMU driver enables SNP support after PCI bus enumeration.
This patch-set adds support to call snp_rmptable_init() early and
directly from iommu_snp_enable() (after checking and enabling IOMMU
SNP support) which enables SNP host support before KVM initialization
with kvm_amd module built-in.
Additionally the patch-set adds support to initialize PSP SEV driver
during KVM module probe time.
This patch-set has been tested with the following cases/scenarios:
1). kvm_amd module and PSP driver built-in.
2). kvm_amd module built-in with intremap=off kernel command line.
3). kvm_amd module built-in with iommu=off kernel command line.
4). kvm_amd and PSP driver built as modules.
5). kvm_amd built as module with iommu=off kernel command line.
6). kvm_amd module as built-in and PSP driver as module.
7). kvm_amd build as a module and PSP driver as built-in.
v4:
- Add warning if SNP support has been checked on IOMMUs and host
SNP support has been enabled but late IOMMU initialization fails
subsequently.
- Add reviewed-by's.
v3:
- Ensure that dropping the device_initcall() happens in the same
patch that wires up the IOMMU code to invoke snp_rmptable_init()
which then makes sure that snp_rmptable_init() is still getting
called and also merge patches 3 & 4.
- Fix commit logs.
v2:
- Drop calling iommu_snp_enable() early before enabling IOMMUs as
IOMMU subsystem gets initialized via subsys_initcall() and hence
snp_rmptable_init() cannot be invoked via subsys_initcall().
- Instead add support to call snp_rmptable_init() early and
directly via iommu_snp_enable().
- Fix commit logs.
Fixes: c3b86e61b756 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature")
Ashish Kalra (1):
x86/sev: Fix broken SNP support with KVM module built-in
Sean Christopherson (2):
crypto: ccp: Add external API interface for PSP module initialization
KVM: SVM: Ensure PSP module is initialized if KVM module is built-in
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 10 ++++++++++
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 23 +++++++----------------
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
include/linux/psp-sev.h | 9 +++++++++
6 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
--
2.34.1
From: Joshua Washington <joshwash(a)google.com>
Before this patch the NETDEV_XDP_ACT_NDO_XMIT XDP feature flag is set by
default as part of driver initialization, and is never cleared. However,
this flag differs from others in that it is used as an indicator for
whether the driver is ready to perform the ndo_xdp_xmit operation as
part of an XDP_REDIRECT. Kernel helpers
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target exist to convey this meaning.
This patch ensures that the netdev is only reported as a redirect target
when XDP queues exist to forward traffic.
Fixes: 39a7f4aa3e4a ("gve: Add XDP REDIRECT support for GQI-QPL format")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Praveen Kaligineedi <pkaligineedi(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeroen de Borst <jeroendb(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash(a)google.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve.h | 10 ++++++++++
drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_main.c | 6 +++++-
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve.h
index 8167cc5fb0df..78d2a19593d1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve.h
@@ -1116,6 +1116,16 @@ static inline u32 gve_xdp_tx_start_queue_id(struct gve_priv *priv)
return gve_xdp_tx_queue_id(priv, 0);
}
+static inline bool gve_supports_xdp_xmit(struct gve_priv *priv)
+{
+ switch (priv->queue_format) {
+ case GVE_GQI_QPL_FORMAT:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
/* gqi napi handler defined in gve_main.c */
int gve_napi_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_main.c
index 533e659b15b3..92237fb0b60c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_main.c
@@ -1903,6 +1903,8 @@ static void gve_turndown(struct gve_priv *priv)
/* Stop tx queues */
netif_tx_disable(priv->dev);
+ xdp_features_clear_redirect_target(priv->dev);
+
gve_clear_napi_enabled(priv);
gve_clear_report_stats(priv);
@@ -1972,6 +1974,9 @@ static void gve_turnup(struct gve_priv *priv)
napi_schedule(&block->napi);
}
+ if (priv->num_xdp_queues && gve_supports_xdp_xmit(priv))
+ xdp_features_set_redirect_target(priv->dev, false);
+
gve_set_napi_enabled(priv);
}
@@ -2246,7 +2251,6 @@ static void gve_set_netdev_xdp_features(struct gve_priv *priv)
if (priv->queue_format == GVE_GQI_QPL_FORMAT) {
xdp_features = NETDEV_XDP_ACT_BASIC;
xdp_features |= NETDEV_XDP_ACT_REDIRECT;
- xdp_features |= NETDEV_XDP_ACT_NDO_XMIT;
xdp_features |= NETDEV_XDP_ACT_XSK_ZEROCOPY;
} else {
xdp_features = 0;
--
2.48.1.601.g30ceb7b040-goog
Fix several issues in partition probing:
- The bailout for a bad partoffset must use put_dev_sector(), since the
preceding read_part_sector() succeeded.
- If the partition table claims a silly sector size like 0xfff bytes
(which results in partition table entries straddling sector boundaries),
bail out instead of accessing out-of-bounds memory.
- We must not assume that the partition table contains proper NUL
termination - use strnlen() and strncmp() instead of strlen() and
strcmp().
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
---
block/partitions/mac.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/block/partitions/mac.c b/block/partitions/mac.c
index c80183156d68020e0e14974308ac751b3df84421..b02530d986297058de0db929fbf638a76fc44508 100644
--- a/block/partitions/mac.c
+++ b/block/partitions/mac.c
@@ -53,13 +53,25 @@ int mac_partition(struct parsed_partitions *state)
}
secsize = be16_to_cpu(md->block_size);
put_dev_sector(sect);
+
+ /*
+ * If the "block size" is not a power of 2, things get weird - we might
+ * end up with a partition straddling a sector boundary, so we wouldn't
+ * be able to read a partition entry with read_part_sector().
+ * Real block sizes are probably (?) powers of two, so just require
+ * that.
+ */
+ if (!is_power_of_2(secsize))
+ return -1;
datasize = round_down(secsize, 512);
data = read_part_sector(state, datasize / 512, §);
if (!data)
return -1;
partoffset = secsize % 512;
- if (partoffset + sizeof(*part) > datasize)
+ if (partoffset + sizeof(*part) > datasize) {
+ put_dev_sector(sect);
return -1;
+ }
part = (struct mac_partition *) (data + partoffset);
if (be16_to_cpu(part->signature) != MAC_PARTITION_MAGIC) {
put_dev_sector(sect);
@@ -112,8 +124,8 @@ int mac_partition(struct parsed_partitions *state)
int i, l;
goodness++;
- l = strlen(part->name);
- if (strcmp(part->name, "/") == 0)
+ l = strnlen(part->name, sizeof(part->name));
+ if (strncmp(part->name, "/", sizeof(part->name)) == 0)
goodness++;
for (i = 0; i <= l - 4; ++i) {
if (strncasecmp(part->name + i, "root",
---
base-commit: ab68d7eb7b1a64f3f4710da46cc5f93c6c154942
change-id: 20250214-partition-mac-2e7114c62223
--
Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Hi!
Recently I've been pointed to this driver for an example on how consumers
can get a pointer to the supplier's driver data and I noticed a leak.
Callers of of_qcom_ice_get() leak the device reference taken by
of_find_device_by_node(). Introduce devm_of_qcom_ice_get().
Exporting qcom_ice_put() is not done intentionally as the consumers need
the ICE intance for the entire life of their device. Update the consumers
to use the devm variant and make of_qcom_ice_get() static afterwards.
This set touches mmc and scsi subsystems. Since the fix is trivial for
them, I'd suggest taking everything through the SoC tree with Acked-by
tags if people consider this fine. Note that the mmc and scsi patches
depend on the first patch that introduces devm_of_qcom_ice_get().
Thanks!
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus(a)linaro.org>
---
Changes in v2:
- add kernel doc for newly introduced devm_of_qcom_ice_get().
- update cover letter and commit message of first patch.
- collect R-b and A-b tags.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250116-qcom-ice-fix-dev-leak-v1-0-84d937683790@…
---
Tudor Ambarus (4):
soc: qcom: ice: introduce devm_of_qcom_ice_get
mmc: sdhci-msm: fix dev reference leaked through of_qcom_ice_get
scsi: ufs: qcom: fix dev reference leaked through of_qcom_ice_get
soc: qcom: ice: make of_qcom_ice_get() static
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-msm.c | 2 +-
drivers/soc/qcom/ice.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
drivers/ufs/host/ufs-qcom.c | 2 +-
include/soc/qcom/ice.h | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: b323d8e7bc03d27dec646bfdccb7d1a92411f189
change-id: 20250110-qcom-ice-fix-dev-leak-bbff59a964fb
Best regards,
--
Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus(a)linaro.org>
From: Saranya R <quic_sarar(a)quicinc.com>
When some client process A call pdr_add_lookup() to add the look up for
the service and does schedule locator work, later a process B got a new
server packet indicating locator is up and call pdr_locator_new_server()
which eventually sets pdr->locator_init_complete to true which process A
sees and takes list lock and queries domain list but it will timeout due
to deadlock as the response will queued to the same qmi->wq and it is
ordered workqueue and process B is not able to complete new server
request work due to deadlock on list lock.
Fix it by removing the unnecessary list iteration as the list iteration
is already being done inside locator work, so avoid it here and just
call schedule_work() here.
Process A Process B
process_scheduled_works()
pdr_add_lookup() qmi_data_ready_work()
process_scheduled_works() pdr_locator_new_server()
pdr->locator_init_complete=true;
pdr_locator_work()
mutex_lock(&pdr->list_lock);
pdr_locate_service() mutex_lock(&pdr->list_lock);
pdr_get_domain_list()
pr_err("PDR: %s get domain list
txn wait failed: %d\n",
req->service_name,
ret);
Timeout error log due to deadlock:
"
PDR: tms/servreg get domain list txn wait failed: -110
PDR: service lookup for msm/adsp/sensor_pd:tms/servreg failed: -110
"
Thanks to Bjorn and Johan for letting me know that this commit also fixes
an audio regression when using the in-kernel pd-mapper as that makes it
easier to hit this race. [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zqet8iInnDhnxkT9@hovoldconsulting.com/ # [1]
Fixes: fbe639b44a82 ("soc: qcom: Introduce Protection Domain Restart helpers")
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson(a)oss.qualcomm.com>
Tested-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson(a)oss.qualcomm.com>
Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Saranya R <quic_sarar(a)quicinc.com>
Co-developed-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha(a)oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha(a)oss.qualcomm.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Corrected author and added Co-developed-by for myself.
- Added T-by and R-by tags.
- Modified commit message updated with the link of the issue
which also gets fixed by this commit.
Changes in v2:
- Added Fixes tag.
drivers/soc/qcom/pdr_interface.c | 8 +-------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/pdr_interface.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/pdr_interface.c
index 328b6153b2be..71be378d2e43 100644
--- a/drivers/soc/qcom/pdr_interface.c
+++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/pdr_interface.c
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ static int pdr_locator_new_server(struct qmi_handle *qmi,
{
struct pdr_handle *pdr = container_of(qmi, struct pdr_handle,
locator_hdl);
- struct pdr_service *pds;
mutex_lock(&pdr->lock);
/* Create a local client port for QMI communication */
@@ -87,12 +86,7 @@ static int pdr_locator_new_server(struct qmi_handle *qmi,
mutex_unlock(&pdr->lock);
/* Service pending lookup requests */
- mutex_lock(&pdr->list_lock);
- list_for_each_entry(pds, &pdr->lookups, node) {
- if (pds->need_locator_lookup)
- schedule_work(&pdr->locator_work);
- }
- mutex_unlock(&pdr->list_lock);
+ schedule_work(&pdr->locator_work);
return 0;
}
--
2.34.1
Since the conversion to using the TZ allocator, the efivars service is
registered before the memory pool has been allocated, something which
can lead to a NULL-pointer dereference in case of a racing EFI variable
access.
Make sure that all resources have been set up before registering the
efivars.
Fixes: 6612103ec35a ("firmware: qcom: qseecom: convert to using the TZ allocator")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.11
Cc: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org>
---
Note that commit 40289e35ca52 ("firmware: qcom: scm: enable the TZ mem
allocator") looks equally broken as it allocates the tzmem pool only
after qcom_scm_is_available() returns true and other driver can start
making SCM calls.
That one appears to be a bit harder to fix as qcom_tzmem_enable()
currently depends on SCM being available, but someone should definitely
look into untangling that mess.
Johan
.../firmware/qcom/qcom_qseecom_uefisecapp.c | 18 +++++++++---------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_qseecom_uefisecapp.c b/drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_qseecom_uefisecapp.c
index 447246bd04be..98a463e9774b 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_qseecom_uefisecapp.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_qseecom_uefisecapp.c
@@ -814,15 +814,6 @@ static int qcom_uefisecapp_probe(struct auxiliary_device *aux_dev,
qcuefi->client = container_of(aux_dev, struct qseecom_client, aux_dev);
- auxiliary_set_drvdata(aux_dev, qcuefi);
- status = qcuefi_set_reference(qcuefi);
- if (status)
- return status;
-
- status = efivars_register(&qcuefi->efivars, &qcom_efivar_ops);
- if (status)
- qcuefi_set_reference(NULL);
-
memset(&pool_config, 0, sizeof(pool_config));
pool_config.initial_size = SZ_4K;
pool_config.policy = QCOM_TZMEM_POLICY_MULTIPLIER;
@@ -833,6 +824,15 @@ static int qcom_uefisecapp_probe(struct auxiliary_device *aux_dev,
if (IS_ERR(qcuefi->mempool))
return PTR_ERR(qcuefi->mempool);
+ auxiliary_set_drvdata(aux_dev, qcuefi);
+ status = qcuefi_set_reference(qcuefi);
+ if (status)
+ return status;
+
+ status = efivars_register(&qcuefi->efivars, &qcom_efivar_ops);
+ if (status)
+ qcuefi_set_reference(NULL);
+
return status;
}
--
2.45.2
Changes in v10:
- Updated the commit log of patch #1 to make the reasoning - that it makes
applying the subsequent patch cleaner/nicer clear - Bjorn
- Substantially rewrites final patch commit to mostly reflect Bjorn's
summation of my long and rambling previous paragraphs.
Being a visual person, I've included some example pseudo-code which
hopefully makes the intent clearer plus some ASCII art >= Klimt.
- Link to v9: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241230-b4-linux-next-24-11-18-clock-multiple-po…
Changes in v9:
- Added patch to unwind pm subdomains in reverse order.
It would also be possible to squash this patch into patch#2 but,
my own preference is for more granular patches like this instead of
"slipping in" functional changes in larger patches like #2. - bod
- Unwinding pm subdomain on error in patch #2.
To facilitate this change patch #1 was created - Vlad
- Drops Bjorn's RB on patch #2. There is a small churn in this patch
but enough that a reviewer might reasonably expect RB to be given again.
- Amends commit log for patch #3 further.
v8 added a lot to the commit log to provide further information but, it
is clear from the comments I received on the commit log that the added
verbiage was occlusive not elucidative.
Reduce down the commit log of patch #3 - especially Q&A item #1.
Sometimes less is more.
- Link to v8: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241211-b4-linux-next-24-11-18-clock-multiple-po…
Changes in v8:
- Picks up change I agreed with Vlad but failed to cherry-pick into my b4
tree - Vlad/Bod
- Rewords the commit log for patch #3. As I read it I decided I might
translate bits of it from thought-stream into English - Bod
- Link to v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241211-b4-linux-next-24-11-18-clock-multiple-po…
Changes in v7:
- Expand commit log in patch #3
I've discussed with Bjorn on IRC and video what to put into the log here
and captured most of what we discussed.
Mostly the point here is voting for voltages in the power-domain list
is up to the drivers to do with performance states/opp-tables not for the
GDSC code. - Bjorn/Bryan
- Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129-b4-linux-next-24-11-18-clock-multiple-po…
Changes in v6:
- Passes NULL to second parameter of devm_pm_domain_attach_list - Vlad
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128-b4-linux-next-24-11-18-clock-multiple-po…
Changes in v5:
- In-lines devm_pm_domain_attach_list() in probe() directly - Vlad
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241127-b4-linux-next-24-11-18-clock-multiple-po…
v4:
- Adds Bjorn's RB to first patch - Bjorn
- Drops the 'd' in "and int" - Bjorn
- Amends commit log of patch 3 to capture a number of open questions -
Bjorn
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241126-b4-linux-next-24-11-18-clock-multiple-po…
v3:
- Fixes commit log "per which" - Bryan
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241125-b4-linux-next-24-11-18-clock-multiple-po…
v2:
The main change in this version is Bjorn's pointing out that pm_runtime_*
inside of the gdsc_enable/gdsc_disable path would be recursive and cause a
lockdep splat. Dmitry alluded to this too.
Bjorn pointed to stuff being done lower in the gdsc_register() routine that
might be a starting point.
I iterated around that idea and came up with patch #3. When a gdsc has no
parent and the pd_list is non-NULL then attach that orphan GDSC to the
clock controller power-domain list.
Existing subdomain code in gdsc_register() will connect the parent GDSCs in
the clock-controller to the clock-controller subdomain, the new code here
does that same job for a list of power-domains the clock controller depends
on.
To Dmitry's point about MMCX and MCX dependencies for the registers inside
of the clock controller, I have switched off all references in a test dtsi
and confirmed that accessing the clock-controller regs themselves isn't
required.
On the second point I also verified my test branch with lockdep on which
was a concern with the pm_domain version of this solution but I wanted to
cover it anyway with the new approach for completeness sake.
Here's the item-by-item list of changes:
- Adds a patch to capture pm_genpd_add_subdomain() result code - Bryan
- Changes changelog of second patch to remove singleton and generally
to make the commit log easier to understand - Bjorn
- Uses demv_pm_domain_attach_list - Vlad
- Changes error check to if (ret < 0 && ret != -EEXIST) - Vlad
- Retains passing &pd_data instead of NULL - because NULL doesn't do
the same thing - Bryan/Vlad
- Retains standalone function qcom_cc_pds_attach() because the pd_data
enumeration looks neater in a standalone function - Bryan/Vlad
- Drops pm_runtime in favour of gdsc_add_subdomain_list() for each
power-domain in the pd_list.
The pd_list will be whatever is pointed to by power-domains = <>
in the dtsi - Bjorn
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241118-b4-linux-next-24-11-18-clock-multiple-po…
v1:
On x1e80100 and it's SKUs the Camera Clock Controller - CAMCC has
multiple power-domains which power it. Usually with a single power-domain
the core platform code will automatically switch on the singleton
power-domain for you. If you have multiple power-domains for a device, in
this case the clock controller, you need to switch those power-domains
on/off yourself.
The clock controllers can also contain Global Distributed
Switch Controllers - GDSCs which themselves can be referenced from dtsi
nodes ultimately triggering a gdsc_en() in drivers/clk/qcom/gdsc.c.
As an example:
cci0: cci@ac4a000 {
power-domains = <&camcc TITAN_TOP_GDSC>;
};
This series adds the support to attach a power-domain list to the
clock-controllers and the GDSCs those controllers provide so that in the
case of the above example gdsc_toggle_logic() will trigger the power-domain
list with pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and pm_runtime_put_sync()
respectively.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue(a)linaro.org>
---
Bryan O'Donoghue (4):
clk: qcom: gdsc: Release pm subdomains in reverse add order
clk: qcom: gdsc: Capture pm_genpd_add_subdomain result code
clk: qcom: common: Add support for power-domain attachment
clk: qcom: Support attaching GDSCs to multiple parents
drivers/clk/qcom/common.c | 6 ++++
drivers/clk/qcom/gdsc.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
drivers/clk/qcom/gdsc.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 0907e7fb35756464aa34c35d6abb02998418164b
change-id: 20241118-b4-linux-next-24-11-18-clock-multiple-power-domains-a5f994dc452a
Best regards,
--
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue(a)linaro.org>
Hi all,
Here's a bunch of hand-ported bug fixes for 6.12 LTS. Most of the
patches fix a warning about dquot reclaim needing to read dquot buffers
in from disk by pinning buffers at transaction commit time instead of
during reclaim.
If you're going to start using this code, I strongly recommend pulling
from my git trees, which are linked below.
With a bit of luck, this should all go splendidly.
Comments and questions are, as always, welcome.
--D
kernel git tree:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/djwong/xfs-linux.git/log/?h=ne…
---
Commits in this patchset:
* xfs: avoid nested calls to __xfs_trans_commit
* xfs: don't lose solo superblock counter update transactions
* xfs: don't lose solo dquot update transactions
* xfs: separate dquot buffer reads from xfs_dqflush
* xfs: clean up log item accesses in xfs_qm_dqflush{,_done}
* xfs: attach dquot buffer to dquot log item buffer
* xfs: convert quotacheck to attach dquot buffers
* xfs: don't over-report free space or inodes in statvfs
* xfs: release the dquot buf outside of qli_lock
* xfs: lock dquot buffer before detaching dquot from b_li_list
* xfs: fix mount hang during primary superblock recovery failure
---
fs/xfs/xfs_dquot.h | 6 +
fs/xfs/xfs_dquot_item.h | 7 +
fs/xfs/xfs_quota.h | 7 +
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c | 11 ++
fs/xfs/xfs_dquot.c | 199 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
fs/xfs/xfs_dquot_item.c | 51 ++++++++---
fs/xfs/xfs_qm.c | 48 ++++++++--
fs/xfs/xfs_qm_bhv.c | 27 ++++--
fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c | 39 ++++----
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_ail.c | 2
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c | 31 +++++-
11 files changed, 338 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
#regzbot introduced: 63a1f8454962
Dear maintainer,
I think I have found a regression in kernels version 6.10 and newer,
including the latest mainline v6.13-rc4:
fastboot (the tool for communicating with Android bootloaders) now fails to
perform various operations over USB.
The problem manifests as an error when attempting to 'fastboot flash' an
image (e.g. a new kernel containing security updates) to a LineageOS phone.
It also manifests with simpler operations like reading a variable from the
bootloader. For example:
fastboot getvar kernel
A typical error message when the failure occurs:
getvar:kernel FAILED (remote: 'GetVar Variable Not found')
I can reproduce this at will. It happens about 50% of the time when I
run the above getvar command, and almost all the time when I try to push
a new kernel to a device.
A git bisect reveals this:
63a1f8454962a64746a59441687dc2401290326c is the first bad commit
commit 63a1f8454962a64746a59441687dc2401290326c
Author: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon Apr 29 17:02:28 2024 +0300
xhci: stored cached port capability values in one place
Hello,
I hope you are having a great day!
I am writing this email to follow up on my previous email. I haven't
received a response from you yet and I just wanted to make sure that you
have received my email. When you have a moment, could you please let me
know if you have received it or not?
Please acknowledge the receipt of this email.
Regards,
Debbie
______________________________________________________________________________________
*Subject:* Hematologist and Lab Directors Contact
Hello,
I have a quick question for you - would you be interested in receiving*
Hematologists and Lab Directors Contact*
If so, please let me know your *target geography,* and I'll be happy to
provide you with relevant counts and pricing.
Just a note that we can customize the lists to meet any specific
requirements based on your criteria.
Wishing you a fantastic day!
Debbie McCoy
Manager, Demand Generation
If you ever feel like opting out, simply reply with "remove me" in the
subject line
The format of the port width field in the DDI_BUF_CTL and the
TRANS_DDI_FUNC_CTL registers are different starting with MTL, where the
x3 lane mode for HDMI FRL has a different encoding in the two registers.
To account for this use the TRANS_DDI_FUNC_CTL's own port width macro.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.5+
Fixes: b66a8abaa48a ("drm/i915/display/mtl: Fill port width in DDI_BUF_/TRANS_DDI_FUNC_/PORT_BUF_CTL for HDMI")
Reviewed-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/icl_dsi.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/icl_dsi.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/icl_dsi.c
index 9600c2a346d4c..5d3d54922d629 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/icl_dsi.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/icl_dsi.c
@@ -805,8 +805,8 @@ gen11_dsi_configure_transcoder(struct intel_encoder *encoder,
/* select data lane width */
tmp = intel_de_read(display,
TRANS_DDI_FUNC_CTL(display, dsi_trans));
- tmp &= ~DDI_PORT_WIDTH_MASK;
- tmp |= DDI_PORT_WIDTH(intel_dsi->lane_count);
+ tmp &= ~TRANS_DDI_PORT_WIDTH_MASK;
+ tmp |= TRANS_DDI_PORT_WIDTH(intel_dsi->lane_count);
/* select input pipe */
tmp &= ~TRANS_DDI_EDP_INPUT_MASK;
--
2.44.2
The netdevsim driver was getting NOHZ tick-stop errors during packet
transmission due to pending softirq work when calling napi_schedule().
This is showing the following message when running netconsole selftest.
NOHZ tick-stop error: local softirq work is pending, handler #08!!!
Add local_bh_disable()/enable() around the napi_schedule() call to
prevent softirqs from being handled during this xmit.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3762ec05a9fb ("netdevsim: add NAPI support")
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org>
---
drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c b/drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c
index 42f247cbdceecbadf27f7090c030aa5bd240c18a..6aeb081b06da226ab91c49f53d08f465570877ae 100644
--- a/drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c
@@ -87,7 +87,9 @@ static netdev_tx_t nsim_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
if (unlikely(nsim_forward_skb(peer_dev, skb, rq) == NET_RX_DROP))
goto out_drop_cnt;
+ local_bh_disable();
napi_schedule(&rq->napi);
+ local_bh_enable();
rcu_read_unlock();
u64_stats_update_begin(&ns->syncp);
---
base-commit: cf33d96f50903214226b379b3f10d1f262dae018
change-id: 20250212-netdevsim-258d2d628175
Best regards,
--
Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org>
From: BH Hsieh <bhsieh(a)nvidia.com>
Observed VBUS_OVERRIDE & ID_OVERRIDE might be programmed
with unexpected value prior to XUSB PADCTL driver, this
could also occur in virtualization scenario.
For example, UEFI firmware programs ID_OVERRIDE=GROUNDED to set
a type-c port to host mode and keeps the value to kernel.
If the type-c port is connected a usb host, below errors can be
observed right after usb host mode driver gets probed. The errors
would keep until usb role class driver detects the type-c port
as device mode and notifies usb device mode driver to set both
ID_OVERRIDE and VBUS_OVERRIDE to correct value by XUSB PADCTL
driver.
[ 173.765814] usb usb3-port2: Cannot enable. Maybe the USB cable is bad?
[ 173.765837] usb usb3-port2: config error
Taking virtualization into account, asserting XUSB PADCTL
reset would break XUSB functions used by other guest OS,
hence only reset VBUS & ID OVERRIDE of the port in
utmi_phy_init.
Fixes: bbf711682cd5 ("phy: tegra: xusb: Add Tegra186 support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Change-Id: Ic63058d4d49b4a1f8f9ab313196e20ad131cc591
Signed-off-by: BH Hsieh <bhsieh(a)nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Henry Lin <henryl(a)nvidia.com>
---
V1 -> V2: Only reset VBUS/ID OVERRIDE for otg/peripheral port
drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c b/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c
index 0f60d5d1c167..fae6242aa730 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c
@@ -928,6 +928,7 @@ static int tegra186_utmi_phy_init(struct phy *phy)
unsigned int index = lane->index;
struct device *dev = padctl->dev;
int err;
+ u32 reg;
port = tegra_xusb_find_usb2_port(padctl, index);
if (!port) {
@@ -935,6 +936,16 @@ static int tegra186_utmi_phy_init(struct phy *phy)
return -ENODEV;
}
+ if (port->mode == USB_DR_MODE_OTG ||
+ port->mode == USB_DR_MODE_PERIPHERAL) {
+ /* reset VBUS&ID OVERRIDE */
+ reg = padctl_readl(padctl, USB2_VBUS_ID);
+ reg &= ~VBUS_OVERRIDE;
+ reg &= ~ID_OVERRIDE(~0);
+ reg |= ID_OVERRIDE_FLOATING;
+ padctl_writel(padctl, reg, USB2_VBUS_ID);
+ }
+
if (port->supply && port->mode == USB_DR_MODE_HOST) {
err = regulator_enable(port->supply);
if (err) {
--
2.17.1
We currently don't gate the power to the SS phy in phy_exit().
Shuffle the code slightly to ensure the power is gated to the SS phy as
well.
Fixes: 32267c29bc7d ("phy: exynos5-usbdrd: support Exynos USBDRD 3.1 combo phy (HS & SS)")
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.11+
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Griffin <peter.griffin(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: André Draszik <andre.draszik(a)linaro.org>
---
Changes in v4:
- separate this patch out from original series
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241205-gs101-phy-lanes-orientation-phy-v3-5-3…
Changes in v3:
- none
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241203-gs101-phy-lanes-orientation-phy-v2-5-4…
Changes in v2:
- add cc-stable and fixes tags to power gating patch (Krzysztof)
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241127-gs101-phy-lanes-orientation-phy-v1-6-1…
---
drivers/phy/samsung/phy-exynos5-usbdrd.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/samsung/phy-exynos5-usbdrd.c b/drivers/phy/samsung/phy-exynos5-usbdrd.c
index c421b495eb0f..e4699d4e8075 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/samsung/phy-exynos5-usbdrd.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/samsung/phy-exynos5-usbdrd.c
@@ -1296,14 +1296,17 @@ static int exynos5_usbdrd_gs101_phy_exit(struct phy *phy)
struct exynos5_usbdrd_phy *phy_drd = to_usbdrd_phy(inst);
int ret;
+ if (inst->phy_cfg->id == EXYNOS5_DRDPHY_UTMI) {
+ ret = exynos850_usbdrd_phy_exit(phy);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ exynos5_usbdrd_phy_isol(inst, true);
+
if (inst->phy_cfg->id != EXYNOS5_DRDPHY_UTMI)
return 0;
- ret = exynos850_usbdrd_phy_exit(phy);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- exynos5_usbdrd_phy_isol(inst, true);
return regulator_bulk_disable(phy_drd->drv_data->n_regulators,
phy_drd->regulators);
}
---
base-commit: c245a7a79602ccbee780c004c1e4abcda66aec32
change-id: 20241205-gs101-usb-phy-fix-2c558aa0392a
Best regards,
--
André Draszik <andre.draszik(a)linaro.org>
On the arm64 platform with 4K base page config, SECTION_SIZE_BITS is set
to 27, making one section 128M. The related page struct which vmemmap
points to is 2M then.
Commit c1cc1552616d ("arm64: MMU initialisation") optimizes the
vmemmap to populate at the PMD section level which was suitable
initially since hot plug granule is always one section(128M). However,
commit ba72b4c8cf60 ("mm/sparsemem: support sub-section hotplug")
introduced a 2M(SUBSECTION_SIZE) hot plug granule, which disrupted the
existing arm64 assumptions.
Considering the vmemmap_free -> unmap_hotplug_pmd_range path, when
pmd_sect() is true, the entire PMD section is cleared, even if there is
other effective subsection. For example page_struct_map1 and
page_strcut_map2 are part of a single PMD entry and they are hot-added
sequentially. Then page_struct_map1 is removed, vmemmap_free() will clear
the entire PMD entry freeing the struct page map for the whole section,
even though page_struct_map2 is still active. Similar problem exists
with linear mapping as well, for 16K base page(PMD size = 32M) or 64K
base page(PMD = 512M), their block mappings exceed SUBSECTION_SIZE.
Tearing down the entire PMD mapping too will leave other subsections
unmapped in the linear mapping.
To address the issue, we need to prevent PMD/PUD/CONT mappings for both
linear and vmemmap for non-boot sections if corresponding size on the
given base page exceeds SUBSECTION_SIZE(2MB now).
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+
Fixes: ba72b4c8cf60 ("mm/sparsemem: support sub-section hotplug")
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhenhua Huang <quic_zhenhuah(a)quicinc.com>
---
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index b4df5bc5b1b8..b1089365f3e7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -42,9 +42,13 @@
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/kfence.h>
-#define NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS BIT(0)
-#define NO_CONT_MAPPINGS BIT(1)
-#define NO_EXEC_MAPPINGS BIT(2) /* assumes FEAT_HPDS is not used */
+#define NO_PMD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS BIT(0)
+#define NO_PUD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS BIT(1) /* Hotplug case: do not want block mapping for PUD */
+#define NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS (NO_PMD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_PUD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS)
+#define NO_PTE_CONT_MAPPINGS BIT(2)
+#define NO_PMD_CONT_MAPPINGS BIT(3) /* Hotplug case: do not want cont mapping for PMD */
+#define NO_CONT_MAPPINGS (NO_PTE_CONT_MAPPINGS | NO_PMD_CONT_MAPPINGS)
+#define NO_EXEC_MAPPINGS BIT(4) /* assumes FEAT_HPDS is not used */
u64 kimage_voffset __ro_after_init;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kimage_voffset);
@@ -224,7 +228,7 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pte(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
/* use a contiguous mapping if the range is suitably aligned */
if ((((addr | next | phys) & ~CONT_PTE_MASK) == 0) &&
- (flags & NO_CONT_MAPPINGS) == 0)
+ (flags & NO_PTE_CONT_MAPPINGS) == 0)
__prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) | PTE_CONT);
init_pte(ptep, addr, next, phys, __prot);
@@ -254,7 +258,7 @@ static void init_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
/* try section mapping first */
if (((addr | next | phys) & ~PMD_MASK) == 0 &&
- (flags & NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS) == 0) {
+ (flags & NO_PMD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS) == 0) {
pmd_set_huge(pmdp, phys, prot);
/*
@@ -311,7 +315,7 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pmd(pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr,
/* use a contiguous mapping if the range is suitably aligned */
if ((((addr | next | phys) & ~CONT_PMD_MASK) == 0) &&
- (flags & NO_CONT_MAPPINGS) == 0)
+ (flags & NO_PMD_CONT_MAPPINGS) == 0)
__prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) | PTE_CONT);
init_pmd(pmdp, addr, next, phys, __prot, pgtable_alloc, flags);
@@ -358,8 +362,8 @@ static void alloc_init_pud(p4d_t *p4dp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
* For 4K granule only, attempt to put down a 1GB block
*/
if (pud_sect_supported() &&
- ((addr | next | phys) & ~PUD_MASK) == 0 &&
- (flags & NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS) == 0) {
+ ((addr | next | phys) & ~PUD_MASK) == 0 &&
+ (flags & NO_PUD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS) == 0) {
pud_set_huge(pudp, phys, prot);
/*
@@ -1178,7 +1182,13 @@ int __meminit vmemmap_populate(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int node,
{
WARN_ON((start < VMEMMAP_START) || (end > VMEMMAP_END));
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_4K_PAGES))
+ /*
+ * Hotplugged section does not support hugepages as
+ * PMD_SIZE (hence PUD_SIZE) section mapping covers
+ * struct page range that exceeds a SUBSECTION_SIZE
+ * i.e 2MB - for all available base page sizes.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_4K_PAGES) || system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING)
return vmemmap_populate_basepages(start, end, node, altmap);
else
return vmemmap_populate_hugepages(start, end, node, altmap);
@@ -1340,9 +1350,27 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,
struct mhp_params *params)
{
int ret, flags = NO_EXEC_MAPPINGS;
+ unsigned long start_pfn = PFN_DOWN(start);
+ struct mem_section *ms = __pfn_to_section(start_pfn);
VM_BUG_ON(!mhp_range_allowed(start, size, true));
+ /* should not be invoked by early section */
+ WARN_ON(early_section(ms));
+
+ /*
+ * Disallow BLOCK/CONT mappings if the corresponding size exceeds
+ * SUBSECTION_SIZE which now is 2MB.
+ *
+ * PUD_BLOCK or PMD_CONT should consistently exceed SUBSECTION_SIZE
+ * across all variable page size configurations, so add them directly
+ */
+ flags |= NO_PUD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_PMD_CONT_MAPPINGS;
+ if (SUBSECTION_SHIFT < PMD_SHIFT)
+ flags |= NO_PMD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS;
+ if (SUBSECTION_SHIFT < CONT_PTE_SHIFT)
+ flags |= NO_PTE_CONT_MAPPINGS;
+
if (can_set_direct_map())
flags |= NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS;
--
2.25.1
Currently the USB gadget will be set as bus-powered based solely
on whether its bMaxPower is greater than 100mA, but this may miss
devices that may legitimately draw less than 100mA but still want
to report as bus-powered. Similarly during suspend & resume, USB
gadget is incorrectly marked as bus/self powered without checking
the bmAttributes field. Fix these by configuring the USB gadget
as self or bus powered based on bmAttributes, and explicitly set
it as bus-powered if it draws more than 100mA.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5e5caf4fa8d3 ("usb: gadget: composite: Inform controller driver of self-powered")
Signed-off-by: Prashanth K <prashanth.k(a)oss.qualcomm.com>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c
index bdda8c74602d..1fb28bbf6c45 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c
@@ -1050,10 +1050,11 @@ static int set_config(struct usb_composite_dev *cdev,
else
usb_gadget_set_remote_wakeup(gadget, 0);
done:
- if (power <= USB_SELF_POWER_VBUS_MAX_DRAW)
- usb_gadget_set_selfpowered(gadget);
- else
+ if (power > USB_SELF_POWER_VBUS_MAX_DRAW ||
+ !(c->bmAttributes & USB_CONFIG_ATT_SELFPOWER))
usb_gadget_clear_selfpowered(gadget);
+ else
+ usb_gadget_set_selfpowered(gadget);
usb_gadget_vbus_draw(gadget, power);
if (result >= 0 && cdev->delayed_status)
@@ -2615,7 +2616,9 @@ void composite_suspend(struct usb_gadget *gadget)
cdev->suspended = 1;
- usb_gadget_set_selfpowered(gadget);
+ if (cdev->config->bmAttributes & USB_CONFIG_ATT_SELFPOWER)
+ usb_gadget_set_selfpowered(gadget);
+
usb_gadget_vbus_draw(gadget, 2);
}
@@ -2649,8 +2652,11 @@ void composite_resume(struct usb_gadget *gadget)
else
maxpower = min(maxpower, 900U);
- if (maxpower > USB_SELF_POWER_VBUS_MAX_DRAW)
+ if (maxpower > USB_SELF_POWER_VBUS_MAX_DRAW ||
+ !(cdev->config->bmAttributes & USB_CONFIG_ATT_SELFPOWER))
usb_gadget_clear_selfpowered(gadget);
+ else
+ usb_gadget_set_selfpowered(gadget);
usb_gadget_vbus_draw(gadget, maxpower);
} else {
--
2.25.1
Currently while UDC suspends, u_ether attempts to remote wakeup
the host if there are any pending transfers. However, if remote
wakeup fails, the UDC remains suspended but the is_suspend flag
is not set. And since is_suspend flag isn't set, the subsequent
eth_start_xmit() would queue USB requests to suspended UDC.
To fix this, bail out from gether_suspend() only if remote wakeup
operation is successful.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0a1af6dfa077 ("usb: gadget: f_ecm: Add suspend/resume and remote wakeup support")
Signed-off-by: Prashanth K <prashanth.k(a)oss.qualcomm.com>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
index 09e2838917e2..f58590bf5e02 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
@@ -1052,8 +1052,8 @@ void gether_suspend(struct gether *link)
* There is a transfer in progress. So we trigger a remote
* wakeup to inform the host.
*/
- ether_wakeup_host(dev->port_usb);
- return;
+ if (!ether_wakeup_host(dev->port_usb))
+ return;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
link->is_suspend = true;
--
2.25.1
When update_mmu_cache_range() is called by update_mmu_cache(), the vmf
parameter is NULL, which will cause a NULL pointer dereference issue in
adjust_pte():
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000030 when read
Hardware name: Atmel AT91SAM9
PC is at update_mmu_cache_range+0x1e0/0x278
LR is at pte_offset_map_rw_nolock+0x18/0x2c
Call trace:
update_mmu_cache_range from remove_migration_pte+0x29c/0x2ec
remove_migration_pte from rmap_walk_file+0xcc/0x130
rmap_walk_file from remove_migration_ptes+0x90/0xa4
remove_migration_ptes from migrate_pages_batch+0x6d4/0x858
migrate_pages_batch from migrate_pages+0x188/0x488
migrate_pages from compact_zone+0x56c/0x954
compact_zone from compact_node+0x90/0xf0
compact_node from kcompactd+0x1d4/0x204
kcompactd from kthread+0x120/0x12c
kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38
Exception stack(0xc0d8bfb0 to 0xc0d8bff8)
To fix it, do not rely on whether 'ptl' is equal to decide whether to hold
the pte lock, but decide it by whether CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS is
enabled. In addition, if two vmas map to the same PTE page, there is no
need to hold the pte lock again, otherwise a deadlock will occur. Just add
the need_lock parameter to let adjust_pte() know this information.
Reported-by: Ezra Buehler <ezra.buehler(a)husqvarnagroup.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAM1KZSmZ2T_riHvay+7cKEFxoPgeVpHkVFTzVVEQ1BO0c…
Fixes: fc9c45b71f43 ("arm: adjust_pte() use pte_offset_map_rw_nolock()")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- change Ezra's email address (Ezra Buehler)
- some cleanups (David Hildenbrand)
arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c
index 2bec87c3327d2..ea4c4e15f0d31 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int do_adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
}
static int adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
- unsigned long pfn, struct vm_fault *vmf)
+ unsigned long pfn, bool need_lock)
{
spinlock_t *ptl;
pgd_t *pgd;
@@ -99,12 +99,11 @@ static int adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
if (!pte)
return 0;
- /*
- * If we are using split PTE locks, then we need to take the page
- * lock here. Otherwise we are using shared mm->page_table_lock
- * which is already locked, thus cannot take it.
- */
- if (ptl != vmf->ptl) {
+ if (need_lock) {
+ /*
+ * Use nested version here to indicate that we are already
+ * holding one similar spinlock.
+ */
spin_lock_nested(ptl, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
if (unlikely(!pmd_same(pmdval, pmdp_get_lockless(pmd)))) {
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
@@ -114,7 +113,7 @@ static int adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
ret = do_adjust_pte(vma, address, pfn, pte);
- if (ptl != vmf->ptl)
+ if (need_lock)
spin_unlock(ptl);
pte_unmap(pte);
@@ -123,16 +122,18 @@ static int adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
static void
make_coherent(struct address_space *mapping, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long pfn,
- struct vm_fault *vmf)
+ unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long pfn)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *mpnt;
unsigned long offset;
+ unsigned long pmd_start_addr, pmd_end_addr;
pgoff_t pgoff;
int aliases = 0;
pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((addr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ pmd_start_addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PMD_SIZE);
+ pmd_end_addr = pmd_start_addr + PMD_SIZE;
/*
* If we have any shared mappings that are in the same mm
@@ -141,6 +142,14 @@ make_coherent(struct address_space *mapping, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
*/
flush_dcache_mmap_lock(mapping);
vma_interval_tree_foreach(mpnt, &mapping->i_mmap, pgoff, pgoff) {
+ /*
+ * If we are using split PTE locks, then we need to take the pte
+ * lock. Otherwise we are using shared mm->page_table_lock which
+ * is already locked, thus cannot take it.
+ */
+ bool need_lock = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS);
+ unsigned long mpnt_addr;
+
/*
* If this VMA is not in our MM, we can ignore it.
* Note that we intentionally mask out the VMA
@@ -151,7 +160,12 @@ make_coherent(struct address_space *mapping, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
if (!(mpnt->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE))
continue;
offset = (pgoff - mpnt->vm_pgoff) << PAGE_SHIFT;
- aliases += adjust_pte(mpnt, mpnt->vm_start + offset, pfn, vmf);
+ mpnt_addr = mpnt->vm_start + offset;
+
+ /* Avoid deadlocks by not grabbing the same PTE lock again. */
+ if (mpnt_addr >= pmd_start_addr && mpnt_addr < pmd_end_addr)
+ need_lock = false;
+ aliases += adjust_pte(mpnt, mpnt_addr, pfn, need_lock);
}
flush_dcache_mmap_unlock(mapping);
if (aliases)
@@ -194,7 +208,7 @@ void update_mmu_cache_range(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
__flush_dcache_folio(mapping, folio);
if (mapping) {
if (cache_is_vivt())
- make_coherent(mapping, vma, addr, ptep, pfn, vmf);
+ make_coherent(mapping, vma, addr, ptep, pfn);
else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
__flush_icache_all();
}
--
2.20.1
From: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal(a)wdc.com>
commit 17b49bcbf8351d3dbe57204468ac34f033ed60bc upstream.
Several problems exist with scsi_mode_sense() buffer length handling:
1) The allocation length field of the MODE SENSE(10) command is 16-bits,
occupying bytes 7 and 8 of the CDB. With this command, access to mode
pages larger than 255 bytes is thus possible. However, the CDB
allocation length field is set by assigning len to byte 8 only, thus
truncating buffer length larger than 255.
2) If scsi_mode_sense() is called with len smaller than 8 with
sdev->use_10_for_ms set, or smaller than 4 otherwise, the buffer length
is increased to 8 and 4 respectively, and the buffer is zero filled
with these increased values, thus corrupting the memory following the
buffer.
Fix these 2 problems by using put_unaligned_be16() to set the allocation
length field of MODE SENSE(10) CDB and by returning an error when len is
too small.
Furthermore, if len is larger than 255B, always try MODE SENSE(10) first,
even if the device driver did not set sdev->use_10_for_ms. In case of
invalid opcode error for MODE SENSE(10), access to mode pages larger than
255 bytes are not retried using MODE SENSE(6). To avoid buffer length
overflows for the MODE_SENSE(10) case, check that len is smaller than 65535
bytes.
While at it, also fix the folowing:
* Use get_unaligned_be16() to retrieve the mode data length and block
descriptor length fields of the mode sense reply header instead of using
an open coded calculation.
* Fix the kdoc dbd argument explanation: the DBD bit stands for Disable
Block Descriptor, which is the opposite of what the dbd argument
description was.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210820070255.682775-2-damien.lemoal@wdc.com
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal(a)wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev(a)altlinux.org>
---
Backport to fix CVE-2021-47182
Link: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2021-47182
---
drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c
index fb48d47e9183e..06838cf5300d0 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c
@@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(scsi_mode_select);
/**
* scsi_mode_sense - issue a mode sense, falling back from 10 to six bytes if necessary.
* @sdev: SCSI device to be queried
- * @dbd: set if mode sense will allow block descriptors to be returned
+ * @dbd: set to prevent mode sense from returning block descriptors
* @modepage: mode page being requested
* @buffer: request buffer (may not be smaller than eight bytes)
* @len: length of request buffer.
@@ -2108,18 +2108,18 @@ scsi_mode_sense(struct scsi_device *sdev, int dbd, int modepage,
sshdr = &my_sshdr;
retry:
- use_10_for_ms = sdev->use_10_for_ms;
+ use_10_for_ms = sdev->use_10_for_ms || len > 255;
if (use_10_for_ms) {
- if (len < 8)
- len = 8;
+ if (len < 8 || len > 65535)
+ return -EINVAL;
cmd[0] = MODE_SENSE_10;
- cmd[8] = len;
+ put_unaligned_be16(len, &cmd[7]);
header_length = 8;
} else {
if (len < 4)
- len = 4;
+ return -EINVAL;
cmd[0] = MODE_SENSE;
cmd[4] = len;
@@ -2144,8 +2144,14 @@ scsi_mode_sense(struct scsi_device *sdev, int dbd, int modepage,
if ((sshdr->sense_key == ILLEGAL_REQUEST) &&
(sshdr->asc == 0x20) && (sshdr->ascq == 0)) {
/*
- * Invalid command operation code
+ * Invalid command operation code: retry using
+ * MODE SENSE(6) if this was a MODE SENSE(10)
+ * request, except if the request mode page is
+ * too large for MODE SENSE single byte
+ * allocation length field.
*/
+ if (len > 255)
+ return -EIO;
sdev->use_10_for_ms = 0;
goto retry;
}
@@ -2163,12 +2169,11 @@ scsi_mode_sense(struct scsi_device *sdev, int dbd, int modepage,
data->longlba = 0;
data->block_descriptor_length = 0;
} else if (use_10_for_ms) {
- data->length = buffer[0]*256 + buffer[1] + 2;
+ data->length = get_unaligned_be16(&buffer[0]) + 2;
data->medium_type = buffer[2];
data->device_specific = buffer[3];
data->longlba = buffer[4] & 0x01;
- data->block_descriptor_length = buffer[6]*256
- + buffer[7];
+ data->block_descriptor_length = get_unaligned_be16(&buffer[6]);
} else {
data->length = buffer[0] + 1;
data->medium_type = buffer[1];
--
2.42.2
In felix_update_tag_8021q_rx_rules(), the return value of
ocelot_vcap_block_find_filter_by_id() is not checked, which could
lead to a NULL pointer dereference if the filter is not found.
Add the necessary check and use `continue` to skip the current CPU
port if the filter is not found, ensuring that all CPU ports are
processed.
Fixes: f1288fd7293b ("net: dsa: felix: fix VLAN tag loss on CPU reception with ocelot-8021q")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.11+
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
drivers/net/dsa/ocelot/felix.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/ocelot/felix.c b/drivers/net/dsa/ocelot/felix.c
index 3aa9c997018a..10ad43108b88 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/ocelot/felix.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/ocelot/felix.c
@@ -348,6 +348,8 @@ static int felix_update_tag_8021q_rx_rules(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port,
outer_tagging_rule = ocelot_vcap_block_find_filter_by_id(block_vcap_es0,
cookie, false);
+ if (!outer_tagging_rule)
+ continue;
felix_update_tag_8021q_rx_rule(outer_tagging_rule, vlan_filtering);
--
2.42.0.windows.2
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 87c4b5e8a6b65189abd9ea5010ab308941f964a4
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021055-utensil-raven-b270@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 87c4b5e8a6b65189abd9ea5010ab308941f964a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Long Li <longli(a)microsoft.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 19:07:22 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] scsi: storvsc: Set correct data length for sending SCSI
command without payload
In StorVSC, payload->range.len is used to indicate if this SCSI command
carries payload. This data is allocated as part of the private driver data
by the upper layer and may get passed to lower driver uninitialized.
For example, the SCSI error handling mid layer may send TEST_UNIT_READY or
REQUEST_SENSE while reusing the buffer from a failed command. The private
data section may have stale data from the previous command.
If the SCSI command doesn't carry payload, the driver may use this value as
is for communicating with host, resulting in possible corruption.
Fix this by always initializing this value.
Fixes: be0cf6ca301c ("scsi: storvsc: Set the tablesize based on the information given by the host")
Cc: stable(a)kernel.org
Tested-by: Roman Kisel <romank(a)linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Kisel <romank(a)linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux(a)outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli(a)microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1737601642-7759-1-git-send-email-longli@linuxonhy…
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com>
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c b/drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c
index 5a101ac06c47..a8614e54544e 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c
@@ -1800,6 +1800,7 @@ static int storvsc_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd)
length = scsi_bufflen(scmnd);
payload = (struct vmbus_packet_mpb_array *)&cmd_request->mpb;
+ payload->range.len = 0;
payload_sz = 0;
if (scsi_sg_count(scmnd)) {
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x c1472ec1dc4419d0bae663c1a1e6cb98dc7881ad
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021033-chariot-imminent-753d@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From c1472ec1dc4419d0bae663c1a1e6cb98dc7881ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Romain Naour <romain.naour(a)skf.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2024 11:25:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ARM: dts: dra7: Add bus_dma_limit for l4 cfg bus
A bus_dma_limit was added for l3 bus by commit cfb5d65f2595
("ARM: dts: dra7: Add bus_dma_limit for L3 bus") to fix an issue
observed only with SATA on DRA7-EVM with 4GB RAM and CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
enabled.
Since kernel 5.13, the SATA issue can be reproduced again following
the SATA node move from L3 bus to L4_cfg in commit 8af15365a368
("ARM: dts: Configure interconnect target module for dra7 sata").
Fix it by adding an empty dma-ranges property to l4_cfg and
segment@100000 nodes (parent device tree node of SATA controller) to
inherit the 2GB dma ranges limit from l3 bus node.
Note: A similar fix was applied for PCIe controller by commit
90d4d3f4ea45 ("ARM: dts: dra7: Fix bus_dma_limit for PCIe").
Fixes: 8af15365a368 ("ARM: dts: Configure interconnect target module for dra7 sata").
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-omap/c583e1bb-f56b-4489-8012-ce742e85f233@smi…
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.13
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour(a)skf.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241115102537.1330300-1-romain.naour@smile.fr
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman(a)baylibre.com>
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/dra7-l4.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/dra7-l4.dtsi
index 6e67d99832ac..ba7fdaae9c6e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/dra7-l4.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/dra7-l4.dtsi
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ &l4_cfg { /* 0x4a000000 */
ranges = <0x00000000 0x4a000000 0x100000>, /* segment 0 */
<0x00100000 0x4a100000 0x100000>, /* segment 1 */
<0x00200000 0x4a200000 0x100000>; /* segment 2 */
+ dma-ranges;
segment@0 { /* 0x4a000000 */
compatible = "simple-pm-bus";
@@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ segment@100000 { /* 0x4a100000 */
<0x0007e000 0x0017e000 0x001000>, /* ap 124 */
<0x00059000 0x00159000 0x001000>, /* ap 125 */
<0x0005a000 0x0015a000 0x001000>; /* ap 126 */
+ dma-ranges;
target-module@2000 { /* 0x4a102000, ap 27 3c.0 */
compatible = "ti,sysc";
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x c1472ec1dc4419d0bae663c1a1e6cb98dc7881ad
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021032-showgirl-penknife-7098@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From c1472ec1dc4419d0bae663c1a1e6cb98dc7881ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Romain Naour <romain.naour(a)skf.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2024 11:25:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ARM: dts: dra7: Add bus_dma_limit for l4 cfg bus
A bus_dma_limit was added for l3 bus by commit cfb5d65f2595
("ARM: dts: dra7: Add bus_dma_limit for L3 bus") to fix an issue
observed only with SATA on DRA7-EVM with 4GB RAM and CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
enabled.
Since kernel 5.13, the SATA issue can be reproduced again following
the SATA node move from L3 bus to L4_cfg in commit 8af15365a368
("ARM: dts: Configure interconnect target module for dra7 sata").
Fix it by adding an empty dma-ranges property to l4_cfg and
segment@100000 nodes (parent device tree node of SATA controller) to
inherit the 2GB dma ranges limit from l3 bus node.
Note: A similar fix was applied for PCIe controller by commit
90d4d3f4ea45 ("ARM: dts: dra7: Fix bus_dma_limit for PCIe").
Fixes: 8af15365a368 ("ARM: dts: Configure interconnect target module for dra7 sata").
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-omap/c583e1bb-f56b-4489-8012-ce742e85f233@smi…
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.13
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour(a)skf.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241115102537.1330300-1-romain.naour@smile.fr
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman(a)baylibre.com>
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/dra7-l4.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/dra7-l4.dtsi
index 6e67d99832ac..ba7fdaae9c6e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/dra7-l4.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/dra7-l4.dtsi
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ &l4_cfg { /* 0x4a000000 */
ranges = <0x00000000 0x4a000000 0x100000>, /* segment 0 */
<0x00100000 0x4a100000 0x100000>, /* segment 1 */
<0x00200000 0x4a200000 0x100000>; /* segment 2 */
+ dma-ranges;
segment@0 { /* 0x4a000000 */
compatible = "simple-pm-bus";
@@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ segment@100000 { /* 0x4a100000 */
<0x0007e000 0x0017e000 0x001000>, /* ap 124 */
<0x00059000 0x00159000 0x001000>, /* ap 125 */
<0x0005a000 0x0015a000 0x001000>; /* ap 126 */
+ dma-ranges;
target-module@2000 { /* 0x4a102000, ap 27 3c.0 */
compatible = "ti,sysc";
Starting with Rust 1.85.0 (to be released 2025-02-20), `rustc` warns
[1] about disabling neon in the aarch64 hardfloat target:
warning: target feature `neon` cannot be toggled with
`-Ctarget-feature`: unsound on hard-float targets
because it changes float ABI
|
= note: this was previously accepted by the compiler but
is being phased out; it will become a hard error
in a future release!
= note: for more information, see issue #116344
<https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/116344>
Thus, instead, use the softfloat target instead.
While trying it out, I found that the kernel sanitizers were not enabled
for that built-in target [2]. Upstream Rust agreed to backport
the enablement for the current beta so that it is ready for
the 1.85.0 release [3] -- thanks!
However, that still means that before Rust 1.85.0, we cannot switch
since sanitizers could be in use. Thus conditionally do so.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # Needed in 6.12.y and 6.13.y only (Rust is pinned in older LTSs).
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Maurer <mmaurer(a)google.com>
Cc: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
Cc: Ralf Jung <post(a)ralfj.de>
Cc: Jubilee Young <workingjubilee(a)gmail.com>
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/133417 [1]
Link: https://rust-lang.zulipchat.com/#narrow/channel/131828-t-compiler/topic/arm… [2]
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/135905 [3]
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/116344
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
---
Matthew: if you could please give this a go and confirm that it is fine
for Android (with sanitizers enabled, for 1.84.1 and 1.85.0), then a
Tested-by tag would be great. Thanks!
I would like to get this one into -rc3 if possible so that by the time
the compiler releases we are already clean.
I am sending another patch to introduce `rustc-min-version` and use it
here, but I am doing so after this one rather than before so that this
fix can be as simple as possible.
arch/arm64/Makefile | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile
index 358c68565bfd..2b25d671365f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile
@@ -48,7 +48,11 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CC_FLAGS_NO_FPU) \
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, psabi)
KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(compat_vdso)
+ifeq ($(call test-ge, $(CONFIG_RUSTC_VERSION), 108500),y)
+KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += --target=aarch64-unknown-none-softfloat
+else
KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += --target=aarch64-unknown-none -Ctarget-feature="-neon"
+endif
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mabi=lp64)
KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mabi=lp64)
base-commit: a64dcfb451e254085a7daee5fe51bf22959d52d3
--
2.48.1
Currently we treat EFAULT from hmm_range_fault() as a non-fatal error
when called from xe_vm_userptr_pin() with the idea that we want to avoid
killing the entire vm and chucking an error, under the assumption that
the user just did an unmap or something, and has no intention of
actually touching that memory from the GPU. At this point we have
already zapped the PTEs so any access should generate a page fault, and
if the pin fails there also it will then become fatal.
However it looks like it's possible for the userptr vma to still be on
the rebind list in preempt_rebind_work_func(), if we had to retry the
pin again due to something happening in the caller before we did the
rebind step, but in the meantime needing to re-validate the userptr and
this time hitting the EFAULT.
This might explain an internal user report of hitting:
[ 191.738349] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 157 at drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_res_cursor.h:158 xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738551] Workqueue: xe-ordered-wq preempt_rebind_work_func [xe]
[ 191.738616] RIP: 0010:xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738690] Call Trace:
[ 191.738692] <TASK>
[ 191.738694] ? show_regs+0x69/0x80
[ 191.738698] ? __warn+0x93/0x1a0
[ 191.738703] ? xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738759] ? report_bug+0x18f/0x1a0
[ 191.738764] ? handle_bug+0x63/0xa0
[ 191.738767] ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x70
[ 191.738770] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[ 191.738777] ? xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738834] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 191.738849] bind_op_prepare+0x105/0x7b0 [xe]
[ 191.738906] ? dma_resv_reserve_fences+0x301/0x380
[ 191.738912] xe_pt_update_ops_prepare+0x28c/0x4b0 [xe]
[ 191.738966] ? kmemleak_alloc+0x4b/0x80
[ 191.738973] ops_execute+0x188/0x9d0 [xe]
[ 191.739036] xe_vm_rebind+0x4ce/0x5a0 [xe]
[ 191.739098] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x4d/0x60
[ 191.739112] preempt_rebind_work_func+0x76f/0xd00 [xe]
Followed by NPD, when running some workload, since the sg was never
actually populated but the vma is still marked for rebind when it should
be skipped for this special EFAULT case. And from the logs it does seem
like we hit this special EFAULT case before the explosions.
Fixes: 521db22a1d70 ("drm/xe: Invalidate userptr VMA on page pin fault")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.10+
---
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
index d664f2e418b2..1caee9cbeafb 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
@@ -692,6 +692,17 @@ int xe_vm_userptr_pin(struct xe_vm *vm)
xe_vm_unlock(vm);
if (err)
return err;
+
+ /*
+ * We might have already done the pin once already, but then had to retry
+ * before the re-bind happended, due some other condition in the caller, but
+ * in the meantime the userptr got dinged by the notifier such that we need
+ * to revalidate here, but this time we hit the EFAULT. In such a case
+ * make sure we remove ourselves from the rebind list to avoid going down in
+ * flames.
+ */
+ if (!list_empty(&uvma->vma.combined_links.rebind))
+ list_del_init(&uvma->vma.combined_links.rebind);
} else {
if (err < 0)
return err;
--
2.48.1
From: Hugo Villeneuve <hvilleneuve(a)dimonoff.com>
In jadard_prepare() a reset pulse is generated with the following
statements (delays ommited for clarity):
gpiod_set_value(jadard->reset, 1); --> Deassert reset
gpiod_set_value(jadard->reset, 0); --> Assert reset for 10ms
gpiod_set_value(jadard->reset, 1); --> Deassert reset
However, specifying second argument of "0" to gpiod_set_value() means to
deassert the GPIO, and "1" means to assert it. If the reset signal is
defined as GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW in the DTS, the above statements will
incorrectly generate the reset pulse (inverted) and leave it asserted
(LOW) at the end of jadard_prepare().
Fix reset behavior by inverting gpiod_set_value() second argument
in jadard_prepare(). Also modify second argument to devm_gpiod_get()
in jadard_dsi_probe() to assert the reset when probing.
Do not modify it in jadard_unprepare() as it is already properly
asserted with "1", which seems to be the intended behavior.
Fixes: 6b818c533dd8 ("drm: panel: Add Jadard JD9365DA-H3 DSI panel")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hugo Villeneuve <hvilleneuve(a)dimonoff.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-jadard-jd9365da-h3.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-jadard-jd9365da-h3.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-jadard-jd9365da-h3.c
index 44897e5218a69..6fec99cf4d935 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-jadard-jd9365da-h3.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-jadard-jd9365da-h3.c
@@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ static int jadard_prepare(struct drm_panel *panel)
if (jadard->desc->lp11_to_reset_delay_ms)
msleep(jadard->desc->lp11_to_reset_delay_ms);
- gpiod_set_value(jadard->reset, 1);
+ gpiod_set_value(jadard->reset, 0);
msleep(5);
- gpiod_set_value(jadard->reset, 0);
+ gpiod_set_value(jadard->reset, 1);
msleep(10);
- gpiod_set_value(jadard->reset, 1);
+ gpiod_set_value(jadard->reset, 0);
msleep(130);
ret = jadard->desc->init(jadard);
@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ static int jadard_dsi_probe(struct mipi_dsi_device *dsi)
dsi->format = desc->format;
dsi->lanes = desc->lanes;
- jadard->reset = devm_gpiod_get(dev, "reset", GPIOD_OUT_LOW);
+ jadard->reset = devm_gpiod_get(dev, "reset", GPIOD_OUT_HIGH);
if (IS_ERR(jadard->reset)) {
DRM_DEV_ERROR(&dsi->dev, "failed to get our reset GPIO\n");
return PTR_ERR(jadard->reset);
base-commit: 18ba6034468e7949a9e2c2cf28e2e123b4fe7a50
--
2.39.5
In [1] it was reported that the acct(2) system call can be used to
trigger a NULL deref in cases where it is set to write to a file that
triggers an internal lookup.
This can e.g., happen when pointing acct(2) to /sys/power/resume. At the
point the where the write to this file happens the calling task has
already exited and called exit_fs() but an internal lookup might be
triggered through lookup_bdev(). This may trigger a NULL-deref
when accessing current->fs.
This series does two things:
- Reorganize the code so that the the final write happens from the
workqueue but with the caller's credentials. This preserves the
(strange) permission model and has almost no regression risk.
- Block access to kernel internal filesystems as well as procfs and
sysfs in the first place.
This api should stop to exist imho.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250127091811.3183623-1-quzicheng@huawei.com [1]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org>
---
Christian Brauner (2):
acct: perform last write from workqueue
acct: block access to kernel internal filesystems
kernel/acct.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 84 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: af69e27b3c8240f7889b6c457d71084458984d8e
change-id: 20250211-work-acct-a6d8e92a5fe0
This is reproducible on on stable kernels after the backport of commit:
2cf567f421db ("netdevsim: copy addresses for both in and out paths") to
stable kernels.
Using a single cover letter for all stable kernels but will send
separate patches for each stable kernel
Which kselftests are particularly failing:
2c2
< sa[0] tx ipaddr=0x00000000 00000000 00000000 047ba8c0
---
> sa[0] tx ipaddr=0x00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
FAIL: ipsec_offload incorrect driver data
FAIL: ipsec_offload
813 # does driver have correct offload info
814 diff $sysfsf - << EOF
815 SA count=2 tx=3
816 sa[0] tx ipaddr=0x00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
817 sa[0] spi=0x00000009 proto=0x32 salt=0x61626364 crypt=1
818 sa[0] key=0x34333231 38373635 32313039 36353433
819 sa[1] rx ipaddr=0x00000000 00000000 00000000 037ba8c0
820 sa[1] spi=0x00000009 proto=0x32 salt=0x61626364 crypt=1
821 sa[1] key=0x34333231 38373635 32313039 36353433
822 EOF
823 if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
824 echo "FAIL: ipsec_offload incorrect driver data"
825 check_err 1
826 fi
827
This part of check throws errors and the rtnetlink.sh fails on ipsec_offload.
Reason is that the after the below patch:
commit 2cf567f421dbfe7e53b7e5ddee9400da10efb75d
Author: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin(a)gmail.com>
Date: Thu Oct 10 04:00:26 2024 +0000
netdevsim: copy addresses for both in and out paths
[ Upstream commit 2cf567f421dbfe7e53b7e5ddee9400da10efb75d ]
The current code only copies the address for the in path, leaving the out
path address set to 0. This patch corrects the issue by copying the addresses
for both the in and out paths. Before this patch:
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/netdevsim/netdevsim0/ports/0/ipsec
SA count=2 tx=20
sa[0] tx ipaddr=0.0.0.0
sa[0] spi=0x00000100 proto=0x32 salt=0x0adecc3a crypt=1
sa[0] key=0x3167608a ca4f1397 43565909 941fa627
sa[1] rx ipaddr=192.168.0.1
sa[1] spi=0x00000101 proto=0x32 salt=0x0adecc3a crypt=1
sa[1] key=0x3167608a ca4f1397 43565909 941fa627
After this patch:
= cat /sys/kernel/debug/netdevsim/netdevsim0/ports/0/ipsec
SA count=2 tx=20
sa[0] tx ipaddr=192.168.0.2
sa[0] spi=0x00000100 proto=0x32 salt=0x0adecc3a crypt=1
sa[0] key=0x3167608a ca4f1397 43565909 941fa627
sa[1] rx ipaddr=192.168.0.1
sa[1] spi=0x00000101 proto=0x32 salt=0x0adecc3a crypt=1
sa[1] key=0x3167608a ca4f1397 43565909 941fa627
Fixes: 7699353da875 ("netdevsim: add ipsec offload testing")
tx ip address is not 0.0.0.0 anymore, it is was 0.0.0.0 before above patch.
So this commit: 3ec920bb978c ("selftests: rtnetlink: update netdevsim
ipsec output format") which is not backported to stable kernels tries to
address rtneltlink.sh fixing.
fixes the change in handling tx ip address as well, so far so good!
but when I apply this script fix it doesn't pass yet:
2c2
< sa[0] tx ipaddr=0x00000000 00000000 00000000 047ba8c0
---
> sa[0] tx ipaddr=192.168.123.4
5c5
< sa[1] rx ipaddr=0x00000000 00000000 00000000 037ba8c0
---
> sa[1] rx ipaddr=192.168.123.3
FAIL: ipsec_offload incorrect driver data
So it clearly suggest that addresses are not properly handled, IPSec addresses
are printed in hexadecimal format, but the script expects it in more readable
format, that hinted me whats missing, and that commit is:
commit c71bc6da6198a6d88df86094f1052bb581951d65
Author: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin(a)gmail.com>
Date: Thu Oct 10 04:00:25 2024 +0000
netdevsim: print human readable IP address
Currently, IPSec addresses are printed in hexadecimal format, which is
not user-friendly. e.g.
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/netdevsim/netdevsim0/ports/0/ipsec
SA count=2 tx=20
sa[0] rx ipaddr=0x00000000 00000000 00000000 0100a8c0
sa[0] spi=0x00000101 proto=0x32 salt=0x0adecc3a crypt=1
sa[0] key=0x3167608a ca4f1397 43565909 941fa627
sa[1] tx ipaddr=0x00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
sa[1] spi=0x00000100 proto=0x32 salt=0x0adecc3a crypt=1
sa[1] key=0x3167608a ca4f1397 43565909 941fa627
This patch updates the code to print the IPSec address in a human-readable
format for easier debug. e.g.
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/netdevsim/netdevsim0/ports/0/ipsec
SA count=4 tx=40
sa[0] tx ipaddr=0.0.0.0
sa[0] spi=0x00000100 proto=0x32 salt=0x0adecc3a crypt=1
sa[0] key=0x3167608a ca4f1397 43565909 941fa627
sa[1] rx ipaddr=192.168.0.1
sa[1] spi=0x00000101 proto=0x32 salt=0x0adecc3a crypt=1
sa[1] key=0x3167608a ca4f1397 43565909 941fa627
sa[2] tx ipaddr=::
sa[2] spi=0x00000100 proto=0x32 salt=0x0adecc3a crypt=1
sa[2] key=0x3167608a ca4f1397 43565909 941fa627
sa[3] rx ipaddr=2000::1
sa[3] spi=0x00000101 proto=0x32 salt=0x0adecc3a crypt=1
sa[3] key=0x3167608a ca4f1397 43565909 941fa627
Solution:
========
Backport both the commits commit: c71bc6da6198 ("netdevsim: print human
readable IP address") and script fixup commit: 3ec920bb978c ("selftests:
rtnetlink: update netdevsim ipsec output format") to all stable kernels
which have commit: 2cf567f421db ("netdevsim: copy addresses for both in
and out paths") in them.
Another clue to say this is right way to do this is that these above
three patches did go as patchset into net/ [1].
I am sending patches for all stable trees differently, however I am
using same cover letter.
Tested all stable kernels after patching. This failure is no more
reproducible.
Thanks,
Harshit
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/172868703973.3018281.2970275743967117794.git-pa…
Hangbin Liu (2):
netdevsim: print human readable IP address
selftests: rtnetlink: update netdevsim ipsec output format
drivers/net/netdevsim/ipsec.c | 12 ++++++++----
tools/testing/selftests/net/rtnetlink.sh | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--
2.46.0
Currently we treat EFAULT from hmm_range_fault() as a non-fatal error
when called from xe_vm_userptr_pin() with the idea that we want to avoid
killing the entire vm and chucking an error, under the assumption that
the user just did an unmap or something, and has no intention of
actually touching that memory from the GPU. At this point we have
already zapped the PTEs so any access should generate a page fault, and
if the pin fails there also it will then become fatal.
However it looks like it's possible for the userptr vma to still be on
the rebind list in preempt_rebind_work_func(), if we had to retry the
pin again due to something happening in the caller before we did the
rebind step, but in the meantime needing to re-validate the userptr and
this time hitting the EFAULT.
This might explain an internal user report of hitting:
[ 191.738349] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 157 at drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_res_cursor.h:158 xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738551] Workqueue: xe-ordered-wq preempt_rebind_work_func [xe]
[ 191.738616] RIP: 0010:xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738690] Call Trace:
[ 191.738692] <TASK>
[ 191.738694] ? show_regs+0x69/0x80
[ 191.738698] ? __warn+0x93/0x1a0
[ 191.738703] ? xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738759] ? report_bug+0x18f/0x1a0
[ 191.738764] ? handle_bug+0x63/0xa0
[ 191.738767] ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x70
[ 191.738770] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[ 191.738777] ? xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738834] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 191.738849] bind_op_prepare+0x105/0x7b0 [xe]
[ 191.738906] ? dma_resv_reserve_fences+0x301/0x380
[ 191.738912] xe_pt_update_ops_prepare+0x28c/0x4b0 [xe]
[ 191.738966] ? kmemleak_alloc+0x4b/0x80
[ 191.738973] ops_execute+0x188/0x9d0 [xe]
[ 191.739036] xe_vm_rebind+0x4ce/0x5a0 [xe]
[ 191.739098] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x4d/0x60
[ 191.739112] preempt_rebind_work_func+0x76f/0xd00 [xe]
Followed by NPD, when running some workload, since the sg was never
actually populated but the vma is still marked for rebind when it should
be skipped for this special EFAULT case. And from the logs it does seem
like we hit this special EFAULT case before the explosions.
Fixes: 521db22a1d70 ("drm/xe: Invalidate userptr VMA on page pin fault")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.10+
---
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
index d664f2e418b2..1caee9cbeafb 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
@@ -692,6 +692,17 @@ int xe_vm_userptr_pin(struct xe_vm *vm)
xe_vm_unlock(vm);
if (err)
return err;
+
+ /*
+ * We might have already done the pin once already, but then had to retry
+ * before the re-bind happended, due some other condition in the caller, but
+ * in the meantime the userptr got dinged by the notifier such that we need
+ * to revalidate here, but this time we hit the EFAULT. In such a case
+ * make sure we remove ourselves from the rebind list to avoid going down in
+ * flames.
+ */
+ if (!list_empty(&uvma->vma.combined_links.rebind))
+ list_del_init(&uvma->vma.combined_links.rebind);
} else {
if (err < 0)
return err;
--
2.48.1
From: Jos Wang <joswang(a)lenovo.com>
As PD2.0 spec ("6.5.6.2 PSSourceOffTimer"),the PSSourceOffTimer is
used by the Policy Engine in Dual-Role Power device that is currently
acting as a Sink to timeout on a PS_RDY Message during a Power Role
Swap sequence. This condition leads to a Hard Reset for USB Type-A and
Type-B Plugs and Error Recovery for Type-C plugs and return to USB
Default Operation.
Therefore, after PSSourceOffTimer timeout, the tcpm state machine should
switch from PR_SWAP_SNK_SRC_SINK_OFF to ERROR_RECOVERY. This can also
solve the test items in the USB power delivery compliance test:
TEST.PD.PROT.SNK.12 PR_Swap – PSSourceOffTimer Timeout
[1] https://usb.org/document-library/usb-power-delivery-compliance-test-specifi…
Fixes: f0690a25a140 ("staging: typec: USB Type-C Port Manager (tcpm)")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jos Wang <joswang(a)lenovo.com>
---
v2: Modify the commit message, remove unnecessary blank lines.
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c
index 47be450d2be3..6bf1a22c785a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c
@@ -5591,8 +5591,7 @@ static void run_state_machine(struct tcpm_port *port)
tcpm_set_auto_vbus_discharge_threshold(port, TYPEC_PWR_MODE_USB,
port->pps_data.active, 0);
tcpm_set_charge(port, false);
- tcpm_set_state(port, hard_reset_state(port),
- port->timings.ps_src_off_time);
+ tcpm_set_state(port, ERROR_RECOVERY, port->timings.ps_src_off_time);
break;
case PR_SWAP_SNK_SRC_SOURCE_ON:
tcpm_enable_auto_vbus_discharge(port, true);
--
2.17.1
From: Jos Wang <joswang(a)lenovo.com>
As PD2.0 spec ("6.5.6.2 PSSourceOffTimer"),the PSSourceOffTimer is
used by the Policy Engine in Dual-Role Power device that is currently
acting as a Sink to timeout on a PS_RDY Message during a Power Role
Swap sequence. This condition leads to a Hard Reset for USB Type-A and
Type-B Plugs and Error Recovery for Type-C plugs and return to USB
Default Operation.
Therefore, after PSSourceOffTimer timeout, the tcpm state machine should
switch from PR_SWAP_SNK_SRC_SINK_OFF to ERROR_RECOVERY. This can also solve
the test items in the USB power delivery compliance test:
TEST.PD.PROT.SNK.12 PR_Swap – PSSourceOffTimer Timeout
[1] https://usb.org/document-library/usb-power-delivery-compliance-test-specifi…
Fixes: f0690a25a140 ("staging: typec: USB Type-C Port Manager (tcpm)")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jos Wang <joswang(a)lenovo.com>
---
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c
index 47be450d2be3..6bf1a22c785a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c
@@ -5591,8 +5591,7 @@ static void run_state_machine(struct tcpm_port *port)
tcpm_set_auto_vbus_discharge_threshold(port, TYPEC_PWR_MODE_USB,
port->pps_data.active, 0);
tcpm_set_charge(port, false);
- tcpm_set_state(port, hard_reset_state(port),
- port->timings.ps_src_off_time);
+ tcpm_set_state(port, ERROR_RECOVERY, port->timings.ps_src_off_time);
break;
case PR_SWAP_SNK_SRC_SOURCE_ON:
tcpm_enable_auto_vbus_discharge(port, true);
--
2.17.1
The xHC resources allocated for USB devices are not released in correct
order after resuming in case when while suspend device was reconnected.
This issue has been detected during the fallowing scenario:
- connect hub HS to root port
- connect LS/FS device to hub port
- wait for enumeration to finish
- force DUT to suspend
- reconnect hub attached to root port
- wake DUT
For this scenario during enumeration of USB LS/FS device the Cadence xHC
reports completion error code for xHCi commands because the devices was not
property disconnected and in result the xHC resources has not been
correct freed.
XHCI specification doesn't mention that device can be reset in any order
so, we should not treat this issue as Cadence xHC controller bug.
Similar as during disconnecting in this case the device should be cleared
starting form the last usb device in tree toward the root hub.
To fix this issue usbcore driver should disconnect all USB
devices connected to hub which was reconnected while suspending.
Fixes: 3d82904559f4 ("usb: cdnsp: cdns3 Add main part of Cadence USBSSP DRD Driver")
cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawel Laszczak <pawell(a)cadence.com>
---
drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
index 0cd44f1fd56d..2473cbf317a8 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -3627,10 +3627,12 @@ static int finish_port_resume(struct usb_device *udev)
* the device will be rediscovered.
*/
retry_reset_resume:
- if (udev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_RESET)
+ if (udev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_RESET) {
status = -ENODEV;
- else
+ } else {
+ hub_disconnect_children(udev);
status = usb_reset_and_verify_device(udev);
+ }
}
/* 10.5.4.5 says be sure devices in the tree are still there.
--
2.43.0
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 4f6a6bed0bfef4b966f076f33eb4f5547226056a
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021128-repeater-percolate-6131@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4f6a6bed0bfef4b966f076f33eb4f5547226056a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 03:16:14 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] maple_tree: simplify split calculation
Patch series "simplify split calculation", v3.
This patch (of 3):
The current calculation for splitting nodes tries to enforce a minimum
span on the leaf nodes. This code is complex and never worked correctly
to begin with, due to the min value being passed as 0 for all leaves.
The calculation should just split the data as equally as possible
between the new nodes. Note that b_end will be one more than the data,
so the left side is still favoured in the calculation.
The current code may also lead to a deficient node by not leaving enough
data for the right side of the split. This issue is also addressed with
the split calculation change.
[Liam.Howlett(a)Oracle.com: rephrase the change log]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241113031616.10530-1-richard.weiyang@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241113031616.10530-2-richard.weiyang@gmail.com
Fixes: 54a611b60590 ("Maple Tree: add new data structure")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)Oracle.com>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/lib/maple_tree.c b/lib/maple_tree.c
index fe7f9e1f5bbb..ca8ae1e1cc0a 100644
--- a/lib/maple_tree.c
+++ b/lib/maple_tree.c
@@ -1863,11 +1863,11 @@ static inline int mab_no_null_split(struct maple_big_node *b_node,
* Return: The first split location. The middle split is set in @mid_split.
*/
static inline int mab_calc_split(struct ma_state *mas,
- struct maple_big_node *bn, unsigned char *mid_split, unsigned long min)
+ struct maple_big_node *bn, unsigned char *mid_split)
{
unsigned char b_end = bn->b_end;
int split = b_end / 2; /* Assume equal split. */
- unsigned char slot_min, slot_count = mt_slots[bn->type];
+ unsigned char slot_count = mt_slots[bn->type];
/*
* To support gap tracking, all NULL entries are kept together and a node cannot
@@ -1900,18 +1900,7 @@ static inline int mab_calc_split(struct ma_state *mas,
split = b_end / 3;
*mid_split = split * 2;
} else {
- slot_min = mt_min_slots[bn->type];
-
*mid_split = 0;
- /*
- * Avoid having a range less than the slot count unless it
- * causes one node to be deficient.
- * NOTE: mt_min_slots is 1 based, b_end and split are zero.
- */
- while ((split < slot_count - 1) &&
- ((bn->pivot[split] - min) < slot_count - 1) &&
- (b_end - split > slot_min))
- split++;
}
/* Avoid ending a node on a NULL entry */
@@ -2377,7 +2366,7 @@ static inline struct maple_enode
static inline unsigned char mas_mab_to_node(struct ma_state *mas,
struct maple_big_node *b_node, struct maple_enode **left,
struct maple_enode **right, struct maple_enode **middle,
- unsigned char *mid_split, unsigned long min)
+ unsigned char *mid_split)
{
unsigned char split = 0;
unsigned char slot_count = mt_slots[b_node->type];
@@ -2390,7 +2379,7 @@ static inline unsigned char mas_mab_to_node(struct ma_state *mas,
if (b_node->b_end < slot_count) {
split = b_node->b_end;
} else {
- split = mab_calc_split(mas, b_node, mid_split, min);
+ split = mab_calc_split(mas, b_node, mid_split);
*right = mas_new_ma_node(mas, b_node);
}
@@ -2877,7 +2866,7 @@ static void mas_spanning_rebalance(struct ma_state *mas,
mast->bn->b_end--;
mast->bn->type = mte_node_type(mast->orig_l->node);
split = mas_mab_to_node(mas, mast->bn, &left, &right, &middle,
- &mid_split, mast->orig_l->min);
+ &mid_split);
mast_set_split_parents(mast, left, middle, right, split,
mid_split);
mast_cp_to_nodes(mast, left, middle, right, split, mid_split);
@@ -3365,7 +3354,7 @@ static void mas_split(struct ma_state *mas, struct maple_big_node *b_node)
if (mas_push_data(mas, height, &mast, false))
break;
- split = mab_calc_split(mas, b_node, &mid_split, prev_l_mas.min);
+ split = mab_calc_split(mas, b_node, &mid_split);
mast_split_data(&mast, mas, split);
/*
* Usually correct, mab_mas_cp in the above call overwrites
From: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl(a)hpe.com>
[ Upstream commit cc31744a294584a36bf764a0ffa3255a8e69f036 ]
When ident_pud_init() uses only GB pages to create identity maps, large
ranges of addresses not actually requested can be included in the resulting
table; a 4K request will map a full GB. This can include a lot of extra
address space past that requested, including areas marked reserved by the
BIOS. That allows processor speculation into reserved regions, that on UV
systems can cause system halts.
Only use GB pages when map creation requests include the full GB page of
space. Fall back to using smaller 2M pages when only portions of a GB page
are included in the request.
No attempt is made to coalesce mapping requests. If a request requires a
map entry at the 2M (pmd) level, subsequent mapping requests within the
same 1G region will also be at the pmd level, even if adjacent or
overlapping such requests could have been combined to map a full GB page.
Existing usage starts with larger regions and then adds smaller regions, so
this should not have any great consequence.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl(a)hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavin Joseph <me(a)pavinjoseph.com>
Tested-by: Sarah Brofeldt <srhb(a)dbc.dk>
Tested-by: Eric Hagberg <ehagberg(a)gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240717213121.3064030-3-steve.wahl@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Bruno VERNAY <bruno.vernay(a)se.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <hsimeliere.opensource(a)witekio.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
index 968d7005f4a7..a204a332c71f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
@@ -26,18 +26,31 @@ static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page,
for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
pud_t *pud = pud_page + pud_index(addr);
pmd_t *pmd;
+ bool use_gbpage;
next = (addr & PUD_MASK) + PUD_SIZE;
if (next > end)
next = end;
- if (info->direct_gbpages) {
- pud_t pudval;
+ /* if this is already a gbpage, this portion is already mapped */
+ if (pud_leaf(*pud))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Is using a gbpage allowed? */
+ use_gbpage = info->direct_gbpages;
- if (pud_present(*pud))
- continue;
+ /* Don't use gbpage if it maps more than the requested region. */
+ /* at the begining: */
+ use_gbpage &= ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) == 0);
+ /* ... or at the end: */
+ use_gbpage &= ((next & ~PUD_MASK) == 0);
+
+ /* Never overwrite existing mappings */
+ use_gbpage &= !pud_present(*pud);
+
+ if (use_gbpage) {
+ pud_t pudval;
- addr &= PUD_MASK;
pudval = __pud((addr - info->offset) | info->page_flag);
set_pud(pud, pudval);
continue;
--
2.43.0
The role switch registration and set_role() can happen in parallel as they
are invoked independent of each other. There is a possibility that a driver
might spend significant amount of time in usb_role_switch_register() API
due to the presence of time intensive operations like component_add()
which operate under common mutex. This leads to a time window after
allocating the switch and before setting the registered flag where the set
role notifications are dropped. Below timeline summarizes this behavior
Thread1 | Thread2
usb_role_switch_register() |
| |
---> allocate switch |
| |
---> component_add() | usb_role_switch_set_role()
| | |
| | --> Drop role notifications
| | since sw->registered
| | flag is not set.
| |
--->Set registered flag.|
To avoid this, set the registered flag early on in the switch register
API.
Fixes: b787a3e78175 ("usb: roles: don't get/set_role() when usb_role_switch is unregistered")
cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Elson Roy Serrao <quic_eserrao(a)quicinc.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Set the switch registered flag from the get-go as suggested by
Heikki.
- Modified subject line and commit next as per the new logic.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250127230715.6142-1-quic_eserrao@quicinc.com/
drivers/usb/roles/class.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/roles/class.c b/drivers/usb/roles/class.c
index c58a12c147f4..30482d4cf826 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/roles/class.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/roles/class.c
@@ -387,8 +387,11 @@ usb_role_switch_register(struct device *parent,
dev_set_name(&sw->dev, "%s-role-switch",
desc->name ? desc->name : dev_name(parent));
+ sw->registered = true;
+
ret = device_register(&sw->dev);
if (ret) {
+ sw->registered = false;
put_device(&sw->dev);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
@@ -399,8 +402,6 @@ usb_role_switch_register(struct device *parent,
dev_warn(&sw->dev, "failed to add component\n");
}
- sw->registered = true;
-
/* TODO: Symlinks for the host port and the device controller. */
return sw;
--
2.17.1
In 3eab9d7bc2f4 ("fuse: convert readahead to use folios"), the logic
was converted to using the new folio readahead code, which drops the
reference on the folio once it is locked, using an inferred reference
on the folio. Previously we held a reference on the folio for the
entire duration of the readpages call.
This is fine, however for the case for splice pipe responses where we
will remove the old folio and splice in the new folio (see
fuse_try_move_page()), we assume that there is a reference held on the
folio for ap->folios, which is no longer the case.
To fix this, revert back to __readahead_folio() which allows us to hold
the reference on the folio for the duration of readpages until either we
drop the reference ourselves in fuse_readpages_end() or the reference is
dropped after it's replaced in the page cache in the splice case.
This will fix the UAF bug that was reported.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/2f681f48-00f5-4e09-8431-2b3dbfaa881e@…
Fixes: 3eab9d7bc2f4 ("fuse: convert readahead to use folios")
Reported-by: Christian Heusel <christian(a)heusel.eu>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/2f681f48-00f5-4e09-8431-2b3dbfaa881e@heusel.eu/
Closes: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/linux/-/issues/110
Reported-by: Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity(a)gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/34feb867-09e2-46e4-aa31-d9660a806d1a@gmail.com/
Closes: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1236660
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org>
---
fs/fuse/dev.c | 6 ++++++
fs/fuse/file.c | 13 +++++++++++--
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c
index 3c03aac480a4..de9e25e7dd2d 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dev.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c
@@ -933,6 +933,12 @@ static int fuse_check_folio(struct folio *folio)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Attempt to steal a page from the splice() pipe and move it into the
+ * pagecache. If successful, the pointer in @pagep will be updated. The
+ * folio that was originally in @pagep will lose a reference and the new
+ * folio returned in @pagep will carry a reference.
+ */
static int fuse_try_move_page(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, struct page **pagep)
{
int err;
diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c
index 7d92a5479998..d63e56fd3dd2 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/file.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
@@ -955,8 +955,10 @@ static void fuse_readpages_end(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args,
fuse_invalidate_atime(inode);
}
- for (i = 0; i < ap->num_folios; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < ap->num_folios; i++) {
folio_end_read(ap->folios[i], !err);
+ folio_put(ap->folios[i]);
+ }
if (ia->ff)
fuse_file_put(ia->ff, false);
@@ -1048,7 +1050,14 @@ static void fuse_readahead(struct readahead_control *rac)
ap = &ia->ap;
while (ap->num_folios < cur_pages) {
- folio = readahead_folio(rac);
+ /*
+ * This returns a folio with a ref held on it.
+ * The ref needs to be held until the request is
+ * completed, since the splice case (see
+ * fuse_try_move_page()) drops the ref after it's
+ * replaced in the page cache.
+ */
+ folio = __readahead_folio(rac);
ap->folios[ap->num_folios] = folio;
ap->descs[ap->num_folios].length = folio_size(folio);
ap->num_folios++;
--
2.43.5
Hi,
Following up on my primary email about the visitor list. Please let me know your thoughts, and I'd be happy to give more details.
Best regards,
Grace
Subject: Integrated Systems Europe 2025!
Hi,
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Would you like details on the attendees list, exhibitors list, or both? Let me know, and I’ll be happy to share pricing details and answer any questions.
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Best regards,
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Sr. Demand Generation
P.S. If you’d prefer not to receive updates, simply reply with “NO.”
On the arm64 platform with 4K base page config, SECTION_SIZE_BITS is set
to 27, making one section 128M. The related page struct which vmemmap
points to is 2M then.
Commit c1cc1552616d ("arm64: MMU initialisation") optimizes the
vmemmap to populate at the PMD section level which was suitable
initially since hot plug granule is always one section(128M). However,
commit ba72b4c8cf60 ("mm/sparsemem: support sub-section hotplug")
introduced a 2M(SUBSECTION_SIZE) hot plug granule, which disrupted the
existing arm64 assumptions.
Considering the vmemmap_free -> unmap_hotplug_pmd_range path, when
pmd_sect() is true, the entire PMD section is cleared, even if there is
other effective subsection. For example page_struct_map1 and
page_strcut_map2 are part of a single PMD entry and they are hot-added
sequentially. Then page_struct_map1 is removed, vmemmap_free() will clear
the entire PMD entry freeing the struct page map for the whole section,
even though page_struct_map2 is still active. Similar problem exists
with linear mapping as well, for 16K base page(PMD size = 32M) or 64K
base page(PMD = 512M), their block mappings exceed SUBSECTION_SIZE.
Tearing down the entire PMD mapping too will leave other subsections
unmapped in the linear mapping.
To address the issue, we need to prevent PMD/PUD/CONT mappings for both
linear and vmemmap for non-boot sections if corresponding size on the
given base page exceeds SUBSECTION_SIZE(2MB now).
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Fixes: ba72b4c8cf60 ("mm/sparsemem: support sub-section hotplug")
Signed-off-by: Zhenhua Huang <quic_zhenhuah(a)quicinc.com>
---
Hi Catalin and Anshuman,
I have addressed comments so far, please help review.
One outstanding point which not finalized is in vmemmap_populate(): how to judge hotplug
section. Currently I am using system_state, discussion:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1515dae4-cb53-4645-8c72-d33b27ede7eb@quici…
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index e2739b69e11b..8718d6e454c5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -42,9 +42,13 @@
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/kfence.h>
-#define NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS BIT(0)
-#define NO_CONT_MAPPINGS BIT(1)
-#define NO_EXEC_MAPPINGS BIT(2) /* assumes FEAT_HPDS is not used */
+#define NO_PMD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS BIT(0)
+#define NO_PUD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS BIT(1) /* Hotplug case: do not want block mapping for PUD */
+#define NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS (NO_PMD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_PUD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS)
+#define NO_PTE_CONT_MAPPINGS BIT(2)
+#define NO_PMD_CONT_MAPPINGS BIT(3) /* Hotplug case: do not want cont mapping for PMD */
+#define NO_CONT_MAPPINGS (NO_PTE_CONT_MAPPINGS | NO_PMD_CONT_MAPPINGS)
+#define NO_EXEC_MAPPINGS BIT(4) /* assumes FEAT_HPDS is not used */
u64 kimage_voffset __ro_after_init;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kimage_voffset);
@@ -224,7 +228,7 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pte(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
/* use a contiguous mapping if the range is suitably aligned */
if ((((addr | next | phys) & ~CONT_PTE_MASK) == 0) &&
- (flags & NO_CONT_MAPPINGS) == 0)
+ (flags & NO_PTE_CONT_MAPPINGS) == 0)
__prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) | PTE_CONT);
init_pte(ptep, addr, next, phys, __prot);
@@ -254,7 +258,7 @@ static void init_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
/* try section mapping first */
if (((addr | next | phys) & ~PMD_MASK) == 0 &&
- (flags & NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS) == 0) {
+ (flags & NO_PMD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS) == 0) {
pmd_set_huge(pmdp, phys, prot);
/*
@@ -311,7 +315,7 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pmd(pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr,
/* use a contiguous mapping if the range is suitably aligned */
if ((((addr | next | phys) & ~CONT_PMD_MASK) == 0) &&
- (flags & NO_CONT_MAPPINGS) == 0)
+ (flags & NO_PMD_CONT_MAPPINGS) == 0)
__prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) | PTE_CONT);
init_pmd(pmdp, addr, next, phys, __prot, pgtable_alloc, flags);
@@ -358,8 +362,8 @@ static void alloc_init_pud(p4d_t *p4dp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
* For 4K granule only, attempt to put down a 1GB block
*/
if (pud_sect_supported() &&
- ((addr | next | phys) & ~PUD_MASK) == 0 &&
- (flags & NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS) == 0) {
+ ((addr | next | phys) & ~PUD_MASK) == 0 &&
+ (flags & NO_PUD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS) == 0) {
pud_set_huge(pudp, phys, prot);
/*
@@ -1177,7 +1181,13 @@ int __meminit vmemmap_populate(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int node,
{
WARN_ON((start < VMEMMAP_START) || (end > VMEMMAP_END));
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_4K_PAGES))
+ /*
+ * Hotplugged section does not support hugepages as
+ * PMD_SIZE (hence PUD_SIZE) section mapping covers
+ * struct page range that exceeds a SUBSECTION_SIZE
+ * i.e 2MB - for all available base page sizes.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_4K_PAGES) || system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING)
return vmemmap_populate_basepages(start, end, node, altmap);
else
return vmemmap_populate_hugepages(start, end, node, altmap);
@@ -1339,9 +1349,27 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,
struct mhp_params *params)
{
int ret, flags = NO_EXEC_MAPPINGS;
+ unsigned long start_pfn = PFN_DOWN(start);
+ struct mem_section *ms = __pfn_to_section(start_pfn);
VM_BUG_ON(!mhp_range_allowed(start, size, true));
+ /* should not be invoked by early section */
+ WARN_ON(early_section(ms));
+
+ /*
+ * Disallow BlOCK/CONT mappings if the corresponding size exceeds
+ * SUBSECTION_SIZE which now is 2MB.
+ *
+ * PUD_BLOCK or PMD_CONT should consistently exceed SUBSECTION_SIZE
+ * across all variable page size configurations, so add them directly
+ */
+ flags |= NO_PUD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_PMD_CONT_MAPPINGS;
+ if (SUBSECTION_SHIFT < PMD_SHIFT)
+ flags |= NO_PMD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS;
+ if (SUBSECTION_SHIFT < CONT_PTE_SHIFT)
+ flags |= NO_PTE_CONT_MAPPINGS;
+
if (can_set_direct_map())
flags |= NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS;
--
2.25.1
commit c910f2b65518 ("arm64/mm: Update tlb invalidation routines for
FEAT_LPA2") changed the "invalidation level unknown" hint from 0 to
TLBI_TTL_UNKNOWN (INT_MAX). But the fallback "unknown level" path in
flush_hugetlb_tlb_range() was not updated. So as it stands, when trying
to invalidate CONT_PMD_SIZE or CONT_PTE_SIZE hugetlb mappings, we will
spuriously try to invalidate at level 0 on LPA2-enabled systems.
Fix this so that the fallback passes TLBI_TTL_UNKNOWN, and while we are
at it, explicitly use the correct stride and level for CONT_PMD_SIZE and
CONT_PTE_SIZE, which should provide a minor optimization.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: c910f2b65518 ("arm64/mm: Update tlb invalidation routines for FEAT_LPA2")
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/hugetlb.h | 20 ++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hugetlb.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hugetlb.h
index 03db9cb21ace..8ab9542d2d22 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hugetlb.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hugetlb.h
@@ -76,12 +76,20 @@ static inline void flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
{
unsigned long stride = huge_page_size(hstate_vma(vma));
- if (stride == PMD_SIZE)
- __flush_tlb_range(vma, start, end, stride, false, 2);
- else if (stride == PUD_SIZE)
- __flush_tlb_range(vma, start, end, stride, false, 1);
- else
- __flush_tlb_range(vma, start, end, PAGE_SIZE, false, 0);
+ switch (stride) {
+ case PUD_SIZE:
+ __flush_tlb_range(vma, start, end, PUD_SIZE, false, 1);
+ break;
+ case CONT_PMD_SIZE:
+ case PMD_SIZE:
+ __flush_tlb_range(vma, start, end, PMD_SIZE, false, 2);
+ break;
+ case CONT_PTE_SIZE:
+ __flush_tlb_range(vma, start, end, PAGE_SIZE, false, 3);
+ break;
+ default:
+ __flush_tlb_range(vma, start, end, PAGE_SIZE, false, TLBI_TTL_UNKNOWN);
+ }
}
#endif /* __ASM_HUGETLB_H */
--
2.43.0
Now for dwmac-loongson {tx,rx}_fifo_size are uninitialised, which means
zero. This means dwmac-loongson doesn't support changing MTU because in
stmmac_change_mtu() it requires the fifo size be no less than MTU. Thus,
set the correct tx_fifo_size and rx_fifo_size for it (16KB multiplied by
queue counts).
Here {tx,rx}_fifo_size is initialised with the initial value (also the
maximum value) of {tx,rx}_queues_to_use. So it will keep as 16KB if we
don't change the queue count, and will be larger than 16KB if we change
(decrease) the queue count. However stmmac_change_mtu() still work well
with current logic (MTU cannot be larger than 16KB for stmmac).
Note: the Fixes tag picked here is the oldest commit and key commit of
the dwmac-loongson series "stmmac: Add Loongson platform support".
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ad72f783de06 ("net: stmmac: Add multi-channel support")
Acked-by: Yanteng Si <si.yanteng(a)linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chong Qiao <qiaochong(a)loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn>
---
V2: Update commit message and CC list.
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-loongson.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-loongson.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-loongson.c
index bfe6e2d631bd..79acdf38c525 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-loongson.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-loongson.c
@@ -574,6 +574,9 @@ static int loongson_dwmac_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id
if (ret)
goto err_disable_device;
+ plat->tx_fifo_size = SZ_16K * plat->tx_queues_to_use;
+ plat->rx_fifo_size = SZ_16K * plat->rx_queues_to_use;
+
if (dev_of_node(&pdev->dev))
ret = loongson_dwmac_dt_config(pdev, plat, &res);
else
--
2.47.1
The function get_cipher_desc() may return NULL if the cipher type is
invalid or unsupported. In fill_sg_out(), the return value is used
without any checks, which could lead to a NULL pointer dereference.
This patch adds a DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE check to ensure that
cipher_desc is valid and offloadable before proceeding. This prevents
potential crashes and provides a clear warning in debug builds.
Fixes: 8db44ab26beb ("tls: rename tls_cipher_size_desc to tls_cipher_desc")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.6+
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c b/net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c
index f9e3d3d90dcf..0f93a0833ec2 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static void fill_sg_out(struct scatterlist sg_out[3], void *buf,
{
const struct tls_cipher_desc *cipher_desc =
get_cipher_desc(tls_ctx->crypto_send.info.cipher_type);
+ DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!cipher_desc || !cipher_desc->offloadable);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[0], dummy_buf, sync_size);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], nskb->data + tcp_payload_offset, payload_len);
--
2.42.0.windows.2
The function blkg_to_lat() may return NULL if the blkg is not associated
with an iolatency group. In iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec() and
iolatency_pd_init(), the return values are not checked, leading to
potential NULL pointer dereferences.
This patch adds checks for the return values of blkg_to_lat and let it
returns early if it is NULL, preventing the NULL pointer dereference.
Fixes: d70675121546 ("block: introduce blk-iolatency io controller")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
block/blk-iolatency.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/block/blk-iolatency.c b/block/blk-iolatency.c
index ebb522788d97..398f0a1747c4 100644
--- a/block/blk-iolatency.c
+++ b/block/blk-iolatency.c
@@ -787,6 +787,8 @@ static int blk_iolatency_init(struct gendisk *disk)
static void iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec(struct blkcg_gq *blkg, u64 val)
{
struct iolatency_grp *iolat = blkg_to_lat(blkg);
+ if (!iolat)
+ return;
struct blk_iolatency *blkiolat = iolat->blkiolat;
u64 oldval = iolat->min_lat_nsec;
@@ -1013,6 +1015,8 @@ static void iolatency_pd_init(struct blkg_policy_data *pd)
*/
if (blkg->parent && blkg_to_pd(blkg->parent, &blkcg_policy_iolatency)) {
struct iolatency_grp *parent = blkg_to_lat(blkg->parent);
+ if (!parent)
+ return;
atomic_set(&iolat->scale_cookie,
atomic_read(&parent->child_lat.scale_cookie));
} else {
--
2.42.0.windows.2
From: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad(a)microsoft.com>
Our current approach to select a channel for sending requests is this:
1. iterate all channels to find the min and max queue depth
2. if min and max are not the same, pick the channel with min depth
3. if min and max are same, round robin, as all channels are equally loaded
The problem with this approach is that there's a lag between selecting
a channel and sending the request (that increases the queue depth on the channel).
While these numbers will eventually catch up, there could be a skew in the
channel usage, depending on the application's I/O parallelism and the server's
speed of handling requests.
With sufficient parallelism, this lag can artificially increase the queue depth,
thereby impacting the performance negatively.
This change will change the step 1 above to start the iteration from the last
selected channel. This is to reduce the skew in channel usage even in the presence
of this lag.
Fixes: ea90708d3cf3 ("cifs: use the least loaded channel for sending requests")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad(a)microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/client/transport.c | 14 +++++++-------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/smb/client/transport.c b/fs/smb/client/transport.c
index 0dc80959ce48..e2fbf8b18eb2 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/transport.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/transport.c
@@ -1015,14 +1015,16 @@ struct TCP_Server_Info *cifs_pick_channel(struct cifs_ses *ses)
uint index = 0;
unsigned int min_in_flight = UINT_MAX, max_in_flight = 0;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = NULL;
- int i;
+ int i, start, cur;
if (!ses)
return NULL;
spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock);
+ start = atomic_inc_return(&ses->chan_seq);
for (i = 0; i < ses->chan_count; i++) {
- server = ses->chans[i].server;
+ cur = (start + i) % ses->chan_count;
+ server = ses->chans[cur].server;
if (!server || server->terminate)
continue;
@@ -1039,17 +1041,15 @@ struct TCP_Server_Info *cifs_pick_channel(struct cifs_ses *ses)
*/
if (server->in_flight < min_in_flight) {
min_in_flight = server->in_flight;
- index = i;
+ index = cur;
}
if (server->in_flight > max_in_flight)
max_in_flight = server->in_flight;
}
/* if all channels are equally loaded, fall back to round-robin */
- if (min_in_flight == max_in_flight) {
- index = (uint)atomic_inc_return(&ses->chan_seq);
- index %= ses->chan_count;
- }
+ if (min_in_flight == max_in_flight)
+ index = (uint)start % ses->chan_count;
server = ses->chans[index].server;
spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock);
--
2.43.0
Starting with Rust 1.86.0 (to be released 2025-04-03), Clippy will have
a new lint, `doc_overindented_list_items` [1], which catches cases of
overindented list items.
The lint has been added by Yutaro Ohno, based on feedback from the kernel
[2] on a patch that fixed a similar case -- commit 0c5928deada1 ("rust:
block: fix formatting in GenDisk doc").
Clippy reports a single case in the kernel, apart from the one already
fixed in the commit above:
error: doc list item overindented
--> rust/kernel/rbtree.rs:1152:5
|
1152 | /// null, it is a pointer to the root of the [`RBTree`].
| ^^^^ help: try using ` ` (2 spaces)
|
= help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#doc_overindented_…
= note: `-D clippy::doc-overindented-list-items` implied by `-D warnings`
= help: to override `-D warnings` add `#[allow(clippy::doc_overindented_list_items)]`
Thus clean it up.
Cc: Yutaro Ohno <yutaro.ono.418(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # Needed in 6.12.y and 6.13.y only (Rust is pinned in older LTSs).
Fixes: a335e9591404 ("rust: rbtree: add `RBTree::entry`")
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/pull/13711 [1]
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/issues/13601 [2]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
---
rust/kernel/rbtree.rs | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/rust/kernel/rbtree.rs b/rust/kernel/rbtree.rs
index ee2731dad72d..0d1e75810664 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/rbtree.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/rbtree.rs
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ pub struct VacantEntry<'a, K, V> {
/// # Invariants
/// - `parent` may be null if the new node becomes the root.
/// - `child_field_of_parent` is a valid pointer to the left-child or right-child of `parent`. If `parent` is
-/// null, it is a pointer to the root of the [`RBTree`].
+/// null, it is a pointer to the root of the [`RBTree`].
struct RawVacantEntry<'a, K, V> {
rbtree: *mut RBTree<K, V>,
/// The node that will become the parent of the new node if we insert one.
--
2.48.1
Starting with Rust 1.85.0 (currently in beta, to be released 2025-02-20),
under some kernel configurations with `CONFIG_RUST_DEBUG_ASSERTIONS=y`,
one may trigger a new `objtool` warning:
rust/kernel.o: warning: objtool: _R...securityNtB2_11SecurityCtx8as_bytes()
falls through to next function _R...core3ops4drop4Drop4drop()
due to a call to the `noreturn` symbol:
core::panicking::assert_failed::<usize, usize>
Thus add it to the list so that `objtool` knows it is actually `noreturn`.
Do so matching with `strstr` since it is a generic.
See commit 56d680dd23c3 ("objtool/rust: list `noreturn` Rust functions")
for more details.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # Needed in 6.12.y only (Rust is pinned in older LTSs).
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 76060da755b5..e7ec29dfdff2 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ static bool is_rust_noreturn(const struct symbol *func)
str_ends_with(func->name, "_4core9panicking18panic_bounds_check") ||
str_ends_with(func->name, "_4core9panicking19assert_failed_inner") ||
str_ends_with(func->name, "_4core9panicking36panic_misaligned_pointer_dereference") ||
+ strstr(func->name, "_4core9panicking13assert_failed") ||
strstr(func->name, "_4core9panicking11panic_const24panic_const_") ||
(strstr(func->name, "_4core5slice5index24slice_") &&
str_ends_with(func->name, "_fail"));
base-commit: 9d89551994a430b50c4fffcb1e617a057fa76e20
--
2.48.0
The code for detecting CPUs that are vulnerable to Spectre BHB was
based on a hardcoded list of CPU IDs that were known to be affected.
Unfortunately, the list mostly only contained the IDs of standard ARM
cores. The IDs for many cores that are minor variants of the standard
ARM cores (like many Qualcomm Kyro CPUs) weren't listed. This led the
code to assume that those variants were not affected.
Flip the code on its head and instead assume that a core is vulnerable
if it doesn't have CSV2_3 but is unrecognized as being safe. This
involves creating a "Spectre BHB safe" list.
As of right now, the only CPU IDs added to the "Spectre BHB safe" list
are ARM Cortex A35, A53, A55, A510, and A520. This list was created by
looking for cores that weren't listed in ARM's list [1] as per review
feedback on v2 of this patch [2]. Additionally Brahma A53 is added as
per mailing list feedback [3].
NOTE: this patch will not actually _mitigate_ anyone, it will simply
cause them to report themselves as vulnerable. If any cores in the
system are reported as vulnerable but not mitigated then the whole
system will be reported as vulnerable though the system will attempt
to mitigate with the information it has about the known cores.
[1] https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Spectre-BHB
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219175128.GA25477@willie-the-truck
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/r/18dbd7d1-a46c-4112-a425-320c99f67a8d@broadcom.com
Fixes: 558c303c9734 ("arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner(a)chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org>
---
Changes in v4:
- Add MIDR_BRAHMA_B53 as safe.
- Get rid of `spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list`.
Changes in v3:
- Don't guess the mitigation; just report unknown cores as vulnerable.
- Restructure the code since is_spectre_bhb_affected() defaults to true
Changes in v2:
- New
arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h | 1 -
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 203 ++++++++++++++++---------------
2 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
index 0c4d9045c31f..f1524cdeacf1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void);
enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope);
-u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope);
void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
bool try_emulate_el1_ssbs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instr);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
index e149efadff20..17aa836fe46d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
@@ -845,53 +845,70 @@ static unsigned long system_bhb_mitigations;
* This must be called with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU for each type of CPU, before any
* SCOPE_SYSTEM call will give the right answer.
*/
-u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope)
+static bool is_spectre_bhb_safe(int scope)
+{
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_safe_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A510),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A520),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53),
+ {},
+ };
+ static bool all_safe = true;
+
+ if (scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
+ return all_safe;
+
+ if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_safe_list))
+ return true;
+
+ all_safe = false;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(void)
{
u8 k = 0;
- static u8 max_bhb_k;
-
- if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) {
- static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k32_list[] = {
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78AE),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78C),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A710),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X2),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1),
- {},
- };
- static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k24_list[] = {
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A77),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_GOLD),
- {},
- };
- static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k11_list[] = {
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_AMPERE1),
- {},
- };
- static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k8_list[] = {
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
- {},
- };
-
- if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k32_list))
- k = 32;
- else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k24_list))
- k = 24;
- else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k11_list))
- k = 11;
- else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k8_list))
- k = 8;
-
- max_bhb_k = max(max_bhb_k, k);
- } else {
- k = max_bhb_k;
- }
+
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k32_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78AE),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78C),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A710),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X2),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1),
+ {},
+ };
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k24_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A77),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_GOLD),
+ {},
+ };
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k11_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_AMPERE1),
+ {},
+ };
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k8_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
+ {},
+ };
+
+ if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k32_list))
+ k = 32;
+ else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k24_list))
+ k = 24;
+ else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k11_list))
+ k = 11;
+ else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k8_list))
+ k = 8;
return k;
}
@@ -917,29 +934,13 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
}
}
-static bool is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(int scope)
+static bool has_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigation(void)
{
- static bool system_affected;
enum mitigation_state fw_state;
bool has_smccc = arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() != SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE;
- static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list[] = {
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
- {},
- };
- bool cpu_in_list = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(),
- spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list);
-
- if (scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
- return system_affected;
fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
- if (cpu_in_list || (has_smccc && fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)) {
- system_affected = true;
- return true;
- }
-
- return false;
+ return has_smccc && fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
}
static bool supports_ecbhb(int scope)
@@ -955,6 +956,8 @@ static bool supports_ecbhb(int scope)
ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_ECBHB_SHIFT);
}
+static u8 max_bhb_k;
+
bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope)
{
@@ -963,16 +966,18 @@ bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
if (supports_csv2p3(scope))
return false;
- if (supports_clearbhb(scope))
- return true;
-
- if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(scope))
- return true;
+ if (is_spectre_bhb_safe(scope))
+ return false;
- if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(scope))
- return true;
+ /*
+ * At this point the core isn't known to be "safe" so we're going to
+ * assume it's vulnerable. We still need to update `max_bhb_k` though,
+ * but only if we aren't mitigating with clearbhb though.
+ */
+ if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU && !supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
+ max_bhb_k = max(max_bhb_k, spectre_bhb_loop_affected());
- return false;
+ return true;
}
static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
@@ -1003,7 +1008,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
{
bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;
- enum mitigation_state fw_state, state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+ enum mitigation_state state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
struct bp_hardening_data *data = this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data);
if (!is_spectre_bhb_affected(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
@@ -1029,7 +1034,7 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN);
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
set_bit(BHB_INSN, &system_bhb_mitigations);
- } else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
+ } else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected()) {
/*
* Ensure KVM uses the indirect vector which will have the
* branchy-loop added. A57/A72-r0 will already have selected
@@ -1042,32 +1047,29 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP);
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
set_bit(BHB_LOOP, &system_bhb_mitigations);
- } else if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
- fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
- if (fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED) {
- /*
- * Ensure KVM uses one of the spectre bp_hardening
- * vectors. The indirect vector doesn't include the EL3
- * call, so needs upgrading to
- * HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_INDIRECT.
- */
- if (!data->slot || data->slot == HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT)
- data->slot += 1;
-
- this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW);
-
- /*
- * The WA3 call in the vectors supersedes the WA1 call
- * made during context-switch. Uninstall any firmware
- * bp_hardening callback.
- */
- cpu_cb = spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb();
- if (__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn) != cpu_cb)
- __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, NULL);
-
- state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
- set_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
- }
+ } else if (has_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigation()) {
+ /*
+ * Ensure KVM uses one of the spectre bp_hardening
+ * vectors. The indirect vector doesn't include the EL3
+ * call, so needs upgrading to
+ * HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_INDIRECT.
+ */
+ if (!data->slot || data->slot == HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT)
+ data->slot += 1;
+
+ this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW);
+
+ /*
+ * The WA3 call in the vectors supersedes the WA1 call
+ * made during context-switch. Uninstall any firmware
+ * bp_hardening callback.
+ */
+ cpu_cb = spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb();
+ if (__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn) != cpu_cb)
+ __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, NULL);
+
+ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+ set_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
}
update_mitigation_state(&spectre_bhb_state, state);
@@ -1101,7 +1103,6 @@ void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter(struct alt_instr *alt,
{
u8 rd;
u32 insn;
- u16 loop_count = spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM);
BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); /* MOV -> MOV */
@@ -1110,7 +1111,7 @@ void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter(struct alt_instr *alt,
insn = le32_to_cpu(*origptr);
rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD, insn);
- insn = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, loop_count, 0,
+ insn = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, max_bhb_k, 0,
AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_ZERO);
*updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(insn);
--
2.47.1.613.gc27f4b7a9f-goog
From: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com>
Any active plane needs to have its crtc included in the atomic
state. For planes enabled via uapi that is all handler in the core.
But when we use a plane for joiner the uapi code things the plane
is disabled and therefore doesn't have a crtc. So we need to pull
those in by hand. We do it first thing in
intel_joiner_add_affected_crtcs() so that any newly added crtc will
subsequently pull in all of its joined crtcs as well.
The symptoms from failing to do this are:
- duct tape in the form of commit 1d5b09f8daf8 ("drm/i915: Fix NULL
ptr deref by checking new_crtc_state")
- the plane's hw state will get overwritten by the disabled
uapi state if it can't find the uapi counterpart plane in
the atomic state from where it should copy the correct state
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c
index 6c1e7441313e..22bf46be2ca9 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c
@@ -6695,12 +6695,30 @@ static int intel_async_flip_check_hw(struct intel_atomic_state *state, struct in
static int intel_joiner_add_affected_crtcs(struct intel_atomic_state *state)
{
struct drm_i915_private *i915 = to_i915(state->base.dev);
+ const struct intel_plane_state *plane_state;
struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state;
+ struct intel_plane *plane;
struct intel_crtc *crtc;
u8 affected_pipes = 0;
u8 modeset_pipes = 0;
int i;
+ /*
+ * Any plane which is in use by the joiner needs its crtc.
+ * Pull those in first as this will not have happened yet
+ * if the plane remains disabled according to uapi.
+ */
+ for_each_new_intel_plane_in_state(state, plane, plane_state, i) {
+ crtc = to_intel_crtc(plane_state->hw.crtc);
+ if (!crtc)
+ continue;
+
+ crtc_state = intel_atomic_get_crtc_state(&state->base, crtc);
+ if (IS_ERR(crtc_state))
+ return PTR_ERR(crtc_state);
+ }
+
+ /* Now pull in all joined crtcs */
for_each_new_intel_crtc_in_state(state, crtc, crtc_state, i) {
affected_pipes |= crtc_state->joiner_pipes;
if (intel_crtc_needs_modeset(crtc_state))
--
2.45.3
When some client process A call pdr_add_lookup() to add the look up for
the service and does schedule locator work, later a process B got a new
server packet indicating locator is up and call pdr_locator_new_server()
which eventually sets pdr->locator_init_complete to true which process A
sees and takes list lock and queries domain list but it will timeout due
to deadlock as the response will queued to the same qmi->wq and it is
ordered workqueue and process B is not able to complete new server
request work due to deadlock on list lock.
Process A Process B
process_scheduled_works()
pdr_add_lookup() qmi_data_ready_work()
process_scheduled_works() pdr_locator_new_server()
pdr->locator_init_complete=true;
pdr_locator_work()
mutex_lock(&pdr->list_lock);
pdr_locate_service() mutex_lock(&pdr->list_lock);
pdr_get_domain_list()
pr_err("PDR: %s get domain list
txn wait failed: %d\n",
req->service_name,
ret);
Fix it by removing the unnecessary list iteration as the list iteration
is already being done inside locator work, so avoid it here and just
call schedule_work() here.
Fixes: fbe639b44a82 ("soc: qcom: Introduce Protection Domain Restart helpers")
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Saranya R <quic_sarar(a)quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha(a)oss.qualcomm.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Added Fixes tag,
drivers/soc/qcom/pdr_interface.c | 8 +-------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/pdr_interface.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/pdr_interface.c
index 328b6153b2be..71be378d2e43 100644
--- a/drivers/soc/qcom/pdr_interface.c
+++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/pdr_interface.c
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ static int pdr_locator_new_server(struct qmi_handle *qmi,
{
struct pdr_handle *pdr = container_of(qmi, struct pdr_handle,
locator_hdl);
- struct pdr_service *pds;
mutex_lock(&pdr->lock);
/* Create a local client port for QMI communication */
@@ -87,12 +86,7 @@ static int pdr_locator_new_server(struct qmi_handle *qmi,
mutex_unlock(&pdr->lock);
/* Service pending lookup requests */
- mutex_lock(&pdr->list_lock);
- list_for_each_entry(pds, &pdr->lookups, node) {
- if (pds->need_locator_lookup)
- schedule_work(&pdr->locator_work);
- }
- mutex_unlock(&pdr->list_lock);
+ schedule_work(&pdr->locator_work);
return 0;
}
--
2.34.1
The card works fine on 6.6.
Here's the output of alsa-info.sh for 6.6 (where it works):
http://alsa-project.org/db/?f=ac3a0849a332189eb61a640fe94b46de369a655c
Here's the output for 6.12:
http://alsa-project.org/db/?f=22995c74392ed86393fc2c180ab7ae010e6cbfbb
Here's the output of $ lspci -k | grep -A 3 Audio
00:1f.3 Audio device: Intel Corporation Cannon Lake PCH cAVS (rev 10)
DeviceName: Onboard - Sound
Subsystem: Dell Device 0871
Kernel modules: snd_hda_intel, snd_soc_avs, snd_sof_pci_intel_cnl
I have initially also added modinfo for snd_hda_intel, snd_soc_avs,
and snd_sof_pci_intel_cnl - But my email was flagged as spam, so I
won't do so now.
Installed sound related packages:
sof-firmware 2024.09.2-1
alsa-ucm-conf 1.2.13-2
If there's a need for more information, please let me know.
arm64 supports multiple huge_pte sizes. Some of the sizes are covered by
a single pte entry at a particular level (PMD_SIZE, PUD_SIZE), and some
are covered by multiple ptes at a particular level (CONT_PTE_SIZE,
CONT_PMD_SIZE). So the function has to figure out the size from the
huge_pte pointer. This was previously done by walking the pgtable to
determine the level, then using the PTE_CONT bit to determine the number
of ptes.
But the PTE_CONT bit is only valid when the pte is present. For
non-present pte values (e.g. markers, migration entries), the previous
implementation was therefore erroniously determining the size. There is
at least one known caller in core-mm, move_huge_pte(), which may call
huge_ptep_get_and_clear() for a non-present pte. So we must be robust to
this case. Additionally the "regular" ptep_get_and_clear() is robust to
being called for non-present ptes so it makes sense to follow the
behaviour.
Fix this by using the new sz parameter which is now provided to the
function. Additionally when clearing each pte in a contig range, don't
gather the access and dirty bits if the pte is not present.
An alternative approach that would not require API changes would be to
store the PTE_CONT bit in a spare bit in the swap entry pte. But it felt
cleaner to follow other APIs' lead and just pass in the size.
While we are at it, add some debug warnings in functions that require
the pte is present.
As an aside, PTE_CONT is bit 52, which corresponds to bit 40 in the swap
entry offset field (layout of non-present pte). Since hugetlb is never
swapped to disk, this field will only be populated for markers, which
always set this bit to 0 and hwpoison swap entries, which set the offset
field to a PFN; So it would only ever be 1 for a 52-bit PVA system where
memory in that high half was poisoned (I think!). So in practice, this
bit would almost always be zero for non-present ptes and we would only
clear the first entry if it was actually a contiguous block. That's
probably a less severe symptom than if it was always interpretted as 1
and cleared out potentially-present neighboring PTEs.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 66b3923a1a0f ("arm64: hugetlb: add support for PTE contiguous bit")
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/mm/hugetlbpage.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/hugetlbpage.c b/arch/arm64/mm/hugetlbpage.c
index 06db4649af91..328eec4bfe55 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/hugetlbpage.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/hugetlbpage.c
@@ -163,24 +163,23 @@ static pte_t get_clear_contig(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long pgsize,
unsigned long ncontig)
{
- pte_t orig_pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
- unsigned long i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < ncontig; i++, addr += pgsize, ptep++) {
- pte_t pte = __ptep_get_and_clear(mm, addr, ptep);
-
- /*
- * If HW_AFDBM is enabled, then the HW could turn on
- * the dirty or accessed bit for any page in the set,
- * so check them all.
- */
- if (pte_dirty(pte))
- orig_pte = pte_mkdirty(orig_pte);
-
- if (pte_young(pte))
- orig_pte = pte_mkyoung(orig_pte);
+ pte_t pte, tmp_pte;
+ bool present;
+
+ pte = __ptep_get_and_clear(mm, addr, ptep);
+ present = pte_present(pte);
+ while (--ncontig) {
+ ptep++;
+ addr += pgsize;
+ tmp_pte = __ptep_get_and_clear(mm, addr, ptep);
+ if (present) {
+ if (pte_dirty(tmp_pte))
+ pte = pte_mkdirty(pte);
+ if (pte_young(tmp_pte))
+ pte = pte_mkyoung(pte);
+ }
}
- return orig_pte;
+ return pte;
}
static pte_t get_clear_contig_flush(struct mm_struct *mm,
@@ -401,13 +400,8 @@ pte_t huge_ptep_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
{
int ncontig;
size_t pgsize;
- pte_t orig_pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
-
- if (!pte_cont(orig_pte))
- return __ptep_get_and_clear(mm, addr, ptep);
-
- ncontig = find_num_contig(mm, addr, ptep, &pgsize);
+ ncontig = num_contig_ptes(sz, &pgsize);
return get_clear_contig(mm, addr, ptep, pgsize, ncontig);
}
@@ -451,6 +445,8 @@ int huge_ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
pgprot_t hugeprot;
pte_t orig_pte;
+ VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte));
+
if (!pte_cont(pte))
return __ptep_set_access_flags(vma, addr, ptep, pte, dirty);
@@ -461,6 +457,7 @@ int huge_ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
return 0;
orig_pte = get_clear_contig_flush(mm, addr, ptep, pgsize, ncontig);
+ VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(orig_pte));
/* Make sure we don't lose the dirty or young state */
if (pte_dirty(orig_pte))
@@ -485,7 +482,10 @@ void huge_ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
size_t pgsize;
pte_t pte;
- if (!pte_cont(__ptep_get(ptep))) {
+ pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
+ VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte));
+
+ if (!pte_cont(pte)) {
__ptep_set_wrprotect(mm, addr, ptep);
return;
}
@@ -509,8 +509,12 @@ pte_t huge_ptep_clear_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
size_t pgsize;
int ncontig;
+ pte_t pte;
- if (!pte_cont(__ptep_get(ptep)))
+ pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
+ VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte));
+
+ if (!pte_cont(pte))
return ptep_clear_flush(vma, addr, ptep);
ncontig = find_num_contig(mm, addr, ptep, &pgsize);
--
2.43.0
The stmpe_reg_read function can fail, but its return value is not checked
in stmpe_gpio_irq_sync_unlock. This can lead to silent failures and
incorrect behavior if the hardware access fails.
This patch adds checks for the return value of stmpe_reg_read. If the
function fails, an error message is logged and the function returns
early to avoid further issues.
Fixes: b888fb6f2a27 ("gpio: stmpe: i2c transfer are forbiden in atomic context")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.16+
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
drivers/gpio/gpio-stmpe.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-stmpe.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-stmpe.c
index 75a3633ceddb..222279a9d82b 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-stmpe.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-stmpe.c
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static void stmpe_gpio_irq_sync_unlock(struct irq_data *d)
[REG_IE][CSB] = STMPE_IDX_IEGPIOR_CSB,
[REG_IE][MSB] = STMPE_IDX_IEGPIOR_MSB,
};
- int i, j;
+ int ret, i, j;
/*
* STMPE1600: to be able to get IRQ from pins,
@@ -199,8 +199,16 @@ static void stmpe_gpio_irq_sync_unlock(struct irq_data *d)
* GPSR or GPCR registers
*/
if (stmpe->partnum == STMPE1600) {
- stmpe_reg_read(stmpe, stmpe->regs[STMPE_IDX_GPMR_LSB]);
- stmpe_reg_read(stmpe, stmpe->regs[STMPE_IDX_GPMR_CSB]);
+ ret = stmpe_reg_read(stmpe, stmpe->regs[STMPE_IDX_GPMR_LSB]);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ dev_err(stmpe->dev, "Failed to read GPMR_LSB: %d\n", ret);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = stmpe_reg_read(stmpe, stmpe->regs[STMPE_IDX_GPMR_CSB]);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ dev_err(stmpe->dev, "Failed to read GPMR_CSB: %d\n", ret);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
for (i = 0; i < CACHE_NR_REGS; i++) {
@@ -222,6 +230,7 @@ static void stmpe_gpio_irq_sync_unlock(struct irq_data *d)
}
}
+err:
mutex_unlock(&stmpe_gpio->irq_lock);
}
--
2.42.0.windows.2
Jann reported [1] possible issue when trampoline_check_ip returns
address near the bottom of the address space that is allowed to
call into the syscall if uretprobes are not set up.
Though the mmap minimum address restrictions will typically prevent
creating mappings there, let's make sure uretprobe syscall checks
for that.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/202502081235.5A6F352985@keescook/T/#m9d416df341…
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger(a)gmail.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ff474a78cef5 ("uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa(a)kernel.org>
---
v2 changes:
- adding UPROBE_NO_TRAMPOLINE_VADDR macro (Andrii)
- rebased on top of perf/core
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
index 5a952c5ea66b..e8d3c59aa9f7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
@@ -357,19 +357,25 @@ void *arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize)
return &insn;
}
-static unsigned long trampoline_check_ip(void)
+static unsigned long trampoline_check_ip(unsigned long tramp)
{
- unsigned long tramp = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
-
return tramp + (uretprobe_syscall_check - uretprobe_trampoline_entry);
}
+#define UPROBE_NO_TRAMPOLINE_VADDR ((unsigned long)-1)
+
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
- unsigned long err, ip, sp, r11_cx_ax[3];
+ unsigned long err, ip, sp, r11_cx_ax[3], tramp;
+
+ /* If there's no trampoline, we are called from wrong place. */
+ tramp = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
+ if (tramp == UPROBE_NO_TRAMPOLINE_VADDR)
+ goto sigill;
- if (regs->ip != trampoline_check_ip())
+ /* Make sure the ip matches the only allowed sys_uretprobe caller. */
+ if (regs->ip != trampoline_check_ip(tramp))
goto sigill;
err = copy_from_user(r11_cx_ax, (void __user *)regs->sp, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
--
2.48.1
In vcap_debugfs_show_rule_keyset(), the function vcap_keyfields()
returns a NULL pointer upon allocation failure. This can lead to
a NULL pointer dereference in vcap_debugfs_show_rule_keyfield().
To prevent this, add a check for a NULL return value from
vcap_keyfields() and continue the loop if it is NULL.
Fixes: 610c32b2ce66 ("net: microchip: vcap: Add vcap_get_rule")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.2+
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs.c
index 59bfbda29bb3..e9e2f7af9be3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs.c
@@ -202,6 +202,8 @@ static int vcap_debugfs_show_rule_keyset(struct vcap_rule_internal *ri,
list_for_each_entry(ckf, &ri->data.keyfields, ctrl.list) {
keyfield = vcap_keyfields(vctrl, admin->vtype, ri->data.keyset);
+ if (!keyfield)
+ continue;
vcap_debugfs_show_rule_keyfield(vctrl, out, ckf->ctrl.key,
keyfield, &ckf->data);
}
--
2.42.0.windows.2
Fixes for the provided buffers for not allowing kbufs to cross a single
execution section. Upstream had most of it already fixed by chance,
which is why all 3 patches refer to a single upstream commit.
Pavel Begunkov (3):
io_uring: fix multishots with selected buffers
io_uring: fix io_req_prep_async with provided buffers
io_uring/rw: commit provided buffer state on async
io_uring/io_uring.c | 5 ++++-
io_uring/poll.c | 2 ++
io_uring/rw.c | 10 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.47.1
From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello(a)amd.com>
Spurious immediate wake up events are reported on Acer Nitro ANV14. GPIO 11 is
specified as an edge triggered input and also a wake source but this pin is
supposed to be an output pin for an LED, so it's effectively floating.
Block the interrupt from getting set up for this GPIO on this device.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-tested-by: Delgan <delgan.py(a)gmail.com>
Close: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3954
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello(a)amd.com>
---
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi.c
index 1f9fe50bba005..f7746c57ba76a 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi.c
@@ -1689,6 +1689,20 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id gpiolib_acpi_quirks[] __initconst = {
.ignore_wake = "PNP0C50:00@8",
},
},
+ {
+ /*
+ * Spurious wakeups from GPIO 11
+ * Found in BIOS 1.04
+ * https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3954
+ */
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Acer"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_FAMILY, "Acer Nitro V 14"),
+ },
+ .driver_data = &(struct acpi_gpiolib_dmi_quirk) {
+ .ignore_interrupt = "AMDI0030:00@11",
+ },
+ },
{} /* Terminating entry */
};
--
2.43.0
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
iio: filter: admv8818: Force initialization of SDO
to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
From cc2c3540d9477a9931fb0fd851fcaeba524a5b35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sam Winchenbach <swinchenbach(a)arka.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2025 13:34:34 +0000
Subject: iio: filter: admv8818: Force initialization of SDO
When a weak pull-up is present on the SDO line, regmap_update_bits fails
to write both the SOFTRESET and SDOACTIVE bits because it incorrectly
reads them as already set.
Since the soft reset disables the SDO line, performing a
read-modify-write operation on ADI_SPI_CONFIG_A to enable the SDO line
doesn't make sense. This change directly writes to the register instead
of using regmap_update_bits.
Fixes: f34fe888ad05 ("iio:filter:admv8818: add support for ADMV8818")
Signed-off-by: Sam Winchenbach <swinchenbach(a)arka.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/SA1P110MB106904C961B0F3FAFFED74C0BCF5A@SA1P110MB10…
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com>
---
drivers/iio/filter/admv8818.c | 14 ++++----------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/filter/admv8818.c b/drivers/iio/filter/admv8818.c
index 848baa6e3bbf..d85b7d3de866 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/filter/admv8818.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/filter/admv8818.c
@@ -574,21 +574,15 @@ static int admv8818_init(struct admv8818_state *st)
struct spi_device *spi = st->spi;
unsigned int chip_id;
- ret = regmap_update_bits(st->regmap, ADMV8818_REG_SPI_CONFIG_A,
- ADMV8818_SOFTRESET_N_MSK |
- ADMV8818_SOFTRESET_MSK,
- FIELD_PREP(ADMV8818_SOFTRESET_N_MSK, 1) |
- FIELD_PREP(ADMV8818_SOFTRESET_MSK, 1));
+ ret = regmap_write(st->regmap, ADMV8818_REG_SPI_CONFIG_A,
+ ADMV8818_SOFTRESET_N_MSK | ADMV8818_SOFTRESET_MSK);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&spi->dev, "ADMV8818 Soft Reset failed.\n");
return ret;
}
- ret = regmap_update_bits(st->regmap, ADMV8818_REG_SPI_CONFIG_A,
- ADMV8818_SDOACTIVE_N_MSK |
- ADMV8818_SDOACTIVE_MSK,
- FIELD_PREP(ADMV8818_SDOACTIVE_N_MSK, 1) |
- FIELD_PREP(ADMV8818_SDOACTIVE_MSK, 1));
+ ret = regmap_write(st->regmap, ADMV8818_REG_SPI_CONFIG_A,
+ ADMV8818_SDOACTIVE_N_MSK | ADMV8818_SDOACTIVE_MSK);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&spi->dev, "ADMV8818 SDO Enable failed.\n");
return ret;
--
2.48.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
iio: dac: ad3552r: clear reset status flag
to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
From e17b9f20da7d2bc1f48878ab2230523b2512d965 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Angelo Dureghello <adureghello(a)baylibre.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2025 17:24:32 +0100
Subject: iio: dac: ad3552r: clear reset status flag
Clear reset status flag, to keep error status register clean after reset
(ad3552r manual, rev B table 38).
Reset error flag was left to 1, so debugging registers, the "Error
Status Register" was dirty (0x01). It is important to clear this bit, so
if there is any reset event over normal working mode, it is possible to
detect it.
Fixes: 8f2b54824b28 ("drivers:iio:dac: Add AD3552R driver support")
Signed-off-by: Angelo Dureghello <adureghello(a)baylibre.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250125-wip-bl-ad3552r-clear-reset-v2-1-aa3a27f3f…
Cc: <Stable@vger..kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com>
---
drivers/iio/dac/ad3552r.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/dac/ad3552r.c b/drivers/iio/dac/ad3552r.c
index e7206af53af6..7944f5c1d264 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/dac/ad3552r.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/dac/ad3552r.c
@@ -410,6 +410,12 @@ static int ad3552r_reset(struct ad3552r_desc *dac)
return ret;
}
+ /* Clear reset error flag, see ad3552r manual, rev B table 38. */
+ ret = ad3552r_write_reg(dac, AD3552R_REG_ADDR_ERR_STATUS,
+ AD3552R_MASK_RESET_STATUS);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
return ad3552r_update_reg_field(dac,
AD3552R_REG_ADDR_INTERFACE_CONFIG_A,
AD3552R_MASK_ADDR_ASCENSION,
--
2.48.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
iio: adc: ad7192: fix channel select
to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
From 21d7241faf406e8aee3ce348451cc362d5db6a02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Markus Burri <markus.burri(a)mt.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2025 16:07:03 +0100
Subject: iio: adc: ad7192: fix channel select
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Channel configuration doesn't work as expected.
For FIELD_PREP the bit mask is needed and not the bit number.
Fixes: 874bbd1219c7 ("iio: adc: ad7192: Use bitfield access macros")
Signed-off-by: Markus Burri <markus.burri(a)mt.com>
Reviewed-by: Nuno Sá <nuno.sa(a)analog.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250124150703.97848-1-markus.burri@mt.com
Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com>
---
drivers/iio/adc/ad7192.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7192.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7192.c
index e96a5ae92375..cfaf8f7e0a07 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7192.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7192.c
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ static int ad7192_update_scan_mode(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, const unsigned lon
conf &= ~AD7192_CONF_CHAN_MASK;
for_each_set_bit(i, scan_mask, 8)
- conf |= FIELD_PREP(AD7192_CONF_CHAN_MASK, i);
+ conf |= FIELD_PREP(AD7192_CONF_CHAN_MASK, BIT(i));
ret = ad_sd_write_reg(&st->sd, AD7192_REG_CONF, 3, conf);
if (ret < 0)
--
2.48.1
Hi all,
I ran into a small memory leak while working on the BPF selftests suite
on the bpf-next tree. It leads to an oom-kill after thousands of iterations
in the qemu environment provided by tools/testing/selftests/bpf/vmtest.sh.
To reproduce the issue from the net-next tree:
$ git remote add bpf-next https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf
$ git fetch bpf-next
$ git cherry-pick 723f1b9ce332^..edb996fae276
$ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/vmtest.sh -i -s "bash -c 'for i in {1..8192}; do ./test_progs -t xdp_veth_redirect; done'"
[... coffee break ...]
[ XXXX.YYYYYY] sh invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x440dc0(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), order=0, oom_score_adj=0
[...]
[ XXXX.YYYYYY] oom-kill:constraint=CONSTRAINT_NONE,nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0,global_oom,task_memcg=/,task=bash,pid=116,uid=0
[ XXXX.YYYYYY] Out of memory: Killed process 116 (bash) total-vm:6816kB, anon-rss:2816kB, file-rss:240kB, shmem-rss:0kB, UID:0 pgtables:48kB oom_score_adj:0
Signed-off-by: Bastien Curutchet (eBPF Foundation) <bastien.curutchet(a)bootlin.com>
---
Bastien Curutchet (eBPF Foundation) (2):
rtnetlink: Fix rtnl_net_cmp_locks() when DEBUG is off
rtnetlink: Release nets when leaving rtnl_setlink()
net/core/rtnetlink.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
---
base-commit: 5d332c1ad3226c0a31653dbf2391bd332e157625
change-id: 20250211-rtnetlink_leak-8b12ca5c83f3
Best regards,
--
Bastien Curutchet (eBPF Foundation) <bastien.curutchet(a)bootlin.com>
When update_mmu_cache_range() is called by update_mmu_cache(), the vmf
parameter is NULL, which will cause a NULL pointer dereference issue in
adjust_pte():
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000030 when read
Hardware name: Atmel AT91SAM9
PC is at update_mmu_cache_range+0x1e0/0x278
LR is at pte_offset_map_rw_nolock+0x18/0x2c
Call trace:
update_mmu_cache_range from remove_migration_pte+0x29c/0x2ec
remove_migration_pte from rmap_walk_file+0xcc/0x130
rmap_walk_file from remove_migration_ptes+0x90/0xa4
remove_migration_ptes from migrate_pages_batch+0x6d4/0x858
migrate_pages_batch from migrate_pages+0x188/0x488
migrate_pages from compact_zone+0x56c/0x954
compact_zone from compact_node+0x90/0xf0
compact_node from kcompactd+0x1d4/0x204
kcompactd from kthread+0x120/0x12c
kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38
Exception stack(0xc0d8bfb0 to 0xc0d8bff8)
To fix it, do not rely on whether 'ptl' is equal to decide whether to hold
the pte lock, but decide it by whether CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS is
enabled. In addition, if two vmas map to the same PTE page, there is no
need to hold the pte lock again, otherwise a deadlock will occur. Just add
the need_lock parameter to let adjust_pte() know this information.
Reported-by: Ezra Buehler <ezra(a)easyb.ch>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAM1KZSmZ2T_riHvay+7cKEFxoPgeVpHkVFTzVVEQ1BO0c…
Fixes: fc9c45b71f43 ("arm: adjust_pte() use pte_offset_map_rw_nolock()")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
---
arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c
index 2bec87c3327d2..3627bf0957c75 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int do_adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
}
static int adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
- unsigned long pfn, struct vm_fault *vmf)
+ unsigned long pfn, bool need_lock)
{
spinlock_t *ptl;
pgd_t *pgd;
@@ -99,12 +99,11 @@ static int adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
if (!pte)
return 0;
- /*
- * If we are using split PTE locks, then we need to take the page
- * lock here. Otherwise we are using shared mm->page_table_lock
- * which is already locked, thus cannot take it.
- */
- if (ptl != vmf->ptl) {
+ if (need_lock) {
+ /*
+ * Use nested version here to indicate that we are already
+ * holding one similar spinlock.
+ */
spin_lock_nested(ptl, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
if (unlikely(!pmd_same(pmdval, pmdp_get_lockless(pmd)))) {
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
@@ -114,7 +113,7 @@ static int adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
ret = do_adjust_pte(vma, address, pfn, pte);
- if (ptl != vmf->ptl)
+ if (need_lock)
spin_unlock(ptl);
pte_unmap(pte);
@@ -123,16 +122,17 @@ static int adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
static void
make_coherent(struct address_space *mapping, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long pfn,
- struct vm_fault *vmf)
+ unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long pfn)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *mpnt;
unsigned long offset;
+ unsigned long start;
pgoff_t pgoff;
int aliases = 0;
pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((addr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ start = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PMD_SIZE);
/*
* If we have any shared mappings that are in the same mm
@@ -141,6 +141,14 @@ make_coherent(struct address_space *mapping, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
*/
flush_dcache_mmap_lock(mapping);
vma_interval_tree_foreach(mpnt, &mapping->i_mmap, pgoff, pgoff) {
+ unsigned long mpnt_addr;
+ /*
+ * If we are using split PTE locks, then we need to take the pte
+ * lock. Otherwise we are using shared mm->page_table_lock which
+ * is already locked, thus cannot take it.
+ */
+ bool need_lock = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS);
+
/*
* If this VMA is not in our MM, we can ignore it.
* Note that we intentionally mask out the VMA
@@ -151,7 +159,15 @@ make_coherent(struct address_space *mapping, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
if (!(mpnt->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE))
continue;
offset = (pgoff - mpnt->vm_pgoff) << PAGE_SHIFT;
- aliases += adjust_pte(mpnt, mpnt->vm_start + offset, pfn, vmf);
+ mpnt_addr = mpnt->vm_start + offset;
+ /*
+ * If mpnt_addr and addr are mapped to the same PTE page, there
+ * is no need to hold the pte lock again, otherwise a deadlock
+ * will occur.
+ */
+ if (mpnt_addr >= start && mpnt_addr - start < PMD_SIZE)
+ need_lock = false;
+ aliases += adjust_pte(mpnt, mpnt_addr, pfn, need_lock);
}
flush_dcache_mmap_unlock(mapping);
if (aliases)
@@ -194,7 +210,7 @@ void update_mmu_cache_range(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
__flush_dcache_folio(mapping, folio);
if (mapping) {
if (cache_is_vivt())
- make_coherent(mapping, vma, addr, ptep, pfn, vmf);
+ make_coherent(mapping, vma, addr, ptep, pfn);
else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
__flush_icache_all();
}
--
2.20.1
Since the new_metric and last_hop_metric variables can reach
the MAX_METRIC(0xffffffff) value, an integer overflow may occur
when multiplying them by 10/9. It can lead to incorrect behavior.
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: a8d418d9ac25 ("mac80211: mesh: only switch path when new metric is at least 10% better")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilia Gavrilov <Ilia.Gavrilov(a)infotecs.ru>
---
v2:
- Remove 64-bit arithmetic according to https://lore.kernel.org/all/a6bd38c58f2f7685eac53844f2336432503c328e.camel@…
- Replace multiplication by 10/9 with a function that compares metrics by adding 10% without integer overflow
v3:
- Fix a typo (persent->percent)
v4:
- Simplify the is_metric_better() function
- Remove 'inline', add a comment
net/mac80211/mesh_hwmp.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh_hwmp.c b/net/mac80211/mesh_hwmp.c
index 4e9546e998b6..c94a9c7ca960 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mesh_hwmp.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mesh_hwmp.c
@@ -367,6 +367,12 @@ u32 airtime_link_metric_get(struct ieee80211_local *local,
return (u32)result;
}
+/* Check that the first metric is at least 10% better than the second one */
+static bool is_metric_better(u32 x, u32 y)
+{
+ return (x < y) && (x < (y - x / 10));
+}
+
/**
* hwmp_route_info_get - Update routing info to originator and transmitter
*
@@ -458,8 +464,8 @@ static u32 hwmp_route_info_get(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
(mpath->sn == orig_sn &&
(rcu_access_pointer(mpath->next_hop) !=
sta ?
- mult_frac(new_metric, 10, 9) :
- new_metric) >= mpath->metric)) {
+ !is_metric_better(new_metric, mpath->metric) :
+ new_metric >= mpath->metric))) {
process = false;
fresh_info = false;
}
@@ -533,8 +539,8 @@ static u32 hwmp_route_info_get(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
if ((mpath->flags & MESH_PATH_FIXED) ||
((mpath->flags & MESH_PATH_ACTIVE) &&
((rcu_access_pointer(mpath->next_hop) != sta ?
- mult_frac(last_hop_metric, 10, 9) :
- last_hop_metric) > mpath->metric)))
+ !is_metric_better(last_hop_metric, mpath->metric) :
+ last_hop_metric > mpath->metric))))
fresh_info = false;
} else {
mpath = mesh_path_add(sdata, ta);
--
2.39.5
The function drm_syncobj_fence_get() may return NULL if the syncobj
has no fence. In eb_fences_add(), this return value is not checked,
leading to a potential NULL pointer dereference in
i915_request_await_dma_fence().
This patch adds a check for the return value of drm_syncobj_fence_get
and returns an error if it is NULL, preventing the NULL pointer
dereference.
Fixes: 544460c33821 ("drm/i915: Multi-BB execbuf")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.16+
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
index f151640c1d13..7da65535feb9 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
@@ -3252,6 +3252,12 @@ eb_fences_add(struct i915_execbuffer *eb, struct i915_request *rq,
struct dma_fence *fence;
fence = drm_syncobj_fence_get(eb->gem_context->syncobj);
+ if (!fence) {
+ drm_dbg(&eb->i915->drm,
+ "Syncobj handle has no fence\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+
err = i915_request_await_dma_fence(rq, fence);
dma_fence_put(fence);
if (err)
--
2.42.0.windows.2
The patch titled
Subject: arm: pgtable: fix NULL pointer dereference issue
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
arm-pgtable-fix-null-pointer-dereference-issue.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Subject: arm: pgtable: fix NULL pointer dereference issue
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2025 14:40:02 +0800
When update_mmu_cache_range() is called by update_mmu_cache(), the vmf
parameter is NULL, which will cause a NULL pointer dereference issue in
adjust_pte():
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000030 when read
Hardware name: Atmel AT91SAM9
PC is at update_mmu_cache_range+0x1e0/0x278
LR is at pte_offset_map_rw_nolock+0x18/0x2c
Call trace:
update_mmu_cache_range from remove_migration_pte+0x29c/0x2ec
remove_migration_pte from rmap_walk_file+0xcc/0x130
rmap_walk_file from remove_migration_ptes+0x90/0xa4
remove_migration_ptes from migrate_pages_batch+0x6d4/0x858
migrate_pages_batch from migrate_pages+0x188/0x488
migrate_pages from compact_zone+0x56c/0x954
compact_zone from compact_node+0x90/0xf0
compact_node from kcompactd+0x1d4/0x204
kcompactd from kthread+0x120/0x12c
kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38
Exception stack(0xc0d8bfb0 to 0xc0d8bff8)
To fix it, do not rely on whether 'ptl' is equal to decide whether to hold
the pte lock, but decide it by whether CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS is
enabled. In addition, if two vmas map to the same PTE page, there is no
need to hold the pte lock again, otherwise a deadlock will occur. Just add
the need_lock parameter to let adjust_pte() know this information.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250212064002.55598-1-zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com
Fixes: fc9c45b71f43 ("arm: adjust_pte() use pte_offset_map_rw_nolock()")
Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Reported-by: Ezra Buehler <ezra(a)easyb.ch>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAM1KZSmZ2T_riHvay+7cKEFxoPgeVpHkVFTzVVEQ1BO0c…
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Russell King <linux(a)armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c~arm-pgtable-fix-null-pointer-dereference-issue
+++ a/arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int do_adjust_pte(struct vm_area_
}
static int adjust_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
- unsigned long pfn, struct vm_fault *vmf)
+ unsigned long pfn, bool need_lock)
{
spinlock_t *ptl;
pgd_t *pgd;
@@ -99,12 +99,11 @@ again:
if (!pte)
return 0;
- /*
- * If we are using split PTE locks, then we need to take the page
- * lock here. Otherwise we are using shared mm->page_table_lock
- * which is already locked, thus cannot take it.
- */
- if (ptl != vmf->ptl) {
+ if (need_lock) {
+ /*
+ * Use nested version here to indicate that we are already
+ * holding one similar spinlock.
+ */
spin_lock_nested(ptl, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
if (unlikely(!pmd_same(pmdval, pmdp_get_lockless(pmd)))) {
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
@@ -114,7 +113,7 @@ again:
ret = do_adjust_pte(vma, address, pfn, pte);
- if (ptl != vmf->ptl)
+ if (need_lock)
spin_unlock(ptl);
pte_unmap(pte);
@@ -123,16 +122,17 @@ again:
static void
make_coherent(struct address_space *mapping, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long pfn,
- struct vm_fault *vmf)
+ unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long pfn)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *mpnt;
unsigned long offset;
+ unsigned long start;
pgoff_t pgoff;
int aliases = 0;
pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((addr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ start = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PMD_SIZE);
/*
* If we have any shared mappings that are in the same mm
@@ -141,6 +141,14 @@ make_coherent(struct address_space *mapp
*/
flush_dcache_mmap_lock(mapping);
vma_interval_tree_foreach(mpnt, &mapping->i_mmap, pgoff, pgoff) {
+ unsigned long mpnt_addr;
+ /*
+ * If we are using split PTE locks, then we need to take the pte
+ * lock. Otherwise we are using shared mm->page_table_lock which
+ * is already locked, thus cannot take it.
+ */
+ bool need_lock = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS);
+
/*
* If this VMA is not in our MM, we can ignore it.
* Note that we intentionally mask out the VMA
@@ -151,7 +159,15 @@ make_coherent(struct address_space *mapp
if (!(mpnt->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE))
continue;
offset = (pgoff - mpnt->vm_pgoff) << PAGE_SHIFT;
- aliases += adjust_pte(mpnt, mpnt->vm_start + offset, pfn, vmf);
+ mpnt_addr = mpnt->vm_start + offset;
+ /*
+ * If mpnt_addr and addr are mapped to the same PTE page, there
+ * is no need to hold the pte lock again, otherwise a deadlock
+ * will occur.
+ */
+ if (mpnt_addr >= start && mpnt_addr - start < PMD_SIZE)
+ need_lock = false;
+ aliases += adjust_pte(mpnt, mpnt_addr, pfn, need_lock);
}
flush_dcache_mmap_unlock(mapping);
if (aliases)
@@ -194,7 +210,7 @@ void update_mmu_cache_range(struct vm_fa
__flush_dcache_folio(mapping, folio);
if (mapping) {
if (cache_is_vivt())
- make_coherent(mapping, vma, addr, ptep, pfn, vmf);
+ make_coherent(mapping, vma, addr, ptep, pfn);
else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
__flush_icache_all();
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com are
mm-pgtable-fix-incorrect-reclaim-of-non-empty-pte-pages.patch
arm-pgtable-fix-null-pointer-dereference-issue.patch
UNCRD is recruiting eligible candidates for the post listed below:
Human Resources Officer
Economic Affairs Officer
Logistics Officer
Environmental Affairs Officer
Administrative Officer
Chief Nurse
Finance and Budget Officer
Information Management Officer
Property Management Officer
Project Manager Engineer
Pharmacist
Research Officer
Medical Officer
Programme Officer
Training Officer
Engineer
Full Listing in the attached PDF.
HOW TO APPLY
Interested and qualified applicants should send their detailed Resumes/Cvs to recruit(a)uncrd.org as soon as possible.
Each applicant must bear in mind that submission of incomplete or inaccurate applications may render that applicant ineligible for consideration. Candidates under serious consideration for selection will be subjected to a reference-checking process to verify the information provided in the application.
Goodluck,
New Recruitment.
The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x a9ab6591b45258b79af1cb66112fd9f83c8855da
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021018-attire-arrange-51d4@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From a9ab6591b45258b79af1cb66112fd9f83c8855da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi(a)intel.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 12:22:03 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] drm/xe: Fix and re-enable xe_print_blob_ascii85()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Commit 70fb86a85dc9 ("drm/xe: Revert some changes that break a mesa
debug tool") partially reverted some changes to workaround breakage
caused to mesa tools. However, in doing so it also broke fetching the
GuC log via debugfs since xe_print_blob_ascii85() simply bails out.
The fix is to avoid the extra newlines: the devcoredump interface is
line-oriented and adding random newlines in the middle breaks it. If a
tool is able to parse it by looking at the data and checking for chars
that are out of the ascii85 space, it can still do so. A format change
that breaks the line-oriented output on devcoredump however needs better
coordination with existing tools.
v2: Add suffix description comment
v3: Reword explanation of xe_print_blob_ascii85() calling drm_puts()
in a loop
Reviewed-by: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza(a)intel.com>
Cc: John Harrison <John.C.Harrison(a)Intel.com>
Cc: Julia Filipchuk <julia.filipchuk(a)intel.com>
Cc: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza(a)intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 70fb86a85dc9 ("drm/xe: Revert some changes that break a mesa debug tool")
Fixes: ec1455ce7e35 ("drm/xe/devcoredump: Add ASCII85 dump helper function")
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250123202307.95103-2-jose.s…
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi(a)intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2c95bbf5002776117a69caed3b31c10bf7341bec)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_devcoredump.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_devcoredump.c
index a7946a76777e..39fe485d2085 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_devcoredump.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_devcoredump.c
@@ -391,42 +391,34 @@ int xe_devcoredump_init(struct xe_device *xe)
/**
* xe_print_blob_ascii85 - print a BLOB to some useful location in ASCII85
*
- * The output is split to multiple lines because some print targets, e.g. dmesg
- * cannot handle arbitrarily long lines. Note also that printing to dmesg in
- * piece-meal fashion is not possible, each separate call to drm_puts() has a
- * line-feed automatically added! Therefore, the entire output line must be
- * constructed in a local buffer first, then printed in one atomic output call.
+ * The output is split into multiple calls to drm_puts() because some print
+ * targets, e.g. dmesg, cannot handle arbitrarily long lines. These targets may
+ * add newlines, as is the case with dmesg: each drm_puts() call creates a
+ * separate line.
*
* There is also a scheduler yield call to prevent the 'task has been stuck for
* 120s' kernel hang check feature from firing when printing to a slow target
* such as dmesg over a serial port.
*
- * TODO: Add compression prior to the ASCII85 encoding to shrink huge buffers down.
- *
* @p: the printer object to output to
* @prefix: optional prefix to add to output string
+ * @suffix: optional suffix to add at the end. 0 disables it and is
+ * not added to the output, which is useful when using multiple calls
+ * to dump data to @p
* @blob: the Binary Large OBject to dump out
* @offset: offset in bytes to skip from the front of the BLOB, must be a multiple of sizeof(u32)
* @size: the size in bytes of the BLOB, must be a multiple of sizeof(u32)
*/
-void xe_print_blob_ascii85(struct drm_printer *p, const char *prefix,
+void xe_print_blob_ascii85(struct drm_printer *p, const char *prefix, char suffix,
const void *blob, size_t offset, size_t size)
{
const u32 *blob32 = (const u32 *)blob;
char buff[ASCII85_BUFSZ], *line_buff;
size_t line_pos = 0;
- /*
- * Splitting blobs across multiple lines is not compatible with the mesa
- * debug decoder tool. Note that even dropping the explicit '\n' below
- * doesn't help because the GuC log is so big some underlying implementation
- * still splits the lines at 512K characters. So just bail completely for
- * the moment.
- */
- return;
-
#define DMESG_MAX_LINE_LEN 800
-#define MIN_SPACE (ASCII85_BUFSZ + 2) /* 85 + "\n\0" */
+ /* Always leave space for the suffix char and the \0 */
+#define MIN_SPACE (ASCII85_BUFSZ + 2) /* 85 + "<suffix>\0" */
if (size & 3)
drm_printf(p, "Size not word aligned: %zu", size);
@@ -458,7 +450,6 @@ void xe_print_blob_ascii85(struct drm_printer *p, const char *prefix,
line_pos += strlen(line_buff + line_pos);
if ((line_pos + MIN_SPACE) >= DMESG_MAX_LINE_LEN) {
- line_buff[line_pos++] = '\n';
line_buff[line_pos++] = 0;
drm_puts(p, line_buff);
@@ -470,10 +461,11 @@ void xe_print_blob_ascii85(struct drm_printer *p, const char *prefix,
}
}
- if (line_pos) {
- line_buff[line_pos++] = '\n';
- line_buff[line_pos++] = 0;
+ if (suffix)
+ line_buff[line_pos++] = suffix;
+ if (line_pos) {
+ line_buff[line_pos++] = 0;
drm_puts(p, line_buff);
}
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_devcoredump.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_devcoredump.h
index 6a17e6d60102..5391a80a4d1b 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_devcoredump.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_devcoredump.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static inline int xe_devcoredump_init(struct xe_device *xe)
}
#endif
-void xe_print_blob_ascii85(struct drm_printer *p, const char *prefix,
+void xe_print_blob_ascii85(struct drm_printer *p, const char *prefix, char suffix,
const void *blob, size_t offset, size_t size);
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c
index 8b65c5e959cc..50c8076b5158 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c
@@ -1724,7 +1724,8 @@ void xe_guc_ct_snapshot_print(struct xe_guc_ct_snapshot *snapshot,
snapshot->g2h_outstanding);
if (snapshot->ctb)
- xe_print_blob_ascii85(p, "CTB data", snapshot->ctb, 0, snapshot->ctb_size);
+ xe_print_blob_ascii85(p, "CTB data", '\n',
+ snapshot->ctb, 0, snapshot->ctb_size);
} else {
drm_puts(p, "CT disabled\n");
}
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_log.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_log.c
index df4cfb698cdb..2baa4d95571f 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_log.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_log.c
@@ -211,8 +211,10 @@ void xe_guc_log_snapshot_print(struct xe_guc_log_snapshot *snapshot, struct drm_
remain = snapshot->size;
for (i = 0; i < snapshot->num_chunks; i++) {
size_t size = min(GUC_LOG_CHUNK_SIZE, remain);
+ const char *prefix = i ? NULL : "Log data";
+ char suffix = i == snapshot->num_chunks - 1 ? '\n' : 0;
- xe_print_blob_ascii85(p, i ? NULL : "Log data", snapshot->copy[i], 0, size);
+ xe_print_blob_ascii85(p, prefix, suffix, snapshot->copy[i], 0, size);
remain -= size;
}
}