Hello,
We ran automated tests on a recent commit from this kernel tree:
Kernel repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Commit: 10be282f965e - perf/core: Fix a memory leak in perf_event_parse_addr_filter()
The results of these automated tests are provided below.
Overall result: PASSED
Merge: OK
Compile: OK
Tests: OK
All kernel binaries, config files, and logs are available for download here:
https://arr-cki-prod-datawarehouse-public.s3.amazonaws.com/index.html?prefi…
Please reply to this email if you have any questions about the tests that we
ran or if you have any suggestions on how to make future tests more effective.
,-. ,-.
( C ) ( K ) Continuous
`-',-.`-' Kernel
( I ) Integration
`-'
______________________________________________________________________________
Compile testing
---------------
We compiled the kernel for 4 architectures:
aarch64:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
ppc64le:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
s390x:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
x86_64:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
Hardware testing
----------------
We booted each kernel and ran the following tests:
aarch64:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ ACPI table test
✅ ACPI enabled test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking: igmp conformance test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
⚡⚡⚡ storage: SCSI VPD
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Firmware test suite
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ kdump - kexec_boot
Host 3:
✅ Boot test
✅ ACPI table test
✅ ACPI enabled test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
✅ pciutils: update pci ids test
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ Firmware test suite
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ kdump - kexec_boot
ppc64le:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ kdump - sysrq-c
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
🚧 ✅ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ✅ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ✅ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 3:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
Host 4:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
Host 5:
✅ Boot test
🚧 ✅ kdump - sysrq-c
s390x:
Host 1:
✅ Boot test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
🚧 ✅ Storage nvme - tcp
x86_64:
Host 1:
✅ Boot test
✅ ACPI table test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
✅ pciutils: sanity smoke test
✅ pciutils: update pci ids test
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ Firmware test suite
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ kdump - kexec_boot
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ❌ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ❌ CPU: Frequency Driver Test
🚧 ✅ CPU: Idle Test
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IOMMU boot test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ power-management: cpupower/sanity test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 3:
✅ Boot test
🚧 ✅ kdump - sysrq-c
🚧 ✅ kdump - file-load
Test sources: https://gitlab.com/cki-project/kernel-tests
💚 Pull requests are welcome for new tests or improvements to existing tests!
Aborted tests
-------------
Tests that didn't complete running successfully are marked with ⚡⚡⚡.
If this was caused by an infrastructure issue, we try to mark that
explicitly in the report.
Waived tests
------------
If the test run included waived tests, they are marked with 🚧. Such tests are
executed but their results are not taken into account. Tests are waived when
their results are not reliable enough, e.g. when they're just introduced or are
being fixed.
Testing timeout
---------------
We aim to provide a report within reasonable timeframe. Tests that haven't
finished running yet are marked with ⏱.
Hello,
We ran automated tests on a recent commit from this kernel tree:
Kernel repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Commit: 461b89cf49c1 - perf/core: Fix a memory leak in perf_event_parse_addr_filter()
The results of these automated tests are provided below.
Overall result: PASSED
Merge: OK
Compile: OK
Tests: OK
All kernel binaries, config files, and logs are available for download here:
https://arr-cki-prod-datawarehouse-public.s3.amazonaws.com/index.html?prefi…
Please reply to this email if you have any questions about the tests that we
ran or if you have any suggestions on how to make future tests more effective.
,-. ,-.
( C ) ( K ) Continuous
`-',-.`-' Kernel
( I ) Integration
`-'
______________________________________________________________________________
Compile testing
---------------
We compiled the kernel for 4 architectures:
aarch64:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
ppc64le:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
s390x:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
x86_64:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
Hardware testing
----------------
We booted each kernel and ran the following tests:
aarch64:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
🚧 ✅ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
✅ ACPI table test
✅ ACPI enabled test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
✅ pciutils: update pci ids test
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ Firmware test suite
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ kdump - kexec_boot
ppc64le:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ kdump - sysrq-c
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
Host 3:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
⚡⚡⚡ storage: software RAID testing
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 4:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
Host 5:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ kdump - sysrq-c
s390x:
Host 1:
✅ Boot test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
🚧 ✅ Storage nvme - tcp
x86_64:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ ACPI table test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking: igmp conformance test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: sanity smoke test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
⚡⚡⚡ storage: SCSI VPD
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Firmware test suite
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ kdump - kexec_boot
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
🚧 ✅ kdump - sysrq-c
🚧 ✅ kdump - file-load
Host 3:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ❌ CPU: Frequency Driver Test
🚧 ✅ CPU: Idle Test
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IOMMU boot test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ power-management: cpupower/sanity test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 4:
✅ Boot test
✅ ACPI table test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
✅ pciutils: sanity smoke test
✅ pciutils: update pci ids test
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ Firmware test suite
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ kdump - kexec_boot
Test sources: https://gitlab.com/cki-project/kernel-tests
💚 Pull requests are welcome for new tests or improvements to existing tests!
Aborted tests
-------------
Tests that didn't complete running successfully are marked with ⚡⚡⚡.
If this was caused by an infrastructure issue, we try to mark that
explicitly in the report.
Waived tests
------------
If the test run included waived tests, they are marked with 🚧. Such tests are
executed but their results are not taken into account. Tests are waived when
their results are not reliable enough, e.g. when they're just introduced or are
being fixed.
Testing timeout
---------------
We aim to provide a report within reasonable timeframe. Tests that haven't
finished running yet are marked with ⏱.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1844300
Upstream status: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
Build info: https://brewweb.engineering.redhat.com/brew/taskinfo?taskID=32573686
CVE: CVE-2020-8694
author Len Brown <len.brown(a)intel.com> 2020-11-10 13:00:00 -0800
committer Len Brown <len.brown(a)intel.com> 2020-11-10 11:40:57 -0500
commit 949dd0104c496fa7c14991a23c03c62e44637e71 (patch)
tree a90cbfb8ceb195e7160105a272122f97bab99980
parent 3d7772ea5602b88c7c7f0a50d512171a2eed6659 (diff)
download linux-949dd0104c496fa7c14991a23c03c62e44637e71.tar.gz
powercap: restrict energy meter to root access
Remove non-privileged user access to power data contained in
/sys/class/powercap/intel-rapl*/*/energy_uj
Non-privileged users currently have read access to power data and can
use this data to form a security attack. Some privileged
drivers/applications need read access to this data, but don't expose it
to non-privileged users.
For example, thermald uses this data to ensure that power management
works correctly. Thus removing non-privileged access is preferred over
completely disabling this power reporting capability with
CONFIG_INTEL_RAPL=n.
Fixes: 95677a9a3847 ("PowerCap: Fix mode for energy counter")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown(a)intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Donghai Qiao <dqiao(a)redhat.com>
---
drivers/powercap/powercap_sys.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/powercap/powercap_sys.c b/drivers/powercap/powercap_sys.c
index 05ddf8be64a..db69be2892a 100644
--- a/drivers/powercap/powercap_sys.c
+++ b/drivers/powercap/powercap_sys.c
@@ -379,9 +379,9 @@ static void create_power_zone_common_attributes(
&dev_attr_max_energy_range_uj.attr;
if (power_zone->ops->get_energy_uj) {
if (power_zone->ops->reset_energy_uj)
- dev_attr_energy_uj.attr.mode = S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO;
+ dev_attr_energy_uj.attr.mode = S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR;
else
- dev_attr_energy_uj.attr.mode = S_IRUGO;
+ dev_attr_energy_uj.attr.mode = S_IRUSR;
power_zone->zone_dev_attrs[count++] =
&dev_attr_energy_uj.attr;
}
--
2.18.1
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1844300
Upstream status: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
Build info: https://brewweb.engineering.redhat.com/brew/taskinfo?taskID=32573686
CVE: CVE-2020-8694
author Len Brown <len.brown(a)intel.com> 2020-11-10 13:00:00 -0800
committer Len Brown <len.brown(a)intel.com> 2020-11-10 11:40:57 -0500
commit 949dd0104c496fa7c14991a23c03c62e44637e71 (patch)
tree a90cbfb8ceb195e7160105a272122f97bab99980
parent 3d7772ea5602b88c7c7f0a50d512171a2eed6659 (diff)
download linux-949dd0104c496fa7c14991a23c03c62e44637e71.tar.gz
powercap: restrict energy meter to root access
Remove non-privileged user access to power data contained in
/sys/class/powercap/intel-rapl*/*/energy_uj
Non-privileged users currently have read access to power data and can
use this data to form a security attack. Some privileged
drivers/applications need read access to this data, but don't expose it
to non-privileged users.
For example, thermald uses this data to ensure that power management
works correctly. Thus removing non-privileged access is preferred over
completely disabling this power reporting capability with
CONFIG_INTEL_RAPL=n.
Fixes: 95677a9a3847 ("PowerCap: Fix mode for energy counter")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown(a)intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Donghai Qiao <dqiao(a)redhat.com>
---
drivers/powercap/powercap_sys.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/powercap/powercap_sys.c b/drivers/powercap/powercap_sys.c
index 05ddf8be64a..db69be2892a 100644
--- a/drivers/powercap/powercap_sys.c
+++ b/drivers/powercap/powercap_sys.c
@@ -379,9 +379,9 @@ static void create_power_zone_common_attributes(
&dev_attr_max_energy_range_uj.attr;
if (power_zone->ops->get_energy_uj) {
if (power_zone->ops->reset_energy_uj)
- dev_attr_energy_uj.attr.mode = S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO;
+ dev_attr_energy_uj.attr.mode = S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR;
else
- dev_attr_energy_uj.attr.mode = S_IRUGO;
+ dev_attr_energy_uj.attr.mode = S_IRUSR;
power_zone->zone_dev_attrs[count++] =
&dev_attr_energy_uj.attr;
}
--
2.18.1
The patch titled
Subject: mm/userfaultfd: do not access vma->vm_mm after calling handle_userfault()
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
mm-userfaultfd-do-not-access-vma-vm_mm-after-calling-handle_userfault.patch
This patch should soon appear at
https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/mm-userfaultfd-do-not-access-vma-…
and later at
https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/mm-userfaultfd-do-not-access-vma-…
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated
there every 3-4 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer(a)linux.ibm.com>
Subject: mm/userfaultfd: do not access vma->vm_mm after calling handle_userfault()
Alexander reported a syzkaller / KASAN finding on s390, see below for
complete output.
In do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page(), the pre-allocated pagetable will be freed
in some cases. In the case of userfaultfd_missing(), this will happen
after calling handle_userfault(), which might have released the mmap_lock.
Therefore, the following pte_free(vma->vm_mm, pgtable) will access an
unstable vma->vm_mm, which could have been freed or re-used already.
For all architectures other than s390 this will go w/o any negative
impact, because pte_free() simply frees the page and ignores the passed-in
mm. The implementation for SPARC32 would also access mm->page_table_lock
for pte_free(), but there is no THP support in SPARC32, so the buggy code
path will not be used there.
For s390, the mm->context.pgtable_list is being used to maintain the 2K
pagetable fragments, and operating on an already freed or even re-used mm
could result in various more or less subtle bugs due to list / pagetable
corruption.
Fix this by calling pte_free() before handle_userfault(), similar to how
it is already done in __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page() for the WRITE /
non-huge_zero_page case.
Commit 6b251fc96cf2c ("userfaultfd: call handle_userfault() for
userfaultfd_missing() faults") actually introduced both, the
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page() and also __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page()
changes wrt to calling handle_userfault(), but only in the latter case it
put the pte_free() before calling handle_userfault().
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0xcda/0xd90 mm/huge_memory.c:744
Read of size 8 at addr 00000000962d6988 by task syz-executor.0/9334
CPU: 1 PID: 9334 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.10.0-rc1-syzkaller-07083-g4c9720875573 #0
Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 701 (KVM/Linux)
Call Trace:
[<00000000aa0a7a1c>] unwind_start arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h:65 [inline]
[<00000000aa0a7a1c>] show_stack+0x174/0x220 arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c:135
[<00000000aa105952>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
[<00000000aa105952>] dump_stack+0x262/0x2e8 lib/dump_stack.c:118
[<00000000aa0b484e>] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x5e/0x218 mm/kasan/report.c:385
[<00000000a61f13aa>] __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline]
[<00000000a61f13aa>] kasan_report+0x11a/0x168 mm/kasan/report.c:562
[<00000000a620d782>] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0xcda/0xd90 mm/huge_memory.c:744
[<00000000a610632e>] create_huge_pmd mm/memory.c:4256 [inline]
[<00000000a610632e>] __handle_mm_fault+0xe6e/0x1068 mm/memory.c:4480
[<00000000a61067b0>] handle_mm_fault+0x288/0x748 mm/memory.c:4607
[<00000000a598b55c>] do_exception+0x394/0xae0 arch/s390/mm/fault.c:479
[<00000000a598d7c4>] do_dat_exception+0x34/0x80 arch/s390/mm/fault.c:567
[<00000000aa124e5e>] pgm_check_handler+0x1da/0x22c arch/s390/kernel/entry.S:706
[<00000000aa0a6902>] copy_from_user_mvcos arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c:111 [inline]
[<00000000aa0a6902>] raw_copy_from_user+0x3a/0x88 arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c:174
[<00000000a7c24668>] _copy_from_user+0x48/0xa8 lib/usercopy.c:16
[<00000000a5b0b2a8>] copy_from_user include/linux/uaccess.h:192 [inline]
[<00000000a5b0b2a8>] __do_sys_sigaltstack kernel/signal.c:4064 [inline]
[<00000000a5b0b2a8>] __s390x_sys_sigaltstack+0xc8/0x240 kernel/signal.c:4060
[<00000000aa124a9c>] system_call+0xe0/0x28c arch/s390/kernel/entry.S:415
Allocated by task 9334:
stack_trace_save+0xbe/0xf0 kernel/stacktrace.c:121
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:48
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xd0/0xe8 mm/kasan/common.c:461
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:526 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2891 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2899 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x118/0x348 mm/slub.c:2904
vm_area_dup+0x9c/0x2b8 kernel/fork.c:356
__split_vma+0xba/0x560 mm/mmap.c:2742
split_vma+0xca/0x108 mm/mmap.c:2800
mlock_fixup+0x4ae/0x600 mm/mlock.c:550
apply_vma_lock_flags+0x2c6/0x398 mm/mlock.c:619
do_mlock+0x1aa/0x718 mm/mlock.c:711
__do_sys_mlock2 mm/mlock.c:738 [inline]
__s390x_sys_mlock2+0x86/0xa8 mm/mlock.c:728
system_call+0xe0/0x28c arch/s390/kernel/entry.S:415
Freed by task 9333:
stack_trace_save+0xbe/0xf0 kernel/stacktrace.c:121
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:48
kasan_set_track+0x32/0x48 mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_set_free_info+0x34/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
__kasan_slab_free+0x11e/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:422
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1544 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1577 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:3142 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x7c/0x4b8 mm/slub.c:3158
__vma_adjust+0x7b2/0x2508 mm/mmap.c:960
vma_merge+0x87e/0xce0 mm/mmap.c:1209
userfaultfd_release+0x412/0x6b8 fs/userfaultfd.c:868
__fput+0x22c/0x7a8 fs/file_table.c:281
task_work_run+0x200/0x320 kernel/task_work.c:151
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
do_notify_resume+0x100/0x148 arch/s390/kernel/signal.c:538
system_call+0xe6/0x28c arch/s390/kernel/entry.S:416
The buggy address belongs to the object at 00000000962d6948
which belongs to the cache vm_area_struct of size 200
The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of
200-byte region [00000000962d6948, 00000000962d6a10)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:00000000313a09fe refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x962d6
flags: 0x3ffff00000000200(slab)
raw: 3ffff00000000200 000040000257e080 0000000c0000000c 000000008020ba00
raw: 0000000000000000 000f001e00000000 ffffffff00000001 0000000096959501
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page->mem_cgroup:0000000096959501
Memory state around the buggy address:
00000000962d6880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000000962d6900: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb
>00000000962d6980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
00000000962d6a00: fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000000962d6a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201110190329.11920-1-gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.…
Fixes: 6b251fc96cf2c ("userfaultfd: call handle_userfault() for userfaultfd_missing() faults")
Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer(a)linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.3+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/huge_memory.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c~mm-userfaultfd-do-not-access-vma-vm_mm-after-calling-handle_userfault
+++ a/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -710,7 +710,6 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page(st
transparent_hugepage_use_zero_page()) {
pgtable_t pgtable;
struct page *zero_page;
- bool set;
vm_fault_t ret;
pgtable = pte_alloc_one(vma->vm_mm);
if (unlikely(!pgtable))
@@ -723,25 +722,25 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page(st
}
vmf->ptl = pmd_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd);
ret = 0;
- set = false;
if (pmd_none(*vmf->pmd)) {
ret = check_stable_address_space(vma->vm_mm);
if (ret) {
spin_unlock(vmf->ptl);
+ pte_free(vma->vm_mm, pgtable);
} else if (userfaultfd_missing(vma)) {
spin_unlock(vmf->ptl);
+ pte_free(vma->vm_mm, pgtable);
ret = handle_userfault(vmf, VM_UFFD_MISSING);
VM_BUG_ON(ret & VM_FAULT_FALLBACK);
} else {
set_huge_zero_page(pgtable, vma->vm_mm, vma,
haddr, vmf->pmd, zero_page);
spin_unlock(vmf->ptl);
- set = true;
}
- } else
+ } else {
spin_unlock(vmf->ptl);
- if (!set)
pte_free(vma->vm_mm, pgtable);
+ }
return ret;
}
gfp = alloc_hugepage_direct_gfpmask(vma);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from gerald.schaefer(a)linux.ibm.com are
mm-userfaultfd-do-not-access-vma-vm_mm-after-calling-handle_userfault.patch
This reverts commit 00fdec98d9881bf5173af09aebd353ab3b9ac729.
(but only from 5.2 and prior kernels)
The original commit was a preventive fix based on code-review and was
auto-picked for stable back-port (for better or worse).
It was OK for v5.3+ kernels, but turned up needing an implicit change
68e5c6f073bcf70 "(ARC: entry: EV_Trap expects r10 (vs. r9) to have
exception cause)" merged in v5.3 which itself was not backported.
So to summarize the stable backport of this patch for v5.2 and prior
kernels is busted and it won't boot.
The obvious solution is backport 68e5c6f073bcf70 but that is a pain as
it doesn't revert cleanly and each of affected kernels (so far v4.19,
v4.14, v4.9, v4.4) needs a slightly different massaged varaint.
So the easier fix is to simply revert the backport from 5.2 and prior.
The issue was not a big deal as it would cause strace to sporadically
not work correctly.
Waldemar Brodkorb first reported this when running ARC uClibc regressions
on latest stable kernels (with offending backport). Once he bisected it,
the analysis was trivial, so thx to him for this.
Reported-by: Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx(a)uclibc-ng.org>
Bisected-by: Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx(a)uclibc-ng.org>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 5.2 and prior
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta(a)synopsys.com>
---
arch/arc/kernel/entry.S | 16 +++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arc/kernel/entry.S
index ea00c8a17f07..60406ec62eb8 100644
--- a/arch/arc/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arc/kernel/entry.S
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ END(EV_Extension)
tracesys:
; save EFA in case tracer wants the PC of traced task
; using ERET won't work since next-PC has already committed
+ lr r12, [efa]
GET_CURR_TASK_FIELD_PTR TASK_THREAD, r11
st r12, [r11, THREAD_FAULT_ADDR] ; thread.fault_address
@@ -207,9 +208,15 @@ tracesys_exit:
; Breakpoint TRAP
; ---------------------------------------------
trap_with_param:
- mov r0, r12 ; EFA in case ptracer/gdb wants stop_pc
+
+ ; stop_pc info by gdb needs this info
+ lr r0, [efa]
mov r1, sp
+ ; Now that we have read EFA, it is safe to do "fake" rtie
+ ; and get out of CPU exception mode
+ FAKE_RET_FROM_EXCPN
+
; Save callee regs in case gdb wants to have a look
; SP will grow up by size of CALLEE Reg-File
; NOTE: clobbers r12
@@ -236,10 +243,6 @@ ENTRY(EV_Trap)
EXCEPTION_PROLOGUE
- lr r12, [efa]
-
- FAKE_RET_FROM_EXCPN
-
;============ TRAP 1 :breakpoints
; Check ECR for trap with arg (PROLOGUE ensures r10 has ECR)
bmsk.f 0, r10, 7
@@ -247,6 +250,9 @@ ENTRY(EV_Trap)
;============ TRAP (no param): syscall top level
+ ; First return from Exception to pure K mode (Exception/IRQs renabled)
+ FAKE_RET_FROM_EXCPN
+
; If syscall tracing ongoing, invoke pre-post-hooks
GET_CURR_THR_INFO_FLAGS r10
btst r10, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE
--
2.25.1
Debounce filter setting should be independent from IRQ type setting
because according to the ACPI specs, there are separate arguments for
specifying debounce timeout and IRQ type in GpioIo() and GpioInt().
This will fix broken touchpads for laptops whose BIOS set the debounce
timeout to a relatively large value. For example, the BIOS of Lenovo
Legion-5 AMD gaming laptops including 15ARH05 (R7000) and R7000P set
the debounce timeout to 124.8ms. This led to the kernel receiving only
~7 HID reports per second from the Synaptics touchpad
(MSFT0001:00 06CB:7F28). Existing touchpads like [1][2] are not troubled
by this bug because the debounce timeout has been set to 0 by the BIOS
before enabling the debounce filter in setting IRQ type.
[1] https://github.com/Syniurge/i2c-amd-mp2/issues/11#issuecomment-721331582
[2] https://forum.manjaro.org/t/random-short-touchpad-freezes/30832/28
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires(a)redhat.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko(a)gmail.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1887190
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-gpio/CAHp75VcwiGREBUJ0A06EEw-SyabqYsp%2Bdqs2D…
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coiby.xu(a)gmail.com>
---
drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c | 7 -------
1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c b/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c
index e9b761c2b77a..2d4acf21117c 100644
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c
@@ -468,7 +468,6 @@ static int amd_gpio_irq_set_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
pin_reg &= ~BIT(LEVEL_TRIG_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~(ACTIVE_LEVEL_MASK << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= ACTIVE_HIGH << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF;
- pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_REMOVE_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_edge_irq);
break;
@@ -476,7 +475,6 @@ static int amd_gpio_irq_set_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
pin_reg &= ~BIT(LEVEL_TRIG_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~(ACTIVE_LEVEL_MASK << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= ACTIVE_LOW << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF;
- pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_REMOVE_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_edge_irq);
break;
@@ -484,7 +482,6 @@ static int amd_gpio_irq_set_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
pin_reg &= ~BIT(LEVEL_TRIG_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~(ACTIVE_LEVEL_MASK << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= BOTH_EADGE << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF;
- pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_REMOVE_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_edge_irq);
break;
@@ -492,8 +489,6 @@ static int amd_gpio_irq_set_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
pin_reg |= LEVEL_TRIGGER << LEVEL_TRIG_OFF;
pin_reg &= ~(ACTIVE_LEVEL_MASK << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= ACTIVE_HIGH << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF;
- pin_reg &= ~(DB_CNTRl_MASK << DB_CNTRL_OFF);
- pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_PRESERVE_LOW_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_level_irq);
break;
@@ -501,8 +496,6 @@ static int amd_gpio_irq_set_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
pin_reg |= LEVEL_TRIGGER << LEVEL_TRIG_OFF;
pin_reg &= ~(ACTIVE_LEVEL_MASK << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= ACTIVE_LOW << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF;
- pin_reg &= ~(DB_CNTRl_MASK << DB_CNTRL_OFF);
- pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_PRESERVE_HIGH_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_level_irq);
break;
--
2.28.0
From: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.
Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.
It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops.
This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.
Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.
Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces
it.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tytso(a)mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de>
Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb(a)gmail.com>
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
[wt: backported to 4.4 -- no latent_entropy, drop prandom_reseed_late]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 -
include/linux/prandom.h | 36 +++-
kernel/time/timer.c | 7 -
lib/random32.c | 463 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
4 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 191 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 7bb1e42..08d96d5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -678,7 +678,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
r->initialized = 1;
r->entropy_total = 0;
if (r == &nonblocking_pool) {
- prandom_reseed_late();
process_random_ready_list();
wake_up_all(&urandom_init_wait);
pr_notice("random: %s pool is initialized\n", r->name);
@@ -923,7 +922,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
fast_mix(fast_pool);
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, fast_pool->pool[cycles & 3]);
if ((fast_pool->count < 64) &&
!time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index aa16e64..cc1e713 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -16,12 +16,44 @@ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
void prandom_reseed_late(void);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+/*
+ * The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
+ * parallel given enough CPU resources.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
+)
+
+#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
+#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+
+#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+/*
+ * On 32-bit machines, we use HSipHash, a reduced-width version of SipHash.
+ * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
+ * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
+)
+#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
+#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+
+#else
+#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
+#endif
+
struct rnd_state {
__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
};
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
-
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index 43bee49..6ca409a 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -1432,13 +1432,6 @@ void update_process_times(int user_tick)
#endif
scheduler_tick();
run_posix_cpu_timers(p);
-
- /* The current CPU might make use of net randoms without receiving IRQs
- * to renew them often enough. Let's update the net_rand_state from a
- * non-constant value that's not affine to the number of calls to make
- * sure it's updated when there's some activity (we don't care in idle).
- */
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, rol32(jiffies, 24) + user_tick);
}
/*
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index 8072ccd..17e5780 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -39,16 +39,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void);
-#else
-static inline void prandom_state_selftest(void)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
-
/**
* prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -69,25 +59,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state);
/**
- * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
- *
- * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
- * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
- * considered safe for cryptographic use.
- */
-u32 prandom_u32(void)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
- u32 res;
-
- res = prandom_u32_state(state);
- put_cpu_var(state);
-
- return res;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
-
-/**
* prandom_bytes_state - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
*
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -118,20 +89,6 @@ void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t bytes)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes_state);
-/**
- * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
- * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
- * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
- */
-void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- prandom_bytes_state(state, buf, bytes);
- put_cpu_var(state);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
-
static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
{
/* Calling RNG ten times to satisfy recurrence condition */
@@ -147,97 +104,6 @@ static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
prandom_u32_state(state);
}
-static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
-{
- unsigned int val = 0;
-
- (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
- arch_get_random_int(&val));
-
- return val;
-}
-
-static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
- bool mix_with_hwseed)
-{
-#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
-#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
- state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
- state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
- state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
- state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
-}
-
-/**
- * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
- * @seed: seed value
- *
- * Add some additional seeding to the prandom pool.
- */
-void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
-{
- int i;
- /*
- * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are, well,
- * expected.
- */
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
-
- state->s1 = __seed(state->s1 ^ entropy, 2U);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
-
-/*
- * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
- * to start the prandom_u32() engine.
- */
-static int __init prandom_init(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- prandom_state_selftest();
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
- u32 weak_seed = (i + jiffies) ^ random_get_entropy();
-
- prandom_seed_early(state, weak_seed, true);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-core_initcall(prandom_init);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare);
-
-static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer, 0, 0);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare)
-{
- u32 entropy;
- unsigned long expires;
-
- get_random_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
- prandom_seed(entropy);
-
- /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
- expires = 40 + prandom_u32_max(40);
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(expires * MSEC_PER_SEC);
-
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
-static void __init __prandom_start_seed_timer(void)
-{
- set_timer_slack(&seed_timer, HZ);
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(40 * MSEC_PER_SEC);
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
{
int i;
@@ -256,51 +122,6 @@ void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
}
}
-/*
- * Generate better values after random number generator
- * is fully initialized.
- */
-static void __prandom_reseed(bool late)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- static bool latch = false;
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
-
- /* Asking for random bytes might result in bytes getting
- * moved into the nonblocking pool and thus marking it
- * as initialized. In this case we would double back into
- * this function and attempt to do a late reseed.
- * Ignore the pointless attempt to reseed again if we're
- * already waiting for bytes when the nonblocking pool
- * got initialized.
- */
-
- /* only allow initial seeding (late == false) once */
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&lock, flags))
- return;
-
- if (latch && !late)
- goto out;
-
- latch = true;
- prandom_seed_full_state(&net_rand_state);
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock, flags);
-}
-
-void prandom_reseed_late(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(true);
-}
-
-static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(false);
- __prandom_start_seed_timer();
- return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(prandom_reseed);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
static struct prandom_test1 {
u32 seed;
@@ -420,7 +241,28 @@ static struct prandom_test2 {
{ 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U },
};
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
+static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
+{
+ unsigned int val = 0;
+
+ (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
+ arch_get_random_int(&val));
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
+ bool mix_with_hwseed)
+{
+#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
+#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
+ state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
+ state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
+ state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
+ state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
+}
+
+static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
{
int i, j, errors = 0, runs = 0;
bool error = false;
@@ -460,5 +302,266 @@ static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
pr_warn("prandom: %d/%d self tests failed\n", errors, runs);
else
pr_info("prandom: %d self tests passed\n", runs);
+ return 0;
}
+core_initcall(prandom_state_selftest);
#endif
+
+/*
+ * The prandom_u32() implementation is now completely separate from the
+ * prandom_state() functions, which are retained (for now) for compatibility.
+ *
+ * Because of (ab)use in the networking code for choosing random TCP/UDP port
+ * numbers, which open DoS possibilities if guessable, we want something
+ * stronger than a standard PRNG. But the performance requirements of
+ * the network code do not allow robust crypto for this application.
+ *
+ * So this is a homebrew Junior Spaceman implementation, based on the
+ * lowest-latency trustworthy crypto primitive available, SipHash.
+ * (The authors of SipHash have not been consulted about this abuse of
+ * their work.)
+ *
+ * Standard SipHash-2-4 uses 2n+4 rounds to hash n words of input to
+ * one word of output. This abbreviated version uses 2 rounds per word
+ * of output.
+ */
+
+struct siprand_state {
+ unsigned long v0;
+ unsigned long v1;
+ unsigned long v2;
+ unsigned long v3;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct siprand_state, net_rand_state);
+
+/*
+ * This is the core CPRNG function. As "pseudorandom", this is not used
+ * for truly valuable things, just intended to be a PITA to guess.
+ * For maximum speed, we do just two SipHash rounds per word. This is
+ * the same rate as 4 rounds per 64 bits that SipHash normally uses,
+ * so hopefully it's reasonably secure.
+ *
+ * There are two changes from the official SipHash finalization:
+ * - We omit some constants XORed with v2 in the SipHash spec as irrelevant;
+ * they are there only to make the output rounds distinct from the input
+ * rounds, and this application has no input rounds.
+ * - Rather than returning v0^v1^v2^v3, return v1+v3.
+ * If you look at the SipHash round, the last operation on v3 is
+ * "v3 ^= v0", so "v0 ^ v3" just undoes that, a waste of time.
+ * Likewise "v1 ^= v2". (The rotate of v2 makes a difference, but
+ * it still cancels out half of the bits in v2 for no benefit.)
+ * Second, since the last combining operation was xor, continue the
+ * pattern of alternating xor/add for a tiny bit of extra non-linearity.
+ */
+static inline u32 siprand_u32(struct siprand_state *s)
+{
+ unsigned long v0 = s->v0, v1 = s->v1, v2 = s->v2, v3 = s->v3;
+
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ s->v0 = v0; s->v1 = v1; s->v2 = v2; s->v3 = v3;
+ return v1 + v3;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
+ *
+ * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
+ * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
+ * considered safe for cryptographic use.
+ */
+u32 prandom_u32(void)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ return res;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
+ * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
+ * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
+ */
+void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u8 *ptr = buf;
+
+ while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) {
+ put_unaligned(siprand_u32(state), (u32 *)ptr);
+ ptr += sizeof(u32);
+ bytes -= sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+ if (bytes > 0) {
+ u32 rem = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ do {
+ *ptr++ = (u8)rem;
+ rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ } while (--bytes > 0);
+ }
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
+ * @entropy: entropy value
+ *
+ * Add some additional seed material to the prandom pool.
+ * The "entropy" is actually our IP address (the only caller is
+ * the network code), not for unpredictability, but to ensure that
+ * different machines are initialized differently.
+ */
+void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ add_device_randomness(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ unsigned long v0 = state->v0, v1 = state->v1;
+ unsigned long v2 = state->v2, v3 = state->v3;
+
+ do {
+ v3 ^= entropy;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= entropy;
+ } while (unlikely(!v0 || !v1 || !v2 || !v3));
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
+ * the prandom_u32() engine to be started.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_early(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned long v0, v1, v2, v3;
+
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v0))
+ v0 = jiffies;
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v1))
+ v1 = random_get_entropy();
+ v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+
+ v3 ^= i;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= i;
+
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ state->v0 = v0; state->v1 = v1;
+ state->v2 = v2; state->v3 = v3;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+core_initcall(prandom_init_early);
+
+
+/* Stronger reseeding when available, and periodically thereafter. */
+static void prandom_reseed(unsigned long dontcare);
+
+static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, prandom_reseed, 0, 0);
+
+static void prandom_reseed(unsigned long dontcare)
+{
+ unsigned long expires;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Reinitialize each CPU's PRNG with 128 bits of key.
+ * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are,
+ * well, expected.
+ */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+ unsigned long v0 = get_random_long(), v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ unsigned long v1 = get_random_long(), v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ int j;
+
+ /*
+ * On 32-bit machines, hash in two extra words to
+ * approximate 128-bit key length. Not that the hash
+ * has that much security, but this prevents a trivial
+ * 64-bit brute force.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ unsigned long m = get_random_long();
+
+ v3 ^= m;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= m;
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Probably impossible in practice, but there is a
+ * theoretical risk that a race between this reseeding
+ * and the target CPU writing its state back could
+ * create the all-zero SipHash fixed point.
+ *
+ * To ensure that never happens, ensure the state
+ * we write contains no zero words.
+ */
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0 ? v0 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1 ? v1 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2 ? v2 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3 ? v3 : -1ul);
+ }
+
+ /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
+ expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + 40 * HZ + prandom_u32_max(40 * HZ));
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, expires);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The random ready callback can be called from almost any interrupt.
+ * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
+ * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
+ */
+static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+{
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start periodic full reseeding as soon as strong
+ * random numbers are available.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
+{
+ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+ .func = prandom_timer_start
+ };
+ int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+
+ if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+ prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+late_initcall(prandom_init_late);
--
2.9.0
From: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.
Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.
It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops.
This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.
Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.
Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces
it.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tytso(a)mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de>
Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb(a)gmail.com>
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
[wt: backported to 4.9 -- various context adjustments; timer API change]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 1 -
include/linux/prandom.h | 36 +++-
kernel/time/timer.c | 7 -
lib/random32.c | 462 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
4 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index c417aa1..4cbc731 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1211,7 +1211,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
fast_mix(fast_pool);
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, fast_pool->pool[cycles & 3]);
if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index aa16e64..cc1e713 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -16,12 +16,44 @@ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
void prandom_reseed_late(void);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+/*
+ * The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
+ * parallel given enough CPU resources.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
+)
+
+#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
+#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+
+#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+/*
+ * On 32-bit machines, we use HSipHash, a reduced-width version of SipHash.
+ * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
+ * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
+)
+#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
+#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+
+#else
+#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
+#endif
+
struct rnd_state {
__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
};
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
-
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index d2e4698..c9325a1 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -1636,13 +1636,6 @@ void update_process_times(int user_tick)
#endif
scheduler_tick();
run_posix_cpu_timers(p);
-
- /* The current CPU might make use of net randoms without receiving IRQs
- * to renew them often enough. Let's update the net_rand_state from a
- * non-constant value that's not affine to the number of calls to make
- * sure it's updated when there's some activity (we don't care in idle).
- */
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, rol32(jiffies, 24) + user_tick);
}
/**
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index d5c3137..3c5b67b 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -39,16 +39,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void);
-#else
-static inline void prandom_state_selftest(void)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
-
/**
* prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -69,25 +59,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state);
/**
- * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
- *
- * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
- * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
- * considered safe for cryptographic use.
- */
-u32 prandom_u32(void)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
- u32 res;
-
- res = prandom_u32_state(state);
- put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- return res;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
-
-/**
* prandom_bytes_state - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
*
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -118,20 +89,6 @@ void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t bytes)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes_state);
-/**
- * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
- * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
- * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
- */
-void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- prandom_bytes_state(state, buf, bytes);
- put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
-
static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
{
/* Calling RNG ten times to satisfy recurrence condition */
@@ -147,96 +104,6 @@ static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
prandom_u32_state(state);
}
-static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
-{
- unsigned int val = 0;
-
- (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
- arch_get_random_int(&val));
-
- return val;
-}
-
-static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
- bool mix_with_hwseed)
-{
-#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
-#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
- state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
- state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
- state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
- state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
-}
-
-/**
- * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
- * @seed: seed value
- *
- * Add some additional seeding to the prandom pool.
- */
-void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
-{
- int i;
- /*
- * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are, well,
- * expected.
- */
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
-
- state->s1 = __seed(state->s1 ^ entropy, 2U);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
-
-/*
- * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
- * to start the prandom_u32() engine.
- */
-static int __init prandom_init(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- prandom_state_selftest();
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
- u32 weak_seed = (i + jiffies) ^ random_get_entropy();
-
- prandom_seed_early(state, weak_seed, true);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-core_initcall(prandom_init);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare);
-
-static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer, 0, 0);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare)
-{
- u32 entropy;
- unsigned long expires;
-
- get_random_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
- prandom_seed(entropy);
-
- /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
- expires = 40 + prandom_u32_max(40);
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(expires * MSEC_PER_SEC);
-
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
-static void __init __prandom_start_seed_timer(void)
-{
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(40 * MSEC_PER_SEC);
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
{
int i;
@@ -256,51 +123,6 @@ void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed_full_state);
-/*
- * Generate better values after random number generator
- * is fully initialized.
- */
-static void __prandom_reseed(bool late)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- static bool latch = false;
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
-
- /* Asking for random bytes might result in bytes getting
- * moved into the nonblocking pool and thus marking it
- * as initialized. In this case we would double back into
- * this function and attempt to do a late reseed.
- * Ignore the pointless attempt to reseed again if we're
- * already waiting for bytes when the nonblocking pool
- * got initialized.
- */
-
- /* only allow initial seeding (late == false) once */
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&lock, flags))
- return;
-
- if (latch && !late)
- goto out;
-
- latch = true;
- prandom_seed_full_state(&net_rand_state);
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock, flags);
-}
-
-void prandom_reseed_late(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(true);
-}
-
-static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(false);
- __prandom_start_seed_timer();
- return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(prandom_reseed);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
static struct prandom_test1 {
u32 seed;
@@ -420,7 +242,28 @@ static struct prandom_test2 {
{ 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U },
};
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
+static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
+{
+ unsigned int val = 0;
+
+ (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
+ arch_get_random_int(&val));
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
+ bool mix_with_hwseed)
+{
+#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
+#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
+ state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
+ state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
+ state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
+ state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
+}
+
+static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
{
int i, j, errors = 0, runs = 0;
bool error = false;
@@ -460,5 +303,266 @@ static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
pr_warn("prandom: %d/%d self tests failed\n", errors, runs);
else
pr_info("prandom: %d self tests passed\n", runs);
+ return 0;
}
+core_initcall(prandom_state_selftest);
#endif
+
+/*
+ * The prandom_u32() implementation is now completely separate from the
+ * prandom_state() functions, which are retained (for now) for compatibility.
+ *
+ * Because of (ab)use in the networking code for choosing random TCP/UDP port
+ * numbers, which open DoS possibilities if guessable, we want something
+ * stronger than a standard PRNG. But the performance requirements of
+ * the network code do not allow robust crypto for this application.
+ *
+ * So this is a homebrew Junior Spaceman implementation, based on the
+ * lowest-latency trustworthy crypto primitive available, SipHash.
+ * (The authors of SipHash have not been consulted about this abuse of
+ * their work.)
+ *
+ * Standard SipHash-2-4 uses 2n+4 rounds to hash n words of input to
+ * one word of output. This abbreviated version uses 2 rounds per word
+ * of output.
+ */
+
+struct siprand_state {
+ unsigned long v0;
+ unsigned long v1;
+ unsigned long v2;
+ unsigned long v3;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct siprand_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
+
+/*
+ * This is the core CPRNG function. As "pseudorandom", this is not used
+ * for truly valuable things, just intended to be a PITA to guess.
+ * For maximum speed, we do just two SipHash rounds per word. This is
+ * the same rate as 4 rounds per 64 bits that SipHash normally uses,
+ * so hopefully it's reasonably secure.
+ *
+ * There are two changes from the official SipHash finalization:
+ * - We omit some constants XORed with v2 in the SipHash spec as irrelevant;
+ * they are there only to make the output rounds distinct from the input
+ * rounds, and this application has no input rounds.
+ * - Rather than returning v0^v1^v2^v3, return v1+v3.
+ * If you look at the SipHash round, the last operation on v3 is
+ * "v3 ^= v0", so "v0 ^ v3" just undoes that, a waste of time.
+ * Likewise "v1 ^= v2". (The rotate of v2 makes a difference, but
+ * it still cancels out half of the bits in v2 for no benefit.)
+ * Second, since the last combining operation was xor, continue the
+ * pattern of alternating xor/add for a tiny bit of extra non-linearity.
+ */
+static inline u32 siprand_u32(struct siprand_state *s)
+{
+ unsigned long v0 = s->v0, v1 = s->v1, v2 = s->v2, v3 = s->v3;
+
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ s->v0 = v0; s->v1 = v1; s->v2 = v2; s->v3 = v3;
+ return v1 + v3;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
+ *
+ * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
+ * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
+ * considered safe for cryptographic use.
+ */
+u32 prandom_u32(void)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ return res;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
+ * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
+ * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
+ */
+void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u8 *ptr = buf;
+
+ while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) {
+ put_unaligned(siprand_u32(state), (u32 *)ptr);
+ ptr += sizeof(u32);
+ bytes -= sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+ if (bytes > 0) {
+ u32 rem = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ do {
+ *ptr++ = (u8)rem;
+ rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ } while (--bytes > 0);
+ }
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
+ * @entropy: entropy value
+ *
+ * Add some additional seed material to the prandom pool.
+ * The "entropy" is actually our IP address (the only caller is
+ * the network code), not for unpredictability, but to ensure that
+ * different machines are initialized differently.
+ */
+void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ add_device_randomness(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ unsigned long v0 = state->v0, v1 = state->v1;
+ unsigned long v2 = state->v2, v3 = state->v3;
+
+ do {
+ v3 ^= entropy;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= entropy;
+ } while (unlikely(!v0 || !v1 || !v2 || !v3));
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
+ * the prandom_u32() engine to be started.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_early(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned long v0, v1, v2, v3;
+
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v0))
+ v0 = jiffies;
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v1))
+ v1 = random_get_entropy();
+ v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+
+ v3 ^= i;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= i;
+
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ state->v0 = v0; state->v1 = v1;
+ state->v2 = v2; state->v3 = v3;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+core_initcall(prandom_init_early);
+
+
+/* Stronger reseeding when available, and periodically thereafter. */
+static void prandom_reseed(unsigned long dontcare);
+
+static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, prandom_reseed, 0, 0);
+
+static void prandom_reseed(unsigned long dontcare)
+{
+ unsigned long expires;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Reinitialize each CPU's PRNG with 128 bits of key.
+ * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are,
+ * well, expected.
+ */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+ unsigned long v0 = get_random_long(), v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ unsigned long v1 = get_random_long(), v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ int j;
+
+ /*
+ * On 32-bit machines, hash in two extra words to
+ * approximate 128-bit key length. Not that the hash
+ * has that much security, but this prevents a trivial
+ * 64-bit brute force.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ unsigned long m = get_random_long();
+
+ v3 ^= m;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= m;
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Probably impossible in practice, but there is a
+ * theoretical risk that a race between this reseeding
+ * and the target CPU writing its state back could
+ * create the all-zero SipHash fixed point.
+ *
+ * To ensure that never happens, ensure the state
+ * we write contains no zero words.
+ */
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0 ? v0 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1 ? v1 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2 ? v2 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3 ? v3 : -1ul);
+ }
+
+ /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
+ expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + 40 * HZ + prandom_u32_max(40 * HZ));
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, expires);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The random ready callback can be called from almost any interrupt.
+ * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
+ * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
+ */
+static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+{
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start periodic full reseeding as soon as strong
+ * random numbers are available.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
+{
+ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+ .func = prandom_timer_start
+ };
+ int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+
+ if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+ prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+late_initcall(prandom_init_late);
--
2.9.0
From: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.
Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.
It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops.
This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.
Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.
Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces
it.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tytso(a)mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de>
Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb(a)gmail.com>
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
[wt: backported to 4.14 -- various context adjustments; timer API change]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 1 -
include/linux/prandom.h | 36 +++-
kernel/time/timer.c | 7 -
lib/random32.c | 462 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
4 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index b202f66..868d262 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1246,7 +1246,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
fast_mix(fast_pool);
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, fast_pool->pool[cycles & 3]);
if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index aa16e64..cc1e713 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -16,12 +16,44 @@ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
void prandom_reseed_late(void);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+/*
+ * The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
+ * parallel given enough CPU resources.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
+)
+
+#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
+#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+
+#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+/*
+ * On 32-bit machines, we use HSipHash, a reduced-width version of SipHash.
+ * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
+ * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
+)
+#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
+#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+
+#else
+#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
+#endif
+
struct rnd_state {
__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
};
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
-
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index d4bc272..99f885d 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -1596,13 +1596,6 @@ void update_process_times(int user_tick)
scheduler_tick();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
run_posix_cpu_timers(p);
-
- /* The current CPU might make use of net randoms without receiving IRQs
- * to renew them often enough. Let's update the net_rand_state from a
- * non-constant value that's not affine to the number of calls to make
- * sure it's updated when there's some activity (we don't care in idle).
- */
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, rol32(jiffies, 24) + user_tick);
}
/**
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index eb54663..f5e967f 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -40,16 +40,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void);
-#else
-static inline void prandom_state_selftest(void)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
-
/**
* prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -70,25 +60,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state);
/**
- * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
- *
- * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
- * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
- * considered safe for cryptographic use.
- */
-u32 prandom_u32(void)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
- u32 res;
-
- res = prandom_u32_state(state);
- put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- return res;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
-
-/**
* prandom_bytes_state - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
*
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -119,20 +90,6 @@ void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t bytes)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes_state);
-/**
- * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
- * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
- * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
- */
-void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- prandom_bytes_state(state, buf, bytes);
- put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
-
static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
{
/* Calling RNG ten times to satisfy recurrence condition */
@@ -148,96 +105,6 @@ static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
prandom_u32_state(state);
}
-static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
-{
- unsigned int val = 0;
-
- (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
- arch_get_random_int(&val));
-
- return val;
-}
-
-static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
- bool mix_with_hwseed)
-{
-#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
-#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
- state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
- state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
- state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
- state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
-}
-
-/**
- * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
- * @seed: seed value
- *
- * Add some additional seeding to the prandom pool.
- */
-void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
-{
- int i;
- /*
- * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are, well,
- * expected.
- */
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
-
- state->s1 = __seed(state->s1 ^ entropy, 2U);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
-
-/*
- * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
- * to start the prandom_u32() engine.
- */
-static int __init prandom_init(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- prandom_state_selftest();
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
- u32 weak_seed = (i + jiffies) ^ random_get_entropy();
-
- prandom_seed_early(state, weak_seed, true);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-core_initcall(prandom_init);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare);
-
-static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer, 0, 0);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare)
-{
- u32 entropy;
- unsigned long expires;
-
- get_random_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
- prandom_seed(entropy);
-
- /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
- expires = 40 + prandom_u32_max(40);
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(expires * MSEC_PER_SEC);
-
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
-static void __init __prandom_start_seed_timer(void)
-{
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(40 * MSEC_PER_SEC);
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
{
int i;
@@ -257,51 +124,6 @@ void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed_full_state);
-/*
- * Generate better values after random number generator
- * is fully initialized.
- */
-static void __prandom_reseed(bool late)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- static bool latch = false;
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
-
- /* Asking for random bytes might result in bytes getting
- * moved into the nonblocking pool and thus marking it
- * as initialized. In this case we would double back into
- * this function and attempt to do a late reseed.
- * Ignore the pointless attempt to reseed again if we're
- * already waiting for bytes when the nonblocking pool
- * got initialized.
- */
-
- /* only allow initial seeding (late == false) once */
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&lock, flags))
- return;
-
- if (latch && !late)
- goto out;
-
- latch = true;
- prandom_seed_full_state(&net_rand_state);
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock, flags);
-}
-
-void prandom_reseed_late(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(true);
-}
-
-static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(false);
- __prandom_start_seed_timer();
- return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(prandom_reseed);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
static struct prandom_test1 {
u32 seed;
@@ -421,7 +243,28 @@ static struct prandom_test2 {
{ 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U },
};
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
+static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
+{
+ unsigned int val = 0;
+
+ (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
+ arch_get_random_int(&val));
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
+ bool mix_with_hwseed)
+{
+#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
+#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
+ state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
+ state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
+ state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
+ state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
+}
+
+static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
{
int i, j, errors = 0, runs = 0;
bool error = false;
@@ -461,5 +304,266 @@ static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
pr_warn("prandom: %d/%d self tests failed\n", errors, runs);
else
pr_info("prandom: %d self tests passed\n", runs);
+ return 0;
}
+core_initcall(prandom_state_selftest);
#endif
+
+/*
+ * The prandom_u32() implementation is now completely separate from the
+ * prandom_state() functions, which are retained (for now) for compatibility.
+ *
+ * Because of (ab)use in the networking code for choosing random TCP/UDP port
+ * numbers, which open DoS possibilities if guessable, we want something
+ * stronger than a standard PRNG. But the performance requirements of
+ * the network code do not allow robust crypto for this application.
+ *
+ * So this is a homebrew Junior Spaceman implementation, based on the
+ * lowest-latency trustworthy crypto primitive available, SipHash.
+ * (The authors of SipHash have not been consulted about this abuse of
+ * their work.)
+ *
+ * Standard SipHash-2-4 uses 2n+4 rounds to hash n words of input to
+ * one word of output. This abbreviated version uses 2 rounds per word
+ * of output.
+ */
+
+struct siprand_state {
+ unsigned long v0;
+ unsigned long v1;
+ unsigned long v2;
+ unsigned long v3;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct siprand_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
+
+/*
+ * This is the core CPRNG function. As "pseudorandom", this is not used
+ * for truly valuable things, just intended to be a PITA to guess.
+ * For maximum speed, we do just two SipHash rounds per word. This is
+ * the same rate as 4 rounds per 64 bits that SipHash normally uses,
+ * so hopefully it's reasonably secure.
+ *
+ * There are two changes from the official SipHash finalization:
+ * - We omit some constants XORed with v2 in the SipHash spec as irrelevant;
+ * they are there only to make the output rounds distinct from the input
+ * rounds, and this application has no input rounds.
+ * - Rather than returning v0^v1^v2^v3, return v1+v3.
+ * If you look at the SipHash round, the last operation on v3 is
+ * "v3 ^= v0", so "v0 ^ v3" just undoes that, a waste of time.
+ * Likewise "v1 ^= v2". (The rotate of v2 makes a difference, but
+ * it still cancels out half of the bits in v2 for no benefit.)
+ * Second, since the last combining operation was xor, continue the
+ * pattern of alternating xor/add for a tiny bit of extra non-linearity.
+ */
+static inline u32 siprand_u32(struct siprand_state *s)
+{
+ unsigned long v0 = s->v0, v1 = s->v1, v2 = s->v2, v3 = s->v3;
+
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ s->v0 = v0; s->v1 = v1; s->v2 = v2; s->v3 = v3;
+ return v1 + v3;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
+ *
+ * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
+ * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
+ * considered safe for cryptographic use.
+ */
+u32 prandom_u32(void)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ return res;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
+ * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
+ * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
+ */
+void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u8 *ptr = buf;
+
+ while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) {
+ put_unaligned(siprand_u32(state), (u32 *)ptr);
+ ptr += sizeof(u32);
+ bytes -= sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+ if (bytes > 0) {
+ u32 rem = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ do {
+ *ptr++ = (u8)rem;
+ rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ } while (--bytes > 0);
+ }
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
+ * @entropy: entropy value
+ *
+ * Add some additional seed material to the prandom pool.
+ * The "entropy" is actually our IP address (the only caller is
+ * the network code), not for unpredictability, but to ensure that
+ * different machines are initialized differently.
+ */
+void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ add_device_randomness(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ unsigned long v0 = state->v0, v1 = state->v1;
+ unsigned long v2 = state->v2, v3 = state->v3;
+
+ do {
+ v3 ^= entropy;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= entropy;
+ } while (unlikely(!v0 || !v1 || !v2 || !v3));
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
+ * the prandom_u32() engine to be started.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_early(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned long v0, v1, v2, v3;
+
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v0))
+ v0 = jiffies;
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v1))
+ v1 = random_get_entropy();
+ v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+
+ v3 ^= i;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= i;
+
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ state->v0 = v0; state->v1 = v1;
+ state->v2 = v2; state->v3 = v3;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+core_initcall(prandom_init_early);
+
+
+/* Stronger reseeding when available, and periodically thereafter. */
+static void prandom_reseed(unsigned long dontcare);
+
+static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, prandom_reseed, 0, 0);
+
+static void prandom_reseed(unsigned long dontcare)
+{
+ unsigned long expires;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Reinitialize each CPU's PRNG with 128 bits of key.
+ * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are,
+ * well, expected.
+ */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+ unsigned long v0 = get_random_long(), v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ unsigned long v1 = get_random_long(), v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ int j;
+
+ /*
+ * On 32-bit machines, hash in two extra words to
+ * approximate 128-bit key length. Not that the hash
+ * has that much security, but this prevents a trivial
+ * 64-bit brute force.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ unsigned long m = get_random_long();
+
+ v3 ^= m;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= m;
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Probably impossible in practice, but there is a
+ * theoretical risk that a race between this reseeding
+ * and the target CPU writing its state back could
+ * create the all-zero SipHash fixed point.
+ *
+ * To ensure that never happens, ensure the state
+ * we write contains no zero words.
+ */
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0 ? v0 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1 ? v1 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2 ? v2 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3 ? v3 : -1ul);
+ }
+
+ /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
+ expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + 40 * HZ + prandom_u32_max(40 * HZ));
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, expires);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The random ready callback can be called from almost any interrupt.
+ * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
+ * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
+ */
+static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+{
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start periodic full reseeding as soon as strong
+ * random numbers are available.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
+{
+ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+ .func = prandom_timer_start
+ };
+ int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+
+ if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+ prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+late_initcall(prandom_init_late);
--
2.9.0
From: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.
Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.
It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops.
This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.
Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.
Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces
it.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tytso(a)mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de>
Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb(a)gmail.com>
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
[wt: backported to 4.19 -- various context adjustments]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 1 -
include/linux/prandom.h | 36 +++-
kernel/time/timer.c | 7 -
lib/random32.c | 462 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
4 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 80dedec..98925d4 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1257,7 +1257,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
fast_mix(fast_pool);
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, fast_pool->pool[cycles & 3]);
if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index aa16e64..cc1e713 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -16,12 +16,44 @@ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
void prandom_reseed_late(void);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+/*
+ * The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
+ * parallel given enough CPU resources.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
+)
+
+#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
+#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+
+#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+/*
+ * On 32-bit machines, we use HSipHash, a reduced-width version of SipHash.
+ * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
+ * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
+)
+#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
+#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+
+#else
+#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
+#endif
+
struct rnd_state {
__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
};
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
-
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index 61e41ea..a6e88d9 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -1655,13 +1655,6 @@ void update_process_times(int user_tick)
scheduler_tick();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
run_posix_cpu_timers(p);
-
- /* The current CPU might make use of net randoms without receiving IRQs
- * to renew them often enough. Let's update the net_rand_state from a
- * non-constant value that's not affine to the number of calls to make
- * sure it's updated when there's some activity (we don't care in idle).
- */
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, rol32(jiffies, 24) + user_tick);
}
/**
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index b6f3325e..9085b11 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -40,16 +40,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void);
-#else
-static inline void prandom_state_selftest(void)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
-
/**
* prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -70,25 +60,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state);
/**
- * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
- *
- * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
- * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
- * considered safe for cryptographic use.
- */
-u32 prandom_u32(void)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
- u32 res;
-
- res = prandom_u32_state(state);
- put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- return res;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
-
-/**
* prandom_bytes_state - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
*
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -119,20 +90,6 @@ void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t bytes)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes_state);
-/**
- * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
- * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
- * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
- */
-void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- prandom_bytes_state(state, buf, bytes);
- put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
-
static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
{
/* Calling RNG ten times to satisfy recurrence condition */
@@ -148,96 +105,6 @@ static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
prandom_u32_state(state);
}
-static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
-{
- unsigned int val = 0;
-
- (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
- arch_get_random_int(&val));
-
- return val;
-}
-
-static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
- bool mix_with_hwseed)
-{
-#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
-#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
- state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
- state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
- state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
- state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
-}
-
-/**
- * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
- * @seed: seed value
- *
- * Add some additional seeding to the prandom pool.
- */
-void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
-{
- int i;
- /*
- * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are, well,
- * expected.
- */
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
-
- state->s1 = __seed(state->s1 ^ entropy, 2U);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
-
-/*
- * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
- * to start the prandom_u32() engine.
- */
-static int __init prandom_init(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- prandom_state_selftest();
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
- u32 weak_seed = (i + jiffies) ^ random_get_entropy();
-
- prandom_seed_early(state, weak_seed, true);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-core_initcall(prandom_init);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(struct timer_list *unused);
-
-static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(struct timer_list *unused)
-{
- u32 entropy;
- unsigned long expires;
-
- get_random_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
- prandom_seed(entropy);
-
- /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
- expires = 40 + prandom_u32_max(40);
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(expires * MSEC_PER_SEC);
-
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
-static void __init __prandom_start_seed_timer(void)
-{
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(40 * MSEC_PER_SEC);
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
{
int i;
@@ -257,51 +124,6 @@ void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed_full_state);
-/*
- * Generate better values after random number generator
- * is fully initialized.
- */
-static void __prandom_reseed(bool late)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- static bool latch = false;
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
-
- /* Asking for random bytes might result in bytes getting
- * moved into the nonblocking pool and thus marking it
- * as initialized. In this case we would double back into
- * this function and attempt to do a late reseed.
- * Ignore the pointless attempt to reseed again if we're
- * already waiting for bytes when the nonblocking pool
- * got initialized.
- */
-
- /* only allow initial seeding (late == false) once */
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&lock, flags))
- return;
-
- if (latch && !late)
- goto out;
-
- latch = true;
- prandom_seed_full_state(&net_rand_state);
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock, flags);
-}
-
-void prandom_reseed_late(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(true);
-}
-
-static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(false);
- __prandom_start_seed_timer();
- return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(prandom_reseed);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
static struct prandom_test1 {
u32 seed;
@@ -421,7 +243,28 @@ static struct prandom_test2 {
{ 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U },
};
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
+static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
+{
+ unsigned int val = 0;
+
+ (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
+ arch_get_random_int(&val));
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
+ bool mix_with_hwseed)
+{
+#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
+#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
+ state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
+ state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
+ state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
+ state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
+}
+
+static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
{
int i, j, errors = 0, runs = 0;
bool error = false;
@@ -461,5 +304,266 @@ static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
pr_warn("prandom: %d/%d self tests failed\n", errors, runs);
else
pr_info("prandom: %d self tests passed\n", runs);
+ return 0;
}
+core_initcall(prandom_state_selftest);
#endif
+
+/*
+ * The prandom_u32() implementation is now completely separate from the
+ * prandom_state() functions, which are retained (for now) for compatibility.
+ *
+ * Because of (ab)use in the networking code for choosing random TCP/UDP port
+ * numbers, which open DoS possibilities if guessable, we want something
+ * stronger than a standard PRNG. But the performance requirements of
+ * the network code do not allow robust crypto for this application.
+ *
+ * So this is a homebrew Junior Spaceman implementation, based on the
+ * lowest-latency trustworthy crypto primitive available, SipHash.
+ * (The authors of SipHash have not been consulted about this abuse of
+ * their work.)
+ *
+ * Standard SipHash-2-4 uses 2n+4 rounds to hash n words of input to
+ * one word of output. This abbreviated version uses 2 rounds per word
+ * of output.
+ */
+
+struct siprand_state {
+ unsigned long v0;
+ unsigned long v1;
+ unsigned long v2;
+ unsigned long v3;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct siprand_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
+
+/*
+ * This is the core CPRNG function. As "pseudorandom", this is not used
+ * for truly valuable things, just intended to be a PITA to guess.
+ * For maximum speed, we do just two SipHash rounds per word. This is
+ * the same rate as 4 rounds per 64 bits that SipHash normally uses,
+ * so hopefully it's reasonably secure.
+ *
+ * There are two changes from the official SipHash finalization:
+ * - We omit some constants XORed with v2 in the SipHash spec as irrelevant;
+ * they are there only to make the output rounds distinct from the input
+ * rounds, and this application has no input rounds.
+ * - Rather than returning v0^v1^v2^v3, return v1+v3.
+ * If you look at the SipHash round, the last operation on v3 is
+ * "v3 ^= v0", so "v0 ^ v3" just undoes that, a waste of time.
+ * Likewise "v1 ^= v2". (The rotate of v2 makes a difference, but
+ * it still cancels out half of the bits in v2 for no benefit.)
+ * Second, since the last combining operation was xor, continue the
+ * pattern of alternating xor/add for a tiny bit of extra non-linearity.
+ */
+static inline u32 siprand_u32(struct siprand_state *s)
+{
+ unsigned long v0 = s->v0, v1 = s->v1, v2 = s->v2, v3 = s->v3;
+
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ s->v0 = v0; s->v1 = v1; s->v2 = v2; s->v3 = v3;
+ return v1 + v3;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
+ *
+ * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
+ * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
+ * considered safe for cryptographic use.
+ */
+u32 prandom_u32(void)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ return res;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
+ * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
+ * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
+ */
+void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u8 *ptr = buf;
+
+ while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) {
+ put_unaligned(siprand_u32(state), (u32 *)ptr);
+ ptr += sizeof(u32);
+ bytes -= sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+ if (bytes > 0) {
+ u32 rem = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ do {
+ *ptr++ = (u8)rem;
+ rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ } while (--bytes > 0);
+ }
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
+ * @entropy: entropy value
+ *
+ * Add some additional seed material to the prandom pool.
+ * The "entropy" is actually our IP address (the only caller is
+ * the network code), not for unpredictability, but to ensure that
+ * different machines are initialized differently.
+ */
+void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ add_device_randomness(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ unsigned long v0 = state->v0, v1 = state->v1;
+ unsigned long v2 = state->v2, v3 = state->v3;
+
+ do {
+ v3 ^= entropy;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= entropy;
+ } while (unlikely(!v0 || !v1 || !v2 || !v3));
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
+ * the prandom_u32() engine to be started.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_early(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned long v0, v1, v2, v3;
+
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v0))
+ v0 = jiffies;
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v1))
+ v1 = random_get_entropy();
+ v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+
+ v3 ^= i;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= i;
+
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ state->v0 = v0; state->v1 = v1;
+ state->v2 = v2; state->v3 = v3;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+core_initcall(prandom_init_early);
+
+
+/* Stronger reseeding when available, and periodically thereafter. */
+static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused);
+
+static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, prandom_reseed);
+
+static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
+{
+ unsigned long expires;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Reinitialize each CPU's PRNG with 128 bits of key.
+ * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are,
+ * well, expected.
+ */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+ unsigned long v0 = get_random_long(), v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ unsigned long v1 = get_random_long(), v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ int j;
+
+ /*
+ * On 32-bit machines, hash in two extra words to
+ * approximate 128-bit key length. Not that the hash
+ * has that much security, but this prevents a trivial
+ * 64-bit brute force.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ unsigned long m = get_random_long();
+
+ v3 ^= m;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= m;
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Probably impossible in practice, but there is a
+ * theoretical risk that a race between this reseeding
+ * and the target CPU writing its state back could
+ * create the all-zero SipHash fixed point.
+ *
+ * To ensure that never happens, ensure the state
+ * we write contains no zero words.
+ */
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0 ? v0 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1 ? v1 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2 ? v2 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3 ? v3 : -1ul);
+ }
+
+ /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
+ expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + 40 * HZ + prandom_u32_max(40 * HZ));
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, expires);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The random ready callback can be called from almost any interrupt.
+ * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
+ * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
+ */
+static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+{
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start periodic full reseeding as soon as strong
+ * random numbers are available.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
+{
+ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+ .func = prandom_timer_start
+ };
+ int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+
+ if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+ prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+late_initcall(prandom_init_late);
--
2.9.0
From: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.
Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.
It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops.
This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.
Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.
Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces
it.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tytso(a)mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de>
Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb(a)gmail.com>
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
[wt: backported to 5.4 -- no tracepoint there]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 1 -
include/linux/prandom.h | 36 +++-
kernel/time/timer.c | 7 -
lib/random32.c | 462 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
4 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 75a8f7f..2c29f83 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1330,7 +1330,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
fast_mix(fast_pool);
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, fast_pool->pool[cycles & 3]);
if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index aa16e64..cc1e713 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -16,12 +16,44 @@ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
void prandom_reseed_late(void);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+/*
+ * The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
+ * parallel given enough CPU resources.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
+)
+
+#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
+#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+
+#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+/*
+ * On 32-bit machines, we use HSipHash, a reduced-width version of SipHash.
+ * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
+ * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
+)
+#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
+#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+
+#else
+#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
+#endif
+
struct rnd_state {
__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
};
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
-
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index a3ae244..87fa73c 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -1743,13 +1743,6 @@ void update_process_times(int user_tick)
scheduler_tick();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
run_posix_cpu_timers();
-
- /* The current CPU might make use of net randoms without receiving IRQs
- * to renew them often enough. Let's update the net_rand_state from a
- * non-constant value that's not affine to the number of calls to make
- * sure it's updated when there's some activity (we don't care in idle).
- */
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, rol32(jiffies, 24) + user_tick);
}
/**
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index 1786f78..9085b11 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -40,16 +40,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void);
-#else
-static inline void prandom_state_selftest(void)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
-
/**
* prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -70,25 +60,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state);
/**
- * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
- *
- * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
- * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
- * considered safe for cryptographic use.
- */
-u32 prandom_u32(void)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
- u32 res;
-
- res = prandom_u32_state(state);
- put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- return res;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
-
-/**
* prandom_bytes_state - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
*
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -119,20 +90,6 @@ void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t bytes)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes_state);
-/**
- * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
- * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
- * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
- */
-void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- prandom_bytes_state(state, buf, bytes);
- put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
-
static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
{
/* Calling RNG ten times to satisfy recurrence condition */
@@ -148,96 +105,6 @@ static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
prandom_u32_state(state);
}
-static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
-{
- unsigned int val = 0;
-
- (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
- arch_get_random_int(&val));
-
- return val;
-}
-
-static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
- bool mix_with_hwseed)
-{
-#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
-#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
- state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
- state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
- state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
- state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
-}
-
-/**
- * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
- * @entropy: entropy value
- *
- * Add some additional entropy to the prandom pool.
- */
-void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
-{
- int i;
- /*
- * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are, well,
- * expected.
- */
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
-
- state->s1 = __seed(state->s1 ^ entropy, 2U);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
-
-/*
- * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
- * to start the prandom_u32() engine.
- */
-static int __init prandom_init(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- prandom_state_selftest();
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
- u32 weak_seed = (i + jiffies) ^ random_get_entropy();
-
- prandom_seed_early(state, weak_seed, true);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-core_initcall(prandom_init);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(struct timer_list *unused);
-
-static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(struct timer_list *unused)
-{
- u32 entropy;
- unsigned long expires;
-
- get_random_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
- prandom_seed(entropy);
-
- /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
- expires = 40 + prandom_u32_max(40);
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(expires * MSEC_PER_SEC);
-
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
-static void __init __prandom_start_seed_timer(void)
-{
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(40 * MSEC_PER_SEC);
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
{
int i;
@@ -257,51 +124,6 @@ void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed_full_state);
-/*
- * Generate better values after random number generator
- * is fully initialized.
- */
-static void __prandom_reseed(bool late)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- static bool latch = false;
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
-
- /* Asking for random bytes might result in bytes getting
- * moved into the nonblocking pool and thus marking it
- * as initialized. In this case we would double back into
- * this function and attempt to do a late reseed.
- * Ignore the pointless attempt to reseed again if we're
- * already waiting for bytes when the nonblocking pool
- * got initialized.
- */
-
- /* only allow initial seeding (late == false) once */
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&lock, flags))
- return;
-
- if (latch && !late)
- goto out;
-
- latch = true;
- prandom_seed_full_state(&net_rand_state);
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock, flags);
-}
-
-void prandom_reseed_late(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(true);
-}
-
-static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(false);
- __prandom_start_seed_timer();
- return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(prandom_reseed);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
static struct prandom_test1 {
u32 seed;
@@ -421,7 +243,28 @@ static struct prandom_test2 {
{ 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U },
};
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
+static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
+{
+ unsigned int val = 0;
+
+ (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
+ arch_get_random_int(&val));
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
+ bool mix_with_hwseed)
+{
+#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
+#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
+ state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
+ state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
+ state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
+ state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
+}
+
+static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
{
int i, j, errors = 0, runs = 0;
bool error = false;
@@ -461,5 +304,266 @@ static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
pr_warn("prandom: %d/%d self tests failed\n", errors, runs);
else
pr_info("prandom: %d self tests passed\n", runs);
+ return 0;
+}
+core_initcall(prandom_state_selftest);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The prandom_u32() implementation is now completely separate from the
+ * prandom_state() functions, which are retained (for now) for compatibility.
+ *
+ * Because of (ab)use in the networking code for choosing random TCP/UDP port
+ * numbers, which open DoS possibilities if guessable, we want something
+ * stronger than a standard PRNG. But the performance requirements of
+ * the network code do not allow robust crypto for this application.
+ *
+ * So this is a homebrew Junior Spaceman implementation, based on the
+ * lowest-latency trustworthy crypto primitive available, SipHash.
+ * (The authors of SipHash have not been consulted about this abuse of
+ * their work.)
+ *
+ * Standard SipHash-2-4 uses 2n+4 rounds to hash n words of input to
+ * one word of output. This abbreviated version uses 2 rounds per word
+ * of output.
+ */
+
+struct siprand_state {
+ unsigned long v0;
+ unsigned long v1;
+ unsigned long v2;
+ unsigned long v3;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct siprand_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
+
+/*
+ * This is the core CPRNG function. As "pseudorandom", this is not used
+ * for truly valuable things, just intended to be a PITA to guess.
+ * For maximum speed, we do just two SipHash rounds per word. This is
+ * the same rate as 4 rounds per 64 bits that SipHash normally uses,
+ * so hopefully it's reasonably secure.
+ *
+ * There are two changes from the official SipHash finalization:
+ * - We omit some constants XORed with v2 in the SipHash spec as irrelevant;
+ * they are there only to make the output rounds distinct from the input
+ * rounds, and this application has no input rounds.
+ * - Rather than returning v0^v1^v2^v3, return v1+v3.
+ * If you look at the SipHash round, the last operation on v3 is
+ * "v3 ^= v0", so "v0 ^ v3" just undoes that, a waste of time.
+ * Likewise "v1 ^= v2". (The rotate of v2 makes a difference, but
+ * it still cancels out half of the bits in v2 for no benefit.)
+ * Second, since the last combining operation was xor, continue the
+ * pattern of alternating xor/add for a tiny bit of extra non-linearity.
+ */
+static inline u32 siprand_u32(struct siprand_state *s)
+{
+ unsigned long v0 = s->v0, v1 = s->v1, v2 = s->v2, v3 = s->v3;
+
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ s->v0 = v0; s->v1 = v1; s->v2 = v2; s->v3 = v3;
+ return v1 + v3;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
+ *
+ * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
+ * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
+ * considered safe for cryptographic use.
+ */
+u32 prandom_u32(void)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ return res;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
+ * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
+ * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
+ */
+void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u8 *ptr = buf;
+
+ while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) {
+ put_unaligned(siprand_u32(state), (u32 *)ptr);
+ ptr += sizeof(u32);
+ bytes -= sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+ if (bytes > 0) {
+ u32 rem = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ do {
+ *ptr++ = (u8)rem;
+ rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ } while (--bytes > 0);
+ }
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
+ * @entropy: entropy value
+ *
+ * Add some additional seed material to the prandom pool.
+ * The "entropy" is actually our IP address (the only caller is
+ * the network code), not for unpredictability, but to ensure that
+ * different machines are initialized differently.
+ */
+void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ add_device_randomness(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ unsigned long v0 = state->v0, v1 = state->v1;
+ unsigned long v2 = state->v2, v3 = state->v3;
+
+ do {
+ v3 ^= entropy;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= entropy;
+ } while (unlikely(!v0 || !v1 || !v2 || !v3));
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
+ * the prandom_u32() engine to be started.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_early(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned long v0, v1, v2, v3;
+
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v0))
+ v0 = jiffies;
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v1))
+ v1 = random_get_entropy();
+ v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+
+ v3 ^= i;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= i;
+
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ state->v0 = v0; state->v1 = v1;
+ state->v2 = v2; state->v3 = v3;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
+core_initcall(prandom_init_early);
+
+
+/* Stronger reseeding when available, and periodically thereafter. */
+static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused);
+
+static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, prandom_reseed);
+
+static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
+{
+ unsigned long expires;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Reinitialize each CPU's PRNG with 128 bits of key.
+ * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are,
+ * well, expected.
+ */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+ unsigned long v0 = get_random_long(), v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ unsigned long v1 = get_random_long(), v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ int j;
+
+ /*
+ * On 32-bit machines, hash in two extra words to
+ * approximate 128-bit key length. Not that the hash
+ * has that much security, but this prevents a trivial
+ * 64-bit brute force.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ unsigned long m = get_random_long();
+
+ v3 ^= m;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= m;
+ }
#endif
+ /*
+ * Probably impossible in practice, but there is a
+ * theoretical risk that a race between this reseeding
+ * and the target CPU writing its state back could
+ * create the all-zero SipHash fixed point.
+ *
+ * To ensure that never happens, ensure the state
+ * we write contains no zero words.
+ */
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0 ? v0 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1 ? v1 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2 ? v2 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3 ? v3 : -1ul);
+ }
+
+ /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
+ expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + 40 * HZ + prandom_u32_max(40 * HZ));
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, expires);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The random ready callback can be called from almost any interrupt.
+ * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
+ * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
+ */
+static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+{
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start periodic full reseeding as soon as strong
+ * random numbers are available.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
+{
+ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+ .func = prandom_timer_start
+ };
+ int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+
+ if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+ prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+late_initcall(prandom_init_late);
--
2.9.0
From: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.
Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.
It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops.
This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.
Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.
Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces
it.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tytso(a)mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de>
Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb(a)gmail.com>
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml(a)sdf.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
[wt: backported to 5.8 -- no tracepoint there]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 1 -
include/linux/prandom.h | 36 +++-
kernel/time/timer.c | 7 -
lib/random32.c | 462 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
4 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index d20ba1b..2a41b21 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1277,7 +1277,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
fast_mix(fast_pool);
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, fast_pool->pool[cycles & 3]);
if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index aa16e64..cc1e713 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -16,12 +16,44 @@ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
void prandom_reseed_late(void);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+/*
+ * The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
+ * parallel given enough CPU resources.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
+)
+
+#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
+#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+
+#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+/*
+ * On 32-bit machines, we use HSipHash, a reduced-width version of SipHash.
+ * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
+ * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+ v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
+ v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
+ v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
+ v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
+)
+#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
+#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+
+#else
+#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
+#endif
+
struct rnd_state {
__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
};
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
-
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index 026ac01..c9d839c 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -1743,13 +1743,6 @@ void update_process_times(int user_tick)
scheduler_tick();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
run_posix_cpu_timers();
-
- /* The current CPU might make use of net randoms without receiving IRQs
- * to renew them often enough. Let's update the net_rand_state from a
- * non-constant value that's not affine to the number of calls to make
- * sure it's updated when there's some activity (we don't care in idle).
- */
- this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, rol32(jiffies, 24) + user_tick);
}
/**
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index 1786f78..9085b11 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -40,16 +40,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void);
-#else
-static inline void prandom_state_selftest(void)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
-
/**
* prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -70,25 +60,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state);
/**
- * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
- *
- * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
- * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
- * considered safe for cryptographic use.
- */
-u32 prandom_u32(void)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
- u32 res;
-
- res = prandom_u32_state(state);
- put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- return res;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
-
-/**
* prandom_bytes_state - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
*
* @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state.
@@ -119,20 +90,6 @@ void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t bytes)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes_state);
-/**
- * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
- * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
- * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
- */
-void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
-{
- struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-
- prandom_bytes_state(state, buf, bytes);
- put_cpu_var(net_rand_state);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
-
static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
{
/* Calling RNG ten times to satisfy recurrence condition */
@@ -148,96 +105,6 @@ static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
prandom_u32_state(state);
}
-static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
-{
- unsigned int val = 0;
-
- (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
- arch_get_random_int(&val));
-
- return val;
-}
-
-static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
- bool mix_with_hwseed)
-{
-#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
-#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
- state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
- state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
- state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
- state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
-}
-
-/**
- * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
- * @entropy: entropy value
- *
- * Add some additional entropy to the prandom pool.
- */
-void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
-{
- int i;
- /*
- * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are, well,
- * expected.
- */
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
-
- state->s1 = __seed(state->s1 ^ entropy, 2U);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
-
-/*
- * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
- * to start the prandom_u32() engine.
- */
-static int __init prandom_init(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- prandom_state_selftest();
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
- u32 weak_seed = (i + jiffies) ^ random_get_entropy();
-
- prandom_seed_early(state, weak_seed, true);
- prandom_warmup(state);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-core_initcall(prandom_init);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(struct timer_list *unused);
-
-static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer);
-
-static void __prandom_timer(struct timer_list *unused)
-{
- u32 entropy;
- unsigned long expires;
-
- get_random_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
- prandom_seed(entropy);
-
- /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
- expires = 40 + prandom_u32_max(40);
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(expires * MSEC_PER_SEC);
-
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
-static void __init __prandom_start_seed_timer(void)
-{
- seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(40 * MSEC_PER_SEC);
- add_timer(&seed_timer);
-}
-
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
{
int i;
@@ -257,51 +124,6 @@ void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed_full_state);
-/*
- * Generate better values after random number generator
- * is fully initialized.
- */
-static void __prandom_reseed(bool late)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- static bool latch = false;
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
-
- /* Asking for random bytes might result in bytes getting
- * moved into the nonblocking pool and thus marking it
- * as initialized. In this case we would double back into
- * this function and attempt to do a late reseed.
- * Ignore the pointless attempt to reseed again if we're
- * already waiting for bytes when the nonblocking pool
- * got initialized.
- */
-
- /* only allow initial seeding (late == false) once */
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&lock, flags))
- return;
-
- if (latch && !late)
- goto out;
-
- latch = true;
- prandom_seed_full_state(&net_rand_state);
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock, flags);
-}
-
-void prandom_reseed_late(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(true);
-}
-
-static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
-{
- __prandom_reseed(false);
- __prandom_start_seed_timer();
- return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(prandom_reseed);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
static struct prandom_test1 {
u32 seed;
@@ -421,7 +243,28 @@ static struct prandom_test2 {
{ 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U },
};
-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
+static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
+{
+ unsigned int val = 0;
+
+ (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
+ arch_get_random_int(&val));
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
+ bool mix_with_hwseed)
+{
+#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
+#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
+ state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
+ state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
+ state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
+ state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
+}
+
+static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
{
int i, j, errors = 0, runs = 0;
bool error = false;
@@ -461,5 +304,266 @@ static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
pr_warn("prandom: %d/%d self tests failed\n", errors, runs);
else
pr_info("prandom: %d self tests passed\n", runs);
+ return 0;
+}
+core_initcall(prandom_state_selftest);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The prandom_u32() implementation is now completely separate from the
+ * prandom_state() functions, which are retained (for now) for compatibility.
+ *
+ * Because of (ab)use in the networking code for choosing random TCP/UDP port
+ * numbers, which open DoS possibilities if guessable, we want something
+ * stronger than a standard PRNG. But the performance requirements of
+ * the network code do not allow robust crypto for this application.
+ *
+ * So this is a homebrew Junior Spaceman implementation, based on the
+ * lowest-latency trustworthy crypto primitive available, SipHash.
+ * (The authors of SipHash have not been consulted about this abuse of
+ * their work.)
+ *
+ * Standard SipHash-2-4 uses 2n+4 rounds to hash n words of input to
+ * one word of output. This abbreviated version uses 2 rounds per word
+ * of output.
+ */
+
+struct siprand_state {
+ unsigned long v0;
+ unsigned long v1;
+ unsigned long v2;
+ unsigned long v3;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct siprand_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
+
+/*
+ * This is the core CPRNG function. As "pseudorandom", this is not used
+ * for truly valuable things, just intended to be a PITA to guess.
+ * For maximum speed, we do just two SipHash rounds per word. This is
+ * the same rate as 4 rounds per 64 bits that SipHash normally uses,
+ * so hopefully it's reasonably secure.
+ *
+ * There are two changes from the official SipHash finalization:
+ * - We omit some constants XORed with v2 in the SipHash spec as irrelevant;
+ * they are there only to make the output rounds distinct from the input
+ * rounds, and this application has no input rounds.
+ * - Rather than returning v0^v1^v2^v3, return v1+v3.
+ * If you look at the SipHash round, the last operation on v3 is
+ * "v3 ^= v0", so "v0 ^ v3" just undoes that, a waste of time.
+ * Likewise "v1 ^= v2". (The rotate of v2 makes a difference, but
+ * it still cancels out half of the bits in v2 for no benefit.)
+ * Second, since the last combining operation was xor, continue the
+ * pattern of alternating xor/add for a tiny bit of extra non-linearity.
+ */
+static inline u32 siprand_u32(struct siprand_state *s)
+{
+ unsigned long v0 = s->v0, v1 = s->v1, v2 = s->v2, v3 = s->v3;
+
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ s->v0 = v0; s->v1 = v1; s->v2 = v2; s->v3 = v3;
+ return v1 + v3;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
+ *
+ * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
+ * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
+ * considered safe for cryptographic use.
+ */
+u32 prandom_u32(void)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ return res;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
+ * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
+ * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
+ */
+void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
+{
+ struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ u8 *ptr = buf;
+
+ while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) {
+ put_unaligned(siprand_u32(state), (u32 *)ptr);
+ ptr += sizeof(u32);
+ bytes -= sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+ if (bytes > 0) {
+ u32 rem = siprand_u32(state);
+
+ do {
+ *ptr++ = (u8)rem;
+ rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ } while (--bytes > 0);
+ }
+ put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
+
+/**
+ * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
+ * @entropy: entropy value
+ *
+ * Add some additional seed material to the prandom pool.
+ * The "entropy" is actually our IP address (the only caller is
+ * the network code), not for unpredictability, but to ensure that
+ * different machines are initialized differently.
+ */
+void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ add_device_randomness(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ unsigned long v0 = state->v0, v1 = state->v1;
+ unsigned long v2 = state->v2, v3 = state->v3;
+
+ do {
+ v3 ^= entropy;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= entropy;
+ } while (unlikely(!v0 || !v1 || !v2 || !v3));
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
+ * the prandom_u32() engine to be started.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_early(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned long v0, v1, v2, v3;
+
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v0))
+ v0 = jiffies;
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v1))
+ v1 = random_get_entropy();
+ v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+
+ v3 ^= i;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= i;
+
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ state->v0 = v0; state->v1 = v1;
+ state->v2 = v2; state->v3 = v3;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
+core_initcall(prandom_init_early);
+
+
+/* Stronger reseeding when available, and periodically thereafter. */
+static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused);
+
+static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, prandom_reseed);
+
+static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
+{
+ unsigned long expires;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Reinitialize each CPU's PRNG with 128 bits of key.
+ * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are,
+ * well, expected.
+ */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ struct siprand_state *state;
+ unsigned long v0 = get_random_long(), v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
+ unsigned long v1 = get_random_long(), v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ int j;
+
+ /*
+ * On 32-bit machines, hash in two extra words to
+ * approximate 128-bit key length. Not that the hash
+ * has that much security, but this prevents a trivial
+ * 64-bit brute force.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ unsigned long m = get_random_long();
+
+ v3 ^= m;
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
+ v0 ^= m;
+ }
#endif
+ /*
+ * Probably impossible in practice, but there is a
+ * theoretical risk that a race between this reseeding
+ * and the target CPU writing its state back could
+ * create the all-zero SipHash fixed point.
+ *
+ * To ensure that never happens, ensure the state
+ * we write contains no zero words.
+ */
+ state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0 ? v0 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1 ? v1 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2 ? v2 : -1ul);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3 ? v3 : -1ul);
+ }
+
+ /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
+ expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + 40 * HZ + prandom_u32_max(40 * HZ));
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, expires);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The random ready callback can be called from almost any interrupt.
+ * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
+ * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
+ */
+static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+{
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start periodic full reseeding as soon as strong
+ * random numbers are available.
+ */
+static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
+{
+ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+ .func = prandom_timer_start
+ };
+ int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+
+ if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+ prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+late_initcall(prandom_init_late);
--
2.9.0
From: Aili Yao <yaoaili(a)kingsoft.com>
>From commit 6915564dc5a8 ("ACPI: OSL: Change the type of
acpi_os_map_generic_address() return value"),
acpi_os_map_generic_address() will return logical address or NULL for
error, but for ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_IO case, it should be also return 0,
as it's a normal case, but now it will return -ENXIO. so check it out for
such case to avoid einj module initialization fail.
Fixes: 6915564dc5a8 ("ACPI: OSL: Change the type of
acpi_os_map_generic_address() return value")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse(a)arm.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Aili Yao <yaoaili(a)kingsoft.com>
---
drivers/acpi/apei/apei-base.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-base.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-base.c
index 552fd9f..3294cc8 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-base.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-base.c
@@ -633,6 +633,10 @@ int apei_map_generic_address(struct acpi_generic_address *reg)
if (rc)
return rc;
+ /* IO space doesn't need mapping */
+ if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_IO)
+ return 0;
+
if (!acpi_os_map_generic_address(reg))
return -ENXIO;
--
2.9.5
From: Yangtao Li <frank(a)allwinnertech.com>
It is found on many allwinner soc that there is a low probability that
the interrupt status cannot be read in sunxi_pinctrl_irq_handler. This
will cause the interrupt status of a gpio bank to always be active on
gic, preventing gic from responding to other spi interrupts correctly.
So we should call the chained_irq_* each time enter sunxi_pinctrl_irq_handler().
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yangtao Li <frank(a)allwinnertech.com>
---
drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sunxi.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sunxi.c b/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sunxi.c
index 9d8b59dafa4b..dc8d39ae045b 100644
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sunxi.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-sunxi.c
@@ -1141,20 +1141,22 @@ static void sunxi_pinctrl_irq_handler(struct irq_desc *desc)
WARN_ON(bank == pctl->desc->irq_banks);
+ chained_irq_enter(chip, desc);
+
reg = sunxi_irq_status_reg_from_bank(pctl->desc, bank);
val = readl(pctl->membase + reg);
if (val) {
int irqoffset;
- chained_irq_enter(chip, desc);
for_each_set_bit(irqoffset, &val, IRQ_PER_BANK) {
int pin_irq = irq_find_mapping(pctl->domain,
bank * IRQ_PER_BANK + irqoffset);
generic_handle_irq(pin_irq);
}
- chained_irq_exit(chip, desc);
}
+
+ chained_irq_exit(chip, desc);
}
static int sunxi_pinctrl_add_function(struct sunxi_pinctrl *pctl,
--
2.28.0
From: Evgeny Novikov <novikov(a)ispras.ru>
[ Upstream commit 0d66e04875c5aae876cf3d4f4be7978fa2b00523 ]
goku_probe() goes to error label "err" and invokes goku_remove()
in case of failures of pci_enable_device(), pci_resource_start()
and ioremap(). goku_remove() gets a device from
pci_get_drvdata(pdev) and works with it without any checks, in
particular it dereferences a corresponding pointer. But
goku_probe() did not set this device yet. So, one can expect
various crashes. The patch moves setting the device just after
allocation of memory for it.
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Reported-by: Pavel Andrianov <andrianov(a)ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Evgeny Novikov <novikov(a)ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c
index 1fdfec14a3ba1..5d4616061309e 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c
@@ -1773,6 +1773,7 @@ static int goku_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
goto err;
}
+ pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
spin_lock_init(&dev->lock);
dev->pdev = pdev;
dev->gadget.ops = &goku_ops;
@@ -1806,7 +1807,6 @@ static int goku_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
}
dev->regs = (struct goku_udc_regs __iomem *) base;
- pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
INFO(dev, "%s\n", driver_desc);
INFO(dev, "version: " DRIVER_VERSION " %s\n", dmastr());
INFO(dev, "irq %d, pci mem %p\n", pdev->irq, base);
--
2.27.0
From: Evgeny Novikov <novikov(a)ispras.ru>
[ Upstream commit 0d66e04875c5aae876cf3d4f4be7978fa2b00523 ]
goku_probe() goes to error label "err" and invokes goku_remove()
in case of failures of pci_enable_device(), pci_resource_start()
and ioremap(). goku_remove() gets a device from
pci_get_drvdata(pdev) and works with it without any checks, in
particular it dereferences a corresponding pointer. But
goku_probe() did not set this device yet. So, one can expect
various crashes. The patch moves setting the device just after
allocation of memory for it.
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Reported-by: Pavel Andrianov <andrianov(a)ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Evgeny Novikov <novikov(a)ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c
index 5107987bd3538..d363224dce6f5 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c
@@ -1772,6 +1772,7 @@ static int goku_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
goto err;
}
+ pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
spin_lock_init(&dev->lock);
dev->pdev = pdev;
dev->gadget.ops = &goku_ops;
@@ -1805,7 +1806,6 @@ static int goku_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
}
dev->regs = (struct goku_udc_regs __iomem *) base;
- pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
INFO(dev, "%s\n", driver_desc);
INFO(dev, "version: " DRIVER_VERSION " %s\n", dmastr());
INFO(dev, "irq %d, pci mem %p\n", pdev->irq, base);
--
2.27.0
From: Evgeny Novikov <novikov(a)ispras.ru>
[ Upstream commit 0d66e04875c5aae876cf3d4f4be7978fa2b00523 ]
goku_probe() goes to error label "err" and invokes goku_remove()
in case of failures of pci_enable_device(), pci_resource_start()
and ioremap(). goku_remove() gets a device from
pci_get_drvdata(pdev) and works with it without any checks, in
particular it dereferences a corresponding pointer. But
goku_probe() did not set this device yet. So, one can expect
various crashes. The patch moves setting the device just after
allocation of memory for it.
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Reported-by: Pavel Andrianov <andrianov(a)ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Evgeny Novikov <novikov(a)ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c
index 8433c22900dcb..0ed0d03651329 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c
@@ -1772,6 +1772,7 @@ static int goku_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
goto err;
}
+ pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
spin_lock_init(&dev->lock);
dev->pdev = pdev;
dev->gadget.ops = &goku_ops;
@@ -1805,7 +1806,6 @@ static int goku_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
}
dev->regs = (struct goku_udc_regs __iomem *) base;
- pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
INFO(dev, "%s\n", driver_desc);
INFO(dev, "version: " DRIVER_VERSION " %s\n", dmastr());
INFO(dev, "irq %d, pci mem %p\n", pdev->irq, base);
--
2.27.0
From: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla(a)linaro.org>
[ Upstream commit 3f48b6eba15ea342ef4cb420b580f5ed6605669f ]
With the current state of code, we would endup with something like
below in /proc/asound/cards for 2 machines based on this driver.
Machine 1:
0 [DB845c ]: DB845c - DB845c
DB845c
Machine 2:
0 [LenovoYOGAC6301]: Lenovo-YOGA-C63 - Lenovo-YOGA-C630-13Q50
LENOVO-81JL-LenovoYOGAC630_13Q50-LNVNB161216
This is not very UCM friendly both w.r.t to common up configs and
card identification, and UCM2 became totally not usefull with just
one ucm sdm845.conf for two machines which have different setups
w.r.t HDMI and other dais.
Reasons for such thing is partly because Qualcomm machine drivers never
cared to set driver_name.
This patch sets up driver name for the this driver to sort out the
UCM integration issues!
after this patch contents of /proc/asound/cards:
Machine 1:
0 [DB845c ]: sdm845 - DB845c
DB845c
Machine 2:
0 [LenovoYOGAC6301]: sdm845 - Lenovo-YOGA-C630-13Q50
LENOVO-81JL-LenovoYOGAC630_13Q50-LNVNB161216
with this its possible to align with what UCM2 expects and we can have
sdm845/DB845.conf
sdm845/LENOVO-81JL-LenovoYOGAC630_13Q50-LNVNB161216.conf
... for board variants. This should scale much better!
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla(a)linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201023095849.22894-1-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro…
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
sound/soc/qcom/sdm845.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/soc/qcom/sdm845.c b/sound/soc/qcom/sdm845.c
index 7e6c41e63d8e1..23e1de61e92e4 100644
--- a/sound/soc/qcom/sdm845.c
+++ b/sound/soc/qcom/sdm845.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "qdsp6/q6afe.h"
#include "../codecs/rt5663.h"
+#define DRIVER_NAME "sdm845"
#define DEFAULT_SAMPLE_RATE_48K 48000
#define DEFAULT_MCLK_RATE 24576000
#define TDM_BCLK_RATE 6144000
@@ -407,6 +408,7 @@ static int sdm845_snd_platform_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
goto data_alloc_fail;
}
+ card->driver_name = DRIVER_NAME;
card->dapm_widgets = sdm845_snd_widgets;
card->num_dapm_widgets = ARRAY_SIZE(sdm845_snd_widgets);
card->dev = dev;
--
2.27.0
Hello,
We ran automated tests on a recent commit from this kernel tree:
Kernel repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Commit: 0a6c35c58d56 - drm/i915/gt: Use the local HWSP offset during submission
The results of these automated tests are provided below.
Overall result: PASSED
Merge: OK
Compile: OK
Tests: OK
All kernel binaries, config files, and logs are available for download here:
https://arr-cki-prod-datawarehouse-public.s3.amazonaws.com/index.html?prefi…
Please reply to this email if you have any questions about the tests that we
ran or if you have any suggestions on how to make future tests more effective.
,-. ,-.
( C ) ( K ) Continuous
`-',-.`-' Kernel
( I ) Integration
`-'
______________________________________________________________________________
Compile testing
---------------
We compiled the kernel for 4 architectures:
aarch64:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
ppc64le:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
s390x:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
x86_64:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
Hardware testing
----------------
We booted each kernel and ran the following tests:
aarch64:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ❌ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
🚧 ✅ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
✅ ACPI table test
✅ ACPI enabled test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
✅ pciutils: update pci ids test
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ Firmware test suite
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ kdump - kexec_boot
ppc64le:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
🚧 ✅ kdump - sysrq-c
Host 3:
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
🚧 ✅ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ✅ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ✅ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 4:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
Host 5:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
s390x:
Host 1:
✅ Boot test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
🚧 ❌ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
🚧 ❌ Storage nvme - tcp
x86_64:
Host 1:
✅ Boot test
🚧 ✅ kdump - sysrq-c
🚧 ✅ kdump - file-load
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
⚡⚡⚡ storage: software RAID testing
⚡⚡⚡ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CPU: Frequency Driver Test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CPU: Idle Test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IOMMU boot test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ power-management: cpupower/sanity test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 3:
✅ Boot test
✅ ACPI table test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
✅ pciutils: sanity smoke test
✅ pciutils: update pci ids test
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ Firmware test suite
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ kdump - kexec_boot
Host 4:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
⚡⚡⚡ storage: software RAID testing
⚡⚡⚡ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CPU: Frequency Driver Test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CPU: Idle Test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IOMMU boot test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ power-management: cpupower/sanity test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 5:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ CPU: Frequency Driver Test
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IOMMU boot test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ power-management: cpupower/sanity test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Test sources: https://gitlab.com/cki-project/kernel-tests
💚 Pull requests are welcome for new tests or improvements to existing tests!
Aborted tests
-------------
Tests that didn't complete running successfully are marked with ⚡⚡⚡.
If this was caused by an infrastructure issue, we try to mark that
explicitly in the report.
Waived tests
------------
If the test run included waived tests, they are marked with 🚧. Such tests are
executed but their results are not taken into account. Tests are waived when
their results are not reliable enough, e.g. when they're just introduced or are
being fixed.
Testing timeout
---------------
We aim to provide a report within reasonable timeframe. Tests that haven't
finished running yet are marked with ⏱.
On 9/14/20 2:00 AM, Zelin Deng wrote:
> pvclock data pointers of vCPUs >= HVC_BOOT_ARRAY_SIZE (64) are stored in
> hvclock_mem wihch is initialized in kvmclock_init_mem().
> Here're 3 scenarios in current implementation:
> - no-kvmclock is set in cmdline. kvm pv clock driver is disabled,
> no impact.
> - no-kvmclock-vsyscall is set in cmdline. kvmclock_init_mem() won't
> be called. No memory for storing pvclock data of vCPUs >= 64, vCPUs
> >= 64 can not be online or hotpluged.
> - tsc unstable. kvmclock_init_mem() won't be called. vCPUs >= 64 can
> not be online or hotpluged.
> It's not reasonable that vCPUs hotplug have been impacted by last 2
> scenarios. Hence move kvmclock_init_mem() to front, in case hvclock_mem
> can not be initialized unexpectedly.
>
> Fixes: 6a1cac56f41f9 (x86/kvm: Use __bss_decrypted attribute in shared variables)
> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com>
> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson(a)intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Zelin Deng <zelin.deng(a)linux.alibaba.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 9 +++++++--
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> index 34b18f6eeb2c..1abbda25e037 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> @@ -271,7 +271,14 @@ static int __init kvm_setup_vsyscall_timeinfo(void)
> {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> u8 flags;
> +#endif
> +
> + if (!kvmclock)
> + return 0;
Overall, I agree with the fix to move the kvmclock_init_mem() in the
beginning of the function so that memory hvclock_mem is allocated. But
curious, why do we need this check? The if (kvmclock) did not exist in
original function and I don't think kvmclock_init_mem() has any
dependency with it, am I missing something ?
> +
> + kvmclock_init_mem();
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> if (!per_cpu(hv_clock_per_cpu, 0) || !kvmclock_vsyscall)
> return 0;
>
> @@ -282,8 +289,6 @@ static int __init kvm_setup_vsyscall_timeinfo(void)
> kvm_clock.vdso_clock_mode = VDSO_CLOCKMODE_PVCLOCK;
> #endif
>
> - kvmclock_init_mem();
> -
> return 0;
> }
> early_initcall(kvm_setup_vsyscall_timeinfo);
Hi,
On 2020-10-19 18:01, Mathy Vanhoef wrote:
> When sending EAPOL frames via NL80211 they are treated as injected
> frames in mac80211. Due to commit 1df2bdba528b ("mac80211: never drop
> injected frames even if normally not allowed") these injected frames
> were not assigned a sta context in the function ieee80211_tx_dequeue,
> causing certain wireless network cards to always send EAPOL frames in
> plaintext. This may cause compatibility issues with some clients or
> APs, which for instance can cause the group key handshake to fail and
> in turn would cause the station to get disconnected.
>
> This commit fixes this regression by assigning a sta context in
> ieee80211_tx_dequeue to injected frames as well.
>
> Note that sending EAPOL frames in plaintext is not a security issue
> since they contain their own encryption and authentication protection.
>
> Fixes: 1df2bdba528b ("mac80211: never drop injected frames even if normally not allowed")
> Reported-by: Thomas Deutschmann <whissi(a)gentoo.org>
> Tested-by: Christian Hesse <list(a)eworm.de>
> Tested-by: Thomas Deutschmann <whissi(a)gentoo.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be>
> ---
> net/mac80211/tx.c | 7 ++++---
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c
> index 8ba10a48d..55b41167a 100644
> --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
> +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
> @@ -3619,13 +3619,14 @@ struct sk_buff *ieee80211_tx_dequeue(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
> tx.skb = skb;
> tx.sdata = vif_to_sdata(info->control.vif);
>
> - if (txq->sta && !(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_INJECTED)) {
> + if (txq->sta) {
> tx.sta = container_of(txq->sta, struct sta_info, sta);
> /*
> * Drop unicast frames to unauthorised stations unless they are
> - * EAPOL frames from the local station.
> + * injected frames or EAPOL frames from the local station.
> */
> - if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
> + if (unlikely(!(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_INJECTED) &&
> + ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
> !ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&tx.sdata->vif) &&
> tx.sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB &&
> !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
>
Can we please get this applied to linux-5.10 and linux-5.9?
Is there anything left to do where I can help with?
Thanks!
--
Regards,
Thomas Deutschmann / Gentoo Linux Developer
C4DD 695F A713 8F24 2AA1 5638 5849 7EE5 1D5D 74A5
The patch below does not apply to the 5.9-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 11522448e641e8f1690c9db06e01985e8e19b401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy(a)csgroup.eu>
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2020 15:14:30 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] powerpc/603: Always fault when _PAGE_ACCESSED is not set
The kernel expects pte_young() to work regardless of CONFIG_SWAP.
Make sure a minor fault is taken to set _PAGE_ACCESSED when it
is not already set, regardless of the selection of CONFIG_SWAP.
Fixes: 84de6ab0e904 ("powerpc/603: don't handle PAGE_ACCESSED in TLB miss handlers.")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy(a)csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a44367744de54e2315b2f1a8cbbd7f88488072e0.16023428…
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S
index 5eb9eedac920..2aa16d5368e1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S
@@ -457,11 +457,7 @@ InstructionTLBMiss:
cmplw 0,r1,r3
#endif
mfspr r2, SPRN_SPRG_PGDIR
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
li r1,_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_EXEC
-#else
- li r1,_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_EXEC
-#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC)
bgt- 112f
lis r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@ha /* if kernel address, use */
@@ -523,11 +519,7 @@ DataLoadTLBMiss:
lis r1, TASK_SIZE@h /* check if kernel address */
cmplw 0,r1,r3
mfspr r2, SPRN_SPRG_PGDIR
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
li r1, _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED
-#else
- li r1, _PAGE_PRESENT
-#endif
bgt- 112f
lis r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@ha /* if kernel address, use */
addi r2, r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@l /* kernel page table */
@@ -603,11 +595,7 @@ DataStoreTLBMiss:
lis r1, TASK_SIZE@h /* check if kernel address */
cmplw 0,r1,r3
mfspr r2, SPRN_SPRG_PGDIR
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
li r1, _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED
-#else
- li r1, _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PRESENT
-#endif
bgt- 112f
lis r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@ha /* if kernel address, use */
addi r2, r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@l /* kernel page table */
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 11522448e641e8f1690c9db06e01985e8e19b401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy(a)csgroup.eu>
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2020 15:14:30 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] powerpc/603: Always fault when _PAGE_ACCESSED is not set
The kernel expects pte_young() to work regardless of CONFIG_SWAP.
Make sure a minor fault is taken to set _PAGE_ACCESSED when it
is not already set, regardless of the selection of CONFIG_SWAP.
Fixes: 84de6ab0e904 ("powerpc/603: don't handle PAGE_ACCESSED in TLB miss handlers.")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy(a)csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a44367744de54e2315b2f1a8cbbd7f88488072e0.16023428…
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S
index 5eb9eedac920..2aa16d5368e1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S
@@ -457,11 +457,7 @@ InstructionTLBMiss:
cmplw 0,r1,r3
#endif
mfspr r2, SPRN_SPRG_PGDIR
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
li r1,_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_EXEC
-#else
- li r1,_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_EXEC
-#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC)
bgt- 112f
lis r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@ha /* if kernel address, use */
@@ -523,11 +519,7 @@ DataLoadTLBMiss:
lis r1, TASK_SIZE@h /* check if kernel address */
cmplw 0,r1,r3
mfspr r2, SPRN_SPRG_PGDIR
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
li r1, _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED
-#else
- li r1, _PAGE_PRESENT
-#endif
bgt- 112f
lis r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@ha /* if kernel address, use */
addi r2, r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@l /* kernel page table */
@@ -603,11 +595,7 @@ DataStoreTLBMiss:
lis r1, TASK_SIZE@h /* check if kernel address */
cmplw 0,r1,r3
mfspr r2, SPRN_SPRG_PGDIR
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
li r1, _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED
-#else
- li r1, _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PRESENT
-#endif
bgt- 112f
lis r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@ha /* if kernel address, use */
addi r2, r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@l /* kernel page table */
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
firmware: xilinx: fix out-of-bounds access
to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From f3217d6f2f7a76b36a3326ad58c8897f4d5fbe31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 16:54:36 +0100
Subject: firmware: xilinx: fix out-of-bounds access
The zynqmp_pm_set_suspend_mode() and zynqmp_pm_get_trustzone_version()
functions pass values as api_id into zynqmp_pm_invoke_fn
that are beyond PM_API_MAX, resulting in an out-of-bounds access:
drivers/firmware/xilinx/zynqmp.c: In function 'zynqmp_pm_set_suspend_mode':
drivers/firmware/xilinx/zynqmp.c:150:24: warning: array subscript 2562 is above array bounds of 'u32[64]' {aka 'unsigned int[64]'} [-Warray-bounds]
150 | if (zynqmp_pm_features[api_id] != PM_FEATURE_UNCHECKED)
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~
drivers/firmware/xilinx/zynqmp.c:28:12: note: while referencing 'zynqmp_pm_features'
28 | static u32 zynqmp_pm_features[PM_API_MAX];
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Replace the resulting undefined behavior with an error return.
This may break some things that happen to work at the moment
but seems better than randomly overwriting kernel data.
I assume we need additional fixes for the two functions that now
return an error.
Fixes: 76582671eb5d ("firmware: xilinx: Add Zynqmp firmware driver")
Fixes: e178df31cf41 ("firmware: xilinx: Implement ZynqMP power management APIs")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201026155449.3703142-1-arnd@kernel.org
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/firmware/xilinx/zynqmp.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/xilinx/zynqmp.c b/drivers/firmware/xilinx/zynqmp.c
index 8d1ff2454e2e..efb8a66efc68 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/xilinx/zynqmp.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/xilinx/zynqmp.c
@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ static int zynqmp_pm_feature(u32 api_id)
return 0;
/* Return value if feature is already checked */
+ if (api_id > ARRAY_SIZE(zynqmp_pm_features))
+ return PM_FEATURE_INVALID;
+
if (zynqmp_pm_features[api_id] != PM_FEATURE_UNCHECKED)
return zynqmp_pm_features[api_id];
--
2.29.2
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From b02414c8f045ab3b9afc816c3735bc98c5c3d262 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 15:31:27 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] ring-buffer: Fix recursion protection transitions between
interrupt context
The recursion protection of the ring buffer depends on preempt_count() to be
correct. But it is possible that the ring buffer gets called after an
interrupt comes in but before it updates the preempt_count(). This will
trigger a false positive in the recursion code.
Use the same trick from the ftrace function callback recursion code which
uses a "transition" bit that gets set, to allow for a single recursion for
to handle transitions between contexts.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 567cd4da54ff4 ("ring-buffer: User context bit recursion checking")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index 7f45fd9d5a45..dc83b3fa9fe7 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -438,14 +438,16 @@ enum {
};
/*
* Used for which event context the event is in.
- * NMI = 0
- * IRQ = 1
- * SOFTIRQ = 2
- * NORMAL = 3
+ * TRANSITION = 0
+ * NMI = 1
+ * IRQ = 2
+ * SOFTIRQ = 3
+ * NORMAL = 4
*
* See trace_recursive_lock() comment below for more details.
*/
enum {
+ RB_CTX_TRANSITION,
RB_CTX_NMI,
RB_CTX_IRQ,
RB_CTX_SOFTIRQ,
@@ -3014,10 +3016,10 @@ rb_wakeups(struct trace_buffer *buffer, struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
* a bit of overhead in something as critical as function tracing,
* we use a bitmask trick.
*
- * bit 0 = NMI context
- * bit 1 = IRQ context
- * bit 2 = SoftIRQ context
- * bit 3 = normal context.
+ * bit 1 = NMI context
+ * bit 2 = IRQ context
+ * bit 3 = SoftIRQ context
+ * bit 4 = normal context.
*
* This works because this is the order of contexts that can
* preempt other contexts. A SoftIRQ never preempts an IRQ
@@ -3040,6 +3042,30 @@ rb_wakeups(struct trace_buffer *buffer, struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
* The least significant bit can be cleared this way, and it
* just so happens that it is the same bit corresponding to
* the current context.
+ *
+ * Now the TRANSITION bit breaks the above slightly. The TRANSITION bit
+ * is set when a recursion is detected at the current context, and if
+ * the TRANSITION bit is already set, it will fail the recursion.
+ * This is needed because there's a lag between the changing of
+ * interrupt context and updating the preempt count. In this case,
+ * a false positive will be found. To handle this, one extra recursion
+ * is allowed, and this is done by the TRANSITION bit. If the TRANSITION
+ * bit is already set, then it is considered a recursion and the function
+ * ends. Otherwise, the TRANSITION bit is set, and that bit is returned.
+ *
+ * On the trace_recursive_unlock(), the TRANSITION bit will be the first
+ * to be cleared. Even if it wasn't the context that set it. That is,
+ * if an interrupt comes in while NORMAL bit is set and the ring buffer
+ * is called before preempt_count() is updated, since the check will
+ * be on the NORMAL bit, the TRANSITION bit will then be set. If an
+ * NMI then comes in, it will set the NMI bit, but when the NMI code
+ * does the trace_recursive_unlock() it will clear the TRANSTION bit
+ * and leave the NMI bit set. But this is fine, because the interrupt
+ * code that set the TRANSITION bit will then clear the NMI bit when it
+ * calls trace_recursive_unlock(). If another NMI comes in, it will
+ * set the TRANSITION bit and continue.
+ *
+ * Note: The TRANSITION bit only handles a single transition between context.
*/
static __always_inline int
@@ -3055,8 +3081,16 @@ trace_recursive_lock(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
bit = pc & NMI_MASK ? RB_CTX_NMI :
pc & HARDIRQ_MASK ? RB_CTX_IRQ : RB_CTX_SOFTIRQ;
- if (unlikely(val & (1 << (bit + cpu_buffer->nest))))
- return 1;
+ if (unlikely(val & (1 << (bit + cpu_buffer->nest)))) {
+ /*
+ * It is possible that this was called by transitioning
+ * between interrupt context, and preempt_count() has not
+ * been updated yet. In this case, use the TRANSITION bit.
+ */
+ bit = RB_CTX_TRANSITION;
+ if (val & (1 << (bit + cpu_buffer->nest)))
+ return 1;
+ }
val |= (1 << (bit + cpu_buffer->nest));
cpu_buffer->current_context = val;
@@ -3071,8 +3105,8 @@ trace_recursive_unlock(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
cpu_buffer->current_context - (1 << cpu_buffer->nest);
}
-/* The recursive locking above uses 4 bits */
-#define NESTED_BITS 4
+/* The recursive locking above uses 5 bits */
+#define NESTED_BITS 5
/**
* ring_buffer_nest_start - Allow to trace while nested
The following commit has been merged into the locking/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 1e106aa3509b86738769775969822ffc1ec21bf4
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/1e106aa3509b86738769775969822ffc1ec21bf4
Author: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 06 Nov 2020 11:52:05 +03:00
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
CommitterDate: Mon, 09 Nov 2020 14:30:30 +01:00
futex: Don't enable IRQs unconditionally in put_pi_state()
The exit_pi_state_list() function calls put_pi_state() with IRQs disabled
and is not expecting that IRQs will be enabled inside the function.
Use the _irqsave() variant so that IRQs are restored to the original state
instead of being enabled unconditionally.
Fixes: 153fbd1226fb ("futex: Fix more put_pi_state() vs. exit_pi_state_list() races")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106085205.GA1159983@mwanda
---
kernel/futex.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index ac32887..00259c7 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -788,8 +788,9 @@ static void put_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
*/
if (pi_state->owner) {
struct task_struct *owner;
+ unsigned long flags;
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock, flags);
owner = pi_state->owner;
if (owner) {
raw_spin_lock(&owner->pi_lock);
@@ -797,7 +798,7 @@ static void put_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
raw_spin_unlock(&owner->pi_lock);
}
rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex, owner);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock, flags);
}
if (current->pi_state_cache) {
From: Tomasz Maciej Nowak <tmn505(a)gmail.com>
commit 5253cb8c00a6f4356760efb38bca0e0393aa06de upstream.
The maker of this board and its variants, stores MAC address in U-Boot
environment. Add alias for bootloader to recognise, to which ethernet
node inject the factory MAC address.
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Maciej Nowak <tmn505(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement(a)bootlin.com>
[pali: Backported to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali(a)kernel.org>
---
This patch is backport for 4.14 stable release. From original patch were
removed aliases for uarts as they are not defined in 4.14 kernel version.
Stable releases 4.19 and 5.4 already contain backport of this patch.
---
arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-espressobin.dts | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-espressobin.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-espressobin.dts
index 2ce52ba74f73..13c0ec053ada 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-espressobin.dts
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-espressobin.dts
@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@
model = "Globalscale Marvell ESPRESSOBin Board";
compatible = "globalscale,espressobin", "marvell,armada3720", "marvell,armada3710";
+ aliases {
+ ethernet0 = ð0;
+ };
+
chosen {
stdout-path = "serial0:115200n8";
};
--
2.20.1
commit b64d814257b027e29a474bcd660f6372490138c7 upstream.
Espressobin boards have 3 ethernet ports and some of them got assigned more
then one MAC address. MAC addresses are stored in U-Boot environment.
Since commit a2c7023f7075c ("net: dsa: read mac address from DT for slave
device") kernel can use MAC addresses from DT for particular DSA port.
Currently Espressobin DTS file contains alias just for ethernet0.
This patch defines additional ethernet aliases in Espressobin DTS files, so
bootloader can fill correct MAC address for DSA switch ports if more MAC
addresses were specified.
DT alias ethernet1 is used for wan port, DT aliases ethernet2 and ethernet3
are used for lan ports for both Espressobin revisions (V5 and V7).
Fixes: 5253cb8c00a6f ("arm64: dts: marvell: espressobin: add ethernet alias")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # a2c7023f7075c: dsa: read mac address
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali(a)kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew(a)lunn.ch>
Reviewed-by: Andre Heider <a.heider(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement(a)bootlin.com>
[pali: Backported Espressobin rev V5 changes to 5.4 and 4.19 versions]
---
This patch is backport for 5.4 and 4.19 stable releases. From original
patch were removed changes for Espressobin revision V7 as these older
kernel versions have DTS files only for Espressobin revision V5.
Note that this patch depends on commit a2c7023f7075c ("dsa: read mac
address") as stated on Cc: line and for 4.19 release needs to be
backported first.
---
.../boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-espressobin.dts | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-espressobin.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-espressobin.dts
index 05dc58c13fa4..6226e7e80980 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-espressobin.dts
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-espressobin.dts
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@
aliases {
ethernet0 = ð0;
+ /* for dsa slave device */
+ ethernet1 = &switch0port1;
+ ethernet2 = &switch0port2;
+ ethernet3 = &switch0port3;
serial0 = &uart0;
serial1 = &uart1;
};
@@ -147,7 +151,7 @@
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
- port@0 {
+ switch0port0: port@0 {
reg = <0>;
label = "cpu";
ethernet = <ð0>;
@@ -158,19 +162,19 @@
};
};
- port@1 {
+ switch0port1: port@1 {
reg = <1>;
label = "wan";
phy-handle = <&switch0phy0>;
};
- port@2 {
+ switch0port2: port@2 {
reg = <2>;
label = "lan0";
phy-handle = <&switch0phy1>;
};
- port@3 {
+ switch0port3: port@3 {
reg = <3>;
label = "lan1";
phy-handle = <&switch0phy2>;
--
2.20.1
perf may fail to build in v4.19.y with the following error.
util/evsel.c: In function ‘perf_evsel__exit’:
util/util.h:25:28: error:
passing argument 1 of ‘free’ discards ‘const’ qualifier from pointer target type
This is observed (at least) with gcc v6.5.0. The underlying problem is
the following statement.
zfree(&evsel->pmu_name);
evsel->pmu_name is decared 'const *'. zfree in turn is defined as
#define zfree(ptr) ({ free(*ptr); *ptr = NULL; })
and thus passes the const * to free(). The problem is not seen
in the upstream kernel since zfree() has been rewritten there.
The problem has been introduced into v4.19.y with the backport of upstream
commit d4953f7ef1a2 (perf parse-events: Fix 3 use after frees found with
clang ASAN).
One possible fix of this problem would be to not declare pmu_name
as const. This patch chooses to typecast the parameter of zfree()
to void *, following the guidance from the upstream kernel which
does the same since commit 7f7c536f23e6a ("tools lib: Adopt
zalloc()/zfree() from tools/perf")
Fixes: a0100a363098 ("perf parse-events: Fix 3 use after frees found with clang ASAN")
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net>
---
This patch only applies to v4.19.y and has no upstream equivalent.
tools/perf/util/util.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.h b/tools/perf/util/util.h
index dc58254a2b69..8c01b2cfdb1a 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/util.h
+++ b/tools/perf/util/util.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static inline void *zalloc(size_t size)
return calloc(1, size);
}
-#define zfree(ptr) ({ free(*ptr); *ptr = NULL; })
+#define zfree(ptr) ({ free((void *)*ptr); *ptr = NULL; })
struct dirent;
struct nsinfo;
--
2.17.1
.. oh, and I suspect it should have been marked for stable.
I added Oleg's ack (implicit in an earlier thread), but didn't add a stable tag.
It's commit b4e00444cab4 ("fork: fix copy_process(CLONE_PARENT) race
with the exiting ->real_parent") in my tree.
I'm not sure how serious it is. Yeah, the race can cause the wrong
exit signal in theory, but I think you almost have to do it with
cooperating processes, at which point you could have just done it
intentionally in the first place.
But it does look like a real data race, and the fix looks small and
obvious enough that I think it's stable material.
Oleg?
Linus
On Sun, Nov 8, 2020 at 11:19 AM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 6, 2020 at 10:47 PM Eddy Wu <itseddy0402(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > current->group_leader->exit_signal may change during copy_process() if
> > current->real_parent exits, move the assignment inside tasklist_lock to avoid
> > the race.
>
> Applied. Thanks,
>
> Linus
The patch below does not apply to the 5.9-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From e67d01d8494640018b08cd767aeb2824a8e11983 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 22:10:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] drm/i915/gt: Flush xcs before tgl breadcrumbs
In a simple test case that writes to scratch and then busy-waits for the
batch to be signaled, we observe that the signal is before the write is
posted. That is bad news.
Splitting the flush + write_dword into two separate flush_dw prevents
the issue from being reproduced, we can presume the post-sync op is not
so post-sync.
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/216
Testcase: igt/gem_exec_fence/parallel
Testcase: igt/i915_selftest/live/gt_timelines
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala(a)linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201102221057.29626-2-chris@…
(cherry picked from commit 09212e81e5450743e5b06b27c4e344e4c45b630d)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_lrc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_lrc.c
index d12861cf0753..f82c6dd1de18 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_lrc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_lrc.c
@@ -4994,7 +4994,9 @@ gen12_emit_fini_breadcrumb_tail(struct i915_request *request, u32 *cs)
static u32 *gen12_emit_fini_breadcrumb(struct i915_request *rq, u32 *cs)
{
- return gen12_emit_fini_breadcrumb_tail(rq, emit_xcs_breadcrumb(rq, cs));
+ /* XXX Stalling flush before seqno write; post-sync not */
+ cs = emit_xcs_breadcrumb(rq, __gen8_emit_flush_dw(cs, 0, 0, 0));
+ return gen12_emit_fini_breadcrumb_tail(rq, cs);
}
static u32 *
On Sun, Nov 8, 2020 at 7:35 PM Greg KH <greg(a)kroah.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 08, 2020 at 05:13:35PM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Sun, Nov 08, 2020 at 04:41:35PM +0100, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> > > On Sat, Nov 7, 2020 at 7:41 PM Linus Torvalds
> > > <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, Nov 7, 2020 at 1:29 AM Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)ffwll.ch> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > It's buggy:
> > > >
> > > > Ack. Who is taking this? Should I do it directly, or expect this
> > > > through Greg's tty/char tree, or what?
> > >
> > > I've sent out v2 with more archive links, typo in commit message fixed
> > > and ack from Peilin added. I'll leave merging up to you guys. Note
> > > that cc: stable still needs to be added, I left that out to avoid an
> > > accidental leak.
> >
> > Great, I'll grab this now and add it to my tty tree and send it to Linus
> > later today.
> >
> > Unless I should be holding off somehow on this? I didn't see anyone
> > wanting to embargo this, or did I miss it?
>
> Given that Minh didn't ask for any embargo, and it's good to get this
> fixed as soon as possible, I've queued this up and will send it to Linus
> in a few minutes.
>
> Thanks all for the quick response,
cc: stable didn't get added I think.
Stable teams, please backport commit 3c4e0dff2095 ("vt: Disable
KD_FONT_OP_COPY") to all supported kernels.
Thanks, Daniel
--
Daniel Vetter
Software Engineer, Intel Corporation
http://blog.ffwll.ch
837a6e7f5cdb ("fs: add generic UNRESVSP and ZERO_RANGE ioctl handlers") changed
ioctls XFS_IOC_UNRESVSP XFS_IOC_UNRESVSP64 and XFS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE to be generic
instead of xfs specific.
Because of this change, 36f11775da75 ("xfs: properly serialise fallocate against
AIO+DIO") needed adaptation, as 5.4 still uses the xfs specific ioctls.
Without this, xfstests xfs/242 and xfs/290 fail. Both of these tests test
XFS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE.
Fixes: 36f11775da75 ("xfs: properly serialise fallocate against AIO+DIO")
Tested-by: Andy Strohman <astroh(a)amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong(a)oracle.com>
---
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
index bf0435dbec43..b3021d9b34a5 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -622,7 +622,6 @@ xfs_ioc_space(
error = xfs_break_layouts(inode, &iolock, BREAK_UNMAP);
if (error)
goto out_unlock;
- inode_dio_wait(inode);
switch (bf->l_whence) {
case 0: /*SEEK_SET*/
@@ -668,6 +667,31 @@ xfs_ioc_space(
goto out_unlock;
}
+ /*
+ * Must wait for all AIO to complete before we continue as AIO can
+ * change the file size on completion without holding any locks we
+ * currently hold. We must do this first because AIO can update both
+ * the on disk and in memory inode sizes, and the operations that follow
+ * require the in-memory size to be fully up-to-date.
+ */
+ inode_dio_wait(inode);
+
+ /*
+ * Now that AIO and DIO has drained we can flush and (if necessary)
+ * invalidate the cached range over the first operation we are about to
+ * run. We include zero range here because it starts with a hole punch
+ * over the target range.
+ */
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case XFS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE:
+ case XFS_IOC_UNRESVSP:
+ case XFS_IOC_UNRESVSP64:
+ error = xfs_flush_unmap_range(ip, bf->l_start, bf->l_len);
+ if (error)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ break;
+ }
+
switch (cmd) {
case XFS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE:
flags |= XFS_PREALLOC_SET;
--
2.16.6
The patch below does not apply to the 5.9-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 537457a979a02a410b555fab289dcb28b588f33b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 16:19:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] drm/i915: Hold onto an explicit ref to i915_vma_work.pinned
Since __vma_release is run by a kworker after the fence has been
signaled, it is no longer protected by the active reference on the vma,
and so the alias of vw->pinned to vma->obj is also not protected by a
reference on the object. Add an explicit reference for vw->pinned so it
will always be safe.
Found by inspection.
Fixes: 54d7195f8c64 ("drm/i915: Unpin vma->obj on early error")
Reported-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201102161931.30031-1-chris@…
(cherry picked from commit bc73e5d33048b7ab5f12b11b5d923700467a8e1d)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c
index ffb5287e055a..caa9b041616b 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c
@@ -314,8 +314,10 @@ static void __vma_release(struct dma_fence_work *work)
{
struct i915_vma_work *vw = container_of(work, typeof(*vw), base);
- if (vw->pinned)
+ if (vw->pinned) {
__i915_gem_object_unpin_pages(vw->pinned);
+ i915_gem_object_put(vw->pinned);
+ }
i915_vm_free_pt_stash(vw->vm, &vw->stash);
i915_vm_put(vw->vm);
@@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ int i915_vma_bind(struct i915_vma *vma,
if (vma->obj) {
__i915_gem_object_pin_pages(vma->obj);
- work->pinned = vma->obj;
+ work->pinned = i915_gem_object_get(vma->obj);
}
} else {
vma->ops->bind_vma(vma->vm, NULL, vma, cache_level, bind_flags);
The patch below does not apply to the 5.9-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 59dd13ad310793757e34afa489dd6fc8544fc3da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2020 21:38:25 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drm/i915/gem: Flush coherency domains on first
set-domain-ioctl
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Avoid skipping what appears to be a no-op set-domain-ioctl if the cache
coherency state is inconsistent with our target domain. This also has
the utility of using the population of the pages to validate the backing
store.
The danger in skipping the first set-domain is leaving the cache
inconsistent and submitting stale data, or worse leaving the clean data
in the cache and not flushing it to the GPU. The impact should be small
as it requires a no-op set-domain as the very first ioctl in a
particular sequence not found in typical userspace.
Reported-by: Zbigniew Kempczyński <zbigniew.kempczynski(a)intel.com>
Fixes: 754a25442705 ("drm/i915: Skip object locking around a no-op set-domain ioctl")
Testcase: igt/gem_mmap_offset/blt-coherency
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.william.auld(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Kempczyński <zbigniew.kempczynski(a)intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201019203825.10966-1-chris@…
(cherry picked from commit 44c2200afcd59f441b43f27829b4003397cc495d)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_domain.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_domain.c
index 7c90a63c273d..fcce6909f201 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_domain.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_domain.c
@@ -508,21 +508,6 @@ i915_gem_set_domain_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
if (!obj)
return -ENOENT;
- /*
- * Already in the desired write domain? Nothing for us to do!
- *
- * We apply a little bit of cunning here to catch a broader set of
- * no-ops. If obj->write_domain is set, we must be in the same
- * obj->read_domains, and only that domain. Therefore, if that
- * obj->write_domain matches the request read_domains, we are
- * already in the same read/write domain and can skip the operation,
- * without having to further check the requested write_domain.
- */
- if (READ_ONCE(obj->write_domain) == read_domains) {
- err = 0;
- goto out;
- }
-
/*
* Try to flush the object off the GPU without holding the lock.
* We will repeat the flush holding the lock in the normal manner
@@ -560,6 +545,19 @@ i915_gem_set_domain_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
if (err)
goto out;
+ /*
+ * Already in the desired write domain? Nothing for us to do!
+ *
+ * We apply a little bit of cunning here to catch a broader set of
+ * no-ops. If obj->write_domain is set, we must be in the same
+ * obj->read_domains, and only that domain. Therefore, if that
+ * obj->write_domain matches the request read_domains, we are
+ * already in the same read/write domain and can skip the operation,
+ * without having to further check the requested write_domain.
+ */
+ if (READ_ONCE(obj->write_domain) == read_domains)
+ goto out_unpin;
+
err = i915_gem_object_lock_interruptible(obj, NULL);
if (err)
goto out_unpin;
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 59dd13ad310793757e34afa489dd6fc8544fc3da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2020 21:38:25 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drm/i915/gem: Flush coherency domains on first
set-domain-ioctl
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Avoid skipping what appears to be a no-op set-domain-ioctl if the cache
coherency state is inconsistent with our target domain. This also has
the utility of using the population of the pages to validate the backing
store.
The danger in skipping the first set-domain is leaving the cache
inconsistent and submitting stale data, or worse leaving the clean data
in the cache and not flushing it to the GPU. The impact should be small
as it requires a no-op set-domain as the very first ioctl in a
particular sequence not found in typical userspace.
Reported-by: Zbigniew Kempczyński <zbigniew.kempczynski(a)intel.com>
Fixes: 754a25442705 ("drm/i915: Skip object locking around a no-op set-domain ioctl")
Testcase: igt/gem_mmap_offset/blt-coherency
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.william.auld(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Kempczyński <zbigniew.kempczynski(a)intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201019203825.10966-1-chris@…
(cherry picked from commit 44c2200afcd59f441b43f27829b4003397cc495d)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_domain.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_domain.c
index 7c90a63c273d..fcce6909f201 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_domain.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_domain.c
@@ -508,21 +508,6 @@ i915_gem_set_domain_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
if (!obj)
return -ENOENT;
- /*
- * Already in the desired write domain? Nothing for us to do!
- *
- * We apply a little bit of cunning here to catch a broader set of
- * no-ops. If obj->write_domain is set, we must be in the same
- * obj->read_domains, and only that domain. Therefore, if that
- * obj->write_domain matches the request read_domains, we are
- * already in the same read/write domain and can skip the operation,
- * without having to further check the requested write_domain.
- */
- if (READ_ONCE(obj->write_domain) == read_domains) {
- err = 0;
- goto out;
- }
-
/*
* Try to flush the object off the GPU without holding the lock.
* We will repeat the flush holding the lock in the normal manner
@@ -560,6 +545,19 @@ i915_gem_set_domain_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
if (err)
goto out;
+ /*
+ * Already in the desired write domain? Nothing for us to do!
+ *
+ * We apply a little bit of cunning here to catch a broader set of
+ * no-ops. If obj->write_domain is set, we must be in the same
+ * obj->read_domains, and only that domain. Therefore, if that
+ * obj->write_domain matches the request read_domains, we are
+ * already in the same read/write domain and can skip the operation,
+ * without having to further check the requested write_domain.
+ */
+ if (READ_ONCE(obj->write_domain) == read_domains)
+ goto out_unpin;
+
err = i915_gem_object_lock_interruptible(obj, NULL);
if (err)
goto out_unpin;
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 8ce70996f759a37bac92e69ae0addd715227bfd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 07:41:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drm/i915/gt: Use the local HWSP offset during submission
We wrap the timeline on construction of the next request, but there may
still be requests in flight that have not yet finalized the breadcrumb.
(The breadcrumb is delayed as we need engine-local offsets, and for the
virtual engine that is not known until execution.) As such, by the time
we write to the timeline's HWSP offset it may have changed, and we
should use the value we preserved in the request instead.
Though the window is small and infrequent (at full flow we can expect a
timeline's seqno to wrap once every 30 minutes), the impact of writing
the old seqno into the new HWSP is severe: the old requests are never
completed, and the new requests are completed before they are even
submitted.
Fixes: ebece7539242 ("drm/i915: Keep timeline HWSP allocated until idle across the system")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala(a)linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201022064127.10159-1-chris@…
(cherry picked from commit c10f6019d0b2dc8a6a62b55459f3ada5bc4e5e1a)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_lrc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_lrc.c
index a32aabce7901..d12861cf0753 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_lrc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_lrc.c
@@ -3547,6 +3547,19 @@ static const struct intel_context_ops execlists_context_ops = {
.destroy = execlists_context_destroy,
};
+static u32 hwsp_offset(const struct i915_request *rq)
+{
+ const struct intel_timeline_cacheline *cl;
+
+ /* Before the request is executed, the timeline/cachline is fixed */
+
+ cl = rcu_dereference_protected(rq->hwsp_cacheline, 1);
+ if (cl)
+ return cl->ggtt_offset;
+
+ return rcu_dereference_protected(rq->timeline, 1)->hwsp_offset;
+}
+
static int gen8_emit_init_breadcrumb(struct i915_request *rq)
{
u32 *cs;
@@ -3569,7 +3582,7 @@ static int gen8_emit_init_breadcrumb(struct i915_request *rq)
*cs++ = MI_NOOP;
*cs++ = MI_STORE_DWORD_IMM_GEN4 | MI_USE_GGTT;
- *cs++ = i915_request_timeline(rq)->hwsp_offset;
+ *cs++ = hwsp_offset(rq);
*cs++ = 0;
*cs++ = rq->fence.seqno - 1;
@@ -4886,11 +4899,9 @@ gen8_emit_fini_breadcrumb_tail(struct i915_request *request, u32 *cs)
return gen8_emit_wa_tail(request, cs);
}
-static u32 *emit_xcs_breadcrumb(struct i915_request *request, u32 *cs)
+static u32 *emit_xcs_breadcrumb(struct i915_request *rq, u32 *cs)
{
- u32 addr = i915_request_active_timeline(request)->hwsp_offset;
-
- return gen8_emit_ggtt_write(cs, request->fence.seqno, addr, 0);
+ return gen8_emit_ggtt_write(cs, rq->fence.seqno, hwsp_offset(rq), 0);
}
static u32 *gen8_emit_fini_breadcrumb(struct i915_request *rq, u32 *cs)
@@ -4909,7 +4920,7 @@ static u32 *gen8_emit_fini_breadcrumb_rcs(struct i915_request *request, u32 *cs)
/* XXX flush+write+CS_STALL all in one upsets gem_concurrent_blt:kbl */
cs = gen8_emit_ggtt_write_rcs(cs,
request->fence.seqno,
- i915_request_active_timeline(request)->hwsp_offset,
+ hwsp_offset(request),
PIPE_CONTROL_FLUSH_ENABLE |
PIPE_CONTROL_CS_STALL);
@@ -4921,7 +4932,7 @@ gen11_emit_fini_breadcrumb_rcs(struct i915_request *request, u32 *cs)
{
cs = gen8_emit_ggtt_write_rcs(cs,
request->fence.seqno,
- i915_request_active_timeline(request)->hwsp_offset,
+ hwsp_offset(request),
PIPE_CONTROL_CS_STALL |
PIPE_CONTROL_TILE_CACHE_FLUSH |
PIPE_CONTROL_RENDER_TARGET_CACHE_FLUSH |
@@ -4991,7 +5002,7 @@ gen12_emit_fini_breadcrumb_rcs(struct i915_request *request, u32 *cs)
{
cs = gen12_emit_ggtt_write_rcs(cs,
request->fence.seqno,
- i915_request_active_timeline(request)->hwsp_offset,
+ hwsp_offset(request),
PIPE_CONTROL0_HDC_PIPELINE_FLUSH,
PIPE_CONTROL_CS_STALL |
PIPE_CONTROL_TILE_CACHE_FLUSH |
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_timeline.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_timeline.c
index a2f74cefe4c3..7ea94d201fe6 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_timeline.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_timeline.c
@@ -188,10 +188,14 @@ cacheline_alloc(struct intel_timeline_hwsp *hwsp, unsigned int cacheline)
return cl;
}
-static void cacheline_acquire(struct intel_timeline_cacheline *cl)
+static void cacheline_acquire(struct intel_timeline_cacheline *cl,
+ u32 ggtt_offset)
{
- if (cl)
- i915_active_acquire(&cl->active);
+ if (!cl)
+ return;
+
+ cl->ggtt_offset = ggtt_offset;
+ i915_active_acquire(&cl->active);
}
static void cacheline_release(struct intel_timeline_cacheline *cl)
@@ -340,7 +344,7 @@ int intel_timeline_pin(struct intel_timeline *tl, struct i915_gem_ww_ctx *ww)
GT_TRACE(tl->gt, "timeline:%llx using HWSP offset:%x\n",
tl->fence_context, tl->hwsp_offset);
- cacheline_acquire(tl->hwsp_cacheline);
+ cacheline_acquire(tl->hwsp_cacheline, tl->hwsp_offset);
if (atomic_fetch_inc(&tl->pin_count)) {
cacheline_release(tl->hwsp_cacheline);
__i915_vma_unpin(tl->hwsp_ggtt);
@@ -515,7 +519,7 @@ __intel_timeline_get_seqno(struct intel_timeline *tl,
GT_TRACE(tl->gt, "timeline:%llx using HWSP offset:%x\n",
tl->fence_context, tl->hwsp_offset);
- cacheline_acquire(cl);
+ cacheline_acquire(cl, tl->hwsp_offset);
tl->hwsp_cacheline = cl;
*seqno = timeline_advance(tl);
@@ -573,9 +577,7 @@ int intel_timeline_read_hwsp(struct i915_request *from,
if (err)
goto out;
- *hwsp = i915_ggtt_offset(cl->hwsp->vma) +
- ptr_unmask_bits(cl->vaddr, CACHELINE_BITS) * CACHELINE_BYTES;
-
+ *hwsp = cl->ggtt_offset;
out:
i915_active_release(&cl->active);
return err;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_timeline_types.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_timeline_types.h
index 02181c5020db..4474f487f589 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_timeline_types.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_timeline_types.h
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ struct intel_timeline_cacheline {
struct intel_timeline_hwsp *hwsp;
void *vaddr;
+ u32 ggtt_offset;
+
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From c97f2a6fb3dfbfbbc88edc8ea62ef2b944e18849 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 04:34:29 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] tty: serial: fsl_lpuart: LS1021A has a FIFO size of 16 words,
like LS1028A
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Prior to the commit that this one fixes, the FIFO size was derived from
the read-only register LPUARTx_FIFO[TXFIFOSIZE] using the following
formula:
TX FIFO size = 2 ^ (LPUARTx_FIFO[TXFIFOSIZE] - 1)
The documentation for LS1021A is a mess. Under chapter 26.1.3 LS1021A
LPUART module special consideration, it mentions TXFIFO_SZ and RXFIFO_SZ
being equal to 4, and in the register description for LPUARTx_FIFO, it
shows the out-of-reset value of TXFIFOSIZE and RXFIFOSIZE fields as "011",
even though these registers read as "101" in reality.
And when LPUART on LS1021A was working, the "101" value did correspond
to "16 datawords", by applying the formula above, even though the
documentation is wrong again (!!!!) and says that "101" means 64 datawords
(hint: it doesn't).
So the "new" formula created by commit f77ebb241ce0 has all the premises
of being wrong for LS1021A, because it relied only on false data and no
actual experimentation.
Interestingly, in commit c2f448cff22a ("tty: serial: fsl_lpuart: add
LS1028A support"), Michael Walle applied a workaround to this by manually
setting the FIFO widths for LS1028A. It looks like the same values are
used by LS1021A as well, in fact.
When the driver thinks that it has a deeper FIFO than it really has,
getty (user space) output gets truncated.
Many thanks to Michael for pointing out where to look.
Fixes: f77ebb241ce0 ("tty: serial: fsl_lpuart: correct the FIFO depth size")
Suggested-by: Michael Walle <michael(a)walle.cc>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201023013429.3551026-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Reviewed-by:Fugang Duan <fugang.duan(a)nxp.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c
index ff4b88c637d0..bd047e1f9bea 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c
@@ -314,9 +314,10 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, lpuart_dt_ids);
/* Forward declare this for the dma callbacks*/
static void lpuart_dma_tx_complete(void *arg);
-static inline bool is_ls1028a_lpuart(struct lpuart_port *sport)
+static inline bool is_layerscape_lpuart(struct lpuart_port *sport)
{
- return sport->devtype == LS1028A_LPUART;
+ return (sport->devtype == LS1021A_LPUART ||
+ sport->devtype == LS1028A_LPUART);
}
static inline bool is_imx8qxp_lpuart(struct lpuart_port *sport)
@@ -1701,11 +1702,11 @@ static int lpuart32_startup(struct uart_port *port)
UARTFIFO_FIFOSIZE_MASK);
/*
- * The LS1028A has a fixed length of 16 words. Although it supports the
- * RX/TXSIZE fields their encoding is different. Eg the reference manual
- * states 0b101 is 16 words.
+ * The LS1021A and LS1028A have a fixed FIFO depth of 16 words.
+ * Although they support the RX/TXSIZE fields, their encoding is
+ * different. Eg the reference manual states 0b101 is 16 words.
*/
- if (is_ls1028a_lpuart(sport)) {
+ if (is_layerscape_lpuart(sport)) {
sport->rxfifo_size = 16;
sport->txfifo_size = 16;
sport->port.fifosize = sport->txfifo_size;
As the error capture will compress user buffers as directed to by the
user, it can take an arbitrary amount of time and space. Break up the
compression loops with a call to cond_resched(), that will allow other
processes to schedule (avoiding the soft lockups) and also serve as a
warning should we try to make this loop atomic in the future.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala(a)linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gpu_error.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gpu_error.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gpu_error.c
index 3e6cbb0d1150..a635ec8d0b94 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gpu_error.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gpu_error.c
@@ -311,6 +311,8 @@ static int compress_page(struct i915_vma_compress *c,
if (zlib_deflate(zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH) != Z_OK)
return -EIO;
+
+ cond_resched();
} while (zstream->avail_in);
/* Fallback to uncompressed if we increase size? */
@@ -397,6 +399,7 @@ static int compress_page(struct i915_vma_compress *c,
if (!(wc && i915_memcpy_from_wc(ptr, src, PAGE_SIZE)))
memcpy(ptr, src, PAGE_SIZE);
dst->pages[dst->page_count++] = ptr;
+ cond_resched();
return 0;
}
--
2.20.1
On Mon, Nov 09, 2020 at 08:54:13AM +0200, Amit Klein wrote:
> Unfortunately, I'm just a security researcher, not a kernel developer...
>
> Does that mean you don't plan to back-port the patch?
At this point in time, unless someone else does the work for me, no, I
do not, sorry. See Willy's response for why :)
thanks,
greg k-h
[ Upstream commit 1b290ef023b3eeb4f4688b582fecb773915ef937 ]
Add alternative topology binary file name based on used machine driver
and fallback to use this name after failed attempt to load topology file
with name based on NHLT.
This change addresses multiple issues with current mechanism, for
example - there are devices without NHLT table, and that currently
results in tplg_name being empty.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Gorski <mateusz.gorski(a)linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart(a)linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200427132727.24942-2-mateusz.gorski@linux.intel…
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
---
This functionality is merged on upstream kernel and widely used. Merging
it to LTS kernel would improve the user experience and resolve some of the
problems regarding topology naming that the users are facing.
sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-topology.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-topology.c b/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-topology.c
index 69cd7a81bf2a..4b114ece58c6 100644
--- a/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-topology.c
+++ b/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-topology.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/uuid.h>
#include <sound/intel-nhlt.h>
#include <sound/soc.h>
+#include <sound/soc-acpi.h>
#include <sound/soc-topology.h>
#include <uapi/sound/snd_sst_tokens.h>
#include <uapi/sound/skl-tplg-interface.h>
@@ -3565,8 +3566,20 @@ int skl_tplg_init(struct snd_soc_component *component, struct hdac_bus *bus)
ret = request_firmware(&fw, skl->tplg_name, bus->dev);
if (ret < 0) {
- dev_info(bus->dev, "tplg fw %s load failed with %d, falling back to dfw_sst.bin",
- skl->tplg_name, ret);
+ char alt_tplg_name[64];
+
+ snprintf(alt_tplg_name, sizeof(alt_tplg_name), "%s-tplg.bin",
+ skl->mach->drv_name);
+ dev_info(bus->dev, "tplg fw %s load failed with %d, trying alternative tplg name %s",
+ skl->tplg_name, ret, alt_tplg_name);
+
+ ret = request_firmware(&fw, alt_tplg_name, bus->dev);
+ if (!ret)
+ goto component_load;
+
+ dev_info(bus->dev, "tplg %s failed with %d, falling back to dfw_sst.bin",
+ alt_tplg_name, ret);
+
ret = request_firmware(&fw, "dfw_sst.bin", bus->dev);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_err(bus->dev, "Fallback tplg fw %s load failed with %d\n",
@@ -3575,6 +3588,8 @@ int skl_tplg_init(struct snd_soc_component *component, struct hdac_bus *bus)
}
}
+component_load:
+
/*
* The complete tplg for SKL is loaded as index 0, we don't use
* any other index
--
2.17.1
On Mon, Nov 09, 2020 at 08:54:13AM +0200, Amit Klein wrote:
> Unfortunately, I'm just a security researcher, not a kernel developer...
>
> Does that mean you don't plan to back-port the patch?
I could possibly have a look, but quite frankly I'm not convinced that we
need to backport this at all. I think that what we've done is mostly to be
future-proof and that the likelihood of practical attacks against live
systems with the previous fix are close to zero.
Cheers,
Willy
On Mon, Nov 09, 2020 at 07:16:25AM +0200, Amit Klein wrote:
> Dear all
>
> Quick question: what's the plan for back-porting this security patch to LTS
> branches?
If you have working and tested backports, to older kernels, I'll be glad
to accept them if you think they are needed.
thanks,
greg k-h
Hello,
We ran automated tests on a recent commit from this kernel tree:
Kernel repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Commit: c8f4a6ef2495 - Linux 5.9.7-rc1
The results of these automated tests are provided below.
Overall result: PASSED
Merge: OK
Compile: OK
Tests: OK
All kernel binaries, config files, and logs are available for download here:
https://arr-cki-prod-datawarehouse-public.s3.amazonaws.com/index.html?prefi…
Please reply to this email if you have any questions about the tests that we
ran or if you have any suggestions on how to make future tests more effective.
,-. ,-.
( C ) ( K ) Continuous
`-',-.`-' Kernel
( I ) Integration
`-'
______________________________________________________________________________
Compile testing
---------------
We compiled the kernel for 4 architectures:
aarch64:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
ppc64le:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
s390x:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
x86_64:
make options: make -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
Hardware testing
----------------
We booted each kernel and ran the following tests:
aarch64:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
🚧 ✅ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
✅ ACPI table test
✅ ACPI enabled test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
✅ pciutils: update pci ids test
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ Firmware test suite
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ kdump - kexec_boot
ppc64le:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
🚧 ✅ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ✅ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ✅ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 3:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ kdump - sysrq-c
Host 4:
✅ Boot test
🚧 ✅ kdump - sysrq-c
Host 5:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory: fork_mem
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func - forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
⚡⚡⚡ pciutils: update pci ids test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
s390x:
Host 1:
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
🚧 ✅ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 2:
✅ Boot test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
x86_64:
Host 1:
✅ Boot test
✅ ACPI table test
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory: fork_mem
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func - local
✅ Networking route_func - forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel
✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test
✅ pciutils: sanity smoke test
✅ pciutils: update pci ids test
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as root
🚧 ✅ Podman system integration test - as user
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ Firmware test suite
🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test
🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test
🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ kdump - kexec_boot
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ❌ CPU: Frequency Driver Test
🚧 ✅ CPU: Idle Test
🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4
🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs
🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IOMMU boot test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ power-management: cpupower/sanity test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - filesystem fio test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage block - queue scheduler test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage nvme - tcp
Host 3:
✅ Boot test
🚧 ✅ kdump - sysrq-c
🚧 ✅ kdump - file-load
Test sources: https://gitlab.com/cki-project/kernel-tests
💚 Pull requests are welcome for new tests or improvements to existing tests!
Aborted tests
-------------
Tests that didn't complete running successfully are marked with ⚡⚡⚡.
If this was caused by an infrastructure issue, we try to mark that
explicitly in the report.
Waived tests
------------
If the test run included waived tests, they are marked with 🚧. Such tests are
executed but their results are not taken into account. Tests are waived when
their results are not reliable enough, e.g. when they're just introduced or are
being fixed.
Testing timeout
---------------
We aim to provide a report within reasonable timeframe. Tests that haven't
finished running yet are marked with ⏱.
Building ia64:defconfig ... failed
--------------
Error log:
drivers/acpi/numa.c: In function 'pxm_to_node':
drivers/acpi/numa.c:49:43: error: 'numa_off' undeclared
Building powerpc:defconfig ... failed
--------------
Error log:
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c: In function ‘kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_hv’:
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c:3161:7: error: implicit declaration of function ‘kvmhv_on_pseries’
Guenter
The patch titled
Subject: mm/zsmalloc: include sparsemem.h for MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-zsmalloc-include-sparsememh-for-max_physmem_bits.patch
This patch was dropped because an updated version will be merged
------------------------------------------------------
From: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Subject: mm/zsmalloc: include sparsemem.h for MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS
Most architectures define MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS in asm/sparsemem.h and don't
include it in asm/pgtable.h.
If MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS is not set in mm/zsmalloc.c it will set
MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS to BITS_PER_LONG. And this is 32-bit, too short when
LPAE is in use.
So include asm/sparsemem.h directly to get the MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS define
on all architectures.
This fixes a crash when accessing zram on 32-bit ARM platform with LPAE and
more than 4GB of memory:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
pgd = a27bd01c
[00000000] *pgd=236a0003, *pmd=1ffa64003
Internal error: Oops: 207 [#1] SMP ARM
Modules linked in: mdio_bcm_unimac(+) brcmfmac cfg80211 brcmutil raspberrypi_hwmon hci_uart crc32_arm_ce bcm2711_thermal phy_generic genet
CPU: 0 PID: 123 Comm: mkfs.ext4 Not tainted 5.9.6 #1
Hardware name: BCM2711
PC is at zs_map_object+0x94/0x338
LR is at zram_bvec_rw.constprop.0+0x330/0xa64
pc : [<c0602b38>] lr : [<c0bda6a0>] psr: 60000013
sp : e376bbe0 ip : 00000000 fp : c1e2921c
r10: 00000002 r9 : c1dda730 r8 : 00000000
r7 : e8ff7a00 r6 : 00000000 r5 : 02f9ffa0 r4 : e3710000
r3 : 000fdffe r2 : c1e0ce80 r1 : ebf979a0 r0 : 00000000
Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 30c5383d Table: 235c2a80 DAC: fffffffd
Process mkfs.ext4 (pid: 123, stack limit = 0x495a22e6)
Stack: (0xe376bbe0 to 0xe376c000)
...
[<c0602b38>] (zs_map_object) from [<c0bda6a0>] (zram_bvec_rw.constprop.0+0x330/0xa64)
[<c0bda6a0>] (zram_bvec_rw.constprop.0) from [<c0bdaf78>] (zram_submit_bio+0x1a4/0x40c)
[<c0bdaf78>] (zram_submit_bio) from [<c085806c>] (submit_bio_noacct+0xd0/0x3c8)
[<c085806c>] (submit_bio_noacct) from [<c08583b0>] (submit_bio+0x4c/0x190)
[<c08583b0>] (submit_bio) from [<c06496b4>] (submit_bh_wbc+0x188/0x1b8)
[<c06496b4>] (submit_bh_wbc) from [<c064ce98>] (__block_write_full_page+0x340/0x5e4)
[<c064ce98>] (__block_write_full_page) from [<c064d3ec>] (block_write_full_page+0x128/0x170)
[<c064d3ec>] (block_write_full_page) from [<c0591ae8>] (__writepage+0x14/0x68)
[<c0591ae8>] (__writepage) from [<c0593efc>] (write_cache_pages+0x1bc/0x494)
[<c0593efc>] (write_cache_pages) from [<c059422c>] (generic_writepages+0x58/0x8c)
[<c059422c>] (generic_writepages) from [<c0594c24>] (do_writepages+0x48/0xec)
[<c0594c24>] (do_writepages) from [<c0589330>] (__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xf0/0x128)
[<c0589330>] (__filemap_fdatawrite_range) from [<c05894bc>] (file_write_and_wait_range+0x48/0x98)
[<c05894bc>] (file_write_and_wait_range) from [<c064f3f8>] (blkdev_fsync+0x1c/0x44)
[<c064f3f8>] (blkdev_fsync) from [<c064408c>] (do_fsync+0x3c/0x70)
[<c064408c>] (do_fsync) from [<c0400374>] (__sys_trace_return+0x0/0x2c)
Exception stack(0xe376bfa8 to 0xe376bff0)
bfa0: 0003d2e0 b6f7b6f0 00000003 00046e40 00001000 00000000
bfc0: 0003d2e0 b6f7b6f0 00000000 00000076 00000000 00000000 befcbb20 befcbb28
bfe0: b6f4e060 befcbad8 b6f23e0c b6dc4a80
Code: e5927000 e0050391 e0871005 e5918018 (e5983000)
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bdfa44bf1c570b05d6c70898e2bbb0acf234ecdf.16047621…
Fixes: 61989a80fb3a ("staging: zsmalloc: zsmalloc memory allocation library")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/zsmalloc.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/mm/zsmalloc.c~mm-zsmalloc-include-sparsememh-for-max_physmem_bits
+++ a/mm/zsmalloc.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/sparsemem.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from stefan(a)agner.ch are
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From cf1ad559a20d1930aa7b47a52f54e1f8718de301 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20Miros=C5=82aw?= <mirq-linux(a)rere.qmqm.pl>
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 22:27:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] regulator: defer probe when trying to get voltage from
unresolved supply
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
regulator_get_voltage_rdev() is called in regulator probe() when
applying machine constraints. The "fixed" commit exposed the problem
that non-bypassed regulators can forward the request to its parent
(like bypassed ones) supply. Return -EPROBE_DEFER when the supply
is expected but not resolved yet.
Fixes: aea6cb99703e ("regulator: resolve supply after creating regulator")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michał Mirosław <mirq-linux(a)rere.qmqm.pl>
Reported-by: Ondřej Jirman <megous(a)megous.com>
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie(a)gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ondřej Jirman <megous(a)megous.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a9041d68b4d35e4a2dd71629c8a6422662acb5ee.16043519…
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/drivers/regulator/core.c b/drivers/regulator/core.c
index a4ffd71696da..a5ad553da8cd 100644
--- a/drivers/regulator/core.c
+++ b/drivers/regulator/core.c
@@ -4165,6 +4165,8 @@ int regulator_get_voltage_rdev(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
ret = rdev->desc->fixed_uV;
} else if (rdev->supply) {
ret = regulator_get_voltage_rdev(rdev->supply->rdev);
+ } else if (rdev->supply_name) {
+ return -EPROBE_DEFER;
} else {
return -EINVAL;
}
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From cf1ad559a20d1930aa7b47a52f54e1f8718de301 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20Miros=C5=82aw?= <mirq-linux(a)rere.qmqm.pl>
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 22:27:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] regulator: defer probe when trying to get voltage from
unresolved supply
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
regulator_get_voltage_rdev() is called in regulator probe() when
applying machine constraints. The "fixed" commit exposed the problem
that non-bypassed regulators can forward the request to its parent
(like bypassed ones) supply. Return -EPROBE_DEFER when the supply
is expected but not resolved yet.
Fixes: aea6cb99703e ("regulator: resolve supply after creating regulator")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michał Mirosław <mirq-linux(a)rere.qmqm.pl>
Reported-by: Ondřej Jirman <megous(a)megous.com>
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie(a)gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ondřej Jirman <megous(a)megous.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a9041d68b4d35e4a2dd71629c8a6422662acb5ee.16043519…
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/drivers/regulator/core.c b/drivers/regulator/core.c
index a4ffd71696da..a5ad553da8cd 100644
--- a/drivers/regulator/core.c
+++ b/drivers/regulator/core.c
@@ -4165,6 +4165,8 @@ int regulator_get_voltage_rdev(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
ret = rdev->desc->fixed_uV;
} else if (rdev->supply) {
ret = regulator_get_voltage_rdev(rdev->supply->rdev);
+ } else if (rdev->supply_name) {
+ return -EPROBE_DEFER;
} else {
return -EINVAL;
}
The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From cf1ad559a20d1930aa7b47a52f54e1f8718de301 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20Miros=C5=82aw?= <mirq-linux(a)rere.qmqm.pl>
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 22:27:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] regulator: defer probe when trying to get voltage from
unresolved supply
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
regulator_get_voltage_rdev() is called in regulator probe() when
applying machine constraints. The "fixed" commit exposed the problem
that non-bypassed regulators can forward the request to its parent
(like bypassed ones) supply. Return -EPROBE_DEFER when the supply
is expected but not resolved yet.
Fixes: aea6cb99703e ("regulator: resolve supply after creating regulator")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michał Mirosław <mirq-linux(a)rere.qmqm.pl>
Reported-by: Ondřej Jirman <megous(a)megous.com>
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie(a)gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ondřej Jirman <megous(a)megous.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a9041d68b4d35e4a2dd71629c8a6422662acb5ee.16043519…
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/drivers/regulator/core.c b/drivers/regulator/core.c
index a4ffd71696da..a5ad553da8cd 100644
--- a/drivers/regulator/core.c
+++ b/drivers/regulator/core.c
@@ -4165,6 +4165,8 @@ int regulator_get_voltage_rdev(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
ret = rdev->desc->fixed_uV;
} else if (rdev->supply) {
ret = regulator_get_voltage_rdev(rdev->supply->rdev);
+ } else if (rdev->supply_name) {
+ return -EPROBE_DEFER;
} else {
return -EINVAL;
}
When the command feature of the ADC is used, it is possible to program
the ADC, and specify at each step what input should be processed, and in
comparison to what reference.
This broke the AUX and battery readings when the touchscreen was
enabled, most likely because the CMD feature would change the VREF all
the time.
Now, when AUX or battery are read, we temporarily disable the CMD
feature, which means that we won't get touchscreen readings in that time
frame. But it now gives correct values for AUX / battery, and the
touchscreen isn't disabled for long enough to be an actual issue.
Fixes: b96952f498db ("IIO: Ingenic JZ47xx: Add touchscreen mode.")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul(a)crapouillou.net>
---
drivers/iio/adc/ingenic-adc.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ingenic-adc.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ingenic-adc.c
index 92b25083e23f..ecaff6a9b716 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/adc/ingenic-adc.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ingenic-adc.c
@@ -177,13 +177,12 @@ static void ingenic_adc_set_config(struct ingenic_adc *adc,
mutex_unlock(&adc->lock);
}
-static void ingenic_adc_enable(struct ingenic_adc *adc,
- int engine,
- bool enabled)
+static void ingenic_adc_enable_unlocked(struct ingenic_adc *adc,
+ int engine,
+ bool enabled)
{
u8 val;
- mutex_lock(&adc->lock);
val = readb(adc->base + JZ_ADC_REG_ENABLE);
if (enabled)
@@ -192,20 +191,42 @@ static void ingenic_adc_enable(struct ingenic_adc *adc,
val &= ~BIT(engine);
writeb(val, adc->base + JZ_ADC_REG_ENABLE);
+}
+
+static void ingenic_adc_enable(struct ingenic_adc *adc,
+ int engine,
+ bool enabled)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&adc->lock);
+ ingenic_adc_enable_unlocked(adc, engine, enabled);
mutex_unlock(&adc->lock);
}
static int ingenic_adc_capture(struct ingenic_adc *adc,
int engine)
{
+ u32 cfg;
u8 val;
int ret;
- ingenic_adc_enable(adc, engine, true);
+ /*
+ * Disable CMD_SEL temporarily, because it causes wrong VBAT readings,
+ * probably due to the switch of VREF. We must keep the lock here to
+ * avoid races with the buffer enable/disable functions.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&adc->lock);
+ cfg = readl(adc->base + JZ_ADC_REG_CFG);
+ writel(cfg & ~JZ_ADC_REG_CFG_CMD_SEL, adc->base + JZ_ADC_REG_CFG);
+
+
+ ingenic_adc_enable_unlocked(adc, engine, true);
ret = readb_poll_timeout(adc->base + JZ_ADC_REG_ENABLE, val,
!(val & BIT(engine)), 250, 1000);
if (ret)
- ingenic_adc_enable(adc, engine, false);
+ ingenic_adc_enable_unlocked(adc, engine, false);
+
+ writel(cfg, adc->base + JZ_ADC_REG_CFG);
+ mutex_unlock(&adc->lock);
return ret;
}
--
2.28.0
Hi,
I get the following build warning in v5.4.75.
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm-perf.c: In function 'etm_setup_aux':
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm-perf.c:226:37: warning:
passing argument 1 of 'coresight_get_enabled_sink' makes pointer from integer without a cast
Actually, the warning is fatal, since the call is
sink = coresight_get_enabled_sink(true);
However, the argument to coresight_get_enabled_sink() is now a pointer.
The parameter change was introduced with commit 8fd52a21ab57
("coresight: Make sysfs functional on topologies with per core sink").
In the upstream kernel, the call is removed with commit bb1860efc817
("coresight: etm: perf: Sink selection using sysfs is deprecated").
That commit alone would, however, likely not solve the problem.
It looks like at least two more commits would be needed.
716f5652a131 coresight: etm: perf: Fix warning caused by etm_setup_aux failure
8e264c52e1da coresight: core: Allow the coresight core driver to be built as a module
39a7661dcf65 coresight: Fix uninitialised pointer bug in etm_setup_aux()
Looking into the coresight code, I see several additional commits affecting
the sysfs interface since v5.4. I have no idea what would actually be needed
for stable code in v5.4.y, short of applying them all.
With all this in mind, I would suggest to revert commit 8fd52a21ab57
("coresight: Make sysfs functional on topologies with per core sink")
from v5.4.y, especially since it is not marked as bug fix or for stable.
Thanks,
Guenter
The patch titled
Subject: mm/zsmalloc: include sparsemem.h for MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
mm-zsmalloc-include-sparsememh-for-max_physmem_bits.patch
This patch should soon appear at
https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/mm-zsmalloc-include-sparsememh-fo…
and later at
https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/mm-zsmalloc-include-sparsememh-fo…
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated
there every 3-4 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Subject: mm/zsmalloc: include sparsemem.h for MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS
Most architectures define MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS in asm/sparsemem.h and don't
include it in asm/pgtable.h. Include asm/sparsemem.h directly to get the
MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS define on all architectures.
This fixes a crash when accessing zram on 32-bit ARM platform with LPAE and
more than 4GB of memory:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
pgd = a27bd01c
[00000000] *pgd=236a0003, *pmd=1ffa64003
Internal error: Oops: 207 [#1] SMP ARM
Modules linked in: mdio_bcm_unimac(+) brcmfmac cfg80211 brcmutil raspberrypi_hwmon hci_uart crc32_arm_ce bcm2711_thermal phy_generic genet
CPU: 0 PID: 123 Comm: mkfs.ext4 Not tainted 5.9.6 #1
Hardware name: BCM2711
PC is at zs_map_object+0x94/0x338
LR is at zram_bvec_rw.constprop.0+0x330/0xa64
pc : [<c0602b38>] lr : [<c0bda6a0>] psr: 60000013
sp : e376bbe0 ip : 00000000 fp : c1e2921c
r10: 00000002 r9 : c1dda730 r8 : 00000000
r7 : e8ff7a00 r6 : 00000000 r5 : 02f9ffa0 r4 : e3710000
r3 : 000fdffe r2 : c1e0ce80 r1 : ebf979a0 r0 : 00000000
Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 30c5383d Table: 235c2a80 DAC: fffffffd
Process mkfs.ext4 (pid: 123, stack limit = 0x495a22e6)
Stack: (0xe376bbe0 to 0xe376c000)
...
[<c0602b38>] (zs_map_object) from [<c0bda6a0>] (zram_bvec_rw.constprop.0+0x330/0xa64)
[<c0bda6a0>] (zram_bvec_rw.constprop.0) from [<c0bdaf78>] (zram_submit_bio+0x1a4/0x40c)
[<c0bdaf78>] (zram_submit_bio) from [<c085806c>] (submit_bio_noacct+0xd0/0x3c8)
[<c085806c>] (submit_bio_noacct) from [<c08583b0>] (submit_bio+0x4c/0x190)
[<c08583b0>] (submit_bio) from [<c06496b4>] (submit_bh_wbc+0x188/0x1b8)
[<c06496b4>] (submit_bh_wbc) from [<c064ce98>] (__block_write_full_page+0x340/0x5e4)
[<c064ce98>] (__block_write_full_page) from [<c064d3ec>] (block_write_full_page+0x128/0x170)
[<c064d3ec>] (block_write_full_page) from [<c0591ae8>] (__writepage+0x14/0x68)
[<c0591ae8>] (__writepage) from [<c0593efc>] (write_cache_pages+0x1bc/0x494)
[<c0593efc>] (write_cache_pages) from [<c059422c>] (generic_writepages+0x58/0x8c)
[<c059422c>] (generic_writepages) from [<c0594c24>] (do_writepages+0x48/0xec)
[<c0594c24>] (do_writepages) from [<c0589330>] (__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xf0/0x128)
[<c0589330>] (__filemap_fdatawrite_range) from [<c05894bc>] (file_write_and_wait_range+0x48/0x98)
[<c05894bc>] (file_write_and_wait_range) from [<c064f3f8>] (blkdev_fsync+0x1c/0x44)
[<c064f3f8>] (blkdev_fsync) from [<c064408c>] (do_fsync+0x3c/0x70)
[<c064408c>] (do_fsync) from [<c0400374>] (__sys_trace_return+0x0/0x2c)
Exception stack(0xe376bfa8 to 0xe376bff0)
bfa0: 0003d2e0 b6f7b6f0 00000003 00046e40 00001000 00000000
bfc0: 0003d2e0 b6f7b6f0 00000000 00000076 00000000 00000000 befcbb20 befcbb28
bfe0: b6f4e060 befcbad8 b6f23e0c b6dc4a80
Code: e5927000 e0050391 e0871005 e5918018 (e5983000)
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bdfa44bf1c570b05d6c70898e2bbb0acf234ecdf.16047621…
Fixes: 61989a80fb3a ("staging: zsmalloc: zsmalloc memory allocation library")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/zsmalloc.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/mm/zsmalloc.c~mm-zsmalloc-include-sparsememh-for-max_physmem_bits
+++ a/mm/zsmalloc.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/sparsemem.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from stefan(a)agner.ch are
mm-zsmalloc-include-sparsememh-for-max_physmem_bits.patch
The following commit has been merged into the locking/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 9f5d1c336a10c0d24e83e40b4c1b9539f7dba627
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/9f5d1c336a10c0d24e83e40b4c1b9539f7dba627
Author: Mike Galbraith <efault(a)gmx.de>
AuthorDate: Wed, 04 Nov 2020 16:12:44 +01:00
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
CommitterDate: Sat, 07 Nov 2020 22:07:04 +01:00
futex: Handle transient "ownerless" rtmutex state correctly
Gratian managed to trigger the BUG_ON(!newowner) in fixup_pi_state_owner().
This is one possible chain of events leading to this:
Task Prio Operation
T1 120 lock(F)
T2 120 lock(F) -> blocks (top waiter)
T3 50 (RT) lock(F) -> boosts T1 and blocks (new top waiter)
XX timeout/ -> wakes T2
signal
T1 50 unlock(F) -> wakes T3 (rtmutex->owner == NULL, waiter bit is set)
T2 120 cleanup -> try_to_take_mutex() fails because T3 is the top waiter
and the lower priority T2 cannot steal the lock.
-> fixup_pi_state_owner() sees newowner == NULL -> BUG_ON()
The comment states that this is invalid and rt_mutex_real_owner() must
return a non NULL owner when the trylock failed, but in case of a queued
and woken up waiter rt_mutex_real_owner() == NULL is a valid transient
state. The higher priority waiter has simply not yet managed to take over
the rtmutex.
The BUG_ON() is therefore wrong and this is just another retry condition in
fixup_pi_state_owner().
Drop the locks, so that T3 can make progress, and then try the fixup again.
Gratian provided a great analysis, traces and a reproducer. The analysis is
to the point, but it confused the hell out of that tglx dude who had to
page in all the futex horrors again. Condensed version is above.
[ tglx: Wrote comment and changelog ]
Fixes: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan(a)ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault(a)gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87a6w6x7bb.fsf@ni.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87sg9pkvf7.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
---
kernel/futex.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index f8614ef..ac32887 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2380,10 +2380,22 @@ retry:
}
/*
- * Since we just failed the trylock; there must be an owner.
+ * The trylock just failed, so either there is an owner or
+ * there is a higher priority waiter than this one.
*/
newowner = rt_mutex_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
- BUG_ON(!newowner);
+ /*
+ * If the higher priority waiter has not yet taken over the
+ * rtmutex then newowner is NULL. We can't return here with
+ * that state because it's inconsistent vs. the user space
+ * state. So drop the locks and try again. It's a valid
+ * situation and not any different from the other retry
+ * conditions.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!newowner)) {
+ err = -EAGAIN;
+ goto handle_err;
+ }
} else {
WARN_ON_ONCE(argowner != current);
if (oldowner == current) {
The following commit has been merged into the locking/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 63c1b4db662a0967dd7839a2fbaa5300e553901d
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/63c1b4db662a0967dd7839a2fbaa5300e553901d
Author: Mike Galbraith <efault(a)gmx.de>
AuthorDate: Wed, 04 Nov 2020 16:12:44 +01:00
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
CommitterDate: Fri, 06 Nov 2020 22:24:58 +01:00
futex: Handle transient "ownerless" rtmutex state correctly
Gratian managed to trigger the BUG_ON(!newowner) in fixup_pi_state_owner().
This is one possible chain of events leading to this:
Task Prio Operation
T1 120 lock(F)
T2 120 lock(F) -> blocks (top waiter)
T3 50 (RT) lock(F) -> boosts T1 and blocks (new top waiter)
XX timeout/ -> wakes T2
signal
T1 50 unlock(F) -> wakes T3 (rtmutex->owner == NULL, waiter bit is set)
T2 120 cleanup -> try_to_take_mutex() fails because T3 is the top waiter
and the lower priority T2 cannot steal the lock.
-> fixup_pi_state_owner() sees newowner == NULL -> BUG_ON()
The comment states that this is invalid and rt_mutex_real_owner() must
return a non NULL owner when the trylock failed, but in case of a queued
and woken up waiter rt_mutex_real_owner() == NULL is a valid transient
state. The higher priority waiter has simply not yet managed to take over
the rtmutex.
The BUG_ON() is therefore wrong and this is just another retry condition in
fixup_pi_state_owner().
Drop the locks, so that T3 can make progress, and then try the fixup again.
Gratian provided a great analysis, traces and a reproducer. The analysis is
to the point, but it confused the hell out of that tglx dude who had to
page in all the futex horrors again. Condensed version is above.
[ tglx: Wrote comment and changelog ]
Fixes: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan(a)ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault(a)gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87a6w6x7bb.fsf@ni.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87sg9pkvf7.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
---
kernel/futex.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index f8614ef..7406914 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2380,10 +2380,22 @@ retry:
}
/*
- * Since we just failed the trylock; there must be an owner.
+ * The trylock just failed, so either there is an owner or
+ * there is a higher priority waiter than this one.
*/
newowner = rt_mutex_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
- BUG_ON(!newowner);
+ /*
+ * If the higher priority waiter has not yet taken over the
+ * rtmutex then newowner is NULL. We can't return here with
+ * that state because it's inconsistent vs. the user space
+ * state. So drop the locks and try again. It's a valid
+ * situation and not any different from the other retry
+ * conditions.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!newowner)) {
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ goto handle_err;
+ }
} else {
WARN_ON_ONCE(argowner != current);
if (oldowner == current) {