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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/nospec: Fix header guards names" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/nospec: Fix header guards names to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:30:27 CET 2018 From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 13:11:37 +0100 Subject: x86/nospec: Fix header guards names From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> (cherry picked from commit 7a32fc51ca938e67974cbb9db31e1a43f98345a9) ... to adhere to the _ASM_X86_ naming scheme. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: riel(a)redhat.com Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: jikos(a)kernel.org Cc: luto(a)amacapital.net Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: keescook(a)google.com Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: pjt(a)google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-3-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ -#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ +#define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> @@ -232,4 +232,4 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi } #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ -#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */ +#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp(a)suse.de are queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/x86-microcode-amd-do-not-load-when-running-on-a-hypervisor.patch queue-4.9/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 17:47:03 -0800 Subject: x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 085331dfc6bbe3501fb936e657331ca943827600) Commit 75f139aaf896 "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup" added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of 'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. The lfence can be avoided in this path by using the array_index_nospec() helper designed for these types of fixes. Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com> Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151744959670.6342.3001723920950249067.stgit@dwill… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 20 +++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/tboot.h> #include <linux/hrtimer.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include "kvm_cache_regs.h" #include "x86.h" @@ -856,21 +857,18 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_t static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field) { - BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX); + const size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table); + unsigned short offset; - if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table)) + BUILD_BUG_ON(size > SHRT_MAX); + if (field >= size) return -ENOENT; - /* - * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a - * generic mechanism. - */ - asm("lfence"); - - if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0) + field = array_index_nospec(field, size); + offset = vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field]; + if (offset == 0) return -ENOENT; - - return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field]; + return offset; } static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86: Introduce barrier_nospec" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86: Introduce barrier_nospec to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:02:33 -0800 Subject: x86: Introduce barrier_nospec From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit b3d7ad85b80bbc404635dca80f5b129f6242bc7a) Rename the open coded form of this instruction sequence from rdtsc_ordered() into a generic barrier primitive, barrier_nospec(). One of the mitigations for Spectre variant1 vulnerabilities is to fence speculative execution after successfully validating a bounds check. I.e. force the result of a bounds check to resolve in the instruction pipeline to ensure speculative execution honors that result before potentially operating on out-of-bounds data. No functional changes. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727415361.33451.9049453007262764675.stgit@dwil… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_ /* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */ #define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec +/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */ +#define barrier_nospec() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \ + "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC) + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE #define dma_rmb() rmb() #else --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h @@ -188,8 +188,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long lon * that some other imaginary CPU is updating continuously with a * time stamp. */ - alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, - "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC); + barrier_nospec(); return rdtsc(); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:02:39 -0800 Subject: x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit b3bbfb3fb5d25776b8e3f361d2eedaabb0b496cd) For __get_user() paths, do not allow the kernel to speculate on the value of a user controlled pointer. In addition to the 'stac' instruction for Supervisor Mode Access Protection (SMAP), a barrier_nospec() causes the access_ok() result to resolve in the pipeline before the CPU might take any speculative action on the pointer value. Given the cost of 'stac' the speculation barrier is placed after 'stac' to hopefully overlap the cost of disabling SMAP with the cost of flushing the instruction pipeline. Since __get_user is a major kernel interface that deals with user controlled pointers, the __uaccess_begin_nospec() mechanism will prevent speculative execution past an access_ok() permission check. While speculative execution past access_ok() is not enough to lead to a kernel memory leak, it is a necessary precondition. To be clear, __uaccess_begin_nospec() is addressing a class of potential problems near __get_user() usages. Note, that while the barrier_nospec() in __uaccess_begin_nospec() is used to protect __get_user(), pointer masking similar to array_index_nospec() will be used for get_user() since it incorporates a bounds check near the usage. uaccess_try_nospec provides the same mechanism for get_user_try. No functional changes. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727415922.33451.5796614273104346583.stgit@dwil… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -123,6 +123,11 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void); #define __uaccess_begin() stac() #define __uaccess_end() clac() +#define __uaccess_begin_nospec() \ +({ \ + stac(); \ + barrier_nospec(); \ +}) /* * This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into @@ -474,6 +479,10 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long bu __uaccess_begin(); \ barrier(); +#define uaccess_try_nospec do { \ + current->thread.uaccess_err = 0; \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ + #define uaccess_catch(err) \ __uaccess_end(); \ (err) |= (current->thread.uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:02:28 -0800 Subject: x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit babdde2698d482b6c0de1eab4f697cf5856c5859) array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software. The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the control flow. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414808.33451.1873237130672785331.stgit@dwil… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -23,6 +23,30 @@ #define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory") #endif +/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the + * bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * Returns: + * 0 - (index < size) + */ +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long mask; + + asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;" + :"=r" (mask) + :"r"(size),"r" (index) + :"cc"); + return mask; +} + +/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */ +#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE #define dma_rmb() rmb() #else Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:02:54 -0800 Subject: x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit c7f631cb07e7da06ac1d231ca178452339e32a94) Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e. array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by: cmp %limit, %ptr sbb %mask, %mask and %mask, %ptr With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit or NULL. Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417469.33451.11804043010080838495.stgit@dwi… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 1: movzbl (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_2) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 2: movzwl -1(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -67,6 +71,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 3: movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -82,6 +88,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 4: movq -7(%_ASM_AX),%rdx xor %eax,%eax @@ -93,6 +101,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user_8 + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 4: movl -7(%_ASM_AX),%edx 5: movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%ecx Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-entry-64-remove-the-syscall64-fast-path.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:30:27 CET 2018 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:38:49 -0800 Subject: x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path From: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 21d375b6b34ff511a507de27bf316b3dde6938d9) The SYCALLL64 fast path was a nice, if small, optimization back in the good old days when syscalls were actually reasonably fast. Now there is PTI to slow everything down, and indirect branches are verboten, making everything messier. The retpoline code in the fast path is particularly nasty. Just get rid of the fast path. The slow path is barely slower. [ tglx: Split out the 'push all extra regs' part ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/462dff8d4d64dfbfc851fbf3130641809d980ecd.15171644… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 123 -------------------------------------------- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 7 -- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -179,94 +179,11 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs) pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */ sub $(6*8), %rsp /* pt_regs->bp, bx, r12-15 not saved */ - /* - * If we need to do entry work or if we guess we'll need to do - * exit work, go straight to the slow path. - */ - movq PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11 - testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY|_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11) - jnz entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path - -entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath: - /* - * Easy case: enable interrupts and issue the syscall. If the syscall - * needs pt_regs, we'll call a stub that disables interrupts again - * and jumps to the slow path. - */ - TRACE_IRQS_ON - ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) -#if __SYSCALL_MASK == ~0 - cmpq $__NR_syscall_max, %rax -#else - andl $__SYSCALL_MASK, %eax - cmpl $__NR_syscall_max, %eax -#endif - ja 1f /* return -ENOSYS (already in pt_regs->ax) */ - movq %r10, %rcx - - /* - * This call instruction is handled specially in stub_ptregs_64. - * It might end up jumping to the slow path. If it jumps, RAX - * and all argument registers are clobbered. - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax - call __x86_indirect_thunk_rax -#else - call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8) -#endif -.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call: - - movq %rax, RAX(%rsp) -1: - - /* - * If we get here, then we know that pt_regs is clean for SYSRET64. - * If we see that no exit work is required (which we are required - * to check with IRQs off), then we can go straight to SYSRET64. - */ - DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) - TRACE_IRQS_OFF - movq PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11 - testl $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11) - jnz 1f - - LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT - TRACE_IRQS_ON /* user mode is traced as IRQs on */ - movq RIP(%rsp), %rcx - movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 - RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11 - /* - * This opens a window where we have a user CR3, but are - * running in the kernel. This makes using the CS - * register useless for telling whether or not we need to - * switch CR3 in NMIs. Normal interrupts are OK because - * they are off here. - */ - SWITCH_USER_CR3 - movq RSP(%rsp), %rsp - USERGS_SYSRET64 - -1: - /* - * The fast path looked good when we started, but something changed - * along the way and we need to switch to the slow path. Calling - * raise(3) will trigger this, for example. IRQs are off. - */ - TRACE_IRQS_ON - ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) - SAVE_EXTRA_REGS - movq %rsp, %rdi - call syscall_return_slowpath /* returns with IRQs disabled */ - jmp return_from_SYSCALL_64 - -entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path: /* IRQs are off. */ SAVE_EXTRA_REGS movq %rsp, %rdi call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */ -return_from_SYSCALL_64: RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ /* we're about to change IF */ @@ -339,6 +256,7 @@ return_from_SYSCALL_64: syscall_return_via_sysret: /* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */ RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11 + /* * This opens a window where we have a user CR3, but are * running in the kernel. This makes using the CS @@ -363,45 +281,6 @@ opportunistic_sysret_failed: jmp restore_c_regs_and_iret END(entry_SYSCALL_64) -ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64) - /* - * Syscalls marked as needing ptregs land here. - * If we are on the fast path, we need to save the extra regs, - * which we achieve by trying again on the slow path. If we are on - * the slow path, the extra regs are already saved. - * - * RAX stores a pointer to the C function implementing the syscall. - * IRQs are on. - */ - cmpq $.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call, (%rsp) - jne 1f - - /* - * Called from fast path -- disable IRQs again, pop return address - * and jump to slow path - */ - DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) - TRACE_IRQS_OFF - popq %rax - jmp entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path - -1: - JMP_NOSPEC %rax /* Called from C */ -END(stub_ptregs_64) - -.macro ptregs_stub func -ENTRY(ptregs_\func) - leaq \func(%rip), %rax - jmp stub_ptregs_64 -END(ptregs_\func) -.endm - -/* Instantiate ptregs_stub for each ptregs-using syscall */ -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_(sym) -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_ptregs(sym) ptregs_stub sym -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym) -#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> - /* * %rdi: prev task * %rsi: next task --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c @@ -6,14 +6,11 @@ #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_(sym) sym -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_ptregs(sym) ptregs_##sym - -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) extern asmlinkage long __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym)(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); +#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); #include <asm/syscalls_64.h> #undef __SYSCALL_64 -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) [nr] = __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym), +#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) [nr] = sym, extern long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from luto(a)kernel.org are queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-push-extra-regs-right-away.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-move-status-from-thread_struct-to-thread_info.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-remove-the-syscall64-fast-path.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-entry-64-push-extra-regs-right-away.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:30:27 CET 2018 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:38:49 -0800 Subject: x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away From: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit d1f7732009e0549eedf8ea1db948dc37be77fd46) With the fast path removed there is no point in splitting the push of the normal and the extra register set. Just push the extra regs right away. [ tglx: Split out from 'x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path' ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/462dff8d4d64dfbfc851fbf3130641809d980ecd.15171644… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -177,10 +177,14 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs) pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */ pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */ pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */ - sub $(6*8), %rsp /* pt_regs->bp, bx, r12-15 not saved */ + pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ + pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ + pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */ + pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */ + pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */ + pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */ /* IRQs are off. */ - SAVE_EXTRA_REGS movq %rsp, %rdi call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from luto(a)kernel.org are queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-push-extra-regs-right-away.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-move-status-from-thread_struct-to-thread_info.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-remove-the-syscall64-fast-path.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpuid-fix-up-virtual-ibrs-ibpb-stibp-feature-bits-on-intel.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:30:23 +0000 Subject: x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit 7fcae1118f5fd44a862aa5c3525248e35ee67c3b) Despite the fact that all the other code there seems to be doing it, just using set_cpu_cap() in early_intel_init() doesn't actually work. For CPUs with PKU support, setup_pku() calls get_cpu_cap() after c->c_init() has set those feature bits. That resets those bits back to what was queried from the hardware. Turning the bits off for bad microcode is easy to fix. That can just use setup_clear_cpu_cap() to force them off for all CPUs. I was less keen on forcing the feature bits *on* that way, just in case of inconsistencies. I appreciate that the kernel is going to get this utterly wrong if CPU features are not consistent, because it has already applied alternatives by the time secondary CPUs are brought up. But at least if setup_force_cpu_cap() isn't being used, we might have a chance of *detecting* the lack of the corresponding bit and either panicking or refusing to bring the offending CPU online. So ensure that the appropriate feature bits are set within get_cpu_cap() regardless of how many extra times it's called. Fixes: 2961298e ("x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517322623-15261-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 27 ++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -718,6 +718,26 @@ static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpu } } +static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + /* + * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support, + * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also, + * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on + * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available. + * + * We use the AMD bits in 0x8000_0008 EBX as the generic hardware + * features, which are visible in /proc/cpuinfo and used by the + * kernel. So set those accordingly from the Intel bits. + */ + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) { + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + } + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); +} + void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; @@ -812,6 +832,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a); init_scattered_cpuid_features(c); + init_speculation_control(c); } static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -140,28 +140,17 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui rdmsr(MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV, lower_word, c->microcode); } - /* - * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support, - * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also, - * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on - * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available. - */ - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) { - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB); - } - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP)) - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); - /* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */ - if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) || + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n"); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); } /* Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-push-extra-regs-right-away.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-move-status-from-thread_struct-to-thread_info.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-remove-the-syscall64-fast-path.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-avoid-retpolines-for-built-in-__init-functions.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-bugs-make-retpoline-module-warning-conditional.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-check-config_retpoline-in-command-line-parser.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpuid-fix-up-virtual-ibrs-ibpb-stibp-feature-bits-on-intel.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-simplify-spectre_v2-command-line-parsing.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-add-basic-ibpb-indirect-branch-prediction-barrier-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpu-bugs-make-retpoline-module-warning-conditional.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:30:27 CET 2018 From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 15:45:14 +0100 Subject: x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> (cherry picked from commit e383095c7fe8d218e00ec0f83e4b95ed4e627b02) If sysfs is disabled and RETPOLINE not defined: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:97:13: warning: ‘spectre_v2_bad_module’ defined but not used [-Wunused-variable] static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; Hide it. Fixes: caf7501a1b4e ("module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module") Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -93,9 +93,10 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; -static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; #ifdef RETPOLINE +static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; + bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) { if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline) @@ -105,6 +106,13 @@ bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpol spectre_v2_bad_module = true; return false; } + +static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) +{ + return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""; +} +#else +static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } #endif static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) @@ -299,7 +307,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IPBP" : "", - spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""); + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tglx(a)linutronix.de are queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-push-extra-regs-right-away.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-move-status-from-thread_struct-to-thread_info.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-microcode-amd-do-not-load-when-running-on-a-hypervisor.patch queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-remove-the-syscall64-fast-path.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-avoid-retpolines-for-built-in-__init-functions.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-bugs-make-retpoline-module-warning-conditional.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-check-config_retpoline-in-command-line-parser.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpuid-fix-up-virtual-ibrs-ibpb-stibp-feature-bits-on-intel.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-simplify-spectre_v2-command-line-parsing.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch queue-4.9/kaiser-fix-intel_bts-perf-crashes.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:30:27 CET 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 16:24:32 +0000 Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit 2961298efe1ea1b6fc0d7ee8b76018fa6c0bcef2) We want to expose the hardware features simply in /proc/cpuinfo as "ibrs", "ibpb" and "stibp". Since AMD has separate CPUID bits for those, use them as the user-visible bits. When the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit is set which indicates both IBRS and IBPB capability, set those (AMD) bits accordingly. Likewise if the Intel STIBP bit is set, set the AMD STIBP that's used for the generic hardware capability. Hide the rest from /proc/cpuinfo by putting "" in the comments. Including RETPOLINE and RETPOLINE_AMD which shouldn't be visible there. There are patches to make the sysfs vulnerabilities information non-readable by non-root, and the same should apply to all information about which mitigations are actually in use. Those *shouldn't* appear in /proc/cpuinfo. The feature bit for whether IBPB is actually used, which is needed for ALTERNATIVEs, is renamed to X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB. Originally-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 18 +++++++++--------- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++---------- 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -194,15 +194,15 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ /* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */ #define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */ -#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/ +#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ @@ -260,9 +260,9 @@ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */ #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+1) /* Instructions Retired Count */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD (13*32+12) /* Prediction Command MSR (AMD) */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL (13*32+14) /* Speculation Control MSR only (AMD) */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (AMD) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */ @@ -301,8 +301,8 @@ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ -#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (18*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */ /* --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" "wrmsr", - X86_FEATURE_IBPB) + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD), [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB) : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"); --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -272,9 +272,8 @@ retpoline_auto: } /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) { - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); } } @@ -307,7 +306,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -140,17 +140,28 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui rdmsr(MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV, lower_word, c->microcode); } - if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || - cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || - cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL) || - cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD) || - cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { - pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling SPEC_CTRL\n"); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + /* + * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support, + * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also, + * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on + * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available. + */ + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) { + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + } + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); + + /* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */ + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { + pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n"); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB); clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); } /* Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-push-extra-regs-right-away.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-move-status-from-thread_struct-to-thread_info.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-remove-the-syscall64-fast-path.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-avoid-retpolines-for-built-in-__init-functions.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-bugs-make-retpoline-module-warning-conditional.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-check-config_retpoline-in-command-line-parser.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpuid-fix-up-virtual-ibrs-ibpb-stibp-feature-bits-on-intel.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-simplify-spectre_v2-command-line-parsing.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-add-basic-ibpb-indirect-branch-prediction-barrier-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-asm-move-status-from-thread_struct-to-thread_info.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:38:50 -0800 Subject: x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info From: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 37a8f7c38339b22b69876d6f5a0ab851565284e3) The TS_COMPAT bit is very hot and is accessed from code paths that mostly also touch thread_info::flags. Move it into struct thread_info to improve cache locality. The only reason it was in thread_struct is that there was a brief period during which arch-specific fields were not allowed in struct thread_info. Linus suggested further changing: ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); to: if (unlikely(ti->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED))) ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); on the theory that frequently dirtying the cacheline even in pure 64-bit code that never needs to modify status hurts performance. That could be a reasonable followup patch, but I suspect it matters less on top of this patch. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/03148bcc1b217100e6e8ecf6a5468c45cf4304b6.15171644… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 -- arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h | 6 +++--- arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_us * special case only applies after poking regs and before the * very next return to user mode. */ - current->thread.status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); + ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); #endif user_enter_irqoff(); @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_3 unsigned int nr = (unsigned int)regs->orig_ax; #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT; + ti->status |= TS_COMPAT; #endif if (READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY) { --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -391,8 +391,6 @@ struct thread_struct { unsigned short gsindex; #endif - u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */ - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 unsigned long fsbase; unsigned long gsbase; --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static inline long syscall_get_error(str * TS_COMPAT is set for 32-bit syscall entries and then * remains set until we return to user mode. */ - if (task->thread.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) + if (task->thread_info.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) /* * Sign-extend the value so (int)-EFOO becomes (long)-EFOO * and will match correctly in comparisons. @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static inline void syscall_get_arguments unsigned long *args) { # ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (task->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) switch (i) { case 0: if (!n--) break; @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments const unsigned long *args) { # ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (task->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) switch (i) { case 0: if (!n--) break; --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ struct task_struct; struct thread_info { unsigned long flags; /* low level flags */ + u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */ }; #define INIT_THREAD_INFO(tsk) \ @@ -213,7 +214,7 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_fram #define in_ia32_syscall() true #else #define in_ia32_syscall() (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) && \ - current->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + current_thread_info()->status & TS_COMPAT) #endif /* --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ void set_personality_ia32(bool x32) current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC; /* in_compat_syscall() uses the presence of the x32 syscall bit flag to determine compat status */ - current->thread.status &= ~TS_COMPAT; + current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT; } else { set_thread_flag(TIF_IA32); clear_thread_flag(TIF_X32); @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ void set_personality_ia32(bool x32) current->mm->context.ia32_compat = TIF_IA32; current->personality |= force_personality32; /* Prepare the first "return" to user space */ - current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT; + current_thread_info()->status |= TS_COMPAT; } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_personality_ia32); --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ static int putreg32(struct task_struct * */ regs->orig_ax = value; if (syscall_get_nr(child, regs) >= 0) - child->thread.status |= TS_I386_REGS_POKED; + child->thread_info.status |= TS_I386_REGS_POKED; break; case offsetof(struct user32, regs.eflags): --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c @@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_nr_resta * than the tracee. */ #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (current->thread.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) + if (current_thread_info()->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) return __NR_ia32_restart_syscall; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from luto(a)kernel.org are queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-push-extra-regs-right-away.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-move-status-from-thread_struct-to-thread_info.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-remove-the-syscall64-fast-path.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:30:27 CET 2018 From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 13:11:39 +0100 Subject: x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> (cherry picked from commit 55fa19d3e51f33d9cd4056d25836d93abf9438db) Make [ 0.031118] Spectre V2 mitigation: Mitigation: Full generic retpoline into [ 0.031118] Spectre V2: Mitigation: Full generic retpoline to reduce the mitigation mitigations strings. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: riel(a)redhat.com Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: jikos(a)kernel.org Cc: luto(a)amacapital.net Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: keescook(a)google.com Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: pjt(a)google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-5-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] }; #undef pr_fmt -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp(a)suse.de are queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/x86-microcode-amd-do-not-load-when-running-on-a-hypervisor.patch queue-4.9/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:30:27 CET 2018 From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 13:11:36 +0100 Subject: x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> (cherry picked from commit 0e6c16c652cadaffd25a6bb326ec10da5bcec6b4) After commit ad67b74d2469 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p") pointers are being hashed when printed. However, this makes the alternative debug output completely useless. Switch to %px in order to see the unadorned kernel pointers. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: riel(a)redhat.com Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: jikos(a)kernel.org Cc: luto(a)amacapital.net Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: keescook(a)google.com Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: pjt(a)google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-2-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ recompute_jump(struct alt_instr *a, u8 * tgt_rip = next_rip + o_dspl; n_dspl = tgt_rip - orig_insn; - DPRINTK("target RIP: %p, new_displ: 0x%x", tgt_rip, n_dspl); + DPRINTK("target RIP: %px, new_displ: 0x%x", tgt_rip, n_dspl); if (tgt_rip - orig_insn >= 0) { if (n_dspl - 2 <= 127) @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static void __init_or_module optimize_no sync_core(); local_irq_restore(flags); - DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%p: [%d:%d) optimized NOPs: ", + DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%px: [%d:%d) optimized NOPs: ", instr, a->instrlen - a->padlen, a->padlen); } @@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ void __init_or_module apply_alternatives u8 *instr, *replacement; u8 insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN]; - DPRINTK("alt table %p -> %p", start, end); + DPRINTK("alt table %px, -> %px", start, end); /* * The scan order should be from start to end. A later scanned * alternative code can overwrite previously scanned alternative code. @@ -394,14 +394,14 @@ void __init_or_module apply_alternatives continue; } - DPRINTK("feat: %d*32+%d, old: (%p, len: %d), repl: (%p, len: %d), pad: %d", + DPRINTK("feat: %d*32+%d, old: (%px len: %d), repl: (%px, len: %d), pad: %d", a->cpuid >> 5, a->cpuid & 0x1f, instr, a->instrlen, replacement, a->replacementlen, a->padlen); - DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%p: old_insn: ", instr); - DUMP_BYTES(replacement, a->replacementlen, "%p: rpl_insn: ", replacement); + DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%px: old_insn: ", instr); + DUMP_BYTES(replacement, a->replacementlen, "%px: rpl_insn: ", replacement); memcpy(insnbuf, replacement, a->replacementlen); insnbuf_sz = a->replacementlen; @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ void __init_or_module apply_alternatives a->instrlen - a->replacementlen); insnbuf_sz += a->instrlen - a->replacementlen; } - DUMP_BYTES(insnbuf, insnbuf_sz, "%p: final_insn: ", instr); + DUMP_BYTES(insnbuf, insnbuf_sz, "%px: final_insn: ", instr); text_poke_early(instr, insnbuf, insnbuf_sz); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp(a)suse.de are queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/x86-microcode-amd-do-not-load-when-running-on-a-hypervisor.patch queue-4.9/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:03:15 -0800 Subject: nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 259d8c1e984318497c84eef547bbb6b1d9f4eb05) Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that txq_params->ac is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level driver's ->conf_tx() handler is called. Use a new helper, array_index_nospec(), to sanitize txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that any speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS). Reported-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes(a)sipsolutions.net> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: linux-wireless(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem(a)davemloft.net> Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727419584.33451.7700736761686184303.stgit@dwil… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/nl80211.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/netlink.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/etherdevice.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/genetlink.h> @@ -2014,20 +2015,22 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_param static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[], struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params) { + u8 ac; + if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]) return -EINVAL; - txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]); + ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]); txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]); txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]); txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]); txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]); - if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS) + if (ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS) return -EINVAL; - + txq_params->ac = array_index_nospec(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS); return 0; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:03:05 -0800 Subject: vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507) 'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to read from the 'fdt->fd' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from __fcheck_files. Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727418500.33451.17392199002892248656.stgit@dwi… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/include/linux/fdtable.h +++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/fs.h> @@ -81,8 +82,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_file { struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt); - if (fd < fdt->max_fds) + if (fd < fdt->max_fds) { + fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds); return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]); + } return NULL; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:02:22 -0800 Subject: array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit f3804203306e098dae9ca51540fcd5eb700d7f40) array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov(a)lynx.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Cc: Russell King <linux(a)armlinux.org.uk> Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414229.33451.18411580953862676575.stgit@dwi… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/nospec.h | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/nospec.h --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +// Copyright(c) 2018 Linus Torvalds. All rights reserved. +// Copyright(c) 2018 Alexei Starovoitov. All rights reserved. +// Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. + +#ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H +#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H + +/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * When @index is out of bounds (@index >= @size), the sign bit will be + * set. Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of + * zero for an out of bounds index, or ~0 if within bounds [0, @size). + */ +#ifndef array_index_mask_nospec +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + /* + * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage. + * + * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the + * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the + * mask. + * + * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that + * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX. + */ + if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX, + "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n")) + return 0; + + /* + * Always calculate and emit the mask even if the compiler + * thinks the mask is not needed. The compiler does not take + * into account the value of @index under speculation. + */ + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(index); + return ~(long)(index | (size - 1UL - index)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1); +} +#endif + +/* + * array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check + * + * For a code sequence like: + * + * if (index < size) { + * index = array_index_nospec(index, size); + * val = array[index]; + * } + * + * ...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then + * array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0, + * size). + */ +#define array_index_nospec(index, size) \ +({ \ + typeof(index) _i = (index); \ + typeof(size) _s = (size); \ + unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \ + \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \ + \ + _i &= _mask; \ + _i; \ +}) +#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "Documentation: Document array_index_nospec" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled Documentation: Document array_index_nospec to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:02:16 -0800 Subject: Documentation: Document array_index_nospec From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> (cherry picked from commit f84a56f73dddaeac1dba8045b007f742f61cd2da) Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet(a)lwn.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwi… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- Documentation/speculation.txt | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/speculation.txt --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/speculation.txt @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +This document explains potential effects of speculation, and how undesirable +effects can be mitigated portably using common APIs. + +=========== +Speculation +=========== + +To improve performance and minimize average latencies, many contemporary CPUs +employ speculative execution techniques such as branch prediction, performing +work which may be discarded at a later stage. + +Typically speculative execution cannot be observed from architectural state, +such as the contents of registers. However, in some cases it is possible to +observe its impact on microarchitectural state, such as the presence or +absence of data in caches. Such state may form side-channels which can be +observed to extract secret information. + +For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds +checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the +following code: + + int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) + { + if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) + return 0; + else + return array[index]; + } + +Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as: + + CMP <index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS + B.LT less + MOV <returnval>, #0 + RET + less: + LDR <returnval>, [<array>, <index>] + RET + +It is possible that a CPU mis-predicts the conditional branch, and +speculatively loads array[index], even if index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS. This +value will subsequently be discarded, but the speculated load may affect +microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured. + +More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may +result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following +code, building on the prior example: + + int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index) + { + int val1, val2, + + val1 = load_array(arr1, index); + val2 = load_array(arr2, val1); + + return val2; + } + +Under speculation, the first call to load_array() may return the value +of an out-of-bounds address, while the second call will influence +microarchitectural state dependent on this value. This may provide an +arbitrary read primitive. + +==================================== +Mitigating speculation side-channels +==================================== + +The kernel provides a generic API to ensure that bounds checks are +respected even under speculation. Architectures which are affected by +speculation-based side-channels are expected to implement these +primitives. + +The array_index_nospec() helper in <linux/nospec.h> can be used to +prevent information from being leaked via side-channels. + +A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index +value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation +conditions. + +This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example: + + int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) + { + if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) + return 0; + else { + index = array_index_nospec(index, MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS); + return array[index]; + } + } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from mark.rutland(a)arm.com are queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.14 000/159] 4.14.9-stable review

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.9 release. There are 159 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know. Responses should be made by Sun Dec 24 08:45:36 UTC 2017. Anything received after that time might be too late. The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.9-rc1.gz or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y and the diffstat can be found below. thanks, greg k-h ------------- Pseudo-Shortlog of commits: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Linux 4.14.9-rc1 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer(a)who-t.net> platform/x86: asus-wireless: send an EV_SYN/SYN_REPORT between state changes Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano(a)linaro.org> thermal/drivers/hisi: Fix multiple alarm interrupts firing Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano(a)linaro.org> thermal/drivers/hisi: Simplify the temperature/step computation Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano(a)linaro.org> thermal/drivers/hisi: Fix kernel panic on alarm interrupt Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano(a)linaro.org> thermal/drivers/hisi: Fix missing interrupt enablement Niranjana Vishwanathapura <niranjana.vishwanathapura(a)intel.com> IB/opa_vnic: Properly return the total MACs in UC MAC list Scott Franco <safranco(a)intel.com> IB/opa_vnic: Properly clear Mac Table Digest Eric Anholt <eric(a)anholt.net> drm/vc4: Avoid using vrefresh==0 mode in DSI htotal math. Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com> cpuidle: fix broadcast control when broadcast can not be entered Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni(a)free-electrons.com> rtc: set the alarm to the next expiring timer Hoang Tran <tranviethoang.vn(a)gmail.com> tcp: fix under-evaluated ssthresh in TCP Vegas Chen-Yu Tsai <wens(a)csie.org> clk: sunxi-ng: sun6i: Rename HDMI DDC clock to avoid name collision Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs(a)gmail.com> staging: greybus: light: Release memory obtained by kasprintf Wei Hu(Xavier) <xavier.huwei(a)huawei.com> RDMA/hns: Avoid NULL pointer exception Mike Manning <mmanning(a)brocade.com> net: ipv6: send NS for DAD when link operationally up Mick Tarsel <mjtarsel(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> ibmvnic: Set state UP Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller(a)intel.com> fm10k: ensure we process SM mbx when processing VF mbx Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski(a)samsung.com> ARM: exynos_defconfig: Enable UAS support for Odroid HC1 board Alex Williamson <alex.williamson(a)redhat.com> vfio/pci: Virtualize Maximum Payload Size Alan Brady <alan.brady(a)intel.com> i40e: fix client notify of VF reset Dick Kennedy <dick.kennedy(a)broadcom.com> scsi: lpfc: Fix warning messages when NVME_TARGET_FC not defined Dick Kennedy <dick.kennedy(a)broadcom.com> scsi: lpfc: PLOGI failures during NPIV testing Dick Kennedy <dick.kennedy(a)broadcom.com> scsi: lpfc: Fix secure firmware updates Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller(a)intel.com> fm10k: fix mis-ordered parameters in declaration for .ndo_set_vf_bw Nicolas Dechesne <nicolas.dechesne(a)linaro.org> ASoC: codecs: msm8916-wcd-analog: fix module autoload Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner(a)gmail.com> sctp: silence warns on sctp_stream_init allocations Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com> powerpc/watchdog: Do not trigger SMP crash from touch_nmi_watchdog Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com> powerpc/xmon: Avoid tripping SMP hardlockup watchdog Ed Blake <ed.blake(a)sondrel.com> ASoC: img-parallel-out: Add pm_runtime_get/put to set_fmt callback Jean-François Têtu <jean-francois.tetu(a)savoirfairelinux.com> ASoC: codecs: msm8916-wcd-analog: fix micbias level Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi(a)linux.intel.com> tracing: Exclude 'generic fields' from histograms Gabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni(a)huawei.com> PCI/AER: Report non-fatal errors only to the affected endpoint Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller(a)intel.com> i40e/i40evf: spread CPU affinity hints across online CPUs only Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> Bluetooth: hci_bcm: Fix setting of irq trigger type Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> Bluetooth: hci_uart_set_flow_control: Fix NULL deref when using serdev Andrew Jeffery <andrew(a)aj.id.au> leds: pca955x: Don't invert requested value in pca955x_gpio_set_value() Wei Wang <weiwan(a)google.com> ipv6: grab rt->rt6i_ref before allocating pcpu rt William Tu <u9012063(a)gmail.com> ip_gre: check packet length and mtu correctly in erspan tx Guoqing Jiang <gqjiang(a)suse.com> md: always set THREAD_WAKEUP and wake up wqueue if thread existed Luca Miccio <lucmiccio(a)gmail.com> block,bfq: Disable writeback throttling Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> IB/rxe: check for allocation failure on elem Emil Tantilov <emil.s.tantilov(a)intel.com> ixgbe: fix use of uninitialized padding Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi83(a)gmail.com> iio: st_sensors: add register mask for status register Lihong Yang <lihong.yang(a)intel.com> i40e: use the safe hash table iterator when deleting mac filters Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> igb: check memory allocation failure Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam(a)nxp.com> PM / OPP: Move error message to debug level Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes(a)gmail.com> PCI: Create SR-IOV virtfn/physfn links before attaching driver Sreekanth Reddy <sreekanth.reddy(a)broadcom.com> scsi: mpt3sas: Fix IO error occurs on pulling out a drive from RAID1 volume created on two SATA drive Varun Prakash <varun(a)chelsio.com> scsi: cxgb4i: fix Tx skb leak David Daney <david.daney(a)cavium.com> PCI: Avoid bus reset if bridge itself is broken Dan Murphy <dmurphy(a)ti.com> net: phy: at803x: Change error to EINVAL for invalid MAC Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> kvm, mm: account kvm related kmem slabs to kmemcg Russell King <rmk+kernel(a)armlinux.org.uk> rtc: pl031: make interrupt optional Christophe Jaillet <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> crypto: lrw - Fix an error handling path in 'create()' Christian Lamparter <chunkeey(a)gmail.com> crypto: crypto4xx - increase context and scatter ring buffer elements Chen-Yu Tsai <wens(a)csie.org> clk: sunxi-ng: sun5i: Fix bit offset of audio PLL post-divider Chen-Yu Tsai <wens(a)csie.org> clk: sunxi-ng: nm: Check if requested rate is supported by fractional clock Shashank Sharma <shashank.sharma(a)intel.com> drm: Add retries for lspcon mode detection Derek Basehore <dbasehore(a)chromium.org> backlight: pwm_bl: Fix overflow condition Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> optee: fix invalid of_node_put() in optee_driver_init() Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky(a)oracle.com> x86/entry/64/paravirt: Use paravirt-safe macro to access eflags Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> x86/mm/kasan: Don't use vmemmap_populate() to initialize shadow Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE() Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> locking/barriers: Add implicit smp_read_barrier_depends() to READ_ONCE() Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> bpf: fix build issues on um due to mising bpf_perf_event.h Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> perf/x86: Enable free running PEBS for REGS_USER/INTR Rudolf Marek <r.marek(a)assembler.cz> x86: Make X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK detectable in CPUID on AMD Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon(a)linux.intel.com> x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> drivers/misc/intel/pti: Rename the header file to free up the namespace Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> x86/virt: Add enum for hypervisors to replace x86_hyper Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> x86/virt, x86/platform: Merge 'struct x86_hyper' into 'struct x86_platform' and 'struct x86_init' James Morse <james.morse(a)arm.com> ACPI / APEI: Replace ioremap_page_range() with fixmap Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Run most existing LDT test cases against the GDT as well Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Add infrastructure to test set_thread_area() Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> x86/cpufeatures: Fix various details in the feature definitions Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> x86/cpufeatures: Re-tabulate the X86_FEATURE definitions Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> x86/mm: Define _PAGE_TABLE using _KERNPG_TABLE Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> bitops: Revert cbe96375025e ("bitops: Add clear/set_bit32() to linux/bitops.h") Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> x86/cpuid: Replace set/clear_bit32() Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> x86/entry/64: Shorten TEST instructions Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/traps: Use a new on_thread_stack() helper to clean up an assertion Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Remove thread_struct::sp0 Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/32: Fix cpu_current_top_of_stack initialization at boot Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Remove all remaining direct thread_struct::sp0 reads Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Stop initializing TSS.sp0 at boot Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/xen/64, x86/entry/64: Clean up SP code in cpu_initialize_context() Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry: Add task_top_of_stack() to find the top of a task's stack Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Pass SP0 directly to load_sp0() Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/32: Pull the MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS update code out of native_load_sp0() Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: De-Xen-ify our NMI code Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> xen, x86/entry/64: Add xen NMI trap entry Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Remove the RESTORE_..._REGS infrastructure Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Use POP instead of MOV to restore regs on NMI return Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Merge the fast and slow SYSRET paths Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Use pop instead of movq in syscall_return_via_sysret Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Shrink paranoid_exit_restore and make labels local Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Simplify reg restore code in the standard IRET paths Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Move SWAPGS into the common IRET-to-usermode path Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Split the IRET-to-user and IRET-to-kernel paths Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Remove the restore_c_regs_and_iret label Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon(a)linux.intel.com> ptrace,x86: Make user_64bit_mode() available to 32-bit builds Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon(a)linux.intel.com> x86/boot: Relocate definition of the initial state of CR0 Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon(a)linux.intel.com> x86/mm: Relocate page fault error codes to traps.h Gayatri Kammela <gayatri.kammela(a)intel.com> x86/cpufeatures: Enable new SSE/AVX/AVX512 CPU features Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> x86/mm/64: Rename the register_page_bootmem_memmap() 'size' parameter to 'nr_pages' Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> x86/build: Beautify build log of syscall headers Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/asm: Don't use the confusing '.ifeq' directive Dongjiu Geng <gengdongjiu(a)huawei.com> ACPI / APEI: remove the unused dead-code for SEA/NMI notification type Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> x86/xen: Drop 5-level paging support code from the XEN_PV code Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> x86/xen: Provide pre-built page tables only for CONFIG_XEN_PV=y and CONFIG_XEN_PVH=y Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> x86/kasan: Use the same shadow offset for 4- and 5-level paging Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> mm/sparsemem: Allocate mem_section at runtime for CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> x86/cpuid: Prevent out of bound access in do_clear_cpu_cap() Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> objtool: Print top level commands on incorrect usage Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> x86/platform/UV: Convert timers to use timer_setup() Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> x86/fpu: Remove the explicit clearing of XSAVE dependent features Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> x86/fpu: Make XSAVE check the base CPUID features before enabling Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> x86/fpu: Parse clearcpuid= as early XSAVE argument Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> x86/cpuid: Add generic table for CPUID dependencies Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> bitops: Add clear/set_bit32() to linux/bitops.h Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/unwind: Make CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC=y the default in kconfig for 64-bit Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/unwind: Rename unwinder config options to 'CONFIG_UNWINDER_*' Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> x86/fpu/debug: Remove unused 'x86_fpu_state' and 'x86_fpu_deactivate_state' tracepoints Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> x86/unwinder: Make CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC=y the default in the 64-bit defconfig Jan Beulich <JBeulich(a)suse.com> ACPI / APEI: adjust a local variable type in ghes_ioremap_pfn_irq() Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/head: Add unwind hint annotations Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/xen: Add unwind hint annotations Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/xen: Fix xen head ELF annotations Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/boot: Annotate verify_cpu() as a callable function Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/head: Fix head ELF function annotations Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/head: Remove unused 'bad_address' code Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/head: Remove confusing comment Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> objtool: Don't report end of section error after an empty unwind hint Uros Bizjak <ubizjak(a)gmail.com> x86/asm: Remove unnecessary \n\t in front of CC_SET() from asm templates ------------- Diffstat: Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt | 2 +- Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 2 +- Makefile | 8 +- arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h | 7 + arch/powerpc/kernel/watchdog.c | 7 +- arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c | 17 +- arch/um/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 5 +- arch/x86/Kconfig.debug | 39 +- arch/x86/configs/tiny.config | 4 +- arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 69 +-- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 6 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 322 +++++++++--- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 10 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/Makefile | 4 +- arch/x86/events/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 4 + arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 24 +- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h | 10 +- arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 11 +- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 538 +++++++++++---------- arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h | 11 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 74 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/hypervisor.h | 53 +- arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/kdebug.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/module.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 14 +- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/percpu.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 109 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/rmwcc.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 26 + arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/trace/fpu.h | 10 - arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 21 +- arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h | 15 +- arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 24 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 10 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c | 5 +- arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 6 + arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 7 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 195 +++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 121 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hypervisor.c | 64 +-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c | 8 +- arch/x86/kernel/doublefault.c | 36 +- arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 74 ++- arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c | 6 + arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 6 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c | 11 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 43 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 5 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 45 +- arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/irq.c | 12 - arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/paravirt_patch_64.c | 2 - arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 27 +- arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c | 8 +- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 19 +- arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 72 +-- arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | 88 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/verify_cpu.S | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c | 20 +- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 9 + arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 9 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 88 ++-- arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 10 +- arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 262 ++++++++-- arch/x86/power/cpu.c | 16 +- arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c | 12 +- arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 15 +- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 161 +++--- arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c | 17 +- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S | 11 +- block/bfq-iosched.c | 3 +- block/blk-wbt.c | 2 +- crypto/lrw.c | 6 +- drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 78 +-- drivers/base/power/opp/core.c | 2 +- drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c | 23 +- drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c | 7 + drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun5i.c | 4 +- drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun6i-a31.c | 2 +- drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu_nm.c | 3 + drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c | 1 + drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.h | 10 +- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_dual_mode_helper.c | 16 +- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_dsi.c | 3 +- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 2 +- drivers/iio/accel/st_accel_core.c | 35 +- drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c | 2 +- drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_trigger.c | 16 +- drivers/iio/gyro/st_gyro_core.c | 15 +- drivers/iio/magnetometer/st_magn_core.c | 10 +- drivers/iio/pressure/st_pressure_core.c | 15 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_hw_v1.c | 5 + drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c | 2 + drivers/infiniband/ulp/opa_vnic/opa_vnic_encap.c | 1 + .../infiniband/ulp/opa_vnic/opa_vnic_vema_iface.c | 8 +- drivers/input/mouse/vmmouse.c | 10 +- drivers/leds/leds-pca955x.c | 17 +- drivers/md/dm-mpath.c | 20 +- drivers/md/md.c | 4 +- drivers/misc/pti.c | 2 +- drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c | 2 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k.h | 4 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k_iov.c | 12 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 16 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c | 7 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40evf/i40evf_main.c | 9 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 2 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_common.c | 4 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_x550.c | 2 + drivers/net/phy/at803x.c | 2 +- drivers/pci/iov.c | 3 +- drivers/pci/pci.c | 4 + drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c | 9 +- drivers/platform/x86/asus-wireless.c | 1 + drivers/rtc/interface.c | 2 +- drivers/rtc/rtc-pl031.c | 14 +- drivers/scsi/cxgbi/cxgb4i/cxgb4i.c | 1 + drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c | 3 +- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h | 2 +- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nvmet.c | 2 + drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c | 5 + drivers/staging/greybus/light.c | 2 + drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 1 - drivers/thermal/hisi_thermal.c | 74 ++- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 6 +- drivers/video/backlight/pwm_bl.c | 7 +- fs/dcache.c | 4 +- fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 2 +- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 2 +- include/linux/compiler.h | 1 + include/linux/hypervisor.h | 8 +- include/linux/iio/common/st_sensors.h | 7 +- include/linux/{pti.h => intel-pti.h} | 6 +- include/linux/mm.h | 2 +- include/linux/mmzone.h | 6 +- include/linux/rculist.h | 4 +- include/linux/rcupdate.h | 4 +- kernel/events/core.c | 4 +- kernel/seccomp.c | 2 +- kernel/task_work.c | 2 +- kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 4 +- lib/Kconfig.debug | 2 +- mm/page_alloc.c | 10 + mm/slab.h | 2 +- mm/sparse.c | 17 +- net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 8 +- net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 12 +- net/ipv6/route.c | 58 +-- net/sctp/stream.c | 8 +- scripts/Makefile.build | 2 +- sound/soc/codecs/msm8916-wcd-analog.c | 9 +- sound/soc/img/img-parallel-out.c | 2 + tools/objtool/check.c | 7 +- tools/objtool/objtool.c | 6 +- tools/testing/selftests/x86/ldt_gdt.c | 61 ++- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +- 188 files changed, 2414 insertions(+), 1428 deletions(-)

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: Waiman Long <longman(a)redhat.com> Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 17:09:34 -0500 Subject: x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk From: Waiman Long <longman(a)redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit 1df37383a8aeabb9b418698f0bcdffea01f4b1b2) It doesn't make sense to have an indirect call thunk with esp/rsp as retpoline code won't work correctly with the stack pointer register. Removing it will help compiler writers to catch error in case such a thunk call is emitted incorrectly. Fixes: 76b043848fd2 ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support") Suggested-by: Jeff Law <law(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516658974-27852-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 - arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 1 - 2 files changed, 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -37,5 +37,4 @@ INDIRECT_THUNK(dx) INDIRECT_THUNK(si) INDIRECT_THUNK(di) INDIRECT_THUNK(bp) -INDIRECT_THUNK(sp) #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DX) GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SI) GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DI) GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BP) -GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SP) #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT GENERATE_THUNK(r8) GENERATE_THUNK(r9) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from longman(a)redhat.com are queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:13 +0000 Subject: x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit fec9434a12f38d3aeafeb75711b71d8a1fdef621) Also, for CPUs which don't speculate at all, don't report that they're vulnerable to the Spectre variants either. Leave the cpu_no_meltdown[] match table with just X86_VENDOR_AMD in it for now, even though that could be done with a simple comparison, on the assumption that we'll have more to add. Based on suggestions from Dave Hansen and Alan Cox. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ #include <asm/pat.h> #include <asm/microcode.h> #include <asm/microcode_intel.h> +#include <asm/intel-family.h> +#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC #include <asm/uv/uv.h> @@ -838,6 +840,41 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s #endif } +static const __initdata struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = { + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 }, + {} +}; + +static const __initdata struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = { + { X86_VENDOR_AMD }, + {} +}; + +static bool __init cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 ia32_cap = 0; + + if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown)) + return false; + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap); + + /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */ + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO) + return false; + + return true; +} + /* * Do minimum CPU detection early. * Fields really needed: vendor, cpuid_level, family, model, mask, @@ -884,11 +921,12 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); - if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); - - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation)) { + if (cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(c)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + } fpu__init_system(c); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:12 +0000 Subject: x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit 1e340c60d0dd3ae07b5bedc16a0469c14b9f3410) Add MSR and bit definitions for SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD and ARCH_CAPABILITIES. See Intel's 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ #define EFER_FFXSR (1<<_EFER_FFXSR) /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */ +#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ + +#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ +#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ + #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1 #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2 #define MSR_FSB_FREQ 0x000000cd @@ -50,6 +57,11 @@ #define SNB_C3_AUTO_UNDEMOTE (1UL << 28) #define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe + +#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a +#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ +#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */ + #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:10 +0000 Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit fc67dd70adb711a45d2ef34e12d1a8be75edde61) Add three feature bits exposed by new microcode on Intel CPUs for speculation control. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -296,6 +296,9 @@ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (18*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */ /* * BUG word(s) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:09 +0000 Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit 95ca0ee8636059ea2800dfbac9ecac6212d6b38f) This is a pure feature bits leaf. There are two AVX512 feature bits in it already which were handled as scattered bits, and three more from this leaf are going to be added for speculation control features. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 2 -- 6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs CPUID_8000_000A_EDX, CPUID_7_ECX, CPUID_8000_0007_EBX, + CPUID_7_EDX, }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES @@ -78,8 +79,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ @@ -100,8 +102,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 18 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* @@ -197,9 +197,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ /* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */ #define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */ @@ -295,6 +293,10 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+3) /* Scalable MCA */ +/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ + /* * BUG word(s) */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK15 0 #define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK15 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK16 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -737,6 +737,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx; c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx; + c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx; } /* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struc const struct cpuid_bit *cb; static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CR_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CR_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CR_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CR_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE, CR_EDX, 7, 0x80000007, 0 }, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:11 +0000 Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit 5d10cbc91d9eb5537998b65608441b592eec65e7) AMD exposes the PRED_CMD/SPEC_CTRL MSRs slightly differently to Intel. See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b3e25cc-286d-8bd0-aeaf-9ac4aae39de8@amd.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -258,6 +258,9 @@ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */ #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+1) /* Instructions Retired Count */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD (13*32+12) /* Prediction Command MSR (AMD) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL (13*32+14) /* Speculation Control MSR only (AMD) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (AMD) */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:14 +0000 Subject: x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit a5b2966364538a0e68c9fa29bc0a3a1651799035) This doesn't refuse to load the affected microcodes; it just refuses to use the Spectre v2 mitigation features if they're detected, by clearing the appropriate feature bits. The AMD CPUID bits are handled here too, because hypervisors *may* have been exposing those bits even on Intel chips, for fine-grained control of what's available. It is non-trivial to use x86_match_cpu() for this table because that doesn't handle steppings. And the approach taken in commit bd9240a18 almost made me lose my lunch. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 7 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ */ #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH 0x0E + #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM 0x0F #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L 0x16 #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN 0x17 @@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G 0x1F /* Auburndale / Havendale */ #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP 0x1A #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX 0x2E + #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE 0x25 #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP 0x2C #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX 0x2F @@ -36,9 +38,9 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E 0x46 #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE 0x3D -#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56 #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E 0x47 #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X 0x4F +#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56 #define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE 0x4E #define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP 0x5E @@ -57,9 +59,10 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 0x4D /* Avaton/Rangely */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT 0x4C /* CherryTrail / Braswell */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD 0x4A /* Tangier */ -#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Annidale */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Anniedale */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT 0x5C #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON 0x5F /* Goldmont Microserver */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE 0x7A /* Xeon Phi */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -61,6 +61,59 @@ void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x8 } } +/* + * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken. + * Information taken from; + * - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/microcode-up… + * - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345 + * - Microcode revisions observed in the wild + * - Release note from 20180108 microcode release + */ +struct sku_microcode { + u8 model; + u8 stepping; + u32 microcode; +}; +static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = { + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 0x01, 0x21 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x18 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a }, + /* Updated in the 20180108 release; blacklist until we know otherwise */ + { INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, 0x01, 0x22 }, + /* Observed in the wild */ + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 }, +}; + +static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) { + if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model && + c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping) + return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode); + } + return false; +} + static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 misc_enable; @@ -87,6 +140,19 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui rdmsr(MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV, lower_word, c->microcode); } + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { + pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling SPEC_CTRL\n"); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP); + } + /* * Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41: * Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 15:50:28 -0800 Subject: module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module From: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> (cherry picked from commit caf7501a1b4ec964190f31f9c3f163de252273b8) There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the right compiler or the right option. To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source or prebuilt object files are not checked. If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: jeyu(a)kernel.org Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- include/linux/module.h | 9 +++++++++ kernel/module.c | 11 +++++++++++ scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/module.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> @@ -92,6 +93,19 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; +static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; + +#ifdef RETPOLINE +bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline) + return true; + + pr_err("System may be vunerable to spectre v2\n"); + spectre_v2_bad_module = true; + return false; +} +#endif static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { @@ -277,6 +291,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""); } #endif --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -791,6 +791,15 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(c static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {} #endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */ +#ifdef RETPOLINE +extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline); +#else +static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + return true; +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module) { --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2817,6 +2817,15 @@ static int check_modinfo_livepatch(struc } #endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ +static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) +{ + if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline"))) + return; + + pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n", + mod->name); +} + /* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, struct load_info *info) @@ -2969,6 +2978,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module * add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } + check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info); + if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) { add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality " --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -2130,6 +2130,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffe buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n"); } +/* Cannot check for assembler */ +static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b) +{ + buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n"); + buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"); + buf_printf(b, "#endif\n"); +} + static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name) { static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging"; @@ -2474,6 +2482,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) add_header(&buf, mod); add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module); + add_retpoline(&buf); add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name); err |= add_versions(&buf, mod); add_depends(&buf, mod, modules); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ak(a)linux.intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 10:58:13 +0100 Subject: KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> (cherry picked from commit 1a29b5b7f347a1a9230c1e0af5b37e3e571588ab) Replace the indirect calls with CALL_NOSPEC. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: rga(a)amazon.de Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron(a)akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125095843.595615683@infradead.org [dwmw2: Use ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT like upstream, now we have it] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h> #include <linux/stringify.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "x86.h" #include "tss.h" @@ -1012,8 +1013,8 @@ static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsign void (*fop)(void) = (void *)em_setcc + 4 * (condition & 0xf); flags = (flags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]" - : "=a"(rc) : [fastop]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC + : "=a"(rc) : [thunk_target]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); return rc; } @@ -5306,15 +5307,14 @@ static void fetch_possible_mmx_operand(s static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*fop)(struct fastop *)) { - register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP); ulong flags = (ctxt->eflags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF; if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp)) fop += __ffs(ctxt->dst.bytes) * FASTOP_SIZE; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" : "+a"(ctxt->dst.val), "+d"(ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D"(flags), - [fastop]"+S"(fop), "+r"(__sp) + [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : "c"(ctxt->src2.val)); ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kaiser-fix-intel_bts-perf-crashes.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 10:58:14 +0100 Subject: KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> (cherry picked from commit c940a3fb1e2e9b7d03228ab28f375fb5a47ff699) Replace indirect call with CALL_NOSPEC. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: rga(a)amazon.de Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron(a)akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125095843.645776917@infradead.org Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -8676,14 +8676,14 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(str #endif "pushf\n\t" __ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t" - "call *%[entry]\n\t" + CALL_NOSPEC : #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 [sp]"=&r"(tmp), #endif "+r"(__sp) : - [entry]"r"(entry), + THUNK_TARGET(entry), [ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS), [cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS) ); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kaiser-fix-intel_bts-perf-crashes.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] v3.18.94 build: 0 failures 1 warnings (v3.18.94)

by Build bot for Mark Brown

Tree/Branch: v3.18.94 Git describe: v3.18.94 Commit: cde3537bd1 Linux 3.18.94 Build Time: 50 min 14 sec Passed: 9 / 9 (100.00 %) Failed: 0 / 9 ( 0.00 %) Errors: 0 Warnings: 1 Section Mismatches: 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- defconfigs with issues (other than build errors): 2 warnings 0 mismatches : x86_64-defconfig ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Warnings Summary: 1 2 ../include/linux/ftrace.h:632:36: warning: calling '__builtin_return_address' with a nonzero argument is unsafe [-Wframe-address] =============================================================================== Detailed per-defconfig build reports below: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x86_64-defconfig : PASS, 0 errors, 2 warnings, 0 section mismatches Warnings: ../include/linux/ftrace.h:632:36: warning: calling '__builtin_return_address' with a nonzero argument is unsafe [-Wframe-address] ../include/linux/ftrace.h:632:36: warning: calling '__builtin_return_address' with a nonzero argument is unsafe [-Wframe-address] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passed with no errors, warnings or mismatches: arm64-allnoconfig arm64-allmodconfig arm-multi_v5_defconfig arm-multi_v7_defconfig arm-allmodconfig arm-allnoconfig x86_64-allnoconfig arm64-defconfig

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] A question about commit 6c16fa backported in 3.18.93

by Wang Han

Hello, I am not familiar with Linux mailing, sorry for this. I am writing this mail because I am not sure about commit 6c16fa957e84c8b640dadc4e0264ff0d2dae7aa3 added in 3.18.93. That backport made the arp.h changes in struct __ipv4_neigh_lookup(), but compared with upstream commit, I think that 3 lines should be added in __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(), as I go through the context. Also the latter would be called unconditionally if former is called so it would cover more cases. Could you please check this and let me know? Though it would 90% be my derp. Thanks, Wang

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH for 3.18] ipv4: Map neigh lookup keys in __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref()

by Wang Han

As discussed earlier, From: Wang Han <wanghan1995315(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2018 03:28:35 +1400 Subject: [PATCH] ipv4: Map neigh lookup keys in __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref() Commit 6c16fa957e84 is an incorrect backport as we map the keys in struct __ipv4_neigh_lookup(), but the correct place to add the code is struct __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(), compared to upstream. Fix it by moving the code, or fewer cases will be covered as __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref() will be called unconditionally from __ipv4_neigh_lookup(), and it can be called from other places such as ip_output.c. Fixes: 6c16fa957e84 (ipv4: Make neigh lookup keys for loopback/point-to-point devices be INADDR_ANY) Signed-off-by: Wang Han <wanghan1995315(a)gmail.com> --- include/net/arp.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/arp.h b/include/net/arp.h index 174014585ade..5d8c7990582f 100644 --- a/include/net/arp.h +++ b/include/net/arp.h @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ static inline struct neighbour *__ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(struct net_device *dev struct neighbour *n; u32 hash_val; + if (dev->flags & (IFF_LOOPBACK | IFF_POINTOPOINT)) + key = INADDR_ANY; + hash_val = arp_hashfn(key, dev, nht->hash_rnd[0]) >> (32 - nht->hash_shift); for (n = rcu_dereference_bh(nht->hash_buckets[hash_val]); n != NULL; @@ -37,9 +40,6 @@ static inline struct neighbour *__ipv4_neigh_lookup(struct net_device *dev, u32 { struct neighbour *n; - if (dev->flags & (IFF_LOOPBACK | IFF_POINTOPOINT)) - key = INADDR_ANY; - rcu_read_lock_bh(); n = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, key); if (n && !atomic_inc_not_zero(&n->refcnt)) -- 2.14.1

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 3.18 00/36] 3.18.94-stable review

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

On Wed, Feb 07, 2018 at 03:19:07PM +0000, Harsh Shandilya wrote: > On Tue 6 Feb, 2018, 12:09 AM Greg Kroah-Hartman, <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> > wrote: > > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.94 release. > > There are 36 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response > > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please > > let me know. > > > > Responses should be made by Wed Feb 7 18:23:41 UTC 2018. > > Anything received after that time might be too late. > > > > Let's find out if I am too late. > > https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg213160.html will have to be lined > up for 3.18.94, or to .95 if I'm late since it's fixing a erroneous > backport from 3.18.93 which went unnoticed until after release. The email > bringing it up and the subsequent patch were probably lost in the usual > stable noise. I have applied it to the CAF tree for the oneplus3 and > verified that it does not break compilation or userspace for arm64. It will be queued up for the next release, I missed it this time, sorry. greg k-h

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [Bug 197863] Thinkpad X240 resume dramatically slower on kernels 4.13+

by Greg KH

On Sat, Feb 03, 2018 at 07:25:54PM +0100, Markus Demleitner wrote: > On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 07:32:04AM +0100, Greg KH wrote: > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 07:21:09PM +0100, Markus Demleitner wrote: > > > A while ago I opened bug #197863 in the kernel bugzilla: > > > > > > https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197863 > > > > > > Essentially, xhci_hcd on a resume from RAM takes several seconds on a > > > Thinkpad X240 that is equipped with a Sierra LTE modem after an > > > upgrade to 4.13: > [...] > > > Now, interestingly, there are quick resumes in 4.15.0, too, now and > > > then. In that case, things look pretty much like on 4.12.2. Here's > > > a 4.15.0 fast resume example: > > > > > > [ 873.127570] usb 1-4: device firmware changed > > > [ 873.277351] usb 1-8: reset high-speed USB device number 4 using xhci_hcd > > > [ 873.515141] restoring control 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000101/0/2 > > > [ 873.583238] OOM killer enabled. > > > [ 873.583240] Restarting tasks ... > > > [ 873.583339] usb 1-4: USB disconnect, device number 10 > > > [ 873.586356] done. > > > [ 873.604420] PM: suspend exit > > > [ 873.737283] usb 1-4: new high-speed USB device number 11 using xhci_hcd > > > [ 880.867398] usb 1-4: device descriptor read/64, error -110 > > > [ 881.175558] usb 1-4: New USB device found, idVendor=1199, idProduct=a001 > > > [ 881.175563] usb 1-4: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3 > > > [ 881.175566] usb 1-4: Product: Sierra Wireless EM7345 4G LTE > > > [ 881.175568] usb 1-4: Manufacturer: Sierra Wireless Inc. > > > [ 881.175570] usb 1-4: SerialNumber: 013937002544516 > > > > > > Any guess what might be behind this? > > > > Any chance you can run 'git bisect' to find the offending commit for > > this issue? > > It's 662591461c4b9a1e3b9b159dbf37648a585ebaae. To my eyes, it even > looks plausible that it's causing the problematic behaviour, but > since I can't say I understand what I'd be doing if I dabbled with > the change, I've refrained from guessing how to fix it. > > I'm happy to try patches, though. Ok, thanks. I've added the authors of this patch to the email here, perhaps they have an idea of what is going on? greg k-h

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] Linux 4.15.2

by Greg KH

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 46b26bfee27b..1e762c210f1b 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2742,8 +2742,6 @@ norandmaps Don't use address space randomization. Equivalent to echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space - noreplace-paravirt [X86,IA-64,PV_OPS] Don't patch paravirt_ops - noreplace-smp [X86-32,SMP] Don't replace SMP instructions with UP alternatives diff --git a/Documentation/speculation.txt b/Documentation/speculation.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e9e6cbae2841 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/speculation.txt @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +This document explains potential effects of speculation, and how undesirable +effects can be mitigated portably using common APIs. + +=========== +Speculation +=========== + +To improve performance and minimize average latencies, many contemporary CPUs +employ speculative execution techniques such as branch prediction, performing +work which may be discarded at a later stage. + +Typically speculative execution cannot be observed from architectural state, +such as the contents of registers. However, in some cases it is possible to +observe its impact on microarchitectural state, such as the presence or +absence of data in caches. Such state may form side-channels which can be +observed to extract secret information. + +For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds +checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the +following code: + + int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) + { + if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) + return 0; + else + return array[index]; + } + +Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as: + + CMP <index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS + B.LT less + MOV <returnval>, #0 + RET + less: + LDR <returnval>, [<array>, <index>] + RET + +It is possible that a CPU mis-predicts the conditional branch, and +speculatively loads array[index], even if index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS. This +value will subsequently be discarded, but the speculated load may affect +microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured. + +More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may +result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following +code, building on the prior example: + + int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index) + { + int val1, val2, + + val1 = load_array(arr1, index); + val2 = load_array(arr2, val1); + + return val2; + } + +Under speculation, the first call to load_array() may return the value +of an out-of-bounds address, while the second call will influence +microarchitectural state dependent on this value. This may provide an +arbitrary read primitive. + +==================================== +Mitigating speculation side-channels +==================================== + +The kernel provides a generic API to ensure that bounds checks are +respected even under speculation. Architectures which are affected by +speculation-based side-channels are expected to implement these +primitives. + +The array_index_nospec() helper in <linux/nospec.h> can be used to +prevent information from being leaked via side-channels. + +A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index +value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation +conditions. + +This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example: + + int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) + { + if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) + return 0; + else { + index = array_index_nospec(index, MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS); + return array[index]; + } + } diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index af101b556ba0..54f1bc10b531 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 15 -SUBLEVEL = 1 +SUBLEVEL = 2 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Fearless Coyote diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index d7d3cc24baf4..21dbdf0e476b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/uprobes.h> #include <linux/livepatch.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> @@ -206,7 +207,7 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs) * special case only applies after poking regs and before the * very next return to user mode. */ - current->thread.status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); + ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); #endif user_enter_irqoff(); @@ -282,7 +283,8 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs) * regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls. */ if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) { - regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK]( + nr = array_index_nospec(nr & __SYSCALL_MASK, NR_syscalls); + regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr]( regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx, regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9); } @@ -304,7 +306,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs) unsigned int nr = (unsigned int)regs->orig_ax; #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT; + ti->status |= TS_COMPAT; #endif if (READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY) { @@ -318,6 +320,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs) } if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) { + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls); /* * It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation * takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index 60c4c342316c..2a35b1e0fb90 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -252,7 +252,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + /* Clobbers %ebx */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index ff6f8022612c..c752abe89d80 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -236,91 +236,20 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe) pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */ pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */ pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */ - sub $(6*8), %rsp /* pt_regs->bp, bx, r12-15 not saved */ - UNWIND_HINT_REGS extra=0 - - TRACE_IRQS_OFF - - /* - * If we need to do entry work or if we guess we'll need to do - * exit work, go straight to the slow path. - */ - movq PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11 - testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY|_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11) - jnz entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path - -entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath: - /* - * Easy case: enable interrupts and issue the syscall. If the syscall - * needs pt_regs, we'll call a stub that disables interrupts again - * and jumps to the slow path. - */ - TRACE_IRQS_ON - ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) -#if __SYSCALL_MASK == ~0 - cmpq $__NR_syscall_max, %rax -#else - andl $__SYSCALL_MASK, %eax - cmpl $__NR_syscall_max, %eax -#endif - ja 1f /* return -ENOSYS (already in pt_regs->ax) */ - movq %r10, %rcx - - /* - * This call instruction is handled specially in stub_ptregs_64. - * It might end up jumping to the slow path. If it jumps, RAX - * and all argument registers are clobbered. - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax - call __x86_indirect_thunk_rax -#else - call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8) -#endif -.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call: - - movq %rax, RAX(%rsp) -1: + pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ + pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ + pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */ + pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */ + pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */ + pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */ + UNWIND_HINT_REGS - /* - * If we get here, then we know that pt_regs is clean for SYSRET64. - * If we see that no exit work is required (which we are required - * to check with IRQs off), then we can go straight to SYSRET64. - */ - DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) TRACE_IRQS_OFF - movq PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11 - testl $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11) - jnz 1f - - LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT - TRACE_IRQS_ON /* user mode is traced as IRQs on */ - movq RIP(%rsp), %rcx - movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 - addq $6*8, %rsp /* skip extra regs -- they were preserved */ - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY - jmp .Lpop_c_regs_except_rcx_r11_and_sysret -1: - /* - * The fast path looked good when we started, but something changed - * along the way and we need to switch to the slow path. Calling - * raise(3) will trigger this, for example. IRQs are off. - */ - TRACE_IRQS_ON - ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) - SAVE_EXTRA_REGS - movq %rsp, %rdi - call syscall_return_slowpath /* returns with IRQs disabled */ - jmp return_from_SYSCALL_64 - -entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path: /* IRQs are off. */ - SAVE_EXTRA_REGS movq %rsp, %rdi call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */ -return_from_SYSCALL_64: TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ /* we're about to change IF */ /* @@ -393,7 +322,6 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret: /* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY POP_EXTRA_REGS -.Lpop_c_regs_except_rcx_r11_and_sysret: popq %rsi /* skip r11 */ popq %r10 popq %r9 @@ -424,47 +352,6 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret: USERGS_SYSRET64 END(entry_SYSCALL_64) -ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64) - /* - * Syscalls marked as needing ptregs land here. - * If we are on the fast path, we need to save the extra regs, - * which we achieve by trying again on the slow path. If we are on - * the slow path, the extra regs are already saved. - * - * RAX stores a pointer to the C function implementing the syscall. - * IRQs are on. - */ - cmpq $.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call, (%rsp) - jne 1f - - /* - * Called from fast path -- disable IRQs again, pop return address - * and jump to slow path - */ - DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) - TRACE_IRQS_OFF - popq %rax - UNWIND_HINT_REGS extra=0 - jmp entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path - -1: - JMP_NOSPEC %rax /* Called from C */ -END(stub_ptregs_64) - -.macro ptregs_stub func -ENTRY(ptregs_\func) - UNWIND_HINT_FUNC - leaq \func(%rip), %rax - jmp stub_ptregs_64 -END(ptregs_\func) -.endm - -/* Instantiate ptregs_stub for each ptregs-using syscall */ -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_(sym) -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_ptregs(sym) ptregs_stub sym -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym) -#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> - /* * %rdi: prev task * %rsi: next task @@ -499,7 +386,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + /* Clobbers %rbx */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c index 9c09775e589d..c176d2fab1da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c @@ -7,14 +7,11 @@ #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_(sym) sym -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_ptregs(sym) ptregs_##sym - -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) extern asmlinkage long __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym)(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); +#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); #include <asm/syscalls_64.h> #undef __SYSCALL_64 -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) [nr] = __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym), +#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) [nr] = sym, extern long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h index 1908214b9125..4d111616524b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -38,4 +38,7 @@ INDIRECT_THUNK(dx) INDIRECT_THUNK(si) INDIRECT_THUNK(di) INDIRECT_THUNK(bp) +asmlinkage void __fill_rsb(void); +asmlinkage void __clear_rsb(void); + #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h index 7fb336210e1b..30d406146016 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -24,6 +24,34 @@ #define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory") #endif +/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the + * bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * Returns: + * 0 - (index < size) + */ +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long mask; + + asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;" + :"=r" (mask) + :"r"(size),"r" (index) + :"cc"); + return mask; +} + +/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */ +#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec + +/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */ +#define barrier_nospec() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \ + "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC) + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE #define dma_rmb() rmb() #else diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index ea9a7dde62e5..70eddb3922ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs CPUID_8000_000A_EDX, CPUID_7_ECX, CPUID_8000_0007_EBX, + CPUID_7_EDX, }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES @@ -79,8 +80,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ @@ -101,8 +103,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 25b9375c1484..73b5fff159a4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 18 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* @@ -203,14 +203,14 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW ( 7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS ( 7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ + +#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ @@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+ 1) /* Instructions Retired Count */ #define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR (13*32+ 2) /* Always save/restore FP error pointers */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */ @@ -319,6 +322,13 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+ 1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+ 3) /* Scalable MCA */ +/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */ + /* * BUG word(s) */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index b027633e7300..33833d1909af 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK15 0 #define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h index 64c4a30e0d39..e203169931c7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h @@ -137,8 +137,10 @@ enum fixed_addresses { extern void reserve_top_address(unsigned long reserve); -#define FIXADDR_SIZE (__end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT) -#define FIXADDR_START (FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_SIZE) +#define FIXADDR_SIZE (__end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT) +#define FIXADDR_START (FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_SIZE) +#define FIXADDR_TOT_SIZE (__end_of_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT) +#define FIXADDR_TOT_START (FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_TOT_SIZE) extern int fixmaps_set; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index e7b983a35506..e520a1e6fc11 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */ +#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ + +#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ +#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ + #define MSR_PPIN_CTL 0x0000004e #define MSR_PPIN 0x0000004f @@ -57,6 +64,11 @@ #define SNB_C3_AUTO_UNDEMOTE (1UL << 28) #define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe + +#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a +#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ +#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */ + #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h index 07962f5f6fba..30df295f6d94 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h @@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long long rdtsc_ordered(void) * that some other imaginary CPU is updating continuously with a * time stamp. */ - alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, - "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC); + barrier_nospec(); return rdtsc(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 4ad41087ce0e..4d57894635f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -1,56 +1,12 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ -#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ +#define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> -/* - * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. - * - * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an - * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. - * - * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based - * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to - * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes - * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would - * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. - * - * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and - * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that - * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there. - */ - -#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ -#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ - -/* - * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be - * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation - * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. - */ -#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ - mov $(nr/2), reg; \ -771: \ - call 772f; \ -773: /* speculation trap */ \ - pause; \ - lfence; \ - jmp 773b; \ -772: \ - call 774f; \ -775: /* speculation trap */ \ - pause; \ - lfence; \ - jmp 775b; \ -774: \ - dec reg; \ - jnz 771b; \ - add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; - #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ /* @@ -121,17 +77,10 @@ #endif .endm - /* - * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP - * monstrosity above, manually. - */ -.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req +/* This clobbers the BX register */ +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER nr:req ftr:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ - __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ - \ftr -.Lskip_rsb_\@: + ALTERNATIVE "", "call __clear_rsb", \ftr #endif .endm @@ -201,22 +150,25 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future - * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - unsigned long loops; - - asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", - __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) - "910:" - : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT - : : "memory" ); + alternative_input("", + "call __fill_rsb", + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, + ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER(_ASM_BX, "memory")); #endif } +static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) +{ + alternative_input("", + "call __ibp_barrier", + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB, + ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER("eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory")); +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ -#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */ +#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h index ce245b0cdfca..0777e18a1d23 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h @@ -44,8 +44,9 @@ extern bool __vmalloc_start_set; /* set once high_memory is set */ */ #define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (NR_CPUS * 40) -#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE \ - ((FIXADDR_START - PAGE_SIZE * (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES + 1)) & PMD_MASK) +#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE \ + ((FIXADDR_TOT_START - PAGE_SIZE * (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES + 1)) \ + & PMD_MASK) #define PKMAP_BASE \ ((CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE - PAGE_SIZE) & PMD_MASK) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index d3a67fba200a..513f9604c192 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -460,8 +460,6 @@ struct thread_struct { unsigned short gsindex; #endif - u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */ - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 unsigned long fsbase; unsigned long gsbase; @@ -971,4 +969,7 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void); void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy); void df_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code); + +void __ibp_barrier(void); + #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h index d91ba04dd007..fb3a6de7440b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK15 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK16 (NEED_LA57) #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h index e3c95e8e61c5..03eedc21246d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static inline long syscall_get_error(struct task_struct *task, * TS_COMPAT is set for 32-bit syscall entries and then * remains set until we return to user mode. */ - if (task->thread.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) + if (task->thread_info.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) /* * Sign-extend the value so (int)-EFOO becomes (long)-EFOO * and will match correctly in comparisons. @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *args) { # ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (task->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) switch (i) { case 0: if (!n--) break; @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task, const unsigned long *args) { # ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (task->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) switch (i) { case 0: if (!n--) break; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index 00223333821a..eda3b6823ca4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct task_struct; struct thread_info { unsigned long flags; /* low level flags */ + u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */ }; #define INIT_THREAD_INFO(tsk) \ @@ -221,7 +222,7 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack, #define in_ia32_syscall() true #else #define in_ia32_syscall() (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) && \ - current->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + current_thread_info()->status & TS_COMPAT) #endif /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h index d33e4a26dc7e..2b8f18ca5874 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h @@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ struct tlb_state { struct mm_struct *loaded_mm; u16 loaded_mm_asid; u16 next_asid; + /* last user mm's ctx id */ + u64 last_ctx_id; /* * We can be in one of several states: diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 574dff4d2913..aae77eb8491c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -124,6 +124,11 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void); #define __uaccess_begin() stac() #define __uaccess_end() clac() +#define __uaccess_begin_nospec() \ +({ \ + stac(); \ + barrier_nospec(); \ +}) /* * This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into @@ -445,7 +450,7 @@ do { \ ({ \ int __gu_err; \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ - __uaccess_begin(); \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \ __uaccess_end(); \ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ @@ -487,6 +492,10 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; __uaccess_begin(); \ barrier(); +#define uaccess_try_nospec do { \ + current->thread.uaccess_err = 0; \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ + #define uaccess_catch(err) \ __uaccess_end(); \ (err) |= (current->thread.uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \ @@ -548,7 +557,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; * get_user_ex(...); * } get_user_catch(err) */ -#define get_user_try uaccess_try +#define get_user_try uaccess_try_nospec #define get_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err) #define get_user_ex(x, ptr) do { \ @@ -582,7 +591,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void) __typeof__(ptr) __uval = (uval); \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old); \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new); \ - __uaccess_begin(); \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ switch (size) { \ case 1: \ { \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h index 72950401b223..ba2dc1930630 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h @@ -29,21 +29,21 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) switch (n) { case 1: ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)to, from, ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 2: ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)to, from, ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 4: ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)to, from, ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4); __uaccess_end(); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h index f07ef3c575db..62546b3a398e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h @@ -55,31 +55,31 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long size) return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size); switch (size) { case 1: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)dst, (u8 __user *)src, ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 2: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)dst, (u16 __user *)src, ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 4: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)dst, (u32 __user *)src, ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 8: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 8); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 10: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 10); if (likely(!ret)) @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long size) __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 16: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 16); if (likely(!ret)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 4817d743c263..a481763a3776 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -46,17 +46,6 @@ static int __init setup_noreplace_smp(char *str) } __setup("noreplace-smp", setup_noreplace_smp); -#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT -static int __initdata_or_module noreplace_paravirt = 0; - -static int __init setup_noreplace_paravirt(char *str) -{ - noreplace_paravirt = 1; - return 1; -} -__setup("noreplace-paravirt", setup_noreplace_paravirt); -#endif - #define DPRINTK(fmt, args...) \ do { \ if (debug_alternative) \ @@ -298,7 +287,7 @@ recompute_jump(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *orig_insn, u8 *repl_insn, u8 *insnbuf) tgt_rip = next_rip + o_dspl; n_dspl = tgt_rip - orig_insn; - DPRINTK("target RIP: %p, new_displ: 0x%x", tgt_rip, n_dspl); + DPRINTK("target RIP: %px, new_displ: 0x%x", tgt_rip, n_dspl); if (tgt_rip - orig_insn >= 0) { if (n_dspl - 2 <= 127) @@ -355,7 +344,7 @@ static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *ins add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen); local_irq_restore(flags); - DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%p: [%d:%d) optimized NOPs: ", + DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%px: [%d:%d) optimized NOPs: ", instr, a->instrlen - a->padlen, a->padlen); } @@ -376,7 +365,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, u8 *instr, *replacement; u8 insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN]; - DPRINTK("alt table %p -> %p", start, end); + DPRINTK("alt table %px, -> %px", start, end); /* * The scan order should be from start to end. A later scanned * alternative code can overwrite previously scanned alternative code. @@ -400,14 +389,14 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, continue; } - DPRINTK("feat: %d*32+%d, old: (%p, len: %d), repl: (%p, len: %d), pad: %d", + DPRINTK("feat: %d*32+%d, old: (%px len: %d), repl: (%px, len: %d), pad: %d", a->cpuid >> 5, a->cpuid & 0x1f, instr, a->instrlen, replacement, a->replacementlen, a->padlen); - DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%p: old_insn: ", instr); - DUMP_BYTES(replacement, a->replacementlen, "%p: rpl_insn: ", replacement); + DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%px: old_insn: ", instr); + DUMP_BYTES(replacement, a->replacementlen, "%px: rpl_insn: ", replacement); memcpy(insnbuf, replacement, a->replacementlen); insnbuf_sz = a->replacementlen; @@ -433,7 +422,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, a->instrlen - a->replacementlen); insnbuf_sz += a->instrlen - a->replacementlen; } - DUMP_BYTES(insnbuf, insnbuf_sz, "%p: final_insn: ", instr); + DUMP_BYTES(insnbuf, insnbuf_sz, "%px: final_insn: ", instr); text_poke_early(instr, insnbuf, insnbuf_sz); } @@ -599,9 +588,6 @@ void __init_or_module apply_paravirt(struct paravirt_patch_site *start, struct paravirt_patch_site *p; char insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN]; - if (noreplace_paravirt) - return; - for (p = start; p < end; p++) { unsigned int used; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 390b3dc3d438..71949bf2de5a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/module.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> @@ -90,20 +91,41 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { }; #undef pr_fmt -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; +#ifdef RETPOLINE +static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; + +bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline) + return true; + + pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n"); + spectre_v2_bad_module = true; + return false; +} + +static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) +{ + return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""; +} +#else +static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } +#endif + static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s\n", reason); + pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s\n", reason); + pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } static inline bool retp_compiler(void) @@ -118,42 +140,68 @@ static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len); } +static const struct { + const char *option; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd; + bool secure; +} mitigation_options[] = { + { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false }, + { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true }, + { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false }, + { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false }, + { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false }, + { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, +}; + static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) { char arg[20]; - int ret; - - ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, - sizeof(arg)); - if (ret > 0) { - if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) { - goto disable; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) { - spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) { - spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) { - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { - pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - } - spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) { - spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) { + int ret, i; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; + else { + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, + sizeof(arg)); + if (ret < 0) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) { + if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option)) + continue; + cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd; + break; + } + + if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) { + pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } } - if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) && + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) { + pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; -disable: - spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; + } + + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if (mitigation_options[i].secure) + spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option); + else + spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option); + + return cmd; } /* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */ @@ -191,10 +239,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) return; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: - /* FALLTRHU */ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: - goto retpoline_auto; - + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_auto; + break; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) goto retpoline_amd; @@ -249,6 +297,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n"); } + + /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); + pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); + } } #undef pr_fmt @@ -269,7 +323,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, @@ -278,6 +332,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif + +void __ibp_barrier(void) +{ + __wrmsr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, 0); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__ibp_barrier); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index ef29ad001991..d63f4b5706e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ #include <asm/pat.h> #include <asm/microcode.h> #include <asm/microcode_intel.h> +#include <asm/intel-family.h> +#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC #include <asm/uv/uv.h> @@ -748,6 +750,26 @@ static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + /* + * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support, + * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also, + * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on + * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available. + * + * We use the AMD bits in 0x8000_0008 EBX as the generic hardware + * features, which are visible in /proc/cpuinfo and used by the + * kernel. So set those accordingly from the Intel bits. + */ + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) { + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + } + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); +} + void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; @@ -769,6 +791,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx; c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx; + c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx; } /* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */ @@ -841,6 +864,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a); init_scattered_cpuid_features(c); + init_speculation_control(c); /* * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe. @@ -876,6 +900,41 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #endif } +static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = { + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 }, + {} +}; + +static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = { + { X86_VENDOR_AMD }, + {} +}; + +static bool __init cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 ia32_cap = 0; + + if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown)) + return false; + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap); + + /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */ + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO) + return false; + + return true; +} + /* * Do minimum CPU detection early. * Fields really needed: vendor, cpuid_level, family, model, mask, @@ -923,11 +982,12 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); - if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); - - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation)) { + if (cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(c)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + } fpu__init_system(c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index b1af22073e28..319bf989fad1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -102,6 +102,59 @@ static void probe_xeon_phi_r3mwait(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) ELF_HWCAP2 |= HWCAP2_RING3MWAIT; } +/* + * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken. + * Information taken from; + * - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/microcode-up… + * - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345 + * - Microcode revisions observed in the wild + * - Release note from 20180108 microcode release + */ +struct sku_microcode { + u8 model; + u8 stepping; + u32 microcode; +}; +static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = { + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 0x01, 0x21 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x18 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a }, + /* Updated in the 20180108 release; blacklist until we know otherwise */ + { INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, 0x01, 0x22 }, + /* Observed in the wild */ + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 }, +}; + +static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) { + if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model && + c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping) + return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode); + } + return false; +} + static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 misc_enable; @@ -122,6 +175,19 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (c->x86 >= 6 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IA64)) c->microcode = intel_get_microcode_revision(); + /* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */ + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { + pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n"); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); + } + /* * Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41: * diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index d0e69769abfd..df11f5d604be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ struct cpuid_bit { static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CPUID_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3, CPUID_EBX, 1, 0x00000010, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x00000010, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 1 }, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index c75466232016..9eb448c7859d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static void __set_personality_x32(void) * Pretend to come from a x32 execve. */ task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax = __NR_x32_execve | __X32_SYSCALL_BIT; - current->thread.status &= ~TS_COMPAT; + current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT; #endif } @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static void __set_personality_ia32(void) current->personality |= force_personality32; /* Prepare the first "return" to user space */ task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax = __NR_ia32_execve; - current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT; + current_thread_info()->status |= TS_COMPAT; #endif } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c index f37d18124648..ed5c4cdf0a34 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static int putreg32(struct task_struct *child, unsigned regno, u32 value) */ regs->orig_ax = value; if (syscall_get_nr(child, regs) >= 0) - child->thread.status |= TS_I386_REGS_POKED; + child->thread_info.status |= TS_I386_REGS_POKED; break; case offsetof(struct user32, regs.eflags): diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c index b9e00e8f1c9b..4cdc0b27ec82 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_nr_restart_syscall(const struct pt_regs *regs) * than the tracee. */ #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (current->thread.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) + if (current_thread_info()->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) return __NR_ia32_restart_syscall; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 0099e10eb045..13f5d4217e4f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -67,9 +67,7 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void) #define F(x) bit(X86_FEATURE_##x) -/* These are scattered features in cpufeatures.h. */ -#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4VNNIW 2 -#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4FMAPS 3 +/* For scattered features from cpufeatures.h; we currently expose none */ #define KF(x) bit(KVM_CPUID_BIT_##x) int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -367,6 +365,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, F(3DNOWPREFETCH) | F(OSVW) | 0 /* IBS */ | F(XOP) | 0 /* SKINIT, WDT, LWP */ | F(FMA4) | F(TBM); + /* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */ + const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features = + F(IBPB) | F(IBRS); + /* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */ const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features = F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) | @@ -392,7 +394,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/ const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features = - KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS); + F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) | + F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES); /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */ get_cpu(); @@ -477,7 +480,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, if (!tdp_enabled || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) entry->ecx &= ~F(PKU); entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features; - entry->edx &= get_scattered_cpuid_leaf(7, 0, CPUID_EDX); + cpuid_mask(&entry->edx, CPUID_7_EDX); } else { entry->ebx = 0; entry->ecx = 0; @@ -627,7 +630,14 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, if (!g_phys_as) g_phys_as = phys_as; entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8); - entry->ebx = entry->edx = 0; + entry->edx = 0; + /* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) + entry->ebx |= F(IBPB); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + entry->ebx |= F(IBRS); + entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features; + cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX); break; } case 0x80000019: diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index c2cea6651279..9a327d5b6d1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX}, [CPUID_7_ECX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_ECX}, [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, + [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX}, }; static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned x86_feature) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index b514b2b2845a..290ecf711aec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h> #include <linux/stringify.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "x86.h" #include "tss.h" @@ -1021,8 +1022,8 @@ static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsigned int condition, unsigned long flags) void (*fop)(void) = (void *)em_setcc + 4 * (condition & 0xf); flags = (flags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]" - : "=a"(rc) : [fastop]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC + : "=a"(rc) : [thunk_target]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); return rc; } @@ -5335,9 +5336,9 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*fop)(struct fastop *)) if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp)) fop += __ffs(ctxt->dst.bytes) * FASTOP_SIZE; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" : "+a"(ctxt->dst.val), "+d"(ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D"(flags), - [fastop]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT + [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : "c"(ctxt->src2.val)); ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index f40d0da1f1d3..4e3c79530526 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm { u64 gs_base; } host; + u64 spec_ctrl; + u32 *msrpm; ulong nmi_iret_rip; @@ -249,6 +251,8 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs { { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true }, { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true }, #endif + { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false }, @@ -529,6 +533,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data { struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc; struct page *save_area; + struct vmcb *current_vmcb; }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data); @@ -880,6 +885,25 @@ static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index) return false; } +static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned msr) +{ + u8 bit_write; + unsigned long tmp; + u32 offset; + u32 *msrpm; + + msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm: + to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm; + + offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr); + bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1; + tmp = msrpm[offset]; + + BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID); + + return !!test_bit(bit_write, &tmp); +} + static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr, int read, int write) { @@ -1582,6 +1606,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) u32 dummy; u32 eax = 1; + svm->spec_ctrl = 0; + if (!init_event) { svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE; @@ -1703,11 +1729,17 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER); kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu); kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm); + /* + * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in + * svm_vcpu_load(). So do a full IBPB now. + */ + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); } static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu); int i; if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) { @@ -1736,6 +1768,10 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux); + if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) { + sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb; + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + } avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu); } @@ -3593,6 +3629,13 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_VM_CR: msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr; break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl; + break; case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV: msr_info->data = 0x01000065; break; @@ -3684,6 +3727,49 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + return 1; + + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) + return 1; + + svm->spec_ctrl = data; + + if (!data) + break; + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm. + * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up + * touching the MSR anyway now. + */ + set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1); + break; + case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) + return 1; + + if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB) + return 1; + + if (!data) + break; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + break; + set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1); + break; case MSR_STAR: svm->vmcb->save.star = data; break; @@ -4936,6 +5022,15 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) local_irq_enable(); + /* + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr + * being speculatively taken. + */ + if (svm->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + asm volatile ( "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t" "mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t" @@ -5028,6 +5123,27 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif ); + /* + * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the + * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and + * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding + * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former + * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. + * + * For non-nested case: + * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + * + * For nested case: + * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + */ + if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + + if (svm->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index c829d89e2e63..bee4c49f6dd0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <linux/tboot.h> #include <linux/hrtimer.h> #include <linux/frame.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include "kvm_cache_regs.h" #include "x86.h" @@ -111,6 +112,14 @@ static u64 __read_mostly host_xss; static bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1; module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO); +#define MSR_TYPE_R 1 +#define MSR_TYPE_W 2 +#define MSR_TYPE_RW 3 + +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1 +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2 +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM 4 + #define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX 0xffffffffffffffffULL /* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division. */ @@ -185,7 +194,6 @@ module_param(ple_window_max, int, S_IRUGO); extern const ulong vmx_return; #define NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS 8 -#define VMCS02_POOL_SIZE 1 struct vmcs { u32 revision_id; @@ -210,6 +218,7 @@ struct loaded_vmcs { int soft_vnmi_blocked; ktime_t entry_time; s64 vnmi_blocked_time; + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; struct list_head loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link; }; @@ -226,7 +235,7 @@ struct shared_msr_entry { * stored in guest memory specified by VMPTRLD, but is opaque to the guest, * which must access it using VMREAD/VMWRITE/VMCLEAR instructions. * More than one of these structures may exist, if L1 runs multiple L2 guests. - * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build a vmcs02: a VMCS for the + * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build the vmcs02: a VMCS for the * underlying hardware which will be used to run L2. * This structure is packed to ensure that its layout is identical across * machines (necessary for live migration). @@ -409,13 +418,6 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 { */ #define VMCS12_SIZE 0x1000 -/* Used to remember the last vmcs02 used for some recently used vmcs12s */ -struct vmcs02_list { - struct list_head list; - gpa_t vmptr; - struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02; -}; - /* * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu. @@ -440,15 +442,15 @@ struct nested_vmx { */ bool sync_shadow_vmcs; - /* vmcs02_list cache of VMCSs recently used to run L2 guests */ - struct list_head vmcs02_pool; - int vmcs02_num; bool change_vmcs01_virtual_x2apic_mode; /* L2 must run next, and mustn't decide to exit to L1. */ bool nested_run_pending; + + struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02; + /* - * Guest pages referred to in vmcs02 with host-physical pointers, so - * we must keep them pinned while L2 runs. + * Guest pages referred to in the vmcs02 with host-physical + * pointers, so we must keep them pinned while L2 runs. */ struct page *apic_access_page; struct page *virtual_apic_page; @@ -457,8 +459,6 @@ struct nested_vmx { bool pi_pending; u16 posted_intr_nv; - unsigned long *msr_bitmap; - struct hrtimer preemption_timer; bool preemption_timer_expired; @@ -581,6 +581,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { struct kvm_vcpu vcpu; unsigned long host_rsp; u8 fail; + u8 msr_bitmap_mode; u32 exit_intr_info; u32 idt_vectoring_info; ulong rflags; @@ -592,6 +593,10 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base; u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base; #endif + + u64 arch_capabilities; + u64 spec_ctrl; + u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow; u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow; u32 secondary_exec_control; @@ -898,21 +903,18 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = { static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field) { - BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX); + const size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table); + unsigned short offset; - if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table)) + BUILD_BUG_ON(size > SHRT_MAX); + if (field >= size) return -ENOENT; - /* - * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a - * generic mechanism. - */ - asm("lfence"); - - if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0) + field = array_index_nospec(field, size); + offset = vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field]; + if (offset == 0) return -ENOENT; - - return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field]; + return offset; } static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -935,6 +937,9 @@ static bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked); static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, u16 error_code); +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs); @@ -954,12 +959,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(spinlock_t, blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock); enum { VMX_IO_BITMAP_A, VMX_IO_BITMAP_B, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY_X2APIC_APICV, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE_X2APIC_APICV, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY_X2APIC, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE_X2APIC, VMX_VMREAD_BITMAP, VMX_VMWRITE_BITMAP, VMX_BITMAP_NR @@ -969,12 +968,6 @@ static unsigned long *vmx_bitmap[VMX_BITMAP_NR]; #define vmx_io_bitmap_a (vmx_bitmap[VMX_IO_BITMAP_A]) #define vmx_io_bitmap_b (vmx_bitmap[VMX_IO_BITMAP_B]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY_X2APIC_APICV]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE_X2APIC_APICV]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY_X2APIC]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE_X2APIC]) #define vmx_vmread_bitmap (vmx_bitmap[VMX_VMREAD_BITMAP]) #define vmx_vmwrite_bitmap (vmx_bitmap[VMX_VMWRITE_BITMAP]) @@ -1918,6 +1911,52 @@ static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb); } +/* + * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap. + */ +static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) +{ + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return true; + + msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap; + + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + } + + return true; +} + +/* + * Check if MSR is intercepted for L01 MSR bitmap. + */ +static bool msr_write_intercepted_l01(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) +{ + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return true; + + msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + } + + return true; +} + static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit) { @@ -2296,6 +2335,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) { per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs; vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs); + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); } if (!already_loaded) { @@ -2572,36 +2612,6 @@ static void move_msr_up(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int from, int to) vmx->guest_msrs[from] = tmp; } -static void vmx_set_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - unsigned long *msr_bitmap; - - if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_bitmap; - else if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() && - (vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) & - SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) { - if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv; - } else { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic; - } - } else { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy; - } - - vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(msr_bitmap)); -} - /* * Set up the vmcs to automatically save and restore system * msrs. Don't touch the 64-bit msrs if the guest is in legacy @@ -2642,7 +2652,7 @@ static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs; if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu); } /* @@ -3276,6 +3286,20 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_IA32_TSC: msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl; + break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->arch_capabilities; + break; case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS); break; @@ -3383,6 +3407,70 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + return 1; + + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) + return 1; + + vmx->spec_ctrl = data; + + if (!data) + break; + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the + * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten + * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well + * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, + MSR_TYPE_RW); + break; + case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + return 1; + + if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB) + return 1; + + if (!data) + break; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the + * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten + * in the merging. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, + MSR_TYPE_W); + break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated) + return 1; + vmx->arch_capabilities = data; + break; case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT: if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) { if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data)) @@ -3837,11 +3925,6 @@ static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(int cpu) return vmcs; } -static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(void) -{ - return alloc_vmcs_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id()); -} - static void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs) { free_pages((unsigned long)vmcs, vmcs_config.order); @@ -3857,9 +3940,38 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs); free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs); loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL; + if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap) + free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap); WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL); } +static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(void) +{ + return alloc_vmcs_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id()); +} + +static int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) +{ + loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); + if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs) + return -ENOMEM; + + loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL; + loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs); + + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { + loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap) + goto out_vmcs; + memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); + } + return 0; + +out_vmcs: + free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs); + return -ENOMEM; +} + static void free_kvm_area(void) { int cpu; @@ -4918,10 +5030,8 @@ static void free_vpid(int vpid) spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock); } -#define MSR_TYPE_R 1 -#define MSR_TYPE_W 2 -static void __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, - u32 msr, int type) +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type) { int f = sizeof(unsigned long); @@ -4955,6 +5065,50 @@ static void __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, } } +static void __always_inline vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type) +{ + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return; + + /* + * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals + * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round. + * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff. + */ + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + if (type & MSR_TYPE_R) + /* read-low */ + __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f); + + if (type & MSR_TYPE_W) + /* write-low */ + __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + if (type & MSR_TYPE_R) + /* read-high */ + __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f); + + if (type & MSR_TYPE_W) + /* write-high */ + __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + + } +} + +static void __always_inline vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type, bool value) +{ + if (value) + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type); + else + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type); +} + /* * If a msr is allowed by L0, we should check whether it is allowed by L1. * The corresponding bit will be cleared unless both of L0 and L1 allow it. @@ -5001,30 +5155,70 @@ static void nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1, } } -static void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(u32 msr, bool longmode_only) +static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - if (!longmode_only) - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + u8 mode = 0; + + if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() && + (vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) & + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) { + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC; + if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV; + } + + if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM; + + return mode; } -static void vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(u32 msr, int type, bool apicv_active) +#define X2APIC_MSR(r) (APIC_BASE_MSR + ((r) >> 4)) + +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u8 mode) { - if (apicv_active) { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv, - msr, type); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv, - msr, type); - } else { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - msr, type); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - msr, type); + int msr; + + for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) { + unsigned word = msr / BITS_PER_LONG; + msr_bitmap[word] = (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) ? 0 : ~0; + msr_bitmap[word + (0x800 / sizeof(long))] = ~0; + } + + if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC) { + /* + * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt + * delivery is not in use. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW); + if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) { + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_R); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W); + } } } +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + u8 mode = vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(vcpu); + u8 changed = mode ^ vmx->msr_bitmap_mode; + + if (!changed) + return; + + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW, + !(mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM)); + + if (changed & (MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC | MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV)) + vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(msr_bitmap, mode); + + vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = mode; +} + static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return enable_apicv; @@ -5274,7 +5468,7 @@ static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); } static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) @@ -5461,7 +5655,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmcs_write64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap)); } if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy)); + vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap)); vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull); /* 22.3.1.5 */ @@ -5539,6 +5733,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) ++vmx->nmsrs; } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities); vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl); @@ -5567,6 +5763,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) u64 cr0; vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0; + vmx->spec_ctrl = 0; vmx->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = get_rdx_init_val(); kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0); @@ -6744,7 +6941,7 @@ void vmx_enable_tdp(void) static __init int hardware_setup(void) { - int r = -ENOMEM, i, msr; + int r = -ENOMEM, i; rdmsrl_safe(MSR_EFER, &host_efer); @@ -6764,9 +6961,6 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) memset(vmx_io_bitmap_b, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - memset(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - memset(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_config) < 0) { r = -EIO; goto out; @@ -6835,42 +7029,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 48; } - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_FS_BASE, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_GS_BASE, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, true); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, false); - - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv, - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv, - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, PAGE_SIZE); - set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */ - for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr++) { - if (msr == 0x839 /* TMCCT */) - continue; - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(msr, MSR_TYPE_R, true); - } - - /* - * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt - * delivery is not in use. - */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(0x808, MSR_TYPE_W, true); - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(0x808, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W, false); - - /* EOI */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(0x80b, MSR_TYPE_W, true); - /* SELF-IPI */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(0x83f, MSR_TYPE_W, true); - if (enable_ept) vmx_enable_tdp(); else @@ -6973,94 +7133,6 @@ static int handle_monitor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return handle_nop(vcpu); } -/* - * To run an L2 guest, we need a vmcs02 based on the L1-specified vmcs12. - * We could reuse a single VMCS for all the L2 guests, but we also want the - * option to allocate a separate vmcs02 for each separate loaded vmcs12 - this - * allows keeping them loaded on the processor, and in the future will allow - * optimizations where prepare_vmcs02 doesn't need to set all the fields on - * every entry if they never change. - * So we keep, in vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, a cache of size VMCS02_POOL_SIZE - * (>=0) with a vmcs02 for each recently loaded vmcs12s, most recent first. - * - * The following functions allocate and free a vmcs02 in this pool. - */ - -/* Get a VMCS from the pool to use as vmcs02 for the current vmcs12. */ -static struct loaded_vmcs *nested_get_current_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item; - list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) - if (item->vmptr == vmx->nested.current_vmptr) { - list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool); - return &item->vmcs02; - } - - if (vmx->nested.vmcs02_num >= max(VMCS02_POOL_SIZE, 1)) { - /* Recycle the least recently used VMCS. */ - item = list_last_entry(&vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, - struct vmcs02_list, list); - item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr; - list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool); - return &item->vmcs02; - } - - /* Create a new VMCS */ - item = kzalloc(sizeof(struct vmcs02_list), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!item) - return NULL; - item->vmcs02.vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); - item->vmcs02.shadow_vmcs = NULL; - if (!item->vmcs02.vmcs) { - kfree(item); - return NULL; - } - loaded_vmcs_init(&item->vmcs02); - item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr; - list_add(&(item->list), &(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool)); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num++; - return &item->vmcs02; -} - -/* Free and remove from pool a vmcs02 saved for a vmcs12 (if there is one) */ -static void nested_free_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, gpa_t vmptr) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item; - list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) - if (item->vmptr == vmptr) { - free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02); - list_del(&item->list); - kfree(item); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num--; - return; - } -} - -/* - * Free all VMCSs saved for this vcpu, except the one pointed by - * vmx->loaded_vmcs. We must be running L1, so vmx->loaded_vmcs - * must be &vmx->vmcs01. - */ -static void nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item, *n; - - WARN_ON(vmx->loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01); - list_for_each_entry_safe(item, n, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) { - /* - * Something will leak if the above WARN triggers. Better than - * a use-after-free. - */ - if (vmx->loaded_vmcs == &item->vmcs02) - continue; - - free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02); - list_del(&item->list); - kfree(item); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num--; - } -} - /* * The following 3 functions, nested_vmx_succeed()/failValid()/failInvalid(), * set the success or error code of an emulated VMX instruction, as specified @@ -7241,13 +7313,11 @@ static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs; + int r; - if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { - vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx->nested.msr_bitmap) - goto out_msr_bitmap; - } + r = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); + if (r < 0) + goto out_vmcs02; vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 = kmalloc(VMCS12_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12) @@ -7264,9 +7334,6 @@ static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = shadow_vmcs; } - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool)); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num = 0; - hrtimer_init(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED); vmx->nested.preemption_timer.function = vmx_preemption_timer_fn; @@ -7278,9 +7345,9 @@ static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12); out_cached_vmcs12: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap); + free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); -out_msr_bitmap: +out_vmcs02: return -ENOMEM; } @@ -7423,10 +7490,6 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02); vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1; vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull; - if (vmx->nested.msr_bitmap) { - free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap); - vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = NULL; - } if (enable_shadow_vmcs) { vmx_disable_shadow_vmcs(vmx); vmcs_clear(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs); @@ -7434,7 +7497,7 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = NULL; } kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12); - /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in current vmcs02 */ + /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in the vmcs02 */ if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) { kvm_release_page_dirty(vmx->nested.apic_access_page); vmx->nested.apic_access_page = NULL; @@ -7450,7 +7513,7 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx->nested.pi_desc = NULL; } - nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(vmx); + free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); } /* Emulate the VMXOFF instruction */ @@ -7493,8 +7556,6 @@ static int handle_vmclear(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmptr + offsetof(struct vmcs12, launch_state), &zero, sizeof(zero)); - nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmptr); - nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu); return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } @@ -8406,10 +8467,11 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_reflected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason) /* * The host physical addresses of some pages of guest memory - * are loaded into VMCS02 (e.g. L1's Virtual APIC Page). The CPU - * may write to these pages via their host physical address while - * L2 is running, bypassing any address-translation-based dirty - * tracking (e.g. EPT write protection). + * are loaded into the vmcs02 (e.g. vmcs12's Virtual APIC + * Page). The CPU may write to these pages via their host + * physical address while L2 is running, bypassing any + * address-translation-based dirty tracking (e.g. EPT write + * protection). * * Mark them dirty on every exit from L2 to prevent them from * getting out of sync with dirty tracking. @@ -8943,7 +9005,7 @@ static void vmx_set_virtual_x2apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool set) } vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, sec_exec_control); - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); } static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t hpa) @@ -9129,14 +9191,14 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif "pushf\n\t" __ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t" - "call *%[entry]\n\t" + CALL_NOSPEC : #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 [sp]"=&r"(tmp), #endif ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : - [entry]"r"(entry), + THUNK_TARGET(entry), [ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS), [cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS) ); @@ -9373,6 +9435,15 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu); + /* + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr + * being speculatively taken. + */ + if (vmx->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl); + vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched; asm( /* Store host registers */ @@ -9491,6 +9562,27 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif ); + /* + * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the + * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and + * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding + * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former + * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. + * + * For non-nested case: + * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + * + * For nested case: + * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + */ + if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl); + + if (vmx->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); @@ -9604,6 +9696,7 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id) { int err; struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; int cpu; if (!vmx) @@ -9636,13 +9729,20 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id) if (!vmx->guest_msrs) goto free_pml; - vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01; - vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); - vmx->loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL; - if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) + err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01); + if (err < 0) goto free_msrs; - loaded_vmcs_init(vmx->loaded_vmcs); + msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = 0; + + vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01; cpu = get_cpu(); vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu); vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu; @@ -10105,10 +10205,25 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int msr; struct page *page; unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1; - unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_bitmap; + unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap; + /* + * pred_cmd & spec_ctrl are trying to verify two things: + * + * 1. L0 gave a permission to L1 to actually passthrough the MSR. This + * ensures that we do not accidentally generate an L02 MSR bitmap + * from the L12 MSR bitmap that is too permissive. + * 2. That L1 or L2s have actually used the MSR. This avoids + * unnecessarily merging of the bitmap if the MSR is unused. This + * works properly because we only update the L01 MSR bitmap lazily. + * So even if L0 should pass L1 these MSRs, the L01 bitmap is only + * updated to reflect this when L1 (or its L2s) actually write to + * the MSR. + */ + bool pred_cmd = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD); + bool spec_ctrl = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - /* This shortcut is ok because we support only x2APIC MSRs so far. */ - if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12)) + if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12) && + !pred_cmd && !spec_ctrl) return false; page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->msr_bitmap); @@ -10141,6 +10256,19 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, MSR_TYPE_W); } } + + if (spec_ctrl) + nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr( + msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, + MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + + if (pred_cmd) + nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr( + msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0, + MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, + MSR_TYPE_W); + kunmap(page); kvm_release_page_clean(page); @@ -10682,6 +10810,9 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, if (kvm_has_tsc_control) decache_tsc_multiplier(vmx); + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap)); + if (enable_vpid) { /* * There is no direct mapping between vpid02 and vpid12, the @@ -10903,20 +11034,15 @@ static int enter_vmx_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool from_vmentry) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); - struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs02; u32 msr_entry_idx; u32 exit_qual; - vmcs02 = nested_get_current_vmcs02(vmx); - if (!vmcs02) - return -ENOMEM; - enter_guest_mode(vcpu); if (!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS)) vmx->nested.vmcs01_debugctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL); - vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, vmcs02); + vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->nested.vmcs02); vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx); if (prepare_vmcs02(vcpu, vmcs12, from_vmentry, &exit_qual)) { @@ -11485,7 +11611,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0); if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); if (nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count)) @@ -11534,10 +11660,6 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason, vm_exit_controls_reset_shadow(vmx); vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx); - /* if no vmcs02 cache requested, remove the one we used */ - if (VMCS02_POOL_SIZE == 0) - nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmx->nested.current_vmptr); - /* Update any VMCS fields that might have changed while L2 ran */ vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.nr); vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.nr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index c53298dfbf50..ac381437c291 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1009,6 +1009,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = { #endif MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES }; static unsigned num_msrs_to_save; diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile index f23934bbaf4e..69a473919260 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o +OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_retpoline.o :=y obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S index c97d935a29e8..49b167f73215 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 1: movzbl (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -54,6 +56,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_2) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 2: movzwl -1(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -68,6 +72,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 3: movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -83,6 +89,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 4: movq -7(%_ASM_AX),%rdx xor %eax,%eax @@ -94,6 +102,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user_8 + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 4: movl -7(%_ASM_AX),%edx 5: movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%ecx diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index c909961e678a..480edc3a5e03 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/export.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/bitsperlong.h> .macro THUNK reg .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk @@ -46,3 +47,58 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(r13) GENERATE_THUNK(r14) GENERATE_THUNK(r15) #endif + +/* + * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. + * + * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an + * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. + * + * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based + * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to + * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes + * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would + * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. + * + * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be + * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation + * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. + */ +.macro STUFF_RSB nr:req sp:req + mov $(\nr / 2), %_ASM_BX + .align 16 +771: + call 772f +773: /* speculation trap */ + pause + lfence + jmp 773b + .align 16 +772: + call 774f +775: /* speculation trap */ + pause + lfence + jmp 775b + .align 16 +774: + dec %_ASM_BX + jnz 771b + add $((BITS_PER_LONG/8) * \nr), \sp +.endm + +#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ + +ENTRY(__fill_rsb) + STUFF_RSB RSB_FILL_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP + ret +END(__fill_rsb) +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fill_rsb) + +#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ + +ENTRY(__clear_rsb) + STUFF_RSB RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP + ret +END(__clear_rsb) +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__clear_rsb) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c index 1b377f734e64..7add8ba06887 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c @@ -331,12 +331,12 @@ do { \ unsigned long __copy_user_ll(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { - stac(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n)) __copy_user(to, from, n); else n = __copy_user_intel(to, from, n); - clac(); + __uaccess_end(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll); @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll); unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { - stac(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n); @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *fr #else __copy_user(to, from, n); #endif - clac(); + __uaccess_end(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 5bfe61a5e8e3..012d02624848 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -6,13 +6,14 @@ #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/cache.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/uv/uv.h> -#include <linux/debugfs.h> /* * TLB flushing, formerly SMP-only @@ -247,6 +248,27 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, } else { u16 new_asid; bool need_flush; + u64 last_ctx_id = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id); + + /* + * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch + * predictor when switching between processes. This stops + * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another. + * + * As an optimization, flush indirect branches only when + * switching into processes that disable dumping. This + * protects high value processes like gpg, without having + * too high performance overhead. IBPB is *expensive*! + * + * This will not flush branches when switching into kernel + * threads. It will also not flush if we switch to idle + * thread and back to the same process. It will flush if we + * switch to a different non-dumpable process. + */ + if (tsk && tsk->mm && + tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id && + get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { /* @@ -292,6 +314,14 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, trace_tlb_flush_rcuidle(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, 0); } + /* + * Record last user mm's context id, so we can avoid + * flushing branch buffer with IBPB if we switch back + * to the same user. + */ + if (next != &init_mm) + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, next->context.ctx_id); + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, new_asid); } @@ -369,6 +399,7 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void) write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0)); /* Reinitialize tlbstate. */ + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, 0); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id); diff --git a/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c b/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c index db040b378224..9180b9bd5821 100644 --- a/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c +++ b/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c @@ -441,3 +441,7 @@ static struct platform_driver img_ascii_lcd_driver = { .remove = img_ascii_lcd_remove, }; module_platform_driver(img_ascii_lcd_driver); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Imagination Technologies ASCII LCD Display"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Paul Burton <paul.burton(a)mips.com>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c b/drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c index d9ab7c75b14f..e0c73ceba2ed 100644 --- a/drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c +++ b/drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ static struct fpga_manager *fpga_region_get_manager(struct fpga_region *region) mgr_node = of_parse_phandle(np, "fpga-mgr", 0); if (mgr_node) { mgr = of_fpga_mgr_get(mgr_node); + of_node_put(mgr_node); of_node_put(np); return mgr; } @@ -192,10 +193,13 @@ static int fpga_region_get_bridges(struct fpga_region *region, parent_br = region_np->parent; /* If overlay has a list of bridges, use it. */ - if (of_parse_phandle(overlay, "fpga-bridges", 0)) + br = of_parse_phandle(overlay, "fpga-bridges", 0); + if (br) { + of_node_put(br); np = overlay; - else + } else { np = region_np; + } for (i = 0; ; i++) { br = of_parse_phandle(np, "fpga-bridges", i); @@ -203,12 +207,15 @@ static int fpga_region_get_bridges(struct fpga_region *region, break; /* If parent bridge is in list, skip it. */ - if (br == parent_br) + if (br == parent_br) { + of_node_put(br); continue; + } /* If node is a bridge, get it and add to list */ ret = fpga_bridge_get_to_list(br, region->info, &region->bridge_list); + of_node_put(br); /* If any of the bridges are in use, give up */ if (ret == -EBUSY) { diff --git a/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9-i2c.c b/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9-i2c.c index 98fbb628d5bd..38411e1c155b 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9-i2c.c +++ b/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9-i2c.c @@ -63,3 +63,6 @@ static struct i2c_driver kxsd9_i2c_driver = { .id_table = kxsd9_i2c_id, }; module_i2c_driver(kxsd9_i2c_driver); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("KXSD9 accelerometer I2C interface"); diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-vadc-common.c b/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-vadc-common.c index 47d24ae5462f..fe3d7826783c 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-vadc-common.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-vadc-common.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <linux/math64.h> #include <linux/log2.h> #include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/module.h> #include "qcom-vadc-common.h" @@ -229,3 +230,6 @@ int qcom_vadc_decimation_from_dt(u32 value) return __ffs64(value / VADC_DECIMATION_MIN); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(qcom_vadc_decimation_from_dt); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Qualcomm ADC common functionality"); diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c b/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c index 866aa3ce1ac9..6cf0006d4c8d 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c @@ -436,3 +436,7 @@ int pxa2xx_pinctrl_exit(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pxa2xx_pinctrl_exit); + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik(a)free.fr>"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Marvell PXA2xx pinctrl driver"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c index 854995e1cae7..7e7e6eb95b0a 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c @@ -974,6 +974,8 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port, } } else { retval = uart_startup(tty, state, 1); + if (retval == 0) + tty_port_set_initialized(port, true); if (retval > 0) retval = 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h index 1c65817673db..41615f38bcff 100644 --- a/include/linux/fdtable.h +++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/fs.h> @@ -82,8 +83,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned i { struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt); - if (fd < fdt->max_fds) + if (fd < fdt->max_fds) { + fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds); return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]); + } return NULL; } diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h index ea1b31101d9e..506a98151131 100644 --- a/include/linux/init.h +++ b/include/linux/init.h @@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/types.h> +/* Built-in __init functions needn't be compiled with retpoline */ +#if defined(RETPOLINE) && !defined(MODULE) +#define __noretpoline __attribute__((indirect_branch("keep"))) +#else +#define __noretpoline +#endif + /* These macros are used to mark some functions or * initialized data (doesn't apply to uninitialized data) * as `initialization' functions. The kernel can take this @@ -40,7 +47,7 @@ /* These are for everybody (although not all archs will actually discard it in modules) */ -#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold __latent_entropy +#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold __latent_entropy __noretpoline #define __initdata __section(.init.data) #define __initconst __section(.init.rodata) #define __exitdata __section(.exit.data) diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h index c69b49abe877..1d8f245967be 100644 --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -801,6 +801,15 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {} #endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */ +#ifdef RETPOLINE +extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline); +#else +static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + return true; +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module) { diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b99bced39ac2 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +// Copyright(c) 2018 Linus Torvalds. All rights reserved. +// Copyright(c) 2018 Alexei Starovoitov. All rights reserved. +// Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. + +#ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H +#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H + +/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * When @index is out of bounds (@index >= @size), the sign bit will be + * set. Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of + * zero for an out of bounds index, or ~0 if within bounds [0, @size). + */ +#ifndef array_index_mask_nospec +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + /* + * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage. + * + * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the + * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the + * mask. + * + * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that + * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX. + */ + if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX, + "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n")) + return 0; + + /* + * Always calculate and emit the mask even if the compiler + * thinks the mask is not needed. The compiler does not take + * into account the value of @index under speculation. + */ + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(index); + return ~(long)(index | (size - 1UL - index)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1); +} +#endif + +/* + * array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check + * + * For a code sequence like: + * + * if (index < size) { + * index = array_index_nospec(index, size); + * val = array[index]; + * } + * + * ...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then + * array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0, + * size). + */ +#define array_index_nospec(index, size) \ +({ \ + typeof(index) _i = (index); \ + typeof(size) _s = (size); \ + unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \ + \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \ + \ + _i &= _mask; \ + _i; \ +}) +#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */ diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index dea01ac9cb74..09e48eee4d55 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2863,6 +2863,15 @@ static int check_modinfo_livepatch(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) } #endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ +static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) +{ + if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline"))) + return; + + pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n", + mod->name); +} + /* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, struct load_info *info) @@ -3029,6 +3038,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags) add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } + check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info); + if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) { add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality " diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index 542a4fc0a8d7..4bbcfc1e2d43 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/nl80211.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/netlink.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/etherdevice.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/genetlink.h> @@ -2056,20 +2057,22 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_params_policy[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[], struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params) { + u8 ac; + if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]) return -EINVAL; - txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]); + ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]); txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]); txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]); txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]); txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]); - if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS) + if (ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS) return -EINVAL; - + txq_params->ac = array_index_nospec(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS); return 0; } diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index f51cf977c65b..6510536c06df 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -2165,6 +2165,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffer *b, int is_intree) buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n"); } +/* Cannot check for assembler */ +static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b) +{ + buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n"); + buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"); + buf_printf(b, "#endif\n"); +} + static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name) { static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging"; @@ -2506,6 +2514,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) err |= check_modname_len(mod); add_header(&buf, mod); add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module); + add_retpoline(&buf); add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name); err |= add_versions(&buf, mod); add_depends(&buf, mod, modules); diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c index 25c63510ae15..7cdd2dc4fd79 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c @@ -70,3 +70,7 @@ static struct spi_driver pcm512x_spi_driver = { }; module_spi_driver(pcm512x_spi_driver); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ASoC PCM512x codec driver - SPI"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index f40d46e24bcc..9cd028aa1509 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -543,18 +543,14 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) dest_off = insn->offset + insn->len + insn->immediate; insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, dest_off); - /* - * FIXME: Thanks to retpolines, it's now considered - * normal for a function to call within itself. So - * disable this warning for now. - */ -#if 0 - if (!insn->call_dest) { - WARN_FUNC("can't find call dest symbol at offset 0x%lx", - insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_off); + + if (!insn->call_dest && !insn->ignore) { + WARN_FUNC("unsupported intra-function call", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + WARN("If this is a retpoline, please patch it in with alternatives and annotate it with ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE."); return -1; } -#endif + } else if (rela->sym->type == STT_SECTION) { insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(rela->sym->sec, rela->addend+4); @@ -598,7 +594,7 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *orig_insn, struct instruction **new_insn) { - struct instruction *last_orig_insn, *last_new_insn, *insn, *fake_jump; + struct instruction *last_orig_insn, *last_new_insn, *insn, *fake_jump = NULL; unsigned long dest_off; last_orig_insn = NULL; @@ -614,28 +610,30 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, last_orig_insn = insn; } - if (!next_insn_same_sec(file, last_orig_insn)) { - WARN("%s: don't know how to handle alternatives at end of section", - special_alt->orig_sec->name); - return -1; - } - - fake_jump = malloc(sizeof(*fake_jump)); - if (!fake_jump) { - WARN("malloc failed"); - return -1; + if (next_insn_same_sec(file, last_orig_insn)) { + fake_jump = malloc(sizeof(*fake_jump)); + if (!fake_jump) { + WARN("malloc failed"); + return -1; + } + memset(fake_jump, 0, sizeof(*fake_jump)); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fake_jump->alts); + clear_insn_state(&fake_jump->state); + + fake_jump->sec = special_alt->new_sec; + fake_jump->offset = -1; + fake_jump->type = INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL; + fake_jump->jump_dest = list_next_entry(last_orig_insn, list); + fake_jump->ignore = true; } - memset(fake_jump, 0, sizeof(*fake_jump)); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fake_jump->alts); - clear_insn_state(&fake_jump->state); - - fake_jump->sec = special_alt->new_sec; - fake_jump->offset = -1; - fake_jump->type = INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL; - fake_jump->jump_dest = list_next_entry(last_orig_insn, list); - fake_jump->ignore = true; if (!special_alt->new_len) { + if (!fake_jump) { + WARN("%s: empty alternative at end of section", + special_alt->orig_sec->name); + return -1; + } + *new_insn = fake_jump; return 0; } @@ -648,6 +646,8 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, last_new_insn = insn; + insn->ignore = orig_insn->ignore_alts; + if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL && insn->type != INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL) continue; @@ -656,8 +656,14 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, continue; dest_off = insn->offset + insn->len + insn->immediate; - if (dest_off == special_alt->new_off + special_alt->new_len) + if (dest_off == special_alt->new_off + special_alt->new_len) { + if (!fake_jump) { + WARN("%s: alternative jump to end of section", + special_alt->orig_sec->name); + return -1; + } insn->jump_dest = fake_jump; + } if (!insn->jump_dest) { WARN_FUNC("can't find alternative jump destination", @@ -672,7 +678,8 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, return -1; } - list_add(&fake_jump->list, &last_new_insn->list); + if (fake_jump) + list_add(&fake_jump->list, &last_new_insn->list); return 0; } @@ -729,10 +736,6 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(struct objtool_file *file) goto out; } - /* Ignore retpoline alternatives. */ - if (orig_insn->ignore_alts) - continue; - new_insn = NULL; if (!special_alt->group || special_alt->new_len) { new_insn = find_insn(file, special_alt->new_sec, @@ -1089,11 +1092,11 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret) return ret; - ret = add_call_destinations(file); + ret = add_special_section_alts(file); if (ret) return ret; - ret = add_special_section_alts(file); + ret = add_call_destinations(file); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1720,10 +1723,12 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *first, insn->visited = true; - list_for_each_entry(alt, &insn->alts, list) { - ret = validate_branch(file, alt->insn, state); - if (ret) - return 1; + if (!insn->ignore_alts) { + list_for_each_entry(alt, &insn->alts, list) { + ret = validate_branch(file, alt->insn, state); + if (ret) + return 1; + } } switch (insn->type) { diff --git a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c index e61fe703197b..18384d9be4e1 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c +++ b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c @@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static int create_orc_entry(struct section *u_sec, struct section *ip_relasec, struct orc_entry *orc; struct rela *rela; + if (!insn_sec->sym) { + WARN("missing symbol for section %s", insn_sec->name); + return -1; + } + /* populate ORC data */ orc = (struct orc_entry *)u_sec->data->d_buf + idx; memcpy(orc, o, sizeof(*orc));

7 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] Linux 4.14.18

by Greg KH

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 8122b5f98ea1..c76afdcafbef 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2718,8 +2718,6 @@ norandmaps Don't use address space randomization. Equivalent to echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space - noreplace-paravirt [X86,IA-64,PV_OPS] Don't patch paravirt_ops - noreplace-smp [X86-32,SMP] Don't replace SMP instructions with UP alternatives diff --git a/Documentation/speculation.txt b/Documentation/speculation.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e9e6cbae2841 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/speculation.txt @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +This document explains potential effects of speculation, and how undesirable +effects can be mitigated portably using common APIs. + +=========== +Speculation +=========== + +To improve performance and minimize average latencies, many contemporary CPUs +employ speculative execution techniques such as branch prediction, performing +work which may be discarded at a later stage. + +Typically speculative execution cannot be observed from architectural state, +such as the contents of registers. However, in some cases it is possible to +observe its impact on microarchitectural state, such as the presence or +absence of data in caches. Such state may form side-channels which can be +observed to extract secret information. + +For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds +checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the +following code: + + int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) + { + if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) + return 0; + else + return array[index]; + } + +Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as: + + CMP <index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS + B.LT less + MOV <returnval>, #0 + RET + less: + LDR <returnval>, [<array>, <index>] + RET + +It is possible that a CPU mis-predicts the conditional branch, and +speculatively loads array[index], even if index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS. This +value will subsequently be discarded, but the speculated load may affect +microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured. + +More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may +result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following +code, building on the prior example: + + int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index) + { + int val1, val2, + + val1 = load_array(arr1, index); + val2 = load_array(arr2, val1); + + return val2; + } + +Under speculation, the first call to load_array() may return the value +of an out-of-bounds address, while the second call will influence +microarchitectural state dependent on this value. This may provide an +arbitrary read primitive. + +==================================== +Mitigating speculation side-channels +==================================== + +The kernel provides a generic API to ensure that bounds checks are +respected even under speculation. Architectures which are affected by +speculation-based side-channels are expected to implement these +primitives. + +The array_index_nospec() helper in <linux/nospec.h> can be used to +prevent information from being leaked via side-channels. + +A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index +value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation +conditions. + +This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example: + + int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) + { + if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) + return 0; + else { + index = array_index_nospec(index, MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS); + return array[index]; + } + } diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 7ed993896dd5..a69e5da9ed86 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 14 -SUBLEVEL = 17 +SUBLEVEL = 18 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Petit Gorille diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index cb782ac1c35d..fe418226df7f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ config PPC select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST if SMP select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE + select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES if PPC_BOOK3S_64 select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW_LEVEL select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c index 935059cb9e40..9527a4c6cbc2 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include <linux/memory.h> #include <linux/nmi.h> +#include <asm/debugfs.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/kdump.h> #include <asm/prom.h> @@ -884,4 +885,41 @@ void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable) if (!no_rfi_flush) rfi_flush_enable(enable); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS +static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val) +{ + if (val == 1) + rfi_flush_enable(true); + else if (val == 0) + rfi_flush_enable(false); + else + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static int rfi_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val) +{ + *val = rfi_flush ? 1 : 0; + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_rfi_flush, rfi_flush_get, rfi_flush_set, "%llu\n"); + +static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void) +{ + debugfs_create_file("rfi_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_rfi_flush); + return 0; +} +device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init); +#endif + +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + if (rfi_flush) + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: RFI Flush\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index 03505ffbe1b6..60e21ccfb6d6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/uprobes.h> #include <linux/livepatch.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> @@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs) * special case only applies after poking regs and before the * very next return to user mode. */ - current->thread.status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); + ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); #endif user_enter_irqoff(); @@ -284,7 +285,8 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs) * regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls. */ if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) { - regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK]( + nr = array_index_nospec(nr & __SYSCALL_MASK, NR_syscalls); + regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr]( regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx, regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9); } @@ -306,7 +308,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs) unsigned int nr = (unsigned int)regs->orig_ax; #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT; + ti->status |= TS_COMPAT; #endif if (READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY) { @@ -320,6 +322,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs) } if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) { + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls); /* * It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation * takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index 60c4c342316c..2a35b1e0fb90 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -252,7 +252,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + /* Clobbers %ebx */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index be6b66464f6a..16e2d72e79a0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -232,91 +232,20 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe) pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */ pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */ pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */ - sub $(6*8), %rsp /* pt_regs->bp, bx, r12-15 not saved */ - UNWIND_HINT_REGS extra=0 - - TRACE_IRQS_OFF - - /* - * If we need to do entry work or if we guess we'll need to do - * exit work, go straight to the slow path. - */ - movq PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11 - testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY|_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11) - jnz entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path - -entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath: - /* - * Easy case: enable interrupts and issue the syscall. If the syscall - * needs pt_regs, we'll call a stub that disables interrupts again - * and jumps to the slow path. - */ - TRACE_IRQS_ON - ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) -#if __SYSCALL_MASK == ~0 - cmpq $__NR_syscall_max, %rax -#else - andl $__SYSCALL_MASK, %eax - cmpl $__NR_syscall_max, %eax -#endif - ja 1f /* return -ENOSYS (already in pt_regs->ax) */ - movq %r10, %rcx - - /* - * This call instruction is handled specially in stub_ptregs_64. - * It might end up jumping to the slow path. If it jumps, RAX - * and all argument registers are clobbered. - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax - call __x86_indirect_thunk_rax -#else - call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8) -#endif -.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call: - - movq %rax, RAX(%rsp) -1: + pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ + pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ + pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */ + pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */ + pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */ + pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */ + UNWIND_HINT_REGS - /* - * If we get here, then we know that pt_regs is clean for SYSRET64. - * If we see that no exit work is required (which we are required - * to check with IRQs off), then we can go straight to SYSRET64. - */ - DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) TRACE_IRQS_OFF - movq PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11 - testl $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11) - jnz 1f - - LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT - TRACE_IRQS_ON /* user mode is traced as IRQs on */ - movq RIP(%rsp), %rcx - movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 - addq $6*8, %rsp /* skip extra regs -- they were preserved */ - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY - jmp .Lpop_c_regs_except_rcx_r11_and_sysret -1: - /* - * The fast path looked good when we started, but something changed - * along the way and we need to switch to the slow path. Calling - * raise(3) will trigger this, for example. IRQs are off. - */ - TRACE_IRQS_ON - ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) - SAVE_EXTRA_REGS - movq %rsp, %rdi - call syscall_return_slowpath /* returns with IRQs disabled */ - jmp return_from_SYSCALL_64 - -entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path: /* IRQs are off. */ - SAVE_EXTRA_REGS movq %rsp, %rdi call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */ -return_from_SYSCALL_64: TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ /* we're about to change IF */ /* @@ -389,7 +318,6 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret: /* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY POP_EXTRA_REGS -.Lpop_c_regs_except_rcx_r11_and_sysret: popq %rsi /* skip r11 */ popq %r10 popq %r9 @@ -420,47 +348,6 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret: USERGS_SYSRET64 END(entry_SYSCALL_64) -ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64) - /* - * Syscalls marked as needing ptregs land here. - * If we are on the fast path, we need to save the extra regs, - * which we achieve by trying again on the slow path. If we are on - * the slow path, the extra regs are already saved. - * - * RAX stores a pointer to the C function implementing the syscall. - * IRQs are on. - */ - cmpq $.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call, (%rsp) - jne 1f - - /* - * Called from fast path -- disable IRQs again, pop return address - * and jump to slow path - */ - DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) - TRACE_IRQS_OFF - popq %rax - UNWIND_HINT_REGS extra=0 - jmp entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path - -1: - JMP_NOSPEC %rax /* Called from C */ -END(stub_ptregs_64) - -.macro ptregs_stub func -ENTRY(ptregs_\func) - UNWIND_HINT_FUNC - leaq \func(%rip), %rax - jmp stub_ptregs_64 -END(ptregs_\func) -.endm - -/* Instantiate ptregs_stub for each ptregs-using syscall */ -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_(sym) -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_ptregs(sym) ptregs_stub sym -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym) -#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> - /* * %rdi: prev task * %rsi: next task @@ -495,7 +382,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + /* Clobbers %rbx */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c index 9c09775e589d..c176d2fab1da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c @@ -7,14 +7,11 @@ #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_(sym) sym -#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_ptregs(sym) ptregs_##sym - -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) extern asmlinkage long __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym)(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); +#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); #include <asm/syscalls_64.h> #undef __SYSCALL_64 -#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) [nr] = __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym), +#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) [nr] = sym, extern long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h index 0927cdc4f946..4d111616524b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -38,5 +38,7 @@ INDIRECT_THUNK(dx) INDIRECT_THUNK(si) INDIRECT_THUNK(di) INDIRECT_THUNK(bp) -INDIRECT_THUNK(sp) +asmlinkage void __fill_rsb(void); +asmlinkage void __clear_rsb(void); + #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h index 01727dbc294a..1e7c955b6303 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -24,6 +24,34 @@ #define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory") #endif +/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the + * bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * Returns: + * 0 - (index < size) + */ +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long mask; + + asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;" + :"=r" (mask) + :"r"(size),"r" (index) + :"cc"); + return mask; +} + +/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */ +#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec + +/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */ +#define barrier_nospec() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \ + "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC) + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE #define dma_rmb() rmb() #else diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index ea9a7dde62e5..70eddb3922ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs CPUID_8000_000A_EDX, CPUID_7_ECX, CPUID_8000_0007_EBX, + CPUID_7_EDX, }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES @@ -79,8 +80,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ @@ -101,8 +103,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 25b9375c1484..73b5fff159a4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 18 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* @@ -203,14 +203,14 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW ( 7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS ( 7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ + +#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ @@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+ 1) /* Instructions Retired Count */ #define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR (13*32+ 2) /* Always save/restore FP error pointers */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */ @@ -319,6 +322,13 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+ 1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+ 3) /* Scalable MCA */ +/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */ + /* * BUG word(s) */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index e428e16dd822..c6a3af198294 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK15 0 #define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h index 64c4a30e0d39..e203169931c7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h @@ -137,8 +137,10 @@ enum fixed_addresses { extern void reserve_top_address(unsigned long reserve); -#define FIXADDR_SIZE (__end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT) -#define FIXADDR_START (FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_SIZE) +#define FIXADDR_SIZE (__end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT) +#define FIXADDR_START (FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_SIZE) +#define FIXADDR_TOT_SIZE (__end_of_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT) +#define FIXADDR_TOT_START (FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_TOT_SIZE) extern int fixmaps_set; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index fa11fb1fa570..eb83ff1bae8f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */ +#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ + +#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ +#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ + #define MSR_PPIN_CTL 0x0000004e #define MSR_PPIN 0x0000004f @@ -57,6 +64,11 @@ #define SNB_C3_AUTO_UNDEMOTE (1UL << 28) #define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe + +#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a +#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ +#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */ + #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h index 07962f5f6fba..30df295f6d94 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h @@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long long rdtsc_ordered(void) * that some other imaginary CPU is updating continuously with a * time stamp. */ - alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, - "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC); + barrier_nospec(); return rdtsc(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 4ad41087ce0e..4d57894635f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -1,56 +1,12 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ -#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ +#define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> -/* - * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. - * - * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an - * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. - * - * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based - * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to - * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes - * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would - * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. - * - * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and - * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that - * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there. - */ - -#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ -#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ - -/* - * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be - * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation - * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. - */ -#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ - mov $(nr/2), reg; \ -771: \ - call 772f; \ -773: /* speculation trap */ \ - pause; \ - lfence; \ - jmp 773b; \ -772: \ - call 774f; \ -775: /* speculation trap */ \ - pause; \ - lfence; \ - jmp 775b; \ -774: \ - dec reg; \ - jnz 771b; \ - add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; - #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ /* @@ -121,17 +77,10 @@ #endif .endm - /* - * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP - * monstrosity above, manually. - */ -.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req +/* This clobbers the BX register */ +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER nr:req ftr:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ - __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ - \ftr -.Lskip_rsb_\@: + ALTERNATIVE "", "call __clear_rsb", \ftr #endif .endm @@ -201,22 +150,25 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future - * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - unsigned long loops; - - asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", - __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) - "910:" - : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT - : : "memory" ); + alternative_input("", + "call __fill_rsb", + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, + ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER(_ASM_BX, "memory")); #endif } +static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) +{ + alternative_input("", + "call __ibp_barrier", + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB, + ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER("eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory")); +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ -#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */ +#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h index ce245b0cdfca..0777e18a1d23 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h @@ -44,8 +44,9 @@ extern bool __vmalloc_start_set; /* set once high_memory is set */ */ #define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (NR_CPUS * 40) -#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE \ - ((FIXADDR_START - PAGE_SIZE * (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES + 1)) & PMD_MASK) +#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE \ + ((FIXADDR_TOT_START - PAGE_SIZE * (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES + 1)) \ + & PMD_MASK) #define PKMAP_BASE \ ((CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE - PAGE_SIZE) & PMD_MASK) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 9c18da64daa9..c57c6e77c29f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -459,8 +459,6 @@ struct thread_struct { unsigned short gsindex; #endif - u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */ - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 unsigned long fsbase; unsigned long gsbase; @@ -970,4 +968,7 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void); void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy); void df_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code); + +void __ibp_barrier(void); + #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h index d91ba04dd007..fb3a6de7440b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK15 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK16 (NEED_LA57) #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h index e3c95e8e61c5..03eedc21246d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static inline long syscall_get_error(struct task_struct *task, * TS_COMPAT is set for 32-bit syscall entries and then * remains set until we return to user mode. */ - if (task->thread.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) + if (task->thread_info.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) /* * Sign-extend the value so (int)-EFOO becomes (long)-EFOO * and will match correctly in comparisons. @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *args) { # ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (task->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) switch (i) { case 0: if (!n--) break; @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task, const unsigned long *args) { # ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (task->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) switch (i) { case 0: if (!n--) break; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index 00223333821a..eda3b6823ca4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct task_struct; struct thread_info { unsigned long flags; /* low level flags */ + u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */ }; #define INIT_THREAD_INFO(tsk) \ @@ -221,7 +222,7 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack, #define in_ia32_syscall() true #else #define in_ia32_syscall() (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) && \ - current->thread.status & TS_COMPAT) + current_thread_info()->status & TS_COMPAT) #endif /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h index 3effd3c994af..4405c4b308e8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h @@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ struct tlb_state { struct mm_struct *loaded_mm; u16 loaded_mm_asid; u16 next_asid; + /* last user mm's ctx id */ + u64 last_ctx_id; /* * We can be in one of several states: diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 574dff4d2913..aae77eb8491c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -124,6 +124,11 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void); #define __uaccess_begin() stac() #define __uaccess_end() clac() +#define __uaccess_begin_nospec() \ +({ \ + stac(); \ + barrier_nospec(); \ +}) /* * This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into @@ -445,7 +450,7 @@ do { \ ({ \ int __gu_err; \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ - __uaccess_begin(); \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \ __uaccess_end(); \ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ @@ -487,6 +492,10 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; __uaccess_begin(); \ barrier(); +#define uaccess_try_nospec do { \ + current->thread.uaccess_err = 0; \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ + #define uaccess_catch(err) \ __uaccess_end(); \ (err) |= (current->thread.uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \ @@ -548,7 +557,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; * get_user_ex(...); * } get_user_catch(err) */ -#define get_user_try uaccess_try +#define get_user_try uaccess_try_nospec #define get_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err) #define get_user_ex(x, ptr) do { \ @@ -582,7 +591,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void) __typeof__(ptr) __uval = (uval); \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old); \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new); \ - __uaccess_begin(); \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ switch (size) { \ case 1: \ { \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h index 72950401b223..ba2dc1930630 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h @@ -29,21 +29,21 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) switch (n) { case 1: ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)to, from, ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 2: ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)to, from, ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 4: ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)to, from, ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4); __uaccess_end(); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h index f07ef3c575db..62546b3a398e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h @@ -55,31 +55,31 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long size) return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size); switch (size) { case 1: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)dst, (u8 __user *)src, ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 2: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)dst, (u16 __user *)src, ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 4: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)dst, (u32 __user *)src, ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 8: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 8); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 10: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 10); if (likely(!ret)) @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long size) __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 16: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 16); if (likely(!ret)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index e0b97e4d1db5..21be0193d9dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -46,17 +46,6 @@ static int __init setup_noreplace_smp(char *str) } __setup("noreplace-smp", setup_noreplace_smp); -#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT -static int __initdata_or_module noreplace_paravirt = 0; - -static int __init setup_noreplace_paravirt(char *str) -{ - noreplace_paravirt = 1; - return 1; -} -__setup("noreplace-paravirt", setup_noreplace_paravirt); -#endif - #define DPRINTK(fmt, args...) \ do { \ if (debug_alternative) \ @@ -298,7 +287,7 @@ recompute_jump(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *orig_insn, u8 *repl_insn, u8 *insnbuf) tgt_rip = next_rip + o_dspl; n_dspl = tgt_rip - orig_insn; - DPRINTK("target RIP: %p, new_displ: 0x%x", tgt_rip, n_dspl); + DPRINTK("target RIP: %px, new_displ: 0x%x", tgt_rip, n_dspl); if (tgt_rip - orig_insn >= 0) { if (n_dspl - 2 <= 127) @@ -355,7 +344,7 @@ static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *ins add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen); local_irq_restore(flags); - DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%p: [%d:%d) optimized NOPs: ", + DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%px: [%d:%d) optimized NOPs: ", instr, a->instrlen - a->padlen, a->padlen); } @@ -376,7 +365,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, u8 *instr, *replacement; u8 insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN]; - DPRINTK("alt table %p -> %p", start, end); + DPRINTK("alt table %px, -> %px", start, end); /* * The scan order should be from start to end. A later scanned * alternative code can overwrite previously scanned alternative code. @@ -400,14 +389,14 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, continue; } - DPRINTK("feat: %d*32+%d, old: (%p, len: %d), repl: (%p, len: %d), pad: %d", + DPRINTK("feat: %d*32+%d, old: (%px len: %d), repl: (%px, len: %d), pad: %d", a->cpuid >> 5, a->cpuid & 0x1f, instr, a->instrlen, replacement, a->replacementlen, a->padlen); - DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%p: old_insn: ", instr); - DUMP_BYTES(replacement, a->replacementlen, "%p: rpl_insn: ", replacement); + DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%px: old_insn: ", instr); + DUMP_BYTES(replacement, a->replacementlen, "%px: rpl_insn: ", replacement); memcpy(insnbuf, replacement, a->replacementlen); insnbuf_sz = a->replacementlen; @@ -433,7 +422,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, a->instrlen - a->replacementlen); insnbuf_sz += a->instrlen - a->replacementlen; } - DUMP_BYTES(insnbuf, insnbuf_sz, "%p: final_insn: ", instr); + DUMP_BYTES(insnbuf, insnbuf_sz, "%px: final_insn: ", instr); text_poke_early(instr, insnbuf, insnbuf_sz); } @@ -599,9 +588,6 @@ void __init_or_module apply_paravirt(struct paravirt_patch_site *start, struct paravirt_patch_site *p; char insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN]; - if (noreplace_paravirt) - return; - for (p = start; p < end; p++) { unsigned int used; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 390b3dc3d438..71949bf2de5a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/module.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> @@ -90,20 +91,41 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { }; #undef pr_fmt -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; +#ifdef RETPOLINE +static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; + +bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline) + return true; + + pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n"); + spectre_v2_bad_module = true; + return false; +} + +static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) +{ + return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""; +} +#else +static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } +#endif + static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s\n", reason); + pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s\n", reason); + pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } static inline bool retp_compiler(void) @@ -118,42 +140,68 @@ static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len); } +static const struct { + const char *option; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd; + bool secure; +} mitigation_options[] = { + { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false }, + { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true }, + { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false }, + { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false }, + { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false }, + { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, +}; + static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) { char arg[20]; - int ret; - - ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, - sizeof(arg)); - if (ret > 0) { - if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) { - goto disable; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) { - spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) { - spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) { - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { - pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - } - spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) { - spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) { + int ret, i; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; + else { + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, + sizeof(arg)); + if (ret < 0) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) { + if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option)) + continue; + cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd; + break; + } + + if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) { + pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } } - if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) && + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) { + pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; -disable: - spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; + } + + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if (mitigation_options[i].secure) + spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option); + else + spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option); + + return cmd; } /* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */ @@ -191,10 +239,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) return; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: - /* FALLTRHU */ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: - goto retpoline_auto; - + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_auto; + break; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) goto retpoline_amd; @@ -249,6 +297,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n"); } + + /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); + pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); + } } #undef pr_fmt @@ -269,7 +323,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, @@ -278,6 +332,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif + +void __ibp_barrier(void) +{ + __wrmsr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, 0); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__ibp_barrier); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 372ba3fb400f..92b66e21bae5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ #include <asm/pat.h> #include <asm/microcode.h> #include <asm/microcode_intel.h> +#include <asm/intel-family.h> +#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC #include <asm/uv/uv.h> @@ -724,6 +726,26 @@ static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + /* + * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support, + * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also, + * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on + * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available. + * + * We use the AMD bits in 0x8000_0008 EBX as the generic hardware + * features, which are visible in /proc/cpuinfo and used by the + * kernel. So set those accordingly from the Intel bits. + */ + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) { + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + } + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); +} + void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; @@ -745,6 +767,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx; c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx; + c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx; } /* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */ @@ -817,6 +840,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a); init_scattered_cpuid_features(c); + init_speculation_control(c); /* * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe. @@ -852,6 +876,41 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #endif } +static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = { + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 }, + { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 }, + {} +}; + +static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = { + { X86_VENDOR_AMD }, + {} +}; + +static bool __init cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 ia32_cap = 0; + + if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown)) + return false; + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap); + + /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */ + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO) + return false; + + return true; +} + /* * Do minimum CPU detection early. * Fields really needed: vendor, cpuid_level, family, model, mask, @@ -899,11 +958,12 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); - if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); - - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation)) { + if (cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(c)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + } fpu__init_system(c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index b720dacac051..4cf4f8cbc69d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -102,6 +102,59 @@ static void probe_xeon_phi_r3mwait(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) ELF_HWCAP2 |= HWCAP2_RING3MWAIT; } +/* + * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken. + * Information taken from; + * - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/microcode-up… + * - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345 + * - Microcode revisions observed in the wild + * - Release note from 20180108 microcode release + */ +struct sku_microcode { + u8 model; + u8 stepping; + u32 microcode; +}; +static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = { + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 0x01, 0x21 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x18 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a }, + /* Updated in the 20180108 release; blacklist until we know otherwise */ + { INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, 0x01, 0x22 }, + /* Observed in the wild */ + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 }, +}; + +static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) { + if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model && + c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping) + return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode); + } + return false; +} + static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 misc_enable; @@ -122,6 +175,19 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (c->x86 >= 6 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IA64)) c->microcode = intel_get_microcode_revision(); + /* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */ + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { + pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n"); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); + } + /* * Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41: * diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index d0e69769abfd..df11f5d604be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ struct cpuid_bit { static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CPUID_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3, CPUID_EBX, 1, 0x00000010, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x00000010, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 1 }, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index c75466232016..9eb448c7859d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static void __set_personality_x32(void) * Pretend to come from a x32 execve. */ task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax = __NR_x32_execve | __X32_SYSCALL_BIT; - current->thread.status &= ~TS_COMPAT; + current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT; #endif } @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static void __set_personality_ia32(void) current->personality |= force_personality32; /* Prepare the first "return" to user space */ task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax = __NR_ia32_execve; - current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT; + current_thread_info()->status |= TS_COMPAT; #endif } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c index f37d18124648..ed5c4cdf0a34 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static int putreg32(struct task_struct *child, unsigned regno, u32 value) */ regs->orig_ax = value; if (syscall_get_nr(child, regs) >= 0) - child->thread.status |= TS_I386_REGS_POKED; + child->thread_info.status |= TS_I386_REGS_POKED; break; case offsetof(struct user32, regs.eflags): diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c index b9e00e8f1c9b..4cdc0b27ec82 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_nr_restart_syscall(const struct pt_regs *regs) * than the tracee. */ #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - if (current->thread.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) + if (current_thread_info()->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) return __NR_ia32_restart_syscall; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 0099e10eb045..13f5d4217e4f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -67,9 +67,7 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void) #define F(x) bit(X86_FEATURE_##x) -/* These are scattered features in cpufeatures.h. */ -#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4VNNIW 2 -#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4FMAPS 3 +/* For scattered features from cpufeatures.h; we currently expose none */ #define KF(x) bit(KVM_CPUID_BIT_##x) int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -367,6 +365,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, F(3DNOWPREFETCH) | F(OSVW) | 0 /* IBS */ | F(XOP) | 0 /* SKINIT, WDT, LWP */ | F(FMA4) | F(TBM); + /* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */ + const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features = + F(IBPB) | F(IBRS); + /* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */ const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features = F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) | @@ -392,7 +394,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/ const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features = - KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS); + F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) | + F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES); /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */ get_cpu(); @@ -477,7 +480,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, if (!tdp_enabled || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) entry->ecx &= ~F(PKU); entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features; - entry->edx &= get_scattered_cpuid_leaf(7, 0, CPUID_EDX); + cpuid_mask(&entry->edx, CPUID_7_EDX); } else { entry->ebx = 0; entry->ecx = 0; @@ -627,7 +630,14 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, if (!g_phys_as) g_phys_as = phys_as; entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8); - entry->ebx = entry->edx = 0; + entry->edx = 0; + /* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) + entry->ebx |= F(IBPB); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + entry->ebx |= F(IBRS); + entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features; + cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX); break; } case 0x80000019: diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index c2cea6651279..9a327d5b6d1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX}, [CPUID_7_ECX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_ECX}, [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, + [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX}, }; static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned x86_feature) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index eca6a89f2326..fab073b19528 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h> #include <linux/stringify.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "x86.h" #include "tss.h" @@ -1021,8 +1022,8 @@ static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsigned int condition, unsigned long flags) void (*fop)(void) = (void *)em_setcc + 4 * (condition & 0xf); flags = (flags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]" - : "=a"(rc) : [fastop]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC + : "=a"(rc) : [thunk_target]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); return rc; } @@ -5350,9 +5351,9 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*fop)(struct fastop *)) if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp)) fop += __ffs(ctxt->dst.bytes) * FASTOP_SIZE; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" : "+a"(ctxt->dst.val), "+d"(ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D"(flags), - [fastop]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT + [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : "c"(ctxt->src2.val)); ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 6a8284f72328..e0bc3ad0f6cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm { u64 gs_base; } host; + u64 spec_ctrl; + u32 *msrpm; ulong nmi_iret_rip; @@ -249,6 +251,8 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs { { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true }, { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true }, #endif + { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false }, @@ -529,6 +533,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data { struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc; struct page *save_area; + struct vmcb *current_vmcb; }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data); @@ -880,6 +885,25 @@ static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index) return false; } +static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned msr) +{ + u8 bit_write; + unsigned long tmp; + u32 offset; + u32 *msrpm; + + msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm: + to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm; + + offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr); + bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1; + tmp = msrpm[offset]; + + BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID); + + return !!test_bit(bit_write, &tmp); +} + static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr, int read, int write) { @@ -1585,6 +1609,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) u32 dummy; u32 eax = 1; + svm->spec_ctrl = 0; + if (!init_event) { svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE; @@ -1706,11 +1732,17 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER); kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu); kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm); + /* + * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in + * svm_vcpu_load(). So do a full IBPB now. + */ + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); } static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu); int i; if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) { @@ -1739,6 +1771,10 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux); + if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) { + sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb; + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + } avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu); } @@ -3579,6 +3615,13 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_VM_CR: msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr; break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl; + break; case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV: msr_info->data = 0x01000065; break; @@ -3670,6 +3713,49 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + return 1; + + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) + return 1; + + svm->spec_ctrl = data; + + if (!data) + break; + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm. + * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up + * touching the MSR anyway now. + */ + set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1); + break; + case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) + return 1; + + if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB) + return 1; + + if (!data) + break; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + break; + set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1); + break; case MSR_STAR: svm->vmcb->save.star = data; break; @@ -4922,6 +5008,15 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) local_irq_enable(); + /* + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr + * being speculatively taken. + */ + if (svm->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + asm volatile ( "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t" "mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t" @@ -5014,6 +5109,27 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif ); + /* + * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the + * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and + * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding + * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former + * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. + * + * For non-nested case: + * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + * + * For nested case: + * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + */ + if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + + if (svm->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index a45063a9219c..0ae4b1a86168 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <linux/tboot.h> #include <linux/hrtimer.h> #include <linux/frame.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include "kvm_cache_regs.h" #include "x86.h" @@ -108,6 +109,14 @@ static u64 __read_mostly host_xss; static bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1; module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO); +#define MSR_TYPE_R 1 +#define MSR_TYPE_W 2 +#define MSR_TYPE_RW 3 + +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1 +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2 +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM 4 + #define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX 0xffffffffffffffffULL /* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division. */ @@ -182,7 +191,6 @@ module_param(ple_window_max, int, S_IRUGO); extern const ulong vmx_return; #define NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS 8 -#define VMCS02_POOL_SIZE 1 struct vmcs { u32 revision_id; @@ -207,6 +215,7 @@ struct loaded_vmcs { int soft_vnmi_blocked; ktime_t entry_time; s64 vnmi_blocked_time; + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; struct list_head loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link; }; @@ -223,7 +232,7 @@ struct shared_msr_entry { * stored in guest memory specified by VMPTRLD, but is opaque to the guest, * which must access it using VMREAD/VMWRITE/VMCLEAR instructions. * More than one of these structures may exist, if L1 runs multiple L2 guests. - * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build a vmcs02: a VMCS for the + * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build the vmcs02: a VMCS for the * underlying hardware which will be used to run L2. * This structure is packed to ensure that its layout is identical across * machines (necessary for live migration). @@ -406,13 +415,6 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 { */ #define VMCS12_SIZE 0x1000 -/* Used to remember the last vmcs02 used for some recently used vmcs12s */ -struct vmcs02_list { - struct list_head list; - gpa_t vmptr; - struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02; -}; - /* * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu. @@ -437,15 +439,15 @@ struct nested_vmx { */ bool sync_shadow_vmcs; - /* vmcs02_list cache of VMCSs recently used to run L2 guests */ - struct list_head vmcs02_pool; - int vmcs02_num; bool change_vmcs01_virtual_x2apic_mode; /* L2 must run next, and mustn't decide to exit to L1. */ bool nested_run_pending; + + struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02; + /* - * Guest pages referred to in vmcs02 with host-physical pointers, so - * we must keep them pinned while L2 runs. + * Guest pages referred to in the vmcs02 with host-physical + * pointers, so we must keep them pinned while L2 runs. */ struct page *apic_access_page; struct page *virtual_apic_page; @@ -454,8 +456,6 @@ struct nested_vmx { bool pi_pending; u16 posted_intr_nv; - unsigned long *msr_bitmap; - struct hrtimer preemption_timer; bool preemption_timer_expired; @@ -570,6 +570,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { struct kvm_vcpu vcpu; unsigned long host_rsp; u8 fail; + u8 msr_bitmap_mode; u32 exit_intr_info; u32 idt_vectoring_info; ulong rflags; @@ -581,6 +582,10 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base; u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base; #endif + + u64 arch_capabilities; + u64 spec_ctrl; + u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow; u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow; u32 secondary_exec_control; @@ -887,21 +892,18 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = { static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field) { - BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX); + const size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table); + unsigned short offset; - if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table)) + BUILD_BUG_ON(size > SHRT_MAX); + if (field >= size) return -ENOENT; - /* - * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a - * generic mechanism. - */ - asm("lfence"); - - if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0) + field = array_index_nospec(field, size); + offset = vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field]; + if (offset == 0) return -ENOENT; - - return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field]; + return offset; } static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -927,6 +929,9 @@ static bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked); static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, u16 error_code); +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs); @@ -946,12 +951,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(spinlock_t, blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock); enum { VMX_IO_BITMAP_A, VMX_IO_BITMAP_B, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY_X2APIC_APICV, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE_X2APIC_APICV, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY_X2APIC, - VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE_X2APIC, VMX_VMREAD_BITMAP, VMX_VMWRITE_BITMAP, VMX_BITMAP_NR @@ -961,12 +960,6 @@ static unsigned long *vmx_bitmap[VMX_BITMAP_NR]; #define vmx_io_bitmap_a (vmx_bitmap[VMX_IO_BITMAP_A]) #define vmx_io_bitmap_b (vmx_bitmap[VMX_IO_BITMAP_B]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY_X2APIC_APICV]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE_X2APIC_APICV]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LEGACY_X2APIC]) -#define vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic (vmx_bitmap[VMX_MSR_BITMAP_LONGMODE_X2APIC]) #define vmx_vmread_bitmap (vmx_bitmap[VMX_VMREAD_BITMAP]) #define vmx_vmwrite_bitmap (vmx_bitmap[VMX_VMWRITE_BITMAP]) @@ -1913,6 +1906,52 @@ static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb); } +/* + * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap. + */ +static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) +{ + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return true; + + msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap; + + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + } + + return true; +} + +/* + * Check if MSR is intercepted for L01 MSR bitmap. + */ +static bool msr_write_intercepted_l01(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) +{ + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return true; + + msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + } + + return true; +} + static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit) { @@ -2291,6 +2330,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) { per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs; vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs); + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); } if (!already_loaded) { @@ -2567,36 +2607,6 @@ static void move_msr_up(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int from, int to) vmx->guest_msrs[from] = tmp; } -static void vmx_set_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - unsigned long *msr_bitmap; - - if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_bitmap; - else if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() && - (vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) & - SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) { - if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv; - } else { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic; - } - } else { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy; - } - - vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(msr_bitmap)); -} - /* * Set up the vmcs to automatically save and restore system * msrs. Don't touch the 64-bit msrs if the guest is in legacy @@ -2637,7 +2647,7 @@ static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs; if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu); } /* @@ -3273,6 +3283,20 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_IA32_TSC: msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl; + break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->arch_capabilities; + break; case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS); break; @@ -3380,6 +3404,70 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + return 1; + + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) + return 1; + + vmx->spec_ctrl = data; + + if (!data) + break; + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the + * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten + * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well + * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, + MSR_TYPE_RW); + break; + case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + return 1; + + if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB) + return 1; + + if (!data) + break; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the + * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten + * in the merging. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, + MSR_TYPE_W); + break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated) + return 1; + vmx->arch_capabilities = data; + break; case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT: if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) { if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data)) @@ -3822,11 +3910,6 @@ static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(int cpu) return vmcs; } -static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(void) -{ - return alloc_vmcs_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id()); -} - static void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs) { free_pages((unsigned long)vmcs, vmcs_config.order); @@ -3842,9 +3925,38 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs); free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs); loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL; + if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap) + free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap); WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL); } +static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(void) +{ + return alloc_vmcs_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id()); +} + +static int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) +{ + loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); + if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs) + return -ENOMEM; + + loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL; + loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs); + + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { + loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap) + goto out_vmcs; + memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); + } + return 0; + +out_vmcs: + free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs); + return -ENOMEM; +} + static void free_kvm_area(void) { int cpu; @@ -4917,10 +5029,8 @@ static void free_vpid(int vpid) spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock); } -#define MSR_TYPE_R 1 -#define MSR_TYPE_W 2 -static void __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, - u32 msr, int type) +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type) { int f = sizeof(unsigned long); @@ -4954,6 +5064,50 @@ static void __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, } } +static void __always_inline vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type) +{ + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return; + + /* + * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals + * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round. + * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff. + */ + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + if (type & MSR_TYPE_R) + /* read-low */ + __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f); + + if (type & MSR_TYPE_W) + /* write-low */ + __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + if (type & MSR_TYPE_R) + /* read-high */ + __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f); + + if (type & MSR_TYPE_W) + /* write-high */ + __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + + } +} + +static void __always_inline vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type, bool value) +{ + if (value) + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type); + else + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type); +} + /* * If a msr is allowed by L0, we should check whether it is allowed by L1. * The corresponding bit will be cleared unless both of L0 and L1 allow it. @@ -5000,30 +5154,70 @@ static void nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1, } } -static void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(u32 msr, bool longmode_only) +static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - if (!longmode_only) - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + u8 mode = 0; + + if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() && + (vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) & + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) { + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC; + if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV; + } + + if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM; + + return mode; } -static void vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(u32 msr, int type, bool apicv_active) +#define X2APIC_MSR(r) (APIC_BASE_MSR + ((r) >> 4)) + +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u8 mode) { - if (apicv_active) { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv, - msr, type); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv, - msr, type); - } else { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - msr, type); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - msr, type); + int msr; + + for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) { + unsigned word = msr / BITS_PER_LONG; + msr_bitmap[word] = (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) ? 0 : ~0; + msr_bitmap[word + (0x800 / sizeof(long))] = ~0; + } + + if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC) { + /* + * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt + * delivery is not in use. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW); + if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) { + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_R); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W); + } } } +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + u8 mode = vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(vcpu); + u8 changed = mode ^ vmx->msr_bitmap_mode; + + if (!changed) + return; + + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW, + !(mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM)); + + if (changed & (MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC | MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV)) + vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(msr_bitmap, mode); + + vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = mode; +} + static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return enable_apicv; @@ -5269,7 +5463,7 @@ static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); } static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) @@ -5456,7 +5650,7 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmcs_write64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap)); } if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy)); + vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap)); vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull); /* 22.3.1.5 */ @@ -5534,6 +5728,8 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) ++vmx->nmsrs; } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities); vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl); @@ -5564,6 +5760,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) u64 cr0; vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0; + vmx->spec_ctrl = 0; vmx->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = get_rdx_init_val(); kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0); @@ -6739,7 +6936,7 @@ void vmx_enable_tdp(void) static __init int hardware_setup(void) { - int r = -ENOMEM, i, msr; + int r = -ENOMEM, i; rdmsrl_safe(MSR_EFER, &host_efer); @@ -6760,9 +6957,6 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) memset(vmx_io_bitmap_b, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - memset(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - memset(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_config) < 0) { r = -EIO; goto out; @@ -6825,42 +7019,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 48; } - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_FS_BASE, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_GS_BASE, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, true); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, false); - - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv, - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv, - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, PAGE_SIZE); - set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */ - for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr++) { - if (msr == 0x839 /* TMCCT */) - continue; - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(msr, MSR_TYPE_R, true); - } - - /* - * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt - * delivery is not in use. - */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(0x808, MSR_TYPE_W, true); - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(0x808, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W, false); - - /* EOI */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(0x80b, MSR_TYPE_W, true); - /* SELF-IPI */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_x2apic(0x83f, MSR_TYPE_W, true); - if (enable_ept) vmx_enable_tdp(); else @@ -6963,94 +7123,6 @@ static int handle_monitor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return handle_nop(vcpu); } -/* - * To run an L2 guest, we need a vmcs02 based on the L1-specified vmcs12. - * We could reuse a single VMCS for all the L2 guests, but we also want the - * option to allocate a separate vmcs02 for each separate loaded vmcs12 - this - * allows keeping them loaded on the processor, and in the future will allow - * optimizations where prepare_vmcs02 doesn't need to set all the fields on - * every entry if they never change. - * So we keep, in vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, a cache of size VMCS02_POOL_SIZE - * (>=0) with a vmcs02 for each recently loaded vmcs12s, most recent first. - * - * The following functions allocate and free a vmcs02 in this pool. - */ - -/* Get a VMCS from the pool to use as vmcs02 for the current vmcs12. */ -static struct loaded_vmcs *nested_get_current_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item; - list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) - if (item->vmptr == vmx->nested.current_vmptr) { - list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool); - return &item->vmcs02; - } - - if (vmx->nested.vmcs02_num >= max(VMCS02_POOL_SIZE, 1)) { - /* Recycle the least recently used VMCS. */ - item = list_last_entry(&vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, - struct vmcs02_list, list); - item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr; - list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool); - return &item->vmcs02; - } - - /* Create a new VMCS */ - item = kzalloc(sizeof(struct vmcs02_list), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!item) - return NULL; - item->vmcs02.vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); - item->vmcs02.shadow_vmcs = NULL; - if (!item->vmcs02.vmcs) { - kfree(item); - return NULL; - } - loaded_vmcs_init(&item->vmcs02); - item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr; - list_add(&(item->list), &(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool)); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num++; - return &item->vmcs02; -} - -/* Free and remove from pool a vmcs02 saved for a vmcs12 (if there is one) */ -static void nested_free_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, gpa_t vmptr) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item; - list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) - if (item->vmptr == vmptr) { - free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02); - list_del(&item->list); - kfree(item); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num--; - return; - } -} - -/* - * Free all VMCSs saved for this vcpu, except the one pointed by - * vmx->loaded_vmcs. We must be running L1, so vmx->loaded_vmcs - * must be &vmx->vmcs01. - */ -static void nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item, *n; - - WARN_ON(vmx->loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01); - list_for_each_entry_safe(item, n, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) { - /* - * Something will leak if the above WARN triggers. Better than - * a use-after-free. - */ - if (vmx->loaded_vmcs == &item->vmcs02) - continue; - - free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02); - list_del(&item->list); - kfree(item); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num--; - } -} - /* * The following 3 functions, nested_vmx_succeed()/failValid()/failInvalid(), * set the success or error code of an emulated VMX instruction, as specified @@ -7231,13 +7303,11 @@ static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs; + int r; - if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { - vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx->nested.msr_bitmap) - goto out_msr_bitmap; - } + r = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); + if (r < 0) + goto out_vmcs02; vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 = kmalloc(VMCS12_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12) @@ -7254,9 +7324,6 @@ static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = shadow_vmcs; } - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool)); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num = 0; - hrtimer_init(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED); vmx->nested.preemption_timer.function = vmx_preemption_timer_fn; @@ -7268,9 +7335,9 @@ static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12); out_cached_vmcs12: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap); + free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); -out_msr_bitmap: +out_vmcs02: return -ENOMEM; } @@ -7412,10 +7479,6 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02); vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1; vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull; - if (vmx->nested.msr_bitmap) { - free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap); - vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = NULL; - } if (enable_shadow_vmcs) { vmx_disable_shadow_vmcs(vmx); vmcs_clear(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs); @@ -7423,7 +7486,7 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = NULL; } kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12); - /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in current vmcs02 */ + /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in the vmcs02 */ if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) { kvm_release_page_dirty(vmx->nested.apic_access_page); vmx->nested.apic_access_page = NULL; @@ -7439,7 +7502,7 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx->nested.pi_desc = NULL; } - nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(vmx); + free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); } /* Emulate the VMXOFF instruction */ @@ -7482,8 +7545,6 @@ static int handle_vmclear(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmptr + offsetof(struct vmcs12, launch_state), &zero, sizeof(zero)); - nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmptr); - nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu); return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } @@ -8395,10 +8456,11 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_reflected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason) /* * The host physical addresses of some pages of guest memory - * are loaded into VMCS02 (e.g. L1's Virtual APIC Page). The CPU - * may write to these pages via their host physical address while - * L2 is running, bypassing any address-translation-based dirty - * tracking (e.g. EPT write protection). + * are loaded into the vmcs02 (e.g. vmcs12's Virtual APIC + * Page). The CPU may write to these pages via their host + * physical address while L2 is running, bypassing any + * address-translation-based dirty tracking (e.g. EPT write + * protection). * * Mark them dirty on every exit from L2 to prevent them from * getting out of sync with dirty tracking. @@ -8932,7 +8994,7 @@ static void vmx_set_virtual_x2apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool set) } vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, sec_exec_control); - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); } static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t hpa) @@ -9118,14 +9180,14 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif "pushf\n\t" __ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t" - "call *%[entry]\n\t" + CALL_NOSPEC : #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 [sp]"=&r"(tmp), #endif ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : - [entry]"r"(entry), + THUNK_TARGET(entry), [ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS), [cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS) ); @@ -9362,6 +9424,15 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu); + /* + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr + * being speculatively taken. + */ + if (vmx->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl); + vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched; asm( /* Store host registers */ @@ -9480,6 +9551,27 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif ); + /* + * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the + * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and + * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding + * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former + * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. + * + * For non-nested case: + * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + * + * For nested case: + * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + */ + if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl); + + if (vmx->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); @@ -9594,6 +9686,7 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id) { int err; struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; int cpu; if (!vmx) @@ -9626,13 +9719,20 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id) if (!vmx->guest_msrs) goto free_pml; - vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01; - vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); - vmx->loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL; - if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) + err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01); + if (err < 0) goto free_msrs; - loaded_vmcs_init(vmx->loaded_vmcs); + msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = 0; + + vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01; cpu = get_cpu(); vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu); vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu; @@ -10101,10 +10201,25 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int msr; struct page *page; unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1; - unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_bitmap; + unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap; + /* + * pred_cmd & spec_ctrl are trying to verify two things: + * + * 1. L0 gave a permission to L1 to actually passthrough the MSR. This + * ensures that we do not accidentally generate an L02 MSR bitmap + * from the L12 MSR bitmap that is too permissive. + * 2. That L1 or L2s have actually used the MSR. This avoids + * unnecessarily merging of the bitmap if the MSR is unused. This + * works properly because we only update the L01 MSR bitmap lazily. + * So even if L0 should pass L1 these MSRs, the L01 bitmap is only + * updated to reflect this when L1 (or its L2s) actually write to + * the MSR. + */ + bool pred_cmd = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD); + bool spec_ctrl = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - /* This shortcut is ok because we support only x2APIC MSRs so far. */ - if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12)) + if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12) && + !pred_cmd && !spec_ctrl) return false; page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->msr_bitmap); @@ -10137,6 +10252,19 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, MSR_TYPE_W); } } + + if (spec_ctrl) + nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr( + msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, + MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + + if (pred_cmd) + nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr( + msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0, + MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, + MSR_TYPE_W); + kunmap(page); kvm_release_page_clean(page); @@ -10678,6 +10806,9 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, if (kvm_has_tsc_control) decache_tsc_multiplier(vmx); + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap)); + if (enable_vpid) { /* * There is no direct mapping between vpid02 and vpid12, the @@ -10894,20 +11025,15 @@ static int enter_vmx_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool from_vmentry) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); - struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs02; u32 msr_entry_idx; u32 exit_qual; - vmcs02 = nested_get_current_vmcs02(vmx); - if (!vmcs02) - return -ENOMEM; - enter_guest_mode(vcpu); if (!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS)) vmx->nested.vmcs01_debugctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL); - vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, vmcs02); + vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->nested.vmcs02); vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx); if (prepare_vmcs02(vcpu, vmcs12, from_vmentry, &exit_qual)) { @@ -11476,7 +11602,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0); if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); if (nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count)) @@ -11522,10 +11648,6 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason, vm_exit_controls_reset_shadow(vmx); vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx); - /* if no vmcs02 cache requested, remove the one we used */ - if (VMCS02_POOL_SIZE == 0) - nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmx->nested.current_vmptr); - /* Update any VMCS fields that might have changed while L2 ran */ vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.nr); vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.nr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 8c28023a43b1..f97358423f9c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1006,6 +1006,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = { #endif MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES }; static unsigned num_msrs_to_save; diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile index d435c89875c1..d0a3170e6804 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o +OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_retpoline.o :=y obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S index c97d935a29e8..49b167f73215 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 1: movzbl (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -54,6 +56,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_2) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 2: movzwl -1(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -68,6 +72,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 3: movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax @@ -83,6 +89,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 4: movq -7(%_ASM_AX),%rdx xor %eax,%eax @@ -94,6 +102,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8) mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user_8 + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX ASM_STAC 4: movl -7(%_ASM_AX),%edx 5: movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%ecx diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index dfb2ba91b670..480edc3a5e03 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/export.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/bitsperlong.h> .macro THUNK reg .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk @@ -36,7 +37,6 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DX) GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SI) GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DI) GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BP) -GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SP) #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT GENERATE_THUNK(r8) GENERATE_THUNK(r9) @@ -47,3 +47,58 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(r13) GENERATE_THUNK(r14) GENERATE_THUNK(r15) #endif + +/* + * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. + * + * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an + * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. + * + * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based + * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to + * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes + * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would + * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. + * + * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be + * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation + * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. + */ +.macro STUFF_RSB nr:req sp:req + mov $(\nr / 2), %_ASM_BX + .align 16 +771: + call 772f +773: /* speculation trap */ + pause + lfence + jmp 773b + .align 16 +772: + call 774f +775: /* speculation trap */ + pause + lfence + jmp 775b + .align 16 +774: + dec %_ASM_BX + jnz 771b + add $((BITS_PER_LONG/8) * \nr), \sp +.endm + +#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ + +ENTRY(__fill_rsb) + STUFF_RSB RSB_FILL_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP + ret +END(__fill_rsb) +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fill_rsb) + +#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ + +ENTRY(__clear_rsb) + STUFF_RSB RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP + ret +END(__clear_rsb) +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__clear_rsb) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c index 1b377f734e64..7add8ba06887 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c @@ -331,12 +331,12 @@ do { \ unsigned long __copy_user_ll(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { - stac(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n)) __copy_user(to, from, n); else n = __copy_user_intel(to, from, n); - clac(); + __uaccess_end(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll); @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll); unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { - stac(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n); @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *fr #else __copy_user(to, from, n); #endif - clac(); + __uaccess_end(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 5bfe61a5e8e3..012d02624848 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -6,13 +6,14 @@ #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/cache.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/uv/uv.h> -#include <linux/debugfs.h> /* * TLB flushing, formerly SMP-only @@ -247,6 +248,27 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, } else { u16 new_asid; bool need_flush; + u64 last_ctx_id = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id); + + /* + * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch + * predictor when switching between processes. This stops + * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another. + * + * As an optimization, flush indirect branches only when + * switching into processes that disable dumping. This + * protects high value processes like gpg, without having + * too high performance overhead. IBPB is *expensive*! + * + * This will not flush branches when switching into kernel + * threads. It will also not flush if we switch to idle + * thread and back to the same process. It will flush if we + * switch to a different non-dumpable process. + */ + if (tsk && tsk->mm && + tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id && + get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { /* @@ -292,6 +314,14 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, trace_tlb_flush_rcuidle(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, 0); } + /* + * Record last user mm's context id, so we can avoid + * flushing branch buffer with IBPB if we switch back + * to the same user. + */ + if (next != &init_mm) + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, next->context.ctx_id); + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, new_asid); } @@ -369,6 +399,7 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void) write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0)); /* Reinitialize tlbstate. */ + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, 0); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id); diff --git a/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c b/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c index a9020f82eea7..58403052514f 100644 --- a/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c +++ b/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c @@ -443,3 +443,7 @@ static struct platform_driver img_ascii_lcd_driver = { .remove = img_ascii_lcd_remove, }; module_platform_driver(img_ascii_lcd_driver); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Imagination Technologies ASCII LCD Display"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Paul Burton <paul.burton(a)mips.com>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c b/drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c index d9ab7c75b14f..e0c73ceba2ed 100644 --- a/drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c +++ b/drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ static struct fpga_manager *fpga_region_get_manager(struct fpga_region *region) mgr_node = of_parse_phandle(np, "fpga-mgr", 0); if (mgr_node) { mgr = of_fpga_mgr_get(mgr_node); + of_node_put(mgr_node); of_node_put(np); return mgr; } @@ -192,10 +193,13 @@ static int fpga_region_get_bridges(struct fpga_region *region, parent_br = region_np->parent; /* If overlay has a list of bridges, use it. */ - if (of_parse_phandle(overlay, "fpga-bridges", 0)) + br = of_parse_phandle(overlay, "fpga-bridges", 0); + if (br) { + of_node_put(br); np = overlay; - else + } else { np = region_np; + } for (i = 0; ; i++) { br = of_parse_phandle(np, "fpga-bridges", i); @@ -203,12 +207,15 @@ static int fpga_region_get_bridges(struct fpga_region *region, break; /* If parent bridge is in list, skip it. */ - if (br == parent_br) + if (br == parent_br) { + of_node_put(br); continue; + } /* If node is a bridge, get it and add to list */ ret = fpga_bridge_get_to_list(br, region->info, &region->bridge_list); + of_node_put(br); /* If any of the bridges are in use, give up */ if (ret == -EBUSY) { diff --git a/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9-i2c.c b/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9-i2c.c index 98fbb628d5bd..38411e1c155b 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9-i2c.c +++ b/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9-i2c.c @@ -63,3 +63,6 @@ static struct i2c_driver kxsd9_i2c_driver = { .id_table = kxsd9_i2c_id, }; module_i2c_driver(kxsd9_i2c_driver); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("KXSD9 accelerometer I2C interface"); diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-vadc-common.c b/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-vadc-common.c index 47d24ae5462f..fe3d7826783c 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-vadc-common.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-vadc-common.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <linux/math64.h> #include <linux/log2.h> #include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/module.h> #include "qcom-vadc-common.h" @@ -229,3 +230,6 @@ int qcom_vadc_decimation_from_dt(u32 value) return __ffs64(value / VADC_DECIMATION_MIN); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(qcom_vadc_decimation_from_dt); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Qualcomm ADC common functionality"); diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c b/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c index 866aa3ce1ac9..6cf0006d4c8d 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c @@ -436,3 +436,7 @@ int pxa2xx_pinctrl_exit(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pxa2xx_pinctrl_exit); + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik(a)free.fr>"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Marvell PXA2xx pinctrl driver"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c index 3a14cccbd7ff..7948acf14601 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c @@ -987,6 +987,8 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port, } } else { retval = uart_startup(tty, state, 1); + if (retval == 0) + tty_port_set_initialized(port, true); if (retval > 0) retval = 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h index 1c65817673db..41615f38bcff 100644 --- a/include/linux/fdtable.h +++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/fs.h> @@ -82,8 +83,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned i { struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt); - if (fd < fdt->max_fds) + if (fd < fdt->max_fds) { + fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds); return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]); + } return NULL; } diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h index f38b993edacb..943139a563e3 100644 --- a/include/linux/init.h +++ b/include/linux/init.h @@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/types.h> +/* Built-in __init functions needn't be compiled with retpoline */ +#if defined(RETPOLINE) && !defined(MODULE) +#define __noretpoline __attribute__((indirect_branch("keep"))) +#else +#define __noretpoline +#endif + /* These macros are used to mark some functions or * initialized data (doesn't apply to uninitialized data) * as `initialization' functions. The kernel can take this @@ -40,7 +47,7 @@ /* These are for everybody (although not all archs will actually discard it in modules) */ -#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold __inittrace __latent_entropy +#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold __inittrace __latent_entropy __noretpoline #define __initdata __section(.init.data) #define __initconst __section(.init.rodata) #define __exitdata __section(.exit.data) diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h index fe5aa3736707..b1cc541f2ddf 100644 --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -794,6 +794,15 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {} #endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */ +#ifdef RETPOLINE +extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline); +#else +static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + return true; +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module) { diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b99bced39ac2 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +// Copyright(c) 2018 Linus Torvalds. All rights reserved. +// Copyright(c) 2018 Alexei Starovoitov. All rights reserved. +// Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. + +#ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H +#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H + +/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * When @index is out of bounds (@index >= @size), the sign bit will be + * set. Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of + * zero for an out of bounds index, or ~0 if within bounds [0, @size). + */ +#ifndef array_index_mask_nospec +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + /* + * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage. + * + * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the + * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the + * mask. + * + * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that + * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX. + */ + if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX, + "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n")) + return 0; + + /* + * Always calculate and emit the mask even if the compiler + * thinks the mask is not needed. The compiler does not take + * into account the value of @index under speculation. + */ + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(index); + return ~(long)(index | (size - 1UL - index)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1); +} +#endif + +/* + * array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check + * + * For a code sequence like: + * + * if (index < size) { + * index = array_index_nospec(index, size); + * val = array[index]; + * } + * + * ...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then + * array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0, + * size). + */ +#define array_index_nospec(index, size) \ +({ \ + typeof(index) _i = (index); \ + typeof(size) _s = (size); \ + unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \ + \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \ + \ + _i &= _mask; \ + _i; \ +}) +#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */ diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index de66ec825992..690c0651c40f 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2855,6 +2855,15 @@ static int check_modinfo_livepatch(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) } #endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ +static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) +{ + if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline"))) + return; + + pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n", + mod->name); +} + /* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, struct load_info *info) @@ -3021,6 +3030,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags) add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } + check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info); + if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) { add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality " diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index d396cb61a280..81bef0676e1d 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/nl80211.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/netlink.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/etherdevice.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/genetlink.h> @@ -2056,20 +2057,22 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_params_policy[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[], struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params) { + u8 ac; + if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]) return -EINVAL; - txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]); + ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]); txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]); txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]); txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]); txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]); - if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS) + if (ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS) return -EINVAL; - + txq_params->ac = array_index_nospec(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS); return 0; } diff --git a/scripts/faddr2line b/scripts/faddr2line index 39e07d8574dd..7721d5b2b0c0 100755 --- a/scripts/faddr2line +++ b/scripts/faddr2line @@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ set -o errexit set -o nounset -READELF="${CROSS_COMPILE}readelf" -ADDR2LINE="${CROSS_COMPILE}addr2line" -SIZE="${CROSS_COMPILE}size" -NM="${CROSS_COMPILE}nm" +READELF="${CROSS_COMPILE:-}readelf" +ADDR2LINE="${CROSS_COMPILE:-}addr2line" +SIZE="${CROSS_COMPILE:-}size" +NM="${CROSS_COMPILE:-}nm" command -v awk >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "awk isn't installed" command -v ${READELF} >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "readelf isn't installed" diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index 98314b400a95..54deaa1066cf 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -2165,6 +2165,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffer *b, int is_intree) buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n"); } +/* Cannot check for assembler */ +static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b) +{ + buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n"); + buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"); + buf_printf(b, "#endif\n"); +} + static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name) { static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging"; @@ -2506,6 +2514,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) err |= check_modname_len(mod); add_header(&buf, mod); add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module); + add_retpoline(&buf); add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name); err |= add_versions(&buf, mod); add_depends(&buf, mod, modules); diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c index 712ed6598c48..ebdf9bd5a64c 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c @@ -70,3 +70,7 @@ static struct spi_driver pcm512x_spi_driver = { }; module_spi_driver(pcm512x_spi_driver); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ASoC PCM512x codec driver - SPI"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index f40d46e24bcc..9cd028aa1509 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -543,18 +543,14 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) dest_off = insn->offset + insn->len + insn->immediate; insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, dest_off); - /* - * FIXME: Thanks to retpolines, it's now considered - * normal for a function to call within itself. So - * disable this warning for now. - */ -#if 0 - if (!insn->call_dest) { - WARN_FUNC("can't find call dest symbol at offset 0x%lx", - insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_off); + + if (!insn->call_dest && !insn->ignore) { + WARN_FUNC("unsupported intra-function call", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + WARN("If this is a retpoline, please patch it in with alternatives and annotate it with ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE."); return -1; } -#endif + } else if (rela->sym->type == STT_SECTION) { insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(rela->sym->sec, rela->addend+4); @@ -598,7 +594,7 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *orig_insn, struct instruction **new_insn) { - struct instruction *last_orig_insn, *last_new_insn, *insn, *fake_jump; + struct instruction *last_orig_insn, *last_new_insn, *insn, *fake_jump = NULL; unsigned long dest_off; last_orig_insn = NULL; @@ -614,28 +610,30 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, last_orig_insn = insn; } - if (!next_insn_same_sec(file, last_orig_insn)) { - WARN("%s: don't know how to handle alternatives at end of section", - special_alt->orig_sec->name); - return -1; - } - - fake_jump = malloc(sizeof(*fake_jump)); - if (!fake_jump) { - WARN("malloc failed"); - return -1; + if (next_insn_same_sec(file, last_orig_insn)) { + fake_jump = malloc(sizeof(*fake_jump)); + if (!fake_jump) { + WARN("malloc failed"); + return -1; + } + memset(fake_jump, 0, sizeof(*fake_jump)); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fake_jump->alts); + clear_insn_state(&fake_jump->state); + + fake_jump->sec = special_alt->new_sec; + fake_jump->offset = -1; + fake_jump->type = INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL; + fake_jump->jump_dest = list_next_entry(last_orig_insn, list); + fake_jump->ignore = true; } - memset(fake_jump, 0, sizeof(*fake_jump)); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fake_jump->alts); - clear_insn_state(&fake_jump->state); - - fake_jump->sec = special_alt->new_sec; - fake_jump->offset = -1; - fake_jump->type = INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL; - fake_jump->jump_dest = list_next_entry(last_orig_insn, list); - fake_jump->ignore = true; if (!special_alt->new_len) { + if (!fake_jump) { + WARN("%s: empty alternative at end of section", + special_alt->orig_sec->name); + return -1; + } + *new_insn = fake_jump; return 0; } @@ -648,6 +646,8 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, last_new_insn = insn; + insn->ignore = orig_insn->ignore_alts; + if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL && insn->type != INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL) continue; @@ -656,8 +656,14 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, continue; dest_off = insn->offset + insn->len + insn->immediate; - if (dest_off == special_alt->new_off + special_alt->new_len) + if (dest_off == special_alt->new_off + special_alt->new_len) { + if (!fake_jump) { + WARN("%s: alternative jump to end of section", + special_alt->orig_sec->name); + return -1; + } insn->jump_dest = fake_jump; + } if (!insn->jump_dest) { WARN_FUNC("can't find alternative jump destination", @@ -672,7 +678,8 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, return -1; } - list_add(&fake_jump->list, &last_new_insn->list); + if (fake_jump) + list_add(&fake_jump->list, &last_new_insn->list); return 0; } @@ -729,10 +736,6 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(struct objtool_file *file) goto out; } - /* Ignore retpoline alternatives. */ - if (orig_insn->ignore_alts) - continue; - new_insn = NULL; if (!special_alt->group || special_alt->new_len) { new_insn = find_insn(file, special_alt->new_sec, @@ -1089,11 +1092,11 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret) return ret; - ret = add_call_destinations(file); + ret = add_special_section_alts(file); if (ret) return ret; - ret = add_special_section_alts(file); + ret = add_call_destinations(file); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1720,10 +1723,12 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *first, insn->visited = true; - list_for_each_entry(alt, &insn->alts, list) { - ret = validate_branch(file, alt->insn, state); - if (ret) - return 1; + if (!insn->ignore_alts) { + list_for_each_entry(alt, &insn->alts, list) { + ret = validate_branch(file, alt->insn, state); + if (ret) + return 1; + } } switch (insn->type) { diff --git a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c index e61fe703197b..18384d9be4e1 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c +++ b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c @@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static int create_orc_entry(struct section *u_sec, struct section *ip_relasec, struct orc_entry *orc; struct rela *rela; + if (!insn_sec->sym) { + WARN("missing symbol for section %s", insn_sec->name); + return -1; + } + /* populate ORC data */ orc = (struct orc_entry *)u_sec->data->d_buf + idx; memcpy(orc, o, sizeof(*orc));

7 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] Linux 3.18.94

by Greg KH

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 172d9e596d25..03a5b7e2076c 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 3 PATCHLEVEL = 18 -SUBLEVEL = 93 +SUBLEVEL = 94 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Diseased Newt diff --git a/arch/um/Makefile b/arch/um/Makefile index e4b1a9639c4d..d467ae58c934 100644 --- a/arch/um/Makefile +++ b/arch/um/Makefile @@ -68,9 +68,10 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS-y) -D__arch_um__ \ KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(ARCH_INCLUDE) -USER_CFLAGS = $(patsubst $(KERNEL_DEFINES),,$(patsubst -D__KERNEL__,,\ - $(patsubst -I%,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)))) $(ARCH_INCLUDE) $(MODE_INCLUDE) \ - $(filter -I%,$(CFLAGS)) -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -idirafter include +USER_CFLAGS = $(patsubst $(KERNEL_DEFINES),,$(patsubst -I%,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))) \ + $(ARCH_INCLUDE) $(MODE_INCLUDE) $(filter -I%,$(CFLAGS)) \ + -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -idirafter $(srctree)/include \ + -idirafter $(obj)/include -D__KERNEL__ -D__UM_HOST__ #This will adjust *FLAGS accordingly to the platform. include $(srctree)/$(ARCH_DIR)/Makefile-os-$(OS) @@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ archheaders: archprepare: include/generated/user_constants.h LINK-$(CONFIG_LD_SCRIPT_STATIC) += -static -LINK-$(CONFIG_LD_SCRIPT_DYN) += -Wl,-rpath,/lib +LINK-$(CONFIG_LD_SCRIPT_DYN) += -Wl,-rpath,/lib $(call cc-option, -no-pie) CFLAGS_NO_HARDENING := $(call cc-option, -fno-PIC,) $(call cc-option, -fno-pic,) \ $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector,) \ diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/mconsole.h b/arch/um/drivers/mconsole.h index 8b22535c62ce..44af7379ea19 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/mconsole.h +++ b/arch/um/drivers/mconsole.h @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #ifndef __MCONSOLE_H__ #define __MCONSOLE_H__ -#ifndef __KERNEL__ +#ifdef __UM_HOST__ #include <stdint.h> #define u32 uint32_t #endif diff --git a/arch/um/include/shared/init.h b/arch/um/include/shared/init.h index b3906f860a87..233e2593eee0 100644 --- a/arch/um/include/shared/init.h +++ b/arch/um/include/shared/init.h @@ -40,28 +40,8 @@ typedef int (*initcall_t)(void); typedef void (*exitcall_t)(void); -#ifndef __KERNEL__ -#ifndef __section -# define __section(S) __attribute__ ((__section__(#S))) -#endif - -#if __GNUC__ == 3 - -#if __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 3 -# define __used __attribute__((__used__)) -#else -# define __used __attribute__((__unused__)) -#endif - -#else -#if __GNUC__ == 4 -# define __used __attribute__((__used__)) -#endif -#endif - -#else #include <linux/compiler.h> -#endif + /* These are for everybody (although not all archs will actually discard it in modules) */ #define __init __section(.init.text) @@ -131,7 +111,7 @@ extern struct uml_param __uml_setup_start, __uml_setup_end; #define __uml_postsetup_call __used __section(.uml.postsetup.init) #define __uml_exit_call __used __section(.uml.exitcall.exit) -#ifndef __KERNEL__ +#ifdef __UM_HOST__ #define __define_initcall(level,fn) \ static initcall_t __initcall_##fn __used \ diff --git a/arch/um/include/shared/user.h b/arch/um/include/shared/user.h index cef068563336..4cff19f6207a 100644 --- a/arch/um/include/shared/user.h +++ b/arch/um/include/shared/user.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0])) /* This is to get size_t */ -#ifdef __KERNEL__ +#ifndef __UM_HOST__ #include <linux/types.h> #else #include <stddef.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 306d152336cd..bcae7051aba2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -849,7 +849,8 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr2, static inline int emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type) { - return x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0, emulation_type, NULL, 0); + return x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0, + emulation_type | EMULTYPE_NO_REEXECUTE, NULL, 0); } void kvm_enable_efer_bits(u64); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index 852572c971c4..08751c554d35 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -4385,6 +4385,8 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len) bool op_prefix = false; bool has_seg_override = false; struct opcode opcode; + u16 dummy; + struct desc_struct desc; ctxt->memop.type = OP_NONE; ctxt->memopp = NULL; @@ -4403,6 +4405,11 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len) switch (mode) { case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL: case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86: + def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 2; + ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &dummy, &desc, NULL, VCPU_SREG_CS); + if (desc.d) + def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 4; + break; case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16: def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 2; break; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index c1fd6d3d4394..9b02ba40fed0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -4569,7 +4569,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, 0); vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, 0); - vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, 0x02); + kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, X86_EFLAGS_FIXED); kvm_rip_write(vcpu, 0xfff0); vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, 0); @@ -5707,7 +5707,7 @@ static int handle_invalid_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (test_bit(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &vcpu->requests)) return 1; - err = emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_NO_REEXECUTE); + err = emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0); if (err == EMULATE_USER_EXIT) { ++vcpu->stat.mmio_exits; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 0dcbe370374f..80a83113a1ce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -5109,7 +5109,7 @@ static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR; vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION; vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0; - r = EMULATE_FAIL; + r = EMULATE_USER_EXIT; } kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); diff --git a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/tls.h b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/tls.h index 27cce00c6b30..a682db13df23 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/tls.h +++ b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/tls.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #ifndef _SYSDEP_TLS_H #define _SYSDEP_TLS_H -# ifndef __KERNEL__ +#ifdef __UM_HOST__ /* Change name to avoid conflicts with the original one from <asm/ldt.h>, which * may be named user_desc (but in 2.4 and in header matching its API was named @@ -22,11 +22,11 @@ typedef struct um_dup_user_desc { #endif } user_desc_t; -# else /* __KERNEL__ */ +#else /* __UM_HOST__ */ typedef struct user_desc user_desc_t; -# endif /* __KERNEL__ */ +#endif /* __UM_HOST__ */ extern int os_set_thread_area(user_desc_t *info, int pid); extern int os_get_thread_area(user_desc_t *info, int pid); diff --git a/drivers/block/loop.c b/drivers/block/loop.c index 6cb1beb47c25..94385b969f67 100644 --- a/drivers/block/loop.c +++ b/drivers/block/loop.c @@ -1512,9 +1512,8 @@ out: return err; } -static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode) +static void __lo_release(struct loop_device *lo) { - struct loop_device *lo = disk->private_data; int err; mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex); @@ -1542,6 +1541,13 @@ out: mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex); } +static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode) +{ + mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex); + __lo_release(disk->private_data); + mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex); +} + static const struct block_device_operations lo_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .open = lo_open, diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-iop.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-iop.c index 0a5e9d3f308c..2978aa5ae282 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-iop.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-iop.c @@ -130,3 +130,7 @@ static int __init iop3xx_gpio_init(void) return platform_driver_register(&iop3xx_gpio_driver); } arch_initcall(iop3xx_gpio_init); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("GPIO handling for Intel IOP3xx processors"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Lennert Buytenhek <buytenh(a)wantstofly.org>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c b/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c index 291d11fe93e7..6f3fabb5350f 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ */ #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/math64.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/err.h> @@ -443,8 +444,8 @@ static long pmbus_reg2data_linear(struct pmbus_data *data, static long pmbus_reg2data_direct(struct pmbus_data *data, struct pmbus_sensor *sensor) { - long val = (s16) sensor->data; - long m, b, R; + s64 b, val = (s16)sensor->data; + s32 m, R; m = data->info->m[sensor->class]; b = data->info->b[sensor->class]; @@ -472,11 +473,12 @@ static long pmbus_reg2data_direct(struct pmbus_data *data, R--; } while (R < 0) { - val = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(val, 10); + val = div_s64(val + 5LL, 10L); /* round closest */ R++; } - return (val - b) / m; + val = div_s64(val - b, m); + return clamp_val(val, LONG_MIN, LONG_MAX); } /* @@ -588,7 +590,8 @@ static u16 pmbus_data2reg_linear(struct pmbus_data *data, static u16 pmbus_data2reg_direct(struct pmbus_data *data, struct pmbus_sensor *sensor, long val) { - long m, b, R; + s64 b, val64 = val; + s32 m, R; m = data->info->m[sensor->class]; b = data->info->b[sensor->class]; @@ -605,18 +608,18 @@ static u16 pmbus_data2reg_direct(struct pmbus_data *data, R -= 3; /* Adjust R and b for data in milli-units */ b *= 1000; } - val = val * m + b; + val64 = val64 * m + b; while (R > 0) { - val *= 10; + val64 *= 10; R--; } while (R < 0) { - val = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(val, 10); + val64 = div_s64(val64 + 5LL, 10L); /* round closest */ R++; } - return val; + return (u16)clamp_val(val64, S16_MIN, S16_MAX); } static u16 pmbus_data2reg_vid(struct pmbus_data *data, diff --git a/drivers/input/input.c b/drivers/input/input.c index 0f175f55782b..34aae7e5498a 100644 --- a/drivers/input/input.c +++ b/drivers/input/input.c @@ -668,6 +668,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(input_close_device); */ static void input_dev_release_keys(struct input_dev *dev) { + bool need_sync = false; int code; if (is_event_supported(EV_KEY, dev->evbit, EV_MAX)) { @@ -675,9 +676,11 @@ static void input_dev_release_keys(struct input_dev *dev) if (is_event_supported(code, dev->keybit, KEY_MAX) && __test_and_clear_bit(code, dev->key)) { input_pass_event(dev, EV_KEY, code, 0); + need_sync = true; } } - input_pass_event(dev, EV_SYN, SYN_REPORT, 1); + if (need_sync) + input_pass_event(dev, EV_SYN, SYN_REPORT, 1); } } diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c b/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c index 43829d9493f7..e53ce5e2a28a 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c @@ -808,7 +808,10 @@ int bch_btree_cache_alloc(struct cache_set *c) c->shrink.scan_objects = bch_mca_scan; c->shrink.seeks = 4; c->shrink.batch = c->btree_pages * 2; - register_shrinker(&c->shrink); + + if (register_shrinker(&c->shrink)) + pr_warn("bcache: %s: could not register shrinker", + __func__); return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c b/drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c index 29428bef272c..3bbc77aa6a33 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static void usbtv_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) static struct usb_device_id usbtv_id_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x1b71, 0x3002) }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x1f71, 0x3301) }, {} }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, usbtv_id_table); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c index 3b3911e511ac..1ffad88e8a29 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c @@ -3172,7 +3172,7 @@ static int __igb_close(struct net_device *netdev, bool suspending) static int igb_close(struct net_device *netdev) { - if (netif_device_present(netdev)) + if (netif_device_present(netdev) || netdev->dismantle) return __igb_close(netdev, false); return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/Kconfig b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/Kconfig index 7b90a5eba099..9d6c252c1911 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/Kconfig @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ config XILINX_AXI_EMAC config XILINX_LL_TEMAC tristate "Xilinx LL TEMAC (LocalLink Tri-mode Ethernet MAC) driver" depends on (PPC || MICROBLAZE) + depends on !64BIT || BROKEN select PHYLIB ---help--- This driver supports the Xilinx 10/100/1000 LocalLink TEMAC diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c index 8f45be1592ca..e76f46edee08 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ struct netfront_cb { /* IRQ name is queue name with "-tx" or "-rx" appended */ #define IRQ_NAME_SIZE (QUEUE_NAME_SIZE + 3) +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(module_unload_q); + struct netfront_stats { u64 rx_packets; u64 tx_packets; @@ -2080,10 +2082,12 @@ static void netback_changed(struct xenbus_device *dev, break; case XenbusStateClosed: + wake_up_all(&module_unload_q); if (dev->state == XenbusStateClosed) break; /* Missed the backend's CLOSING state -- fallthrough */ case XenbusStateClosing: + wake_up_all(&module_unload_q); xenbus_frontend_closed(dev); break; } @@ -2305,6 +2309,20 @@ static int xennet_remove(struct xenbus_device *dev) dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "%s\n", dev->nodename); + if (xenbus_read_driver_state(dev->otherend) != XenbusStateClosed) { + xenbus_switch_state(dev, XenbusStateClosing); + wait_event(module_unload_q, + xenbus_read_driver_state(dev->otherend) == + XenbusStateClosing); + + xenbus_switch_state(dev, XenbusStateClosed); + wait_event(module_unload_q, + xenbus_read_driver_state(dev->otherend) == + XenbusStateClosed || + xenbus_read_driver_state(dev->otherend) == + XenbusStateUnknown); + } + xennet_disconnect_backend(info); xennet_sysfs_delif(info->netdev); diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c index 605ca60e8a10..64ee59685aac 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -4287,12 +4287,15 @@ static int ufshcd_config_vreg(struct device *dev, struct ufs_vreg *vreg, bool on) { int ret = 0; - struct regulator *reg = vreg->reg; - const char *name = vreg->name; + struct regulator *reg; + const char *name; int min_uV, uA_load; BUG_ON(!vreg); + reg = vreg->reg; + name = vreg->name; + if (regulator_count_voltages(reg) > 0) { min_uV = on ? vreg->min_uV : 0; ret = regulator_set_voltage(reg, min_uV, vreg->max_uV); diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-imx.c b/drivers/spi/spi-imx.c index bf0effb86137..4c5e43f6f7f6 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-imx.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-imx.c @@ -1220,12 +1220,23 @@ static int spi_imx_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct spi_master *master = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); struct spi_imx_data *spi_imx = spi_master_get_devdata(master); + int ret; spi_bitbang_stop(&spi_imx->bitbang); + ret = clk_enable(spi_imx->clk_per); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = clk_enable(spi_imx->clk_ipg); + if (ret) { + clk_disable(spi_imx->clk_per); + return ret; + } + writel(0, spi_imx->base + MXC_CSPICTRL); - clk_unprepare(spi_imx->clk_ipg); - clk_unprepare(spi_imx->clk_per); + clk_disable_unprepare(spi_imx->clk_ipg); + clk_disable_unprepare(spi_imx->clk_per); spi_imx_sdma_exit(spi_imx); spi_master_put(master); diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c index d598fec4abbf..0bfb4fe8a86e 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c @@ -1396,19 +1396,13 @@ static int rtw_wx_get_essid(struct net_device *dev, if ((check_fwstate(pmlmepriv, _FW_LINKED)) || (check_fwstate(pmlmepriv, WIFI_ADHOC_MASTER_STATE))) { len = pcur_bss->Ssid.SsidLength; - - wrqu->essid.length = len; - memcpy(extra, pcur_bss->Ssid.Ssid, len); - - wrqu->essid.flags = 1; } else { - ret = -1; - goto exit; + len = 0; + *extra = 0; } - -exit: - + wrqu->essid.length = len; + wrqu->essid.flags = 1; return ret; } diff --git a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c index a5e94b8fa2dc..e01d39509172 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ static int acm_submit_read_urb(struct acm *acm, int index, gfp_t mem_flags) res = usb_submit_urb(acm->read_urbs[index], mem_flags); if (res) { - if (res != -EPERM) { + if (res != -EPERM && res != -ENODEV) { dev_err(&acm->data->dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb failed: %d\n", __func__, res); @@ -1712,6 +1712,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id acm_ids[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x0ace, 0x1611), /* ZyDAS 56K USB MODEM - new version */ .driver_info = SINGLE_RX_URB, /* firmware bug */ }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x11ca, 0x0201), /* VeriFone Mx870 Gadget Serial */ + .driver_info = SINGLE_RX_URB, + }, { USB_DEVICE(0x22b8, 0x7000), /* Motorola Q Phone */ .driver_info = NO_UNION_NORMAL, /* has no union descriptor */ }, diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c index f24adf48b0cc..0056ca7e588c 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c @@ -103,7 +103,6 @@ int config_ep_by_speed(struct usb_gadget *g, struct usb_function *f, struct usb_ep *_ep) { - struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = get_gadget_data(g); struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *chosen_desc = NULL; struct usb_descriptor_header **speed_desc = NULL; @@ -170,8 +169,12 @@ ep_found: _ep->maxburst = comp_desc->bMaxBurst + 1; break; default: - if (comp_desc->bMaxBurst != 0) + if (comp_desc->bMaxBurst != 0) { + struct usb_composite_dev *cdev; + + cdev = get_gadget_data(g); ERROR(cdev, "ep0 bMaxBurst must be 0\n"); + } _ep->maxburst = 1; break; } diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c index 2c46089ac423..88aa287f10ea 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c @@ -3438,7 +3438,8 @@ static void ffs_closed(struct ffs_data *ffs) ci = opts->func_inst.group.cg_item.ci_parent->ci_parent; ffs_dev_unlock(); - unregister_gadget_item(ci); + if (test_bit(FFS_FL_BOUND, &ffs->flags)) + unregister_gadget_item(ci); return; done: ffs_dev_unlock(); diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/Kconfig b/drivers/usb/serial/Kconfig index a69f7cd9d0bf..1594e811ab00 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/Kconfig @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ config USB_SERIAL_SIMPLE - Fundamental Software dongle. - HP4x calculators - a number of Motorola phones + - Motorola Tetra devices - Novatel Wireless GPS receivers - Siemens USB/MPI adapter. - ViVOtech ViVOpay USB device. diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c b/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c index f35befe3bccf..eef2cbb001ea 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c @@ -2219,7 +2219,6 @@ static int write_cmd_usb(struct edgeport_port *edge_port, /* something went wrong */ dev_err(dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb(write command) failed, status = %d\n", __func__, status); - usb_kill_urb(urb); usb_free_urb(urb); atomic_dec(&CmdUrbs); return status; diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c b/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c index 534c308c6b33..387dde4abb57 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_RSAQ2) }, { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_DCU11) }, { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_RSAQ3) }, + { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_CHILITAG) }, { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_PHAROS) }, { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_ALDIGA) }, { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_MMX) }, diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h b/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h index e3b7af8adfb7..6184bd4d3777 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_DCU11 0x1234 #define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_PHAROS 0xaaa0 #define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_RSAQ3 0xaaa2 +#define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_CHILITAG 0xaaa8 #define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_ALDIGA 0x0611 #define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_MMX 0x0612 #define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_GPRS 0x0609 diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c b/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c index 40de275cddf4..35f6b121f9d8 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c @@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ DEVICE(vivopay, VIVOPAY_IDS); { USB_DEVICE(0x22b8, 0x2c64) } /* Motorola V950 phone */ DEVICE(moto_modem, MOTO_IDS); +/* Motorola Tetra driver */ +#define MOTOROLA_TETRA_IDS() \ + { USB_DEVICE(0x0cad, 0x9011) } /* Motorola Solutions TETRA PEI */ +DEVICE(motorola_tetra, MOTOROLA_TETRA_IDS); + /* Novatel Wireless GPS driver */ #define NOVATEL_IDS() \ { USB_DEVICE(0x09d7, 0x0100) } /* NovAtel FlexPack GPS */ @@ -101,6 +106,7 @@ static struct usb_serial_driver * const serial_drivers[] = { &flashloader_device, &vivopay_device, &moto_modem_device, + &motorola_tetra_device, &novatel_gps_device, &hp4x_device, &suunto_device, @@ -115,6 +121,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = { FLASHLOADER_IDS(), VIVOPAY_IDS(), MOTO_IDS(), + MOTOROLA_TETRA_IDS(), NOVATEL_IDS(), HP4X_IDS(), SUUNTO_IDS(), diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/uas.c b/drivers/usb/storage/uas.c index 017278ec4e03..7d535f1ddecc 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/storage/uas.c +++ b/drivers/usb/storage/uas.c @@ -1067,20 +1067,19 @@ static int uas_post_reset(struct usb_interface *intf) return 0; err = uas_configure_endpoints(devinfo); - if (err) { + if (err && err != ENODEV) shost_printk(KERN_ERR, shost, "%s: alloc streams error %d after reset", __func__, err); - return 1; - } + /* we must unblock the host in every case lest we deadlock */ spin_lock_irqsave(shost->host_lock, flags); scsi_report_bus_reset(shost, 0); spin_unlock_irqrestore(shost->host_lock, flags); scsi_unblock_requests(shost); - return 0; + return err ? 1 : 0; } static int uas_suspend(struct usb_interface *intf, pm_message_t message) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index d59ce5a665d9..34b718c6ce53 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -62,12 +62,16 @@ static const stateid_t zero_stateid = { static const stateid_t currentstateid = { .si_generation = 1, }; +static const stateid_t close_stateid = { + .si_generation = 0xffffffffU, +}; static u64 current_sessionid = 1; #define ZERO_STATEID(stateid) (!memcmp((stateid), &zero_stateid, sizeof(stateid_t))) #define ONE_STATEID(stateid) (!memcmp((stateid), &one_stateid, sizeof(stateid_t))) #define CURRENT_STATEID(stateid) (!memcmp((stateid), &currentstateid, sizeof(stateid_t))) +#define CLOSE_STATEID(stateid) (!memcmp((stateid), &close_stateid, sizeof(stateid_t))) /* forward declarations */ static bool check_for_locks(struct nfs4_file *fp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lowner); @@ -4411,7 +4415,8 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_validate_stateid(struct nfs4_client *cl, stateid_t *stateid) struct nfs4_stid *s; __be32 status = nfserr_bad_stateid; - if (ZERO_STATEID(stateid) || ONE_STATEID(stateid)) + if (ZERO_STATEID(stateid) || ONE_STATEID(stateid) || + CLOSE_STATEID(stateid)) return status; /* Client debugging aid. */ if (!same_clid(&stateid->si_opaque.so_clid, &cl->cl_clientid)) { @@ -4469,7 +4474,8 @@ nfsd4_lookup_stateid(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, else if (typemask & NFS4_DELEG_STID) typemask |= NFS4_REVOKED_DELEG_STID; - if (ZERO_STATEID(stateid) || ONE_STATEID(stateid)) + if (ZERO_STATEID(stateid) || ONE_STATEID(stateid) || + CLOSE_STATEID(stateid)) return nfserr_bad_stateid; status = lookup_clientid(&stateid->si_opaque.so_clid, cstate, nn); if (status == nfserr_stale_clientid) { @@ -4901,6 +4907,11 @@ nfsd4_close(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, nfsd4_close_open_stateid(stp); + /* See RFC5661 sectionm 18.2.4 */ + if (stp->st_stid.sc_client->cl_minorversion) + memcpy(&close->cl_stateid, &close_stateid, + sizeof(close->cl_stateid)); + /* put reference from nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op */ nfs4_put_stid(&stp->st_stid); out: diff --git a/fs/quota/dquot.c b/fs/quota/dquot.c index 18aaccb290c2..a9b448e8f92d 100644 --- a/fs/quota/dquot.c +++ b/fs/quota/dquot.c @@ -2730,7 +2730,8 @@ static int __init dquot_init(void) printk("Dquot-cache hash table entries: %ld (order %ld, %ld bytes)\n", nr_hash, order, (PAGE_SIZE << order)); - register_shrinker(&dqcache_shrinker); + if (register_shrinker(&dqcache_shrinker)) + panic("Cannot register dquot shrinker"); return 0; } diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh_hwmp.c b/net/mac80211/mesh_hwmp.c index 214e63b84e5c..4efc60236cdb 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mesh_hwmp.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mesh_hwmp.c @@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ static void hwmp_rann_frame_process(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct mesh_path *mpath; u8 ttl, flags, hopcount; const u8 *orig_addr; - u32 orig_sn, metric, metric_txsta, interval; + u32 orig_sn, new_metric, orig_metric, last_hop_metric, interval; bool root_is_gate; ttl = rann->rann_ttl; @@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static void hwmp_rann_frame_process(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, interval = le32_to_cpu(rann->rann_interval); hopcount = rann->rann_hopcount; hopcount++; - metric = le32_to_cpu(rann->rann_metric); + orig_metric = le32_to_cpu(rann->rann_metric); /* Ignore our own RANNs */ if (ether_addr_equal(orig_addr, sdata->vif.addr)) @@ -791,7 +791,10 @@ static void hwmp_rann_frame_process(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, return; } - metric_txsta = airtime_link_metric_get(local, sta); + last_hop_metric = airtime_link_metric_get(local, sta); + new_metric = orig_metric + last_hop_metric; + if (new_metric < orig_metric) + new_metric = MAX_METRIC; mpath = mesh_path_lookup(sdata, orig_addr); if (!mpath) { @@ -804,7 +807,7 @@ static void hwmp_rann_frame_process(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, } if (!(SN_LT(mpath->sn, orig_sn)) && - !(mpath->sn == orig_sn && metric < mpath->rann_metric)) { + !(mpath->sn == orig_sn && new_metric < mpath->rann_metric)) { rcu_read_unlock(); return; } @@ -822,7 +825,7 @@ static void hwmp_rann_frame_process(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, } mpath->sn = orig_sn; - mpath->rann_metric = metric + metric_txsta; + mpath->rann_metric = new_metric; mpath->is_root = true; /* Recording RANNs sender address to send individually * addressed PREQs destined for root mesh STA */ @@ -842,7 +845,7 @@ static void hwmp_rann_frame_process(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, mesh_path_sel_frame_tx(MPATH_RANN, flags, orig_addr, orig_sn, 0, NULL, 0, broadcast_addr, hopcount, ttl, interval, - metric + metric_txsta, 0, sdata); + new_metric, 0, sdata); } rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index be04b056c1bd..8223fe463fa3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3969,6 +3969,8 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u32 tsid = task_sid(task); + if (!sksec) + return -EFAULT; if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c index 0a52e377a617..83bf65ae8251 100644 --- a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c @@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ static struct snd_seq_client *seq_create_client1(int client_index, int poolsize) rwlock_init(&client->ports_lock); mutex_init(&client->ports_mutex); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&client->ports_list_head); + mutex_init(&client->ioctl_mutex); /* find free slot in the client table */ spin_lock_irqsave(&clients_lock, flags); @@ -2200,6 +2201,7 @@ static int snd_seq_do_ioctl(struct snd_seq_client *client, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg) { struct seq_ioctl_table *p; + int ret; switch (cmd) { case SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_PVERSION: @@ -2213,8 +2215,12 @@ static int snd_seq_do_ioctl(struct snd_seq_client *client, unsigned int cmd, if (! arg) return -EFAULT; for (p = ioctl_tables; p->cmd; p++) { - if (p->cmd == cmd) - return p->func(client, arg); + if (p->cmd == cmd) { + mutex_lock(&client->ioctl_mutex); + ret = p->func(client, arg); + mutex_unlock(&client->ioctl_mutex); + return ret; + } } pr_debug("ALSA: seq unknown ioctl() 0x%x (type='%c', number=0x%02x)\n", cmd, _IOC_TYPE(cmd), _IOC_NR(cmd)); diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h index 20f0a725ec7d..91f8f165bfdc 100644 --- a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h +++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct snd_seq_client { struct list_head ports_list_head; rwlock_t ports_lock; struct mutex ports_mutex; + struct mutex ioctl_mutex; int convert32; /* convert 32->64bit */ /* output pool */ diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c index f297058c0038..3ace683f0aec 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c @@ -67,3 +67,7 @@ static struct spi_driver pcm512x_spi_driver = { }; module_spi_driver(pcm512x_spi_driver); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ASoC PCM512x codec driver - SPI"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_bind.c b/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_bind.c index fa46141ae68b..e121cfb1746a 100644 --- a/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_bind.c +++ b/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_bind.c @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ static int bind_device(char *busid) int rc; struct udev *udev; struct udev_device *dev; + const char *devpath; /* Check whether the device with this bus ID exists. */ udev = udev_new(); @@ -152,8 +153,16 @@ static int bind_device(char *busid) err("device with the specified bus ID does not exist"); return -1; } + devpath = udev_device_get_devpath(dev); udev_unref(udev); + /* If the device is already attached to vhci_hcd - bail out */ + if (strstr(devpath, USBIP_VHCI_DRV_NAME)) { + err("bind loop detected: device: %s is attached to %s\n", + devpath, USBIP_VHCI_DRV_NAME); + return -1; + } + rc = unbind_other(busid); if (rc == UNBIND_ST_FAILED) { err("could not unbind driver from device on busid %s", busid); diff --git a/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_list.c b/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_list.c index d5ce34a410e7..ac6081c3db82 100644 --- a/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_list.c +++ b/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_list.c @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ static int list_devices(bool parsable) const char *busid; char product_name[128]; int ret = -1; + const char *devpath; /* Create libudev context. */ udev = udev_new(); @@ -202,6 +203,14 @@ static int list_devices(bool parsable) path = udev_list_entry_get_name(dev_list_entry); dev = udev_device_new_from_syspath(udev, path); + /* Ignore devices attached to vhci_hcd */ + devpath = udev_device_get_devpath(dev); + if (strstr(devpath, USBIP_VHCI_DRV_NAME)) { + dbg("Skip the device %s already attached to %s\n", + devpath, USBIP_VHCI_DRV_NAME); + continue; + } + /* Get device information. */ idVendor = udev_device_get_sysattr_value(dev, "idVendor"); idProduct = udev_device_get_sysattr_value(dev, "idProduct");

7 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] platform/x86: dell-laptop: Allocate buffer on heap rather than globally

by Mario.Limonciello＠dell.com

commit 9862b43624 upstream There has been a race condition identified with initialization of the dell-laptop driver due to changes in 4.15. This commit has been shown to resolve the race condition. I'd like to see this brought back to 4.15 stable. It doesn't apply to anything earlier. Thanks,

7 years, 7 months

2
2
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] Revert "usb: musb: host: don't start next rx urb if current one failed"

by Bin Liu

This reverts commit dbac5d07d13e330e6706813c9fde477140fb5d80. commit dbac5d07d13e ("usb: musb: host: don't start next rx urb if current one failed") along with commit b5801212229f ("usb: musb: host: clear rxcsr error bit if set") try to solve the issue described in [1], but the latter alone is sufficient, and the former causes the issue as in [2], so now revert it. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-usb&m=146173995117456&w=2 [2] https://marc.info/?l=linux-usb&m=151689238420622&w=2 Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu(a)ti.com> --- drivers/usb/musb/musb_host.c | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_host.c b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_host.c index 394b4ac86161..45ed32c2cba9 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_host.c +++ b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_host.c @@ -391,13 +391,7 @@ static void musb_advance_schedule(struct musb *musb, struct urb *urb, } } - /* - * The pipe must be broken if current urb->status is set, so don't - * start next urb. - * TODO: to minimize the risk of regression, only check urb->status - * for RX, until we have a test case to understand the behavior of TX. - */ - if ((!status || !is_in) && qh && qh->is_ready) { + if (qh != NULL && qh->is_ready) { musb_dbg(musb, "... next ep%d %cX urb %p", hw_ep->epnum, is_in ? 'R' : 'T', next_urb(qh)); musb_start_urb(musb, is_in, qh); -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] [to-be-updated] fontswap-thp-fix.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: mm: fontswap: thp fix has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was fontswap-thp-fix.patch This patch was dropped because an updated version will be merged ------------------------------------------------------ From: Huang Ying <huang.ying.caritas(a)gmail.com> Subject: mm: fontswap: thp fix Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87d11j4pdy.fsf@yhuang-dev.intel.com Fixes: bd4c82c22c367e068 ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky(a)gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet(a)ieee.org> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/page_io.c | 2 +- mm/vmscan.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff -puN mm/page_io.c~fontswap-thp-fix mm/page_io.c --- a/mm/page_io.c~fontswap-thp-fix +++ a/mm/page_io.c @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ int swap_writepage(struct page *page, st unlock_page(page); goto out; } - if (frontswap_store(page) == 0) { + if (!PageTransHuge(page) && frontswap_store(page) == 0) { set_page_writeback(page); unlock_page(page); end_page_writeback(page); diff -puN mm/vmscan.c~fontswap-thp-fix mm/vmscan.c --- a/mm/vmscan.c~fontswap-thp-fix +++ a/mm/vmscan.c @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ #include <linux/swapops.h> #include <linux/balloon_compaction.h> +#include <linux/frontswap.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -1121,13 +1122,22 @@ static unsigned long shrink_page_list(st if (!can_split_huge_page(page, NULL)) goto activate_locked; /* + * Split THP if frontswap enabled, + * because it cannot process THP + */ + if (frontswap_enabled()) { + if (split_huge_page_to_list( + page, page_list)) + goto activate_locked; + } + /* * Split pages without a PMD map right * away. Chances are some or all of the * tail pages can be freed without IO. */ - if (!compound_mapcount(page) && - split_huge_page_to_list(page, - page_list)) + else if (!compound_mapcount(page) && + split_huge_page_to_list(page, + page_list)) goto activate_locked; } if (!add_to_swap(page)) { _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from huang.ying.caritas(a)gmail.com are mm-swap-frontswap-fix-thp-swap-if-frontswap-enabled.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] + mm-swap-frontswap-fix-thp-swap-if-frontswap-enabled.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: mm, swap, frontswap: Fix THP swap if frontswap enabled has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is mm-swap-frontswap-fix-thp-swap-if-frontswap-enabled.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/mm-swap-frontswap-fix-thp-swap-if-… and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/mm-swap-frontswap-fix-thp-swap-if-… Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Huang Ying <huang.ying.caritas(a)gmail.com> Subject: mm, swap, frontswap: Fix THP swap if frontswap enabled It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in random user space applications as follow, kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000] #0 0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6) #1 0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6) #2 0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt) #3 0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt) #4 0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt) #5 0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt) #6 0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt) #7 0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt) #8 0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt) #9 0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt) #10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6) #11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt) After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c22c367e068 ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). The root cause is as follows: When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages instead to improve the performance. But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as normal page, so only the head page is saved. After swapping in, tail pages will not be restored to its original contents, so cause the memory corruption in the applications. This is fixed via splitting THP before writing the page to swap device if frontswap is enabled. To deal with the situation where frontswap is enabled at runtime, whether the page is THP is checked before using frontswap during swapping out too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180207070035.30302-1-ying.huang@intel.com Fixes: bd4c82c22c367e068 ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang(a)intel.com> Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky(a)gmail.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet(a)ieee.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning(a)redhat.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Shaohua Li <shli(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)techsingularity.net> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.14+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/page_io.c | 2 +- mm/swapfile.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff -puN mm/page_io.c~mm-swap-frontswap-fix-thp-swap-if-frontswap-enabled mm/page_io.c --- a/mm/page_io.c~mm-swap-frontswap-fix-thp-swap-if-frontswap-enabled +++ a/mm/page_io.c @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ int swap_writepage(struct page *page, st unlock_page(page); goto out; } - if (frontswap_store(page) == 0) { + if (!PageTransHuge(page) && frontswap_store(page) == 0) { set_page_writeback(page); unlock_page(page); end_page_writeback(page); diff -puN mm/swapfile.c~mm-swap-frontswap-fix-thp-swap-if-frontswap-enabled mm/swapfile.c --- a/mm/swapfile.c~mm-swap-frontswap-fix-thp-swap-if-frontswap-enabled +++ a/mm/swapfile.c @@ -934,6 +934,9 @@ int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, bool clus /* Only single cluster request supported */ WARN_ON_ONCE(n_goal > 1 && cluster); + /* Frontswap doesn't support THP */ + if (frontswap_enabled() && cluster) + goto noswap; avail_pgs = atomic_long_read(&nr_swap_pages) / nr_pages; if (avail_pgs <= 0) _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from huang.ying.caritas(a)gmail.com are mm-swap-frontswap-fix-thp-swap-if-frontswap-enabled.patch fontswap-thp-fix.patch

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: keys-encrypted-fix-buffer-overread-in-valid_master_desc.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 14:48:18 +0100 Subject: KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream. With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const cha */ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc) { - if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else - goto out; + int prefix_len; + + if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN; + else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if (!new_desc[prefix_len]) + return -EINVAL; + + if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; -out: - return -EINVAL; } /* Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.9/keys-encrypted-fix-buffer-overread-in-valid_master_desc.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 5331aec1bf9c9da557668174e0a4bfcee39f1121 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 15:56:28 -0500 Subject: media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> commit 5331aec1bf9c9da557668174e0a4bfcee39f1121 upstream. This change resolves a new compile-time warning when built as a loadable module: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.o see include/linux/module.h for more information This adds the license as "GPL", which matches the header of the file. MODULE_DESCRIPTION and MODULE_AUTHOR are also added. Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil(a)cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c @@ -418,3 +418,7 @@ void soc_camera_calc_client_output(struc mf->height = soc_camera_shift_scale(rect->height, shift, scale_v); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(soc_camera_calc_client_output); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("soc-camera scaling-cropping functions"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Guennadi Liakhovetski <kernel(a)pengutronix.de>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jc(a)linux.com are queue-4.9/media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch queue-4.9/auxdisplay-img-ascii-lcd-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch queue-4.9/asoc-pcm512x-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch queue-4.9/pinctrl-pxa-pxa2xx-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "b43: Add missing MODULE_FIRMWARE()" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled b43: Add missing MODULE_FIRMWARE() to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: b43-add-missing-module_firmware.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 3c89a72ad80c64bdbd5ff851ee9c328a191f7e01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 11:27:52 +0200 Subject: b43: Add missing MODULE_FIRMWARE() From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> commit 3c89a72ad80c64bdbd5ff851ee9c328a191f7e01 upstream. Some firmware entries were forgotten to be added via MODULE_FIRMWARE(), which may result in the non-functional state when the driver is loaded in initrd. Link: http://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1037344 Fixes: 15be8e89cdd9 ("b43: add more bcma cores") Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c @@ -71,8 +71,18 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode11.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode13.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode14.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode15.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode16_lp.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode16_mimo.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode24_lcn.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode25_lcn.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode25_mimo.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode26_mimo.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode29_mimo.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode33_lcn40.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode30_mimo.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode5.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode40.fw"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode42.fw"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode9.fw"); static int modparam_bad_frames_preempt; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tiwai(a)suse.de are queue-4.9/b43-add-missing-module_firmware.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 5331aec1bf9c9da557668174e0a4bfcee39f1121 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 15:56:28 -0500 Subject: media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> commit 5331aec1bf9c9da557668174e0a4bfcee39f1121 upstream. This change resolves a new compile-time warning when built as a loadable module: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.o see include/linux/module.h for more information This adds the license as "GPL", which matches the header of the file. MODULE_DESCRIPTION and MODULE_AUTHOR are also added. Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil(a)cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c @@ -405,3 +405,7 @@ void soc_camera_calc_client_output(struc mf->height = soc_camera_shift_scale(rect->height, shift, scale_v); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(soc_camera_calc_client_output); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("soc-camera scaling-cropping functions"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Guennadi Liakhovetski <kernel(a)pengutronix.de>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jc(a)linux.com are queue-4.4/media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch queue-4.4/asoc-pcm512x-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: keys-encrypted-fix-buffer-overread-in-valid_master_desc.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 14:48:18 +0100 Subject: KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream. With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const cha */ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc) { - if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else - goto out; + int prefix_len; + + if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN; + else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if (!new_desc[prefix_len]) + return -EINVAL; + + if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; -out: - return -EINVAL; } /* Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.4/keys-encrypted-fix-buffer-overread-in-valid_master_desc.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "don't put symlink bodies in pagecache into highmem" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled don't put symlink bodies in pagecache into highmem to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: don-t-put-symlink-bodies-in-pagecache-into-highmem.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 21fc61c73c3903c4c312d0802da01ec2b323d174 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2015 01:07:57 -0500 Subject: don't put symlink bodies in pagecache into highmem From: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> commit 21fc61c73c3903c4c312d0802da01ec2b323d174 upstream. kmap() in page_follow_link_light() needed to go - allowing to hold an arbitrary number of kmaps for long is a great way to deadlocking the system. new helper (inode_nohighmem(inode)) needs to be used for pagecache symlinks inodes; done for all in-tree cases. page_follow_link_light() instrumented to yell about anything missed. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)android.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 1 + fs/ext4/namei.c | 1 + fs/ext4/symlink.c | 10 +++------- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 1 + fs/f2fs/namei.c | 5 ++--- fs/inode.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4417,6 +4417,7 @@ struct inode *ext4_iget(struct super_blo inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; ext4_set_aops(inode); } + inode_nohighmem(inode); } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &ext4_special_inode_operations; --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -3151,6 +3151,7 @@ static int ext4_symlink(struct inode *di if ((disk_link.len > EXT4_N_BLOCKS * 4)) { if (!encryption_required) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); ext4_set_aops(inode); /* * We cannot call page_symlink() with transaction started --- a/fs/ext4/symlink.c +++ b/fs/ext4/symlink.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow cpage = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, NULL); if (IS_ERR(cpage)) return ERR_CAST(cpage); - caddr = kmap(cpage); + caddr = page_address(cpage); caddr[size] = 0; } @@ -75,16 +75,12 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow /* Null-terminate the name */ if (res <= plen) paddr[res] = '\0'; - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } return *cookie = paddr; errout: - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } kfree(paddr); return ERR_PTR(res); } --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ make_now: inode->i_op = &f2fs_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations; else inode->i_op = &f2fs_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &f2fs_dblock_aops; } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c @@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ static int f2fs_symlink(struct inode *di inode->i_op = &f2fs_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations; else inode->i_op = &f2fs_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &f2fs_dblock_aops; f2fs_lock_op(sbi); @@ -942,7 +943,7 @@ static const char *f2fs_encrypted_follow cpage = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, NULL); if (IS_ERR(cpage)) return ERR_CAST(cpage); - caddr = kmap(cpage); + caddr = page_address(cpage); caddr[size] = 0; /* Symlink is encrypted */ @@ -982,13 +983,11 @@ static const char *f2fs_encrypted_follow /* Null-terminate the name */ paddr[res] = '\0'; - kunmap(cpage); page_cache_release(cpage); return *cookie = paddr; errout: kfree(cstr.name); f2fs_fname_crypto_free_buffer(&pstr); - kunmap(cpage); page_cache_release(cpage); return ERR_PTR(res); } --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -2028,3 +2028,9 @@ void inode_set_flags(struct inode *inode new_flags) != old_flags)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_set_flags); + +void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode) +{ + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_nohighmem); --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -3066,5 +3066,6 @@ static inline bool dir_relax(struct inod } extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); +extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk are queue-4.4/don-t-put-symlink-bodies-in-pagecache-into-highmem.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 5331aec1bf9c9da557668174e0a4bfcee39f1121 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 15:56:28 -0500 Subject: media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> commit 5331aec1bf9c9da557668174e0a4bfcee39f1121 upstream. This change resolves a new compile-time warning when built as a loadable module: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.o see include/linux/module.h for more information This adds the license as "GPL", which matches the header of the file. MODULE_DESCRIPTION and MODULE_AUTHOR are also added. Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil(a)cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c @@ -420,3 +420,7 @@ void soc_camera_calc_client_output(struc mf->height = soc_camera_shift_scale(rect->height, shift, scale_v); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(soc_camera_calc_client_output); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("soc-camera scaling-cropping functions"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Guennadi Liakhovetski <kernel(a)pengutronix.de>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jc(a)linux.com are queue-4.15/media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch queue-4.15/media-mtk-vcodec-add-missing-module_license-description.patch queue-4.15/media-tegra-cec-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "media: tegra-cec: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled media: tegra-cec: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: media-tegra-cec-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 20772c1a6f0e03d4231e2b539863987fa0c94e89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 15:56:52 -0500 Subject: media: tegra-cec: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> commit 20772c1a6f0e03d4231e2b539863987fa0c94e89 upstream. This change resolves a new compile-time warning when built as a loadable module: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in drivers/media/platform/tegra-cec/tegra_cec.o see include/linux/module.h for more information This adds the license as "GPL v2", which matches the header of the file. MODULE_DESCRIPTION and MODULE_AUTHOR are also added. Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil(a)cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/media/platform/tegra-cec/tegra_cec.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/media/platform/tegra-cec/tegra_cec.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/tegra-cec/tegra_cec.c @@ -493,3 +493,8 @@ static struct platform_driver tegra_cec_ }; module_platform_driver(tegra_cec_driver); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Tegra HDMI CEC driver"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("NVIDIA CORPORATION"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Cisco Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jc(a)linux.com are queue-4.15/media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch queue-4.15/media-mtk-vcodec-add-missing-module_license-description.patch queue-4.15/media-tegra-cec-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "media: mtk-vcodec: add missing MODULE_LICENSE/DESCRIPTION" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled media: mtk-vcodec: add missing MODULE_LICENSE/DESCRIPTION to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: media-mtk-vcodec-add-missing-module_license-description.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ccbc1e3876d5476fc23429690a683294ef0f755b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 02:47:54 -0500 Subject: media: mtk-vcodec: add missing MODULE_LICENSE/DESCRIPTION From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> commit ccbc1e3876d5476fc23429690a683294ef0f755b upstream. This change resolves a new compile-time warning when built as a loadable module: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in drivers/media/platform/mtk-vcodec/mtk-vcodec-common.o see include/linux/module.h for more information This adds the license as "GPL v2", which matches the header of the file. MODULE_DESCRIPTION is also added. Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil(a)cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/media/platform/mtk-vcodec/mtk_vcodec_util.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/media/platform/mtk-vcodec/mtk_vcodec_util.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/mtk-vcodec/mtk_vcodec_util.c @@ -115,3 +115,6 @@ struct mtk_vcodec_ctx *mtk_vcodec_get_cu return ctx; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(mtk_vcodec_get_curr_ctx); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Mediatek video codec driver"); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jc(a)linux.com are queue-4.15/media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch queue-4.15/media-mtk-vcodec-add-missing-module_license-description.patch queue-4.15/media-tegra-cec-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "gpio: uniphier: fix mismatch between license text and MODULE_LICENSE" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled gpio: uniphier: fix mismatch between license text and MODULE_LICENSE to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: gpio-uniphier-fix-mismatch-between-license-text-and-module_license.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 13f9d59cef91a027bb338fc79b564fafa7680cd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2017 19:01:49 +0900 Subject: gpio: uniphier: fix mismatch between license text and MODULE_LICENSE From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> commit 13f9d59cef91a027bb338fc79b564fafa7680cd8 upstream. The comment block of this file indicates GPL-2.0 "only", while the MODULE_LICENSE is GPL-2.0 "or later", as include/linux/module.h describes as follows: "GPL" [GNU Public License v2 or later] "GPL v2" [GNU Public License v2] I am the author of this driver, and my intention is GPL-2.0 "only". Fixes: dbe776c2ca54 ("gpio: uniphier: add UniPhier GPIO controller driver") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/gpio/gpio-uniphier.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-uniphier.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-uniphier.c @@ -505,4 +505,4 @@ module_platform_driver(uniphier_gpio_dri MODULE_AUTHOR("Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com>"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("UniPhier GPIO driver"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com are queue-4.15/gpio-uniphier-fix-mismatch-between-license-text-and-module_license.patch

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 5331aec1bf9c9da557668174e0a4bfcee39f1121 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 15:56:28 -0500 Subject: media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> commit 5331aec1bf9c9da557668174e0a4bfcee39f1121 upstream. This change resolves a new compile-time warning when built as a loadable module: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.o see include/linux/module.h for more information This adds the license as "GPL", which matches the header of the file. MODULE_DESCRIPTION and MODULE_AUTHOR are also added. Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil(a)cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c @@ -419,3 +419,7 @@ void soc_camera_calc_client_output(struc mf->height = soc_camera_shift_scale(rect->height, shift, scale_v); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(soc_camera_calc_client_output); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("soc-camera scaling-cropping functions"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Guennadi Liakhovetski <kernel(a)pengutronix.de>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jc(a)linux.com are queue-4.14/media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch queue-4.14/media-mtk-vcodec-add-missing-module_license-description.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "media: mtk-vcodec: add missing MODULE_LICENSE/DESCRIPTION" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled media: mtk-vcodec: add missing MODULE_LICENSE/DESCRIPTION to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: media-mtk-vcodec-add-missing-module_license-description.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ccbc1e3876d5476fc23429690a683294ef0f755b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 02:47:54 -0500 Subject: media: mtk-vcodec: add missing MODULE_LICENSE/DESCRIPTION From: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> commit ccbc1e3876d5476fc23429690a683294ef0f755b upstream. This change resolves a new compile-time warning when built as a loadable module: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in drivers/media/platform/mtk-vcodec/mtk-vcodec-common.o see include/linux/module.h for more information This adds the license as "GPL v2", which matches the header of the file. MODULE_DESCRIPTION is also added. Signed-off-by: Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil(a)cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/media/platform/mtk-vcodec/mtk_vcodec_util.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/media/platform/mtk-vcodec/mtk_vcodec_util.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/mtk-vcodec/mtk_vcodec_util.c @@ -115,3 +115,6 @@ struct mtk_vcodec_ctx *mtk_vcodec_get_cu return ctx; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(mtk_vcodec_get_curr_ctx); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Mediatek video codec driver"); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jc(a)linux.com are queue-4.14/media-soc_camera-soc_scale_crop-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch queue-4.14/media-mtk-vcodec-add-missing-module_license-description.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ARM: exynos_defconfig: Enable options to mount a rootfs via NFS" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ARM: exynos_defconfig: Enable options to mount a rootfs via NFS to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: arm-exynos_defconfig-enable-options-to-mount-a-rootfs-via-nfs.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 19f79ccf6d77409cd138bce8db206cdac7fd5ea7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier.martinez(a)collabora.co.uk> Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 01:50:16 +0900 Subject: ARM: exynos_defconfig: Enable options to mount a rootfs via NFS From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier.martinez(a)collabora.co.uk> commit 19f79ccf6d77409cd138bce8db206cdac7fd5ea7 upstream. This patch enables the options to mount a rootfs over NFS and also support for automatic configuration of IP addresses during boot as needed by NFS. Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier.martinez(a)collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Kukjin Kim <kgene(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Guillaume Tucker <guillaume.tucker(a)collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig +++ b/arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig @@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ CONFIG_PACKET=y CONFIG_UNIX=y CONFIG_NET_KEY=y CONFIG_INET=y +CONFIG_IP_PNP=y +CONFIG_IP_PNP_DHCP=y +CONFIG_IP_PNP_BOOTP=y +CONFIG_IP_PNP_RARP=y CONFIG_RFKILL_REGULATOR=y CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER_PATH="/sbin/hotplug" CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y @@ -170,6 +174,8 @@ CONFIG_TMPFS=y CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL=y CONFIG_CRAMFS=y CONFIG_ROMFS_FS=y +CONFIG_NFS_FS=y +CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from javier.martinez(a)collabora.co.uk are queue-3.18/arm-exynos_defconfig-enable-options-to-mount-a-rootfs-via-nfs.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: keys-encrypted-fix-buffer-overread-in-valid_master_desc.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 14:48:18 +0100 Subject: KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream. With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const cha */ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc) { - if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else - goto out; + int prefix_len; + + if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN; + else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if (!new_desc[prefix_len]) + return -EINVAL; + + if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; -out: - return -EINVAL; } /* Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-3.18/keys-encrypted-fix-buffer-overread-in-valid_master_desc.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ARM: exynos_defconfig: Enable NFSv4 client" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ARM: exynos_defconfig: Enable NFSv4 client to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: arm-exynos_defconfig-enable-nfsv4-client.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 1c1fb9b0c89a2506e556114c813a606bc1508d49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski(a)samsung.com> Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 13:09:43 +0900 Subject: ARM: exynos_defconfig: Enable NFSv4 client From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski(a)samsung.com> commit 1c1fb9b0c89a2506e556114c813a606bc1508d49 upstream. NFS client is already enabled (NFS_FS) and by default it enables clients for version 2 and 3. Enable explicitly the version 4 client to utilize the newer protocol. The NFS client is especially useful for testing kernel in automated environments (network boot with network file system). Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski(a)samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier(a)osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Guillaume Tucker <guillaume.tucker(a)collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig +++ b/arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL=y CONFIG_CRAMFS=y CONFIG_ROMFS_FS=y CONFIG_NFS_FS=y +CONFIG_NFS_V4=y CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from k.kozlowski(a)samsung.com are queue-3.18/arm-exynos_defconfig-enable-nfsv4-client.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCHv2 1/1] ext4/f2fs: don't put symlink in pagecache into highmem

by Jin Qian

From: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> partial backport from 21fc61c73c3903c4c312d0802da01ec2b323d174 upstream to v4.4 to prevent virt_to_page on highmem. ext4_encrypted_follow_link uses kmap() for cpage caddr = kmap(cpage); _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr calls virt_to_page on the kmapped address. _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr() ext4_fname_decrypt() sg_init_one() sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len); sg_set_page(sg, virt_to_page(buf), buflen, offset_in_page(buf)); Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.4.y Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)android.com> --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 1 + fs/ext4/namei.c | 1 + fs/ext4/symlink.c | 10 +++------- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 1 + fs/f2fs/namei.c | 5 ++--- fs/inode.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 4df1cb19a243..f0cabc8c96cb 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4417,6 +4417,7 @@ struct inode *ext4_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; ext4_set_aops(inode); } + inode_nohighmem(inode); } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &ext4_special_inode_operations; diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 4c36dca486cc..32960b3ecd4f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -3151,6 +3151,7 @@ static int ext4_symlink(struct inode *dir, if ((disk_link.len > EXT4_N_BLOCKS * 4)) { if (!encryption_required) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); ext4_set_aops(inode); /* * We cannot call page_symlink() with transaction started diff --git a/fs/ext4/symlink.c b/fs/ext4/symlink.c index e8e7af62ac95..287c3980fa0b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/symlink.c +++ b/fs/ext4/symlink.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook cpage = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, NULL); if (IS_ERR(cpage)) return ERR_CAST(cpage); - caddr = kmap(cpage); + caddr = page_address(cpage); caddr[size] = 0; } @@ -75,16 +75,12 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook /* Null-terminate the name */ if (res <= plen) paddr[res] = '\0'; - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } return *cookie = paddr; errout: - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } kfree(paddr); return ERR_PTR(res); } diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index 97e20decacb4..5528801a5baf 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ make_now: inode->i_op = &f2fs_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations; else inode->i_op = &f2fs_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &f2fs_dblock_aops; } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c index 2c32110f9fc0..484df6850747 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c @@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ static int f2fs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, inode->i_op = &f2fs_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations; else inode->i_op = &f2fs_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &f2fs_dblock_aops; f2fs_lock_op(sbi); @@ -942,7 +943,7 @@ static const char *f2fs_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook cpage = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, NULL); if (IS_ERR(cpage)) return ERR_CAST(cpage); - caddr = kmap(cpage); + caddr = page_address(cpage); caddr[size] = 0; /* Symlink is encrypted */ @@ -982,13 +983,11 @@ static const char *f2fs_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook /* Null-terminate the name */ paddr[res] = '\0'; - kunmap(cpage); page_cache_release(cpage); return *cookie = paddr; errout: kfree(cstr.name); f2fs_fname_crypto_free_buffer(&pstr); - kunmap(cpage); page_cache_release(cpage); return ERR_PTR(res); } diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index b0edef500590..b95615f3fc50 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -2028,3 +2028,9 @@ void inode_set_flags(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags, new_flags) != old_flags)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_set_flags); + +void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode) +{ + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_nohighmem); diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index c8decb7075d6..f746a59fcc88 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -3066,5 +3066,6 @@ static inline bool dir_relax(struct inode *inode) } extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); +extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] locking-qrwlock-include-asm-byteorderh-as-needed.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: locking/qrwlock: include asm/byteorder.h as needed has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was locking-qrwlock-include-asm-byteorderh-as-needed.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Subject: locking/qrwlock: include asm/byteorder.h as needed Moving the qrwlock struct definition into a header file introduced a subtle bug on all little-endian machines, where some files in some configurations would see the fields in an incorrect order. This was found by building with an LTO enabled compiler that warns every time we try to link together files with incompatible data structures. A second patch changes linux/kconfig.h to always define the symbols, but this seems to be the root cause of most of the issues, so I'd suggest we do both. On a current linux-next kernel, I verified that this header is responsible for all type mismatches as a result from the endianess confusion. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202154104.1522809-1-arnd@arndb.de Fixes: e0d02285f16e ("locking/qrwlock: Use 'struct qrwlock' instead of 'struct __qrwlock'") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico(a)linaro.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger(a)amd.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/asm-generic/qrwlock_types.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff -puN include/asm-generic/qrwlock_types.h~locking-qrwlock-include-asm-byteorderh-as-needed include/asm-generic/qrwlock_types.h --- a/include/asm-generic/qrwlock_types.h~locking-qrwlock-include-asm-byteorderh-as-needed +++ a/include/asm-generic/qrwlock_types.h @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #define __ASM_GENERIC_QRWLOCK_TYPES_H #include <linux/types.h> +#include <asm/byteorder.h> #include <asm/spinlock_types.h> /* _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are kbuild-always-define-endianess-in-kconfigh.patch bugh-work-around-gcc-pr82365-in-bug.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: pipe: fix off-by-one error when checking buffer limits has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: pipe: fix off-by-one error when checking buffer limits With pipe-user-pages-hard set to 'N', users were actually only allowed up to 'N - 1' buffers; and likewise for pipe-user-pages-soft. Fix this to allow up to 'N' buffers, as would be expected. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-5-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: b0b91d18e2e9 ("pipe: fix limit checking in pipe_set_size()") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/pipe.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/pipe.c~pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits fs/pipe.c --- a/fs/pipe.c~pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits +++ a/fs/pipe.c @@ -605,12 +605,12 @@ static unsigned long account_pipe_buffer static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs) { - return pipe_user_pages_soft && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_soft; + return pipe_user_pages_soft && user_bufs > pipe_user_pages_soft; } static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs) { - return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard; + return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs > pipe_user_pages_hard; } static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits pipe-user-pages-hard and pipe-user-pages-soft are only supposed to apply to unprivileged users, as documented in both Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt and the pipe(7) man page. However, the capabilities are actually only checked when increasing a pipe's size using F_SETPIPE_SZ, not when creating a new pipe. Therefore, if pipe-user-pages-hard has been set, the root user can run into it and be unable to create pipes. Similarly, if pipe-user-pages-soft has been set, the root user can run into it and have their pipes limited to 1 page each. Fix this by allowing the privileged override in both cases. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-4-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: 759c01142a5d ("pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/pipe.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/pipe.c~pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits fs/pipe.c --- a/fs/pipe.c~pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits +++ a/fs/pipe.c @@ -613,6 +613,11 @@ static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(u return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard; } +static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) +{ + return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void) { struct pipe_inode_info *pipe; @@ -629,12 +634,12 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info( user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs); - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) { + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) { user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1); pipe_bufs = 1; } - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs)) + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) goto out_revert_acct; pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer), @@ -1065,7 +1070,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_in if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers && (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) || too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + is_unprivileged_user()) { ret = -EPERM; goto out_revert_acct; } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] kasan-rework-kconfig-settings.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: kasan: rework Kconfig settings has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-rework-kconfig-settings.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Subject: kasan: rework Kconfig settings We get a lot of very large stack frames using gcc-7.0.1 with the default -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope --param asan-stack=1 options, which can easily cause an overflow of the kernel stack, e.g. drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2434:1: warning: the frame size of 46176 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2800lib.c:5650:1: warning: the frame size of 23632 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes lib/atomic64_test.c:250:1: warning: the frame size of 11200 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2621:1: warning: the frame size of 9208 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv090x.c:3431:1: warning: the frame size of 6816 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes fs/fscache/stats.c:287:1: warning: the frame size of 6536 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes To reduce this risk, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope is now split out into a separate CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA Kconfig option, leading to stack frames that are smaller than 2 kilobytes most of the time on x86_64. An earlier version of this patch also prevented combining KASAN_EXTRA with KASAN_INLINE, but that is no longer necessary with gcc-7.0.1. All patches to get the frame size below 2048 bytes with CONFIG_KASAN=y and CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA=n have been merged by maintainers now, so we can bring back that default now. KASAN_EXTRA=y still causes lots of warnings but now defaults to !COMPILE_TEST to disable it in allmodconfig, and it remains disabled in all other defconfigs since it is a new option. I arbitrarily raise the warning limit for KASAN_EXTRA to 3072 to reduce the noise, but an allmodconfig kernel still has around 50 warnings on gcc-7. I experimented a bit more with smaller stack frames and have another follow-up series that reduces the warning limit for 64-bit architectures to 1280 bytes (without CONFIG_KASAN). With earlier versions of this patch series, I also had patches to address the warnings we get with KASAN and/or KASAN_EXTRA, using a "noinline_if_stackbloat" annotation. That annotation now got replaced with a gcc-8 bugfix (see https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715) and a workaround for older compilers, which means that KASAN_EXTRA is now just as bad as before and will lead to an instant stack overflow in a few extreme cases. This reverts parts of commit commit 3f181b4 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y"). Two patches in linux-next should be merged first to avoid introducing warnings in an allmodconfig build: 3cd890dbe2a4 ("media: dvb-frontends: fix i2c access helpers for KASAN") 16c3ada89cff ("media: r820t: fix r820t_write_reg for KASAN") Do we really need to backport this? I think we do: without this patch, enabling KASAN will lead to unavoidable kernel stack overflow in certain device drivers when built with gcc-7 or higher on linux-4.10+ or any version that contains a backport of commit c5caf21ab0cf8. Most people are probably still on older compilers, but it will get worse over time as they upgrade their distros. The warnings we get on kernels older than this should all be for code that uses dangerously large stack frames, though most of them do not cause an actual stack overflow by themselves.The asan-stack option was added in linux-4.0, and commit 3f181b4d8652 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y") effectively turned off the warning for allmodconfig kernels, so I would like to see this fix backported to any kernels later than 4.0. I have done dozens of fixes for individual functions with stack frames larger than 2048 bytes with asan-stack, and I plan to make sure that all those fixes make it into the stable kernels as well (most are already there). Part of the complication here is that asan-stack (from 4.0) was originally assumed to always require much larger stacks, but that turned out to be a combination of multiple gcc bugs that we have now worked around and fixed, but sanitize-address-use-after-scope (from v4.10) has a much higher inherent stack usage and also suffers from at least three other problems that we have analyzed but not yet fixed upstream, each of them makes the stack usage more severe than it should be. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171221134744.2295529-1-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- lib/Kconfig.debug | 2 +- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 11 +++++++++++ scripts/Makefile.kasan | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff -puN lib/Kconfig.debug~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings lib/Kconfig.debug --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ config ENABLE_MUST_CHECK config FRAME_WARN int "Warn for stack frames larger than (needs gcc 4.4)" range 0 8192 - default 0 if KASAN + default 3072 if KASAN_EXTRA default 2048 if GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY default 1280 if (!64BIT && PARISC) default 1024 if (!64BIT && !PARISC) diff -puN lib/Kconfig.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings lib/Kconfig.kasan --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/lib/Kconfig.kasan @@ -20,6 +20,17 @@ config KASAN Currently CONFIG_KASAN doesn't work with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB (the resulting kernel does not boot). +config KASAN_EXTRA + bool "KAsan: extra checks" + depends on KASAN && DEBUG_KERNEL && !COMPILE_TEST + help + This enables further checks in the kernel address sanitizer, for now + it only includes the address-use-after-scope check that can lead + to excessive kernel stack usage, frame size warnings and longer + compile time. + https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715 has more + + choice prompt "Instrumentation type" depends on KASAN diff -puN scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings scripts/Makefile.kasan --- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/scripts/Makefile.kasan @@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ else endif +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA CFLAGS_KASAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope) +endif CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are kbuild-always-define-endianess-in-kconfigh.patch bugh-work-around-gcc-pr82365-in-bug.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: lib/ubsan: add type mismatch handler for new GCC/Clang has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Subject: lib/ubsan: add type mismatch handler for new GCC/Clang UBSAN=y fails to build with new GCC/clang: arch/x86/kernel/head64.o: In function `sanitize_boot_params': arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h:37: undefined reference to `__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1' because Clang and GCC 8 slightly changed ABI for 'type mismatch' errors. Compiler now uses new __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1() function with slightly modified 'struct type_mismatch_data'. Let's add new 'struct type_mismatch_data_common' which is independent from compiler's layout of 'struct type_mismatch_data'. And make __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch[_v1]() functions transform compiler-dependent type mismatch data to our internal representation. This way, we can support both old and new compilers with minimal amount of change. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180119152853.16806-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: Sodagudi Prasad <psodagud(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.5+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- lib/ubsan.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- lib/ubsan.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff -puN lib/ubsan.c~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang lib/ubsan.c --- a/lib/ubsan.c~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang +++ a/lib/ubsan.c @@ -265,14 +265,14 @@ void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(stru } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow); -static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct type_mismatch_data *data) +static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s null pointer of type %s\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], @@ -281,15 +281,15 @@ static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -static void handle_misaligned_access(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void handle_misaligned_access(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s misaligned address %p for type %s\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], @@ -299,15 +299,15 @@ static void handle_misaligned_access(str ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -static void handle_object_size_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void handle_object_size_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s address %p with insufficient space\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], (void *) ptr); @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static void handle_object_size_mismatch( ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void ubsan_type_mismatch_common(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { @@ -326,8 +326,36 @@ void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct else handle_object_size_mismatch(data, ptr); } + +void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, + unsigned long ptr) +{ + struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = { + .location = &data->location, + .type = data->type, + .alignment = data->alignment, + .type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind + }; + + ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch); +void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1(struct type_mismatch_data_v1 *data, + unsigned long ptr) +{ + + struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = { + .location = &data->location, + .type = data->type, + .alignment = 1UL << data->log_alignment, + .type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind + }; + + ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1); + void __ubsan_handle_nonnull_return(struct nonnull_return_data *data) { unsigned long flags; diff -puN lib/ubsan.h~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang lib/ubsan.h --- a/lib/ubsan.h~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang +++ a/lib/ubsan.h @@ -37,6 +37,20 @@ struct type_mismatch_data { unsigned char type_check_kind; }; +struct type_mismatch_data_v1 { + struct source_location location; + struct type_descriptor *type; + unsigned char log_alignment; + unsigned char type_check_kind; +}; + +struct type_mismatch_data_common { + struct source_location *location; + struct type_descriptor *type; + unsigned long alignment; + unsigned char type_check_kind; +}; + struct nonnull_arg_data { struct source_location location; struct source_location attr_location; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com are mm-kasan-dont-vfree-nonexistent-vm_area.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] revert-kernel-relayc-fix-potential-memory-leak.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: kernel/relay.c: revert "kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak" has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was revert-kernel-relayc-fix-potential-memory-leak.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: kernel/relay.c: revert "kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak" This reverts ba62bafe942b159a6 ("kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak"). This commit introduced a double free bug, because 'chan' is already freed by the line: kref_put(&chan->kref, relay_destroy_channel); This bug was found by syzkaller, using the BLKTRACESETUP ioctl. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180127004759.101823-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: ba62bafe942b ("kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Zhouyi Zhou <yizhouzhou(a)ict.ac.cn> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.7+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/relay.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff -puN kernel/relay.c~revert-kernel-relayc-fix-potential-memory-leak kernel/relay.c --- a/kernel/relay.c~revert-kernel-relayc-fix-potential-memory-leak +++ a/kernel/relay.c @@ -611,7 +611,6 @@ free_bufs: kref_put(&chan->kref, relay_destroy_channel); mutex_unlock(&relay_channels_mutex); - kfree(chan); return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(relay_open); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Subject: kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" This reverts 92266d6ef60c2381 ("async: simplify lowest_in_progress()"), which was simply wrong: In the case where domain is NULL, we now use the wrong offsetof() in the list_first_entry macro, so we don't actually fetch the ->cookie value, but rather the eight bytes located sizeof(struct list_head) further into the struct async_entry. On 64 bit, that's the data member, while on 32 bit, that's a u64 built from func and data in some order. I think the bug happens to be harmless in practice: It obviously only affects callers which pass a NULL domain, and AFAICT the only such caller is async_synchronize_full() -> async_synchronize_full_domain(NULL) -> async_synchronize_cookie_domain(ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX, NULL) and the ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX means that in practice we end up waiting for the async_global_pending list to be empty - but it would break if somebody happened to pass (void*)-1 as the data element to async_schedule, and of course also if somebody ever does a async_synchronize_cookie_domain(, NULL) with a "finite" cookie value. Maybe the "harmless in practice" means this isn't -stable material. But I'm not completely confident my quick git grep'ing is enough, and there might be affected code in one of the earlier kernels that has since been removed, so I'll leave the decision to the stable guys. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128104938.3921-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk Fixes: 92266d6ef60c "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Adam Wallis <awallis(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [3.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/async.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff -puN kernel/async.c~revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress kernel/async.c --- a/kernel/async.c~revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress +++ a/kernel/async.c @@ -84,20 +84,24 @@ static atomic_t entry_count; static async_cookie_t lowest_in_progress(struct async_domain *domain) { - struct list_head *pending; + struct async_entry *first = NULL; async_cookie_t ret = ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX; unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&async_lock, flags); - if (domain) - pending = &domain->pending; - else - pending = &async_global_pending; + if (domain) { + if (!list_empty(&domain->pending)) + first = list_first_entry(&domain->pending, + struct async_entry, domain_list); + } else { + if (!list_empty(&async_global_pending)) + first = list_first_entry(&async_global_pending, + struct async_entry, global_list); + } - if (!list_empty(pending)) - ret = list_first_entry(pending, struct async_entry, - domain_list)->cookie; + if (first) + ret = first->cookie; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&async_lock, flags); return ret; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk are ida-do-zeroing-in-ida_pre_get.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] fs-proc-kcorec-use-probe_kernel_read-instead-of-memcpy.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy() has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was fs-proc-kcorec-use-probe_kernel_read-instead-of-memcpy.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens(a)de.ibm.com> Subject: fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy() df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") added a bounce buffer to avoid hardened usercopy checks. Copying to the bounce buffer was implemented with a simple memcpy() assuming that it is always valid to read from kernel memory iff the kern_addr_valid() check passed. A simple, but pointless, test case like "dd if=/proc/kcore of=/dev/null" now can easily crash the kernel, since the former execption handling on invalid kernel addresses now doesn't work anymore. Also adding a kern_addr_valid() implementation wouldn't help here. Most architectures simply return 1 here, while a couple implemented a page table walk to figure out if something is mapped at the address in question. With DEBUG_PAGEALLOC active mappings are established and removed all the time, so that relying on the result of kern_addr_valid() before executing the memcpy() also doesn't work. Therefore simply use probe_kernel_read() to copy to the bounce buffer. This also allows to simplify read_kcore(). At least on s390 this fixes the observed crashes and doesn't introduce warnings that were removed with df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data"), even though the generic probe_kernel_read() implementation uses uaccess functions. While looking into this I'm also wondering if kern_addr_valid() could be completely removed...(?) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202132739.99971-1-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Fixes: df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens(a)de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa(a)kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/proc/kcore.c | 18 +++++------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/proc/kcore.c~fs-proc-kcorec-use-probe_kernel_read-instead-of-memcpy fs/proc/kcore.c --- a/fs/proc/kcore.c~fs-proc-kcorec-use-probe_kernel_read-instead-of-memcpy +++ a/fs/proc/kcore.c @@ -512,23 +512,15 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __use return -EFAULT; } else { if (kern_addr_valid(start)) { - unsigned long n; - /* * Using bounce buffer to bypass the * hardened user copy kernel text checks. */ - memcpy(buf, (char *) start, tsz); - n = copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz); - /* - * We cannot distinguish between fault on source - * and fault on destination. When this happens - * we clear too and hope it will trigger the - * EFAULT again. - */ - if (n) { - if (clear_user(buffer + tsz - n, - n)) + if (probe_kernel_read(buf, (void *) start, tsz)) { + if (clear_user(buffer, tsz)) + return -EFAULT; + } else { + if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz)) return -EFAULT; } } else { _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from heiko.carstens(a)de.ibm.com are

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [merged] kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: kasan: don't emit builtin calls when sanitization is off has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Subject: kasan: don't emit builtin calls when sanitization is off With KASAN enabled the kernel has two different memset() functions, one with KASAN checks (memset) and one without (__memset). KASAN uses some macro tricks to use the proper version where required. For example memset() calls in mm/slub.c are without KASAN checks, since they operate on poisoned slab object metadata. The issue is that clang emits memset() calls even when there is no memset() in the source code. They get linked with improper memset() implementation and the kernel fails to boot due to a huge amount of KASAN reports during early boot stages. The solution is to add -fno-builtin flag for files with KASAN_SANITIZE := n marker. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8ffecfffe04088c52c42b92739c2bd8a0bcb3f5e.151638459… Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers(a)google.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml(a)markovi.net> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- Makefile | 3 ++- scripts/Makefile.kasan | 3 +++ scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff -puN Makefile~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off Makefile --- a/Makefile~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off +++ a/Makefile @@ -434,7 +434,8 @@ export MAKE LEX YACC AWK GENKSYMS INSTAL export HOSTCXX HOSTCXXFLAGS LDFLAGS_MODULE CHECK CHECKFLAGS export KBUILD_CPPFLAGS NOSTDINC_FLAGS LINUXINCLUDE OBJCOPYFLAGS LDFLAGS -export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_UBSAN +export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE +export CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE CFLAGS_UBSAN export KBUILD_AFLAGS AFLAGS_KERNEL AFLAGS_MODULE export KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE export KBUILD_AFLAGS_KERNEL KBUILD_CFLAGS_KERNEL diff -puN scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off scripts/Makefile.kasan --- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off +++ a/scripts/Makefile.kasan @@ -31,4 +31,7 @@ else endif CFLAGS_KASAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope) + +CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin + endif diff -puN scripts/Makefile.lib~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off scripts/Makefile.lib --- a/scripts/Makefile.lib~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off +++ a/scripts/Makefile.lib @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_KASAN),y) _c_flags += $(if $(patsubst n%,, \ $(KASAN_SANITIZE_$(basetarget).o)$(KASAN_SANITIZE)y), \ - $(CFLAGS_KASAN)) + $(CFLAGS_KASAN), $(CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE)) endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_UBSAN),y) _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from andreyknvl(a)google.com are

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCHES] Networking

by David Miller

Please queue up the following networking bug fixes for 4.9.x, 4.14.x, and 4.15.x -stable, respectively. Thanks!

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:38:15 PST 2018 From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 16:40:41 +0800 Subject: tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> [ Upstream commit 9b42d55a66d388e4dd5550107df051a9637564fc ] socket can be disconnected and gets transformed back to a listening socket, if sk_frag.page is not released, which will be cloned into a new socket by sk_clone_lock, but the reference count of this page is increased, lead to a use after free or double free issue Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2280,6 +2280,12 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash); + if (sk->sk_frag.page) { + put_page(sk->sk_frag.page); + sk->sk_frag.page = NULL; + sk->sk_frag.offset = 0; + } + sk->sk_error_report(sk); return err; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from lirongqing(a)baidu.com are queue-3.18/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "qlcnic: fix deadlock bug" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled qlcnic: fix deadlock bug to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: qlcnic-fix-deadlock-bug.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:38:15 PST 2018 From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:53:42 +0800 Subject: qlcnic: fix deadlock bug From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> [ Upstream commit 233ac3891607f501f08879134d623b303838f478 ] The following soft lockup was caught. This is a deadlock caused by recusive locking. Process kworker/u40:1:28016 was holding spin lock "mbx->queue_lock" in qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(), while a softirq came in and ask the same spin lock in qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(). This lock should be hold by disable bh.. [161846.962125] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [kworker/u40:1:28016] [161846.962367] Modules linked in: tun ocfs2 xen_netback xen_blkback xen_gntalloc xen_gntdev xen_evtchn xenfs xen_privcmd autofs4 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs bnx2fc fcoe libfcoe libfc sunrpc 8021q mrp garp bridge stp llc bonding dm_round_robin dm_multipath iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support pcspkr sb_edac edac_core i2c_i801 shpchp lpc_ich mfd_core ioatdma ipmi_devintf ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler sg ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod igb i2c_algo_bit i2c_core ahci libahci megaraid_sas ixgbe dca ptp pps_core vxlan udp_tunnel ip6_udp_tunnel qla2xxx scsi_transport_fc qlcnic crc32c_intel be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi ipv6 cxgb3 mdio libiscsi_tcp qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [161846.962454] [161846.962460] CPU: 1 PID: 28016 Comm: kworker/u40:1 Not tainted 4.1.12-94.5.9.el6uek.x86_64 #2 [161846.962463] Hardware name: Oracle Corporation SUN SERVER X4-2L /ASSY,MB,X4-2L , BIOS 26050100 09/19/2017 [161846.962489] Workqueue: qlcnic_mailbox qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker [qlcnic] [161846.962493] task: ffff8801f2e34600 ti: ffff88004ca5c000 task.ti: ffff88004ca5c000 [161846.962496] RIP: e030:[<ffffffff810013aa>] [<ffffffff810013aa>] xen_hypercall_sched_op+0xa/0x20 [161846.962506] RSP: e02b:ffff880202e43388 EFLAGS: 00000206 [161846.962509] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f6996b70 RCX: ffffffff810013aa [161846.962511] RDX: ffff880202e433cc RSI: ffff880202e433b0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [161846.962513] RBP: ffff880202e433d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8801fe893200 [161846.962516] R10: ffff8801fe400538 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffff880202e4b000 [161846.962518] R13: 0000000000000050 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000000020d [161846.962528] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880202e40000(0000) knlGS:ffff880202e40000 [161846.962531] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [161846.962533] CR2: 0000000002612640 CR3: 00000001bb796000 CR4: 0000000000042660 [161846.962536] Stack: [161846.962538] ffff880202e43608 0000000000000000 ffffffff813f0442 ffff880202e433b0 [161846.962543] 0000000000000000 ffff880202e433cc ffffffff00000001 0000000000000000 [161846.962547] 00000009813f03d6 ffff880202e433e0 ffffffff813f0460 ffff880202e43440 [161846.962552] Call Trace: [161846.962555] <IRQ> [161846.962565] [<ffffffff813f0442>] ? xen_poll_irq_timeout+0x42/0x50 [161846.962570] [<ffffffff813f0460>] xen_poll_irq+0x10/0x20 [161846.962578] [<ffffffff81014222>] xen_lock_spinning+0xe2/0x110 [161846.962583] [<ffffffff81013f01>] __raw_callee_save_xen_lock_spinning+0x11/0x20 [161846.962592] [<ffffffff816e5c57>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x57/0x80 [161846.962609] [<ffffffffa028acfc>] qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd+0x7c/0xe0 [qlcnic] [161846.962623] [<ffffffffa028e008>] qlcnic_83xx_issue_cmd+0x58/0x210 [qlcnic] [161846.962636] [<ffffffffa028caf2>] qlcnic_83xx_sre_macaddr_change+0x162/0x1d0 [qlcnic] [161846.962649] [<ffffffffa028cb8b>] qlcnic_83xx_change_l2_filter+0x2b/0x30 [qlcnic] [161846.962657] [<ffffffff8160248b>] ? __skb_flow_dissect+0x18b/0x650 [161846.962670] [<ffffffffa02856e5>] qlcnic_send_filter+0x205/0x250 [qlcnic] [161846.962682] [<ffffffffa0285c77>] qlcnic_xmit_frame+0x547/0x7b0 [qlcnic] [161846.962691] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962696] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962701] [<ffffffff81630112>] sch_direct_xmit+0x112/0x220 [161846.962706] [<ffffffff8160b80f>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1df/0x5e0 [161846.962710] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962721] [<ffffffffa0575bd5>] bond_dev_queue_xmit+0x35/0x80 [bonding] [161846.962729] [<ffffffffa05769fb>] __bond_start_xmit+0x1cb/0x210 [bonding] [161846.962736] [<ffffffffa0576a71>] bond_start_xmit+0x31/0x60 [bonding] [161846.962740] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962745] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962749] [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0 [161846.962754] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962760] [<ffffffffa05cfa72>] vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb2/0x150 [8021q] [161846.962764] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962769] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962773] [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0 [161846.962777] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962789] [<ffffffffa05adf74>] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x54/0xa0 [bridge] [161846.962797] [<ffffffffa05ae4ff>] br_forward_finish+0x2f/0x90 [bridge] [161846.962807] [<ffffffff810b0dad>] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x1d/0x100 [161846.962811] [<ffffffff815f929b>] ? __alloc_skb+0x8b/0x1f0 [161846.962818] [<ffffffffa05ae04d>] __br_forward+0x8d/0x120 [bridge] [161846.962822] [<ffffffff815f613b>] ? __kmalloc_reserve+0x3b/0xa0 [161846.962829] [<ffffffff810be55e>] ? update_rq_runnable_avg+0xee/0x230 [161846.962836] [<ffffffffa05ae176>] br_forward+0x96/0xb0 [bridge] [161846.962845] [<ffffffffa05af85e>] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1ae/0x420 [bridge] [161846.962853] [<ffffffffa05afc4f>] br_handle_frame+0x17f/0x260 [bridge] [161846.962862] [<ffffffffa05afad0>] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x420/0x420 [bridge] [161846.962867] [<ffffffff8160d057>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1f7/0x870 [161846.962872] [<ffffffff8160d6f2>] __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x70 [161846.962877] [<ffffffff8160d913>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x23/0x90 [161846.962884] [<ffffffffa07512ea>] ? xenvif_idx_release+0xea/0x100 [xen_netback] [161846.962889] [<ffffffff816e5a10>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x50 [161846.962893] [<ffffffff8160e624>] netif_receive_skb_sk+0x24/0x90 [161846.962899] [<ffffffffa075269a>] xenvif_tx_submit+0x2ca/0x3f0 [xen_netback] [161846.962906] [<ffffffffa0753f0c>] xenvif_tx_action+0x9c/0xd0 [xen_netback] [161846.962915] [<ffffffffa07567f5>] xenvif_poll+0x35/0x70 [xen_netback] [161846.962920] [<ffffffff8160e01b>] napi_poll+0xcb/0x1e0 [161846.962925] [<ffffffff8160e1c0>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x1c0 [161846.962931] [<ffffffff8108aaba>] __do_softirq+0x10a/0x350 [161846.962938] [<ffffffff8108ae75>] irq_exit+0x125/0x130 [161846.962943] [<ffffffff813f03a9>] xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x39/0x50 [161846.962950] [<ffffffff816e7ffe>] xen_do_hypervisor_callback+0x1e/0x40 [161846.962952] <EOI> [161846.962959] [<ffffffff816e5c4a>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x4a/0x80 [161846.962964] [<ffffffff816e5b1e>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1e/0xa0 [161846.962978] [<ffffffffa028e279>] ? qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker+0xb9/0x2a0 [qlcnic] [161846.962991] [<ffffffff810a14e1>] ? process_one_work+0x151/0x4b0 [161846.962995] [<ffffffff8100c3f2>] ? check_events+0x12/0x20 [161846.963001] [<ffffffff810a1960>] ? worker_thread+0x120/0x480 [161846.963005] [<ffffffff816e187b>] ? __schedule+0x30b/0x890 [161846.963010] [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0 [161846.963015] [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0 [161846.963021] [<ffffffff810a6b3e>] ? kthread+0xce/0xf0 [161846.963025] [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70 [161846.963031] [<ffffffff816e6522>] ? ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70 [161846.963035] [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70 [161846.963037] Code: cc 51 41 53 b8 1c 00 00 00 0f 05 41 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 51 41 53 b8 1d 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c @@ -3825,7 +3825,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue( struct list_head *head = &mbx->cmd_q; struct qlcnic_cmd_args *cmd = NULL; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); while (!list_empty(head)) { cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); @@ -3836,7 +3836,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue( qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); } static int qlcnic_83xx_check_mbx_status(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter) @@ -3872,12 +3872,12 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_dequeue_mbx_cmd( { struct qlcnic_mailbox *mbx = adapter->ahw->mailbox; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_del(&cmd->list); mbx->num_cmds--; - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } @@ -3942,7 +3942,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(s init_completion(&cmd->completion); cmd->rsp_opcode = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_UNKNOWN; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_add_tail(&cmd->list, &mbx->cmd_q); mbx->num_cmds++; @@ -3950,7 +3950,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(s *timeout = cmd->total_cmds * QLC_83XX_MBX_TIMEOUT; queue_work(mbx->work_q, &mbx->work); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return 0; } @@ -4046,15 +4046,15 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(s mbx->rsp_status = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_WAIT; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mbx->aen_lock, flags); - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); if (list_empty(head)) { - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return; } cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); mbx_ops->encode_cmd(adapter, cmd); mbx_ops->nofity_fw(adapter, QLC_83XX_MBX_REQUEST); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com are queue-3.18/qlcnic-fix-deadlock-bug.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization." has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization. to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: r8169-fix-rtl8168ep-take-too-long-to-complete-driver-initialization.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:38:15 PST 2018 From: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 01:32:36 +0800 Subject: r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization. From: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> [ Upstream commit 086ca23d03c0d2f4088f472386778d293e15c5f6 ] Driver check the wrong register bit in rtl_ocp_tx_cond() that keep driver waiting until timeout. Fix this by waiting for the right register bit. Signed-off-by: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c @@ -1375,7 +1375,7 @@ DECLARE_RTL_COND(rtl_ocp_tx_cond) { void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; - return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x02; + return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x20; } static void rtl8168dp_driver_start(struct rtl8169_private *tp) @@ -1421,7 +1421,7 @@ static void rtl8168ep_driver_stop(struct void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; RTL_W8(IBCR2, RTL_R8(IBCR2) & ~0x01); - rtl_msleep_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); + rtl_msleep_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); RTL_W8(IBISR0, RTL_R8(IBISR0) | 0x20); RTL_W8(IBCR0, RTL_R8(IBCR0) & ~0x01); ocp_write(tp, 0x01, 0x180, OOB_CMD_DRIVER_STOP); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from hau(a)realtek.com are queue-3.18/r8169-fix-rtl8168ep-take-too-long-to-complete-driver-initialization.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:38:15 PST 2018 From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 10:26:57 -0800 Subject: net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit e7aadb27a5415e8125834b84a74477bfbee4eff5 ] Newly added igmpv3_get_srcaddr() needs to be called under rcu lock. Timer callbacks do not ensure this locking. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0+ #200 Not tainted ----------------------------- ./include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by syzkaller616973/4074: #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bfce669e>] __do_page_fault+0x32d/0xc90 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1355 #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:178 [inline] #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] call_timer_fn+0x1c6/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1316 #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline] #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] igmpv3_send_report+0x98/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:600 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 4074 Comm: syzkaller616973 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #200 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 __in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 [inline] igmpv3_get_srcaddr net/ipv4/igmp.c:329 [inline] igmpv3_newpack+0xeef/0x12e0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:389 add_grhead.isra.27+0x235/0x300 net/ipv4/igmp.c:432 add_grec+0xbd3/0x1170 net/ipv4/igmp.c:565 igmpv3_send_report+0xd5/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:605 igmp_send_report+0xc43/0x1050 net/ipv4/igmp.c:722 igmp_timer_expire+0x322/0x5c0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:831 call_timer_fn+0x228/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1326 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline] __run_timers+0x7ee/0xb70 kernel/time/timer.c:1666 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692 __do_softirq+0x2d7/0xb85 kernel/softirq.c:285 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:541 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052 apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:938 Fixes: a46182b00290 ("net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -384,7 +384,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *igmpv3_newpack(st pip->frag_off = htons(IP_DF); pip->ttl = 1; pip->daddr = fl4.daddr; + + rcu_read_lock(); pip->saddr = igmpv3_get_srcaddr(dev, &fl4); + rcu_read_unlock(); + pip->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP; pip->tot_len = 0; /* filled in later */ ip_select_ident(skb, NULL); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from edumazet(a)google.com are queue-3.18/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch queue-3.18/net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ip6mr: fix stale iterator" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ip6mr: fix stale iterator to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ip6mr-fix-stale-iterator.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:38:15 PST 2018 From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 16:29:30 +0200 Subject: ip6mr: fix stale iterator From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> [ Upstream commit 4adfa79fc254efb7b0eb3cd58f62c2c3f805f1ba ] When we dump the ip6mr mfc entries via proc, we initialize an iterator with the table to dump but we don't clear the cache pointer which might be initialized from a prior read on the same descriptor that ended. This can result in lock imbalance (an unnecessary unlock) leading to other crashes and hangs. Clear the cache pointer like ipmr does to fix the issue. Thanks for the reliable reproducer. Here's syzbot's trace: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Not tainted syzkaller971460/3195 is trying to release lock (mrt_lock) at: [<000000006898068d>] ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 1 lock held by syzkaller971460/3195: #0: (&p->lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000744a6565>] seq_read+0xd5/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:165 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x12f/0x140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3561 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3775 [inline] lock_release+0x5f9/0xda0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4023 __raw_read_unlock include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:225 [inline] _raw_read_unlock+0x1a/0x30 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:255 ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 traverse+0x3bc/0xa00 fs/seq_file.c:135 seq_read+0x96a/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:189 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at lib/usercopy.c:25 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3195, name: syzkaller971460 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 ___might_sleep+0x2b2/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6060 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6013 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4525 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] seq_read+0xcb4/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:279 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 at lib/usercopy.c:26 _copy_to_user+0xb5/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:26 Reported-by: syzbot <bot+eceb3204562c41a438fa1f2335e0fe4f6886d669(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -498,6 +498,7 @@ static void *ipmr_mfc_seq_start(struct s return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); it->mrt = mrt; + it->cache = NULL; return *pos ? ipmr_mfc_seq_idx(net, seq->private, *pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com are queue-3.18/ip6mr-fix-stale-iterator.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "vhost_net: stop device during reset owner" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled vhost_net: stop device during reset owner to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: vhost_net-stop-device-during-reset-owner.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:22:35 PST 2018 From: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 22:03:52 +0800 Subject: vhost_net: stop device during reset owner From: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 4cd879515d686849eec5f718aeac62a70b067d82 ] We don't stop device before reset owner, this means we could try to serve any virtqueue kick before reset dev->worker. This will result a warn since the work was pending at llist during owner resetting. Fix this by stopping device during owner reset. Reported-by: syzbot+eb17c6162478cc50632c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3a4d5c94e9593 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/vhost/net.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c @@ -981,6 +981,7 @@ static long vhost_net_reset_owner(struct } vhost_net_stop(n, &tx_sock, &rx_sock); vhost_net_flush(n); + vhost_dev_stop(&n->dev); vhost_dev_reset_owner(&n->dev, memory); vhost_net_vq_reset(n); done: Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jasowang(a)redhat.com are queue-4.4/vhost_net-stop-device-during-reset-owner.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "vhost_net: stop device during reset owner" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled vhost_net: stop device during reset owner to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: vhost_net-stop-device-during-reset-owner.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:22:35 PST 2018 From: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 22:03:52 +0800 Subject: vhost_net: stop device during reset owner From: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 4cd879515d686849eec5f718aeac62a70b067d82 ] We don't stop device before reset owner, this means we could try to serve any virtqueue kick before reset dev->worker. This will result a warn since the work was pending at llist during owner resetting. Fix this by stopping device during owner reset. Reported-by: syzbot+eb17c6162478cc50632c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3a4d5c94e9593 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/vhost/net.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c @@ -1009,6 +1009,7 @@ static long vhost_net_reset_owner(struct } vhost_net_stop(n, &tx_sock, &rx_sock); vhost_net_flush(n); + vhost_dev_stop(&n->dev); vhost_dev_reset_owner(&n->dev, memory); vhost_net_vq_reset(n); done: Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jasowang(a)redhat.com are queue-3.18/vhost_net-stop-device-during-reset-owner.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization." has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization. to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: r8169-fix-rtl8168ep-take-too-long-to-complete-driver-initialization.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:22:35 PST 2018 From: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 01:32:36 +0800 Subject: r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization. From: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> [ Upstream commit 086ca23d03c0d2f4088f472386778d293e15c5f6 ] Driver check the wrong register bit in rtl_ocp_tx_cond() that keep driver waiting until timeout. Fix this by waiting for the right register bit. Signed-off-by: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c @@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ DECLARE_RTL_COND(rtl_ocp_tx_cond) { void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; - return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x02; + return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x20; } static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct rtl8169_private *tp) @@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct r void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; RTL_W8(IBCR2, RTL_R8(IBCR2) & ~0x01); - rtl_msleep_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); + rtl_msleep_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); RTL_W8(IBISR0, RTL_R8(IBISR0) | 0x20); RTL_W8(IBCR0, RTL_R8(IBCR0) & ~0x01); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from hau(a)realtek.com are queue-4.4/r8169-fix-rtl8168ep-take-too-long-to-complete-driver-initialization.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:22:35 PST 2018 From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 16:40:41 +0800 Subject: tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> [ Upstream commit 9b42d55a66d388e4dd5550107df051a9637564fc ] socket can be disconnected and gets transformed back to a listening socket, if sk_frag.page is not released, which will be cloned into a new socket by sk_clone_lock, but the reference count of this page is increased, lead to a use after free or double free issue Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2276,6 +2276,12 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash); + if (sk->sk_frag.page) { + put_page(sk->sk_frag.page); + sk->sk_frag.page = NULL; + sk->sk_frag.offset = 0; + } + sk->sk_error_report(sk); return err; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from lirongqing(a)baidu.com are queue-4.4/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "qlcnic: fix deadlock bug" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled qlcnic: fix deadlock bug to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: qlcnic-fix-deadlock-bug.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:22:35 PST 2018 From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:53:42 +0800 Subject: qlcnic: fix deadlock bug From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> [ Upstream commit 233ac3891607f501f08879134d623b303838f478 ] The following soft lockup was caught. This is a deadlock caused by recusive locking. Process kworker/u40:1:28016 was holding spin lock "mbx->queue_lock" in qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(), while a softirq came in and ask the same spin lock in qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(). This lock should be hold by disable bh.. [161846.962125] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [kworker/u40:1:28016] [161846.962367] Modules linked in: tun ocfs2 xen_netback xen_blkback xen_gntalloc xen_gntdev xen_evtchn xenfs xen_privcmd autofs4 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs bnx2fc fcoe libfcoe libfc sunrpc 8021q mrp garp bridge stp llc bonding dm_round_robin dm_multipath iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support pcspkr sb_edac edac_core i2c_i801 shpchp lpc_ich mfd_core ioatdma ipmi_devintf ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler sg ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod igb i2c_algo_bit i2c_core ahci libahci megaraid_sas ixgbe dca ptp pps_core vxlan udp_tunnel ip6_udp_tunnel qla2xxx scsi_transport_fc qlcnic crc32c_intel be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi ipv6 cxgb3 mdio libiscsi_tcp qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [161846.962454] [161846.962460] CPU: 1 PID: 28016 Comm: kworker/u40:1 Not tainted 4.1.12-94.5.9.el6uek.x86_64 #2 [161846.962463] Hardware name: Oracle Corporation SUN SERVER X4-2L /ASSY,MB,X4-2L , BIOS 26050100 09/19/2017 [161846.962489] Workqueue: qlcnic_mailbox qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker [qlcnic] [161846.962493] task: ffff8801f2e34600 ti: ffff88004ca5c000 task.ti: ffff88004ca5c000 [161846.962496] RIP: e030:[<ffffffff810013aa>] [<ffffffff810013aa>] xen_hypercall_sched_op+0xa/0x20 [161846.962506] RSP: e02b:ffff880202e43388 EFLAGS: 00000206 [161846.962509] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f6996b70 RCX: ffffffff810013aa [161846.962511] RDX: ffff880202e433cc RSI: ffff880202e433b0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [161846.962513] RBP: ffff880202e433d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8801fe893200 [161846.962516] R10: ffff8801fe400538 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffff880202e4b000 [161846.962518] R13: 0000000000000050 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000000020d [161846.962528] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880202e40000(0000) knlGS:ffff880202e40000 [161846.962531] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [161846.962533] CR2: 0000000002612640 CR3: 00000001bb796000 CR4: 0000000000042660 [161846.962536] Stack: [161846.962538] ffff880202e43608 0000000000000000 ffffffff813f0442 ffff880202e433b0 [161846.962543] 0000000000000000 ffff880202e433cc ffffffff00000001 0000000000000000 [161846.962547] 00000009813f03d6 ffff880202e433e0 ffffffff813f0460 ffff880202e43440 [161846.962552] Call Trace: [161846.962555] <IRQ> [161846.962565] [<ffffffff813f0442>] ? xen_poll_irq_timeout+0x42/0x50 [161846.962570] [<ffffffff813f0460>] xen_poll_irq+0x10/0x20 [161846.962578] [<ffffffff81014222>] xen_lock_spinning+0xe2/0x110 [161846.962583] [<ffffffff81013f01>] __raw_callee_save_xen_lock_spinning+0x11/0x20 [161846.962592] [<ffffffff816e5c57>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x57/0x80 [161846.962609] [<ffffffffa028acfc>] qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd+0x7c/0xe0 [qlcnic] [161846.962623] [<ffffffffa028e008>] qlcnic_83xx_issue_cmd+0x58/0x210 [qlcnic] [161846.962636] [<ffffffffa028caf2>] qlcnic_83xx_sre_macaddr_change+0x162/0x1d0 [qlcnic] [161846.962649] [<ffffffffa028cb8b>] qlcnic_83xx_change_l2_filter+0x2b/0x30 [qlcnic] [161846.962657] [<ffffffff8160248b>] ? __skb_flow_dissect+0x18b/0x650 [161846.962670] [<ffffffffa02856e5>] qlcnic_send_filter+0x205/0x250 [qlcnic] [161846.962682] [<ffffffffa0285c77>] qlcnic_xmit_frame+0x547/0x7b0 [qlcnic] [161846.962691] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962696] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962701] [<ffffffff81630112>] sch_direct_xmit+0x112/0x220 [161846.962706] [<ffffffff8160b80f>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1df/0x5e0 [161846.962710] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962721] [<ffffffffa0575bd5>] bond_dev_queue_xmit+0x35/0x80 [bonding] [161846.962729] [<ffffffffa05769fb>] __bond_start_xmit+0x1cb/0x210 [bonding] [161846.962736] [<ffffffffa0576a71>] bond_start_xmit+0x31/0x60 [bonding] [161846.962740] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962745] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962749] [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0 [161846.962754] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962760] [<ffffffffa05cfa72>] vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb2/0x150 [8021q] [161846.962764] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962769] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962773] [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0 [161846.962777] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962789] [<ffffffffa05adf74>] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x54/0xa0 [bridge] [161846.962797] [<ffffffffa05ae4ff>] br_forward_finish+0x2f/0x90 [bridge] [161846.962807] [<ffffffff810b0dad>] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x1d/0x100 [161846.962811] [<ffffffff815f929b>] ? __alloc_skb+0x8b/0x1f0 [161846.962818] [<ffffffffa05ae04d>] __br_forward+0x8d/0x120 [bridge] [161846.962822] [<ffffffff815f613b>] ? __kmalloc_reserve+0x3b/0xa0 [161846.962829] [<ffffffff810be55e>] ? update_rq_runnable_avg+0xee/0x230 [161846.962836] [<ffffffffa05ae176>] br_forward+0x96/0xb0 [bridge] [161846.962845] [<ffffffffa05af85e>] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1ae/0x420 [bridge] [161846.962853] [<ffffffffa05afc4f>] br_handle_frame+0x17f/0x260 [bridge] [161846.962862] [<ffffffffa05afad0>] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x420/0x420 [bridge] [161846.962867] [<ffffffff8160d057>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1f7/0x870 [161846.962872] [<ffffffff8160d6f2>] __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x70 [161846.962877] [<ffffffff8160d913>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x23/0x90 [161846.962884] [<ffffffffa07512ea>] ? xenvif_idx_release+0xea/0x100 [xen_netback] [161846.962889] [<ffffffff816e5a10>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x50 [161846.962893] [<ffffffff8160e624>] netif_receive_skb_sk+0x24/0x90 [161846.962899] [<ffffffffa075269a>] xenvif_tx_submit+0x2ca/0x3f0 [xen_netback] [161846.962906] [<ffffffffa0753f0c>] xenvif_tx_action+0x9c/0xd0 [xen_netback] [161846.962915] [<ffffffffa07567f5>] xenvif_poll+0x35/0x70 [xen_netback] [161846.962920] [<ffffffff8160e01b>] napi_poll+0xcb/0x1e0 [161846.962925] [<ffffffff8160e1c0>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x1c0 [161846.962931] [<ffffffff8108aaba>] __do_softirq+0x10a/0x350 [161846.962938] [<ffffffff8108ae75>] irq_exit+0x125/0x130 [161846.962943] [<ffffffff813f03a9>] xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x39/0x50 [161846.962950] [<ffffffff816e7ffe>] xen_do_hypervisor_callback+0x1e/0x40 [161846.962952] <EOI> [161846.962959] [<ffffffff816e5c4a>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x4a/0x80 [161846.962964] [<ffffffff816e5b1e>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1e/0xa0 [161846.962978] [<ffffffffa028e279>] ? qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker+0xb9/0x2a0 [qlcnic] [161846.962991] [<ffffffff810a14e1>] ? process_one_work+0x151/0x4b0 [161846.962995] [<ffffffff8100c3f2>] ? check_events+0x12/0x20 [161846.963001] [<ffffffff810a1960>] ? worker_thread+0x120/0x480 [161846.963005] [<ffffffff816e187b>] ? __schedule+0x30b/0x890 [161846.963010] [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0 [161846.963015] [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0 [161846.963021] [<ffffffff810a6b3e>] ? kthread+0xce/0xf0 [161846.963025] [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70 [161846.963031] [<ffffffff816e6522>] ? ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70 [161846.963035] [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70 [161846.963037] Code: cc 51 41 53 b8 1c 00 00 00 0f 05 41 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 51 41 53 b8 1d 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c @@ -3850,7 +3850,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue( struct list_head *head = &mbx->cmd_q; struct qlcnic_cmd_args *cmd = NULL; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); while (!list_empty(head)) { cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); @@ -3861,7 +3861,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue( qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); } static int qlcnic_83xx_check_mbx_status(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter) @@ -3897,12 +3897,12 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_dequeue_mbx_cmd( { struct qlcnic_mailbox *mbx = adapter->ahw->mailbox; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_del(&cmd->list); mbx->num_cmds--; - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } @@ -3967,7 +3967,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(s init_completion(&cmd->completion); cmd->rsp_opcode = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_UNKNOWN; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_add_tail(&cmd->list, &mbx->cmd_q); mbx->num_cmds++; @@ -3975,7 +3975,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(s *timeout = cmd->total_cmds * QLC_83XX_MBX_TIMEOUT; queue_work(mbx->work_q, &mbx->work); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return 0; } @@ -4071,15 +4071,15 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(s mbx->rsp_status = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_WAIT; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mbx->aen_lock, flags); - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); if (list_empty(head)) { - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return; } cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); mbx_ops->encode_cmd(adapter, cmd); mbx_ops->nofity_fw(adapter, QLC_83XX_MBX_REQUEST); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com are queue-4.4/qlcnic-fix-deadlock-bug.patch

7 years, 7 months

1
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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ipv6-fix-so_reuseport-udp-socket-with-implicit-sk_ipv6only.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:22:35 PST 2018 From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 23:15:27 -0800 Subject: ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> [ Upstream commit 7ece54a60ee2ba7a386308cae73c790bd580589c ] If a sk_v6_rcv_saddr is !IPV6_ADDR_ANY and !IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED, it implicitly implies it is an ipv6only socket. However, in inet6_bind(), this addr_type checking and setting sk->sk_ipv6only to 1 are only done after sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum) has been completed successfully. This inconsistency between sk_v6_rcv_saddr and sk_ipv6only confuses the 'get_port()'. In particular, when binding SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets, udp_reuseport_add_sock(sk,...) is called. udp_reuseport_add_sock() checks "ipv6_only_sock(sk2) == ipv6_only_sock(sk)" before adding sk to sk2->sk_reuseport_cb. In this case, ipv6_only_sock(sk2) could be 1 while ipv6_only_sock(sk) is still 0 here. The end result is, reuseport_alloc(sk) is called instead of adding sk to the existing sk2->sk_reuseport_cb. It can be reproduced by binding two SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets on an IPv6 address (!ANY and !MAPPED). Only one of the socket will receive packet. The fix is to set the implicit sk_ipv6only before calling get_port(). The original sk_ipv6only has to be saved such that it can be restored in case get_port() failed. The situation is similar to the inet_reset_saddr(sk) after get_port() has failed. Thanks to Calvin Owens <calvinowens(a)fb.com> who created an easy reproduction which leads to a fix. Fixes: e32ea7e74727 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport UDP socket selection") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru struct net *net = sock_net(sk); __be32 v4addr = 0; unsigned short snum; + bool saved_ipv6only; int addr_type = 0; int err = 0; @@ -365,19 +366,21 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)) np->saddr = addr->sin6_addr; + saved_ipv6only = sk->sk_ipv6only; + if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY && addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) + sk->sk_ipv6only = 1; + /* Make sure we are allowed to bind here. */ if ((snum || !inet->bind_address_no_port) && sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) { + sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only; inet_reset_saddr(sk); err = -EADDRINUSE; goto out; } - if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) { + if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK; - if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) - sk->sk_ipv6only = 1; - } if (snum) sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK; inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from kafai(a)fb.com are queue-4.4/ipv6-fix-so_reuseport-udp-socket-with-implicit-sk_ipv6only.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:22:35 PST 2018 From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 10:26:57 -0800 Subject: net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit e7aadb27a5415e8125834b84a74477bfbee4eff5 ] Newly added igmpv3_get_srcaddr() needs to be called under rcu lock. Timer callbacks do not ensure this locking. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0+ #200 Not tainted ----------------------------- ./include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by syzkaller616973/4074: #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bfce669e>] __do_page_fault+0x32d/0xc90 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1355 #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:178 [inline] #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] call_timer_fn+0x1c6/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1316 #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline] #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] igmpv3_send_report+0x98/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:600 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 4074 Comm: syzkaller616973 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #200 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 __in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 [inline] igmpv3_get_srcaddr net/ipv4/igmp.c:329 [inline] igmpv3_newpack+0xeef/0x12e0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:389 add_grhead.isra.27+0x235/0x300 net/ipv4/igmp.c:432 add_grec+0xbd3/0x1170 net/ipv4/igmp.c:565 igmpv3_send_report+0xd5/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:605 igmp_send_report+0xc43/0x1050 net/ipv4/igmp.c:722 igmp_timer_expire+0x322/0x5c0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:831 call_timer_fn+0x228/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1326 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline] __run_timers+0x7ee/0xb70 kernel/time/timer.c:1666 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692 __do_softirq+0x2d7/0xb85 kernel/softirq.c:285 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:541 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052 apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:938 Fixes: a46182b00290 ("net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -392,7 +392,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *igmpv3_newpack(st pip->frag_off = htons(IP_DF); pip->ttl = 1; pip->daddr = fl4.daddr; + + rcu_read_lock(); pip->saddr = igmpv3_get_srcaddr(dev, &fl4); + rcu_read_unlock(); + pip->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP; pip->tot_len = 0; /* filled in later */ ip_select_ident(net, skb, NULL); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from edumazet(a)google.com are queue-4.4/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch queue-4.4/net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ip6mr: fix stale iterator" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ip6mr: fix stale iterator to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ip6mr-fix-stale-iterator.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:22:35 PST 2018 From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 16:29:30 +0200 Subject: ip6mr: fix stale iterator From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> [ Upstream commit 4adfa79fc254efb7b0eb3cd58f62c2c3f805f1ba ] When we dump the ip6mr mfc entries via proc, we initialize an iterator with the table to dump but we don't clear the cache pointer which might be initialized from a prior read on the same descriptor that ended. This can result in lock imbalance (an unnecessary unlock) leading to other crashes and hangs. Clear the cache pointer like ipmr does to fix the issue. Thanks for the reliable reproducer. Here's syzbot's trace: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Not tainted syzkaller971460/3195 is trying to release lock (mrt_lock) at: [<000000006898068d>] ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 1 lock held by syzkaller971460/3195: #0: (&p->lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000744a6565>] seq_read+0xd5/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:165 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x12f/0x140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3561 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3775 [inline] lock_release+0x5f9/0xda0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4023 __raw_read_unlock include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:225 [inline] _raw_read_unlock+0x1a/0x30 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:255 ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 traverse+0x3bc/0xa00 fs/seq_file.c:135 seq_read+0x96a/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:189 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at lib/usercopy.c:25 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3195, name: syzkaller971460 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 ___might_sleep+0x2b2/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6060 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6013 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4525 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] seq_read+0xcb4/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:279 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 at lib/usercopy.c:26 _copy_to_user+0xb5/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:26 Reported-by: syzbot <bot+eceb3204562c41a438fa1f2335e0fe4f6886d669(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ static void *ipmr_mfc_seq_start(struct s return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); it->mrt = mrt; + it->cache = NULL; return *pos ? ipmr_mfc_seq_idx(net, seq->private, *pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com are queue-4.4/ip6mr-fix-stale-iterator.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "vhost_net: stop device during reset owner" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled vhost_net: stop device during reset owner to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: vhost_net-stop-device-during-reset-owner.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 22:03:52 +0800 Subject: vhost_net: stop device during reset owner From: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 4cd879515d686849eec5f718aeac62a70b067d82 ] We don't stop device before reset owner, this means we could try to serve any virtqueue kick before reset dev->worker. This will result a warn since the work was pending at llist during owner resetting. Fix this by stopping device during owner reset. Reported-by: syzbot+eb17c6162478cc50632c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3a4d5c94e9593 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/vhost/net.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c @@ -1212,6 +1212,7 @@ static long vhost_net_reset_owner(struct } vhost_net_stop(n, &tx_sock, &rx_sock); vhost_net_flush(n); + vhost_dev_stop(&n->dev); vhost_dev_reset_owner(&n->dev, umem); vhost_net_vq_reset(n); done: Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jasowang(a)redhat.com are queue-4.14/vhost_net-stop-device-during-reset-owner.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: tcp_bbr-fix-pacing_gain-to-always-be-unity-when-using-lt_bw.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 15:43:05 -0500 Subject: tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 3aff3b4b986e51bcf4ab249e5d48d39596e0df6a ] This commit fixes the pacing_gain to remain at BBR_UNIT (1.0) when using lt_bw and returning from the PROBE_RTT state to PROBE_BW. Previously, when using lt_bw, upon exiting PROBE_RTT and entering PROBE_BW the bbr_reset_probe_bw_mode() code could sometimes randomly end up with a cycle_idx of 0 and hence have bbr_advance_cycle_phase() set a pacing gain above 1.0. In such cases this would result in a pacing rate that is 1.25x higher than intended, potentially resulting in a high loss rate for a little while until we stop using the lt_bw a bit later. This commit is a stable candidate for kernels back as far as 4.9. Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control") Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil(a)google.com> Reported-by: Beyers Cronje <bcronje(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c @@ -481,7 +481,8 @@ static void bbr_advance_cycle_phase(stru bbr->cycle_idx = (bbr->cycle_idx + 1) & (CYCLE_LEN - 1); bbr->cycle_mstamp = tp->delivered_mstamp; - bbr->pacing_gain = bbr_pacing_gain[bbr->cycle_idx]; + bbr->pacing_gain = bbr->lt_use_bw ? BBR_UNIT : + bbr_pacing_gain[bbr->cycle_idx]; } /* Gain cycling: cycle pacing gain to converge to fair share of available bw. */ @@ -490,8 +491,7 @@ static void bbr_update_cycle_phase(struc { struct bbr *bbr = inet_csk_ca(sk); - if ((bbr->mode == BBR_PROBE_BW) && !bbr->lt_use_bw && - bbr_is_next_cycle_phase(sk, rs)) + if (bbr->mode == BBR_PROBE_BW && bbr_is_next_cycle_phase(sk, rs)) bbr_advance_cycle_phase(sk); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ncardwell(a)google.com are queue-4.14/tcp_bbr-fix-pacing_gain-to-always-be-unity-when-using-lt_bw.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock()" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock() to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: soreuseport-fix-mem-leak-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 10:27:27 -0800 Subject: soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock() From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 4db428a7c9ab07e08783e0fcdc4ca0f555da0567 ] reuseport_add_sock() needs to deal with attaching a socket having its own sk_reuseport_cb, after a prior setsockopt(SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_?BPF) Without this fix, not only a WARN_ONCE() was issued, but we were also leaking memory. Thanks to sysbot and Eric Biggers for providing us nice C repros. ------------[ cut here ]------------ socket already in reuseport group WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3496 at net/core/sock_reuseport.c:119 reuseport_add_sock+0x742/0x9b0 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:117 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 3496 Comm: syzkaller869503 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6+ #245 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:183 __warn+0x1dc/0x200 kernel/panic.c:547 report_bug+0x211/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:184 fixup_bug.part.11+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline] do_error_trap+0x2d7/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296 do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315 invalid_op+0x22/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1079 Fixes: ef456144da8e ("soreuseport: define reuseport groups") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+c0ea2226f77a42936bf7(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Craig Gallek <kraig(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/core/sock_reuseport.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) --- a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c +++ b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c @@ -94,6 +94,16 @@ static struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_ return more_reuse; } +static void reuseport_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct sock_reuseport *reuse; + + reuse = container_of(head, struct sock_reuseport, rcu); + if (reuse->prog) + bpf_prog_destroy(reuse->prog); + kfree(reuse); +} + /** * reuseport_add_sock - Add a socket to the reuseport group of another. * @sk: New socket to add to the group. @@ -102,7 +112,7 @@ static struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_ */ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sk2) { - struct sock_reuseport *reuse; + struct sock_reuseport *old_reuse, *reuse; if (!rcu_access_pointer(sk2->sk_reuseport_cb)) { int err = reuseport_alloc(sk2); @@ -113,10 +123,13 @@ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, spin_lock_bh(&reuseport_lock); reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk2->sk_reuseport_cb, - lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)), - WARN_ONCE(rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_reuseport_cb, - lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)), - "socket already in reuseport group"); + lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)); + old_reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_reuseport_cb, + lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)); + if (old_reuse && old_reuse->num_socks != 1) { + spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock); + return -EBUSY; + } if (reuse->num_socks == reuse->max_socks) { reuse = reuseport_grow(reuse); @@ -134,19 +147,11 @@ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock); + if (old_reuse) + call_rcu(&old_reuse->rcu, reuseport_free_rcu); return 0; } -static void reuseport_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) -{ - struct sock_reuseport *reuse; - - reuse = container_of(head, struct sock_reuseport, rcu); - if (reuse->prog) - bpf_prog_destroy(reuse->prog); - kfree(reuse); -} - void reuseport_detach_sock(struct sock *sk) { struct sock_reuseport *reuse; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from edumazet(a)google.com are queue-4.14/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch queue-4.14/net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch queue-4.14/soreuseport-fix-mem-leak-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch queue-4.14/revert-defer-call-to-mem_cgroup_sk_alloc.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 16:40:41 +0800 Subject: tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> [ Upstream commit 9b42d55a66d388e4dd5550107df051a9637564fc ] socket can be disconnected and gets transformed back to a listening socket, if sk_frag.page is not released, which will be cloned into a new socket by sk_clone_lock, but the reference count of this page is increased, lead to a use after free or double free issue Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2379,6 +2379,12 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash); + if (sk->sk_frag.page) { + put_page(sk->sk_frag.page); + sk->sk_frag.page = NULL; + sk->sk_frag.offset = 0; + } + sk->sk_error_report(sk); return err; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from lirongqing(a)baidu.com are queue-4.14/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "Revert "defer call to mem_cgroup_sk_alloc()"" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled Revert "defer call to mem_cgroup_sk_alloc()" to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: revert-defer-call-to-mem_cgroup_sk_alloc.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Roman Gushchin <guro(a)fb.com> Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 15:26:57 +0000 Subject: Revert "defer call to mem_cgroup_sk_alloc()" From: Roman Gushchin <guro(a)fb.com> [ Upstream commit edbe69ef2c90fc86998a74b08319a01c508bd497 ] This patch effectively reverts commit 9f1c2674b328 ("net: memcontrol: defer call to mem_cgroup_sk_alloc()"). Moving mem_cgroup_sk_alloc() to the inet_csk_accept() completely breaks memcg socket memory accounting, as packets received before memcg pointer initialization are not accounted and are causing refcounting underflow on socket release. Actually the free-after-use problem was fixed by commit c0576e397508 ("net: call cgroup_sk_alloc() earlier in sk_clone_lock()") for the cgroup pointer. So, let's revert it and call mem_cgroup_sk_alloc() just before cgroup_sk_alloc(). This is safe, as we hold a reference to the socket we're cloning, and it holds a reference to the memcg. Also, let's drop BUG_ON(mem_cgroup_is_root()) check from mem_cgroup_sk_alloc(). I see no reasons why bumping the root memcg counter is a good reason to panic, and there are no realistic ways to hit it. Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro(a)fb.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- mm/memcontrol.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ net/core/sock.c | 5 +---- net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -5828,6 +5828,20 @@ void mem_cgroup_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk if (!mem_cgroup_sockets_enabled) return; + /* + * Socket cloning can throw us here with sk_memcg already + * filled. It won't however, necessarily happen from + * process context. So the test for root memcg given + * the current task's memcg won't help us in this case. + * + * Respecting the original socket's memcg is a better + * decision in this case. + */ + if (sk->sk_memcg) { + css_get(&sk->sk_memcg->css); + return; + } + rcu_read_lock(); memcg = mem_cgroup_from_task(current); if (memcg == root_mem_cgroup) --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1677,16 +1677,13 @@ struct sock *sk_clone_lock(const struct newsk->sk_dst_pending_confirm = 0; newsk->sk_wmem_queued = 0; newsk->sk_forward_alloc = 0; - - /* sk->sk_memcg will be populated at accept() time */ - newsk->sk_memcg = NULL; - atomic_set(&newsk->sk_drops, 0); newsk->sk_send_head = NULL; newsk->sk_userlocks = sk->sk_userlocks & ~SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK; atomic_set(&newsk->sk_zckey, 0); sock_reset_flag(newsk, SOCK_DONE); + mem_cgroup_sk_alloc(newsk); cgroup_sk_alloc(&newsk->sk_cgrp_data); rcu_read_lock(); --- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c @@ -475,7 +475,6 @@ struct sock *inet_csk_accept(struct sock } spin_unlock_bh(&queue->fastopenq.lock); } - mem_cgroup_sk_alloc(newsk); out: release_sock(sk); if (req) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from guro(a)fb.com are queue-4.14/revert-defer-call-to-mem_cgroup_sk_alloc.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "rocker: fix possible null pointer dereference in rocker_router_fib_event_work" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled rocker: fix possible null pointer dereference in rocker_router_fib_event_work to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rocker-fix-possible-null-pointer-dereference-in-rocker_router_fib_event_work.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)mellanox.com> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 12:21:15 +0100 Subject: rocker: fix possible null pointer dereference in rocker_router_fib_event_work From: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)mellanox.com> [ Upstream commit a83165f00f16c0e0ef5b7cec3cbd0d4788699265 ] Currently, rocker user may experience following null pointer derefence bug: [ 3.062141] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000d0 [ 3.065163] IP: rocker_router_fib_event_work+0x36/0x110 [rocker] The problem is uninitialized rocker->wops pointer that is initialized only with the first initialized port. So move the port initialization before registering the fib events. Fixes: 936bd486564a ("rocker: use FIB notifications instead of switchdev calls") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker_main.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker_main.c @@ -2902,6 +2902,12 @@ static int rocker_probe(struct pci_dev * goto err_alloc_ordered_workqueue; } + err = rocker_probe_ports(rocker); + if (err) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to probe ports\n"); + goto err_probe_ports; + } + /* Only FIBs pointing to our own netdevs are programmed into * the device, so no need to pass a callback. */ @@ -2918,22 +2924,16 @@ static int rocker_probe(struct pci_dev * rocker->hw.id = rocker_read64(rocker, SWITCH_ID); - err = rocker_probe_ports(rocker); - if (err) { - dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to probe ports\n"); - goto err_probe_ports; - } - dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Rocker switch with id %*phN\n", (int)sizeof(rocker->hw.id), &rocker->hw.id); return 0; -err_probe_ports: - unregister_switchdev_notifier(&rocker_switchdev_notifier); err_register_switchdev_notifier: unregister_fib_notifier(&rocker->fib_nb); err_register_fib_notifier: + rocker_remove_ports(rocker); +err_probe_ports: destroy_workqueue(rocker->rocker_owq); err_alloc_ordered_workqueue: free_irq(rocker_msix_vector(rocker, ROCKER_MSIX_VEC_EVENT), rocker); @@ -2961,9 +2961,9 @@ static void rocker_remove(struct pci_dev { struct rocker *rocker = pci_get_drvdata(pdev); - rocker_remove_ports(rocker); unregister_switchdev_notifier(&rocker_switchdev_notifier); unregister_fib_notifier(&rocker->fib_nb); + rocker_remove_ports(rocker); rocker_write32(rocker, CONTROL, ROCKER_CONTROL_RESET); destroy_workqueue(rocker->rocker_owq); free_irq(rocker_msix_vector(rocker, ROCKER_MSIX_VEC_EVENT), rocker); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jiri(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rocker-fix-possible-null-pointer-dereference-in-rocker_router_fib_event_work.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization." has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization. to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: r8169-fix-rtl8168ep-take-too-long-to-complete-driver-initialization.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 01:32:36 +0800 Subject: r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization. From: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> [ Upstream commit 086ca23d03c0d2f4088f472386778d293e15c5f6 ] Driver check the wrong register bit in rtl_ocp_tx_cond() that keep driver waiting until timeout. Fix this by waiting for the right register bit. Signed-off-by: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c @@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ DECLARE_RTL_COND(rtl_ocp_tx_cond) { void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; - return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x02; + return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x20; } static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct rtl8169_private *tp) @@ -1396,7 +1396,7 @@ static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct r void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; RTL_W8(IBCR2, RTL_R8(IBCR2) & ~0x01); - rtl_msleep_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); + rtl_msleep_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); RTL_W8(IBISR0, RTL_R8(IBISR0) | 0x20); RTL_W8(IBCR0, RTL_R8(IBCR0) & ~0x01); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from hau(a)realtek.com are queue-4.14/r8169-fix-rtl8168ep-take-too-long-to-complete-driver-initialization.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06 to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-ep06.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:12:55 +0100 Subject: qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06 From: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit c0b91a56a2e57a5a370655b25d677ae0ebf8a2d0 ] The Quectel EP06 is a Cat. 6 LTE modem. It uses the same interface as the EC20/EC25 for QMI, and requires the same "set DTR"-quirk to work. Signed-off-by: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn(a)mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -1243,6 +1243,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id produc {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0125, 4)}, /* Quectel EC25, EC20 R2.0 Mini PCIe */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0121, 4)}, /* Quectel EC21 Mini PCIe */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2c7c, 0x0296, 4)}, /* Quectel BG96 */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0306, 4)}, /* Quectel EP06 Mini PCIe */ /* 4. Gobi 1000 devices */ {QMI_GOBI1K_DEVICE(0x05c6, 0x9212)}, /* Acer Gobi Modem Device */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com are queue-4.14/qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-ep06.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "qlcnic: fix deadlock bug" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled qlcnic: fix deadlock bug to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: qlcnic-fix-deadlock-bug.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:53:42 +0800 Subject: qlcnic: fix deadlock bug From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> [ Upstream commit 233ac3891607f501f08879134d623b303838f478 ] The following soft lockup was caught. This is a deadlock caused by recusive locking. Process kworker/u40:1:28016 was holding spin lock "mbx->queue_lock" in qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(), while a softirq came in and ask the same spin lock in qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(). This lock should be hold by disable bh.. [161846.962125] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [kworker/u40:1:28016] [161846.962367] Modules linked in: tun ocfs2 xen_netback xen_blkback xen_gntalloc xen_gntdev xen_evtchn xenfs xen_privcmd autofs4 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs bnx2fc fcoe libfcoe libfc sunrpc 8021q mrp garp bridge stp llc bonding dm_round_robin dm_multipath iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support pcspkr sb_edac edac_core i2c_i801 shpchp lpc_ich mfd_core ioatdma ipmi_devintf ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler sg ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod igb i2c_algo_bit i2c_core ahci libahci megaraid_sas ixgbe dca ptp pps_core vxlan udp_tunnel ip6_udp_tunnel qla2xxx scsi_transport_fc qlcnic crc32c_intel be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi ipv6 cxgb3 mdio libiscsi_tcp qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [161846.962454] [161846.962460] CPU: 1 PID: 28016 Comm: kworker/u40:1 Not tainted 4.1.12-94.5.9.el6uek.x86_64 #2 [161846.962463] Hardware name: Oracle Corporation SUN SERVER X4-2L /ASSY,MB,X4-2L , BIOS 26050100 09/19/2017 [161846.962489] Workqueue: qlcnic_mailbox qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker [qlcnic] [161846.962493] task: ffff8801f2e34600 ti: ffff88004ca5c000 task.ti: ffff88004ca5c000 [161846.962496] RIP: e030:[<ffffffff810013aa>] [<ffffffff810013aa>] xen_hypercall_sched_op+0xa/0x20 [161846.962506] RSP: e02b:ffff880202e43388 EFLAGS: 00000206 [161846.962509] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f6996b70 RCX: ffffffff810013aa [161846.962511] RDX: ffff880202e433cc RSI: ffff880202e433b0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [161846.962513] RBP: ffff880202e433d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8801fe893200 [161846.962516] R10: ffff8801fe400538 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffff880202e4b000 [161846.962518] R13: 0000000000000050 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000000020d [161846.962528] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880202e40000(0000) knlGS:ffff880202e40000 [161846.962531] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [161846.962533] CR2: 0000000002612640 CR3: 00000001bb796000 CR4: 0000000000042660 [161846.962536] Stack: [161846.962538] ffff880202e43608 0000000000000000 ffffffff813f0442 ffff880202e433b0 [161846.962543] 0000000000000000 ffff880202e433cc ffffffff00000001 0000000000000000 [161846.962547] 00000009813f03d6 ffff880202e433e0 ffffffff813f0460 ffff880202e43440 [161846.962552] Call Trace: [161846.962555] <IRQ> [161846.962565] [<ffffffff813f0442>] ? xen_poll_irq_timeout+0x42/0x50 [161846.962570] [<ffffffff813f0460>] xen_poll_irq+0x10/0x20 [161846.962578] [<ffffffff81014222>] xen_lock_spinning+0xe2/0x110 [161846.962583] [<ffffffff81013f01>] __raw_callee_save_xen_lock_spinning+0x11/0x20 [161846.962592] [<ffffffff816e5c57>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x57/0x80 [161846.962609] [<ffffffffa028acfc>] qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd+0x7c/0xe0 [qlcnic] [161846.962623] [<ffffffffa028e008>] qlcnic_83xx_issue_cmd+0x58/0x210 [qlcnic] [161846.962636] [<ffffffffa028caf2>] qlcnic_83xx_sre_macaddr_change+0x162/0x1d0 [qlcnic] [161846.962649] [<ffffffffa028cb8b>] qlcnic_83xx_change_l2_filter+0x2b/0x30 [qlcnic] [161846.962657] [<ffffffff8160248b>] ? __skb_flow_dissect+0x18b/0x650 [161846.962670] [<ffffffffa02856e5>] qlcnic_send_filter+0x205/0x250 [qlcnic] [161846.962682] [<ffffffffa0285c77>] qlcnic_xmit_frame+0x547/0x7b0 [qlcnic] [161846.962691] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962696] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962701] [<ffffffff81630112>] sch_direct_xmit+0x112/0x220 [161846.962706] [<ffffffff8160b80f>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1df/0x5e0 [161846.962710] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962721] [<ffffffffa0575bd5>] bond_dev_queue_xmit+0x35/0x80 [bonding] [161846.962729] [<ffffffffa05769fb>] __bond_start_xmit+0x1cb/0x210 [bonding] [161846.962736] [<ffffffffa0576a71>] bond_start_xmit+0x31/0x60 [bonding] [161846.962740] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962745] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962749] [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0 [161846.962754] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962760] [<ffffffffa05cfa72>] vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb2/0x150 [8021q] [161846.962764] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962769] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962773] [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0 [161846.962777] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962789] [<ffffffffa05adf74>] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x54/0xa0 [bridge] [161846.962797] [<ffffffffa05ae4ff>] br_forward_finish+0x2f/0x90 [bridge] [161846.962807] [<ffffffff810b0dad>] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x1d/0x100 [161846.962811] [<ffffffff815f929b>] ? __alloc_skb+0x8b/0x1f0 [161846.962818] [<ffffffffa05ae04d>] __br_forward+0x8d/0x120 [bridge] [161846.962822] [<ffffffff815f613b>] ? __kmalloc_reserve+0x3b/0xa0 [161846.962829] [<ffffffff810be55e>] ? update_rq_runnable_avg+0xee/0x230 [161846.962836] [<ffffffffa05ae176>] br_forward+0x96/0xb0 [bridge] [161846.962845] [<ffffffffa05af85e>] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1ae/0x420 [bridge] [161846.962853] [<ffffffffa05afc4f>] br_handle_frame+0x17f/0x260 [bridge] [161846.962862] [<ffffffffa05afad0>] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x420/0x420 [bridge] [161846.962867] [<ffffffff8160d057>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1f7/0x870 [161846.962872] [<ffffffff8160d6f2>] __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x70 [161846.962877] [<ffffffff8160d913>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x23/0x90 [161846.962884] [<ffffffffa07512ea>] ? xenvif_idx_release+0xea/0x100 [xen_netback] [161846.962889] [<ffffffff816e5a10>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x50 [161846.962893] [<ffffffff8160e624>] netif_receive_skb_sk+0x24/0x90 [161846.962899] [<ffffffffa075269a>] xenvif_tx_submit+0x2ca/0x3f0 [xen_netback] [161846.962906] [<ffffffffa0753f0c>] xenvif_tx_action+0x9c/0xd0 [xen_netback] [161846.962915] [<ffffffffa07567f5>] xenvif_poll+0x35/0x70 [xen_netback] [161846.962920] [<ffffffff8160e01b>] napi_poll+0xcb/0x1e0 [161846.962925] [<ffffffff8160e1c0>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x1c0 [161846.962931] [<ffffffff8108aaba>] __do_softirq+0x10a/0x350 [161846.962938] [<ffffffff8108ae75>] irq_exit+0x125/0x130 [161846.962943] [<ffffffff813f03a9>] xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x39/0x50 [161846.962950] [<ffffffff816e7ffe>] xen_do_hypervisor_callback+0x1e/0x40 [161846.962952] <EOI> [161846.962959] [<ffffffff816e5c4a>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x4a/0x80 [161846.962964] [<ffffffff816e5b1e>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1e/0xa0 [161846.962978] [<ffffffffa028e279>] ? qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker+0xb9/0x2a0 [qlcnic] [161846.962991] [<ffffffff810a14e1>] ? process_one_work+0x151/0x4b0 [161846.962995] [<ffffffff8100c3f2>] ? check_events+0x12/0x20 [161846.963001] [<ffffffff810a1960>] ? worker_thread+0x120/0x480 [161846.963005] [<ffffffff816e187b>] ? __schedule+0x30b/0x890 [161846.963010] [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0 [161846.963015] [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0 [161846.963021] [<ffffffff810a6b3e>] ? kthread+0xce/0xf0 [161846.963025] [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70 [161846.963031] [<ffffffff816e6522>] ? ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70 [161846.963035] [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70 [161846.963037] Code: cc 51 41 53 b8 1c 00 00 00 0f 05 41 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 51 41 53 b8 1d 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c @@ -3891,7 +3891,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue( struct list_head *head = &mbx->cmd_q; struct qlcnic_cmd_args *cmd = NULL; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); while (!list_empty(head)) { cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); @@ -3902,7 +3902,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue( qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); } static int qlcnic_83xx_check_mbx_status(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter) @@ -3938,12 +3938,12 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_dequeue_mbx_cmd( { struct qlcnic_mailbox *mbx = adapter->ahw->mailbox; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_del(&cmd->list); mbx->num_cmds--; - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } @@ -4008,7 +4008,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(s init_completion(&cmd->completion); cmd->rsp_opcode = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_UNKNOWN; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_add_tail(&cmd->list, &mbx->cmd_q); mbx->num_cmds++; @@ -4016,7 +4016,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(s *timeout = cmd->total_cmds * QLC_83XX_MBX_TIMEOUT; queue_work(mbx->work_q, &mbx->work); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return 0; } @@ -4112,15 +4112,15 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(s mbx->rsp_status = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_WAIT; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mbx->aen_lock, flags); - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); if (list_empty(head)) { - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return; } cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); mbx_ops->encode_cmd(adapter, cmd); mbx_ops->nofity_fw(adapter, QLC_83XX_MBX_REQUEST); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com are queue-4.14/qlcnic-fix-deadlock-bug.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 10:26:57 -0800 Subject: net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit e7aadb27a5415e8125834b84a74477bfbee4eff5 ] Newly added igmpv3_get_srcaddr() needs to be called under rcu lock. Timer callbacks do not ensure this locking. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0+ #200 Not tainted ----------------------------- ./include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by syzkaller616973/4074: #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bfce669e>] __do_page_fault+0x32d/0xc90 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1355 #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:178 [inline] #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] call_timer_fn+0x1c6/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1316 #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline] #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] igmpv3_send_report+0x98/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:600 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 4074 Comm: syzkaller616973 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #200 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 __in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 [inline] igmpv3_get_srcaddr net/ipv4/igmp.c:329 [inline] igmpv3_newpack+0xeef/0x12e0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:389 add_grhead.isra.27+0x235/0x300 net/ipv4/igmp.c:432 add_grec+0xbd3/0x1170 net/ipv4/igmp.c:565 igmpv3_send_report+0xd5/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:605 igmp_send_report+0xc43/0x1050 net/ipv4/igmp.c:722 igmp_timer_expire+0x322/0x5c0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:831 call_timer_fn+0x228/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1326 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline] __run_timers+0x7ee/0xb70 kernel/time/timer.c:1666 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692 __do_softirq+0x2d7/0xb85 kernel/softirq.c:285 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:541 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052 apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:938 Fixes: a46182b00290 ("net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -386,7 +386,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *igmpv3_newpack(st pip->frag_off = htons(IP_DF); pip->ttl = 1; pip->daddr = fl4.daddr; + + rcu_read_lock(); pip->saddr = igmpv3_get_srcaddr(dev, &fl4); + rcu_read_unlock(); + pip->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP; pip->tot_len = 0; /* filled in later */ ip_select_ident(net, skb, NULL); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from edumazet(a)google.com are queue-4.14/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch queue-4.14/net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch queue-4.14/soreuseport-fix-mem-leak-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch queue-4.14/revert-defer-call-to-mem_cgroup_sk_alloc.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "net: ipv6: send unsolicited NA after DAD" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: ipv6: send unsolicited NA after DAD to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net-ipv6-send-unsolicited-na-after-dad.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: David Ahern <dsahern(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 20:16:29 -0800 Subject: net: ipv6: send unsolicited NA after DAD From: David Ahern <dsahern(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit c76fe2d98c726224a975a0d0198c3fb50406d325 ] Unsolicited IPv6 neighbor advertisements should be sent after DAD completes. Update ndisc_send_unsol_na to skip tentative, non-optimistic addresses and have those sent by addrconf_dad_completed after DAD. Fixes: 4a6e3c5def13c ("net: ipv6: send unsolicited NA on admin up") Reported-by: Vivek Venkatraman <vivek(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- net/ipv6/ndisc.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ static struct rt6_info *addrconf_get_pre static void addrconf_dad_start(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp); static void addrconf_dad_work(struct work_struct *w); -static void addrconf_dad_completed(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool bump_id); +static void addrconf_dad_completed(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool bump_id, + bool send_na); static void addrconf_dad_run(struct inet6_dev *idev); static void addrconf_rs_timer(unsigned long data); static void __ipv6_ifa_notify(int event, struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa); @@ -3825,12 +3826,17 @@ static void addrconf_dad_begin(struct in idev->cnf.accept_dad < 1) || !(ifp->flags&IFA_F_TENTATIVE) || ifp->flags & IFA_F_NODAD) { + bool send_na = false; + + if (ifp->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE && + !(ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)) + send_na = true; bump_id = ifp->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE; ifp->flags &= ~(IFA_F_TENTATIVE|IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC|IFA_F_DADFAILED); spin_unlock(&ifp->lock); read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); - addrconf_dad_completed(ifp, bump_id); + addrconf_dad_completed(ifp, bump_id, send_na); return; } @@ -3959,16 +3965,21 @@ static void addrconf_dad_work(struct wor } if (ifp->dad_probes == 0) { + bool send_na = false; + /* * DAD was successful */ + if (ifp->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE && + !(ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)) + send_na = true; bump_id = ifp->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE; ifp->flags &= ~(IFA_F_TENTATIVE|IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC|IFA_F_DADFAILED); spin_unlock(&ifp->lock); write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); - addrconf_dad_completed(ifp, bump_id); + addrconf_dad_completed(ifp, bump_id, send_na); goto out; } @@ -4006,7 +4017,8 @@ static bool ipv6_lonely_lladdr(struct in return true; } -static void addrconf_dad_completed(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool bump_id) +static void addrconf_dad_completed(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool bump_id, + bool send_na) { struct net_device *dev = ifp->idev->dev; struct in6_addr lladdr; @@ -4038,6 +4050,16 @@ static void addrconf_dad_completed(struc if (send_mld) ipv6_mc_dad_complete(ifp->idev); + /* send unsolicited NA if enabled */ + if (send_na && + (ifp->idev->cnf.ndisc_notify || + dev_net(dev)->ipv6.devconf_all->ndisc_notify)) { + ndisc_send_na(dev, &in6addr_linklocal_allnodes, &ifp->addr, + /*router=*/ !!ifp->idev->cnf.forwarding, + /*solicited=*/ false, /*override=*/ true, + /*inc_opt=*/ true); + } + if (send_rs) { /* * If a host as already performed a random delay --- a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c @@ -558,6 +558,11 @@ static void ndisc_send_unsol_na(struct n read_lock_bh(&idev->lock); list_for_each_entry(ifa, &idev->addr_list, if_list) { + /* skip tentative addresses until dad completes */ + if (ifa->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE && + !(ifa->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)) + continue; + ndisc_send_na(dev, &in6addr_linklocal_allnodes, &ifa->addr, /*router=*/ !!idev->cnf.forwarding, /*solicited=*/ false, /*override=*/ true, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dsahern(a)gmail.com are queue-4.14/net-ipv6-send-unsolicited-na-after-dad.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ipv6-fix-so_reuseport-udp-socket-with-implicit-sk_ipv6only.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 23:15:27 -0800 Subject: ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> [ Upstream commit 7ece54a60ee2ba7a386308cae73c790bd580589c ] If a sk_v6_rcv_saddr is !IPV6_ADDR_ANY and !IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED, it implicitly implies it is an ipv6only socket. However, in inet6_bind(), this addr_type checking and setting sk->sk_ipv6only to 1 are only done after sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum) has been completed successfully. This inconsistency between sk_v6_rcv_saddr and sk_ipv6only confuses the 'get_port()'. In particular, when binding SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets, udp_reuseport_add_sock(sk,...) is called. udp_reuseport_add_sock() checks "ipv6_only_sock(sk2) == ipv6_only_sock(sk)" before adding sk to sk2->sk_reuseport_cb. In this case, ipv6_only_sock(sk2) could be 1 while ipv6_only_sock(sk) is still 0 here. The end result is, reuseport_alloc(sk) is called instead of adding sk to the existing sk2->sk_reuseport_cb. It can be reproduced by binding two SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets on an IPv6 address (!ANY and !MAPPED). Only one of the socket will receive packet. The fix is to set the implicit sk_ipv6only before calling get_port(). The original sk_ipv6only has to be saved such that it can be restored in case get_port() failed. The situation is similar to the inet_reset_saddr(sk) after get_port() has failed. Thanks to Calvin Owens <calvinowens(a)fb.com> who created an easy reproduction which leads to a fix. Fixes: e32ea7e74727 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport UDP socket selection") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru struct net *net = sock_net(sk); __be32 v4addr = 0; unsigned short snum; + bool saved_ipv6only; int addr_type = 0; int err = 0; @@ -389,19 +390,21 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)) np->saddr = addr->sin6_addr; + saved_ipv6only = sk->sk_ipv6only; + if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY && addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) + sk->sk_ipv6only = 1; + /* Make sure we are allowed to bind here. */ if ((snum || !inet->bind_address_no_port) && sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) { + sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only; inet_reset_saddr(sk); err = -EADDRINUSE; goto out; } - if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) { + if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK; - if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) - sk->sk_ipv6only = 1; - } if (snum) sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK; inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from kafai(a)fb.com are queue-4.14/ipv6-fix-so_reuseport-udp-socket-with-implicit-sk_ipv6only.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ip6mr: fix stale iterator" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ip6mr: fix stale iterator to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ip6mr-fix-stale-iterator.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:20 PST 2018 From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 16:29:30 +0200 Subject: ip6mr: fix stale iterator From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> [ Upstream commit 4adfa79fc254efb7b0eb3cd58f62c2c3f805f1ba ] When we dump the ip6mr mfc entries via proc, we initialize an iterator with the table to dump but we don't clear the cache pointer which might be initialized from a prior read on the same descriptor that ended. This can result in lock imbalance (an unnecessary unlock) leading to other crashes and hangs. Clear the cache pointer like ipmr does to fix the issue. Thanks for the reliable reproducer. Here's syzbot's trace: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Not tainted syzkaller971460/3195 is trying to release lock (mrt_lock) at: [<000000006898068d>] ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 1 lock held by syzkaller971460/3195: #0: (&p->lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000744a6565>] seq_read+0xd5/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:165 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x12f/0x140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3561 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3775 [inline] lock_release+0x5f9/0xda0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4023 __raw_read_unlock include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:225 [inline] _raw_read_unlock+0x1a/0x30 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:255 ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 traverse+0x3bc/0xa00 fs/seq_file.c:135 seq_read+0x96a/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:189 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at lib/usercopy.c:25 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3195, name: syzkaller971460 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 ___might_sleep+0x2b2/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6060 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6013 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4525 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] seq_read+0xcb4/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:279 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 at lib/usercopy.c:26 _copy_to_user+0xb5/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:26 Reported-by: syzbot <bot+eceb3204562c41a438fa1f2335e0fe4f6886d669(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static void *ipmr_mfc_seq_start(struct s return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); it->mrt = mrt; + it->cache = NULL; return *pos ? ipmr_mfc_seq_idx(net, seq->private, *pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com are queue-4.14/ip6mr-fix-stale-iterator.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: tcp_bbr-fix-pacing_gain-to-always-be-unity-when-using-lt_bw.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 15:43:05 -0500 Subject: tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 3aff3b4b986e51bcf4ab249e5d48d39596e0df6a ] This commit fixes the pacing_gain to remain at BBR_UNIT (1.0) when using lt_bw and returning from the PROBE_RTT state to PROBE_BW. Previously, when using lt_bw, upon exiting PROBE_RTT and entering PROBE_BW the bbr_reset_probe_bw_mode() code could sometimes randomly end up with a cycle_idx of 0 and hence have bbr_advance_cycle_phase() set a pacing gain above 1.0. In such cases this would result in a pacing rate that is 1.25x higher than intended, potentially resulting in a high loss rate for a little while until we stop using the lt_bw a bit later. This commit is a stable candidate for kernels back as far as 4.9. Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control") Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil(a)google.com> Reported-by: Beyers Cronje <bcronje(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c @@ -481,7 +481,8 @@ static void bbr_advance_cycle_phase(stru bbr->cycle_idx = (bbr->cycle_idx + 1) & (CYCLE_LEN - 1); bbr->cycle_mstamp = tp->delivered_mstamp; - bbr->pacing_gain = bbr_pacing_gain[bbr->cycle_idx]; + bbr->pacing_gain = bbr->lt_use_bw ? BBR_UNIT : + bbr_pacing_gain[bbr->cycle_idx]; } /* Gain cycling: cycle pacing gain to converge to fair share of available bw. */ @@ -490,8 +491,7 @@ static void bbr_update_cycle_phase(struc { struct bbr *bbr = inet_csk_ca(sk); - if ((bbr->mode == BBR_PROBE_BW) && !bbr->lt_use_bw && - bbr_is_next_cycle_phase(sk, rs)) + if (bbr->mode == BBR_PROBE_BW && bbr_is_next_cycle_phase(sk, rs)) bbr_advance_cycle_phase(sk); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ncardwell(a)google.com are queue-4.15/tcp_bbr-fix-pacing_gain-to-always-be-unity-when-using-lt_bw.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "vhost_net: stop device during reset owner" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled vhost_net: stop device during reset owner to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: vhost_net-stop-device-during-reset-owner.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 22:03:52 +0800 Subject: vhost_net: stop device during reset owner From: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 4cd879515d686849eec5f718aeac62a70b067d82 ] We don't stop device before reset owner, this means we could try to serve any virtqueue kick before reset dev->worker. This will result a warn since the work was pending at llist during owner resetting. Fix this by stopping device during owner reset. Reported-by: syzbot+eb17c6162478cc50632c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3a4d5c94e9593 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/vhost/net.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c @@ -1208,6 +1208,7 @@ static long vhost_net_reset_owner(struct } vhost_net_stop(n, &tx_sock, &rx_sock); vhost_net_flush(n); + vhost_dev_stop(&n->dev); vhost_dev_reset_owner(&n->dev, umem); vhost_net_vq_reset(n); done: Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jasowang(a)redhat.com are queue-4.15/vhost_net-stop-device-during-reset-owner.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 16:40:41 +0800 Subject: tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> [ Upstream commit 9b42d55a66d388e4dd5550107df051a9637564fc ] socket can be disconnected and gets transformed back to a listening socket, if sk_frag.page is not released, which will be cloned into a new socket by sk_clone_lock, but the reference count of this page is increased, lead to a use after free or double free issue Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2434,6 +2434,12 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash); + if (sk->sk_frag.page) { + put_page(sk->sk_frag.page); + sk->sk_frag.page = NULL; + sk->sk_frag.offset = 0; + } + sk->sk_error_report(sk); return err; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from lirongqing(a)baidu.com are queue-4.15/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "rocker: fix possible null pointer dereference in rocker_router_fib_event_work" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled rocker: fix possible null pointer dereference in rocker_router_fib_event_work to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rocker-fix-possible-null-pointer-dereference-in-rocker_router_fib_event_work.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)mellanox.com> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 12:21:15 +0100 Subject: rocker: fix possible null pointer dereference in rocker_router_fib_event_work From: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)mellanox.com> [ Upstream commit a83165f00f16c0e0ef5b7cec3cbd0d4788699265 ] Currently, rocker user may experience following null pointer derefence bug: [ 3.062141] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000d0 [ 3.065163] IP: rocker_router_fib_event_work+0x36/0x110 [rocker] The problem is uninitialized rocker->wops pointer that is initialized only with the first initialized port. So move the port initialization before registering the fib events. Fixes: 936bd486564a ("rocker: use FIB notifications instead of switchdev calls") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker_main.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker_main.c @@ -2902,6 +2902,12 @@ static int rocker_probe(struct pci_dev * goto err_alloc_ordered_workqueue; } + err = rocker_probe_ports(rocker); + if (err) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to probe ports\n"); + goto err_probe_ports; + } + /* Only FIBs pointing to our own netdevs are programmed into * the device, so no need to pass a callback. */ @@ -2918,22 +2924,16 @@ static int rocker_probe(struct pci_dev * rocker->hw.id = rocker_read64(rocker, SWITCH_ID); - err = rocker_probe_ports(rocker); - if (err) { - dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to probe ports\n"); - goto err_probe_ports; - } - dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Rocker switch with id %*phN\n", (int)sizeof(rocker->hw.id), &rocker->hw.id); return 0; -err_probe_ports: - unregister_switchdev_notifier(&rocker_switchdev_notifier); err_register_switchdev_notifier: unregister_fib_notifier(&rocker->fib_nb); err_register_fib_notifier: + rocker_remove_ports(rocker); +err_probe_ports: destroy_workqueue(rocker->rocker_owq); err_alloc_ordered_workqueue: free_irq(rocker_msix_vector(rocker, ROCKER_MSIX_VEC_EVENT), rocker); @@ -2961,9 +2961,9 @@ static void rocker_remove(struct pci_dev { struct rocker *rocker = pci_get_drvdata(pdev); - rocker_remove_ports(rocker); unregister_switchdev_notifier(&rocker_switchdev_notifier); unregister_fib_notifier(&rocker->fib_nb); + rocker_remove_ports(rocker); rocker_write32(rocker, CONTROL, ROCKER_CONTROL_RESET); destroy_workqueue(rocker->rocker_owq); free_irq(rocker_msix_vector(rocker, ROCKER_MSIX_VEC_EVENT), rocker); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jiri(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.15/net_sched-get-rid-of-rcu_barrier-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch queue-4.15/rocker-fix-possible-null-pointer-dereference-in-rocker_router_fib_event_work.patch queue-4.15/net-sched-fix-use-after-free-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock()" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock() to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: soreuseport-fix-mem-leak-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 10:27:27 -0800 Subject: soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock() From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 4db428a7c9ab07e08783e0fcdc4ca0f555da0567 ] reuseport_add_sock() needs to deal with attaching a socket having its own sk_reuseport_cb, after a prior setsockopt(SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_?BPF) Without this fix, not only a WARN_ONCE() was issued, but we were also leaking memory. Thanks to sysbot and Eric Biggers for providing us nice C repros. ------------[ cut here ]------------ socket already in reuseport group WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3496 at net/core/sock_reuseport.c:119 reuseport_add_sock+0x742/0x9b0 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:117 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 3496 Comm: syzkaller869503 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6+ #245 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:183 __warn+0x1dc/0x200 kernel/panic.c:547 report_bug+0x211/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:184 fixup_bug.part.11+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline] do_error_trap+0x2d7/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296 do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315 invalid_op+0x22/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1079 Fixes: ef456144da8e ("soreuseport: define reuseport groups") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+c0ea2226f77a42936bf7(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Craig Gallek <kraig(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/core/sock_reuseport.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) --- a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c +++ b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c @@ -94,6 +94,16 @@ static struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_ return more_reuse; } +static void reuseport_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct sock_reuseport *reuse; + + reuse = container_of(head, struct sock_reuseport, rcu); + if (reuse->prog) + bpf_prog_destroy(reuse->prog); + kfree(reuse); +} + /** * reuseport_add_sock - Add a socket to the reuseport group of another. * @sk: New socket to add to the group. @@ -102,7 +112,7 @@ static struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_ */ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sk2) { - struct sock_reuseport *reuse; + struct sock_reuseport *old_reuse, *reuse; if (!rcu_access_pointer(sk2->sk_reuseport_cb)) { int err = reuseport_alloc(sk2); @@ -113,10 +123,13 @@ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, spin_lock_bh(&reuseport_lock); reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk2->sk_reuseport_cb, - lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)), - WARN_ONCE(rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_reuseport_cb, - lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)), - "socket already in reuseport group"); + lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)); + old_reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_reuseport_cb, + lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)); + if (old_reuse && old_reuse->num_socks != 1) { + spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock); + return -EBUSY; + } if (reuse->num_socks == reuse->max_socks) { reuse = reuseport_grow(reuse); @@ -134,19 +147,11 @@ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock); + if (old_reuse) + call_rcu(&old_reuse->rcu, reuseport_free_rcu); return 0; } -static void reuseport_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) -{ - struct sock_reuseport *reuse; - - reuse = container_of(head, struct sock_reuseport, rcu); - if (reuse->prog) - bpf_prog_destroy(reuse->prog); - kfree(reuse); -} - void reuseport_detach_sock(struct sock *sk) { struct sock_reuseport *reuse; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from edumazet(a)google.com are queue-4.15/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch queue-4.15/net_sched-get-rid-of-rcu_barrier-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch queue-4.15/net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch queue-4.15/ipv6-change-route-cache-aging-logic.patch queue-4.15/soreuseport-fix-mem-leak-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch queue-4.15/revert-defer-call-to-mem_cgroup_sk_alloc.patch queue-4.15/ipv6-addrconf-break-critical-section-in-addrconf_verify_rtnl.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "Revert "defer call to mem_cgroup_sk_alloc()"" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled Revert "defer call to mem_cgroup_sk_alloc()" to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: revert-defer-call-to-mem_cgroup_sk_alloc.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Roman Gushchin <guro(a)fb.com> Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 15:26:57 +0000 Subject: Revert "defer call to mem_cgroup_sk_alloc()" From: Roman Gushchin <guro(a)fb.com> [ Upstream commit edbe69ef2c90fc86998a74b08319a01c508bd497 ] This patch effectively reverts commit 9f1c2674b328 ("net: memcontrol: defer call to mem_cgroup_sk_alloc()"). Moving mem_cgroup_sk_alloc() to the inet_csk_accept() completely breaks memcg socket memory accounting, as packets received before memcg pointer initialization are not accounted and are causing refcounting underflow on socket release. Actually the free-after-use problem was fixed by commit c0576e397508 ("net: call cgroup_sk_alloc() earlier in sk_clone_lock()") for the cgroup pointer. So, let's revert it and call mem_cgroup_sk_alloc() just before cgroup_sk_alloc(). This is safe, as we hold a reference to the socket we're cloning, and it holds a reference to the memcg. Also, let's drop BUG_ON(mem_cgroup_is_root()) check from mem_cgroup_sk_alloc(). I see no reasons why bumping the root memcg counter is a good reason to panic, and there are no realistic ways to hit it. Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro(a)fb.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- mm/memcontrol.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ net/core/sock.c | 5 +---- net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -5828,6 +5828,20 @@ void mem_cgroup_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk if (!mem_cgroup_sockets_enabled) return; + /* + * Socket cloning can throw us here with sk_memcg already + * filled. It won't however, necessarily happen from + * process context. So the test for root memcg given + * the current task's memcg won't help us in this case. + * + * Respecting the original socket's memcg is a better + * decision in this case. + */ + if (sk->sk_memcg) { + css_get(&sk->sk_memcg->css); + return; + } + rcu_read_lock(); memcg = mem_cgroup_from_task(current); if (memcg == root_mem_cgroup) --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1675,16 +1675,13 @@ struct sock *sk_clone_lock(const struct newsk->sk_dst_pending_confirm = 0; newsk->sk_wmem_queued = 0; newsk->sk_forward_alloc = 0; - - /* sk->sk_memcg will be populated at accept() time */ - newsk->sk_memcg = NULL; - atomic_set(&newsk->sk_drops, 0); newsk->sk_send_head = NULL; newsk->sk_userlocks = sk->sk_userlocks & ~SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK; atomic_set(&newsk->sk_zckey, 0); sock_reset_flag(newsk, SOCK_DONE); + mem_cgroup_sk_alloc(newsk); cgroup_sk_alloc(&newsk->sk_cgrp_data); rcu_read_lock(); --- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c @@ -475,7 +475,6 @@ struct sock *inet_csk_accept(struct sock } spin_unlock_bh(&queue->fastopenq.lock); } - mem_cgroup_sk_alloc(newsk); out: release_sock(sk); if (req) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from guro(a)fb.com are queue-4.15/revert-defer-call-to-mem_cgroup_sk_alloc.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization." has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization. to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: r8169-fix-rtl8168ep-take-too-long-to-complete-driver-initialization.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 01:32:36 +0800 Subject: r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization. From: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> [ Upstream commit 086ca23d03c0d2f4088f472386778d293e15c5f6 ] Driver check the wrong register bit in rtl_ocp_tx_cond() that keep driver waiting until timeout. Fix this by waiting for the right register bit. Signed-off-by: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c @@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ DECLARE_RTL_COND(rtl_ocp_tx_cond) { void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; - return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x02; + return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x20; } static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct rtl8169_private *tp) @@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct r void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; RTL_W8(IBCR2, RTL_R8(IBCR2) & ~0x01); - rtl_msleep_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); + rtl_msleep_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); RTL_W8(IBISR0, RTL_R8(IBISR0) | 0x20); RTL_W8(IBCR0, RTL_R8(IBCR0) & ~0x01); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from hau(a)realtek.com are queue-4.15/r8169-fix-rtl8168ep-take-too-long-to-complete-driver-initialization.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "qlcnic: fix deadlock bug" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled qlcnic: fix deadlock bug to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: qlcnic-fix-deadlock-bug.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:53:42 +0800 Subject: qlcnic: fix deadlock bug From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> [ Upstream commit 233ac3891607f501f08879134d623b303838f478 ] The following soft lockup was caught. This is a deadlock caused by recusive locking. Process kworker/u40:1:28016 was holding spin lock "mbx->queue_lock" in qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(), while a softirq came in and ask the same spin lock in qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(). This lock should be hold by disable bh.. [161846.962125] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [kworker/u40:1:28016] [161846.962367] Modules linked in: tun ocfs2 xen_netback xen_blkback xen_gntalloc xen_gntdev xen_evtchn xenfs xen_privcmd autofs4 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs bnx2fc fcoe libfcoe libfc sunrpc 8021q mrp garp bridge stp llc bonding dm_round_robin dm_multipath iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support pcspkr sb_edac edac_core i2c_i801 shpchp lpc_ich mfd_core ioatdma ipmi_devintf ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler sg ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod igb i2c_algo_bit i2c_core ahci libahci megaraid_sas ixgbe dca ptp pps_core vxlan udp_tunnel ip6_udp_tunnel qla2xxx scsi_transport_fc qlcnic crc32c_intel be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi ipv6 cxgb3 mdio libiscsi_tcp qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [161846.962454] [161846.962460] CPU: 1 PID: 28016 Comm: kworker/u40:1 Not tainted 4.1.12-94.5.9.el6uek.x86_64 #2 [161846.962463] Hardware name: Oracle Corporation SUN SERVER X4-2L /ASSY,MB,X4-2L , BIOS 26050100 09/19/2017 [161846.962489] Workqueue: qlcnic_mailbox qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker [qlcnic] [161846.962493] task: ffff8801f2e34600 ti: ffff88004ca5c000 task.ti: ffff88004ca5c000 [161846.962496] RIP: e030:[<ffffffff810013aa>] [<ffffffff810013aa>] xen_hypercall_sched_op+0xa/0x20 [161846.962506] RSP: e02b:ffff880202e43388 EFLAGS: 00000206 [161846.962509] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f6996b70 RCX: ffffffff810013aa [161846.962511] RDX: ffff880202e433cc RSI: ffff880202e433b0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [161846.962513] RBP: ffff880202e433d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8801fe893200 [161846.962516] R10: ffff8801fe400538 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffff880202e4b000 [161846.962518] R13: 0000000000000050 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000000020d [161846.962528] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880202e40000(0000) knlGS:ffff880202e40000 [161846.962531] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [161846.962533] CR2: 0000000002612640 CR3: 00000001bb796000 CR4: 0000000000042660 [161846.962536] Stack: [161846.962538] ffff880202e43608 0000000000000000 ffffffff813f0442 ffff880202e433b0 [161846.962543] 0000000000000000 ffff880202e433cc ffffffff00000001 0000000000000000 [161846.962547] 00000009813f03d6 ffff880202e433e0 ffffffff813f0460 ffff880202e43440 [161846.962552] Call Trace: [161846.962555] <IRQ> [161846.962565] [<ffffffff813f0442>] ? xen_poll_irq_timeout+0x42/0x50 [161846.962570] [<ffffffff813f0460>] xen_poll_irq+0x10/0x20 [161846.962578] [<ffffffff81014222>] xen_lock_spinning+0xe2/0x110 [161846.962583] [<ffffffff81013f01>] __raw_callee_save_xen_lock_spinning+0x11/0x20 [161846.962592] [<ffffffff816e5c57>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x57/0x80 [161846.962609] [<ffffffffa028acfc>] qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd+0x7c/0xe0 [qlcnic] [161846.962623] [<ffffffffa028e008>] qlcnic_83xx_issue_cmd+0x58/0x210 [qlcnic] [161846.962636] [<ffffffffa028caf2>] qlcnic_83xx_sre_macaddr_change+0x162/0x1d0 [qlcnic] [161846.962649] [<ffffffffa028cb8b>] qlcnic_83xx_change_l2_filter+0x2b/0x30 [qlcnic] [161846.962657] [<ffffffff8160248b>] ? __skb_flow_dissect+0x18b/0x650 [161846.962670] [<ffffffffa02856e5>] qlcnic_send_filter+0x205/0x250 [qlcnic] [161846.962682] [<ffffffffa0285c77>] qlcnic_xmit_frame+0x547/0x7b0 [qlcnic] [161846.962691] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962696] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962701] [<ffffffff81630112>] sch_direct_xmit+0x112/0x220 [161846.962706] [<ffffffff8160b80f>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1df/0x5e0 [161846.962710] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962721] [<ffffffffa0575bd5>] bond_dev_queue_xmit+0x35/0x80 [bonding] [161846.962729] [<ffffffffa05769fb>] __bond_start_xmit+0x1cb/0x210 [bonding] [161846.962736] [<ffffffffa0576a71>] bond_start_xmit+0x31/0x60 [bonding] [161846.962740] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962745] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962749] [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0 [161846.962754] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962760] [<ffffffffa05cfa72>] vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb2/0x150 [8021q] [161846.962764] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962769] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962773] [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0 [161846.962777] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962789] [<ffffffffa05adf74>] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x54/0xa0 [bridge] [161846.962797] [<ffffffffa05ae4ff>] br_forward_finish+0x2f/0x90 [bridge] [161846.962807] [<ffffffff810b0dad>] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x1d/0x100 [161846.962811] [<ffffffff815f929b>] ? __alloc_skb+0x8b/0x1f0 [161846.962818] [<ffffffffa05ae04d>] __br_forward+0x8d/0x120 [bridge] [161846.962822] [<ffffffff815f613b>] ? __kmalloc_reserve+0x3b/0xa0 [161846.962829] [<ffffffff810be55e>] ? update_rq_runnable_avg+0xee/0x230 [161846.962836] [<ffffffffa05ae176>] br_forward+0x96/0xb0 [bridge] [161846.962845] [<ffffffffa05af85e>] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1ae/0x420 [bridge] [161846.962853] [<ffffffffa05afc4f>] br_handle_frame+0x17f/0x260 [bridge] [161846.962862] [<ffffffffa05afad0>] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x420/0x420 [bridge] [161846.962867] [<ffffffff8160d057>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1f7/0x870 [161846.962872] [<ffffffff8160d6f2>] __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x70 [161846.962877] [<ffffffff8160d913>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x23/0x90 [161846.962884] [<ffffffffa07512ea>] ? xenvif_idx_release+0xea/0x100 [xen_netback] [161846.962889] [<ffffffff816e5a10>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x50 [161846.962893] [<ffffffff8160e624>] netif_receive_skb_sk+0x24/0x90 [161846.962899] [<ffffffffa075269a>] xenvif_tx_submit+0x2ca/0x3f0 [xen_netback] [161846.962906] [<ffffffffa0753f0c>] xenvif_tx_action+0x9c/0xd0 [xen_netback] [161846.962915] [<ffffffffa07567f5>] xenvif_poll+0x35/0x70 [xen_netback] [161846.962920] [<ffffffff8160e01b>] napi_poll+0xcb/0x1e0 [161846.962925] [<ffffffff8160e1c0>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x1c0 [161846.962931] [<ffffffff8108aaba>] __do_softirq+0x10a/0x350 [161846.962938] [<ffffffff8108ae75>] irq_exit+0x125/0x130 [161846.962943] [<ffffffff813f03a9>] xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x39/0x50 [161846.962950] [<ffffffff816e7ffe>] xen_do_hypervisor_callback+0x1e/0x40 [161846.962952] <EOI> [161846.962959] [<ffffffff816e5c4a>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x4a/0x80 [161846.962964] [<ffffffff816e5b1e>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1e/0xa0 [161846.962978] [<ffffffffa028e279>] ? qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker+0xb9/0x2a0 [qlcnic] [161846.962991] [<ffffffff810a14e1>] ? process_one_work+0x151/0x4b0 [161846.962995] [<ffffffff8100c3f2>] ? check_events+0x12/0x20 [161846.963001] [<ffffffff810a1960>] ? worker_thread+0x120/0x480 [161846.963005] [<ffffffff816e187b>] ? __schedule+0x30b/0x890 [161846.963010] [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0 [161846.963015] [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0 [161846.963021] [<ffffffff810a6b3e>] ? kthread+0xce/0xf0 [161846.963025] [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70 [161846.963031] [<ffffffff816e6522>] ? ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70 [161846.963035] [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70 [161846.963037] Code: cc 51 41 53 b8 1c 00 00 00 0f 05 41 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 51 41 53 b8 1d 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c @@ -3891,7 +3891,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue( struct list_head *head = &mbx->cmd_q; struct qlcnic_cmd_args *cmd = NULL; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); while (!list_empty(head)) { cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); @@ -3902,7 +3902,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue( qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); } static int qlcnic_83xx_check_mbx_status(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter) @@ -3938,12 +3938,12 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_dequeue_mbx_cmd( { struct qlcnic_mailbox *mbx = adapter->ahw->mailbox; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_del(&cmd->list); mbx->num_cmds--; - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } @@ -4008,7 +4008,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(s init_completion(&cmd->completion); cmd->rsp_opcode = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_UNKNOWN; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_add_tail(&cmd->list, &mbx->cmd_q); mbx->num_cmds++; @@ -4016,7 +4016,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(s *timeout = cmd->total_cmds * QLC_83XX_MBX_TIMEOUT; queue_work(mbx->work_q, &mbx->work); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return 0; } @@ -4112,15 +4112,15 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(s mbx->rsp_status = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_WAIT; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mbx->aen_lock, flags); - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); if (list_empty(head)) { - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return; } cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); mbx_ops->encode_cmd(adapter, cmd); mbx_ops->nofity_fw(adapter, QLC_83XX_MBX_REQUEST); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com are queue-4.15/qlcnic-fix-deadlock-bug.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06 to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-ep06.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:12:55 +0100 Subject: qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06 From: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit c0b91a56a2e57a5a370655b25d677ae0ebf8a2d0 ] The Quectel EP06 is a Cat. 6 LTE modem. It uses the same interface as the EC20/EC25 for QMI, and requires the same "set DTR"-quirk to work. Signed-off-by: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn(a)mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -1245,6 +1245,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id produc {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0125, 4)}, /* Quectel EC25, EC20 R2.0 Mini PCIe */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0121, 4)}, /* Quectel EC21 Mini PCIe */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2c7c, 0x0296, 4)}, /* Quectel BG96 */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0306, 4)}, /* Quectel EP06 Mini PCIe */ /* 4. Gobi 1000 devices */ {QMI_GOBI1K_DEVICE(0x05c6, 0x9212)}, /* Acer Gobi Modem Device */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com are queue-4.15/qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-ep06.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "net_sched: get rid of rcu_barrier() in tcf_block_put_ext()" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net_sched: get rid of rcu_barrier() in tcf_block_put_ext() to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net_sched-get-rid-of-rcu_barrier-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 10:48:18 -0800 Subject: net_sched: get rid of rcu_barrier() in tcf_block_put_ext() From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit efbf78973978b0d25af59bc26c8013a942af6e64 ] Both Eric and Paolo noticed the rcu_barrier() we use in tcf_block_put_ext() could be a performance bottleneck when we have a lot of tc classes. Paolo provided the following to demonstrate the issue: tc qdisc add dev lo root htb for I in `seq 1 1000`; do tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:$I htb rate 100kbit tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:$I handle $((I + 1)): htb for J in `seq 1 10`; do tc filter add dev lo parent $((I + 1)): u32 match ip src 1.1.1.$J done done time tc qdisc del dev root real 0m54.764s user 0m0.023s sys 0m0.000s The rcu_barrier() there is to ensure we free the block after all chains are gone, that is, to queue tcf_block_put_final() at the tail of workqueue. We can achieve this ordering requirement by refcnt'ing tcf block instead, that is, the tcf block is freed only when the last chain in this block is gone. This also simplifies the code. Paolo reported after this patch we get: real 0m0.017s user 0m0.000s sys 0m0.017s Tested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)mellanox.com> Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/net/sch_generic.h | 1 - net/sched/cls_api.c | 30 +++++++++--------------------- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) --- a/include/net/sch_generic.h +++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h @@ -280,7 +280,6 @@ struct tcf_block { struct net *net; struct Qdisc *q; struct list_head cb_list; - struct work_struct work; }; static inline void qdisc_cb_private_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, int sz) --- a/net/sched/cls_api.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c @@ -217,8 +217,12 @@ static void tcf_chain_flush(struct tcf_c static void tcf_chain_destroy(struct tcf_chain *chain) { + struct tcf_block *block = chain->block; + list_del(&chain->list); kfree(chain); + if (list_empty(&block->chain_list)) + kfree(block); } static void tcf_chain_hold(struct tcf_chain *chain) @@ -329,27 +333,13 @@ int tcf_block_get(struct tcf_block **p_b } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcf_block_get); -static void tcf_block_put_final(struct work_struct *work) -{ - struct tcf_block *block = container_of(work, struct tcf_block, work); - struct tcf_chain *chain, *tmp; - - rtnl_lock(); - - /* At this point, all the chains should have refcnt == 1. */ - list_for_each_entry_safe(chain, tmp, &block->chain_list, list) - tcf_chain_put(chain); - rtnl_unlock(); - kfree(block); -} - /* XXX: Standalone actions are not allowed to jump to any chain, and bound * actions should be all removed after flushing. */ void tcf_block_put_ext(struct tcf_block *block, struct Qdisc *q, struct tcf_block_ext_info *ei) { - struct tcf_chain *chain; + struct tcf_chain *chain, *tmp; if (!block) return; @@ -365,13 +355,11 @@ void tcf_block_put_ext(struct tcf_block tcf_block_offload_unbind(block, q, ei); - INIT_WORK(&block->work, tcf_block_put_final); - /* Wait for existing RCU callbacks to cool down, make sure their works - * have been queued before this. We can not flush pending works here - * because we are holding the RTNL lock. + /* At this point, all the chains should have refcnt >= 1. Block will be + * freed after all chains are gone. */ - rcu_barrier(); - tcf_queue_work(&block->work); + list_for_each_entry_safe(chain, tmp, &block->chain_list, list) + tcf_chain_put(chain); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcf_block_put_ext); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com are queue-4.15/net_sched-get-rid-of-rcu_barrier-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch queue-4.15/cls_u32-add-missing-rcu-annotation.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "net: sched: fix use-after-free in tcf_block_put_ext" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: sched: fix use-after-free in tcf_block_put_ext to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net-sched-fix-use-after-free-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)mellanox.com> Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 19:27:27 +0100 Subject: net: sched: fix use-after-free in tcf_block_put_ext From: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)mellanox.com> [ Upstream commit df45bf84e4f5a48f23d4b1a07d21d566e8b587b2 ] Since the block is freed with last chain being put, once we reach the end of iteration of list_for_each_entry_safe, the block may be already freed. I'm hitting this only by creating and deleting clsact: [ 202.171952] ================================================================== [ 202.180182] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.187590] Read of size 8 at addr ffff880225539a80 by task tc/796 [ 202.194508] [ 202.196185] CPU: 0 PID: 796 Comm: tc Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2jiri+ #5 [ 202.203200] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. "MSN2100-CB2F"/"SA001017", BIOS 5.6.5 06/07/2016 [ 202.213613] Call Trace: [ 202.216369] dump_stack+0xda/0x169 [ 202.220192] ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x147/0x147 [ 202.224790] ? show_regs_print_info+0x54/0x54 [ 202.229691] ? tcf_chain_destroy+0x1dc/0x250 [ 202.234494] print_address_description+0x83/0x3d0 [ 202.239781] ? tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.244575] kasan_report+0x1ba/0x460 [ 202.248707] ? tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.253518] tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.258117] ? tcf_chain_flush+0x290/0x290 [ 202.262708] ? qdisc_hash_del+0x82/0x1a0 [ 202.267111] ? qdisc_hash_add+0x50/0x50 [ 202.271411] ? __lock_is_held+0x5f/0x1a0 [ 202.275843] clsact_destroy+0x3d/0x80 [sch_ingress] [ 202.281323] qdisc_destroy+0xcb/0x240 [ 202.285445] qdisc_graft+0x216/0x7b0 [ 202.289497] tc_get_qdisc+0x260/0x560 Fix this by holding the block also by chain 0 and put chain 0 explicitly, out of the list_for_each_entry_safe loop at the very end of tcf_block_put_ext. Fixes: efbf78973978 ("net_sched: get rid of rcu_barrier() in tcf_block_put_ext()") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/sched/cls_api.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/net/sched/cls_api.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c @@ -343,23 +343,24 @@ void tcf_block_put_ext(struct tcf_block if (!block) return; - /* Hold a refcnt for all chains, except 0, so that they don't disappear + /* Hold a refcnt for all chains, so that they don't disappear * while we are iterating. */ list_for_each_entry(chain, &block->chain_list, list) - if (chain->index) - tcf_chain_hold(chain); + tcf_chain_hold(chain); list_for_each_entry(chain, &block->chain_list, list) tcf_chain_flush(chain); tcf_block_offload_unbind(block, q, ei); - /* At this point, all the chains should have refcnt >= 1. Block will be - * freed after all chains are gone. - */ + /* At this point, all the chains should have refcnt >= 1. */ list_for_each_entry_safe(chain, tmp, &block->chain_list, list) tcf_chain_put(chain); + + /* Finally, put chain 0 and allow block to be freed. */ + chain = list_first_entry(&block->chain_list, struct tcf_chain, list); + tcf_chain_put(chain); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcf_block_put_ext); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jiri(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.15/net_sched-get-rid-of-rcu_barrier-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch queue-4.15/rocker-fix-possible-null-pointer-dereference-in-rocker_router_fib_event_work.patch queue-4.15/net-sched-fix-use-after-free-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "net: ipv6: send unsolicited NA after DAD" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: ipv6: send unsolicited NA after DAD to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net-ipv6-send-unsolicited-na-after-dad.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: David Ahern <dsahern(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 20:16:29 -0800 Subject: net: ipv6: send unsolicited NA after DAD From: David Ahern <dsahern(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit c76fe2d98c726224a975a0d0198c3fb50406d325 ] Unsolicited IPv6 neighbor advertisements should be sent after DAD completes. Update ndisc_send_unsol_na to skip tentative, non-optimistic addresses and have those sent by addrconf_dad_completed after DAD. Fixes: 4a6e3c5def13c ("net: ipv6: send unsolicited NA on admin up") Reported-by: Vivek Venkatraman <vivek(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- net/ipv6/ndisc.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -186,7 +186,8 @@ static struct rt6_info *addrconf_get_pre static void addrconf_dad_start(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp); static void addrconf_dad_work(struct work_struct *w); -static void addrconf_dad_completed(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool bump_id); +static void addrconf_dad_completed(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool bump_id, + bool send_na); static void addrconf_dad_run(struct inet6_dev *idev); static void addrconf_rs_timer(struct timer_list *t); static void __ipv6_ifa_notify(int event, struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa); @@ -3833,12 +3834,17 @@ static void addrconf_dad_begin(struct in idev->cnf.accept_dad < 1) || !(ifp->flags&IFA_F_TENTATIVE) || ifp->flags & IFA_F_NODAD) { + bool send_na = false; + + if (ifp->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE && + !(ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)) + send_na = true; bump_id = ifp->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE; ifp->flags &= ~(IFA_F_TENTATIVE|IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC|IFA_F_DADFAILED); spin_unlock(&ifp->lock); read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); - addrconf_dad_completed(ifp, bump_id); + addrconf_dad_completed(ifp, bump_id, send_na); return; } @@ -3967,16 +3973,21 @@ static void addrconf_dad_work(struct wor } if (ifp->dad_probes == 0) { + bool send_na = false; + /* * DAD was successful */ + if (ifp->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE && + !(ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)) + send_na = true; bump_id = ifp->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE; ifp->flags &= ~(IFA_F_TENTATIVE|IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC|IFA_F_DADFAILED); spin_unlock(&ifp->lock); write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); - addrconf_dad_completed(ifp, bump_id); + addrconf_dad_completed(ifp, bump_id, send_na); goto out; } @@ -4014,7 +4025,8 @@ static bool ipv6_lonely_lladdr(struct in return true; } -static void addrconf_dad_completed(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool bump_id) +static void addrconf_dad_completed(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool bump_id, + bool send_na) { struct net_device *dev = ifp->idev->dev; struct in6_addr lladdr; @@ -4046,6 +4058,16 @@ static void addrconf_dad_completed(struc if (send_mld) ipv6_mc_dad_complete(ifp->idev); + /* send unsolicited NA if enabled */ + if (send_na && + (ifp->idev->cnf.ndisc_notify || + dev_net(dev)->ipv6.devconf_all->ndisc_notify)) { + ndisc_send_na(dev, &in6addr_linklocal_allnodes, &ifp->addr, + /*router=*/ !!ifp->idev->cnf.forwarding, + /*solicited=*/ false, /*override=*/ true, + /*inc_opt=*/ true); + } + if (send_rs) { /* * If a host as already performed a random delay --- a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c @@ -566,6 +566,11 @@ static void ndisc_send_unsol_na(struct n read_lock_bh(&idev->lock); list_for_each_entry(ifa, &idev->addr_list, if_list) { + /* skip tentative addresses until dad completes */ + if (ifa->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE && + !(ifa->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)) + continue; + ndisc_send_na(dev, &in6addr_linklocal_allnodes, &ifa->addr, /*router=*/ !!idev->cnf.forwarding, /*solicited=*/ false, /*override=*/ true, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dsahern(a)gmail.com are queue-4.15/net-ipv6-send-unsolicited-na-after-dad.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 10:26:57 -0800 Subject: net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit e7aadb27a5415e8125834b84a74477bfbee4eff5 ] Newly added igmpv3_get_srcaddr() needs to be called under rcu lock. Timer callbacks do not ensure this locking. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0+ #200 Not tainted ----------------------------- ./include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by syzkaller616973/4074: #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bfce669e>] __do_page_fault+0x32d/0xc90 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1355 #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:178 [inline] #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] call_timer_fn+0x1c6/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1316 #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline] #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] igmpv3_send_report+0x98/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:600 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 4074 Comm: syzkaller616973 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #200 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 __in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 [inline] igmpv3_get_srcaddr net/ipv4/igmp.c:329 [inline] igmpv3_newpack+0xeef/0x12e0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:389 add_grhead.isra.27+0x235/0x300 net/ipv4/igmp.c:432 add_grec+0xbd3/0x1170 net/ipv4/igmp.c:565 igmpv3_send_report+0xd5/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:605 igmp_send_report+0xc43/0x1050 net/ipv4/igmp.c:722 igmp_timer_expire+0x322/0x5c0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:831 call_timer_fn+0x228/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1326 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline] __run_timers+0x7ee/0xb70 kernel/time/timer.c:1666 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692 __do_softirq+0x2d7/0xb85 kernel/softirq.c:285 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:541 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052 apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:938 Fixes: a46182b00290 ("net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -386,7 +386,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *igmpv3_newpack(st pip->frag_off = htons(IP_DF); pip->ttl = 1; pip->daddr = fl4.daddr; + + rcu_read_lock(); pip->saddr = igmpv3_get_srcaddr(dev, &fl4); + rcu_read_unlock(); + pip->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP; pip->tot_len = 0; /* filled in later */ ip_select_ident(net, skb, NULL); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from edumazet(a)google.com are queue-4.15/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch queue-4.15/net_sched-get-rid-of-rcu_barrier-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch queue-4.15/net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch queue-4.15/ipv6-change-route-cache-aging-logic.patch queue-4.15/soreuseport-fix-mem-leak-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch queue-4.15/revert-defer-call-to-mem_cgroup_sk_alloc.patch queue-4.15/ipv6-addrconf-break-critical-section-in-addrconf_verify_rtnl.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ipv6-fix-so_reuseport-udp-socket-with-implicit-sk_ipv6only.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 23:15:27 -0800 Subject: ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> [ Upstream commit 7ece54a60ee2ba7a386308cae73c790bd580589c ] If a sk_v6_rcv_saddr is !IPV6_ADDR_ANY and !IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED, it implicitly implies it is an ipv6only socket. However, in inet6_bind(), this addr_type checking and setting sk->sk_ipv6only to 1 are only done after sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum) has been completed successfully. This inconsistency between sk_v6_rcv_saddr and sk_ipv6only confuses the 'get_port()'. In particular, when binding SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets, udp_reuseport_add_sock(sk,...) is called. udp_reuseport_add_sock() checks "ipv6_only_sock(sk2) == ipv6_only_sock(sk)" before adding sk to sk2->sk_reuseport_cb. In this case, ipv6_only_sock(sk2) could be 1 while ipv6_only_sock(sk) is still 0 here. The end result is, reuseport_alloc(sk) is called instead of adding sk to the existing sk2->sk_reuseport_cb. It can be reproduced by binding two SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets on an IPv6 address (!ANY and !MAPPED). Only one of the socket will receive packet. The fix is to set the implicit sk_ipv6only before calling get_port(). The original sk_ipv6only has to be saved such that it can be restored in case get_port() failed. The situation is similar to the inet_reset_saddr(sk) after get_port() has failed. Thanks to Calvin Owens <calvinowens(a)fb.com> who created an easy reproduction which leads to a fix. Fixes: e32ea7e74727 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport UDP socket selection") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru struct net *net = sock_net(sk); __be32 v4addr = 0; unsigned short snum; + bool saved_ipv6only; int addr_type = 0; int err = 0; @@ -389,19 +390,21 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)) np->saddr = addr->sin6_addr; + saved_ipv6only = sk->sk_ipv6only; + if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY && addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) + sk->sk_ipv6only = 1; + /* Make sure we are allowed to bind here. */ if ((snum || !inet->bind_address_no_port) && sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) { + sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only; inet_reset_saddr(sk); err = -EADDRINUSE; goto out; } - if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) { + if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK; - if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) - sk->sk_ipv6only = 1; - } if (snum) sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK; inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from kafai(a)fb.com are queue-4.15/ipv6-change-route-cache-aging-logic.patch queue-4.15/ipv6-fix-so_reuseport-udp-socket-with-implicit-sk_ipv6only.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ipv6: change route cache aging logic" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ipv6: change route cache aging logic to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ipv6-change-route-cache-aging-logic.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Wei Wang <weiwan(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 11:40:17 -0800 Subject: ipv6: change route cache aging logic From: Wei Wang <weiwan(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 31afeb425f7fad8bcf9561aeb0b8405479f97a98 ] In current route cache aging logic, if a route has both RTF_EXPIRE and RTF_GATEWAY set, the route will only be removed if the neighbor cache has no NTF_ROUTER flag. Otherwise, even if the route has expired, it won't get deleted. Fix this logic to always check if the route has expired first and then do the gateway neighbor cache check if previous check decide to not remove the exception entry. Fixes: 1859bac04fb6 ("ipv6: remove from fib tree aged out RTF_CACHE dst") Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/route.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -1586,12 +1586,19 @@ static void rt6_age_examine_exception(st * EXPIRES exceptions - e.g. pmtu-generated ones are pruned when * expired, independently from their aging, as per RFC 8201 section 4 */ - if (!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES) && - time_after_eq(now, rt->dst.lastuse + gc_args->timeout)) { - RT6_TRACE("aging clone %p\n", rt); + if (!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES)) { + if (time_after_eq(now, rt->dst.lastuse + gc_args->timeout)) { + RT6_TRACE("aging clone %p\n", rt); + rt6_remove_exception(bucket, rt6_ex); + return; + } + } else if (time_after(jiffies, rt->dst.expires)) { + RT6_TRACE("purging expired route %p\n", rt); rt6_remove_exception(bucket, rt6_ex); return; - } else if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_GATEWAY) { + } + + if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_GATEWAY) { struct neighbour *neigh; __u8 neigh_flags = 0; @@ -1606,11 +1613,8 @@ static void rt6_age_examine_exception(st rt6_remove_exception(bucket, rt6_ex); return; } - } else if (__rt6_check_expired(rt)) { - RT6_TRACE("purging expired route %p\n", rt); - rt6_remove_exception(bucket, rt6_ex); - return; } + gc_args->more++; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from weiwan(a)google.com are queue-4.15/ipv6-change-route-cache-aging-logic.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ipv6: addrconf: break critical section in addrconf_verify_rtnl()" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ipv6: addrconf: break critical section in addrconf_verify_rtnl() to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ipv6-addrconf-break-critical-section-in-addrconf_verify_rtnl.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 16:10:43 -0800 Subject: ipv6: addrconf: break critical section in addrconf_verify_rtnl() From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit e64e469b9a2c22d41b3dd7172118760cec22d473 ] Heiner reported a lockdep splat [1] This is caused by attempting GFP_KERNEL allocation while RCU lock is held and BH blocked. We believe that addrconf_verify_rtnl() could run for a long period, so instead of using GFP_ATOMIC here as Ido suggested, we should break the critical section and restart it after the allocation. [1] [86220.125562] ============================= [86220.125586] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [86220.125612] 4.15.0-rc7-next-20180110+ #7 Not tainted [86220.125641] ----------------------------- [86220.125666] kernel/sched/core.c:6026 Illegal context switch in RCU-bh read-side critical section! [86220.125711] other info that might help us debug this: [86220.125755] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [86220.125792] 4 locks held by kworker/0:2/1003: [86220.125817] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da8e9b73>] process_one_work+0x1de/0x680 [86220.125895] #1: ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da8e9b73>] process_one_work+0x1de/0x680 [86220.125959] #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000b06d9510>] rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 [86220.126017] #3: (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: [<00000000aef52299>] addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x1e/0x510 [ipv6] [86220.126111] stack backtrace: [86220.126142] CPU: 0 PID: 1003 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc7-next-20180110+ #7 [86220.126185] Hardware name: ZOTAC ZBOX-CI321NANO/ZBOX-CI321NANO, BIOS B246P105 06/01/2015 [86220.126250] Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_verify_work [ipv6] [86220.126288] Call Trace: [86220.126312] dump_stack+0x70/0x9e [86220.126337] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xce/0xf0 [86220.126365] ___might_sleep+0x1d3/0x240 [86220.126390] __might_sleep+0x45/0x80 [86220.126416] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x53/0x250 [86220.126458] ? ipv6_add_addr+0xfe/0x6e0 [ipv6] [86220.126498] ipv6_add_addr+0xfe/0x6e0 [ipv6] [86220.126538] ipv6_create_tempaddr+0x24d/0x430 [ipv6] [86220.126580] ? ipv6_create_tempaddr+0x24d/0x430 [ipv6] [86220.126623] addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x339/0x510 [ipv6] [86220.126664] ? addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x339/0x510 [ipv6] [86220.126708] addrconf_verify_work+0xe/0x20 [ipv6] [86220.126738] process_one_work+0x258/0x680 [86220.126765] worker_thread+0x35/0x3f0 [86220.126790] kthread+0x124/0x140 [86220.126813] ? process_one_work+0x680/0x680 [86220.126839] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40 [86220.126869] ? umh_complete+0x40/0x40 [86220.126893] ? call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x12a/0x160 [86220.126926] ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x60 [86220.126999] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.h:420 [86220.127041] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1003, name: kworker/0:2 [86220.127082] 4 locks held by kworker/0:2/1003: [86220.127107] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da8e9b73>] process_one_work+0x1de/0x680 [86220.127179] #1: ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da8e9b73>] process_one_work+0x1de/0x680 [86220.127242] #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000b06d9510>] rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 [86220.127300] #3: (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: [<00000000aef52299>] addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x1e/0x510 [ipv6] [86220.127414] CPU: 0 PID: 1003 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc7-next-20180110+ #7 [86220.127463] Hardware name: ZOTAC ZBOX-CI321NANO/ZBOX-CI321NANO, BIOS B246P105 06/01/2015 [86220.127528] Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_verify_work [ipv6] [86220.127568] Call Trace: [86220.127591] dump_stack+0x70/0x9e [86220.127616] ___might_sleep+0x14d/0x240 [86220.127644] __might_sleep+0x45/0x80 [86220.127672] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x53/0x250 [86220.127717] ? ipv6_add_addr+0xfe/0x6e0 [ipv6] [86220.127762] ipv6_add_addr+0xfe/0x6e0 [ipv6] [86220.127807] ipv6_create_tempaddr+0x24d/0x430 [ipv6] [86220.127854] ? ipv6_create_tempaddr+0x24d/0x430 [ipv6] [86220.127903] addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x339/0x510 [ipv6] [86220.127950] ? addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x339/0x510 [ipv6] [86220.127998] addrconf_verify_work+0xe/0x20 [ipv6] [86220.128032] process_one_work+0x258/0x680 [86220.128063] worker_thread+0x35/0x3f0 [86220.128091] kthread+0x124/0x140 [86220.128117] ? process_one_work+0x680/0x680 [86220.128146] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40 [86220.128180] ? umh_complete+0x40/0x40 [86220.128207] ? call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x12a/0x160 [86220.128243] ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x60 Fixes: f3d9832e56c4 ("ipv6: addrconf: cleanup locking in ipv6_add_addr") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reported-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -4352,9 +4352,11 @@ restart: spin_lock(&ifpub->lock); ifpub->regen_count = 0; spin_unlock(&ifpub->lock); + rcu_read_unlock_bh(); ipv6_create_tempaddr(ifpub, ifp, true); in6_ifa_put(ifpub); in6_ifa_put(ifp); + rcu_read_lock_bh(); goto restart; } } else if (time_before(ifp->tstamp + ifp->prefered_lft * HZ - regen_advance * HZ, next)) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from edumazet(a)google.com are queue-4.15/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch queue-4.15/net_sched-get-rid-of-rcu_barrier-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch queue-4.15/net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch queue-4.15/ipv6-change-route-cache-aging-logic.patch queue-4.15/soreuseport-fix-mem-leak-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch queue-4.15/revert-defer-call-to-mem_cgroup_sk_alloc.patch queue-4.15/ipv6-addrconf-break-critical-section-in-addrconf_verify_rtnl.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ip6mr: fix stale iterator" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ip6mr: fix stale iterator to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ip6mr-fix-stale-iterator.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 16:29:30 +0200 Subject: ip6mr: fix stale iterator From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> [ Upstream commit 4adfa79fc254efb7b0eb3cd58f62c2c3f805f1ba ] When we dump the ip6mr mfc entries via proc, we initialize an iterator with the table to dump but we don't clear the cache pointer which might be initialized from a prior read on the same descriptor that ended. This can result in lock imbalance (an unnecessary unlock) leading to other crashes and hangs. Clear the cache pointer like ipmr does to fix the issue. Thanks for the reliable reproducer. Here's syzbot's trace: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Not tainted syzkaller971460/3195 is trying to release lock (mrt_lock) at: [<000000006898068d>] ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 1 lock held by syzkaller971460/3195: #0: (&p->lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000744a6565>] seq_read+0xd5/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:165 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x12f/0x140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3561 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3775 [inline] lock_release+0x5f9/0xda0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4023 __raw_read_unlock include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:225 [inline] _raw_read_unlock+0x1a/0x30 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:255 ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 traverse+0x3bc/0xa00 fs/seq_file.c:135 seq_read+0x96a/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:189 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at lib/usercopy.c:25 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3195, name: syzkaller971460 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 ___might_sleep+0x2b2/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6060 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6013 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4525 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] seq_read+0xcb4/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:279 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 at lib/usercopy.c:26 _copy_to_user+0xb5/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:26 Reported-by: syzbot <bot+eceb3204562c41a438fa1f2335e0fe4f6886d669(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ static void *ipmr_mfc_seq_start(struct s return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); it->mrt = mrt; + it->cache = NULL; return *pos ? ipmr_mfc_seq_idx(net, seq->private, *pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com are queue-4.15/ip6mr-fix-stale-iterator.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "cls_u32: add missing RCU annotation." has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled cls_u32: add missing RCU annotation. to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: cls_u32-add-missing-rcu-annotation.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 11:29:33 PST 2018 From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 16:02:22 +0100 Subject: cls_u32: add missing RCU annotation. From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 058a6c033488494a6b1477b05fe8e1a16e344462 ] In a couple of points of the control path, n->ht_down is currently accessed without the required RCU annotation. The accesses are safe, but sparse complaints. Since we already held the rtnl lock, let use rtnl_dereference(). Fixes: a1b7c5fd7fe9 ("net: sched: add cls_u32 offload hooks for netdevs") Fixes: de5df63228fc ("net: sched: cls_u32 changes to knode must appear atomic to readers") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/sched/cls_u32.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -544,6 +544,7 @@ static void u32_remove_hw_knode(struct t static int u32_replace_hw_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n, u32 flags) { + struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down); struct tcf_block *block = tp->chain->block; struct tc_cls_u32_offload cls_u32 = {}; bool skip_sw = tc_skip_sw(flags); @@ -563,7 +564,7 @@ static int u32_replace_hw_knode(struct t cls_u32.knode.sel = &n->sel; cls_u32.knode.exts = &n->exts; if (n->ht_down) - cls_u32.knode.link_handle = n->ht_down->handle; + cls_u32.knode.link_handle = ht->handle; err = tc_setup_cb_call(block, NULL, TC_SETUP_CLSU32, &cls_u32, skip_sw); if (err < 0) { @@ -840,8 +841,9 @@ static void u32_replace_knode(struct tcf static struct tc_u_knode *u32_init_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n) { - struct tc_u_knode *new; + struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down); struct tc_u32_sel *s = &n->sel; + struct tc_u_knode *new; new = kzalloc(sizeof(*n) + s->nkeys*sizeof(struct tc_u32_key), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -859,11 +861,11 @@ static struct tc_u_knode *u32_init_knode new->fshift = n->fshift; new->res = n->res; new->flags = n->flags; - RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->ht_down, n->ht_down); + RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->ht_down, ht); /* bump reference count as long as we hold pointer to structure */ - if (new->ht_down) - new->ht_down->refcnt++; + if (ht) + ht->refcnt++; #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF /* Statistics may be incremented by readers during update Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from pabeni(a)redhat.com are queue-4.15/net_sched-get-rid-of-rcu_barrier-in-tcf_block_put_ext.patch queue-4.15/ipv6-change-route-cache-aging-logic.patch queue-4.15/cls_u32-add-missing-rcu-annotation.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "kbuild: rpm-pkg: keep spec file until make mrproper" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled kbuild: rpm-pkg: keep spec file until make mrproper to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kbuild-rpm-pkg-keep-spec-file-until-make-mrproper.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From af60e207087975d069858741c44ed4f450330ac4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2017 10:10:10 +0900 Subject: kbuild: rpm-pkg: keep spec file until make mrproper From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> commit af60e207087975d069858741c44ed4f450330ac4 upstream. If build fails during (bin)rpm-pkg, the spec file is not cleaned by anyone until the next successful build of the package. We do not have to immediately delete the spec file in case somebody may want to take a look at it. Instead, make them ignored by git, and cleaned up by make mrproper. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- .gitignore | 5 +++++ scripts/package/Makefile | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ modules.builtin /Module.markers # +# RPM spec file (make rpm-pkg) +# +/*.spec + +# # Debian directory (make deb-pkg) # /debian/ --- a/scripts/package/Makefile +++ b/scripts/package/Makefile @@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ rpm-pkg rpm: FORCE $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(MKSPEC) >$(objtree)/kernel.spec $(call cmd,src_tar,$(KERNELPATH),kernel.spec) +rpmbuild $(RPMOPTS) --target $(UTS_MACHINE) -ta $(KERNELPATH).tar.gz - rm $(KERNELPATH).tar.gz kernel.spec # binrpm-pkg # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -59,7 +58,8 @@ binrpm-pkg: FORCE $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(MKSPEC) prebuilt > $(objtree)/binkernel.spec +rpmbuild $(RPMOPTS) --define "_builddir $(objtree)" --target \ $(UTS_MACHINE) -bb $(objtree)/binkernel.spec - rm binkernel.spec + +clean-files += $(objtree)/*.spec # Deb target # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com are queue-4.14/gitignore-move-.dtb-and-.dtb.s-patterns-to-the-top-level-.gitignore.patch queue-4.14/kbuild-rpm-pkg-keep-spec-file-until-make-mrproper.patch queue-4.14/gitignore-sort-normal-pattern-rules-alphabetically.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch ".gitignore: sort normal pattern rules alphabetically" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled .gitignore: sort normal pattern rules alphabetically to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: gitignore-sort-normal-pattern-rules-alphabetically.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 1377dd3e29878b8f5d9f5c9000975f50a428a0cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 00:33:45 +0900 Subject: .gitignore: sort normal pattern rules alphabetically From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> commit 1377dd3e29878b8f5d9f5c9000975f50a428a0cd upstream. We are having more and more ignore patterns. Sort the list alphabetically. We will easily catch duplicated patterns if any. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- .gitignore | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -7,38 +7,38 @@ # command after changing this file, to see if there are # any tracked files which get ignored after the change. # -# Normal rules +# Normal rules (sorted alphabetically) # .* +*.a +*.bin +*.bz2 +*.c.[012]*.* +*.dwo +*.elf +*.gcno +*.gz +*.i +*.ko +*.ll +*.lst +*.lz4 +*.lzma +*.lzo +*.mod.c *.o *.o.* -*.a +*.order +*.patch *.s -*.ko *.so *.so.dbg -*.mod.c -*.i -*.lst +*.su *.symtypes -*.order -*.elf -*.bin *.tar -*.gz -*.bz2 -*.lzma *.xz -*.lz4 -*.lzo -*.patch -*.gcno -*.ll -modules.builtin Module.symvers -*.dwo -*.su -*.c.[012]*.* +modules.builtin # # Top-level generic files Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com are queue-4.14/gitignore-move-.dtb-and-.dtb.s-patterns-to-the-top-level-.gitignore.patch queue-4.14/kbuild-rpm-pkg-keep-spec-file-until-make-mrproper.patch queue-4.14/gitignore-sort-normal-pattern-rules-alphabetically.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch ".gitignore: move *.dtb and *.dtb.S patterns to the top-level .gitignore" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled .gitignore: move *.dtb and *.dtb.S patterns to the top-level .gitignore to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: gitignore-move-.dtb-and-.dtb.s-patterns-to-the-top-level-.gitignore.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 10b62a2f785ab55857380f0c63d9fa468fd8c676 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 00:33:46 +0900 Subject: .gitignore: move *.dtb and *.dtb.S patterns to the top-level .gitignore From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> commit 10b62a2f785ab55857380f0c63d9fa468fd8c676 upstream. Most of DT files are compiled under arch/*/boot/dts/, but we have some other directories, like drivers/of/unittest-data/. We often miss to add gitignore patterns per directory. Since there are no source files that end with .dtb or .dtb.S, we can ignore the patterns globally. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- .gitignore | 2 ++ arch/arc/boot/.gitignore | 1 - arch/arm/boot/.gitignore | 1 - arch/arm64/boot/dts/.gitignore | 1 - arch/metag/boot/.gitignore | 1 - arch/microblaze/boot/.gitignore | 1 - arch/mips/boot/.gitignore | 1 - arch/nios2/boot/.gitignore | 1 - arch/powerpc/boot/.gitignore | 1 - arch/xtensa/boot/.gitignore | 1 - drivers/of/unittest-data/.gitignore | 2 -- 11 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ *.bin *.bz2 *.c.[012]*.* +*.dtb +*.dtb.S *.dwo *.elf *.gcno --- a/arch/arc/boot/.gitignore +++ b/arch/arc/boot/.gitignore @@ -1,2 +1 @@ -*.dtb* uImage --- a/arch/arm/boot/.gitignore +++ b/arch/arm/boot/.gitignore @@ -3,4 +3,3 @@ zImage xipImage bootpImage uImage -*.dtb --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/.gitignore +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -*.dtb --- a/arch/metag/boot/.gitignore +++ b/arch/metag/boot/.gitignore @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ vmlinux* uImage* ramdisk.* -*.dtb* --- a/arch/microblaze/boot/.gitignore +++ b/arch/microblaze/boot/.gitignore @@ -1,3 +1,2 @@ -*.dtb linux.bin* simpleImage.* --- a/arch/mips/boot/.gitignore +++ b/arch/mips/boot/.gitignore @@ -5,4 +5,3 @@ zImage zImage.tmp calc_vmlinuz_load_addr uImage -*.dtb --- a/arch/nios2/boot/.gitignore +++ b/arch/nios2/boot/.gitignore @@ -1,2 +1 @@ -*.dtb vmImage --- a/arch/powerpc/boot/.gitignore +++ b/arch/powerpc/boot/.gitignore @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ otheros.bld uImage cuImage.* dtbImage.* -*.dtb treeImage.* vmlinux.strip zImage --- a/arch/xtensa/boot/.gitignore +++ b/arch/xtensa/boot/.gitignore @@ -1,3 +1,2 @@ uImage zImage.redboot -*.dtb --- a/drivers/of/unittest-data/.gitignore +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -testcases.dtb -testcases.dtb.S Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com are queue-4.14/gitignore-move-.dtb-and-.dtb.s-patterns-to-the-top-level-.gitignore.patch queue-4.14/kbuild-rpm-pkg-keep-spec-file-until-make-mrproper.patch queue-4.14/gitignore-sort-normal-pattern-rules-alphabetically.patch

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] Regression for ip6-in-ip4 IPsec tunnel in 4.14.16

by Mike Maloney

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 12:23 PM, Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac(a)debian.org> wrote: > On Wed, 2018-02-07 at 18:05 +0100, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote: >> I'll try to printk the mtu before returning EINVAL to see why it's lower than >> 1280, but maybe the IP encapsulation is not correctly handled? > > I did: > > diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c > index 3763dc01e374..d3c651158d35 100644 > --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c > +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c > @@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ static int ip6_setup_cork(struct sock *sk, struct inet_cork_full *cork, > mtu = np->frag_size; > } > if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU) > - return -EINVAL; > + printk("mtu: %d\n", mtu); > cork->base.fragsize = mtu; > if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path)) > cork->base.flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG; > > and I get: > > févr. 07 18:19:50 scapa kernel: mtu: 1218 > > and it doesn't depend on the original packet size (same thing happens with > ping -s 100). It also happens with UDP (DNS) traffic, but apparently not with > TCP. > > Regards, > -- > Yves-Alexis Hi Yves-Alexis - I apologize for the problem. It seems to me that tunneling with an outer MTU that causes the inner MTU to be smaller than the min, is potentially problematic in other ways as well. But also it could seem unfortunate that the code with my fix does not look at actual packet size, but instead only looks at the MTU and then fails, even if no packet was going to be so large. The intention of my patch was to prevent a negative number while calculating the maxfraglen in __ip6_append_data(). An alternative fix maybe to instead return an error only if the mtu is less than or equal to the fragheaderlen. Something like: diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index 3763dc01e374..5d912a289b95 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -1214,8 +1214,6 @@ static int ip6_setup_cork(struct sock *sk, struct inet_cork_full *cork, if (np->frag_size) mtu = np->frag_size; } - if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU) - return -EINVAL; cork->base.fragsize = mtu; if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path)) cork->base.flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG; @@ -1264,6 +1262,8 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len + (opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0); + if (mtu < fragheaderlen + 8) + return -EINVAL; maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr); (opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0); But then we also have to convince ourselves that maxfraglen can never be <= 0. I'd have to think about that. I am not sure if others have thoughts on supporting MTUs configured below the min in the spec. Thanks. -- Mike Maloney

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 3.18 00/36] 3.18.94-stable review

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

On Tue, Feb 06, 2018 at 11:42:15AM +0000, Harsh Shandilya wrote: > On Tue 6 Feb, 2018, 4:04 PM Greg Kroah-Hartman, <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> > wrote: > > > On Tue, Feb 06, 2018 at 06:48:53AM +0000, Harsh Shandilya wrote: > > > On Tue 6 Feb, 2018, 12:09 AM Greg Kroah-Hartman, < > > gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.94 release. > > > > There are 36 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response > > > > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please > > > > let me know. > > > > > > > > Responses should be made by Wed Feb 7 18:23:41 UTC 2018. > > > > Anything received after that time might be too late. > > > > > > > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: > > > > > > > > kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/stable-review/patch-3.18.94-rc1.gz > > > > or in the git tree and branch at: > > > > git:// > > git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git > > > > linux-3.18.y > > > > and the diffstat can be found below. > > > > > > > > thanks, > > > > > > > > greg k-h > > > > > > > > > > Builds and boots on the OnePlus 3T, no regressions noticed. > > > > Yeah! That device is the only reason I keep this tree alive :) > > > > thanks for testing and letting me know. > > > > greg k-h > > > > Guess I should drop my kernel tree for the device and save you the pain of > maintaining 3.18 :P Heh, maybe :) > Atleast CAF has been keeping up with upstream now thanks to your > kernel-common merges so there's still hope for MSM platform users :) That's good to see. Now if only those platform users would actually update their kernels to these new versions :( > P.S. common merge should go in cleanly, both the merge conflicts I had were > from CAF changes. Thanks for letting me know, that's great to hear as I just had a question from some companies who are worried that taking stable patches will cause tons of merge issues. It hasn't in my experience, and seeing reports of this from others is great news. thanks, greg k-h

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/microcode/AMD: Do not load when running on a hypervisor" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/microcode/AMD: Do not load when running on a hypervisor to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-microcode-amd-do-not-load-when-running-on-a-hypervisor.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From a15a753539eca8ba243d576f02e7ca9c4b7d7042 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2016 17:44:13 +0100 Subject: x86/microcode/AMD: Do not load when running on a hypervisor From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> commit a15a753539eca8ba243d576f02e7ca9c4b7d7042 upstream. Doing so is completely void of sense for multiple reasons so prevent it. Set dis_ucode_ldr to true and thus disable the microcode loader by default to address xen pv guests which execute the AP path but not the BSP path. By having it turned off by default, the APs won't run into the loader either. Also, check CPUID(1).ECX[31] which hypervisors set. Well almost, not the xen pv one. That one gets the aforementioned "fix". Also, improve the detection method by caching the final decision whether to continue loading in dis_ucode_ldr and do it once on the BSP. The APs then simply test that value. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky(a)oracle.com> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161218164414.9649-4-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Rolf Neugebauer <rolf.neugebauer(a)docker.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ #define MICROCODE_VERSION "2.01" static struct microcode_ops *microcode_ops; -static bool dis_ucode_ldr; +static bool dis_ucode_ldr = true; /* * Synchronization. @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ struct cpu_info_ctx { static bool __init check_loader_disabled_bsp(void) { static const char *__dis_opt_str = "dis_ucode_ldr"; + u32 a, b, c, d; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 const char *cmdline = (const char *)__pa_nodebug(boot_command_line); @@ -85,8 +86,23 @@ static bool __init check_loader_disabled bool *res = &dis_ucode_ldr; #endif - if (cmdline_find_option_bool(cmdline, option)) - *res = true; + if (!have_cpuid_p()) + return *res; + + a = 1; + c = 0; + native_cpuid(&a, &b, &c, &d); + + /* + * CPUID(1).ECX[31]: reserved for hypervisor use. This is still not + * completely accurate as xen pv guests don't see that CPUID bit set but + * that's good enough as they don't land on the BSP path anyway. + */ + if (c & BIT(31)) + return *res; + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(cmdline, option) <= 0) + *res = false; return *res; } @@ -118,9 +134,6 @@ void __init load_ucode_bsp(void) if (check_loader_disabled_bsp()) return; - if (!have_cpuid_p()) - return; - vendor = x86_cpuid_vendor(); family = x86_cpuid_family(); @@ -154,9 +167,6 @@ void load_ucode_ap(void) if (check_loader_disabled_ap()) return; - if (!have_cpuid_p()) - return; - vendor = x86_cpuid_vendor(); family = x86_cpuid_family(); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp(a)suse.de are queue-4.9/x86-microcode-amd-do-not-load-when-running-on-a-hypervisor.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix connection lost problem correctly

by Larry Finger

There has been a coding error in rtl8821ae since it was first introduced, namely that an 8-bit register was read using a 16-bit read in _rtl8821ae_dbi_read(). This error was fixed with commit 40b368af4b75 ("rtlwifi: Fix alignment issues"); however, this change led to instability in the connection. To restore stability, this change was reverted in commit b8b8b16352cd ("rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix connection lost problem"). Unfortunately, the unaligned access causes machine checks in ARM architecture, and we were finally forced to find the actual cause of the problem on x86 platforms. Following a suggestion from Pkshih <pkshih(a)realtek.com>, it was found that increasing the ASPM L1 latency from 0 to 7 fixed the instability. This parameter was varied to see if a smaller value would work; however, it appears that 7 is the safest value. A new symbol is defined for this quantity, thus it can be easily changed if necessary. Fixes: b8b8b16352cd ("rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix connection lost problem") Cc: Stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+ Fix-suggested-by: Pkshih <pkshih(a)realtek.com> Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger(a)lwfinger.net> --- Kalle, This patch should be submitted to 4.16. Larry --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/hw.c | 5 +++-- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/wifi.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/hw.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/hw.c index f20e77b4bb65..317c1b3101da 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/hw.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/hw.c @@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ static u8 _rtl8821ae_dbi_read(struct rtl_priv *rtlpriv, u16 addr) } if (0 == tmp) { read_addr = REG_DBI_RDATA + addr % 4; - ret = rtl_read_word(rtlpriv, read_addr); + ret = rtl_read_byte(rtlpriv, read_addr); } return ret; } @@ -1165,7 +1165,8 @@ static void _rtl8821ae_enable_aspm_back_door(struct ieee80211_hw *hw) } tmp = _rtl8821ae_dbi_read(rtlpriv, 0x70f); - _rtl8821ae_dbi_write(rtlpriv, 0x70f, tmp | BIT(7)); + _rtl8821ae_dbi_write(rtlpriv, 0x70f, tmp | BIT(7) | + ASPM_L1_LATENCY << 3); tmp = _rtl8821ae_dbi_read(rtlpriv, 0x719); _rtl8821ae_dbi_write(rtlpriv, 0x719, tmp | BIT(3) | BIT(4)); diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/wifi.h b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/wifi.h index 1c9ed28b42da..4f48b934ec01 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/wifi.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/wifi.h @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ #define RTL_USB_MAX_RX_COUNT 100 #define QBSS_LOAD_SIZE 5 #define MAX_WMMELE_LENGTH 64 +#define ASPM_L1_LATENCY 7 #define TOTAL_CAM_ENTRY 32 -- 2.16.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] drm/i915/breadcrumbs: Ignore unsubmitted signalers

by Chris Wilson

When a request is preempted, it is unsubmitted from the HW queue and removed from the active list of breadcrumbs. In the process, this however triggers the signaler and it may see the clear rbtree with the old, and still valid, seqno. This confuses the signaler into action and signaling the fence. Fixes: d6a2289d9d6b ("drm/i915: Remove the preempted request from the execution queue") Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_breadcrumbs.c | 20 ++++---------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_breadcrumbs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_breadcrumbs.c index efbc627a2a25..b955f7d7bd0f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_breadcrumbs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_breadcrumbs.c @@ -588,29 +588,16 @@ void intel_engine_remove_wait(struct intel_engine_cs *engine, spin_unlock_irq(&b->rb_lock); } -static bool signal_valid(const struct drm_i915_gem_request *request) -{ - return intel_wait_check_request(&request->signaling.wait, request); -} - static bool signal_complete(const struct drm_i915_gem_request *request) { if (!request) return false; - /* If another process served as the bottom-half it may have already - * signalled that this wait is already completed. - */ - if (intel_wait_complete(&request->signaling.wait)) - return signal_valid(request); - - /* Carefully check if the request is complete, giving time for the + /* + * Carefully check if the request is complete, giving time for the * seqno to be visible or if the GPU hung. */ - if (__i915_request_irq_complete(request)) - return true; - - return false; + return __i915_request_irq_complete(request); } static struct drm_i915_gem_request *to_signaler(struct rb_node *rb) @@ -712,6 +699,7 @@ static int intel_breadcrumbs_signaler(void *arg) &request->fence.flags)) { local_bh_disable(); dma_fence_signal(&request->fence); + GEM_BUG_ON(!i915_gem_request_completed(request)); local_bh_enable(); /* kick start the tasklets */ } -- 2.15.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 3.18] ARM: exynos_defconfig: enable CONFIG_ROOT_NFS and dependencies

by Guillaume Tucker

Enable CONFIG_ROOT_NFS and dependencies (CONFIG_NFS_*, CONFIG_IP_PNP) in order to be able to boot the Exynos devices with NFS root. Tested on exynos4412-odroidx2. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Tucker <guillaume.tucker(a)collabora.com> --- arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig b/arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig index e21ef830a483..999ea477be54 100644 --- a/arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig +++ b/arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig @@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ CONFIG_PACKET=y CONFIG_UNIX=y CONFIG_NET_KEY=y CONFIG_INET=y +CONFIG_IP_PNP=y +CONFIG_IP_PNP_DHCP=y +CONFIG_IP_PNP_BOOTP=y +CONFIG_IP_PNP_RARP=y CONFIG_RFKILL_REGULATOR=y CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER_PATH="/sbin/hotplug" CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y @@ -170,6 +174,10 @@ CONFIG_TMPFS=y CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL=y CONFIG_CRAMFS=y CONFIG_ROMFS_FS=y +CONFIG_NFS_FS=y +CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y +CONFIG_NFS_V4=y +CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y -- 2.11.0

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] ALSA: hda - Fix headset mic detection problem for two Dell machines

by Hui Wang

One of them has the codec of alc256 and the other one has the codec of alc289. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang(a)canonical.com> --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 2347588..b791efe 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -6735,6 +6735,11 @@ static const struct snd_hda_pin_quirk alc269_pin_fixup_tbl[] = { {0x14, 0x90170110}, {0x21, 0x02211020}), SND_HDA_PIN_QUIRK(0x10ec0256, 0x1028, "Dell", ALC255_FIXUP_DELL1_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, + {0x12, 0x90a60130}, + {0x14, 0x90170110}, + {0x14, 0x01011020}, + {0x21, 0x0221101f}), + SND_HDA_PIN_QUIRK(0x10ec0256, 0x1028, "Dell", ALC255_FIXUP_DELL1_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, ALC256_STANDARD_PINS), SND_HDA_PIN_QUIRK(0x10ec0256, 0x1043, "ASUS", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC, {0x14, 0x90170110}, @@ -6803,6 +6808,10 @@ static const struct snd_hda_pin_quirk alc269_pin_fixup_tbl[] = { {0x12, 0x90a60120}, {0x14, 0x90170110}, {0x21, 0x0321101f}), + SND_HDA_PIN_QUIRK(0x10ec0289, 0x1028, "Dell", ALC225_FIXUP_DELL1_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, + {0x12, 0xb7a60130}, + {0x14, 0x90170110}, + {0x21, 0x04211020}), SND_HDA_PIN_QUIRK(0x10ec0290, 0x103c, "HP", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC1, ALC290_STANDARD_PINS, {0x15, 0x04211040}, -- 2.7.4

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.4.y 1/2] drm: rcar-du: Use the VBK interrupt for vblank events

by Nhan Nguyen

From: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> commit cbbb90b0c084d7dfb2ed8e3fecf8df200fbdd2a0 upstream. When implementing support for interlaced modes, the driver switched from reporting vblank events on the vertical blanking (VBK) interrupt to the frame end interrupt (FRM). This incorrectly divided the reported refresh rate by two. Fix it by moving back to the VBK interrupt. Fixes: 906eff7fcada ("drm: rcar-du: Implement support for interlaced modes") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Reviewed-by: Kieran Bingham <kieran.bingham+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c index 9befd62..25bdab6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c @@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static irqreturn_t rcar_du_crtc_irq(int irq, void *arg) status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); rcar_du_crtc_write(rcrtc, DSRCR, status & DSRCR_MASK); - if (status & DSSR_FRM) { + if (status & DSSR_VBK) { drm_handle_vblank(rcrtc->crtc.dev, rcrtc->index); rcar_du_crtc_finish_page_flip(rcrtc); ret = IRQ_HANDLED; -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.9.y 2/2] drm: rcar-du: Fix race condition when disabling planes at CRTC stop

by Nhan Nguyen

From: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> commit 641307df71fe77d7b38a477067495ede05d47295 upstream. When stopping the CRTC the driver must disable all planes and wait for the change to take effect at the next vblank. Merely calling drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank() is not enough, as the function doesn't include any mechanism to handle the race with vblank interrupts. Replace the drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank() call with a manual mechanism that handles the vblank interrupt race. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Reviewed-by: Kieran Bingham <kieran.bingham+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h | 8 +++++ 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c index 848f7f2..3322b15 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c @@ -392,6 +392,31 @@ static void rcar_du_crtc_start(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) rcrtc->started = true; } +static void rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) +{ + struct rcar_du_device *rcdu = rcrtc->group->dev; + struct drm_crtc *crtc = &rcrtc->crtc; + u32 status; + /* Make sure vblank interrupts are enabled. */ + drm_crtc_vblank_get(crtc); + /* + * Disable planes and calculate how many vertical blanking interrupts we + * have to wait for. If a vertical blanking interrupt has been triggered + * but not processed yet, we don't know whether it occurred before or + * after the planes got disabled. We thus have to wait for two vblank + * interrupts in that case. + */ + spin_lock_irq(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + rcar_du_group_write(rcrtc->group, rcrtc->index % 2 ? DS2PR : DS1PR, 0); + status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); + rcrtc->vblank_count = status & DSSR_VBK ? 2 : 1; + spin_unlock_irq(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + if (!wait_event_timeout(rcrtc->vblank_wait, rcrtc->vblank_count == 0, + msecs_to_jiffies(100))) + dev_warn(rcdu->dev, "vertical blanking timeout\n"); + drm_crtc_vblank_put(crtc); +} + static void rcar_du_crtc_stop(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) { struct drm_crtc *crtc = &rcrtc->crtc; @@ -400,17 +425,16 @@ static void rcar_du_crtc_stop(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) return; /* Disable all planes and wait for the change to take effect. This is - * required as the DSnPR registers are updated on vblank, and no vblank - * will occur once the CRTC is stopped. Disabling planes when starting - * the CRTC thus wouldn't be enough as it would start scanning out - * immediately from old frame buffers until the next vblank. + * required as the plane enable registers are updated on vblank, and no + * vblank will occur once the CRTC is stopped. Disabling planes when + * starting the CRTC thus wouldn't be enough as it would start scanning + * out immediately from old frame buffers until the next vblank. * * This increases the CRTC stop delay, especially when multiple CRTCs * are stopped in one operation as we now wait for one vblank per CRTC. * Whether this can be improved needs to be researched. */ - rcar_du_group_write(rcrtc->group, rcrtc->index % 2 ? DS2PR : DS1PR, 0); - drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank(crtc); + rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(rcrtc); /* Disable vertical blanking interrupt reporting. We first need to wait * for page flip completion before stopping the CRTC as userspace @@ -548,10 +572,25 @@ static irqreturn_t rcar_du_crtc_irq(int irq, void *arg) irqreturn_t ret = IRQ_NONE; u32 status; + spin_lock(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); rcar_du_crtc_write(rcrtc, DSRCR, status & DSRCR_MASK); if (status & DSSR_VBK) { + /* + * Wake up the vblank wait if the counter reaches 0. This must + * be protected by the vblank_lock to avoid races in + * rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(). + */ + if (rcrtc->vblank_count) { + if (--rcrtc->vblank_count == 0) + wake_up(&rcrtc->vblank_wait); + } + } + spin_unlock(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + + if (status & DSSR_VBK) { drm_crtc_handle_vblank(&rcrtc->crtc); rcar_du_crtc_finish_page_flip(rcrtc); ret = IRQ_HANDLED; @@ -606,6 +645,8 @@ int rcar_du_crtc_create(struct rcar_du_group *rgrp, unsigned int index) } init_waitqueue_head(&rcrtc->flip_wait); + init_waitqueue_head(&rcrtc->vblank_wait); + spin_lock_init(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); rcrtc->group = rgrp; rcrtc->mmio_offset = mmio_offsets[index]; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h index 6f08b7e..48bef05 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #define __RCAR_DU_CRTC_H__ #include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/wait.h> #include <drm/drmP.h> @@ -33,6 +34,9 @@ * @started: whether the CRTC has been started and is running * @event: event to post when the pending page flip completes * @flip_wait: wait queue used to signal page flip completion + * @vblank_lock: protects vblank_wait and vblank_count + * @vblank_wait: wait queue used to signal vertical blanking + * @vblank_count: number of vertical blanking interrupts to wait for * @outputs: bitmask of the outputs (enum rcar_du_output) driven by this CRTC * @group: CRTC group this CRTC belongs to */ @@ -48,6 +52,10 @@ struct rcar_du_crtc { struct drm_pending_vblank_event *event; wait_queue_head_t flip_wait; + spinlock_t vblank_lock; + wait_queue_head_t vblank_wait; + unsigned int vblank_count; + unsigned int outputs; struct rcar_du_group *group; -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.9.y 1/2] drm: rcar-du: Use the VBK interrupt for vblank events

by Nhan Nguyen

From: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> commit cbbb90b0c084d7dfb2ed8e3fecf8df200fbdd2a0 upstream. When implementing support for interlaced modes, the driver switched from reporting vblank events on the vertical blanking (VBK) interrupt to the frame end interrupt (FRM). This incorrectly divided the reported refresh rate by two. Fix it by moving back to the VBK interrupt. Fixes: 906eff7fcada ("drm: rcar-du: Implement support for interlaced modes") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Reviewed-by: Kieran Bingham <kieran.bingham+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c index a2ec6d8..848f7f2 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static irqreturn_t rcar_du_crtc_irq(int irq, void *arg) status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); rcar_du_crtc_write(rcrtc, DSRCR, status & DSRCR_MASK); - if (status & DSSR_FRM) { + if (status & DSSR_VBK) { drm_crtc_handle_vblank(&rcrtc->crtc); rcar_du_crtc_finish_page_flip(rcrtc); ret = IRQ_HANDLED; -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.9.y 3/3] ASoC: rsnd: avoid duplicate free_irq()

by Nhan Nguyen

From: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> commit e0936c3471a8411a5df327641fa3ffe12a2fb07b upstream. commit 1f8754d4daea5f ("ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI") fixed Parent SSI duplicate free_irq(). But on Renesas Sound, not only Parent SSI but also Multi SSI have same issue. This patch avoid duplicate free_irq() if it was not pure SSI. Fixes: 1f8754d4daea5f ("ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> --- sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c index 9472d99..3454cba 100644 --- a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c +++ b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c @@ -694,12 +694,12 @@ static int rsnd_ssi_dma_remove(struct rsnd_mod *mod, struct rsnd_priv *priv) { struct rsnd_ssi *ssi = rsnd_mod_to_ssi(mod); - struct rsnd_mod *ssi_parent_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssip(io); + struct rsnd_mod *pure_ssi_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssi(io); struct device *dev = rsnd_priv_to_dev(priv); int irq = ssi->irq; - /* Do nothing for SSI parent mod */ - if (ssi_parent_mod == mod) + /* Do nothing if non SSI (= SSI parent, multi SSI) mod */ + if (pure_ssi_mod != mod) return 0; /* PIO will request IRQ again */ -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.9.y 2/3] ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI

by Nhan Nguyen

From: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> commit 1f8754d4daea5f257370a52a30fcb22798c54516 upstream. If SSI uses shared pin, some SSI will be used as parent SSI. Then, normal SSI's remove and Parent SSI's remove (these are same SSI) will be called when unbind or remove timing. In this case, free_irq() will be called twice. This patch solve this issue. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> Tested-by: Hiroyuki Yokoyama <hiroyuki.yokoyama.vx(a)renesas.com> Reported-by: Hiroyuki Yokoyama <hiroyuki.yokoyama.vx(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> --- sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c index 6cb6db0..9472d99 100644 --- a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c +++ b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c @@ -694,9 +694,14 @@ static int rsnd_ssi_dma_remove(struct rsnd_mod *mod, struct rsnd_priv *priv) { struct rsnd_ssi *ssi = rsnd_mod_to_ssi(mod); + struct rsnd_mod *ssi_parent_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssip(io); struct device *dev = rsnd_priv_to_dev(priv); int irq = ssi->irq; + /* Do nothing for SSI parent mod */ + if (ssi_parent_mod == mod) + return 0; + /* PIO will request IRQ again */ devm_free_irq(dev, irq, mod); -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.9.y 1/3] ASoC: simple-card: Fix misleading error message

by Nhan Nguyen

From: Julian Scheel <julian(a)jusst.de> commit 7ac45d1635a4cd2e99a4b11903d4a2815ca1b27b upstream. In case cpu could not be found the error message would always refer to /codec/ not being found in DT. Fix this by catching the cpu node not found case explicitly. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Julian Scheel <julian(a)jusst.de> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> --- sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c index f608f8d2..dd88c2c 100644 --- a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c +++ b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c @@ -232,13 +232,19 @@ static int asoc_simple_card_dai_link_of(struct device_node *node, snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scpu", prefix); cpu = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); + if (!cpu) { + ret = -EINVAL; + dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop); + goto dai_link_of_err; + } + snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%splat", prefix); plat = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scodec", prefix); codec = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); - if (!cpu || !codec) { + if (!codec) { ret = -EINVAL; dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop); goto dai_link_of_err; -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [tip:sched/urgent] sched/rt: Up the root domain ref count when passing it around via IPIs

by Steven Rostedt

I see this was just applied to Linus's tree. This too probably should be tagged for stable as well. -- Steve On Tue, 6 Feb 2018 03:54:42 -0800 "tip-bot for Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <tipbot(a)zytor.com> wrote: > Commit-ID: 364f56653708ba8bcdefd4f0da2a42904baa8eeb > Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/364f56653708ba8bcdefd4f0da2a42904baa8eeb > Author: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> > AuthorDate: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 20:45:38 -0500 > Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> > CommitDate: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 10:20:33 +0100 > > sched/rt: Up the root domain ref count when passing it around via IPIs > > When issuing an IPI RT push, where an IPI is sent to each CPU that has more > than one RT task scheduled on it, it references the root domain's rto_mask, > that contains all the CPUs within the root domain that has more than one RT > task in the runable state. The problem is, after the IPIs are initiated, the > rq->lock is released. This means that the root domain that is associated to > the run queue could be freed while the IPIs are going around. > > Add a sched_get_rd() and a sched_put_rd() that will increment and decrement > the root domain's ref count respectively. This way when initiating the IPIs, > the scheduler will up the root domain's ref count before releasing the > rq->lock, ensuring that the root domain does not go away until the IPI round > is complete. > > Reported-by: Pavan Kondeti <pkondeti(a)codeaurora.org> > Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> > Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> > Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> > Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault(a)gmx.de> > Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> > Fixes: 4bdced5c9a292 ("sched/rt: Simplify the IPI based RT balancing logic") > Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEU1=PkiHO35Dzna8EQqNSKW1fr1y1zRQ5y66X117MG06sQtN… > Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> > --- > kernel/sched/rt.c | 9 +++++++-- > kernel/sched/sched.h | 2 ++ > kernel/sched/topology.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/sched/rt.c b/kernel/sched/rt.c > index 2fb627d..89a086e 100644 > --- a/kernel/sched/rt.c > +++ b/kernel/sched/rt.c > @@ -1990,8 +1990,11 @@ static void tell_cpu_to_push(struct rq *rq) > > rto_start_unlock(&rq->rd->rto_loop_start); > > - if (cpu >= 0) > + if (cpu >= 0) { > + /* Make sure the rd does not get freed while pushing */ > + sched_get_rd(rq->rd); > irq_work_queue_on(&rq->rd->rto_push_work, cpu); > + } > } > > /* Called from hardirq context */ > @@ -2021,8 +2024,10 @@ void rto_push_irq_work_func(struct irq_work *work) > > raw_spin_unlock(&rd->rto_lock); > > - if (cpu < 0) > + if (cpu < 0) { > + sched_put_rd(rd); > return; > + } > > /* Try the next RT overloaded CPU */ > irq_work_queue_on(&rd->rto_push_work, cpu); > diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h > index 2e95505..fb5fc45 100644 > --- a/kernel/sched/sched.h > +++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h > @@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ extern struct mutex sched_domains_mutex; > extern void init_defrootdomain(void); > extern int sched_init_domains(const struct cpumask *cpu_map); > extern void rq_attach_root(struct rq *rq, struct root_domain *rd); > +extern void sched_get_rd(struct root_domain *rd); > +extern void sched_put_rd(struct root_domain *rd); > > #ifdef HAVE_RT_PUSH_IPI > extern void rto_push_irq_work_func(struct irq_work *work); > diff --git a/kernel/sched/topology.c b/kernel/sched/topology.c > index 034cbed..519b024 100644 > --- a/kernel/sched/topology.c > +++ b/kernel/sched/topology.c > @@ -259,6 +259,19 @@ void rq_attach_root(struct rq *rq, struct root_domain *rd) > call_rcu_sched(&old_rd->rcu, free_rootdomain); > } > > +void sched_get_rd(struct root_domain *rd) > +{ > + atomic_inc(&rd->refcount); > +} > + > +void sched_put_rd(struct root_domain *rd) > +{ > + if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&rd->refcount)) > + return; > + > + call_rcu_sched(&rd->rcu, free_rootdomain); > +} > + > static int init_rootdomain(struct root_domain *rd) > { > if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&rd->span, GFP_KERNEL))

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [tip:sched/urgent] sched/rt: Use container_of() to get root domain in rto_push_irq_work_func()

by Steven Rostedt

I see this was just applied to Linus's tree. It probably should be tagged for stable as well. -- Steve On Tue, 6 Feb 2018 03:54:16 -0800 "tip-bot for Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <tipbot(a)zytor.com> wrote: > Commit-ID: ad0f1d9d65938aec72a698116cd73a980916895e > Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/ad0f1d9d65938aec72a698116cd73a980916895e > Author: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> > AuthorDate: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 20:45:37 -0500 > Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> > CommitDate: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 10:20:33 +0100 > > sched/rt: Use container_of() to get root domain in rto_push_irq_work_func() > > When the rto_push_irq_work_func() is called, it looks at the RT overloaded > bitmask in the root domain via the runqueue (rq->rd). The problem is that > during CPU up and down, nothing here stops rq->rd from changing between > taking the rq->rd->rto_lock and releasing it. That means the lock that is > released is not the same lock that was taken. > > Instead of using this_rq()->rd to get the root domain, as the irq work is > part of the root domain, we can simply get the root domain from the irq work > that is passed to the routine: > > container_of(work, struct root_domain, rto_push_work) > > This keeps the root domain consistent. > > Reported-by: Pavan Kondeti <pkondeti(a)codeaurora.org> > Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> > Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> > Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> > Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault(a)gmx.de> > Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> > Fixes: 4bdced5c9a292 ("sched/rt: Simplify the IPI based RT balancing logic") > Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEU1=PkiHO35Dzna8EQqNSKW1fr1y1zRQ5y66X117MG06sQtN… > Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> > --- > kernel/sched/rt.c | 15 ++++++++------- > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/sched/rt.c b/kernel/sched/rt.c > index 862a513..2fb627d 100644 > --- a/kernel/sched/rt.c > +++ b/kernel/sched/rt.c > @@ -1907,9 +1907,8 @@ static void push_rt_tasks(struct rq *rq) > * the rt_loop_next will cause the iterator to perform another scan. > * > */ > -static int rto_next_cpu(struct rq *rq) > +static int rto_next_cpu(struct root_domain *rd) > { > - struct root_domain *rd = rq->rd; > int next; > int cpu; > > @@ -1985,7 +1984,7 @@ static void tell_cpu_to_push(struct rq *rq) > * Otherwise it is finishing up and an ipi needs to be sent. > */ > if (rq->rd->rto_cpu < 0) > - cpu = rto_next_cpu(rq); > + cpu = rto_next_cpu(rq->rd); > > raw_spin_unlock(&rq->rd->rto_lock); > > @@ -1998,6 +1997,8 @@ static void tell_cpu_to_push(struct rq *rq) > /* Called from hardirq context */ > void rto_push_irq_work_func(struct irq_work *work) > { > + struct root_domain *rd = > + container_of(work, struct root_domain, rto_push_work); > struct rq *rq; > int cpu; > > @@ -2013,18 +2014,18 @@ void rto_push_irq_work_func(struct irq_work *work) > raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock); > } > > - raw_spin_lock(&rq->rd->rto_lock); > + raw_spin_lock(&rd->rto_lock); > > /* Pass the IPI to the next rt overloaded queue */ > - cpu = rto_next_cpu(rq); > + cpu = rto_next_cpu(rd); > > - raw_spin_unlock(&rq->rd->rto_lock); > + raw_spin_unlock(&rd->rto_lock); > > if (cpu < 0) > return; > > /* Try the next RT overloaded CPU */ > - irq_work_queue_on(&rq->rd->rto_push_work, cpu); > + irq_work_queue_on(&rd->rto_push_work, cpu); > } > #endif /* HAVE_RT_PUSH_IPI */ >

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] memremap: fix softlockup reports at teardown

by Dan Williams

The cond_resched() currently in the setup path needs to be duplicated in the teardown path. Rather than require each instance of for_each_device_pfn() to open code the same sequence, embed it in the helper. Link: https://github.com/intel/ixpdimm_sw/issues/11 Cc: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse(a)redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 71389703839e ("mm, zone_device: Replace {get, put}_zone_device_page()...") Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> --- kernel/memremap.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/memremap.c b/kernel/memremap.c index 4849be5f9b3c..4dd4274cabe2 100644 --- a/kernel/memremap.c +++ b/kernel/memremap.c @@ -275,8 +275,15 @@ static unsigned long pfn_end(struct dev_pagemap *pgmap) return (res->start + resource_size(res)) >> PAGE_SHIFT; } +static unsigned long pfn_next(unsigned long pfn) +{ + if (pfn % 1024 == 0) + cond_resched(); + return pfn + 1; +} + #define for_each_device_pfn(pfn, map) \ - for (pfn = pfn_first(map); pfn < pfn_end(map); pfn++) + for (pfn = pfn_first(map); pfn < pfn_end(map); pfn = pfn_next(pfn)) static void devm_memremap_pages_release(void *data) { @@ -337,10 +344,10 @@ void *devm_memremap_pages(struct device *dev, struct dev_pagemap *pgmap) resource_size_t align_start, align_size, align_end; struct vmem_altmap *altmap = pgmap->altmap_valid ? &pgmap->altmap : NULL; + struct resource *res = &pgmap->res; unsigned long pfn, pgoff, order; pgprot_t pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL; - int error, nid, is_ram, i = 0; - struct resource *res = &pgmap->res; + int error, nid, is_ram; align_start = res->start & ~(SECTION_SIZE - 1); align_size = ALIGN(res->start + resource_size(res), SECTION_SIZE) @@ -409,8 +416,6 @@ void *devm_memremap_pages(struct device *dev, struct dev_pagemap *pgmap) list_del(&page->lru); page->pgmap = pgmap; percpu_ref_get(pgmap->ref); - if (!(++i % 1024)) - cond_resched(); } devm_add_action(dev, devm_memremap_pages_release, pgmap);

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH -mm] mm, swap, frontswap: Fix THP swap if frontswap enabled

by Huang, Ying

From: Huang Ying <ying.huang(a)intel.com> It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in random user space applications as follow, kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000] #0 0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6) #1 0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6) #2 0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt) #3 0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt) #4 0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt) #5 0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt) #6 0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt) #7 0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt) #8 0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt) #9 0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt) #10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6) #11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt) After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c22c367e068 ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). The root cause is as follow. When the pages are written to storage device during swapping out in swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages instead to improve the performance. But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as normal page, so only the head page is saved. After swapping in, tail pages will not be restored to its original contents, so cause the memory corruption in the applications. This is fixed via splitting THP at the begin of swapping out if frontswap is enabled. To avoid frontswap to be enabled at runtime, whether the page is THP is checked before using frontswap during swapping out too. Reported-and-tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang(a)intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet(a)ieee.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning(a)redhat.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Shaohua Li <shli(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)techsingularity.net> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.14 Fixes: bd4c82c22c367e068 ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") --- mm/page_io.c | 2 +- mm/vmscan.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/page_io.c b/mm/page_io.c index b41cf9644585..6dca817ae7a0 100644 --- a/mm/page_io.c +++ b/mm/page_io.c @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ int swap_writepage(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc) unlock_page(page); goto out; } - if (frontswap_store(page) == 0) { + if (!PageTransHuge(page) && frontswap_store(page) == 0) { set_page_writeback(page); unlock_page(page); end_page_writeback(page); diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c index bee53495a829..d1c1e00b08bb 100644 --- a/mm/vmscan.c +++ b/mm/vmscan.c @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ #include <linux/swapops.h> #include <linux/balloon_compaction.h> +#include <linux/frontswap.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -1063,14 +1064,23 @@ static unsigned long shrink_page_list(struct list_head *page_list, /* cannot split THP, skip it */ if (!can_split_huge_page(page, NULL)) goto activate_locked; + /* + * Split THP if frontswap enabled, + * because it cannot process THP + */ + if (frontswap_enabled()) { + if (split_huge_page_to_list( + page, page_list)) + goto activate_locked; + } /* * Split pages without a PMD map right * away. Chances are some or all of the * tail pages can be freed without IO. */ - if (!compound_mapcount(page) && - split_huge_page_to_list(page, - page_list)) + else if (!compound_mapcount(page) && + split_huge_page_to_list(page, + page_list)) goto activate_locked; } if (!add_to_swap(page)) { -- 2.15.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCHv2 1/1] ext4: don't put symlink in pagecache into highmem

by Jin Qian

From: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> partial backport from 21fc61c73c3903c4c312d0802da01ec2b323d174 upstream to v4.4 to prevent virt_to_page on highmem. ext4_encrypted_follow_link uses kmap() for cpage caddr = kmap(cpage); _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr calls virt_to_page on the kmapped address. _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr() ext4_fname_decrypt() sg_init_one() sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len); sg_set_page(sg, virt_to_page(buf), buflen, offset_in_page(buf)); Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)android.com> --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 1 + fs/ext4/namei.c | 1 + fs/ext4/symlink.c | 10 +++------- fs/inode.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 4df1cb19a243..f0cabc8c96cb 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4417,6 +4417,7 @@ struct inode *ext4_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; ext4_set_aops(inode); } + inode_nohighmem(inode); } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &ext4_special_inode_operations; diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 4c36dca486cc..32960b3ecd4f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -3151,6 +3151,7 @@ static int ext4_symlink(struct inode *dir, if ((disk_link.len > EXT4_N_BLOCKS * 4)) { if (!encryption_required) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); ext4_set_aops(inode); /* * We cannot call page_symlink() with transaction started diff --git a/fs/ext4/symlink.c b/fs/ext4/symlink.c index e8e7af62ac95..287c3980fa0b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/symlink.c +++ b/fs/ext4/symlink.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook cpage = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, NULL); if (IS_ERR(cpage)) return ERR_CAST(cpage); - caddr = kmap(cpage); + caddr = page_address(cpage); caddr[size] = 0; } @@ -75,16 +75,12 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook /* Null-terminate the name */ if (res <= plen) paddr[res] = '\0'; - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } return *cookie = paddr; errout: - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } kfree(paddr); return ERR_PTR(res); } diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index b0edef500590..b95615f3fc50 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -2028,3 +2028,9 @@ void inode_set_flags(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags, new_flags) != old_flags)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_set_flags); + +void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode) +{ + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_nohighmem); diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index c8decb7075d6..f746a59fcc88 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -3066,5 +3066,6 @@ static inline bool dir_relax(struct inode *inode) } extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); +extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 5/9] X.509: fix NULL dereference when restricting key with unsupported_sig

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> The asymmetric key type allows an X.509 certificate to be added even if its signature's hash algorithm is not available in the crypto API. In that case 'payload.data[asym_auth]' will be NULL. But the key restriction code failed to check for this case before trying to use the signature, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference in key_or_keyring_common() or in restrict_link_by_signature(). Fix this by returning -ENOPKG when the signature is unsupported. Reproducer when all the CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512* options are disabled and keyctl has support for the 'restrict_keyring' command: keyctl new_session keyctl restrict_keyring @s asymmetric builtin_trusted openssl req -new -sha512 -x509 -batch -nodes -outform der \ | keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s Fixes: a511e1af8b12 ("KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c index 86fb68508952..7c93c7728454 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c @@ -67,8 +67,9 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); * * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the - * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if - * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed. + * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted, -ENOPKG if the signature + * uses unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching + * certificate but the signature check cannot be performed. */ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_type *type, @@ -88,6 +89,8 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring, return -EOPNOTSUPP; sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; + if (!sig) + return -ENOPKG; if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) return -ENOKEY; @@ -139,6 +142,8 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, return -EOPNOTSUPP; sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; + if (!sig) + return -ENOPKG; if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) return -ENOKEY; @@ -222,9 +227,9 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, * * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list, - * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if - * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be - * performed. + * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses + * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate + * but the signature check cannot be performed. */ int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_type *type, @@ -249,9 +254,9 @@ int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring, * * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list, - * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if - * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be - * performed. + * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses + * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate + * but the signature check cannot be performed. */ int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_type *type, -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 2/9] PKCS#7: fix certificate blacklisting

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> If there is a blacklisted certificate in a SignerInfo's certificate chain, then pkcs7_verify_sig_chain() sets sinfo->blacklisted and returns 0. But, pkcs7_verify() fails to handle this case appropriately, as it actually continues on to the line 'actual_ret = 0;', indicating that the SignerInfo has passed verification. Consequently, PKCS#7 signature verification ignores the certificate blacklist. Fix this by not considering blacklisted SignerInfos to have passed verification. Also fix the function comment with regards to when 0 is returned. Fixes: 03bb79315ddc ("PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 2f6a768b91d7..97c77f66b20d 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -366,8 +366,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, * * (*) -EBADMSG if some part of the message was invalid, or: * - * (*) 0 if no signature chains were found to be blacklisted or to contain - * unsupported crypto, or: + * (*) 0 if a signature chain passed verification, or: * * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a blacklisted key was encountered, or: * @@ -423,8 +422,11 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo); - if (sinfo->blacklisted && actual_ret == -ENOPKG) - actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + if (sinfo->blacklisted) { + if (actual_ret == -ENOPKG) + actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + continue; + } if (ret < 0) { if (ret == -ENOPKG) { sinfo->unsupported_crypto = true; -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 1/9] PKCS#7: fix certificate chain verification

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> When pkcs7_verify_sig_chain() is building the certificate chain for a SignerInfo using the certificates in the PKCS#7 message, it is passing the wrong arguments to public_key_verify_signature(). Consequently, when the next certificate is supposed to be used to verify the previous certificate, the next certificate is actually used to verify itself. An attacker can use this bug to create a bogus certificate chain that has no cryptographic relationship between the beginning and end. Fortunately I couldn't quite find a way to use this to bypass the overall signature verification, though it comes very close. Here's the reasoning: due to the bug, every certificate in the chain beyond the first actually has to be self-signed (where "self-signed" here refers to the actual key and signature; an attacker might still manipulate the certificate fields such that the self_signed flag doesn't actually get set, and thus the chain doesn't end immediately). But to pass trust validation (pkcs7_validate_trust()), either the SignerInfo or one of the certificates has to actually be signed by a trusted key. Since only self-signed certificates can be added to the chain, the only way for an attacker to introduce a trusted signature is to include a self-signed trusted certificate. But, when pkcs7_validate_trust_one() reaches that certificate, instead of trying to verify the signature on that certificate, it will actually look up the corresponding trusted key, which will succeed, and then try to verify the *previous* certificate, which will fail. Thus, disaster is narrowly averted (as far as I could tell). Fixes: 6c2dc5ae4ab7 ("X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 39e6de0c2761..2f6a768b91d7 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, sinfo->index); return 0; } - ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, p->sig); + ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, x509->sig); if (ret < 0) return ret; x509->signer = p; -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 101/114] pipe: fix off-by-one error when checking buffer limits

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: pipe: fix off-by-one error when checking buffer limits With pipe-user-pages-hard set to 'N', users were actually only allowed up to 'N - 1' buffers; and likewise for pipe-user-pages-soft. Fix this to allow up to 'N' buffers, as would be expected. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-5-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: b0b91d18e2e9 ("pipe: fix limit checking in pipe_set_size()") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/pipe.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/pipe.c~pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits fs/pipe.c --- a/fs/pipe.c~pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits +++ a/fs/pipe.c @@ -605,12 +605,12 @@ static unsigned long account_pipe_buffer static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs) { - return pipe_user_pages_soft && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_soft; + return pipe_user_pages_soft && user_bufs > pipe_user_pages_soft; } static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs) { - return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard; + return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs > pipe_user_pages_hard; } static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) _

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 100/114] pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits pipe-user-pages-hard and pipe-user-pages-soft are only supposed to apply to unprivileged users, as documented in both Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt and the pipe(7) man page. However, the capabilities are actually only checked when increasing a pipe's size using F_SETPIPE_SZ, not when creating a new pipe. Therefore, if pipe-user-pages-hard has been set, the root user can run into it and be unable to create pipes. Similarly, if pipe-user-pages-soft has been set, the root user can run into it and have their pipes limited to 1 page each. Fix this by allowing the privileged override in both cases. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-4-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: 759c01142a5d ("pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/pipe.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/pipe.c~pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits fs/pipe.c --- a/fs/pipe.c~pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits +++ a/fs/pipe.c @@ -613,6 +613,11 @@ static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(u return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard; } +static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) +{ + return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void) { struct pipe_inode_info *pipe; @@ -629,12 +634,12 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info( user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs); - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) { + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) { user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1); pipe_bufs = 1; } - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs)) + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) goto out_revert_acct; pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer), @@ -1065,7 +1070,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_in if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers && (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) || too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + is_unprivileged_user()) { ret = -EPERM; goto out_revert_acct; } _

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 097/114] kasan: rework Kconfig settings

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Subject: kasan: rework Kconfig settings We get a lot of very large stack frames using gcc-7.0.1 with the default -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope --param asan-stack=1 options, which can easily cause an overflow of the kernel stack, e.g. drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2434:1: warning: the frame size of 46176 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2800lib.c:5650:1: warning: the frame size of 23632 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes lib/atomic64_test.c:250:1: warning: the frame size of 11200 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2621:1: warning: the frame size of 9208 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv090x.c:3431:1: warning: the frame size of 6816 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes fs/fscache/stats.c:287:1: warning: the frame size of 6536 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes To reduce this risk, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope is now split out into a separate CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA Kconfig option, leading to stack frames that are smaller than 2 kilobytes most of the time on x86_64. An earlier version of this patch also prevented combining KASAN_EXTRA with KASAN_INLINE, but that is no longer necessary with gcc-7.0.1. All patches to get the frame size below 2048 bytes with CONFIG_KASAN=y and CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA=n have been merged by maintainers now, so we can bring back that default now. KASAN_EXTRA=y still causes lots of warnings but now defaults to !COMPILE_TEST to disable it in allmodconfig, and it remains disabled in all other defconfigs since it is a new option. I arbitrarily raise the warning limit for KASAN_EXTRA to 3072 to reduce the noise, but an allmodconfig kernel still has around 50 warnings on gcc-7. I experimented a bit more with smaller stack frames and have another follow-up series that reduces the warning limit for 64-bit architectures to 1280 bytes (without CONFIG_KASAN). With earlier versions of this patch series, I also had patches to address the warnings we get with KASAN and/or KASAN_EXTRA, using a "noinline_if_stackbloat" annotation. That annotation now got replaced with a gcc-8 bugfix (see https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715) and a workaround for older compilers, which means that KASAN_EXTRA is now just as bad as before and will lead to an instant stack overflow in a few extreme cases. This reverts parts of commit commit 3f181b4 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y"). Two patches in linux-next should be merged first to avoid introducing warnings in an allmodconfig build: 3cd890dbe2a4 ("media: dvb-frontends: fix i2c access helpers for KASAN") 16c3ada89cff ("media: r820t: fix r820t_write_reg for KASAN") Do we really need to backport this? I think we do: without this patch, enabling KASAN will lead to unavoidable kernel stack overflow in certain device drivers when built with gcc-7 or higher on linux-4.10+ or any version that contains a backport of commit c5caf21ab0cf8. Most people are probably still on older compilers, but it will get worse over time as they upgrade their distros. The warnings we get on kernels older than this should all be for code that uses dangerously large stack frames, though most of them do not cause an actual stack overflow by themselves.The asan-stack option was added in linux-4.0, and commit 3f181b4d8652 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y") effectively turned off the warning for allmodconfig kernels, so I would like to see this fix backported to any kernels later than 4.0. I have done dozens of fixes for individual functions with stack frames larger than 2048 bytes with asan-stack, and I plan to make sure that all those fixes make it into the stable kernels as well (most are already there). Part of the complication here is that asan-stack (from 4.0) was originally assumed to always require much larger stacks, but that turned out to be a combination of multiple gcc bugs that we have now worked around and fixed, but sanitize-address-use-after-scope (from v4.10) has a much higher inherent stack usage and also suffers from at least three other problems that we have analyzed but not yet fixed upstream, each of them makes the stack usage more severe than it should be. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171221134744.2295529-1-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- lib/Kconfig.debug | 2 +- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 11 +++++++++++ scripts/Makefile.kasan | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff -puN lib/Kconfig.debug~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings lib/Kconfig.debug --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ config ENABLE_MUST_CHECK config FRAME_WARN int "Warn for stack frames larger than (needs gcc 4.4)" range 0 8192 - default 0 if KASAN + default 3072 if KASAN_EXTRA default 2048 if GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY default 1280 if (!64BIT && PARISC) default 1024 if (!64BIT && !PARISC) diff -puN lib/Kconfig.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings lib/Kconfig.kasan --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/lib/Kconfig.kasan @@ -20,6 +20,17 @@ config KASAN Currently CONFIG_KASAN doesn't work with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB (the resulting kernel does not boot). +config KASAN_EXTRA + bool "KAsan: extra checks" + depends on KASAN && DEBUG_KERNEL && !COMPILE_TEST + help + This enables further checks in the kernel address sanitizer, for now + it only includes the address-use-after-scope check that can lead + to excessive kernel stack usage, frame size warnings and longer + compile time. + https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715 has more + + choice prompt "Instrumentation type" depends on KASAN diff -puN scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings scripts/Makefile.kasan --- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/scripts/Makefile.kasan @@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ else endif +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA CFLAGS_KASAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope) +endif CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin _

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 080/114] lib/ubsan: add type mismatch handler for new GCC/Clang

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Subject: lib/ubsan: add type mismatch handler for new GCC/Clang UBSAN=y fails to build with new GCC/clang: arch/x86/kernel/head64.o: In function `sanitize_boot_params': arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h:37: undefined reference to `__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1' because Clang and GCC 8 slightly changed ABI for 'type mismatch' errors. Compiler now uses new __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1() function with slightly modified 'struct type_mismatch_data'. Let's add new 'struct type_mismatch_data_common' which is independent from compiler's layout of 'struct type_mismatch_data'. And make __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch[_v1]() functions transform compiler-dependent type mismatch data to our internal representation. This way, we can support both old and new compilers with minimal amount of change. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180119152853.16806-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: Sodagudi Prasad <psodagud(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.5+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- lib/ubsan.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- lib/ubsan.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff -puN lib/ubsan.c~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang lib/ubsan.c --- a/lib/ubsan.c~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang +++ a/lib/ubsan.c @@ -265,14 +265,14 @@ void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(stru } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow); -static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct type_mismatch_data *data) +static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s null pointer of type %s\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], @@ -281,15 +281,15 @@ static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -static void handle_misaligned_access(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void handle_misaligned_access(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s misaligned address %p for type %s\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], @@ -299,15 +299,15 @@ static void handle_misaligned_access(str ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -static void handle_object_size_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void handle_object_size_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s address %p with insufficient space\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], (void *) ptr); @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static void handle_object_size_mismatch( ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void ubsan_type_mismatch_common(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { @@ -326,8 +326,36 @@ void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct else handle_object_size_mismatch(data, ptr); } + +void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, + unsigned long ptr) +{ + struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = { + .location = &data->location, + .type = data->type, + .alignment = data->alignment, + .type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind + }; + + ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch); +void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1(struct type_mismatch_data_v1 *data, + unsigned long ptr) +{ + + struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = { + .location = &data->location, + .type = data->type, + .alignment = 1UL << data->log_alignment, + .type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind + }; + + ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1); + void __ubsan_handle_nonnull_return(struct nonnull_return_data *data) { unsigned long flags; diff -puN lib/ubsan.h~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang lib/ubsan.h --- a/lib/ubsan.h~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang +++ a/lib/ubsan.h @@ -37,6 +37,20 @@ struct type_mismatch_data { unsigned char type_check_kind; }; +struct type_mismatch_data_v1 { + struct source_location location; + struct type_descriptor *type; + unsigned char log_alignment; + unsigned char type_check_kind; +}; + +struct type_mismatch_data_common { + struct source_location *location; + struct type_descriptor *type; + unsigned long alignment; + unsigned char type_check_kind; +}; + struct nonnull_arg_data { struct source_location location; struct source_location attr_location; _

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 075/114] kernel/relay.c: revert "kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak"

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: kernel/relay.c: revert "kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak" This reverts ba62bafe942b159a6 ("kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak"). This commit introduced a double free bug, because 'chan' is already freed by the line: kref_put(&chan->kref, relay_destroy_channel); This bug was found by syzkaller, using the BLKTRACESETUP ioctl. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180127004759.101823-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: ba62bafe942b ("kernel/relay.c: fix potential memory leak") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Zhouyi Zhou <yizhouzhou(a)ict.ac.cn> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.7+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/relay.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff -puN kernel/relay.c~revert-kernel-relayc-fix-potential-memory-leak kernel/relay.c --- a/kernel/relay.c~revert-kernel-relayc-fix-potential-memory-leak +++ a/kernel/relay.c @@ -611,7 +611,6 @@ free_bufs: kref_put(&chan->kref, relay_destroy_channel); mutex_unlock(&relay_channels_mutex); - kfree(chan); return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(relay_open); _

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 033/114] kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()"

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Subject: kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" This reverts 92266d6ef60c2381 ("async: simplify lowest_in_progress()"), which was simply wrong: In the case where domain is NULL, we now use the wrong offsetof() in the list_first_entry macro, so we don't actually fetch the ->cookie value, but rather the eight bytes located sizeof(struct list_head) further into the struct async_entry. On 64 bit, that's the data member, while on 32 bit, that's a u64 built from func and data in some order. I think the bug happens to be harmless in practice: It obviously only affects callers which pass a NULL domain, and AFAICT the only such caller is async_synchronize_full() -> async_synchronize_full_domain(NULL) -> async_synchronize_cookie_domain(ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX, NULL) and the ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX means that in practice we end up waiting for the async_global_pending list to be empty - but it would break if somebody happened to pass (void*)-1 as the data element to async_schedule, and of course also if somebody ever does a async_synchronize_cookie_domain(, NULL) with a "finite" cookie value. Maybe the "harmless in practice" means this isn't -stable material. But I'm not completely confident my quick git grep'ing is enough, and there might be affected code in one of the earlier kernels that has since been removed, so I'll leave the decision to the stable guys. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128104938.3921-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk Fixes: 92266d6ef60c "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Adam Wallis <awallis(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [3.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/async.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff -puN kernel/async.c~revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress kernel/async.c --- a/kernel/async.c~revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress +++ a/kernel/async.c @@ -84,20 +84,24 @@ static atomic_t entry_count; static async_cookie_t lowest_in_progress(struct async_domain *domain) { - struct list_head *pending; + struct async_entry *first = NULL; async_cookie_t ret = ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX; unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&async_lock, flags); - if (domain) - pending = &domain->pending; - else - pending = &async_global_pending; + if (domain) { + if (!list_empty(&domain->pending)) + first = list_first_entry(&domain->pending, + struct async_entry, domain_list); + } else { + if (!list_empty(&async_global_pending)) + first = list_first_entry(&async_global_pending, + struct async_entry, global_list); + } - if (!list_empty(pending)) - ret = list_first_entry(pending, struct async_entry, - domain_list)->cookie; + if (first) + ret = first->cookie; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&async_lock, flags); return ret; _

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 021/114] fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy()

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens(a)de.ibm.com> Subject: fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy() df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") added a bounce buffer to avoid hardened usercopy checks. Copying to the bounce buffer was implemented with a simple memcpy() assuming that it is always valid to read from kernel memory iff the kern_addr_valid() check passed. A simple, but pointless, test case like "dd if=/proc/kcore of=/dev/null" now can easily crash the kernel, since the former execption handling on invalid kernel addresses now doesn't work anymore. Also adding a kern_addr_valid() implementation wouldn't help here. Most architectures simply return 1 here, while a couple implemented a page table walk to figure out if something is mapped at the address in question. With DEBUG_PAGEALLOC active mappings are established and removed all the time, so that relying on the result of kern_addr_valid() before executing the memcpy() also doesn't work. Therefore simply use probe_kernel_read() to copy to the bounce buffer. This also allows to simplify read_kcore(). At least on s390 this fixes the observed crashes and doesn't introduce warnings that were removed with df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data"), even though the generic probe_kernel_read() implementation uses uaccess functions. While looking into this I'm also wondering if kern_addr_valid() could be completely removed...(?) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202132739.99971-1-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Fixes: df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens(a)de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa(a)kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/proc/kcore.c | 18 +++++------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/proc/kcore.c~fs-proc-kcorec-use-probe_kernel_read-instead-of-memcpy fs/proc/kcore.c --- a/fs/proc/kcore.c~fs-proc-kcorec-use-probe_kernel_read-instead-of-memcpy +++ a/fs/proc/kcore.c @@ -512,23 +512,15 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __use return -EFAULT; } else { if (kern_addr_valid(start)) { - unsigned long n; - /* * Using bounce buffer to bypass the * hardened user copy kernel text checks. */ - memcpy(buf, (char *) start, tsz); - n = copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz); - /* - * We cannot distinguish between fault on source - * and fault on destination. When this happens - * we clear too and hope it will trigger the - * EFAULT again. - */ - if (n) { - if (clear_user(buffer + tsz - n, - n)) + if (probe_kernel_read(buf, (void *) start, tsz)) { + if (clear_user(buffer, tsz)) + return -EFAULT; + } else { + if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz)) return -EFAULT; } } else { _

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 001/114] kasan: don't emit builtin calls when sanitization is off

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Subject: kasan: don't emit builtin calls when sanitization is off With KASAN enabled the kernel has two different memset() functions, one with KASAN checks (memset) and one without (__memset). KASAN uses some macro tricks to use the proper version where required. For example memset() calls in mm/slub.c are without KASAN checks, since they operate on poisoned slab object metadata. The issue is that clang emits memset() calls even when there is no memset() in the source code. They get linked with improper memset() implementation and the kernel fails to boot due to a huge amount of KASAN reports during early boot stages. The solution is to add -fno-builtin flag for files with KASAN_SANITIZE := n marker. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8ffecfffe04088c52c42b92739c2bd8a0bcb3f5e.151638459… Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers(a)google.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro(a)socionext.com> Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml(a)markovi.net> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- Makefile | 3 ++- scripts/Makefile.kasan | 3 +++ scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff -puN Makefile~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off Makefile --- a/Makefile~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off +++ a/Makefile @@ -434,7 +434,8 @@ export MAKE LEX YACC AWK GENKSYMS INSTAL export HOSTCXX HOSTCXXFLAGS LDFLAGS_MODULE CHECK CHECKFLAGS export KBUILD_CPPFLAGS NOSTDINC_FLAGS LINUXINCLUDE OBJCOPYFLAGS LDFLAGS -export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_UBSAN +export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE +export CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE CFLAGS_UBSAN export KBUILD_AFLAGS AFLAGS_KERNEL AFLAGS_MODULE export KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE export KBUILD_AFLAGS_KERNEL KBUILD_CFLAGS_KERNEL diff -puN scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off scripts/Makefile.kasan --- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off +++ a/scripts/Makefile.kasan @@ -31,4 +31,7 @@ else endif CFLAGS_KASAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope) + +CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin + endif diff -puN scripts/Makefile.lib~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off scripts/Makefile.lib --- a/scripts/Makefile.lib~kasan-dont-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off +++ a/scripts/Makefile.lib @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_KASAN),y) _c_flags += $(if $(patsubst n%,, \ $(KASAN_SANITIZE_$(basetarget).o)$(KASAN_SANITIZE)y), \ - $(CFLAGS_KASAN)) + $(CFLAGS_KASAN), $(CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE)) endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_UBSAN),y) _

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4 to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 520a13c530aeb5f63e011d668c42db1af19ed349 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2017 16:58:26 -0500 Subject: x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4 From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> commit 520a13c530aeb5f63e011d668c42db1af19ed349 upstream. The kernel test bot (run by Xiaolong Ye) reported that the following commit: f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang") is causing double faults in a kernel compiled with GCC 4.4. Linus subsequently diagnosed the crash pattern and the buggy commit and found that the issue is with this code: register unsigned int __asm_call_sp asm("esp"); #define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (__asm_call_sp) Even on a 64-bit kernel, it's using ESP instead of RSP. That causes GCC to produce the following bogus code: ffffffff8147461d: 89 e0 mov %esp,%eax ffffffff8147461f: 4c 89 f7 mov %r14,%rdi ffffffff81474622: 4c 89 fe mov %r15,%rsi ffffffff81474625: ba 20 00 00 00 mov $0x20,%edx ffffffff8147462a: 89 c4 mov %eax,%esp ffffffff8147462c: e8 bf 52 05 00 callq ffffffff814c98f0 <copy_user_generic_unrolled> Despite the absurdity of it backing up and restoring the stack pointer for no reason, the bug is actually the fact that it's only backing up and restoring the lower 32 bits of the stack pointer. The upper 32 bits are getting cleared out, corrupting the stack pointer. So change the '__asm_call_sp' register variable to be associated with the actual full-size stack pointer. This also requires changing the __ASM_SEL() macro to be based on the actual compiled arch size, rather than the CONFIG value, because CONFIG_X86_64 compiles some files with '-m32' (e.g., realmode and vdso). Otherwise Clang fails to build the kernel because it complains about the use of a 64-bit register (RSP) in a 32-bit file. Reported-and-Bisected-and-Tested-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye(a)intel.com> Diagnosed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: LKP <lkp(a)01.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka(a)chromium.org> Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Fixes: f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170928215826.6sdpmwtkiydiytim@treble Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h @@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ # define __ASM_FORM_COMMA(x) " " #x "," #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +#ifndef __x86_64__ +/* 32 bit */ # define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(a) # define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(a) #else +/* 64 bit */ # define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(b) # define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(b) #endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jpoimboe(a)redhat.com are queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4 to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 520a13c530aeb5f63e011d668c42db1af19ed349 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2017 16:58:26 -0500 Subject: x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4 From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> commit 520a13c530aeb5f63e011d668c42db1af19ed349 upstream. The kernel test bot (run by Xiaolong Ye) reported that the following commit: f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang") is causing double faults in a kernel compiled with GCC 4.4. Linus subsequently diagnosed the crash pattern and the buggy commit and found that the issue is with this code: register unsigned int __asm_call_sp asm("esp"); #define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (__asm_call_sp) Even on a 64-bit kernel, it's using ESP instead of RSP. That causes GCC to produce the following bogus code: ffffffff8147461d: 89 e0 mov %esp,%eax ffffffff8147461f: 4c 89 f7 mov %r14,%rdi ffffffff81474622: 4c 89 fe mov %r15,%rsi ffffffff81474625: ba 20 00 00 00 mov $0x20,%edx ffffffff8147462a: 89 c4 mov %eax,%esp ffffffff8147462c: e8 bf 52 05 00 callq ffffffff814c98f0 <copy_user_generic_unrolled> Despite the absurdity of it backing up and restoring the stack pointer for no reason, the bug is actually the fact that it's only backing up and restoring the lower 32 bits of the stack pointer. The upper 32 bits are getting cleared out, corrupting the stack pointer. So change the '__asm_call_sp' register variable to be associated with the actual full-size stack pointer. This also requires changing the __ASM_SEL() macro to be based on the actual compiled arch size, rather than the CONFIG value, because CONFIG_X86_64 compiles some files with '-m32' (e.g., realmode and vdso). Otherwise Clang fails to build the kernel because it complains about the use of a 64-bit register (RSP) in a 32-bit file. Reported-and-Bisected-and-Tested-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye(a)intel.com> Diagnosed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: LKP <lkp(a)01.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka(a)chromium.org> Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Fixes: f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170928215826.6sdpmwtkiydiytim@treble Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h @@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ # define __ASM_FORM_COMMA(x) " " #x "," #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +#ifndef __x86_64__ +/* 32 bit */ # define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(a) # define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(a) #else +/* 64 bit */ # define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(b) # define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(b) #endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jpoimboe(a)redhat.com are queue-4.4/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCHv2 1/1] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()

by Jin Qian

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.9.y Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)android.com> --- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index a871159bf03c..ead2fd60244d 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc) */ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc) { - if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else - goto out; + int prefix_len; + + if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN; + else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if (!new_desc[prefix_len]) + return -EINVAL; + + if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; -out: - return -EINVAL; } /* -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 1/1] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()

by Jin Qian

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.4.y Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)android.com> --- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index ce295c0c1da0..e44e844c8ec4 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc) */ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc) { - if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else - goto out; + int prefix_len; + + if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN; + else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if (!new_desc[prefix_len]) + return -EINVAL; + + if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; -out: - return -EINVAL; } /* -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 1/1] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()

by Jin Qian

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 3.18.y Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> --- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 89d5695c51cd..20251ee5c491 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc) */ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc) { - if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else - goto out; + int prefix_len; + + if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN; + else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if (!new_desc[prefix_len]) + return -EINVAL; + + if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; -out: - return -EINVAL; } /* -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "vhost_net: stop device during reset owner" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled vhost_net: stop device during reset owner to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: vhost_net-stop-device-during-reset-owner.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 22:03:52 +0800 Subject: vhost_net: stop device during reset owner From: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 4cd879515d686849eec5f718aeac62a70b067d82 ] We don't stop device before reset owner, this means we could try to serve any virtqueue kick before reset dev->worker. This will result a warn since the work was pending at llist during owner resetting. Fix this by stopping device during owner reset. Reported-by: syzbot+eb17c6162478cc50632c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3a4d5c94e9593 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/vhost/net.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c @@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ static long vhost_net_reset_owner(struct } vhost_net_stop(n, &tx_sock, &rx_sock); vhost_net_flush(n); + vhost_dev_stop(&n->dev); vhost_dev_reset_owner(&n->dev, umem); vhost_net_vq_reset(n); done: Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jasowang(a)redhat.com are queue-4.9/vhost_net-stop-device-during-reset-owner.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: tcp_bbr-fix-pacing_gain-to-always-be-unity-when-using-lt_bw.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 15:43:05 -0500 Subject: tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 3aff3b4b986e51bcf4ab249e5d48d39596e0df6a ] This commit fixes the pacing_gain to remain at BBR_UNIT (1.0) when using lt_bw and returning from the PROBE_RTT state to PROBE_BW. Previously, when using lt_bw, upon exiting PROBE_RTT and entering PROBE_BW the bbr_reset_probe_bw_mode() code could sometimes randomly end up with a cycle_idx of 0 and hence have bbr_advance_cycle_phase() set a pacing gain above 1.0. In such cases this would result in a pacing rate that is 1.25x higher than intended, potentially resulting in a high loss rate for a little while until we stop using the lt_bw a bit later. This commit is a stable candidate for kernels back as far as 4.9. Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control") Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil(a)google.com> Reported-by: Beyers Cronje <bcronje(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c @@ -452,7 +452,8 @@ static void bbr_advance_cycle_phase(stru bbr->cycle_idx = (bbr->cycle_idx + 1) & (CYCLE_LEN - 1); bbr->cycle_mstamp = tp->delivered_mstamp; - bbr->pacing_gain = bbr_pacing_gain[bbr->cycle_idx]; + bbr->pacing_gain = bbr->lt_use_bw ? BBR_UNIT : + bbr_pacing_gain[bbr->cycle_idx]; } /* Gain cycling: cycle pacing gain to converge to fair share of available bw. */ @@ -461,8 +462,7 @@ static void bbr_update_cycle_phase(struc { struct bbr *bbr = inet_csk_ca(sk); - if ((bbr->mode == BBR_PROBE_BW) && !bbr->lt_use_bw && - bbr_is_next_cycle_phase(sk, rs)) + if (bbr->mode == BBR_PROBE_BW && bbr_is_next_cycle_phase(sk, rs)) bbr_advance_cycle_phase(sk); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ncardwell(a)google.com are queue-4.9/tcp_bbr-fix-pacing_gain-to-always-be-unity-when-using-lt_bw.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 16:40:41 +0800 Subject: tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> [ Upstream commit 9b42d55a66d388e4dd5550107df051a9637564fc ] socket can be disconnected and gets transformed back to a listening socket, if sk_frag.page is not released, which will be cloned into a new socket by sk_clone_lock, but the reference count of this page is increased, lead to a use after free or double free issue Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2316,6 +2316,12 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash); + if (sk->sk_frag.page) { + put_page(sk->sk_frag.page); + sk->sk_frag.page = NULL; + sk->sk_frag.offset = 0; + } + sk->sk_error_report(sk); return err; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from lirongqing(a)baidu.com are queue-4.9/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization." has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization. to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: r8169-fix-rtl8168ep-take-too-long-to-complete-driver-initialization.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 01:32:36 +0800 Subject: r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization. From: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> [ Upstream commit 086ca23d03c0d2f4088f472386778d293e15c5f6 ] Driver check the wrong register bit in rtl_ocp_tx_cond() that keep driver waiting until timeout. Fix this by waiting for the right register bit. Signed-off-by: Chunhao Lin <hau(a)realtek.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c @@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ DECLARE_RTL_COND(rtl_ocp_tx_cond) { void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; - return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x02; + return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x20; } static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct rtl8169_private *tp) @@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct r void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr; RTL_W8(IBCR2, RTL_R8(IBCR2) & ~0x01); - rtl_msleep_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); + rtl_msleep_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000); RTL_W8(IBISR0, RTL_R8(IBISR0) | 0x20); RTL_W8(IBCR0, RTL_R8(IBCR0) & ~0x01); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from hau(a)realtek.com are queue-4.9/r8169-fix-rtl8168ep-take-too-long-to-complete-driver-initialization.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06 to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-ep06.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:12:55 +0100 Subject: qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06 From: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit c0b91a56a2e57a5a370655b25d677ae0ebf8a2d0 ] The Quectel EP06 is a Cat. 6 LTE modem. It uses the same interface as the EC20/EC25 for QMI, and requires the same "set DTR"-quirk to work. Signed-off-by: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn(a)mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -944,6 +944,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id produc {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0125, 4)}, /* Quectel EC25, EC20 R2.0 Mini PCIe */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0121, 4)}, /* Quectel EC21 Mini PCIe */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2c7c, 0x0296, 4)}, /* Quectel BG96 */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0306, 4)}, /* Quectel EP06 Mini PCIe */ /* 4. Gobi 1000 devices */ {QMI_GOBI1K_DEVICE(0x05c6, 0x9212)}, /* Acer Gobi Modem Device */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from kristian.evensen(a)gmail.com are queue-4.9/qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-ep06.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock()" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock() to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: soreuseport-fix-mem-leak-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 10:27:27 -0800 Subject: soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock() From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 4db428a7c9ab07e08783e0fcdc4ca0f555da0567 ] reuseport_add_sock() needs to deal with attaching a socket having its own sk_reuseport_cb, after a prior setsockopt(SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_?BPF) Without this fix, not only a WARN_ONCE() was issued, but we were also leaking memory. Thanks to sysbot and Eric Biggers for providing us nice C repros. ------------[ cut here ]------------ socket already in reuseport group WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3496 at net/core/sock_reuseport.c:119 reuseport_add_sock+0x742/0x9b0 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:117 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 3496 Comm: syzkaller869503 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6+ #245 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:183 __warn+0x1dc/0x200 kernel/panic.c:547 report_bug+0x211/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:184 fixup_bug.part.11+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline] do_error_trap+0x2d7/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296 do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315 invalid_op+0x22/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1079 Fixes: ef456144da8e ("soreuseport: define reuseport groups") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+c0ea2226f77a42936bf7(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Craig Gallek <kraig(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/core/sock_reuseport.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) --- a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c +++ b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c @@ -93,6 +93,16 @@ static struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_ return more_reuse; } +static void reuseport_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct sock_reuseport *reuse; + + reuse = container_of(head, struct sock_reuseport, rcu); + if (reuse->prog) + bpf_prog_destroy(reuse->prog); + kfree(reuse); +} + /** * reuseport_add_sock - Add a socket to the reuseport group of another. * @sk: New socket to add to the group. @@ -101,7 +111,7 @@ static struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_ */ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sk2) { - struct sock_reuseport *reuse; + struct sock_reuseport *old_reuse, *reuse; if (!rcu_access_pointer(sk2->sk_reuseport_cb)) { int err = reuseport_alloc(sk2); @@ -112,10 +122,13 @@ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, spin_lock_bh(&reuseport_lock); reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk2->sk_reuseport_cb, - lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)), - WARN_ONCE(rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_reuseport_cb, - lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)), - "socket already in reuseport group"); + lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)); + old_reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_reuseport_cb, + lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)); + if (old_reuse && old_reuse->num_socks != 1) { + spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock); + return -EBUSY; + } if (reuse->num_socks == reuse->max_socks) { reuse = reuseport_grow(reuse); @@ -133,19 +146,11 @@ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock); + if (old_reuse) + call_rcu(&old_reuse->rcu, reuseport_free_rcu); return 0; } -static void reuseport_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) -{ - struct sock_reuseport *reuse; - - reuse = container_of(head, struct sock_reuseport, rcu); - if (reuse->prog) - bpf_prog_destroy(reuse->prog); - kfree(reuse); -} - void reuseport_detach_sock(struct sock *sk) { struct sock_reuseport *reuse; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from edumazet(a)google.com are queue-4.9/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch queue-4.9/net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch queue-4.9/soreuseport-fix-mem-leak-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "qlcnic: fix deadlock bug" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled qlcnic: fix deadlock bug to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: qlcnic-fix-deadlock-bug.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:53:42 +0800 Subject: qlcnic: fix deadlock bug From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> [ Upstream commit 233ac3891607f501f08879134d623b303838f478 ] The following soft lockup was caught. This is a deadlock caused by recusive locking. Process kworker/u40:1:28016 was holding spin lock "mbx->queue_lock" in qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(), while a softirq came in and ask the same spin lock in qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(). This lock should be hold by disable bh.. [161846.962125] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [kworker/u40:1:28016] [161846.962367] Modules linked in: tun ocfs2 xen_netback xen_blkback xen_gntalloc xen_gntdev xen_evtchn xenfs xen_privcmd autofs4 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs bnx2fc fcoe libfcoe libfc sunrpc 8021q mrp garp bridge stp llc bonding dm_round_robin dm_multipath iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support pcspkr sb_edac edac_core i2c_i801 shpchp lpc_ich mfd_core ioatdma ipmi_devintf ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler sg ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod igb i2c_algo_bit i2c_core ahci libahci megaraid_sas ixgbe dca ptp pps_core vxlan udp_tunnel ip6_udp_tunnel qla2xxx scsi_transport_fc qlcnic crc32c_intel be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi ipv6 cxgb3 mdio libiscsi_tcp qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [161846.962454] [161846.962460] CPU: 1 PID: 28016 Comm: kworker/u40:1 Not tainted 4.1.12-94.5.9.el6uek.x86_64 #2 [161846.962463] Hardware name: Oracle Corporation SUN SERVER X4-2L /ASSY,MB,X4-2L , BIOS 26050100 09/19/2017 [161846.962489] Workqueue: qlcnic_mailbox qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker [qlcnic] [161846.962493] task: ffff8801f2e34600 ti: ffff88004ca5c000 task.ti: ffff88004ca5c000 [161846.962496] RIP: e030:[<ffffffff810013aa>] [<ffffffff810013aa>] xen_hypercall_sched_op+0xa/0x20 [161846.962506] RSP: e02b:ffff880202e43388 EFLAGS: 00000206 [161846.962509] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f6996b70 RCX: ffffffff810013aa [161846.962511] RDX: ffff880202e433cc RSI: ffff880202e433b0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [161846.962513] RBP: ffff880202e433d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8801fe893200 [161846.962516] R10: ffff8801fe400538 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffff880202e4b000 [161846.962518] R13: 0000000000000050 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000000020d [161846.962528] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880202e40000(0000) knlGS:ffff880202e40000 [161846.962531] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [161846.962533] CR2: 0000000002612640 CR3: 00000001bb796000 CR4: 0000000000042660 [161846.962536] Stack: [161846.962538] ffff880202e43608 0000000000000000 ffffffff813f0442 ffff880202e433b0 [161846.962543] 0000000000000000 ffff880202e433cc ffffffff00000001 0000000000000000 [161846.962547] 00000009813f03d6 ffff880202e433e0 ffffffff813f0460 ffff880202e43440 [161846.962552] Call Trace: [161846.962555] <IRQ> [161846.962565] [<ffffffff813f0442>] ? xen_poll_irq_timeout+0x42/0x50 [161846.962570] [<ffffffff813f0460>] xen_poll_irq+0x10/0x20 [161846.962578] [<ffffffff81014222>] xen_lock_spinning+0xe2/0x110 [161846.962583] [<ffffffff81013f01>] __raw_callee_save_xen_lock_spinning+0x11/0x20 [161846.962592] [<ffffffff816e5c57>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x57/0x80 [161846.962609] [<ffffffffa028acfc>] qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd+0x7c/0xe0 [qlcnic] [161846.962623] [<ffffffffa028e008>] qlcnic_83xx_issue_cmd+0x58/0x210 [qlcnic] [161846.962636] [<ffffffffa028caf2>] qlcnic_83xx_sre_macaddr_change+0x162/0x1d0 [qlcnic] [161846.962649] [<ffffffffa028cb8b>] qlcnic_83xx_change_l2_filter+0x2b/0x30 [qlcnic] [161846.962657] [<ffffffff8160248b>] ? __skb_flow_dissect+0x18b/0x650 [161846.962670] [<ffffffffa02856e5>] qlcnic_send_filter+0x205/0x250 [qlcnic] [161846.962682] [<ffffffffa0285c77>] qlcnic_xmit_frame+0x547/0x7b0 [qlcnic] [161846.962691] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962696] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962701] [<ffffffff81630112>] sch_direct_xmit+0x112/0x220 [161846.962706] [<ffffffff8160b80f>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1df/0x5e0 [161846.962710] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962721] [<ffffffffa0575bd5>] bond_dev_queue_xmit+0x35/0x80 [bonding] [161846.962729] [<ffffffffa05769fb>] __bond_start_xmit+0x1cb/0x210 [bonding] [161846.962736] [<ffffffffa0576a71>] bond_start_xmit+0x31/0x60 [bonding] [161846.962740] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962745] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962749] [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0 [161846.962754] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962760] [<ffffffffa05cfa72>] vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb2/0x150 [8021q] [161846.962764] [<ffffffff8160ac22>] xmit_one+0x82/0x1a0 [161846.962769] [<ffffffff8160ad90>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x50/0xa0 [161846.962773] [<ffffffff8160bb1e>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4ee/0x5e0 [161846.962777] [<ffffffff8160bc33>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x20 [161846.962789] [<ffffffffa05adf74>] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x54/0xa0 [bridge] [161846.962797] [<ffffffffa05ae4ff>] br_forward_finish+0x2f/0x90 [bridge] [161846.962807] [<ffffffff810b0dad>] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x1d/0x100 [161846.962811] [<ffffffff815f929b>] ? __alloc_skb+0x8b/0x1f0 [161846.962818] [<ffffffffa05ae04d>] __br_forward+0x8d/0x120 [bridge] [161846.962822] [<ffffffff815f613b>] ? __kmalloc_reserve+0x3b/0xa0 [161846.962829] [<ffffffff810be55e>] ? update_rq_runnable_avg+0xee/0x230 [161846.962836] [<ffffffffa05ae176>] br_forward+0x96/0xb0 [bridge] [161846.962845] [<ffffffffa05af85e>] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1ae/0x420 [bridge] [161846.962853] [<ffffffffa05afc4f>] br_handle_frame+0x17f/0x260 [bridge] [161846.962862] [<ffffffffa05afad0>] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x420/0x420 [bridge] [161846.962867] [<ffffffff8160d057>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1f7/0x870 [161846.962872] [<ffffffff8160d6f2>] __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x70 [161846.962877] [<ffffffff8160d913>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x23/0x90 [161846.962884] [<ffffffffa07512ea>] ? xenvif_idx_release+0xea/0x100 [xen_netback] [161846.962889] [<ffffffff816e5a10>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x50 [161846.962893] [<ffffffff8160e624>] netif_receive_skb_sk+0x24/0x90 [161846.962899] [<ffffffffa075269a>] xenvif_tx_submit+0x2ca/0x3f0 [xen_netback] [161846.962906] [<ffffffffa0753f0c>] xenvif_tx_action+0x9c/0xd0 [xen_netback] [161846.962915] [<ffffffffa07567f5>] xenvif_poll+0x35/0x70 [xen_netback] [161846.962920] [<ffffffff8160e01b>] napi_poll+0xcb/0x1e0 [161846.962925] [<ffffffff8160e1c0>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x1c0 [161846.962931] [<ffffffff8108aaba>] __do_softirq+0x10a/0x350 [161846.962938] [<ffffffff8108ae75>] irq_exit+0x125/0x130 [161846.962943] [<ffffffff813f03a9>] xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x39/0x50 [161846.962950] [<ffffffff816e7ffe>] xen_do_hypervisor_callback+0x1e/0x40 [161846.962952] <EOI> [161846.962959] [<ffffffff816e5c4a>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x4a/0x80 [161846.962964] [<ffffffff816e5b1e>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1e/0xa0 [161846.962978] [<ffffffffa028e279>] ? qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker+0xb9/0x2a0 [qlcnic] [161846.962991] [<ffffffff810a14e1>] ? process_one_work+0x151/0x4b0 [161846.962995] [<ffffffff8100c3f2>] ? check_events+0x12/0x20 [161846.963001] [<ffffffff810a1960>] ? worker_thread+0x120/0x480 [161846.963005] [<ffffffff816e187b>] ? __schedule+0x30b/0x890 [161846.963010] [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0 [161846.963015] [<ffffffff810a1840>] ? process_one_work+0x4b0/0x4b0 [161846.963021] [<ffffffff810a6b3e>] ? kthread+0xce/0xf0 [161846.963025] [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70 [161846.963031] [<ffffffff816e6522>] ? ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70 [161846.963035] [<ffffffff810a6a70>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70 [161846.963037] Code: cc 51 41 53 b8 1c 00 00 00 0f 05 41 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 51 41 53 b8 1d 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 5b 59 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c @@ -3849,7 +3849,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue( struct list_head *head = &mbx->cmd_q; struct qlcnic_cmd_args *cmd = NULL; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); while (!list_empty(head)) { cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); @@ -3860,7 +3860,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue( qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); } static int qlcnic_83xx_check_mbx_status(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter) @@ -3896,12 +3896,12 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_dequeue_mbx_cmd( { struct qlcnic_mailbox *mbx = adapter->ahw->mailbox; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_del(&cmd->list); mbx->num_cmds--; - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd); } @@ -3966,7 +3966,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(s init_completion(&cmd->completion); cmd->rsp_opcode = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_UNKNOWN; - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); list_add_tail(&cmd->list, &mbx->cmd_q); mbx->num_cmds++; @@ -3974,7 +3974,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(s *timeout = cmd->total_cmds * QLC_83XX_MBX_TIMEOUT; queue_work(mbx->work_q, &mbx->work); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return 0; } @@ -4070,15 +4070,15 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(s mbx->rsp_status = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_WAIT; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mbx->aen_lock, flags); - spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); if (list_empty(head)) { - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); return; } cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list); - spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock); mbx_ops->encode_cmd(adapter, cmd); mbx_ops->nofity_fw(adapter, QLC_83XX_MBX_REQUEST); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com are queue-4.9/qlcnic-fix-deadlock-bug.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 10:26:57 -0800 Subject: net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit e7aadb27a5415e8125834b84a74477bfbee4eff5 ] Newly added igmpv3_get_srcaddr() needs to be called under rcu lock. Timer callbacks do not ensure this locking. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0+ #200 Not tainted ----------------------------- ./include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by syzkaller616973/4074: #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bfce669e>] __do_page_fault+0x32d/0xc90 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1355 #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:178 [inline] #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] call_timer_fn+0x1c6/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1316 #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline] #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] igmpv3_send_report+0x98/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:600 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 4074 Comm: syzkaller616973 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #200 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 __in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 [inline] igmpv3_get_srcaddr net/ipv4/igmp.c:329 [inline] igmpv3_newpack+0xeef/0x12e0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:389 add_grhead.isra.27+0x235/0x300 net/ipv4/igmp.c:432 add_grec+0xbd3/0x1170 net/ipv4/igmp.c:565 igmpv3_send_report+0xd5/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:605 igmp_send_report+0xc43/0x1050 net/ipv4/igmp.c:722 igmp_timer_expire+0x322/0x5c0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:831 call_timer_fn+0x228/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1326 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline] __run_timers+0x7ee/0xb70 kernel/time/timer.c:1666 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692 __do_softirq+0x2d7/0xb85 kernel/softirq.c:285 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:541 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052 apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:938 Fixes: a46182b00290 ("net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -386,7 +386,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *igmpv3_newpack(st pip->frag_off = htons(IP_DF); pip->ttl = 1; pip->daddr = fl4.daddr; + + rcu_read_lock(); pip->saddr = igmpv3_get_srcaddr(dev, &fl4); + rcu_read_unlock(); + pip->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP; pip->tot_len = 0; /* filled in later */ ip_select_ident(net, skb, NULL); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from edumazet(a)google.com are queue-4.9/tcp-release-sk_frag.page-in-tcp_disconnect.patch queue-4.9/net-igmp-add-a-missing-rcu-locking-section.patch queue-4.9/soreuseport-fix-mem-leak-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ipv6-fix-so_reuseport-udp-socket-with-implicit-sk_ipv6only.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 23:15:27 -0800 Subject: ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> [ Upstream commit 7ece54a60ee2ba7a386308cae73c790bd580589c ] If a sk_v6_rcv_saddr is !IPV6_ADDR_ANY and !IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED, it implicitly implies it is an ipv6only socket. However, in inet6_bind(), this addr_type checking and setting sk->sk_ipv6only to 1 are only done after sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum) has been completed successfully. This inconsistency between sk_v6_rcv_saddr and sk_ipv6only confuses the 'get_port()'. In particular, when binding SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets, udp_reuseport_add_sock(sk,...) is called. udp_reuseport_add_sock() checks "ipv6_only_sock(sk2) == ipv6_only_sock(sk)" before adding sk to sk2->sk_reuseport_cb. In this case, ipv6_only_sock(sk2) could be 1 while ipv6_only_sock(sk) is still 0 here. The end result is, reuseport_alloc(sk) is called instead of adding sk to the existing sk2->sk_reuseport_cb. It can be reproduced by binding two SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets on an IPv6 address (!ANY and !MAPPED). Only one of the socket will receive packet. The fix is to set the implicit sk_ipv6only before calling get_port(). The original sk_ipv6only has to be saved such that it can be restored in case get_port() failed. The situation is similar to the inet_reset_saddr(sk) after get_port() has failed. Thanks to Calvin Owens <calvinowens(a)fb.com> who created an easy reproduction which leads to a fix. Fixes: e32ea7e74727 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport UDP socket selection") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai(a)fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru struct net *net = sock_net(sk); __be32 v4addr = 0; unsigned short snum; + bool saved_ipv6only; int addr_type = 0; int err = 0; @@ -378,19 +379,21 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)) np->saddr = addr->sin6_addr; + saved_ipv6only = sk->sk_ipv6only; + if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY && addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) + sk->sk_ipv6only = 1; + /* Make sure we are allowed to bind here. */ if ((snum || !inet->bind_address_no_port) && sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) { + sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only; inet_reset_saddr(sk); err = -EADDRINUSE; goto out; } - if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) { + if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK; - if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) - sk->sk_ipv6only = 1; - } if (snum) sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK; inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from kafai(a)fb.com are queue-4.9/ipv6-fix-so_reuseport-udp-socket-with-implicit-sk_ipv6only.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ip6mr: fix stale iterator" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ip6mr: fix stale iterator to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: ip6mr-fix-stale-iterator.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 16:29:30 +0200 Subject: ip6mr: fix stale iterator From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> [ Upstream commit 4adfa79fc254efb7b0eb3cd58f62c2c3f805f1ba ] When we dump the ip6mr mfc entries via proc, we initialize an iterator with the table to dump but we don't clear the cache pointer which might be initialized from a prior read on the same descriptor that ended. This can result in lock imbalance (an unnecessary unlock) leading to other crashes and hangs. Clear the cache pointer like ipmr does to fix the issue. Thanks for the reliable reproducer. Here's syzbot's trace: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Not tainted syzkaller971460/3195 is trying to release lock (mrt_lock) at: [<000000006898068d>] ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 1 lock held by syzkaller971460/3195: #0: (&p->lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000744a6565>] seq_read+0xd5/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:165 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x12f/0x140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3561 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3775 [inline] lock_release+0x5f9/0xda0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4023 __raw_read_unlock include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:225 [inline] _raw_read_unlock+0x1a/0x30 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:255 ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 traverse+0x3bc/0xa00 fs/seq_file.c:135 seq_read+0x96a/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:189 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at lib/usercopy.c:25 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3195, name: syzkaller971460 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 ___might_sleep+0x2b2/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6060 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6013 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4525 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] seq_read+0xcb4/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:279 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 at lib/usercopy.c:26 _copy_to_user+0xb5/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:26 Reported-by: syzbot <bot+eceb3204562c41a438fa1f2335e0fe4f6886d669(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ static void *ipmr_mfc_seq_start(struct s return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); it->mrt = mrt; + it->cache = NULL; return *pos ? ipmr_mfc_seq_idx(net, seq->private, *pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nikolay(a)cumulusnetworks.com are queue-4.9/ip6mr-fix-stale-iterator.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "cls_u32: add missing RCU annotation." has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled cls_u32: add missing RCU annotation. to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: cls_u32-add-missing-rcu-annotation.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Feb 6 12:42:23 PST 2018 From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 16:02:22 +0100 Subject: cls_u32: add missing RCU annotation. From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 058a6c033488494a6b1477b05fe8e1a16e344462 ] In a couple of points of the control path, n->ht_down is currently accessed without the required RCU annotation. The accesses are safe, but sparse complaints. Since we already held the rtnl lock, let use rtnl_dereference(). Fixes: a1b7c5fd7fe9 ("net: sched: add cls_u32 offload hooks for netdevs") Fixes: de5df63228fc ("net: sched: cls_u32 changes to knode must appear atomic to readers") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/sched/cls_u32.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static void u32_clear_hw_hnode(struct tc static int u32_replace_hw_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n, u32 flags) { + struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down); struct net_device *dev = tp->q->dev_queue->dev; struct tc_cls_u32_offload u32_offload = {0}; struct tc_to_netdev offload; @@ -520,7 +521,7 @@ static int u32_replace_hw_knode(struct t offload.cls_u32->knode.sel = &n->sel; offload.cls_u32->knode.exts = &n->exts; if (n->ht_down) - offload.cls_u32->knode.link_handle = n->ht_down->handle; + offload.cls_u32->knode.link_handle = ht->handle; err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc(dev, tp->q->handle, tp->protocol, &offload); @@ -788,8 +789,9 @@ static void u32_replace_knode(struct tcf static struct tc_u_knode *u32_init_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n) { - struct tc_u_knode *new; + struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down); struct tc_u32_sel *s = &n->sel; + struct tc_u_knode *new; new = kzalloc(sizeof(*n) + s->nkeys*sizeof(struct tc_u32_key), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -807,11 +809,11 @@ static struct tc_u_knode *u32_init_knode new->fshift = n->fshift; new->res = n->res; new->flags = n->flags; - RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->ht_down, n->ht_down); + RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->ht_down, ht); /* bump reference count as long as we hold pointer to structure */ - if (new->ht_down) - new->ht_down->refcnt++; + if (ht) + ht->refcnt++; #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF /* Statistics may be incremented by readers during update Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from pabeni(a)redhat.com are queue-4.9/cls_u32-add-missing-rcu-annotation.patch

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH AUTOSEL for 4.14 065/110] led: core: Fix brightness setting when setting delay_off=0

by Sasha Levin

On Sun, Feb 04, 2018 at 06:17:36PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote: > >> > > >> *** if brightness=0, led off >> > > >> *** else apply brightness if next timer <--- timer is stop, and will never apply new setting >> > > >> ** otherwise set led_set_brightness_nosleep >> > > >> >> > > >> To fix that, when we delete the timer, we should clear LED_BLINK_SW. >> > > > >> > > >Can you run the tests on the affected stable kernels? I have feeling >> > > >that the problem described might not be present there. >> > > >> > > Hm, I don't seem to have HW to test that out. Maybe someone else does? >> > >> > Why are you submitting patches you have no way to test? >> >> What? This is stable tree backporting, why are you trying to make a >> requirement for something that we have never had before? > >I don't think random patches should be sent to stable just because >they appeared in mainline. Plus, I don't think I'm making new rules: > >submit-checklist.rst: > >13) Has been build- and runtime tested with and without ``CONFIG_SMP`` >and > ``CONFIG_PREEMPT.`` > >stable-kernel-rules.rst: > >Rules on what kind of patches are accepted, and which ones are not, >into the "-stable" tree: > > - It must be obviously correct and tested. > - It must fix a real bug that bothers people (not a, "This could be a > problem..." type thing). So you're saying that this doesn't qualify as a bug? >> This is a backport of a patch that is already upstream. If it doesn't >> belong in a stable tree, great, let us know that, saying why it is so. > >See jacek.anaszewski(a)gmail.com 's explanation. I might be missing something, but Jacek suggested I pull another patch before this one? -- Thanks, Sasha

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM/x86: Add IBPB support" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM/x86: Add IBPB support to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 15d45071523d89b3fb7372e2135fbd72f6af9506 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 22:59:43 +0100 Subject: KVM/x86: Add IBPB support From: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> commit 15d45071523d89b3fb7372e2135fbd72f6af9506 upstream. The Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) is an indirect branch control mechanism. It keeps earlier branches from influencing later ones. Unlike IBRS and STIBP, IBPB does not define a new mode of operation. It's a command that ensures predicted branch targets aren't used after the barrier. Although IBRS and IBPB are enumerated by the same CPUID enumeration, IBPB is very different. IBPB helps mitigate against three potential attacks: * Mitigate guests from being attacked by other guests. - This is addressed by issing IBPB when we do a guest switch. * Mitigate attacks from guest/ring3->host/ring3. These would require a IBPB during context switch in host, or after VMEXIT. The host process has two ways to mitigate - Either it can be compiled with retpoline - If its going through context switch, and has set !dumpable then there is a IBPB in that path. (Tim's patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10192871) - The case where after a VMEXIT you return back to Qemu might make Qemu attackable from guest when Qemu isn't compiled with retpoline. There are issues reported when doing IBPB on every VMEXIT that resulted in some tsc calibration woes in guest. * Mitigate guest/ring0->host/ring0 attacks. When host kernel is using retpoline it is safe against these attacks. If host kernel isn't using retpoline we might need to do a IBPB flush on every VMEXIT. Even when using retpoline for indirect calls, in certain conditions 'ret' can use the BTB on Skylake-era CPUs. There are other mitigations available like RSB stuffing/clearing. * IBPB is issued only for SVM during svm_free_vcpu(). VMX has a vmclear and SVM doesn't. Follow discussion here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/15/146 Please refer to the following spec for more details on the enumeration and control. Refer here to get documentation about mitigations. https://software.intel.com/en-us/side-channel-security-support [peterz: rebase and changelog rewrite] [karahmed: - rebase - vmx: expose PRED_CMD if guest has it in CPUID - svm: only pass through IBPB if guest has it in CPUID - vmx: support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()] - vmx: support nested] [dwmw2: Expose CPUID bit too (AMD IBPB only for now as we lack IBRS) PRED_CMD is a write-only MSR] Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515720739-43819-6-git-send-email-ashok.raj@intel.… Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-3-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 11 ++++++- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 12 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct F(3DNOWPREFETCH) | F(OSVW) | 0 /* IBS */ | F(XOP) | 0 /* SKINIT, WDT, LWP */ | F(FMA4) | F(TBM); + /* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */ + const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features = + F(IBPB); + /* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */ const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features = F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) | @@ -607,7 +611,12 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct if (!g_phys_as) g_phys_as = phys_as; entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8); - entry->ebx = entry->edx = 0; + entry->edx = 0; + /* IBPB isn't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) + entry->ebx |= F(IBPB); + entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features; + cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX); break; } case 0x80000019: --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -160,6 +160,18 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_rdtsc return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)); } +static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; + + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0); + if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))) + return true; + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0); + return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)); +} + + /* * NRIPS is provided through cpuidfn 0x8000000a.edx bit 3 */ --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_ms { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true }, { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true }, #endif + { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false }, @@ -510,6 +511,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data { struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc; struct page *save_area; + struct vmcb *current_vmcb; }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data); @@ -1644,11 +1646,17 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcp __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER); kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu); kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm); + /* + * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in + * svm_vcpu_load(). So do a full IBPB now. + */ + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); } static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu); int i; if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) { @@ -1677,6 +1685,10 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcp if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux); + if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) { + sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb; + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + } avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu); } @@ -3599,6 +3611,22 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr); break; + case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(vcpu)) + return 1; + + if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB) + return 1; + + if (!data) + break; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + break; + set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1); + break; case MSR_STAR: svm->vmcb->save.star = data; break; --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -549,6 +549,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base; u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base; #endif + u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow; u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow; /* @@ -913,6 +914,8 @@ static void copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); static int alloc_identity_pagetable(struct kvm *kvm); static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs); @@ -1848,6 +1851,29 @@ static void update_exception_bitmap(stru vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb); } +/* + * Check if MSR is intercepted for L01 MSR bitmap. + */ +static bool msr_write_intercepted_l01(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) +{ + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return true; + + msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + } + + return true; +} + static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit) { @@ -2257,6 +2283,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcp if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) { per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs; vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs); + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); } if (!already_loaded) { @@ -3058,6 +3085,33 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info); break; + case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(vcpu)) + return 1; + + if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB) + return 1; + + if (!data) + break; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the + * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten + * in the merging. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, + MSR_TYPE_W); + break; case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT: if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) { if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data)) @@ -9437,9 +9491,23 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_ struct page *page; unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1; unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap; + /* + * pred_cmd is trying to verify two things: + * + * 1. L0 gave a permission to L1 to actually passthrough the MSR. This + * ensures that we do not accidentally generate an L02 MSR bitmap + * from the L12 MSR bitmap that is too permissive. + * 2. That L1 or L2s have actually used the MSR. This avoids + * unnecessarily merging of the bitmap if the MSR is unused. This + * works properly because we only update the L01 MSR bitmap lazily. + * So even if L0 should pass L1 these MSRs, the L01 bitmap is only + * updated to reflect this when L1 (or its L2s) actually write to + * the MSR. + */ + bool pred_cmd = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD); - /* This shortcut is ok because we support only x2APIC MSRs so far. */ - if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12)) + if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12) && + !pred_cmd) return false; page = nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->msr_bitmap); @@ -9477,6 +9545,13 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_ MSR_TYPE_W); } } + + if (pred_cmd) + nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr( + msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0, + MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, + MSR_TYPE_W); + kunmap(page); nested_release_page_clean(page); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ashok.raj(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 904e14fb7cb96401a7dc803ca2863fd5ba32ffe6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 16:51:18 +0100 Subject: KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> commit 904e14fb7cb96401a7dc803ca2863fd5ba32ffe6 upstream. Place the MSR bitmap in struct loaded_vmcs, and update it in place every time the x2apic or APICv state can change. This is rare and the loop can handle 64 MSRs per iteration, in a similar fashion as nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. This prepares for choosing, on a per-VM basis, whether to intercept the SPEC_CTRL and PRED_CMD MSRs. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # prereq for Spectre mitigation Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 316 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 115 insertions(+), 201 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -109,6 +109,14 @@ static u64 __read_mostly host_xss; static bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1; module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO); +#define MSR_TYPE_R 1 +#define MSR_TYPE_W 2 +#define MSR_TYPE_RW 3 + +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1 +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2 +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM 4 + #define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX 0xffffffffffffffffULL /* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division. */ @@ -190,6 +198,7 @@ struct loaded_vmcs { struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs; int cpu; int launched; + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; struct list_head loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link; }; @@ -428,8 +437,6 @@ struct nested_vmx { bool pi_pending; u16 posted_intr_nv; - unsigned long *msr_bitmap; - struct hrtimer preemption_timer; bool preemption_timer_expired; @@ -530,6 +537,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { unsigned long host_rsp; u8 fail; bool nmi_known_unmasked; + u8 msr_bitmap_mode; u32 exit_intr_info; u32 idt_vectoring_info; ulong rflags; @@ -904,6 +912,7 @@ static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(str static void copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); static int alloc_identity_pagetable(struct kvm *kvm); +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs); @@ -923,12 +932,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(spinlock_t, blocke static unsigned long *vmx_io_bitmap_a; static unsigned long *vmx_io_bitmap_b; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive; -static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive; static unsigned long *vmx_vmread_bitmap; static unsigned long *vmx_vmwrite_bitmap; @@ -2522,36 +2525,6 @@ static void move_msr_up(struct vcpu_vmx vmx->guest_msrs[from] = tmp; } -static void vmx_set_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - unsigned long *msr_bitmap; - - if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_bitmap; - else if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() && - (vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) & - SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) { - if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic; - } else { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive; - } - } else { - if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode; - else - msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy; - } - - vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(msr_bitmap)); -} - /* * Set up the vmcs to automatically save and restore system * msrs. Don't touch the 64-bit msrs if the guest is in legacy @@ -2592,7 +2565,7 @@ static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx * vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs; if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu); } /* @@ -3539,6 +3512,8 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct load loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs); free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs); loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL; + if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap) + free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap); WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL); } @@ -3555,7 +3530,18 @@ static int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct load loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL; loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs); + + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { + loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap) + goto out_vmcs; + memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); + } return 0; + +out_vmcs: + free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs); + return -ENOMEM; } static void free_kvm_area(void) @@ -4564,10 +4550,8 @@ static void free_vpid(int vpid) spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock); } -#define MSR_TYPE_R 1 -#define MSR_TYPE_W 2 -static void __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, - u32 msr, int type) +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type) { int f = sizeof(unsigned long); @@ -4601,8 +4585,8 @@ static void __vmx_disable_intercept_for_ } } -static void __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, - u32 msr, int type) +static void __always_inline vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type) { int f = sizeof(unsigned long); @@ -4636,6 +4620,15 @@ static void __vmx_enable_intercept_for_m } } +static void __always_inline vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u32 msr, int type, bool value) +{ + if (value) + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type); + else + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type); +} + /* * If a msr is allowed by L0, we should check whether it is allowed by L1. * The corresponding bit will be cleared unless both of L0 and L1 allow it. @@ -4682,58 +4675,68 @@ static void nested_vmx_disable_intercept } } -static void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(u32 msr, bool longmode_only) +static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - if (!longmode_only) - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); -} - -static void vmx_enable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(u32 msr, bool apicv_active) -{ - if (apicv_active) { - __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - } else { - __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); + u8 mode = 0; + + if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() && + (vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) & + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) { + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC; + if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV; } + + if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) + mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM; + + return mode; } -static void vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(u32 msr, bool apicv_active) +#define X2APIC_MSR(r) (APIC_BASE_MSR + ((r) >> 4)) + +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, + u8 mode) { - if (apicv_active) { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - } else { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_R); + int msr; + + for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) { + unsigned word = msr / BITS_PER_LONG; + msr_bitmap[word] = (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) ? 0 : ~0; + msr_bitmap[word + (0x800 / sizeof(long))] = ~0; + } + + if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC) { + /* + * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt + * delivery is not in use. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW); + if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) { + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_R); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W); + } } } -static void vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(u32 msr, bool apicv_active) +static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - if (apicv_active) { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_W); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - msr, MSR_TYPE_W); - } else { - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_W); - __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - msr, MSR_TYPE_W); - } + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + u8 mode = vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(vcpu); + u8 changed = mode ^ vmx->msr_bitmap_mode; + + if (!changed) + return; + + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW, + !(mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM)); + + if (changed & (MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC | MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV)) + vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(msr_bitmap, mode); + + vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = mode; } static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(void) @@ -4982,7 +4985,7 @@ static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl( } if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); } static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) @@ -5071,7 +5074,7 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vm vmcs_write64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap)); } if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy)); + vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap)); vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull); /* 22.3.1.5 */ @@ -6402,7 +6405,7 @@ static void wakeup_handler(void) static __init int hardware_setup(void) { - int r = -ENOMEM, i, msr; + int r = -ENOMEM, i; rdmsrl_safe(MSR_EFER, &host_efer); @@ -6417,41 +6420,13 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) if (!vmx_io_bitmap_b) goto out; - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy) - goto out1; - - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic) - goto out2; - - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive) - goto out3; - - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode) - goto out4; - - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic) - goto out5; - - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive) - goto out6; - vmx_vmread_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!vmx_vmread_bitmap) - goto out7; + goto out1; vmx_vmwrite_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!vmx_vmwrite_bitmap) - goto out8; + goto out2; memset(vmx_vmread_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); memset(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); @@ -6460,12 +6435,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) memset(vmx_io_bitmap_b, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - memset(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - memset(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); - if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_config) < 0) { r = -EIO; - goto out9; + goto out3; } if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)) @@ -6522,47 +6494,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 48; } - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_FS_BASE, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_GS_BASE, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, true); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, false); - - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic, - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic, - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE); - memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive, - vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, PAGE_SIZE); - set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */ - /* - * enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active() - */ - for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr++) - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(msr, true); - - /* TMCCT */ - vmx_enable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(0x839, true); - /* TPR */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x808, true); - /* EOI */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x80b, true); - /* SELF-IPI */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x83f, true); - - /* - * (enable_apicv && !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active()) || - * !enable_apicv - */ - /* TPR */ - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(0x808, false); - vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x808, false); - if (enable_ept) { kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK, (enable_ept_ad_bits) ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull, @@ -6608,22 +6541,10 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) return alloc_kvm_area(); -out9: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmwrite_bitmap); -out8: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmread_bitmap); -out7: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive); -out6: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic); -out5: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode); -out4: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive); out3: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic); + free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmwrite_bitmap); out2: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy); + free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmread_bitmap); out1: free_page((unsigned long)vmx_io_bitmap_b); out: @@ -6634,12 +6555,6 @@ out: static __exit void hardware_unsetup(void) { - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic); - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive); - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic); - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive); - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy); - free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode); free_page((unsigned long)vmx_io_bitmap_b); free_page((unsigned long)vmx_io_bitmap_a); free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmwrite_bitmap); @@ -7004,13 +6919,6 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu * if (r < 0) goto out_vmcs02; - if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { - vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = - (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vmx->nested.msr_bitmap) - goto out_msr_bitmap; - } - vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 = kmalloc(VMCS12_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12) goto out_cached_vmcs12; @@ -7040,9 +6948,6 @@ out_shadow_vmcs: kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12); out_cached_vmcs12: - free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap); - -out_msr_bitmap: free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); out_vmcs02: @@ -7121,10 +7026,6 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx vmx->nested.vmxon = false; free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02); nested_release_vmcs12(vmx); - if (vmx->nested.msr_bitmap) { - free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap); - vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = NULL; - } if (enable_shadow_vmcs) { vmcs_clear(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs); free_vmcs(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs); @@ -8471,7 +8372,7 @@ static void vmx_set_virtual_x2apic_mode( } vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, sec_exec_control); - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); } static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t hpa) @@ -9091,6 +8992,7 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu( { int err; struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; int cpu; if (!vmx) @@ -9131,6 +9033,15 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu( if (err < 0) goto free_msrs; + msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW); + vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = 0; + vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01; cpu = get_cpu(); vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu); @@ -9525,7 +9436,7 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_ int msr; struct page *page; unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1; - unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_bitmap; + unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap; /* This shortcut is ok because we support only x2APIC MSRs so far. */ if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12)) @@ -10045,6 +9956,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vc if (kvm_has_tsc_control) decache_tsc_multiplier(vmx); + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap)); + if (enable_vpid) { /* * There is no direct mapping between vpid02 and vpid12, the @@ -10749,7 +10663,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struc vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0); if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) - vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu); + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu); if (nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count)) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from pbonzini(a)redhat.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From f21f165ef922c2146cc5bdc620f542953c41714b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 12:16:15 +0100 Subject: KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> commit f21f165ef922c2146cc5bdc620f542953c41714b upstream. Group together the calls to alloc_vmcs and loaded_vmcs_init. Soon we'll also allocate an MSR bitmap there. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # prereq for Spectre mitigation Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -3524,11 +3524,6 @@ static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(int c return vmcs; } -static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(void) -{ - return alloc_vmcs_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id()); -} - static void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs) { free_pages((unsigned long)vmcs, vmcs_config.order); @@ -3547,6 +3542,22 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct load WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL); } +static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(void) +{ + return alloc_vmcs_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id()); +} + +static int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) +{ + loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); + if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs) + return -ENOMEM; + + loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL; + loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs); + return 0; +} + static void free_kvm_area(void) { int cpu; @@ -6949,6 +6960,7 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu * struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs; const u64 VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED | FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX; + int r; /* The Intel VMX Instruction Reference lists a bunch of bits that * are prerequisite to running VMXON, most notably cr4.VMXE must be @@ -6988,11 +7000,9 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu * return 1; } - vmx->nested.vmcs02.vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); - vmx->nested.vmcs02.shadow_vmcs = NULL; - if (!vmx->nested.vmcs02.vmcs) + r = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); + if (r < 0) goto out_vmcs02; - loaded_vmcs_init(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = @@ -9113,17 +9123,15 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu( if (!vmx->guest_msrs) goto free_pml; - vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01; - vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); - vmx->loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL; - if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) - goto free_msrs; if (!vmm_exclusive) kvm_cpu_vmxon(__pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, raw_smp_processor_id()))); - loaded_vmcs_init(vmx->loaded_vmcs); + err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01); if (!vmm_exclusive) kvm_cpu_vmxoff(); + if (err < 0) + goto free_msrs; + vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01; cpu = get_cpu(); vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu); vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from pbonzini(a)redhat.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 28c1c9fabf48d6ad596273a11c46e0d0da3e14cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 22:59:44 +0100 Subject: KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> commit 28c1c9fabf48d6ad596273a11c46e0d0da3e14cd upstream. Intel processors use MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to indicate RDCL_NO (bit 0) and IBRS_ALL (bit 1). This is a read-only MSR. By default the contents will come directly from the hardware, but user-space can still override it. [dwmw2: The bit in kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features can be unconditional] Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-4-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 8 +++++++- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -380,6 +380,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct /* cpuid 7.0.ecx*/ const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_ecx_x86_features = F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/; + /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/ + const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features = + F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES); + /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */ get_cpu(); @@ -462,12 +466,14 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct /* PKU is not yet implemented for shadow paging. */ if (!tdp_enabled || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) entry->ecx &= ~F(PKU); + entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features; + cpuid_mask(&entry->edx, CPUID_7_EDX); } else { entry->ebx = 0; entry->ecx = 0; + entry->edx = 0; } entry->eax = 0; - entry->edx = 0; break; } case 9: --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -171,6 +171,14 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibpb( return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)); } +static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; + + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0); + return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)); +} + /* * NRIPS is provided through cpuidfn 0x8000000a.edx bit 3 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -550,6 +550,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base; #endif + u64 arch_capabilities; + u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow; u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow; /* @@ -2981,6 +2983,12 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_IA32_TSC: msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu); break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(vcpu)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->arch_capabilities; + break; case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS); break; @@ -3112,6 +3120,11 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W); break; + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated) + return 1; + vmx->arch_capabilities = data; + break; case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT: if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) { if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data)) @@ -5202,6 +5215,8 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vm ++vmx->nmsrs; } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities); vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl); --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -975,6 +975,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = { #endif MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX, + MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES }; static unsigned num_msrs_to_save; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from karahmed(a)amazon.de are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From d28b387fb74da95d69d2615732f50cceb38e9a4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 22:59:45 +0100 Subject: KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> commit d28b387fb74da95d69d2615732f50cceb38e9a4d upstream. [ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> ] Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach. To avoid the overhead of saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only start saving and restoring when a non-zero is written to it. No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest. [dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset] Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-5-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 8 ++- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 11 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct /* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */ const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features = - F(IBPB); + F(IBPB) | F(IBRS); /* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */ const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features = @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/ const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features = - F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES); + F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES); /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */ get_cpu(); @@ -618,9 +618,11 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct g_phys_as = phys_as; entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8); entry->edx = 0; - /* IBPB isn't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */ + /* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) entry->ebx |= F(IBPB); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + entry->ebx |= F(IBRS); entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features; cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX); break; --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -171,6 +171,17 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibpb( return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)); } +static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; + + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0); + if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))) + return true; + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0); + return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)); +} + static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -551,6 +551,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { #endif u64 arch_capabilities; + u64 spec_ctrl; u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow; u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow; @@ -1854,6 +1855,29 @@ static void update_exception_bitmap(stru } /* + * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap. + */ +static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) +{ + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return true; + + msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap; + + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + } + + return true; +} + +/* * Check if MSR is intercepted for L01 MSR bitmap. */ static bool msr_write_intercepted_l01(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) @@ -2983,6 +3007,13 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_IA32_TSC: msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl; + break; case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(vcpu)) @@ -3093,6 +3124,36 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu)) + return 1; + + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) + return 1; + + vmx->spec_ctrl = data; + + if (!data) + break; + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the + * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten + * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well + * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, + MSR_TYPE_RW); + break; case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(vcpu)) @@ -5245,6 +5306,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vc u64 cr0; vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0; + vmx->spec_ctrl = 0; vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0; @@ -8830,6 +8892,15 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu); + /* + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr + * being speculatively taken. + */ + if (vmx->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl); + vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched; asm( /* Store host registers */ @@ -8948,6 +9019,27 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc #endif ); + /* + * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the + * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and + * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding + * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former + * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. + * + * For non-nested case: + * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + * + * For nested case: + * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + */ + if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl); + + if (vmx->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); @@ -9507,7 +9599,7 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_ unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1; unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap; /* - * pred_cmd is trying to verify two things: + * pred_cmd & spec_ctrl are trying to verify two things: * * 1. L0 gave a permission to L1 to actually passthrough the MSR. This * ensures that we do not accidentally generate an L02 MSR bitmap @@ -9520,9 +9612,10 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_ * the MSR. */ bool pred_cmd = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD); + bool spec_ctrl = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12) && - !pred_cmd) + !pred_cmd && !spec_ctrl) return false; page = nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->msr_bitmap); @@ -9561,6 +9654,12 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_ } } + if (spec_ctrl) + nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr( + msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, + MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + if (pred_cmd) nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr( msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0, --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = { #endif MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX, - MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES }; static unsigned num_msrs_to_save; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from karahmed(a)amazon.de are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From b2ac58f90540e39324e7a29a7ad471407ae0bf48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2018 15:56:23 +0100 Subject: KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> commit b2ac58f90540e39324e7a29a7ad471407ae0bf48 upstream. [ Based on a patch from Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> ] ... basically doing exactly what we do for VMX: - Passthrough SPEC_CTRL to guests (if enabled in guest CPUID) - Save and restore SPEC_CTRL around VMExit and VMEntry only if the guest actually used it. Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517669783-20732-1-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 88 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm { u64 gs_base; } host; + u64 spec_ctrl; + u32 *msrpm; ulong nmi_iret_rip; @@ -248,6 +250,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_ms { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true }, { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true }, #endif + { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false }, @@ -863,6 +866,25 @@ static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 inde return false; } +static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned msr) +{ + u8 bit_write; + unsigned long tmp; + u32 offset; + u32 *msrpm; + + msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm: + to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm; + + offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr); + bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1; + tmp = msrpm[offset]; + + BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID); + + return !!test_bit(bit_write, &tmp); +} + static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr, int read, int write) { @@ -1537,6 +1559,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vc u32 dummy; u32 eax = 1; + svm->spec_ctrl = 0; + if (!init_event) { svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE; @@ -3520,6 +3544,13 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_VM_CR: msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr; break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl; + break; case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV: msr_info->data = 0x01000065; break; @@ -3611,6 +3642,33 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu)) + return 1; + + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) + return 1; + + svm->spec_ctrl = data; + + if (!data) + break; + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm. + * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up + * touching the MSR anyway now. + */ + set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1); + break; case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: if (!msr->host_initiated && !guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(vcpu)) @@ -4854,6 +4912,15 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu local_irq_enable(); + /* + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr + * being speculatively taken. + */ + if (svm->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + asm volatile ( "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t" "mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t" @@ -4946,6 +5013,27 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu #endif ); + /* + * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the + * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and + * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding + * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former + * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. + * + * For non-nested case: + * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + * + * For nested case: + * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + */ + if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + + if (svm->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from karahmed(a)amazon.de are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: nVMX: vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() can't fail" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: nVMX: vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() can't fail to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 6342c50ad12e8ce0736e722184a7dbdea4a3477f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 11:58:58 +0100 Subject: KVM: nVMX: vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() can't fail From: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> commit 6342c50ad12e8ce0736e722184a7dbdea4a3477f upstream. vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() can't fail, let's turn it into a void function. Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -4738,7 +4738,7 @@ static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(void) return enable_apicv; } -static int vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static void vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); int max_irr; @@ -4749,13 +4749,13 @@ static int vmx_complete_nested_posted_in vmx->nested.pi_pending) { vmx->nested.pi_pending = false; if (!pi_test_and_clear_on(vmx->nested.pi_desc)) - return 0; + return; max_irr = find_last_bit( (unsigned long *)vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir, 256); if (max_irr == 256) - return 0; + return; vapic_page = kmap(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page); if (!vapic_page) { @@ -4772,7 +4772,6 @@ static int vmx_complete_nested_posted_in vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status); } } - return 0; } static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -10493,7 +10492,8 @@ static int vmx_check_nested_events(struc return 0; } - return vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu); + vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu); + return 0; } static u32 vmx_get_preemption_timer_value(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from david(a)redhat.com are queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: nVMX: mark vmcs12 pages dirty on L2 exit" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: nVMX: mark vmcs12 pages dirty on L2 exit to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From c9f04407f2e0b3fc9ff7913c65fcfcb0a4b61570 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Matlack <dmatlack(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 14:00:40 -0700 Subject: KVM: nVMX: mark vmcs12 pages dirty on L2 exit MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: David Matlack <dmatlack(a)google.com> commit c9f04407f2e0b3fc9ff7913c65fcfcb0a4b61570 upstream. The host physical addresses of L1's Virtual APIC Page and Posted Interrupt descriptor are loaded into the VMCS02. The CPU may write to these pages via their host physical address while L2 is running, bypassing address-translation-based dirty tracking (e.g. EPT write protection). Mark them dirty on every exit from L2 to prevent them from getting out of sync with dirty tracking. Also mark the virtual APIC page and the posted interrupt descriptor dirty when KVM is virtualizing posted interrupt processing. Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -4738,6 +4738,28 @@ static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(void) return enable_apicv; } +static void nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); + gfn_t gfn; + + /* + * Don't need to mark the APIC access page dirty; it is never + * written to by the CPU during APIC virtualization. + */ + + if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) { + gfn = vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; + kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn); + } + + if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12)) { + gfn = vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; + kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn); + } +} + + static void vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); @@ -4745,18 +4767,15 @@ static void vmx_complete_nested_posted_i void *vapic_page; u16 status; - if (vmx->nested.pi_desc && - vmx->nested.pi_pending) { - vmx->nested.pi_pending = false; - if (!pi_test_and_clear_on(vmx->nested.pi_desc)) - return; - - max_irr = find_last_bit( - (unsigned long *)vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir, 256); + if (!vmx->nested.pi_desc || !vmx->nested.pi_pending) + return; - if (max_irr == 256) - return; + vmx->nested.pi_pending = false; + if (!pi_test_and_clear_on(vmx->nested.pi_desc)) + return; + max_irr = find_last_bit((unsigned long *)vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir, 256); + if (max_irr != 256) { vapic_page = kmap(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page); if (!vapic_page) { WARN_ON(1); @@ -4772,6 +4791,8 @@ static void vmx_complete_nested_posted_i vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status); } } + + nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(vcpu); } static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -8028,6 +8049,18 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(stru vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE), KVM_ISA_VMX); + /* + * The host physical addresses of some pages of guest memory + * are loaded into VMCS02 (e.g. L1's Virtual APIC Page). The CPU + * may write to these pages via their host physical address while + * L2 is running, bypassing any address-translation-based dirty + * tracking (e.g. EPT write protection). + * + * Mark them dirty on every exit from L2 to prevent them from + * getting out of sync with dirty tracking. + */ + nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(vcpu); + if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending) return false; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dmatlack(a)google.com are queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From de3a0021a60635de96aa92713c1a31a96747d72c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 17:22:25 -0600 Subject: KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> commit de3a0021a60635de96aa92713c1a31a96747d72c upstream. The potential performance advantages of a vmcs02 pool have never been realized. To simplify the code, eliminate the pool. Instead, a single vmcs02 is allocated per VCPU when the VCPU enters VMX operation. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # prereq for Spectre mitigation Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Kanda <mark.kanda(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Ameya More <ameya.more(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 146 ++++++++--------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -173,7 +173,6 @@ module_param(ple_window_max, int, S_IRUG extern const ulong vmx_return; #define NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS 8 -#define VMCS02_POOL_SIZE 1 struct vmcs { u32 revision_id; @@ -207,7 +206,7 @@ struct shared_msr_entry { * stored in guest memory specified by VMPTRLD, but is opaque to the guest, * which must access it using VMREAD/VMWRITE/VMCLEAR instructions. * More than one of these structures may exist, if L1 runs multiple L2 guests. - * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build a vmcs02: a VMCS for the + * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build the vmcs02: a VMCS for the * underlying hardware which will be used to run L2. * This structure is packed to ensure that its layout is identical across * machines (necessary for live migration). @@ -386,13 +385,6 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 { */ #define VMCS12_SIZE 0x1000 -/* Used to remember the last vmcs02 used for some recently used vmcs12s */ -struct vmcs02_list { - struct list_head list; - gpa_t vmptr; - struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02; -}; - /* * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu. @@ -419,15 +411,15 @@ struct nested_vmx { */ bool sync_shadow_vmcs; - /* vmcs02_list cache of VMCSs recently used to run L2 guests */ - struct list_head vmcs02_pool; - int vmcs02_num; bool change_vmcs01_virtual_x2apic_mode; /* L2 must run next, and mustn't decide to exit to L1. */ bool nested_run_pending; + + struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02; + /* - * Guest pages referred to in vmcs02 with host-physical pointers, so - * we must keep them pinned while L2 runs. + * Guest pages referred to in the vmcs02 with host-physical + * pointers, so we must keep them pinned while L2 runs. */ struct page *apic_access_page; struct page *virtual_apic_page; @@ -6684,94 +6676,6 @@ static int handle_monitor(struct kvm_vcp } /* - * To run an L2 guest, we need a vmcs02 based on the L1-specified vmcs12. - * We could reuse a single VMCS for all the L2 guests, but we also want the - * option to allocate a separate vmcs02 for each separate loaded vmcs12 - this - * allows keeping them loaded on the processor, and in the future will allow - * optimizations where prepare_vmcs02 doesn't need to set all the fields on - * every entry if they never change. - * So we keep, in vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, a cache of size VMCS02_POOL_SIZE - * (>=0) with a vmcs02 for each recently loaded vmcs12s, most recent first. - * - * The following functions allocate and free a vmcs02 in this pool. - */ - -/* Get a VMCS from the pool to use as vmcs02 for the current vmcs12. */ -static struct loaded_vmcs *nested_get_current_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item; - list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) - if (item->vmptr == vmx->nested.current_vmptr) { - list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool); - return &item->vmcs02; - } - - if (vmx->nested.vmcs02_num >= max(VMCS02_POOL_SIZE, 1)) { - /* Recycle the least recently used VMCS. */ - item = list_last_entry(&vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, - struct vmcs02_list, list); - item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr; - list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool); - return &item->vmcs02; - } - - /* Create a new VMCS */ - item = kmalloc(sizeof(struct vmcs02_list), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!item) - return NULL; - item->vmcs02.vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); - item->vmcs02.shadow_vmcs = NULL; - if (!item->vmcs02.vmcs) { - kfree(item); - return NULL; - } - loaded_vmcs_init(&item->vmcs02); - item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr; - list_add(&(item->list), &(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool)); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num++; - return &item->vmcs02; -} - -/* Free and remove from pool a vmcs02 saved for a vmcs12 (if there is one) */ -static void nested_free_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, gpa_t vmptr) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item; - list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) - if (item->vmptr == vmptr) { - free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02); - list_del(&item->list); - kfree(item); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num--; - return; - } -} - -/* - * Free all VMCSs saved for this vcpu, except the one pointed by - * vmx->loaded_vmcs. We must be running L1, so vmx->loaded_vmcs - * must be &vmx->vmcs01. - */ -static void nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) -{ - struct vmcs02_list *item, *n; - - WARN_ON(vmx->loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01); - list_for_each_entry_safe(item, n, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) { - /* - * Something will leak if the above WARN triggers. Better than - * a use-after-free. - */ - if (vmx->loaded_vmcs == &item->vmcs02) - continue; - - free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02); - list_del(&item->list); - kfree(item); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num--; - } -} - -/* * The following 3 functions, nested_vmx_succeed()/failValid()/failInvalid(), * set the success or error code of an emulated VMX instruction, as specified * by Vol 2B, VMX Instruction Reference, "Conventions". @@ -7084,6 +6988,12 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu * return 1; } + vmx->nested.vmcs02.vmcs = alloc_vmcs(); + vmx->nested.vmcs02.shadow_vmcs = NULL; + if (!vmx->nested.vmcs02.vmcs) + goto out_vmcs02; + loaded_vmcs_init(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); @@ -7106,9 +7016,6 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu * vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = shadow_vmcs; } - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool)); - vmx->nested.vmcs02_num = 0; - hrtimer_init(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED); vmx->nested.preemption_timer.function = vmx_preemption_timer_fn; @@ -7126,6 +7033,9 @@ out_cached_vmcs12: free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap); out_msr_bitmap: + free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); + +out_vmcs02: return -ENOMEM; } @@ -7211,7 +7121,7 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = NULL; } kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12); - /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in current vmcs02 */ + /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in the vmcs02 */ if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) { nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page); vmx->nested.apic_access_page = NULL; @@ -7227,7 +7137,7 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx vmx->nested.pi_desc = NULL; } - nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(vmx); + free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02); } /* Emulate the VMXOFF instruction */ @@ -7261,8 +7171,6 @@ static int handle_vmclear(struct kvm_vcp vmptr + offsetof(struct vmcs12, launch_state), &zero, sizeof(zero)); - nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmptr); - skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu); return 1; @@ -8051,10 +7959,11 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(stru /* * The host physical addresses of some pages of guest memory - * are loaded into VMCS02 (e.g. L1's Virtual APIC Page). The CPU - * may write to these pages via their host physical address while - * L2 is running, bypassing any address-translation-based dirty - * tracking (e.g. EPT write protection). + * are loaded into the vmcs02 (e.g. vmcs12's Virtual APIC + * Page). The CPU may write to these pages via their host + * physical address while L2 is running, bypassing any + * address-translation-based dirty tracking (e.g. EPT write + * protection). * * Mark them dirty on every exit from L2 to prevent them from * getting out of sync with dirty tracking. @@ -10223,7 +10132,6 @@ static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcp struct vmcs12 *vmcs12; struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); int cpu; - struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs02; bool ia32e; u32 msr_entry_idx; @@ -10363,17 +10271,13 @@ static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcp * the nested entry. */ - vmcs02 = nested_get_current_vmcs02(vmx); - if (!vmcs02) - return -ENOMEM; - enter_guest_mode(vcpu); if (!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS)) vmx->nested.vmcs01_debugctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL); cpu = get_cpu(); - vmx->loaded_vmcs = vmcs02; + vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->nested.vmcs02; vmx_vcpu_put(vcpu); vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu); vcpu->cpu = cpu; @@ -10888,10 +10792,6 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm vm_exit_controls_reset_shadow(vmx); vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx); - /* if no vmcs02 cache requested, remove the one we used */ - if (VMCS02_POOL_SIZE == 0) - nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmx->nested.current_vmptr); - load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12); /* Update any VMCS fields that might have changed while L2 ran */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jmattson(a)google.com are queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH v2 4.4] net: cdc_ncm: initialize drvflags before usage

by Matthias

From: Matthias Hintzmann <matthias.dev(a)gmx.de> ctx->drvflags is checked in the if clause before beeing initialized. Move initialization before first usage. Note, that the if clause was backported with commit 75f82a703b30 ("cdc_ncm: Set NTB format again after altsetting switch for Huawei devices") from mainline (upstream commit 2b02c20ce0c2 ("cdc_ncm: Set NTB format again after altsetting switch for Huawei devices"). In mainline, the initialization is at the right place before the if clause. Fixes: 75f82a703b30 ("cdc_ncm: Set NTB format again after altsetting switch for Huawei devices") Signed-off-by: Matthias Hintzmann <matthias.dev(a)gmx.de> [mrkiko.rs(a)gmail.com: commit message tweaks] --- drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c index 1228d0da407..72cb30828a1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c @@ -825,6 +825,9 @@ int cdc_ncm_bind_common(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf, u8 data_ goto error2; } + /* Device-specific flags */ + ctx->drvflags = drvflags; + /* * Some Huawei devices have been observed to come out of reset in NDP32 mode. * Let's check if this is the case, and set the device to NDP16 mode again if @@ -873,9 +876,6 @@ int cdc_ncm_bind_common(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf, u8 data_ /* finish setting up the device specific data */ cdc_ncm_setup(dev); - /* Device-specific flags */ - ctx->drvflags = drvflags; - /* Allocate the delayed NDP if needed. */ if (ctx->drvflags & CDC_NCM_FLAG_NDP_TO_END) { ctx->delayed_ndp16 = kzalloc(ctx->max_ndp_size, GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.15.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "drm: rcar-du: Fix race condition when disabling planes at CRTC stop" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled drm: rcar-du: Fix race condition when disabling planes at CRTC stop to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: drm-rcar-du-fix-race-condition-when-disabling-planes-at-crtc-stop.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 641307df71fe77d7b38a477067495ede05d47295 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2017 02:31:33 +0300 Subject: drm: rcar-du: Fix race condition when disabling planes at CRTC stop From: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> commit 641307df71fe77d7b38a477067495ede05d47295 upstream. When stopping the CRTC the driver must disable all planes and wait for the change to take effect at the next vblank. Merely calling drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank() is not enough, as the function doesn't include any mechanism to handle the race with vblank interrupts. Replace the drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank() call with a manual mechanism that handles the vblank interrupt race. Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Reviewed-by: Kieran Bingham <kieran.bingham+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h | 8 ++++ 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c @@ -371,6 +371,31 @@ static void rcar_du_crtc_start(struct rc rcrtc->started = true; } +static void rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) +{ + struct rcar_du_device *rcdu = rcrtc->group->dev; + struct drm_crtc *crtc = &rcrtc->crtc; + u32 status; + /* Make sure vblank interrupts are enabled. */ + drm_crtc_vblank_get(crtc); + /* + * Disable planes and calculate how many vertical blanking interrupts we + * have to wait for. If a vertical blanking interrupt has been triggered + * but not processed yet, we don't know whether it occurred before or + * after the planes got disabled. We thus have to wait for two vblank + * interrupts in that case. + */ + spin_lock_irq(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + rcar_du_group_write(rcrtc->group, rcrtc->index % 2 ? DS2PR : DS1PR, 0); + status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); + rcrtc->vblank_count = status & DSSR_VBK ? 2 : 1; + spin_unlock_irq(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + if (!wait_event_timeout(rcrtc->vblank_wait, rcrtc->vblank_count == 0, + msecs_to_jiffies(100))) + dev_warn(rcdu->dev, "vertical blanking timeout\n"); + drm_crtc_vblank_put(crtc); +} + static void rcar_du_crtc_stop(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) { struct drm_crtc *crtc = &rcrtc->crtc; @@ -379,17 +404,16 @@ static void rcar_du_crtc_stop(struct rca return; /* Disable all planes and wait for the change to take effect. This is - * required as the DSnPR registers are updated on vblank, and no vblank - * will occur once the CRTC is stopped. Disabling planes when starting - * the CRTC thus wouldn't be enough as it would start scanning out - * immediately from old frame buffers until the next vblank. + * required as the plane enable registers are updated on vblank, and no + * vblank will occur once the CRTC is stopped. Disabling planes when + * starting the CRTC thus wouldn't be enough as it would start scanning + * out immediately from old frame buffers until the next vblank. * * This increases the CRTC stop delay, especially when multiple CRTCs * are stopped in one operation as we now wait for one vblank per CRTC. * Whether this can be improved needs to be researched. */ - rcar_du_group_write(rcrtc->group, rcrtc->index % 2 ? DS2PR : DS1PR, 0); - drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank(crtc); + rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(rcrtc); /* Disable vertical blanking interrupt reporting. We first need to wait * for page flip completion before stopping the CRTC as userspace @@ -528,10 +552,26 @@ static irqreturn_t rcar_du_crtc_irq(int irqreturn_t ret = IRQ_NONE; u32 status; + spin_lock(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); rcar_du_crtc_write(rcrtc, DSRCR, status & DSRCR_MASK); if (status & DSSR_VBK) { + /* + * Wake up the vblank wait if the counter reaches 0. This must + * be protected by the vblank_lock to avoid races in + * rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(). + */ + if (rcrtc->vblank_count) { + if (--rcrtc->vblank_count == 0) + wake_up(&rcrtc->vblank_wait); + } + } + + spin_unlock(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + + if (status & DSSR_VBK) { drm_handle_vblank(rcrtc->crtc.dev, rcrtc->index); rcar_du_crtc_finish_page_flip(rcrtc); ret = IRQ_HANDLED; @@ -585,6 +625,8 @@ int rcar_du_crtc_create(struct rcar_du_g } init_waitqueue_head(&rcrtc->flip_wait); + init_waitqueue_head(&rcrtc->vblank_wait); + spin_lock_init(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); rcrtc->group = rgrp; rcrtc->mmio_offset = mmio_offsets[index]; --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #define __RCAR_DU_CRTC_H__ #include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/wait.h> #include <drm/drmP.h> @@ -32,6 +33,9 @@ struct rcar_du_group; * @started: whether the CRTC has been started and is running * @event: event to post when the pending page flip completes * @flip_wait: wait queue used to signal page flip completion + * @vblank_lock: protects vblank_wait and vblank_count + * @vblank_wait: wait queue used to signal vertical blanking + * @vblank_count: number of vertical blanking interrupts to wait for * @outputs: bitmask of the outputs (enum rcar_du_output) driven by this CRTC * @enabled: whether the CRTC is enabled, used to control system resume * @group: CRTC group this CRTC belongs to @@ -48,6 +52,10 @@ struct rcar_du_crtc { struct drm_pending_vblank_event *event; wait_queue_head_t flip_wait; + spinlock_t vblank_lock; + wait_queue_head_t vblank_wait; + unsigned int vblank_count; + unsigned int outputs; bool enabled; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com are queue-4.4/drm-rcar-du-use-the-vbk-interrupt-for-vblank-events.patch queue-4.4/drm-rcar-du-fix-race-condition-when-disabling-planes-at-crtc-stop.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "drm: rcar-du: Use the VBK interrupt for vblank events" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled drm: rcar-du: Use the VBK interrupt for vblank events to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: drm-rcar-du-use-the-vbk-interrupt-for-vblank-events.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From cbbb90b0c084d7dfb2ed8e3fecf8df200fbdd2a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 23:46:39 +0300 Subject: drm: rcar-du: Use the VBK interrupt for vblank events From: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> commit cbbb90b0c084d7dfb2ed8e3fecf8df200fbdd2a0 upstream. When implementing support for interlaced modes, the driver switched from reporting vblank events on the vertical blanking (VBK) interrupt to the frame end interrupt (FRM). This incorrectly divided the reported refresh rate by two. Fix it by moving back to the VBK interrupt. Fixes: 906eff7fcada ("drm: rcar-du: Implement support for interlaced modes") Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Reviewed-by: Kieran Bingham <kieran.bingham+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c @@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static irqreturn_t rcar_du_crtc_irq(int status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); rcar_du_crtc_write(rcrtc, DSRCR, status & DSRCR_MASK); - if (status & DSSR_FRM) { + if (status & DSSR_VBK) { drm_handle_vblank(rcrtc->crtc.dev, rcrtc->index); rcar_du_crtc_finish_page_flip(rcrtc); ret = IRQ_HANDLED; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com are queue-4.4/drm-rcar-du-use-the-vbk-interrupt-for-vblank-events.patch queue-4.4/drm-rcar-du-fix-race-condition-when-disabling-planes-at-crtc-stop.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: asoc-rsnd-don-t-call-free_irq-on-parent-ssi.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 1f8754d4daea5f257370a52a30fcb22798c54516 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> Date: Tue, 16 May 2017 01:48:24 +0000 Subject: ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI From: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> commit 1f8754d4daea5f257370a52a30fcb22798c54516 upstream. If SSI uses shared pin, some SSI will be used as parent SSI. Then, normal SSI's remove and Parent SSI's remove (these are same SSI) will be called when unbind or remove timing. In this case, free_irq() will be called twice. This patch solve this issue. Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> Tested-by: Hiroyuki Yokoyama <hiroyuki.yokoyama.vx(a)renesas.com> Reported-by: Hiroyuki Yokoyama <hiroyuki.yokoyama.vx(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- sound/soc/sh/rcar/rsnd.h | 2 ++ sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) --- a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/rsnd.h +++ b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/rsnd.h @@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ enum rsnd_mod_type { RSND_MOD_MIX, RSND_MOD_CTU, RSND_MOD_SRC, + RSND_MOD_SSIP, /* SSI parent */ RSND_MOD_SSI, RSND_MOD_MAX, }; @@ -365,6 +366,7 @@ struct rsnd_dai_stream { }; #define rsnd_io_to_mod(io, i) ((i) < RSND_MOD_MAX ? (io)->mod[(i)] : NULL) #define rsnd_io_to_mod_ssi(io) rsnd_io_to_mod((io), RSND_MOD_SSI) +#define rsnd_io_to_mod_ssip(io) rsnd_io_to_mod((io), RSND_MOD_SSIP) #define rsnd_io_to_mod_src(io) rsnd_io_to_mod((io), RSND_MOD_SRC) #define rsnd_io_to_mod_ctu(io) rsnd_io_to_mod((io), RSND_MOD_CTU) #define rsnd_io_to_mod_mix(io) rsnd_io_to_mod((io), RSND_MOD_MIX) --- a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c +++ b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c @@ -550,11 +550,16 @@ static int rsnd_ssi_dma_remove(struct rs struct rsnd_priv *priv) { struct rsnd_ssi *ssi = rsnd_mod_to_ssi(mod); + struct rsnd_mod *ssi_parent_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssip(io); struct device *dev = rsnd_priv_to_dev(priv); int irq = ssi->info->irq; rsnd_dma_quit(io, rsnd_mod_to_dma(mod)); + /* Do nothing for SSI parent mod */ + if (ssi_parent_mod == mod) + return 0; + /* PIO will request IRQ again */ devm_free_irq(dev, irq, mod); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com are queue-4.4/asoc-rsnd-don-t-call-free_irq-on-parent-ssi.patch queue-4.4/asoc-rsnd-avoid-duplicate-free_irq.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ASoC: simple-card: Fix misleading error message" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ASoC: simple-card: Fix misleading error message to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: asoc-simple-card-fix-misleading-error-message.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 7ac45d1635a4cd2e99a4b11903d4a2815ca1b27b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Scheel <julian(a)jusst.de> Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 12:28:23 +0200 Subject: ASoC: simple-card: Fix misleading error message From: Julian Scheel <julian(a)jusst.de> commit 7ac45d1635a4cd2e99a4b11903d4a2815ca1b27b upstream. In case cpu could not be found the error message would always refer to /codec/ not being found in DT. Fix this by catching the cpu node not found case explicitly. Signed-off-by: Julian Scheel <julian(a)jusst.de> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c +++ b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c @@ -343,13 +343,19 @@ static int asoc_simple_card_dai_link_of( snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scpu", prefix); cpu = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); + if (!cpu) { + ret = -EINVAL; + dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop); + goto dai_link_of_err; + } + snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%splat", prefix); plat = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scodec", prefix); codec = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); - if (!cpu || !codec) { + if (!codec) { ret = -EINVAL; dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop); goto dai_link_of_err; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from julian(a)jusst.de are queue-4.4/asoc-simple-card-fix-misleading-error-message.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ASoC: rsnd: avoid duplicate free_irq()" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ASoC: rsnd: avoid duplicate free_irq() to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: asoc-rsnd-avoid-duplicate-free_irq.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From e0936c3471a8411a5df327641fa3ffe12a2fb07b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 02:16:20 +0000 Subject: ASoC: rsnd: avoid duplicate free_irq() From: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> commit e0936c3471a8411a5df327641fa3ffe12a2fb07b upstream. commit 1f8754d4daea5f ("ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI") fixed Parent SSI duplicate free_irq(). But on Renesas Sound, not only Parent SSI but also Multi SSI have same issue. This patch avoid duplicate free_irq() if it was not pure SSI. Fixes: 1f8754d4daea5f ("ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI") Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c +++ b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c @@ -550,14 +550,14 @@ static int rsnd_ssi_dma_remove(struct rs struct rsnd_priv *priv) { struct rsnd_ssi *ssi = rsnd_mod_to_ssi(mod); - struct rsnd_mod *ssi_parent_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssip(io); + struct rsnd_mod *pure_ssi_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssi(io); struct device *dev = rsnd_priv_to_dev(priv); int irq = ssi->info->irq; rsnd_dma_quit(io, rsnd_mod_to_dma(mod)); - /* Do nothing for SSI parent mod */ - if (ssi_parent_mod == mod) + /* Do nothing if non SSI (= SSI parent, multi SSI) mod */ + if (pure_ssi_mod != mod) return 0; /* PIO will request IRQ again */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com are queue-4.4/asoc-rsnd-don-t-call-free_irq-on-parent-ssi.patch queue-4.4/asoc-rsnd-avoid-duplicate-free_irq.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.4.y 1/3] ASoC: simple-card: Fix misleading error message

by Nhan Nguyen

From: Julian Scheel <julian(a)jusst.de> commit 7ac45d1635a4cd2e99a4b11903d4a2815ca1b27b upstream. In case cpu could not be found the error message would always refer to /codec/ not being found in DT. Fix this by catching the cpu node not found case explicitly. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Julian Scheel <julian(a)jusst.de> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> --- sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c index ff6fcd9..0b1b6fc 100644 --- a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c +++ b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c @@ -343,13 +343,19 @@ static int asoc_simple_card_dai_link_of(struct device_node *node, snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scpu", prefix); cpu = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); + if (!cpu) { + ret = -EINVAL; + dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop); + goto dai_link_of_err; + } + snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%splat", prefix); plat = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scodec", prefix); codec = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); - if (!cpu || !codec) { + if (!codec) { ret = -EINVAL; dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop); goto dai_link_of_err; -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] net: cdc_ncm: initialize drvflags before usage

by Matthias

From: Matthias Hintzmann <matthias.dev(a)gmx.de> ctx->drvflags is checked in the if clause before beeing initialized. Move initialization before first usage. Note, that the if clause was backported from mainline at Nov. 15th 2017 (GetNtbFormat endian fix). In mainline, the initialization is at the right place before the if clause. Signed-off-by: Matthias Hintzmann <matthias.dev(a)gmx.de> --- drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c index 1228d0da407..72cb30828a1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c @@ -825,6 +825,9 @@ int cdc_ncm_bind_common(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf, u8 data_ goto error2; } + /* Device-specific flags */ + ctx->drvflags = drvflags; + /* * Some Huawei devices have been observed to come out of reset in NDP32 mode. * Let's check if this is the case, and set the device to NDP16 mode again if @@ -873,9 +876,6 @@ int cdc_ncm_bind_common(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf, u8 data_ /* finish setting up the device specific data */ cdc_ncm_setup(dev); - /* Device-specific flags */ - ctx->drvflags = drvflags; - /* Allocate the delayed NDP if needed. */ if (ctx->drvflags & CDC_NCM_FLAG_NDP_TO_END) { ctx->delayed_ndp16 = kzalloc(ctx->max_ndp_size, GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.15.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.15 00/60] 4.15.2-stable review

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.15.2 release. There are 60 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know. Responses should be made by Wed Feb 7 18:21:57 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late. The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.15.2-rc1.gz or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.15.y and the diffstat can be found below. thanks, greg k-h ------------- Pseudo-Shortlog of commits: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Linux 4.15.2-rc1 Ian Abbott <abbotti(a)mev.co.uk> fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> KVM/x86: Add IBPB support KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX Darren Kenny <darren.kenny(a)oracle.com> x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path Dou Liyang <douly.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com> x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser William Grant <william.grant(a)canonical.com> x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> ASoC: pcm512x: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org> iio: adc/accel: Fix up module licenses Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe ------------- Diffstat: Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 - Documentation/speculation.txt | 90 ++++ Makefile | 4 +- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 9 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 130 +---- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 7 +- arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 28 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 22 +- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 12 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 86 +-- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h | 5 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 +- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 15 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 134 +++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 70 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 66 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 2 - arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 22 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 116 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 660 ++++++++++++++---------- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 + arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 10 + arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 56 ++ arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 8 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 33 +- drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c | 4 + drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c | 13 +- drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9-i2c.c | 3 + drivers/iio/adc/qcom-vadc-common.c | 4 + drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c | 4 + drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 2 + include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 +- include/linux/init.h | 9 +- include/linux/module.h | 9 + include/linux/nospec.h | 72 +++ kernel/module.c | 11 + net/wireless/nl80211.c | 9 +- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 + sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c | 4 + tools/objtool/check.c | 89 ++-- tools/objtool/orc_gen.c | 5 + 60 files changed, 1312 insertions(+), 637 deletions(-)

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 3.18 00/36] 3.18.94-stable review

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.94 release. There are 36 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know. Responses should be made by Wed Feb 7 18:23:41 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late. The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/stable-review/patch-3.18.94-rc1.gz or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-3.18.y and the diffstat can be found below. thanks, greg k-h ------------- Pseudo-Shortlog of commits: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Linux 3.18.94-rc1 Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> ASoC: pcm512x: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Stefan Agner <stefan(a)agner.ch> spi: imx: do not access registers while clocks disabled Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn(a)android.com> selinux: general protection fault in sock_has_perm Oliver Neukum <oneukum(a)suse.com> usb: uas: unconditionally bring back host after reset Hemant Kumar <hemantk(a)codeaurora.org> usb: f_fs: Prevent gadget unbind if it is already unbound Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> USB: serial: simple: add Motorola Tetra driver Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com> usbip: list: don't list devices attached to vhci_hcd Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com> usbip: prevent bind loops on devices attached to vhci_hcd Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990(a)gmail.com> USB: serial: io_edgeport: fix possible sleep-in-atomic Oliver Neukum <oneukum(a)suse.com> CDC-ACM: apply quirk for card reader Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> USB: cdc-acm: Do not log urb submission errors on disconnect Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> USB: serial: pl2303: new device id for Chilitag Larry Finger <Larry.Finger(a)lwfinger.net> staging: rtl8188eu: Fix incorrect response to SIOCGIWESSID Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> usb: gadget: don't dereference g until after it has been null checked Icenowy Zheng <icenowy(a)aosc.io> media: usbtv: add a new usbid Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva(a)embeddedor.com> scsi: ufs: ufshcd: fix potential NULL pointer dereference in ufshcd_config_vreg Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> quota: Check for register_shrinker() failure. Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas(a)glider.be> net: ethernet: xilinx: Mark XILINX_LL_TEMAC broken on 64-bit Robert Lippert <roblip(a)gmail.com> hwmon: (pmbus) Use 64bit math for DIRECT format values Andrew Elble <aweits(a)rit.edu> nfsd: check for use of the closed special stateid Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust(a)primarydata.com> nfsd: CLOSE SHOULD return the invalid special stateid for NFSv4.x (x>0) Eduardo Otubo <otubo(a)redhat.com> xen-netfront: remove warning when unloading module Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li(a)hotmail.com> KVM: VMX: Fix rflags cache during vCPU reset Chun-Yeow Yeoh <yeohchunyeow(a)gmail.com> mac80211: fix the update of path metric for RANN frame Michael Lyle <mlyle(a)lyle.org> bcache: check return value of register_shrinker Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li(a)hotmail.com> KVM: X86: Fix operand/address-size during instruction decoding Liran Alon <liran.alon(a)oracle.com> KVM: x86: Don't re-execute instruction when not passing CR2 value Liran Alon <liran.alon(a)oracle.com> KVM: x86: emulator: Return to user-mode on L1 CPL=0 emulation failure Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> igb: Free IRQs when device is hotplugged Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> gpio: iop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> ALSA: seq: Make ioctls race-free Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> um: Remove copy&paste code from init.h Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> um: Stop abusing __KERNEL__ Thomas Meyer <thomas(a)m3y3r.de> um: link vmlinux with -no-pie Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov(a)gmail.com> Input: do not emit unneeded EV_SYN when suspending ------------- Diffstat: Makefile | 4 ++-- arch/um/Makefile | 9 +++++---- arch/um/drivers/mconsole.h | 2 +- arch/um/include/shared/init.h | 24 ++---------------------- arch/um/include/shared/user.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/tls.h | 6 +++--- drivers/block/loop.c | 10 ++++++++-- drivers/gpio/gpio-iop.c | 4 ++++ drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c | 21 ++++++++++++--------- drivers/input/input.c | 5 ++++- drivers/md/bcache/btree.c | 5 ++++- drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 7 +++++-- drivers/spi/spi-imx.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 14 ++++---------- drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 5 ++++- drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c | 7 +++++-- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 3 ++- drivers/usb/serial/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c | 1 - drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c | 7 +++++++ drivers/usb/storage/uas.c | 7 +++---- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- fs/quota/dquot.c | 3 ++- net/mac80211/mesh_hwmp.c | 15 +++++++++------ security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++ sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 10 ++++++++-- sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h | 1 + sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c | 4 ++++ tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_bind.c | 9 +++++++++ tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_list.c | 9 +++++++++ 40 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Add patch "arch: define weak abort()" to 4.14-stable tree

by Evgeniy Didin

Patch subject: "arch: define weak abort()" Commit ID: 7c2c11b208be Reason: While building mpi.ko module with lastest stable Linux v4.14.17 an error occured: >ERROR: "abort" [lib/mpi/mpi.ko] undefined! Kernel version: 4.14.x

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 0/3] vfio, dax: disable filesystem-dax and minor fixups

by Dan Williams

Alex, here is a change to vaddr_get_pfn() that we discussed in this thread: https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-01/msg07117.html Namely, drop support for passing Filesystem-DAX mappings through to guests. Perhaps in the future we can create some para-virtualized passthrough interface to coordinate guest-DMA vs host-filesystem operations. For now, this needs to be disabled for data-integrity and guaranteeing forward progress of filesystem operations. If you want to take this through your tree please grab the other dax fixups as well. Otherwise, let me know and I'll take the lot through the nvdimm tree. --- Dan Williams (3): dax: fix S_DAX definition dax: short circuit vma_is_fsdax() in the CONFIG_FS_DAX=n case vfio: disable filesystem-dax page pinning drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- include/linux/fs.h | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.14 00/64] 4.14.18-stable review

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.18 release. There are 64 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know. Responses should be made by Wed Feb 7 18:21:22 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late. The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.18-rc1.gz or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y and the diffstat can be found below. thanks, greg k-h ------------- Pseudo-Shortlog of commits: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Linux 4.14.18-rc1 Ian Abbott <abbotti(a)mev.co.uk> fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> KVM/x86: Add IBPB support KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX Darren Kenny <darren.kenny(a)oracle.com> x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path Dou Liyang <douly.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com> x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser William Grant <william.grant(a)canonical.com> x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> ASoC: pcm512x: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org> iio: adc/accel: Fix up module licenses Jesse Chan <jc(a)linux.com> auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Waiman Long <longman(a)redhat.com> x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> powerpc/64s: Allow control of RFI flush via debugfs Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_meltdown() Liu, Changcheng <changcheng.liu(a)intel.com> scripts/faddr2line: fix CROSS_COMPILE unset error ------------- Diffstat: Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 - Documentation/speculation.txt | 90 ++++ Makefile | 4 +- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 38 ++ arch/x86/entry/common.c | 9 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 130 +---- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 7 +- arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 28 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 22 +- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 12 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 86 +-- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h | 5 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 +- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 15 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 134 +++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 70 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 66 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 2 - arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 22 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 116 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 660 ++++++++++++++---------- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 + arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 10 + arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 57 +- arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 8 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 33 +- drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c | 4 + drivers/fpga/fpga-region.c | 13 +- drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9-i2c.c | 3 + drivers/iio/adc/qcom-vadc-common.c | 4 + drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c | 4 + drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 2 + include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 +- include/linux/init.h | 9 +- include/linux/module.h | 9 + include/linux/nospec.h | 72 +++ kernel/module.c | 11 + net/wireless/nl80211.c | 9 +- scripts/faddr2line | 8 +- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 + sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c | 4 + tools/objtool/check.c | 89 ++-- tools/objtool/orc_gen.c | 5 + 63 files changed, 1355 insertions(+), 643 deletions(-)

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] rtc-opal: Fix handling of firmware error codes, prevent busy loops

by Alexandre Belloni

Hi, On 02/08/2016 at 11:50:16 +1000, Stewart Smith wrote: > According to the OPAL docs: > https://github.com/open-power/skiboot/blob/skiboot-5.2.5/doc/opal-api/opal-… > https://github.com/open-power/skiboot/blob/skiboot-5.2.5/doc/opal-api/opal-… > OPAL_HARDWARE may be returned from OPAL_RTC_READ or OPAL_RTC_WRITE and this > indicates either a transient or permanent error. > > Prior to this patch, Linux was not dealing with OPAL_HARDWARE being a > permanent error particularly well, in that you could end up in a busy > loop. > > This was not too hard to trigger on an AMI BMC based OpenPOWER machine > doing a continuous "ipmitool mc reset cold" to the BMC, the result of > that being that we'd get stuck in an infinite loop in opal_get_rtc_time. > > We now retry a few times before returning the error higher up the stack. > > Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <stewart(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> > --- > drivers/rtc/rtc-opal.c | 12 ++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > Just a note to let you know that this patch should have gone through my tree but it was not sent to linux-rtc or me. I guess what happened is that Michael cleaned up the Linux PPC patchwork queue. -- Alexandre Belloni, Bootlin (formerly Free Electrons) Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering http://bootlin.com

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 1/1] ext4: don't put symlink in pagecache into highmem

by Jin Qian

From: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> partial backport of 21fc61c73c3903c4c312d0802da01ec2b323d174. ext4_encrypted_follow_link uses kmap() for cpage caddr = kmap(cpage); _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr calls virt_to_page on the kmapped address. _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr() ext4_fname_decrypt() sg_init_one() sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len); sg_set_page(sg, virt_to_page(buf), buflen, offset_in_page(buf)); Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)android.com> --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 1 + fs/ext4/namei.c | 1 + fs/ext4/symlink.c | 10 +++------- fs/inode.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 4df1cb19a243..f0cabc8c96cb 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4417,6 +4417,7 @@ struct inode *ext4_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; ext4_set_aops(inode); } + inode_nohighmem(inode); } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &ext4_special_inode_operations; diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 4c36dca486cc..32960b3ecd4f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -3151,6 +3151,7 @@ static int ext4_symlink(struct inode *dir, if ((disk_link.len > EXT4_N_BLOCKS * 4)) { if (!encryption_required) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); ext4_set_aops(inode); /* * We cannot call page_symlink() with transaction started diff --git a/fs/ext4/symlink.c b/fs/ext4/symlink.c index e8e7af62ac95..287c3980fa0b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/symlink.c +++ b/fs/ext4/symlink.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook cpage = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, NULL); if (IS_ERR(cpage)) return ERR_CAST(cpage); - caddr = kmap(cpage); + caddr = page_address(cpage); caddr[size] = 0; } @@ -75,16 +75,12 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook /* Null-terminate the name */ if (res <= plen) paddr[res] = '\0'; - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } return *cookie = paddr; errout: - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } kfree(paddr); return ERR_PTR(res); } diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index b0edef500590..b95615f3fc50 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -2028,3 +2028,9 @@ void inode_set_flags(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags, new_flags) != old_flags)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_set_flags); + +void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode) +{ + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_nohighmem); diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index c8decb7075d6..f746a59fcc88 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -3066,5 +3066,6 @@ static inline bool dir_relax(struct inode *inode) } extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); +extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface

by tip-bot for Dan Williams

Commit-ID: 6b8cf5cc9965673951f1ab3f0e3cf23d06e3e2ee Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/6b8cf5cc9965673951f1ab3f0e3cf23d06e3e2ee Author: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> AuthorDate: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 17:18:17 -0800 Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> CommitDate: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 11:47:57 +0100 x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface At entry userspace may have populated registers with values that could otherwise be useful in a speculative execution attack. Clear them to minimize the kernel's attack surface. Originally-From: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst(a)gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk(a)redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787989697.7847.4083702787288600552.stgit@dwilli… [ Made small improvements to the changelog. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index 98d5358..fd65e01 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -85,15 +85,25 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat) pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */ pushq $-ENOSYS /* pt_regs->ax */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r8 = 0 */ + xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r9 = 0 */ + xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r10 = 0 */ + xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r11 = 0 */ + xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */ pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ + xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */ pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp (will be overwritten) */ + xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r12 = 0 */ + xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r13 = 0 */ + xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r14 = 0 */ + xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r15 = 0 */ + xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */ cld /* @@ -214,15 +224,25 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe) pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->cx (stashed in bp) */ pushq $-ENOSYS /* pt_regs->ax */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r8 = 0 */ + xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r9 = 0 */ + xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r10 = 0 */ + xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r11 = 0 */ + xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */ pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ + xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */ pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp (will be overwritten) */ + xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r12 = 0 */ + xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r13 = 0 */ + xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r14 = 0 */ + xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r15 = 0 */ + xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */ /* * User mode is traced as though IRQs are on, and SYSENTER @@ -338,15 +358,25 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat) pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */ pushq $-ENOSYS /* pt_regs->ax */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r8 = 0 */ + xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r9 = 0 */ + xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r10 = 0 */ + xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r11 = 0 */ + xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */ pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ + xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */ pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ + xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */ pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */ + xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */ pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */ + xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */ pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */ + xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */ pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */ + xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */ cld /*

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface

by tip-bot for Dan Williams

Commit-ID: 3ac6d8c787b835b997eb23e43e09aa0895ef7d58 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/3ac6d8c787b835b997eb23e43e09aa0895ef7d58 Author: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> AuthorDate: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 17:18:11 -0800 Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> CommitDate: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 11:47:44 +0100 x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface Clear the 'extra' registers on entering the 64-bit kernel for exceptions and interrupts. The common registers are not cleared since they are likely clobbered well before they can be exploited in a speculative execution attack. Originally-From: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst(a)gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk(a)redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787989146.7847.15749181712358213254.stgit@dwill… [ Made small improvements to the changelog and the code comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> --- arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index 3f48f69..f4b129d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -147,6 +147,25 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=\offset .endm + /* + * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack + * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are + * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in + * a speculative execution gadget: + */ + .macro CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC + xorl %ebp, %ebp + xorl %ebx, %ebx + xorq %r8, %r8 + xorq %r9, %r9 + xorq %r10, %r10 + xorq %r11, %r11 + xorq %r12, %r12 + xorq %r13, %r13 + xorq %r14, %r14 + xorq %r15, %r15 + .endm + .macro POP_EXTRA_REGS popq %r15 popq %r14 diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 065a71b..9e48002 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -575,6 +575,7 @@ END(irq_entries_start) ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK SAVE_C_REGS SAVE_EXTRA_REGS + CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER testb $3, CS(%rsp) @@ -1133,6 +1134,7 @@ ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback) ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK SAVE_C_REGS SAVE_EXTRA_REGS + CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER jmp error_exit END(xen_failsafe_callback) @@ -1178,6 +1180,7 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry) cld SAVE_C_REGS 8 SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8 + CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8 movl $1, %ebx movl $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx @@ -1230,8 +1233,8 @@ ENTRY(error_entry) cld SAVE_C_REGS 8 SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8 + CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8 - xorl %ebx, %ebx testb $3, CS+8(%rsp) jz .Lerror_kernelspace @@ -1428,6 +1431,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi) pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */ pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */ UNWIND_HINT_REGS + CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER /*

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface

by tip-bot for Dan Williams

Commit-ID: 8e1eb3fa009aa7c0b944b3c8b26b07de0efb3200 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/8e1eb3fa009aa7c0b944b3c8b26b07de0efb3200 Author: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> AuthorDate: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 17:18:05 -0800 Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> CommitDate: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 08:30:27 +0100 x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface At entry userspace may have (maliciously) populated the extra registers outside the syscall calling convention with arbitrary values that could be useful in a speculative execution (Spectre style) attack. Clear these registers to minimize the kernel's attack surface. Note, this only clears the extra registers and not the unused registers for syscalls less than 6 arguments, since those registers are likely to be clobbered well before their values could be put to use under speculation. Note, Linus found that the XOR instructions can be executed with minimized cost if interleaved with the PUSH instructions, and Ingo's analysis found that R10 and R11 should be included in the register clearing beyond the typical 'extra' syscall calling convention registers. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst(a)gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk(a)redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787988577.7847.16733592218894189003.stgit@dwill… [ Made small improvements to the changelog and the code comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index c752abe..065a71b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -235,13 +235,26 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe) pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 */ pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */ pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */ + /* + * Clear extra registers that a speculation attack might + * otherwise want to exploit. Interleave XOR with PUSH + * for better uop scheduling: + */ + xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */ pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */ + xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */ pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ + xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */ pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ + xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */ pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */ + xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */ pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */ + xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */ pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */ + xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */ pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */ + xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */ UNWIND_HINT_REGS TRACE_IRQS_OFF

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH AUTOSEL for 4.14 001/110] net: phy: fix resume handling

by Sasha Levin

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel(a)armlinux.org.uk> [ Upstream commit f5e64032a799d4f54decc7eb6aafcdffb67f9ad9 ] When a PHY has the BMCR_PDOWN bit set, it may decide to ignore writes to other registers, or reset the registers to power-on defaults. Micrel PHYs do this for their interrupt registers. The current structure of phylib tries to enable interrupts before resuming (and releasing) the BMCR_PDOWN bit. This fails, causing Micrel PHYs to stop working after a suspend/resume sequence if they are using interrupts. Fix this by ensuring that the PHY driver resume methods do not take the phydev->lock mutex themselves, but the callers of phy_resume() take that lock. This then allows us to move the call to phy_resume() before we enable interrupts in phy_start(). Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel(a)armlinux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew(a)lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin(a)microsoft.com> --- drivers/net/phy/at803x.c | 4 ---- drivers/net/phy/phy.c | 9 +++------ drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 10 ++++++---- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/at803x.c b/drivers/net/phy/at803x.c index 5f93e6add563..e911e4990b20 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/at803x.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/at803x.c @@ -239,14 +239,10 @@ static int at803x_resume(struct phy_device *phydev) { int value; - mutex_lock(&phydev->lock); - value = phy_read(phydev, MII_BMCR); value &= ~(BMCR_PDOWN | BMCR_ISOLATE); phy_write(phydev, MII_BMCR, value); - mutex_unlock(&phydev->lock); - return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/phy.c b/drivers/net/phy/phy.c index 2b1e67bc1e73..ed10d1fc8f59 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/phy.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/phy.c @@ -828,7 +828,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(phy_stop); */ void phy_start(struct phy_device *phydev) { - bool do_resume = false; int err = 0; mutex_lock(&phydev->lock); @@ -841,6 +840,9 @@ void phy_start(struct phy_device *phydev) phydev->state = PHY_UP; break; case PHY_HALTED: + /* if phy was suspended, bring the physical link up again */ + phy_resume(phydev); + /* make sure interrupts are re-enabled for the PHY */ if (phydev->irq != PHY_POLL) { err = phy_enable_interrupts(phydev); @@ -849,17 +851,12 @@ void phy_start(struct phy_device *phydev) } phydev->state = PHY_RESUMING; - do_resume = true; break; default: break; } mutex_unlock(&phydev->lock); - /* if phy was suspended, bring the physical link up again */ - if (do_resume) - phy_resume(phydev); - phy_trigger_machine(phydev, true); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(phy_start); diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c b/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c index 67f25ac29025..b15b31ca2618 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c @@ -135,7 +135,9 @@ static int mdio_bus_phy_resume(struct device *dev) if (!mdio_bus_phy_may_suspend(phydev)) goto no_resume; + mutex_lock(&phydev->lock); ret = phy_resume(phydev); + mutex_unlock(&phydev->lock); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -1026,7 +1028,9 @@ int phy_attach_direct(struct net_device *dev, struct phy_device *phydev, if (err) goto error; + mutex_lock(&phydev->lock); phy_resume(phydev); + mutex_unlock(&phydev->lock); phy_led_triggers_register(phydev); return err; @@ -1157,6 +1161,8 @@ int phy_resume(struct phy_device *phydev) struct phy_driver *phydrv = to_phy_driver(phydev->mdio.dev.driver); int ret = 0; + WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&phydev->lock)); + if (phydev->drv && phydrv->resume) ret = phydrv->resume(phydev); @@ -1639,13 +1645,9 @@ int genphy_resume(struct phy_device *phydev) { int value; - mutex_lock(&phydev->lock); - value = phy_read(phydev, MII_BMCR); phy_write(phydev, MII_BMCR, value & ~BMCR_PDOWN); - mutex_unlock(&phydev->lock); - return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(genphy_resume); -- 2.11.0

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 3.18 00/36] 3.18.94-stable review

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

On Tue, Feb 06, 2018 at 06:48:53AM +0000, Harsh Shandilya wrote: > On Tue 6 Feb, 2018, 12:09 AM Greg Kroah-Hartman, <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> > wrote: > > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.94 release. > > There are 36 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response > > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please > > let me know. > > > > Responses should be made by Wed Feb 7 18:23:41 UTC 2018. > > Anything received after that time might be too late. > > > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: > > > > kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/stable-review/patch-3.18.94-rc1.gz > > or in the git tree and branch at: > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git > > linux-3.18.y > > and the diffstat can be found below. > > > > thanks, > > > > greg k-h > > > > Builds and boots on the OnePlus 3T, no regressions noticed. Yeah! That device is the only reason I keep this tree alive :) thanks for testing and letting me know. greg k-h

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "um: Fix out-of-tree build" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled um: Fix out-of-tree build to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: um-fix-out-of-tree-build.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 0b5aedfe0e6654ec54f35109e1929a1cf7fc4cdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2015 22:55:26 +0200 Subject: um: Fix out-of-tree build From: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> commit 0b5aedfe0e6654ec54f35109e1929a1cf7fc4cdd upstream. Commit 30b11ee9a (um: Remove copy&paste code from init.h) uncovered an issue wrt. out-of-tree builds. For out-of-tree builds, we must not rely on relative paths. Before 30b11ee9a it worked by chance as no host code included generated header files. Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/um/Makefile | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/um/Makefile +++ b/arch/um/Makefile @@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(ARCH_INCLUDE) USER_CFLAGS = $(patsubst $(KERNEL_DEFINES),,$(patsubst -I%,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))) \ $(ARCH_INCLUDE) $(MODE_INCLUDE) $(filter -I%,$(CFLAGS)) \ - -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -idirafter include \ - -D__KERNEL__ -D__UM_HOST__ + -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -idirafter $(srctree)/include \ + -idirafter $(obj)/include -D__KERNEL__ -D__UM_HOST__ #This will adjust *FLAGS accordingly to the platform. include $(srctree)/$(ARCH_DIR)/Makefile-os-$(OS) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from richard(a)nod.at are queue-3.18/um-stop-abusing-__kernel__.patch queue-3.18/um-link-vmlinux-with-no-pie.patch queue-3.18/um-remove-copy-paste-code-from-init.h.patch queue-3.18/um-fix-out-of-tree-build.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 1/3] drm/i915/breadcrumbs: Ignore unsubmitted signalers

by Chris Wilson

When a request is preempted, it is unsubmitted from the HW queue and removed from the active list of breadcrumbs. In the process, this however triggers the signaler and it may see the clear rbtree with the old, and still valid, seqno. This confuses the signaler into action and signaling the fence. Fixes: d6a2289d9d6b ("drm/i915: Remove the preempted request from the execution queue") Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_breadcrumbs.c | 20 ++++---------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_breadcrumbs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_breadcrumbs.c index efbc627a2a25..b955f7d7bd0f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_breadcrumbs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_breadcrumbs.c @@ -588,29 +588,16 @@ void intel_engine_remove_wait(struct intel_engine_cs *engine, spin_unlock_irq(&b->rb_lock); } -static bool signal_valid(const struct drm_i915_gem_request *request) -{ - return intel_wait_check_request(&request->signaling.wait, request); -} - static bool signal_complete(const struct drm_i915_gem_request *request) { if (!request) return false; - /* If another process served as the bottom-half it may have already - * signalled that this wait is already completed. - */ - if (intel_wait_complete(&request->signaling.wait)) - return signal_valid(request); - - /* Carefully check if the request is complete, giving time for the + /* + * Carefully check if the request is complete, giving time for the * seqno to be visible or if the GPU hung. */ - if (__i915_request_irq_complete(request)) - return true; - - return false; + return __i915_request_irq_complete(request); } static struct drm_i915_gem_request *to_signaler(struct rb_node *rb) @@ -712,6 +699,7 @@ static int intel_breadcrumbs_signaler(void *arg) &request->fence.flags)) { local_bh_disable(); dma_fence_signal(&request->fence); + GEM_BUG_ON(!i915_gem_request_completed(request)); local_bh_enable(); /* kick start the tasklets */ } -- 2.15.1

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH AUTOSEL for 4.14 029/110] ASoC: nau8825: fix issue that pop noise when start capture

by Sasha Levin

On Mon, Feb 05, 2018 at 11:41:54AM +0000, Mark Brown wrote: >On Sat, Feb 03, 2018 at 06:00:42PM +0000, Sasha Levin wrote: >> From: Abhijeet Kumar <abhijeet.kumar(a)intel.com> >> >> [ Upstream commit d070f7c703ef26e3db613f24206823f916272fc6 ] >> >> In skylake platform, we hear a loud pop noise(0 dB) at start of >> audio capture power up sequence. This patch removes the pop noise >> from the recording by adding a delay before enabling ADC. > >> switch (event) { >> case SND_SOC_DAPM_POST_PMU: >> + msleep(125); >> regmap_update_bits(nau8825->regmap, NAU8825_REG_ENA_CTRL, > >This is another one of these where I'm not convinced that backporting to >stable isn't going to introduce regressions - it will fix problems on >some systems but if someone really cares about a startup pop and has >arranged to do something like discard the start of the audio where the >pop occurs then this may cut off even more and cause them to miss >things. It might cause regressions for users who worked around the issue, but it may also fix the issue for users who didn't. I think that in general we'd rather have mainline and stable trees have the same bugs and breakage - we don't want surprises when users jump around between kernels. -- Thanks, Sasha

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.4.y 2/2] drm: rcar-du: Fix race condition when disabling planes at CRTC stop

by Nhan Nguyen

From: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> commit 641307df71fe77d7b38a477067495ede05d47295 upstream. When stopping the CRTC the driver must disable all planes and wait for the change to take effect at the next vblank. Merely calling drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank() is not enough, as the function doesn't include any mechanism to handle the race with vblank interrupts. Replace the drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank() call with a manual mechanism that handles the vblank interrupt race. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Reviewed-by: Kieran Bingham <kieran.bingham+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h | 8 +++++ 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c index 25bdab6..6fab079 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c @@ -371,6 +371,31 @@ static void rcar_du_crtc_start(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) rcrtc->started = true; } +static void rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) +{ + struct rcar_du_device *rcdu = rcrtc->group->dev; + struct drm_crtc *crtc = &rcrtc->crtc; + u32 status; + /* Make sure vblank interrupts are enabled. */ + drm_crtc_vblank_get(crtc); + /* + * Disable planes and calculate how many vertical blanking interrupts we + * have to wait for. If a vertical blanking interrupt has been triggered + * but not processed yet, we don't know whether it occurred before or + * after the planes got disabled. We thus have to wait for two vblank + * interrupts in that case. + */ + spin_lock_irq(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + rcar_du_group_write(rcrtc->group, rcrtc->index % 2 ? DS2PR : DS1PR, 0); + status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); + rcrtc->vblank_count = status & DSSR_VBK ? 2 : 1; + spin_unlock_irq(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + if (!wait_event_timeout(rcrtc->vblank_wait, rcrtc->vblank_count == 0, + msecs_to_jiffies(100))) + dev_warn(rcdu->dev, "vertical blanking timeout\n"); + drm_crtc_vblank_put(crtc); +} + static void rcar_du_crtc_stop(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) { struct drm_crtc *crtc = &rcrtc->crtc; @@ -379,17 +404,16 @@ static void rcar_du_crtc_stop(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc) return; /* Disable all planes and wait for the change to take effect. This is - * required as the DSnPR registers are updated on vblank, and no vblank - * will occur once the CRTC is stopped. Disabling planes when starting - * the CRTC thus wouldn't be enough as it would start scanning out - * immediately from old frame buffers until the next vblank. + * required as the plane enable registers are updated on vblank, and no + * vblank will occur once the CRTC is stopped. Disabling planes when + * starting the CRTC thus wouldn't be enough as it would start scanning + * out immediately from old frame buffers until the next vblank. * * This increases the CRTC stop delay, especially when multiple CRTCs * are stopped in one operation as we now wait for one vblank per CRTC. * Whether this can be improved needs to be researched. */ - rcar_du_group_write(rcrtc->group, rcrtc->index % 2 ? DS2PR : DS1PR, 0); - drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank(crtc); + rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(rcrtc); /* Disable vertical blanking interrupt reporting. We first need to wait * for page flip completion before stopping the CRTC as userspace @@ -528,10 +552,26 @@ static irqreturn_t rcar_du_crtc_irq(int irq, void *arg) irqreturn_t ret = IRQ_NONE; u32 status; + spin_lock(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR); rcar_du_crtc_write(rcrtc, DSRCR, status & DSRCR_MASK); if (status & DSSR_VBK) { + /* + * Wake up the vblank wait if the counter reaches 0. This must + * be protected by the vblank_lock to avoid races in + * rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(). + */ + if (rcrtc->vblank_count) { + if (--rcrtc->vblank_count == 0) + wake_up(&rcrtc->vblank_wait); + } + } + + spin_unlock(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); + + if (status & DSSR_VBK) { drm_handle_vblank(rcrtc->crtc.dev, rcrtc->index); rcar_du_crtc_finish_page_flip(rcrtc); ret = IRQ_HANDLED; @@ -585,6 +625,8 @@ int rcar_du_crtc_create(struct rcar_du_group *rgrp, unsigned int index) } init_waitqueue_head(&rcrtc->flip_wait); + init_waitqueue_head(&rcrtc->vblank_wait); + spin_lock_init(&rcrtc->vblank_lock); rcrtc->group = rgrp; rcrtc->mmio_offset = mmio_offsets[index]; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h index 2bbe3f5..be22ce3 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #define __RCAR_DU_CRTC_H__ #include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/wait.h> #include <drm/drmP.h> @@ -32,6 +33,9 @@ struct rcar_du_group; * @started: whether the CRTC has been started and is running * @event: event to post when the pending page flip completes * @flip_wait: wait queue used to signal page flip completion + * @vblank_lock: protects vblank_wait and vblank_count + * @vblank_wait: wait queue used to signal vertical blanking + * @vblank_count: number of vertical blanking interrupts to wait for * @outputs: bitmask of the outputs (enum rcar_du_output) driven by this CRTC * @enabled: whether the CRTC is enabled, used to control system resume * @group: CRTC group this CRTC belongs to @@ -48,6 +52,10 @@ struct rcar_du_crtc { struct drm_pending_vblank_event *event; wait_queue_head_t flip_wait; + spinlock_t vblank_lock; + wait_queue_head_t vblank_wait; + unsigned int vblank_count; + unsigned int outputs; bool enabled; -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.4.y 3/3] ASoC: rsnd: avoid duplicate free_irq()

by Nhan Nguyen

From: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> commit e0936c3471a8411a5df327641fa3ffe12a2fb07b upstream. commit 1f8754d4daea5f ("ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI") fixed Parent SSI duplicate free_irq(). But on Renesas Sound, not only Parent SSI but also Multi SSI have same issue. This patch avoid duplicate free_irq() if it was not pure SSI. Fixes: 1f8754d4daea5f ("ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> --- sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c index 94739b7..38aae96 100644 --- a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c +++ b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c @@ -550,14 +550,14 @@ static int rsnd_ssi_dma_remove(struct rsnd_mod *mod, struct rsnd_priv *priv) { struct rsnd_ssi *ssi = rsnd_mod_to_ssi(mod); - struct rsnd_mod *ssi_parent_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssip(io); + struct rsnd_mod *pure_ssi_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssi(io); struct device *dev = rsnd_priv_to_dev(priv); int irq = ssi->info->irq; rsnd_dma_quit(io, rsnd_mod_to_dma(mod)); - /* Do nothing for SSI parent mod */ - if (ssi_parent_mod == mod) + /* Do nothing if non SSI (= SSI parent, multi SSI) mod */ + if (pure_ssi_mod != mod) return 0; /* PIO will request IRQ again */ -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.4.y 2/3] ASoC: rsnd: don't call free_irq() on Parent SSI

by Nhan Nguyen

From: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> commit 1f8754d4daea5f257370a52a30fcb22798c54516 upstream. If SSI uses shared pin, some SSI will be used as parent SSI. Then, normal SSI's remove and Parent SSI's remove (these are same SSI) will be called when unbind or remove timing. In this case, free_irq() will be called twice. This patch solve this issue. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx(a)renesas.com> Tested-by: Hiroyuki Yokoyama <hiroyuki.yokoyama.vx(a)renesas.com> Reported-by: Hiroyuki Yokoyama <hiroyuki.yokoyama.vx(a)renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> Signed-off-by: Nhan Nguyen <nhan.nguyen.yb(a)renesas.com> --- sound/soc/sh/rcar/rsnd.h | 2 ++ sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/rsnd.h b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/rsnd.h index 0853298..f61c64d 100644 --- a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/rsnd.h +++ b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/rsnd.h @@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ enum rsnd_mod_type { RSND_MOD_MIX, RSND_MOD_CTU, RSND_MOD_SRC, + RSND_MOD_SSIP, /* SSI parent */ RSND_MOD_SSI, RSND_MOD_MAX, }; @@ -365,6 +366,7 @@ struct rsnd_dai_stream { }; #define rsnd_io_to_mod(io, i) ((i) < RSND_MOD_MAX ? (io)->mod[(i)] : NULL) #define rsnd_io_to_mod_ssi(io) rsnd_io_to_mod((io), RSND_MOD_SSI) +#define rsnd_io_to_mod_ssip(io) rsnd_io_to_mod((io), RSND_MOD_SSIP) #define rsnd_io_to_mod_src(io) rsnd_io_to_mod((io), RSND_MOD_SRC) #define rsnd_io_to_mod_ctu(io) rsnd_io_to_mod((io), RSND_MOD_CTU) #define rsnd_io_to_mod_mix(io) rsnd_io_to_mod((io), RSND_MOD_MIX) diff --git a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c index c62a294..94739b7 100644 --- a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c +++ b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c @@ -550,11 +550,16 @@ static int rsnd_ssi_dma_remove(struct rsnd_mod *mod, struct rsnd_priv *priv) { struct rsnd_ssi *ssi = rsnd_mod_to_ssi(mod); + struct rsnd_mod *ssi_parent_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssip(io); struct device *dev = rsnd_priv_to_dev(priv); int irq = ssi->info->irq; rsnd_dma_quit(io, rsnd_mod_to_dma(mod)); + /* Do nothing for SSI parent mod */ + if (ssi_parent_mod == mod) + return 0; + /* PIO will request IRQ again */ devm_free_irq(dev, irq, mod); -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.4.y] ASoC: simple-card: Fix misleading error message

by Nhan Nguyen

From: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> commit 7ac45d1635a4cd2e99a4b11903d4a2815ca1b27b upstream. In case cpu could not be found the error message would always refer to /codec/ not being found in DT. Fix this by catching the cpu node not found case explicitly. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Julian Scheel <julian(a)jusst.de> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: thongsyho <thong.ho.px(a)rvc.renesas.com> --- sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c index ff6fcd9..0b1b6fc 100644 --- a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c +++ b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c @@ -343,13 +343,19 @@ static int asoc_simple_card_dai_link_of(struct device_node *node, snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scpu", prefix); cpu = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); + if (!cpu) { + ret = -EINVAL; + dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop); + goto dai_link_of_err; + } + snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%splat", prefix); plat = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scodec", prefix); codec = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop); - if (!cpu || !codec) { + if (!codec) { ret = -EINVAL; dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop); goto dai_link_of_err; -- 1.9.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 1/1] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()

by Jin Qian

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)android.com> --- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index a871159bf03c..ead2fd60244d 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc) */ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc) { - if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { - if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN) - goto out; - if (orig_desc) - if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) - goto out; - } else - goto out; + int prefix_len; + + if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN; + else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) + prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if (!new_desc[prefix_len]) + return -EINVAL; + + if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; -out: - return -EINVAL; } /* -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: serial-core-mark-port-as-initialized-after-successful-irq-change.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 44117a1d1732c513875d5a163f10d9adbe866c08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 18:57:26 +0100 Subject: serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> commit 44117a1d1732c513875d5a163f10d9adbe866c08 upstream. setserial changes the IRQ via uart_set_info(). It invokes uart_shutdown() which free the current used IRQ and clear TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED. It will then update the IRQ number and invoke uart_startup() before returning to the caller leaving TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED cleared. The next open will crash with | list_add double add: new=ffffffff839fcc98, prev=ffffffff839fcc98, next=ffffffff839fcc98. since the close from the IOCTL won't free the IRQ (and clean the list) due to the TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED check in uart_shutdown(). There is same pattern in uart_do_autoconfig() and I *think* it also needs to set TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED there. Is there a reason why uart_startup() does not set the flag by itself after the IRQ has been acquired (since it is cleared in uart_shutdown)? Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c @@ -965,6 +965,8 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_stru } } else { retval = uart_startup(tty, state, 1); + if (retval == 0) + tty_port_set_initialized(port, true); if (retval > 0) retval = 0; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bigeasy(a)linutronix.de are queue-4.9/serial-core-mark-port-as-initialized-after-successful-irq-change.patch

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4.4 v2 0/2] Backports for fixes

by Shuah Khan

The first patch in this series isolates and backports a fix to clear just the USB_PORT_STAT_POWER. Without this fix, client can't use the imported device. The second patch is fix to back-ported commit 3eee23c3ec14. tcp_socket address still present in the status file. This is my bad. The bug fixed in the first patch in this series masked this bug. With these two fixes, client can use the imported devices on 4.4 Eric Biggers also reported the tcp_socket address still in the status file while I am getting the patch ready. I added him to Reported-by. Shuah Khan (2): usbip: vhci_hcd: clear just the USB_PORT_STAT_POWER bit usbip: fix 3eee23c3ec14 tcp_socket address still in the status file drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c | 2 +- drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 7 +++---- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.14.1

7 years, 7 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: serial-core-mark-port-as-initialized-after-successful-irq-change.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 44117a1d1732c513875d5a163f10d9adbe866c08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 18:57:26 +0100 Subject: serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> commit 44117a1d1732c513875d5a163f10d9adbe866c08 upstream. setserial changes the IRQ via uart_set_info(). It invokes uart_shutdown() which free the current used IRQ and clear TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED. It will then update the IRQ number and invoke uart_startup() before returning to the caller leaving TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED cleared. The next open will crash with | list_add double add: new=ffffffff839fcc98, prev=ffffffff839fcc98, next=ffffffff839fcc98. since the close from the IOCTL won't free the IRQ (and clean the list) due to the TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED check in uart_shutdown(). There is same pattern in uart_do_autoconfig() and I *think* it also needs to set TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED there. Is there a reason why uart_startup() does not set the flag by itself after the IRQ has been acquired (since it is cleared in uart_shutdown)? Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c @@ -974,6 +974,8 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_stru } } else { retval = uart_startup(tty, state, 1); + if (retval == 0) + tty_port_set_initialized(port, true); if (retval > 0) retval = 0; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bigeasy(a)linutronix.de are queue-4.15/serial-core-mark-port-as-initialized-after-successful-irq-change.patch

7 years, 7 months

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