From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed
on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes.
It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in
the following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Refactor code by reusing __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc in a new helper in
preparation for the actual fix.
Changelog v1 (after splitting of from the KASAN series):
- Rewrite first paragraph of the patch message to point at the user
impact of the issue.
- Move helper to common.c so it can be compiled in all KASAN modes.
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.1+
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
---
Changelog v3:
- Redo the patch after applying Andrey's comments to align the code more
with what's already in include/linux/kasan.h
Changelog v2:
- Redo the whole patch so it's an actual refactor.
include/linux/kasan.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
mm/kasan/common.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +---
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 6d7972bb390c..cde493cb7702 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -615,6 +615,16 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start,
__kasan_poison_vmalloc(start, size);
}
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags);
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ if (kasan_enabled())
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, flags);
+}
+
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start,
@@ -639,6 +649,11 @@ static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start,
static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
{ }
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{ }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
#if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index d4c14359feaf..1ed6289d471a 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "kasan.h"
#include "../slab.h"
@@ -582,3 +583,19 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
}
return true;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ unsigned long size;
+ void *addr;
+ int area;
+
+ for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ size = vms[area]->size;
+ addr = vms[area]->addr;
+ vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ }
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
index 22a73a087135..33e705ccafba 100644
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c
+++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -4872,9 +4872,7 @@ struct vm_struct **pcpu_get_vm_areas(const unsigned long *offsets,
* With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for
* non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
*/
- for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++)
- vms[area]->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(vms[area]->addr,
- vms[area]->size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
kfree(vas);
return vms;
--
2.52.0
From: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
[ Upstream commit 5f2b28b79d2d1946ee36ad8b3dc0066f73c90481 ]
There are actually 2 problems:
- deleting the last element doesn't require the memmove of elements
[i + 1, end) over it. Actually, element i+1 is out of bounds.
- The memmove itself should move size - i - 1 elements, because the last
element is out of bounds.
The out-of-bounds element still remains out of bounds after being
accessed, so the problem is only that we touch it, not that it becomes
in active use. But I suppose it can lead to issues if the out-of-bounds
element is part of an unmapped page.
Fixes: 6666cebc5e30 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Add support for VLAN operations")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250318115716.2124395-4-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <xnguchen(a)sina.cn>
---
drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c b/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
index baba204ad62f..2ac91fe2a79b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
@@ -1921,8 +1921,10 @@ int sja1105_table_delete_entry(struct sja1105_table *table, int i)
if (i > table->entry_count)
return -ERANGE;
- memmove(entries + i * entry_size, entries + (i + 1) * entry_size,
- (table->entry_count - i) * entry_size);
+ if (i + 1 < table->entry_count) {
+ memmove(entries + i * entry_size, entries + (i + 1) * entry_size,
+ (table->entry_count - i - 1) * entry_size);
+ }
table->entry_count--;
--
2.17.1
From: "Mario Limonciello (AMD)" <superm1(a)kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9fc6290117259a8dbf8247cb54559df62fd1550f ]
PCI device 0x115A is similar to pspv5, except it doesn't have platform
access mailbox support.
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
## Comprehensive Analysis
### 1. COMMIT MESSAGE ANALYSIS
**Subject:** `crypto: ccp - Add support for PCI device 0x115A`
**Key Information:**
- PCI device 0x115A is a new AMD security processor variant
- The commit message states it's "similar to pspv5, except it doesn't
have platform access mailbox support"
- Signed off by Mario Limonciello (AMD engineer) and Tom Lendacky (AMD)
- Merged by Herbert Xu (crypto maintainer)
**Tags Present:**
- `Signed-off-by`: 3 (proper sign-off chain)
- `Acked-by`: Tom Lendacky (driver maintainer acknowledgment)
- **NO** `Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org` tag
- **NO** `Fixes:` tag (this is expected - it's not fixing a bug, it's
enabling hardware)
### 2. CODE CHANGE ANALYSIS
The commit adds:
**A) New `pspv7` structure (~10 lines):**
```c
static const struct psp_vdata pspv7 = {
.tee = &teev2,
.cmdresp_reg = 0x10944,
.cmdbuff_addr_lo_reg = 0x10948,
.cmdbuff_addr_hi_reg = 0x1094c,
.bootloader_info_reg = 0x109ec,
.feature_reg = 0x109fc,
.inten_reg = 0x10510,
.intsts_reg = 0x10514,
};
```
This is **identical to pspv5** except it omits the `.platform_access =
&pa_v2` field. This is the explicit difference mentioned in the commit
message.
**B) New `dev_vdata[9]` entry (~6 lines):**
```c
{ /* 9 */
.bar = 2,
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
.psp_vdata = &pspv7,
#endif
},
```
**C) New PCI device ID entry (1 line):**
```c
{ PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x115A), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[9] },
```
### 3. CLASSIFICATION
**This is a NEW DEVICE ID addition** - one of the explicitly allowed
exceptions for stable kernel backports.
The commit:
- Does NOT add new features or APIs
- Does NOT change existing behavior
- Only enables existing PSP driver functionality on new hardware
- Uses established patterns already in the driver
### 4. SCOPE AND RISK ASSESSMENT
**Change size:** ~17 lines total
- Small, contained data-only change
- No logic changes whatsoever
- Follows identical patterns used by existing pspv1-pspv6 structures
**Risk assessment: VERY LOW**
- The driver already handles NULL `platform_access` - verified in `psp-
dev.c`:
```c
if (psp->vdata->platform_access) {
ret = platform_access_dev_init(psp);
...
}
```
- Several existing structures (pspv1, pspv4, pspv6) already omit
`platform_access`
- The `teev2` structure referenced already exists since v6.5
- All register offsets are identical to pspv5
### 5. USER IMPACT
**Who is affected:**
- Users with AMD PCI device 0x115A (new AMD security processor variant)
- Without this patch, this hardware is completely non-functional
**Severity:** HIGH for affected users - enables critical security
hardware (TPM-like functionality)
### 6. STABILITY INDICATORS
**Positive signals:**
- Acked by Tom Lendacky (the original driver author and AMD maintainer)
- Follows exact same pattern as 10+ previous device ID additions in this
driver
- Same author (Mario Limonciello) has successfully added similar devices
before (0x17E0, 0x156E, etc.)
### 7. DEPENDENCY CHECK
**Required in stable tree:**
- `teev2` structure - added in v6.5 (commit 4aa0931be8f0a)
- Verified present in v6.6 and later
**Recent related commits:**
- 52e8ae868a824: "Add missing bootloader info reg for pspv5" (May 2025)
- 72942d6538564: "Add missing tee info reg for teev2" (May 2025)
The pspv7 structure in this commit already includes the
`bootloader_info_reg` correctly, so it was created after these fixes.
### 8. COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR COMMITS
This commit follows the exact same pattern as:
- `bb4185e595e47`: "Add support for PCI device 0x156E" - Added pspv6 +
dev_vdata[8] + PCI ID
- `4aa0931be8f0a`: "Add support for PCI device 0x17E0" - Added
pspv5/teev2 + dev_vdata[7] + PCI ID
- `6cb345939b8cc`: "Add support for PCI device 0x1134" - Added PCI ID
only
- `63935e2ee1f2a`: "Add support for PCI device 0x17D8" - Added PCI ID
only
These similar device ID additions are routinely considered for stable
trees.
---
## Final Assessment
**Should this be backported?**
**YES**, for the following reasons:
1. **Falls under the NEW DEVICE ID exception** - explicitly allowed per
stable kernel rules for enabling real hardware
2. **Trivial, data-only change** - ~17 lines, no logic changes
3. **Uses existing, proven infrastructure** - teev2 exists, NULL
platform_access handling exists
4. **Follows established patterns** - identical to 10+ previous similar
commits in this driver
5. **Zero risk of regression** - only affects users with the specific
0x115A device
6. **Enables real hardware** - without this, users with this AMD
security processor cannot use it at all
7. **Properly reviewed** - Acked by AMD maintainer, merged by crypto
subsystem maintainer
**Concerns:**
- Requires stable tree to have v6.6+ (for teev2 structure)
- May need the bootloader_info_reg fixes backported first for
consistency (commits 52e8ae868a824 and 72942d6538564)
The change is obviously correct, well-tested (used same patterns as
existing code), and enables hardware support that users need. This is
exactly the type of device ID addition that stable trees accept.
**YES**
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
index e7bb803912a6d..8891ceee1d7d0 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
@@ -459,6 +459,17 @@ static const struct psp_vdata pspv6 = {
.intsts_reg = 0x10514, /* P2CMSG_INTSTS */
};
+static const struct psp_vdata pspv7 = {
+ .tee = &teev2,
+ .cmdresp_reg = 0x10944, /* C2PMSG_17 */
+ .cmdbuff_addr_lo_reg = 0x10948, /* C2PMSG_18 */
+ .cmdbuff_addr_hi_reg = 0x1094c, /* C2PMSG_19 */
+ .bootloader_info_reg = 0x109ec, /* C2PMSG_59 */
+ .feature_reg = 0x109fc, /* C2PMSG_63 */
+ .inten_reg = 0x10510, /* P2CMSG_INTEN */
+ .intsts_reg = 0x10514, /* P2CMSG_INTSTS */
+};
+
#endif
static const struct sp_dev_vdata dev_vdata[] = {
@@ -525,6 +536,13 @@ static const struct sp_dev_vdata dev_vdata[] = {
.psp_vdata = &pspv6,
#endif
},
+ { /* 9 */
+ .bar = 2,
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+ .psp_vdata = &pspv7,
+#endif
+ },
+
};
static const struct pci_device_id sp_pci_table[] = {
{ PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x1537), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[0] },
@@ -539,6 +557,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id sp_pci_table[] = {
{ PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x17E0), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[7] },
{ PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x156E), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[8] },
{ PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x17D8), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[8] },
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x115A), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[9] },
/* Last entry must be zero */
{ 0, }
};
--
2.51.0
The documentation states that on machines supporting only global
fan mode control, the pwmX_enable attributes should only be created
for the first fan channel (pwm1_enable, aka channel 0).
Fix the off-by-one error caused by the fact that fan channels have
a zero-based index.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1c1658058c99 ("hwmon: (dell-smm) Add support for automatic fan mode")
Signed-off-by: Armin Wolf <W_Armin(a)gmx.de>
---
drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c b/drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c
index 683baf361c4c..a34753fc2973 100644
--- a/drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c
@@ -861,9 +861,9 @@ static umode_t dell_smm_is_visible(const void *drvdata, enum hwmon_sensor_types
if (auto_fan) {
/*
* The setting affects all fans, so only create a
- * single attribute.
+ * single attribute for the first fan channel.
*/
- if (channel != 1)
+ if (channel != 0)
return 0;
/*
--
2.39.5
The macro FAN_FROM_REG evaluates its arguments multiple times. When used
in lockless contexts involving shared driver data, this leads to
Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race conditions, potentially
causing divide-by-zero errors.
Convert the macro to a static function. This guarantees that arguments
are evaluated only once (pass-by-value), preventing the race
conditions.
Additionally, in store_fan_div, move the calculation of the minimum
limit inside the update lock. This ensures that the read-modify-write
sequence operates on consistent data.
Adhere to the principle of minimal changes by only converting macros
that evaluate arguments multiple times and are used in lockless
contexts.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CALbr=LYJ_ehtp53HXEVkSpYoub+XYSTU8Rg=o1xxMJ8=5z…
Fixes: 9873964d6eb2 ("[PATCH] HWMON: w83791d: New hardware monitoring driver for the Winbond W83791D")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <hanguidong02(a)gmail.com>
---
Based on the discussion in the link, I will submit a series of patches to
address TOCTOU issues in the hwmon subsystem by converting macros to
functions or adjusting locking where appropriate.
---
drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c | 17 +++++++++++------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c b/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c
index ace854b370a0..996e36951f9d 100644
--- a/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c
@@ -218,9 +218,14 @@ static u8 fan_to_reg(long rpm, int div)
return clamp_val((1350000 + rpm * div / 2) / (rpm * div), 1, 254);
}
-#define FAN_FROM_REG(val, div) ((val) == 0 ? -1 : \
- ((val) == 255 ? 0 : \
- 1350000 / ((val) * (div))))
+static int fan_from_reg(int val, int div)
+{
+ if (val == 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (val == 255)
+ return 0;
+ return 1350000 / (val * div);
+}
/* for temp1 which is 8-bit resolution, LSB = 1 degree Celsius */
#define TEMP1_FROM_REG(val) ((val) * 1000)
@@ -521,7 +526,7 @@ static ssize_t show_##reg(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \
struct w83791d_data *data = w83791d_update_device(dev); \
int nr = sensor_attr->index; \
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", \
- FAN_FROM_REG(data->reg[nr], DIV_FROM_REG(data->fan_div[nr]))); \
+ fan_from_reg(data->reg[nr], DIV_FROM_REG(data->fan_div[nr]))); \
}
show_fan_reg(fan);
@@ -585,10 +590,10 @@ static ssize_t store_fan_div(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
if (err)
return err;
+ mutex_lock(&data->update_lock);
/* Save fan_min */
- min = FAN_FROM_REG(data->fan_min[nr], DIV_FROM_REG(data->fan_div[nr]));
+ min = fan_from_reg(data->fan_min[nr], DIV_FROM_REG(data->fan_div[nr]));
- mutex_lock(&data->update_lock);
data->fan_div[nr] = div_to_reg(nr, val);
switch (nr) {
--
2.43.0
From: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus(a)linux.intel.com>
[ Upstream commit 5d010473cdeaabf6a2d3a9e2aed2186c1b73c213 ]
Calling fwnode_get_next_child_node() in ACPI implementation of the fwnode
property API is somewhat problematic as the latter is used in the
impelementation of the former. Instead of using
fwnode_get_next_child_node() in acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint(), call
acpi_get_next_subnode() directly instead.
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus(a)linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron(a)huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251001104320.1272752-3-sakari.ailus@linux.intel.…
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
## Analysis
### 1. COMMIT MESSAGE ANALYSIS
The commit message states:
- Problem: `acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint()` calls
`fwnode_get_next_child_node()`, which dispatches back to ACPI code,
creating unnecessary indirection.
- Solution: Call `acpi_get_next_subnode()` directly instead.
No "Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org" tag, no "Fixes:" tag, no explicit bug
report link. The message says "somewhat problematic," indicating an
architectural issue rather than a critical bug.
### 2. CODE CHANGE ANALYSIS
The diff shows 4 replacements in `acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint()`:
- Line 1475: `fwnode_get_next_child_node(fwnode, port)` →
`acpi_get_next_subnode(fwnode, port)`
- Line 1493: `fwnode_get_next_child_node(port, prev)` →
`acpi_get_next_subnode(port, prev)`
- Line 1495: `fwnode_get_next_child_node(fwnode, port)` →
`acpi_get_next_subnode(fwnode, port)`
- Line 1499: `fwnode_get_next_child_node(port, NULL)` →
`acpi_get_next_subnode(port, NULL)`
Call chain:
1. `fwnode_get_next_child_node()` dispatches via `fwnode_call_ptr_op()`
to the fwnode-specific implementation.
2. For ACPI fwnodes, it calls `acpi_get_next_present_subnode()`
(registered at line 1747).
3. `acpi_get_next_present_subnode()` filters non-present device nodes
and calls `acpi_get_next_subnode()`.
Why the change is safe:
- Graph endpoints are ACPI data nodes (checked by `is_acpi_graph_node()`
at line 1448: `is_acpi_data_node(fwnode)`).
- `acpi_get_next_present_subnode()` only filters non-present device
nodes (lines 1407-1408), not data nodes.
- Therefore, for graph endpoints, `acpi_get_next_subnode()` and
`fwnode_get_next_child_node()` behave the same.
### 3. CLASSIFICATION
This is a bug fix addressing an architectural issue:
- Removes unnecessary indirection in ACPI-specific code.
- Avoids a circular dependency pattern (ACPI → generic → ACPI).
- Functionally equivalent for graph endpoints.
Not a feature addition, not a new API, not a refactor.
### 4. SCOPE AND RISK ASSESSMENT
- Scope: 4 lines changed in one function in one file.
- Risk: Very low — same behavior for graph endpoints, cleaner
architecture.
- Complexity: Low — direct function call replacement.
### 5. USER IMPACT
- Who is affected: Users of ACPI graph endpoints (e.g., camera/media
drivers, device tree-like ACPI usage).
- Severity: Low — architectural improvement, not a visible bug fix.
- Likelihood: The "somewhat problematic" wording suggests no immediate
user-visible issue.
### 6. STABILITY INDICATORS
- Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart, Jonathan Cameron
- Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (ACPI maintainer)
- No "Tested-by:" tags
- Commit date: October 1, 2025 (recent)
### 7. DEPENDENCY CHECK
- `acpi_get_next_subnode()` exists in the same file and has been present
for years.
- No external dependencies introduced.
- Should apply cleanly to stable trees that have this code.
### 8. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Related commits:
- `79389a83bc388`: Introduced `acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint()` with
`fwnode_get_next_child_node()` calls.
- `48698e6cf44c3`: Introduced `acpi_get_next_present_subnode()` to
filter non-present devices.
- `5d010473cdeaa` (this commit): Removes the indirection.
The pattern existed since the function was introduced; this commit
cleans it up.
### 9. STABLE KERNEL CRITERIA EVALUATION
- Obviously correct: Yes — direct call instead of indirection.
- Fixes a real bug: Yes — architectural issue that could cause problems.
- Important issue: Moderate — architectural improvement, not a critical
bug.
- Small and contained: Yes — 4 lines, single function.
- No new features: Yes — same behavior, cleaner code.
- Applies cleanly: Yes — should apply without conflicts.
### 10. RISK VS BENEFIT
Benefits:
- Removes unnecessary indirection.
- Avoids circular dependency pattern.
- Improves code clarity.
- No functional change for graph endpoints.
Risks:
- Very low — functionally equivalent change.
- No new code paths or logic changes.
### 11. CONCERNS AND CONSIDERATIONS
- No "Cc: stable" tag, but that alone doesn't disqualify.
- Recent commit (Oct 2025) — hasn't been in mainline long.
- No explicit bug report or user complaint mentioned.
- Architectural improvement rather than a critical fix.
### CONCLUSION
This is a small, correct fix that removes unnecessary indirection in
ACPI code. It fixes an architectural issue and is functionally
equivalent for graph endpoints. It meets stable kernel criteria:
correct, fixes a real issue, small scope, no new features, and should
apply cleanly.
However, it's an architectural improvement rather than a critical bug
fix, and there's no explicit stable tag or user-visible bug report. The
"somewhat problematic" wording suggests it may not cause immediate
visible problems.
Given the conservative nature of stable trees and the lack of evidence
of user-visible impact, this is borderline but leans toward acceptable
for stable backporting due to its correctness, small scope, and
architectural benefit.
**YES**
drivers/acpi/property.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/property.c b/drivers/acpi/property.c
index 43d5e457814e1..76158b1399029 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/property.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/property.c
@@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ static struct fwnode_handle *acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint(
if (!prev) {
do {
- port = fwnode_get_next_child_node(fwnode, port);
+ port = acpi_get_next_subnode(fwnode, port);
/*
* The names of the port nodes begin with "port@"
* followed by the number of the port node and they also
@@ -1490,13 +1490,13 @@ static struct fwnode_handle *acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint(
if (!port)
return NULL;
- endpoint = fwnode_get_next_child_node(port, prev);
+ endpoint = acpi_get_next_subnode(port, prev);
while (!endpoint) {
- port = fwnode_get_next_child_node(fwnode, port);
+ port = acpi_get_next_subnode(fwnode, port);
if (!port)
break;
if (is_acpi_graph_node(port, "port"))
- endpoint = fwnode_get_next_child_node(port, NULL);
+ endpoint = acpi_get_next_subnode(port, NULL);
}
/*
--
2.51.0
The local variable 'val' was never clamped to -75000 or 180000 because
the return value of clamp_val() was not used. Fix this by assigning the
clamped value back to 'val', and use clamp() instead of clamp_val().
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a557a92e6881 ("net: phy: marvell-88q2xxx: add support for temperature sensor")
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum(a)linux.dev>
---
drivers/net/phy/marvell-88q2xxx.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/marvell-88q2xxx.c b/drivers/net/phy/marvell-88q2xxx.c
index f3d83b04c953..201dee1a1698 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/marvell-88q2xxx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/marvell-88q2xxx.c
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ static int mv88q2xxx_hwmon_write(struct device *dev,
switch (attr) {
case hwmon_temp_max:
- clamp_val(val, -75000, 180000);
+ val = clamp(val, -75000, 180000);
val = (val / 1000) + 75;
val = FIELD_PREP(MDIO_MMD_PCS_MV_TEMP_SENSOR3_INT_THRESH_MASK,
val);
--
Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum(a)linux.dev>
GPG: 1D60 735E 8AEF 3BE4 73B6 9D84 7336 78FD 8DFE EAD4
From: Haotien Hsu <haotienh(a)nvidia.com>
The UTMIP sleepwalk programming sequence requires asserting both
LINEVAL_WALK_EN and WAKE_WALK_EN when enabling the sleepwalk logic.
However, the current code mistakenly cleared WAKE_WALK_EN, which
prevents the sleepwalk trigger from operating correctly.
Fix this by asserting WAKE_WALK_EN together with LINEVAL_WALK_EN.
Fixes: 1f9cab6cc20c ("phy: tegra: xusb: Add wake/sleepwalk for Tegra186")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haotien Hsu <haotienh(a)nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Wayne Chang <waynec(a)nvidia.com>
---
drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c b/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c
index e818f6c3980e..b2a76710c0c4 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c
@@ -401,8 +401,7 @@ static int tegra186_utmi_enable_phy_sleepwalk(struct tegra_xusb_lane *lane,
/* enable the trigger of the sleepwalk logic */
value = ao_readl(priv, XUSB_AO_UTMIP_SLEEPWALK_CFG(index));
- value |= LINEVAL_WALK_EN;
- value &= ~WAKE_WALK_EN;
+ value |= LINEVAL_WALK_EN | WAKE_WALK_EN;
ao_writel(priv, value, XUSB_AO_UTMIP_SLEEPWALK_CFG(index));
/* reset the walk pointer and clear the alarm of the sleepwalk logic,
--
2.25.1
From: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
[ Upstream commit 5f2b28b79d2d1946ee36ad8b3dc0066f73c90481 ]
There are actually 2 problems:
- deleting the last element doesn't require the memmove of elements
[i + 1, end) over it. Actually, element i+1 is out of bounds.
- The memmove itself should move size - i - 1 elements, because the last
element is out of bounds.
The out-of-bounds element still remains out of bounds after being
accessed, so the problem is only that we touch it, not that it becomes
in active use. But I suppose it can lead to issues if the out-of-bounds
element is part of an unmapped page.
Fixes: 6666cebc5e30 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Add support for VLAN operations")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250318115716.2124395-4-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <xnguchen(a)sina.cn>
---
drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c b/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
index baba204ad62f..2ac91fe2a79b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
@@ -1921,8 +1921,10 @@ int sja1105_table_delete_entry(struct sja1105_table *table, int i)
if (i > table->entry_count)
return -ERANGE;
- memmove(entries + i * entry_size, entries + (i + 1) * entry_size,
- (table->entry_count - i) * entry_size);
+ if (i + 1 < table->entry_count) {
+ memmove(entries + i * entry_size, entries + (i + 1) * entry_size,
+ (table->entry_count - i - 1) * entry_size);
+ }
table->entry_count--;
--
2.17.1
get_user/put_user change didn't spend time in next and
seems a bit too risky to rush. I'm keeping it in my tree
and we'll get it in the next cycle.
The following changes since commit ac3fd01e4c1efce8f2c054cdeb2ddd2fc0fb150d:
Linux 6.18-rc7 (2025-11-23 14:53:16 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost.git tags/for_linus
for you to fetch changes up to 205dd7a5d6ad6f4c8e8fcd3c3b95a7c0e7067fee:
virtio_pci: drop kernel.h (2025-11-30 18:02:43 -0500)
----------------------------------------------------------------
virtio,vhost: fixes, cleanups
Just a bunch of fixes and cleanups, mostly very simple. Several
features are merged through net-next this time around.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com>
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alok Tiwari (3):
virtio_vdpa: fix misleading return in void function
vdpa/mlx5: Fix incorrect error code reporting in query_virtqueues
vdpa/pds: use %pe for ERR_PTR() in event handler registration
Kriish Sharma (1):
virtio: fix kernel-doc for mapping/free_coherent functions
Marco Crivellari (2):
virtio_balloon: add WQ_PERCPU to alloc_workqueue users
vduse: add WQ_PERCPU to alloc_workqueue users
Miaoqian Lin (1):
virtio: vdpa: Fix reference count leak in octep_sriov_enable()
Michael S. Tsirkin (11):
virtio: fix typo in virtio_device_ready() comment
virtio: fix whitespace in virtio_config_ops
virtio: fix grammar in virtio_queue_info docs
virtio: fix grammar in virtio_map_ops docs
virtio: standardize Returns documentation style
virtio: fix virtqueue_set_affinity() docs
virtio: fix map ops comment
virtio: clean up features qword/dword terms
vhost/test: add test specific macro for features
vhost: switch to arrays of feature bits
virtio_pci: drop kernel.h
Mike Christie (1):
vhost: Fix kthread worker cgroup failure handling
drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c | 2 +-
drivers/vdpa/octeon_ep/octep_vdpa_main.c | 1 +
drivers/vdpa/pds/vdpa_dev.c | 2 +-
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/vduse_dev.c | 3 ++-
drivers/vhost/net.c | 29 +++++++++++-----------
drivers/vhost/scsi.c | 9 ++++---
drivers/vhost/test.c | 10 ++++++--
drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 4 ++-
drivers/vhost/vhost.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
drivers/vhost/vsock.c | 10 +++++---
drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 12 ++++-----
drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c | 3 ++-
drivers/virtio/virtio_debug.c | 10 ++++----
drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_modern_dev.c | 6 ++---
drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c | 7 +++---
drivers/virtio/virtio_vdpa.c | 2 +-
include/linux/virtio.h | 2 +-
include/linux/virtio_config.h | 24 +++++++++---------
include/linux/virtio_features.h | 29 +++++++++++-----------
include/linux/virtio_pci_modern.h | 8 +++---
include/uapi/linux/virtio_pci.h | 2 +-
21 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
When VM boots with one virtio-crypto PCI device and builtin backend,
run openssl benchmark command with multiple processes, such as
openssl speed -evp aes-128-cbc -engine afalg -seconds 10 -multi 32
openssl processes will hangup and there is error reported like this:
virtio_crypto virtio0: dataq.0:id 3 is not a head!
It seems that the data virtqueue need protection when it is handled
for virtio done notification. If the spinlock protection is added
in virtcrypto_done_task(), openssl benchmark with multiple processes
works well.
Fixes: fed93fb62e05 ("crypto: virtio - Handle dataq logic with tasklet")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo(a)loongson.cn>
---
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
index 3d241446099c..ccc6b5c1b24b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
@@ -75,15 +75,20 @@ static void virtcrypto_done_task(unsigned long data)
struct data_queue *data_vq = (struct data_queue *)data;
struct virtqueue *vq = data_vq->vq;
struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req;
+ unsigned long flags;
unsigned int len;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&data_vq->lock, flags);
do {
virtqueue_disable_cb(vq);
while ((vc_req = virtqueue_get_buf(vq, &len)) != NULL) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data_vq->lock, flags);
if (vc_req->alg_cb)
vc_req->alg_cb(vc_req, len);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&data_vq->lock, flags);
}
} while (!virtqueue_enable_cb(vq));
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data_vq->lock, flags);
}
static void virtcrypto_dataq_callback(struct virtqueue *vq)
--
2.39.3
Currently, kvfree_rcu_barrier() flushes RCU sheaves across all slab
caches when a cache is destroyed. This is unnecessary; only the RCU
sheaves belonging to the cache being destroyed need to be flushed.
As suggested by Vlastimil Babka, introduce a weaker form of
kvfree_rcu_barrier() that operates on a specific slab cache.
Factor out flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache() from flush_all_rcu_sheaves() and
call it from flush_all_rcu_sheaves() and kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache().
Call kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache() instead of kvfree_rcu_barrier() on
cache destruction.
The performance benefit is evaluated on a 12 core 24 threads AMD Ryzen
5900X machine (1 socket), by loading slub_kunit module.
Before:
Total calls: 19
Average latency (us): 18127
Total time (us): 344414
After:
Total calls: 19
Average latency (us): 10066
Total time (us): 191264
Two performance regression have been reported:
- stress module loader test's runtime increases by 50-60% (Daniel)
- internal graphics test's runtime on Tegra23 increases by 35% (Jon)
They are fixed by this change.
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Fixes: ec66e0d59952 ("slab: add sheaf support for batching kfree_rcu() operations")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1bda09da-93be-4737-aef0-d47f8c5c9301@suse.…
Reported-and-tested-by: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez(a)samsung.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/0406562e-2066-4cf8-9902-b2b0616dd742@kerne…
Reported-and-tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh(a)nvidia.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/e988eff6-1287-425e-a06c-805af5bbf262@nvidi…
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo(a)oracle.com>
---
No code change, added proper tags and updated changelog.
include/linux/slab.h | 5 ++++
mm/slab.h | 1 +
mm/slab_common.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
mm/slub.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index cf443f064a66..937c93d44e8c 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -1149,6 +1149,10 @@ static inline void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
{
rcu_barrier();
}
+static inline void kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ rcu_barrier();
+}
static inline void kfree_rcu_scheduler_running(void) { }
#else
@@ -1156,6 +1160,7 @@ void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void);
void kfree_rcu_scheduler_running(void);
#endif
+void kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s);
/**
* kmalloc_size_roundup - Report allocation bucket size for the given size
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index f730e012553c..e767aa7e91b0 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ static inline bool is_kmalloc_normal(struct kmem_cache *s)
bool __kfree_rcu_sheaf(struct kmem_cache *s, void *obj);
void flush_all_rcu_sheaves(void);
+void flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s);
#define SLAB_CORE_FLAGS (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | \
SLAB_CACHE_DMA32 | SLAB_PANIC | \
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 84dfff4f7b1f..dd8a49d6f9cc 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ void kmem_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *s)
return;
/* in-flight kfree_rcu()'s may include objects from our cache */
- kvfree_rcu_barrier();
+ kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(s);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_RCU_DEBUG) &&
(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) {
@@ -2038,25 +2038,13 @@ void kvfree_call_rcu(struct rcu_head *head, void *ptr)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvfree_call_rcu);
-/**
- * kvfree_rcu_barrier - Wait until all in-flight kvfree_rcu() complete.
- *
- * Note that a single argument of kvfree_rcu() call has a slow path that
- * triggers synchronize_rcu() following by freeing a pointer. It is done
- * before the return from the function. Therefore for any single-argument
- * call that will result in a kfree() to a cache that is to be destroyed
- * during module exit, it is developer's responsibility to ensure that all
- * such calls have returned before the call to kmem_cache_destroy().
- */
-void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
+static inline void __kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
{
struct kfree_rcu_cpu_work *krwp;
struct kfree_rcu_cpu *krcp;
bool queued;
int i, cpu;
- flush_all_rcu_sheaves();
-
/*
* Firstly we detach objects and queue them over an RCU-batch
* for all CPUs. Finally queued works are flushed for each CPU.
@@ -2118,8 +2106,43 @@ void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
}
}
}
+
+/**
+ * kvfree_rcu_barrier - Wait until all in-flight kvfree_rcu() complete.
+ *
+ * Note that a single argument of kvfree_rcu() call has a slow path that
+ * triggers synchronize_rcu() following by freeing a pointer. It is done
+ * before the return from the function. Therefore for any single-argument
+ * call that will result in a kfree() to a cache that is to be destroyed
+ * during module exit, it is developer's responsibility to ensure that all
+ * such calls have returned before the call to kmem_cache_destroy().
+ */
+void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
+{
+ flush_all_rcu_sheaves();
+ __kvfree_rcu_barrier();
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvfree_rcu_barrier);
+/**
+ * kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache - Wait for in-flight kvfree_rcu() calls on a
+ * specific slab cache.
+ * @s: slab cache to wait for
+ *
+ * See the description of kvfree_rcu_barrier() for details.
+ */
+void kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ if (s->cpu_sheaves)
+ flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(s);
+ /*
+ * TODO: Introduce a version of __kvfree_rcu_barrier() that works
+ * on a specific slab cache.
+ */
+ __kvfree_rcu_barrier();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache);
+
static unsigned long
kfree_rcu_shrink_count(struct shrinker *shrink, struct shrink_control *sc)
{
@@ -2215,4 +2238,3 @@ void __init kvfree_rcu_init(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KVFREE_RCU_BATCHED */
-
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 785e25a14999..7cec2220712b 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -4118,42 +4118,47 @@ static void flush_rcu_sheaf(struct work_struct *w)
/* needed for kvfree_rcu_barrier() */
-void flush_all_rcu_sheaves(void)
+void flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
struct slub_flush_work *sfw;
- struct kmem_cache *s;
unsigned int cpu;
- cpus_read_lock();
- mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&flush_lock);
- list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list) {
- if (!s->cpu_sheaves)
- continue;
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
- mutex_lock(&flush_lock);
+ /*
+ * we don't check if rcu_free sheaf exists - racing
+ * __kfree_rcu_sheaf() might have just removed it.
+ * by executing flush_rcu_sheaf() on the cpu we make
+ * sure the __kfree_rcu_sheaf() finished its call_rcu()
+ */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
+ INIT_WORK(&sfw->work, flush_rcu_sheaf);
+ sfw->s = s;
+ queue_work_on(cpu, flushwq, &sfw->work);
+ }
- /*
- * we don't check if rcu_free sheaf exists - racing
- * __kfree_rcu_sheaf() might have just removed it.
- * by executing flush_rcu_sheaf() on the cpu we make
- * sure the __kfree_rcu_sheaf() finished its call_rcu()
- */
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
+ flush_work(&sfw->work);
+ }
- INIT_WORK(&sfw->work, flush_rcu_sheaf);
- sfw->s = s;
- queue_work_on(cpu, flushwq, &sfw->work);
- }
+ mutex_unlock(&flush_lock);
+}
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
- flush_work(&sfw->work);
- }
+void flush_all_rcu_sheaves(void)
+{
+ struct kmem_cache *s;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
- mutex_unlock(&flush_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list) {
+ if (!s->cpu_sheaves)
+ continue;
+ flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(s);
}
mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);
--
2.43.0
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
[ Upstream commit 1fe4002cf7f23d70c79bda429ca2a9423ebcfdfa ]
A KASAN build bloats these single load/store helpers such that
it fails to inline them:
vmlinux.o: error: objtool: irqentry_exit+0x5e8: call to instruction_pointer_set() with UACCESS enabled
Make sure the compiler isn't allowed to do stupid.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031105435.GU4068168@noisy.programming.kicks-a…
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
## Comprehensive Analysis: x86/ptrace: Always inline trivial accessors
### 1. COMMIT MESSAGE ANALYSIS
**Subject:** `x86/ptrace: Always inline trivial accessors`
**Key points from the commit message:**
- A **KASAN build** bloats these single load/store helpers such that
they fail to inline
- The result is an **objtool ERROR**: `vmlinux.o: error: objtool:
irqentry_exit+0x5e8: call to instruction_pointer_set() with UACCESS
enabled`
- The commit ensures "the compiler isn't allowed to do stupid"
**Author:** Peter Zijlstra (Intel) - a highly respected kernel developer
and maintainer
**Committer:** Ingo Molnar - x86 subsystem maintainer
**Missing tags:**
- No `Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org` tag
- No `Fixes:` tag
### 2. CODE CHANGE ANALYSIS
The diff changes 8 trivial accessor functions from `static inline` to
`static __always_inline`:
| Function | Purpose | Complexity |
|----------|---------|------------|
| `regs_return_value()` | Returns `regs->ax` | 1 line |
| `regs_set_return_value()` | Sets `regs->ax = rc` | 1 line |
| `kernel_stack_pointer()` | Returns `regs->sp` | 1 line |
| `instruction_pointer()` | Returns `regs->ip` | 1 line |
| `instruction_pointer_set()` | Sets `regs->ip = val` | 1 line |
| `frame_pointer()` | Returns `regs->bp` | 1 line |
| `user_stack_pointer()` | Returns `regs->sp` | 1 line |
| `user_stack_pointer_set()` | Sets `regs->sp = val` | 1 line |
**Technical mechanism of the bug:**
1. KASAN adds memory sanitization instrumentation to functions
2. Even trivial one-liner functions get bloated with KASAN checks
3. The compiler decides the bloated functions are "too big" to inline
4. These functions get called from `irqentry_exit()` in contexts where
UACCESS is enabled (SMAP disabled via STAC)
5. Objtool validates that no unexpected function calls happen with
UACCESS enabled (security/correctness requirement)
6. Result: **BUILD FAILURE** (error, not warning)
**Why `__always_inline` fixes it:**
```c
#define __always_inline inline
__attribute__((__always_inline__))
```
This compiler attribute forces inlining regardless of any optimization
settings or instrumentation, ensuring these trivial accessors always
become inline code rather than function calls.
### 3. CLASSIFICATION
- **Category:** BUILD FIX
- **Type:** Fixes compilation error with KASAN on x86
- **Not a feature:** Simply enforces behavior that was intended
(functions should always inline)
- **Not a quirk/device ID/DT:** N/A
### 4. SCOPE AND RISK ASSESSMENT
**Scope:**
- 1 file changed: `arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h`
- 10 insertions, 10 deletions (only adding `__always_` prefix)
- Changes are purely compile-time
**Risk: VERY LOW**
- Zero runtime functional change when compiler already inlines
- Only forces the compiler to do what it was supposed to do
- Same pattern already successfully applied to other functions in the
same file:
- `user_mode()` - already `__always_inline`
- `v8086_mode()` - commit b008893b08dcc
- `ip_within_syscall_gap()` - commit c6b01dace2cd7
- `regs_irqs_disabled()` - already `__always_inline`
### 5. USER IMPACT
**Who is affected:**
- Anyone building x86 kernels with `CONFIG_KASAN=y`
- KASAN is used for memory debugging, commonly in development and CI
systems
- Enterprise distributions often enable KASAN in debug/test builds
**Severity:** HIGH (build failure = kernel cannot be compiled)
### 6. STABILITY INDICATORS
- **Reviewed-by:** None explicit, but committed through tip tree
- **Tested-by:** None explicit, but the error message shows it was
reproduced
- **Author credibility:** Peter Zijlstra is a top kernel maintainer
- **Committer credibility:** Ingo Molnar is the x86 maintainer
### 7. DEPENDENCY CHECK
**Dependencies:** NONE
- This is a standalone fix
- Does not depend on any other commits
- The affected code exists unchanged in all stable kernels (5.10, 5.15,
6.1, 6.6)
**Backport applicability verified:**
```
v5.10: static inline void instruction_pointer_set(...) ✓
v5.15: static inline void instruction_pointer_set(...) ✓
v6.1: static inline void instruction_pointer_set(...) ✓
v6.6: static inline void instruction_pointer_set(...) ✓
```
The patch should apply cleanly to all stable trees.
### 8. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Similar fixes have been applied to this same file and other kernel
files:
| Commit | Description | Pattern |
|--------|-------------|---------|
| c6b01dace2cd7 | x86: Always inline ip_within_syscall_gap() | Same |
| b008893b08dcc | x86/ptrace: Always inline v8086_mode() | Same |
| cb0ca08b326aa | kcov: mark in_softirq_really() as __always_inline |
Same (backported to stable) |
The KASAN + objtool UACCESS validation issue is a known pattern that has
been addressed multiple times with `__always_inline`.
### SUMMARY
**Strong YES signals:**
- ✅ Fixes a build failure (compilation error, not warning)
- ✅ Small, surgical fix with clear scope (only adds `__always_inline`)
- ✅ Obviously correct - trivial accessors should always inline
- ✅ Zero functional/runtime change
- ✅ No dependencies, applies cleanly to all stable trees
- ✅ Well-established fix pattern used elsewhere in kernel
- ✅ Authored by highly trusted maintainer (Peter Zijlstra)
- ✅ Committed through the proper channel (tip tree via Ingo Molnar)
**Weak NO signals:**
- ⚠️ No explicit `Cc: stable` tag
- ⚠️ No `Fixes:` tag
The absence of stable tags is not disqualifying for build fixes. The
stable kernel rules explicitly state that "build fixes that prevent
compilation" are acceptable. This is a clear-cut build fix that prevents
KASAN-enabled x86 kernels from compiling.
### CONCLUSION
This commit **should be backported** to stable kernel trees. It's a
textbook example of a build fix:
- Small, contained, obviously correct
- Fixes a real build failure affecting KASAN users
- Zero risk of regression (only forces intended behavior)
- No dependencies, clean backport
- Follows established patterns from similar successful fixes
**YES**
arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 20 ++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
index 50f75467f73d0..b5dec859bc75a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
@@ -187,12 +187,12 @@ convert_ip_to_linear(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void send_sigtrap(struct pt_regs *regs, int error_code, int si_code);
-static inline unsigned long regs_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline unsigned long regs_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->ax;
}
-static inline void regs_set_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long rc)
+static __always_inline void regs_set_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long rc)
{
regs->ax = rc;
}
@@ -277,34 +277,34 @@ static __always_inline bool ip_within_syscall_gap(struct pt_regs *regs)
}
#endif
-static inline unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->sp;
}
-static inline unsigned long instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline unsigned long instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->ip;
}
-static inline void instruction_pointer_set(struct pt_regs *regs,
- unsigned long val)
+static __always_inline
+void instruction_pointer_set(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long val)
{
regs->ip = val;
}
-static inline unsigned long frame_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline unsigned long frame_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->bp;
}
-static inline unsigned long user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline unsigned long user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->sp;
}
-static inline void user_stack_pointer_set(struct pt_regs *regs,
- unsigned long val)
+static __always_inline
+void user_stack_pointer_set(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long val)
{
regs->sp = val;
}
--
2.51.0
The patch titled
Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2025 19:00:11 +0000
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed on
systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. It
was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in the
following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Use the new vmalloc flag that disables random tag assignment in
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() - pass the same random tag to all the
vm_structs by tagging the pointers before they go inside
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(). Assigning a common tag resolves the pcpu
chunk address mismatch.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/873821114a9f722ffb5d6702b94782e902883fdf.17648745…
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com>
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/kasan/common.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag
+++ a/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -591,11 +591,28 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct
unsigned long size;
void *addr;
int area;
+ u8 tag;
- for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ /*
+ * If KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG was set at this point, all vms[] pointers
+ * would be unpoisoned with the KASAN_TAG_KERNEL which would disable
+ * KASAN checks down the line.
+ */
+ if (flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG) {
+ pr_warn("KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG flag shouldn't be already set!\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ size = vms[0]->size;
+ addr = vms[0]->addr;
+ vms[0]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ tag = get_tag(vms[0]->addr);
+
+ for (area = 1 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
size = vms[area]->size;
- addr = vms[area]->addr;
- vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ addr = set_tag(vms[area]->addr, tag);
+ vms[area]->addr =
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags | KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);
}
}
#endif
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are
kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison.patch
kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch
The patch titled
Subject: kasan: refactor pcpu kasan vmalloc unpoison
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Subject: kasan: refactor pcpu kasan vmalloc unpoison
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2025 19:00:04 +0000
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed
on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes.
It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in
the following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Refactor code by reusing __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc in a new helper in
preparation for the actual fix.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/eb61d93b907e262eefcaa130261a08bcb6c5ce51.17648745…
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com>
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
mm/kasan/common.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +---
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h~kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison
+++ a/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -615,6 +615,16 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison
__kasan_poison_vmalloc(start, size);
}
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags);
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ if (kasan_enabled())
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, flags);
+}
+
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start,
@@ -639,6 +649,11 @@ static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmall
static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
{ }
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{ }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
#if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison
+++ a/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "kasan.h"
#include "../slab.h"
@@ -582,3 +583,19 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr
}
return true;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ unsigned long size;
+ void *addr;
+ int area;
+
+ for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ size = vms[area]->size;
+ addr = vms[area]->addr;
+ vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ }
+}
+#endif
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c~kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison
+++ a/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -4872,9 +4872,7 @@ retry:
* With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for
* non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
*/
- for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++)
- vms[area]->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(vms[area]->addr,
- vms[area]->size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
kfree(vas);
return vms;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are
kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison.patch
kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch
The patch titled
Subject: mm/kasan: fix incorrect unpoisoning in vrealloc for KASAN
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Subject: mm/kasan: fix incorrect unpoisoning in vrealloc for KASAN
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2025 18:59:55 +0000
Patch series "kasan: vmalloc: Fixes for the percpu allocator and
vrealloc", v3.
Patches fix two issues related to KASAN and vmalloc.
The first one, a KASAN tag mismatch, possibly resulting in a kernel panic,
can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with
multiple NUMA nodes. Initially it was only noticed on x86 [1] but later a
similar issue was also reported on arm64 [2].
Specifically the problem is related to how vm_structs interact with
pcpu_chunks - both when they are allocated, assigned and when pcpu_chunk
addresses are derived.
When vm_structs are allocated they are unpoisoned, each with a different
random tag, if vmalloc support is enabled along the KASAN mode. Later
when first pcpu chunk is allocated it gets its 'base_addr' field set to
the first allocated vm_struct. With that it inherits that vm_struct's
tag.
When pcpu_chunk addresses are later derived (by pcpu_chunk_addr(), for
example in pcpu_alloc_noprof()) the base_addr field is used and offsets
are added to it. If the initial conditions are satisfied then some of the
offsets will point into memory allocated with a different vm_struct. So
while the lower bits will get accurately derived the tag bits in the top
of the pointer won't match the shadow memory contents.
The solution (proposed at v2 of the x86 KASAN series [3]) is to unpoison
the vm_structs with the same tag when allocating them for the per cpu
allocator (in pcpu_get_vm_areas()).
The second one reported by syzkaller [4] is related to vrealloc and
happens because of random tag generation when unpoisoning memory without
allocating new pages. This breaks shadow memory tracking and needs to
reuse the existing tag instead of generating a new one. At the same time
an inconsistency in used flags is corrected.
This patch (of 3):
Syzkaller reported a memory out-of-bounds bug [4]. This patch fixes two
issues:
1. In vrealloc the KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC flag is missing when
unpoisoning the extended region. This flag is required to correctly
associate the allocation with KASAN's vmalloc tracking.
Note: In contrast, vzalloc (via __vmalloc_node_range_noprof)
explicitly sets KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC and calls
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() with it. vrealloc must behave consistently --
especially when reusing existing vmalloc regions -- to ensure KASAN can
track allocations correctly.
2. When vrealloc reuses an existing vmalloc region (without allocating
new pages) KASAN generates a new tag, which breaks tag-based memory
access tracking.
Introduce KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG, a new KASAN flag that allows reusing the
tag already attached to the pointer, ensuring consistent tag behavior
during reallocation.
Pass KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG and KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC to the
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc inside vrealloc_node_align_noprof().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/38dece0a4074c43e48150d1e242f8242c73bf1a5.17648745…
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e7e04692866d02e6d3b32bb43b998e5d17092ba4.173868… [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aMUrW1Znp1GEj7St@MiWiFi-R3L-srv/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAPAsAGxDRv_uFeMYu9TwhBVWHCCtkSxoWY4xmFB_vowMbi… [3]
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3D997752115a851cb0cf36 [4]
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Co-developed-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Fixes: a0309faf1cb0 ("mm: vmalloc: support more granular vrealloc() sizing"
)
Reported-by: syzbot+997752115a851cb0cf36(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68e243a2.050a0220.1696c6.007d.GAE@google.com/T/
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com>
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 1 +
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 2 +-
mm/kasan/shadow.c | 4 +++-
mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ typedef unsigned int __bitwise kasan_vma
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x01u)
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x02u)
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x04u)
+#define KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x08u)
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_PAGE_RANGE 0x1 /* Apply exsiting page range */
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_TLB_FLUSH 0x2 /* TLB flush */
--- a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const voi
return (void *)start;
}
- tag = kasan_random_tag();
+ tag = (flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG) ? get_tag(start) : kasan_random_tag();
start = set_tag(start, tag);
/* Unpoison and initialize memory up to size. */
--- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
@@ -648,7 +648,9 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const voi
!(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL))
return (void *)start;
- start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag());
+ if (unlikely(!(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG)))
+ start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag());
+
kasan_unpoison(start, size, false);
return (void *)start;
}
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -4176,7 +4176,9 @@ void *vrealloc_node_align_noprof(const v
*/
if (size <= alloced_size) {
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(p + old_size, size - old_size,
- KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL |
+ KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC |
+ KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);
/*
* No need to zero memory here, as unused memory will have
* already been zeroed at initial allocation time or during
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev are
mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan.patch
The patch titled
Subject: Revert "mm: fix MAX_FOLIO_ORDER on powerpc configs with hugetlb"
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
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*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Shuah Khan <skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Revert "mm: fix MAX_FOLIO_ORDER on powerpc configs with hugetlb"
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 19:33:56 -0700
This reverts commit 39231e8d6ba7f794b566fd91ebd88c0834a23b98.
Enabling HAVE_GIGANTIC_FOLIOS broke kernel build and git clone on two
systems. git fetch-pack fails when cloning large repos and make hangs or
errors out of Makefile.build with Error: 139. These failures are random
with git clone failing after fetching 1% of the objects, and make hangs
while compiling random files.
Below is is one of the git clone failures:
git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git linux_6.19
Cloning into 'linux_6.19'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 11173575, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (785/785), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (373/373), done.
remote: Total 11173575 (delta 534), reused 505 (delta 411), pack-reused 11172790 (from 1)
Receiving objects: 100% (11173575/11173575), 3.00 GiB | 7.08 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (9195212/9195212), done.
fatal: did not receive expected object 0002003e951b5057c16de5a39140abcbf6e44e50
fatal: fetch-pack: invalid index-pack output
(akpm: reverting this probably just hides a bug, but let's do that for now
while the bug is being worked on).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251204023358.54107-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org
Fixes: 39231e8d6ba7 ("mm: fix MAX_FOLIO_ORDER on powerpc configs with hugetlb")
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy(a)csgroup.eu>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 -
arch/powerpc/platforms/Kconfig.cputype | 1 +
include/linux/mm.h | 13 +++----------
mm/Kconfig | 7 -------
4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig~revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb
+++ a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -137,7 +137,6 @@ config PPC
select ARCH_HAS_DMA_OPS if PPC64
select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
- select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE if ARCH_SUPPORTS_HUGETLBFS
select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
select ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT if PPC64 && PPC_FPU
select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/Kconfig.cputype~revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb
+++ a/arch/powerpc/platforms/Kconfig.cputype
@@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ config PPC_64S_HASH_MMU
config PPC_RADIX_MMU
bool "Radix MMU Support"
depends on PPC_BOOK3S_64
+ select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
default y
help
Enable support for the Power ISA 3.0 Radix style MMU. Currently this
--- a/include/linux/mm.h~revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb
+++ a/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2074,7 +2074,7 @@ static inline unsigned long folio_nr_pag
return folio_large_nr_pages(folio);
}
-#if !defined(CONFIG_HAVE_GIGANTIC_FOLIOS)
+#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE)
/*
* We don't expect any folios that exceed buddy sizes (and consequently
* memory sections).
@@ -2087,17 +2087,10 @@ static inline unsigned long folio_nr_pag
* pages are guaranteed to be contiguous.
*/
#define MAX_FOLIO_ORDER PFN_SECTION_SHIFT
-#elif defined(CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE)
-/*
- * There is no real limit on the folio size. We limit them to the maximum we
- * currently expect (see CONFIG_HAVE_GIGANTIC_FOLIOS): with hugetlb, we expect
- * no folios larger than 16 GiB on 64bit and 1 GiB on 32bit.
- */
-#define MAX_FOLIO_ORDER get_order(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) ? SZ_16G : SZ_1G)
#else
/*
- * Without hugetlb, gigantic folios that are bigger than a single PUD are
- * currently impossible.
+ * There is no real limit on the folio size. We limit them to the maximum we
+ * currently expect (e.g., hugetlb, dax).
*/
#define MAX_FOLIO_ORDER PUD_ORDER
#endif
--- a/mm/Kconfig~revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb
+++ a/mm/Kconfig
@@ -908,13 +908,6 @@ config PAGE_MAPCOUNT
config PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES
def_bool TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE || HUGETLB_PAGE
-#
-# We can end up creating gigantic folio.
-#
-config HAVE_GIGANTIC_FOLIOS
- def_bool (HUGETLB_PAGE && ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE) || \
- (ZONE_DEVICE && HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD)
-
# TODO: Allow to be enabled without THP
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_HUGE_PFNMAP
def_bool n
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org are
revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb.patch