The quilt patch titled
Subject: rust: maple_tree: rcu_read_lock() in destructor to silence lockdep
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
rust-maple_tree-rcu_read_lock-in-destructor-to-silence-lockdep.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
Subject: rust: maple_tree: rcu_read_lock() in destructor to silence lockdep
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2025 13:10:37 +0000
When running the Rust maple tree kunit tests with lockdep, you may trigger
a warning that looks like this:
lib/maple_tree.c:780 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
no locks held by kunit_try_catch/344.
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 344 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G N 6.19.0-rc1+ #2 NONE
Tainted: [N]=TEST
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x71/0x90
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x150/0x190
mas_start+0x104/0x150
mas_find+0x179/0x240
_RINvNtCs5QSdWC790r4_4core3ptr13drop_in_placeINtNtCs1cdwasc6FUb_6kernel10maple_tree9MapleTreeINtNtNtBL_5alloc4kbox3BoxlNtNtB1x_9allocator7KmallocEEECsgxAQYCfdR72_25doctests_kernel_generated+0xaf/0x130
rust_doctest_kernel_maple_tree_rs_0+0x600/0x6b0
? lock_release+0xeb/0x2a0
? kunit_try_catch_run+0x210/0x210
kunit_try_run_case+0x74/0x160
? kunit_try_catch_run+0x210/0x210
kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x12/0x30
kthread+0x21c/0x230
? __do_trace_sched_kthread_stop_ret+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork+0x16c/0x270
? __do_trace_sched_kthread_stop_ret+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
This is because the destructor of maple tree calls mas_find() without
taking rcu_read_lock() or the spinlock. Doing that is actually ok in this
case since the destructor has exclusive access to the entire maple tree,
but it triggers a lockdep warning. To fix that, take the rcu read lock.
In the future, it's possible that memory reclaim could gain a feature
where it reallocates entries in maple trees even if no user-code is
touching it. If that feature is added, then this use of rcu read lock
would become load-bearing, so I did not make it conditional on lockdep.
We have to repeatedly take and release rcu because the destructor of T
might perform operations that sleep.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251217-maple-drop-rcu-v1-1-702af063573f@google.…
Fixes: da939ef4c494 ("rust: maple_tree: add MapleTree")
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
Reported-by: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg(a)kernel.org>
Closes: https://rust-for-linux.zulipchat.com/#narrow/channel/x/topic/x/near/5642151…
Reviewed-by: Gary Guo <gary(a)garyguo.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Almeida <daniel.almeida(a)collabora.com>
Cc: Andrew Ballance <andrewjballance(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Bj��rn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh(a)protonmail.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Trevor Gross <tmgross(a)umich.edu>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
rust/kernel/maple_tree.rs | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/rust/kernel/maple_tree.rs~rust-maple_tree-rcu_read_lock-in-destructor-to-silence-lockdep
+++ a/rust/kernel/maple_tree.rs
@@ -265,7 +265,16 @@ impl<T: ForeignOwnable> MapleTree<T> {
loop {
// This uses the raw accessor because we're destroying pointers without removing them
// from the maple tree, which is only valid because this is the destructor.
- let ptr = ma_state.mas_find_raw(usize::MAX);
+ //
+ // Take the rcu lock because mas_find_raw() requires that you hold either the spinlock
+ // or the rcu read lock. This is only really required if memory reclaim might
+ // reallocate entries in the tree, as we otherwise have exclusive access. That feature
+ // doesn't exist yet, so for now, taking the rcu lock only serves the purpose of
+ // silencing lockdep.
+ let ptr = {
+ let _rcu = kernel::sync::rcu::Guard::new();
+ ma_state.mas_find_raw(usize::MAX)
+ };
if ptr.is_null() {
break;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from aliceryhl(a)google.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: tools/mm/page_owner_sort: fix timestamp comparison for stable sorting
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
tools-mm-page_owner_sort-fix-timestamp-comparison-for-stable-sorting.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Kaushlendra Kumar <kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com>
Subject: tools/mm/page_owner_sort: fix timestamp comparison for stable sorting
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:15:52 +0530
The ternary operator in compare_ts() returns 1 when timestamps are equal,
causing unstable sorting behavior. Replace with explicit three-way
comparison that returns 0 for equal timestamps, ensuring stable qsort
ordering and consistent output.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251209044552.3396468-1-kaushlendra.kumar@intel.…
Fixes: 8f9c447e2e2b ("tools/vm/page_owner_sort.c: support sorting pid and time")
Signed-off-by: Kaushlendra Kumar <kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com>
Cc: Chongxi Zhao <zhaochongxi2019(a)email.szu.edu.cn>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
tools/mm/page_owner_sort.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/tools/mm/page_owner_sort.c~tools-mm-page_owner_sort-fix-timestamp-comparison-for-stable-sorting
+++ a/tools/mm/page_owner_sort.c
@@ -181,7 +181,11 @@ static int compare_ts(const void *p1, co
{
const struct block_list *l1 = p1, *l2 = p2;
- return l1->ts_nsec < l2->ts_nsec ? -1 : 1;
+ if (l1->ts_nsec < l2->ts_nsec)
+ return -1;
+ if (l1->ts_nsec > l2->ts_nsec)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
}
static int compare_cull_condition(const void *p1, const void *p2)
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com are
tools-mm-thp_swap_allocator_test-fix-small-folio-alignment.patch
tools-mm-slabinfo-fix-partial-long-option-mapping.patch
The quilt patch titled
Subject: selftests/mm: fix thread state check in uffd-unit-tests
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
selftests-mm-fix-thread-state-check-in-uffd-unit-tests.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Wake Liu <wakel(a)google.com>
Subject: selftests/mm: fix thread state check in uffd-unit-tests
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2025 17:14:08 +0800
In the thread_state_get() function, the logic to find the thread's state
character was using `sizeof(header) - 1` to calculate the offset from the
"State:\t" string.
The `header` variable is a `const char *` pointer. `sizeof()` on a
pointer returns the size of the pointer itself, not the length of the
string literal it points to. This makes the code's behavior dependent on
the architecture's pointer size.
This bug was identified on a 32-bit ARM build (`gsi_tv_arm`) for Android,
running on an ARMv8-based device, compiled with Clang 19.0.1.
On this 32-bit architecture, `sizeof(char *)` is 4. The expression
`sizeof(header) - 1` resulted in an incorrect offset of 3, causing the
test to read the wrong character from `/proc/[tid]/status` and fail.
On 64-bit architectures, `sizeof(char *)` is 8, so the expression
coincidentally evaluates to 7, which matches the length of "State:\t".
This is why the bug likely remained hidden on 64-bit builds.
To fix this and make the code portable and correct across all
architectures, this patch replaces `sizeof(header) - 1` with
`strlen(header)`. The `strlen()` function correctly calculates the
string's length, ensuring the correct offset is always used.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251210091408.3781445-1-wakel@google.com
Fixes: f60b6634cd88 ("mm/selftests: add a test to verify mmap_changing race with -EAGAIN")
Signed-off-by: Wake Liu <wakel(a)google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Bill Wendling <morbo(a)google.com>
Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt(a)google.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c~selftests-mm-fix-thread-state-check-in-uffd-unit-tests
+++ a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c
@@ -1317,7 +1317,7 @@ static thread_state thread_state_get(pid
p = strstr(tmp, header);
if (p) {
/* For example, "State:\tD (disk sleep)" */
- c = *(p + sizeof(header) - 1);
+ c = *(p + strlen(header));
return c == 'D' ?
THR_STATE_UNINTERRUPTIBLE : THR_STATE_UNKNOWN;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from wakel(a)google.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: kernel/kexec: fix IMA when allocation happens in CMA area
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
kernel-kexec-fix-ima-when-allocation-happens-in-cma-area.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Pingfan Liu <piliu(a)redhat.com>
Subject: kernel/kexec: fix IMA when allocation happens in CMA area
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 09:48:52 +0800
*** Bug description ***
When I tested kexec with the latest kernel, I ran into the following warning:
[ 40.712410] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 40.712576] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1562 at kernel/kexec_core.c:1001 kimage_map_segment+0x144/0x198
[...]
[ 40.816047] Call trace:
[ 40.818498] kimage_map_segment+0x144/0x198 (P)
[ 40.823221] ima_kexec_post_load+0x58/0xc0
[ 40.827246] __do_sys_kexec_file_load+0x29c/0x368
[...]
[ 40.855423] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
*** How to reproduce ***
This bug is only triggered when the kexec target address is allocated in
the CMA area. If no CMA area is reserved in the kernel, use the "cma="
option in the kernel command line to reserve one.
*** Root cause ***
The commit 07d24902977e ("kexec: enable CMA based contiguous
allocation") allocates the kexec target address directly on the CMA area
to avoid copying during the jump. In this case, there is no IND_SOURCE
for the kexec segment. But the current implementation of
kimage_map_segment() assumes that IND_SOURCE pages exist and map them
into a contiguous virtual address by vmap().
*** Solution ***
If IMA segment is allocated in the CMA area, use its page_address()
directly.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251216014852.8737-2-piliu@redhat.com
Fixes: 07d24902977e ("kexec: enable CMA based contiguous allocation")
Signed-off-by: Pingfan Liu <piliu(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf(a)amazon.com>
Cc: Steven Chen <chenste(a)linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/kexec_core.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/kexec_core.c~kernel-kexec-fix-ima-when-allocation-happens-in-cma-area
+++ a/kernel/kexec_core.c
@@ -960,13 +960,17 @@ void *kimage_map_segment(struct kimage *
kimage_entry_t *ptr, entry;
struct page **src_pages;
unsigned int npages;
+ struct page *cma;
void *vaddr = NULL;
int i;
+ cma = image->segment_cma[idx];
+ if (cma)
+ return page_address(cma);
+
addr = image->segment[idx].mem;
size = image->segment[idx].memsz;
eaddr = addr + size;
-
/*
* Collect the source pages and map them in a contiguous VA range.
*/
@@ -1007,7 +1011,8 @@ void *kimage_map_segment(struct kimage *
void kimage_unmap_segment(void *segment_buffer)
{
- vunmap(segment_buffer);
+ if (is_vmalloc_addr(segment_buffer))
+ vunmap(segment_buffer);
}
struct kexec_load_limit {
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from piliu(a)redhat.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2025 19:00:11 +0000
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed on
systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. It
was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in the
following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Use the new vmalloc flag that disables random tag assignment in
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() - pass the same random tag to all the
vm_structs by tagging the pointers before they go inside
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(). Assigning a common tag resolves the pcpu
chunk address mismatch.
[akpm(a)linux-foundation.org: use WARN_ON_ONCE(), per Andrey]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+fCnZeuGdKSEm11oGT6FS71_vGq1vjq-xY36kxVdFvwmag2…
[maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com: remove unneeded pr_warn()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/919897daaaa3c982a27762a2ee038769ad033991.17649453…
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/873821114a9f722ffb5d6702b94782e902883fdf.17648745…
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com>
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/kasan/common.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag
+++ a/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -584,11 +584,26 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct
unsigned long size;
void *addr;
int area;
+ u8 tag;
- for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ /*
+ * If KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG was set at this point, all vms[] pointers
+ * would be unpoisoned with the KASAN_TAG_KERNEL which would disable
+ * KASAN checks down the line.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG))
+ return;
+
+ size = vms[0]->size;
+ addr = vms[0]->addr;
+ vms[0]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ tag = get_tag(vms[0]->addr);
+
+ for (area = 1 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
size = vms[area]->size;
- addr = vms[area]->addr;
- vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ addr = set_tag(vms[area]->addr, tag);
+ vms[area]->addr =
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags | KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);
}
}
#endif
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: kasan: refactor pcpu kasan vmalloc unpoison
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Subject: kasan: refactor pcpu kasan vmalloc unpoison
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2025 19:00:04 +0000
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed
on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes.
It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in
the following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Refactor code by reusing __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc in a new helper in
preparation for the actual fix.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/eb61d93b907e262eefcaa130261a08bcb6c5ce51.17648745…
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com>
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
mm/kasan/common.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +---
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h~kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison
+++ a/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -631,6 +631,16 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison
__kasan_poison_vmalloc(start, size);
}
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags);
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ if (kasan_enabled())
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, flags);
+}
+
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start,
@@ -655,6 +665,11 @@ static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmall
static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
{ }
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{ }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
#if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison
+++ a/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "kasan.h"
#include "../slab.h"
@@ -575,3 +576,19 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr
}
return true;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ unsigned long size;
+ void *addr;
+ int area;
+
+ for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ size = vms[area]->size;
+ addr = vms[area]->addr;
+ vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ }
+}
+#endif
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c~kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison
+++ a/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -5027,9 +5027,7 @@ retry:
* With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for
* non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
*/
- for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++)
- vms[area]->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(vms[area]->addr,
- vms[area]->size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
kfree(vas);
return vms;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm/kasan: fix incorrect unpoisoning in vrealloc for KASAN
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Subject: mm/kasan: fix incorrect unpoisoning in vrealloc for KASAN
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2025 18:59:55 +0000
Patch series "kasan: vmalloc: Fixes for the percpu allocator and
vrealloc", v3.
Patches fix two issues related to KASAN and vmalloc.
The first one, a KASAN tag mismatch, possibly resulting in a kernel panic,
can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with
multiple NUMA nodes. Initially it was only noticed on x86 [1] but later a
similar issue was also reported on arm64 [2].
Specifically the problem is related to how vm_structs interact with
pcpu_chunks - both when they are allocated, assigned and when pcpu_chunk
addresses are derived.
When vm_structs are allocated they are unpoisoned, each with a different
random tag, if vmalloc support is enabled along the KASAN mode. Later
when first pcpu chunk is allocated it gets its 'base_addr' field set to
the first allocated vm_struct. With that it inherits that vm_struct's
tag.
When pcpu_chunk addresses are later derived (by pcpu_chunk_addr(), for
example in pcpu_alloc_noprof()) the base_addr field is used and offsets
are added to it. If the initial conditions are satisfied then some of the
offsets will point into memory allocated with a different vm_struct. So
while the lower bits will get accurately derived the tag bits in the top
of the pointer won't match the shadow memory contents.
The solution (proposed at v2 of the x86 KASAN series [3]) is to unpoison
the vm_structs with the same tag when allocating them for the per cpu
allocator (in pcpu_get_vm_areas()).
The second one reported by syzkaller [4] is related to vrealloc and
happens because of random tag generation when unpoisoning memory without
allocating new pages. This breaks shadow memory tracking and needs to
reuse the existing tag instead of generating a new one. At the same time
an inconsistency in used flags is corrected.
This patch (of 3):
Syzkaller reported a memory out-of-bounds bug [4]. This patch fixes two
issues:
1. In vrealloc the KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC flag is missing when
unpoisoning the extended region. This flag is required to correctly
associate the allocation with KASAN's vmalloc tracking.
Note: In contrast, vzalloc (via __vmalloc_node_range_noprof)
explicitly sets KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC and calls
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() with it. vrealloc must behave consistently --
especially when reusing existing vmalloc regions -- to ensure KASAN can
track allocations correctly.
2. When vrealloc reuses an existing vmalloc region (without allocating
new pages) KASAN generates a new tag, which breaks tag-based memory
access tracking.
Introduce KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG, a new KASAN flag that allows reusing the
tag already attached to the pointer, ensuring consistent tag behavior
during reallocation.
Pass KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG and KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC to the
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc inside vrealloc_node_align_noprof().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1765978969.git.m.wieczorretman@pm.me
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/38dece0a4074c43e48150d1e242f8242c73bf1a5.17648745…
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e7e04692866d02e6d3b32bb43b998e5d17092ba4.173868… [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aMUrW1Znp1GEj7St@MiWiFi-R3L-srv/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAPAsAGxDRv_uFeMYu9TwhBVWHCCtkSxoWY4xmFB_vowMbi… [3]
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=997752115a851cb0cf36 [4]
Fixes: a0309faf1cb0 ("mm: vmalloc: support more granular vrealloc() sizing")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Co-developed-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+997752115a851cb0cf36(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68e243a2.050a0220.1696c6.007d.GAE@google.com/T/
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com>
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 1 +
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 2 +-
mm/kasan/shadow.c | 4 +++-
mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ typedef unsigned int __bitwise kasan_vma
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x01u)
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x02u)
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x04u)
+#define KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x08u)
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_PAGE_RANGE 0x1 /* Apply exsiting page range */
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_TLB_FLUSH 0x2 /* TLB flush */
--- a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const voi
return (void *)start;
}
- tag = kasan_random_tag();
+ tag = (flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG) ? get_tag(start) : kasan_random_tag();
start = set_tag(start, tag);
/* Unpoison and initialize memory up to size. */
--- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
@@ -631,7 +631,9 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const voi
!(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL))
return (void *)start;
- start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag());
+ if (unlikely(!(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG)))
+ start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag());
+
kasan_unpoison(start, size, false);
return (void *)start;
}
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -4331,7 +4331,9 @@ void *vrealloc_node_align_noprof(const v
*/
if (size <= alloced_size) {
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(p + old_size, size - old_size,
- KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL |
+ KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC |
+ KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);
/*
* No need to zero memory here, as unused memory will have
* already been zeroed at initial allocation time or during
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: idr: fix idr_alloc() returning an ID out of range
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
idr-fix-idr_alloc-returning-an-id-out-of-range.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy(a)infradead.org>
Subject: idr: fix idr_alloc() returning an ID out of range
Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 16:18:32 +0000
If you use an IDR with a non-zero base, and specify a range that lies
entirely below the base, 'max - base' becomes very large and
idr_get_free() can return an ID that lies outside of the requested range.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251128161853.3200058-1-willy@infradead.org
Fixes: 6ce711f27500 ("idr: Make 1-based IDRs more efficient")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org>
Reported-by: Jan Sokolowski <jan.sokolowski(a)intel.com>
Reported-by: Koen Koning <koen.koning(a)intel.com>
Reported-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna(a)linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/6449
Reviewed-by: Christian K��nig <christian.koenig(a)amd.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
lib/idr.c | 2 ++
tools/testing/radix-tree/idr-test.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
--- a/lib/idr.c~idr-fix-idr_alloc-returning-an-id-out-of-range
+++ a/lib/idr.c
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ int idr_alloc_u32(struct idr *idr, void
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(idr->idr_rt.xa_flags & ROOT_IS_IDR)))
idr->idr_rt.xa_flags |= IDR_RT_MARKER;
+ if (max < base)
+ return -ENOSPC;
id = (id < base) ? 0 : id - base;
radix_tree_iter_init(&iter, id);
--- a/tools/testing/radix-tree/idr-test.c~idr-fix-idr_alloc-returning-an-id-out-of-range
+++ a/tools/testing/radix-tree/idr-test.c
@@ -57,6 +57,26 @@ void idr_alloc_test(void)
idr_destroy(&idr);
}
+void idr_alloc2_test(void)
+{
+ int id;
+ struct idr idr = IDR_INIT_BASE(idr, 1);
+
+ id = idr_alloc(&idr, idr_alloc2_test, 0, 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ assert(id == -ENOSPC);
+
+ id = idr_alloc(&idr, idr_alloc2_test, 1, 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+ assert(id == 1);
+
+ id = idr_alloc(&idr, idr_alloc2_test, 0, 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ assert(id == -ENOSPC);
+
+ id = idr_alloc(&idr, idr_alloc2_test, 0, 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+ assert(id == -ENOSPC);
+
+ idr_destroy(&idr);
+}
+
void idr_replace_test(void)
{
DEFINE_IDR(idr);
@@ -409,6 +429,7 @@ void idr_checks(void)
idr_replace_test();
idr_alloc_test();
+ idr_alloc2_test();
idr_null_test();
idr_nowait_test();
idr_get_next_test(0);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from willy(a)infradead.org are
From: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida(a)redhat.com>
commit 4e13d3a9c25b7080f8a619f961e943fe08c2672c upstream.
As it was done in commit fc1092f51567 ("ipv4: Fix uninit-value access in
__ip_make_skb()") for IPv4, check FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH on fl6->flowi6_flags
instead of testing HDRINCL on the socket to avoid a race condition which
causes uninit-value access.
Fixes: ea30388baebc ("ipv6: Fix an uninit variable access bug in __ip6_make_skb()")
Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni(a)mvista.com>
---
Referred stable v6.1.y version of the patch to generate this one
[ v6.1 link: https://github.com/gregkh/linux/commit/a05c1ede50e9656f0752e523c7b54f3a3489… ]
---
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index 426330b8dfa4..99ee18b3a953 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1917,7 +1917,8 @@ struct sk_buff *__ip6_make_skb(struct sock *sk,
struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
u8 icmp6_type;
- if (sk->sk_socket->type == SOCK_RAW && !inet_sk(sk)->hdrincl)
+ if (sk->sk_socket->type == SOCK_RAW &&
+ !(fl6->flowi6_flags & FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH))
icmp6_type = fl6->fl6_icmp_type;
else
icmp6_type = icmp6_hdr(skb)->icmp6_type;
--
2.25.1
From: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida(a)redhat.com>
commit 4e13d3a9c25b7080f8a619f961e943fe08c2672c upstream.
As it was done in commit fc1092f51567 ("ipv4: Fix uninit-value access in
__ip_make_skb()") for IPv4, check FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH on fl6->flowi6_flags
instead of testing HDRINCL on the socket to avoid a race condition which
causes uninit-value access.
Fixes: ea30388baebc ("ipv6: Fix an uninit variable access bug in __ip6_make_skb()")
Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni(a)mvista.com>
---
Referred stable v6.1.y version of the patch to generate this one
[ v6.1 link: https://github.com/gregkh/linux/commit/a05c1ede50e9656f0752e523c7b54f3a3489… ]
---
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index 426330b8dfa4..99ee18b3a953 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1917,7 +1917,8 @@ struct sk_buff *__ip6_make_skb(struct sock *sk,
struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
u8 icmp6_type;
- if (sk->sk_socket->type == SOCK_RAW && !inet_sk(sk)->hdrincl)
+ if (sk->sk_socket->type == SOCK_RAW &&
+ !(fl6->flowi6_flags & FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH))
icmp6_type = fl6->fl6_icmp_type;
else
icmp6_type = icmp6_hdr(skb)->icmp6_type;
--
2.25.1
When a newly poisoned subpage ends up in an already poisoned hugetlb
folio, 'num_poisoned_pages' is incremented, but the per node ->mf_stats
is not. Fix the inconsistency by designating action_result() to update
them both.
While at it, define __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison() return values in terms
of symbol names for better readibility. Also rename
folio_set_hugetlb_hwpoison() to hugetlb_update_hwpoison() since the
function does more than the conventional bit setting and the fact
three possible return values are expected.
Fixes: 18f41fa616ee4 ("mm: memory-failure: bump memory failure stats to pglist_data")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu(a)oracle.com>
---
v2 -> v3:
No change.
v1 -> v2:
adapted David and Liam's comment, define __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison()
return values in terms of symbol names instead of naked integers for better
readibility. #define instead of enum is used since the function has footprint
outside MF, just try to limit the MF specifics local.
also renamed folio_set_hugetlb_hwpoison() to hugetlb_update_hwpoison()
since the function does more than the conventional bit setting and the
fact three possible return values are expected.
---
mm/memory-failure.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
index fbc5a01260c8..8b47e8a1b12d 100644
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -1883,12 +1883,18 @@ static unsigned long __folio_free_raw_hwp(struct folio *folio, bool move_flag)
return count;
}
-static int folio_set_hugetlb_hwpoison(struct folio *folio, struct page *page)
+#define MF_HUGETLB_ALREADY_POISONED 3 /* already poisoned */
+#define MF_HUGETLB_ACC_EXISTING_POISON 4 /* accessed existing poisoned page */
+/*
+ * Set hugetlb folio as hwpoisoned, update folio private raw hwpoison list
+ * to keep track of the poisoned pages.
+ */
+static int hugetlb_update_hwpoison(struct folio *folio, struct page *page)
{
struct llist_head *head;
struct raw_hwp_page *raw_hwp;
struct raw_hwp_page *p;
- int ret = folio_test_set_hwpoison(folio) ? -EHWPOISON : 0;
+ int ret = folio_test_set_hwpoison(folio) ? MF_HUGETLB_ALREADY_POISONED : 0;
/*
* Once the hwpoison hugepage has lost reliable raw error info,
@@ -1896,20 +1902,18 @@ static int folio_set_hugetlb_hwpoison(struct folio *folio, struct page *page)
* so skip to add additional raw error info.
*/
if (folio_test_hugetlb_raw_hwp_unreliable(folio))
- return -EHWPOISON;
+ return MF_HUGETLB_ALREADY_POISONED;
+
head = raw_hwp_list_head(folio);
llist_for_each_entry(p, head->first, node) {
if (p->page == page)
- return -EHWPOISON;
+ return MF_HUGETLB_ACC_EXISTING_POISON;
}
raw_hwp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct raw_hwp_page), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (raw_hwp) {
raw_hwp->page = page;
llist_add(&raw_hwp->node, head);
- /* the first error event will be counted in action_result(). */
- if (ret)
- num_poisoned_pages_inc(page_to_pfn(page));
} else {
/*
* Failed to save raw error info. We no longer trace all
@@ -1955,32 +1959,30 @@ void folio_clear_hugetlb_hwpoison(struct folio *folio)
folio_free_raw_hwp(folio, true);
}
+#define MF_HUGETLB_FREED 0 /* freed hugepage */
+#define MF_HUGETLB_IN_USED 1 /* in-use hugepage */
+#define MF_NOT_HUGETLB 2 /* not a hugepage */
+
/*
* Called from hugetlb code with hugetlb_lock held.
- *
- * Return values:
- * 0 - free hugepage
- * 1 - in-use hugepage
- * 2 - not a hugepage
- * -EBUSY - the hugepage is busy (try to retry)
- * -EHWPOISON - the hugepage is already hwpoisoned
*/
int __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
bool *migratable_cleared)
{
struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
struct folio *folio = page_folio(page);
- int ret = 2; /* fallback to normal page handling */
+ int ret = MF_NOT_HUGETLB;
bool count_increased = false;
+ int rc;
if (!folio_test_hugetlb(folio))
goto out;
if (flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED) {
- ret = 1;
+ ret = MF_HUGETLB_IN_USED;
count_increased = true;
} else if (folio_test_hugetlb_freed(folio)) {
- ret = 0;
+ ret = MF_HUGETLB_FREED;
} else if (folio_test_hugetlb_migratable(folio)) {
ret = folio_try_get(folio);
if (ret)
@@ -1991,8 +1993,9 @@ int __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
goto out;
}
- if (folio_set_hugetlb_hwpoison(folio, page)) {
- ret = -EHWPOISON;
+ rc = hugetlb_update_hwpoison(folio, page);
+ if (rc >= MF_HUGETLB_ALREADY_POISONED) {
+ ret = rc;
goto out;
}
@@ -2029,22 +2032,29 @@ static int try_memory_failure_hugetlb(unsigned long pfn, int flags, int *hugetlb
*hugetlb = 1;
retry:
res = get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(pfn, flags, &migratable_cleared);
- if (res == 2) { /* fallback to normal page handling */
+ switch (res) {
+ case MF_NOT_HUGETLB: /* fallback to normal page handling */
*hugetlb = 0;
return 0;
- } else if (res == -EHWPOISON) {
+ case MF_HUGETLB_ALREADY_POISONED:
+ case MF_HUGETLB_ACC_EXISTING_POISON:
if (flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED) {
folio = page_folio(p);
res = kill_accessing_process(current, folio_pfn(folio), flags);
}
- action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_ALREADY_POISONED, MF_FAILED);
+ if (res == MF_HUGETLB_ALREADY_POISONED)
+ action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_ALREADY_POISONED, MF_FAILED);
+ else
+ action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_HUGE, MF_FAILED);
return res;
- } else if (res == -EBUSY) {
+ case -EBUSY:
if (!(flags & MF_NO_RETRY)) {
flags |= MF_NO_RETRY;
goto retry;
}
return action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_GET_HWPOISON, MF_IGNORED);
+ default:
+ break;
}
folio = page_folio(p);
--
2.43.5
The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 0edc78b82bea85e1b2165d8e870a5c3535919695
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122351-chip-causal-80ed@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 0edc78b82bea85e1b2165d8e870a5c3535919695 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 22:50:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/msi: Make irq_retrigger() functional for posted MSI
Luigi reported that retriggering a posted MSI interrupt does not work
correctly.
The reason is that the retrigger happens at the vector domain by sending an
IPI to the actual vector on the target CPU. That works correctly exactly
once because the posted MSI interrupt chip does not issue an EOI as that's
only required for the posted MSI notification vector itself.
As a consequence the vector becomes stale in the ISR, which not only
affects this vector but also any lower priority vector in the affected
APIC because the ISR bit is not cleared.
Luigi proposed to set the vector in the remap PIR bitmap and raise the
posted MSI notification vector. That works, but that still does not cure a
related problem:
If there is ever a stray interrupt on such a vector, then the related
APIC ISR bit becomes stale due to the lack of EOI as described above.
Unlikely to happen, but if it happens it's not debuggable at all.
So instead of playing games with the PIR, this can be actually solved
for both cases by:
1) Keeping track of the posted interrupt vector handler state
2) Implementing a posted MSI specific irq_ack() callback which checks that
state. If the posted vector handler is inactive it issues an EOI,
otherwise it delegates that to the posted handler.
This is correct versus affinity changes and concurrent events on the posted
vector as the actual handler invocation is serialized through the interrupt
descriptor lock.
Fixes: ed1e48ea4370 ("iommu/vt-d: Enable posted mode for device MSIs")
Reported-by: Luigi Rizzo <lrizzo(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Luigi Rizzo <lrizzo(a)google.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251125214631.044440658@linutronix.de
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20251124104836.3685533-1-lrizzo@google.com
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/irq_remapping.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/irq_remapping.h
index 5a0d42464d44..4e55d1755846 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/irq_remapping.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/irq_remapping.h
@@ -87,4 +87,11 @@ static inline void panic_if_irq_remap(const char *msg)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IRQ_REMAP */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_POSTED_MSI
+void intel_ack_posted_msi_irq(struct irq_data *irqd);
+#else
+#define intel_ack_posted_msi_irq NULL
+#endif
+
#endif /* __X86_IRQ_REMAPPING_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
index 86f4e574de02..b2fe6181960c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
@@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC_SIMPLE(sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_nested_ipi)
/* Posted Interrupt Descriptors for coalesced MSIs to be posted */
DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct pi_desc, posted_msi_pi_desc);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(bool, posted_msi_handler_active);
void intel_posted_msi_init(void)
{
@@ -414,6 +415,25 @@ void intel_posted_msi_init(void)
this_cpu_write(posted_msi_pi_desc.ndst, destination);
}
+void intel_ack_posted_msi_irq(struct irq_data *irqd)
+{
+ irq_move_irq(irqd);
+
+ /*
+ * Handle the rare case that irq_retrigger() raised the actual
+ * assigned vector on the target CPU, which means that it was not
+ * invoked via the posted MSI handler below. In that case APIC EOI
+ * is required as otherwise the ISR entry becomes stale and lower
+ * priority interrupts are never going to be delivered after that.
+ *
+ * If the posted handler invoked the device interrupt handler then
+ * the EOI would be premature because it would acknowledge the
+ * posted vector.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!__this_cpu_read(posted_msi_handler_active)))
+ apic_eoi();
+}
+
static __always_inline bool handle_pending_pir(unsigned long *pir, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long pir_copy[NR_PIR_WORDS];
@@ -446,6 +466,8 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_posted_msi_notification)
pid = this_cpu_ptr(&posted_msi_pi_desc);
+ /* Mark the handler active for intel_ack_posted_msi_irq() */
+ __this_cpu_write(posted_msi_handler_active, true);
inc_irq_stat(posted_msi_notification_count);
irq_enter();
@@ -474,6 +496,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_posted_msi_notification)
apic_eoi();
irq_exit();
+ __this_cpu_write(posted_msi_handler_active, false);
set_irq_regs(old_regs);
}
#endif /* X86_POSTED_MSI */
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/irq_remapping.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/irq_remapping.c
index 4f9b01dc91e8..8bcbfe3d9c72 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/irq_remapping.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/irq_remapping.c
@@ -1303,17 +1303,17 @@ static struct irq_chip intel_ir_chip = {
* irq_enter();
* handle_edge_irq()
* irq_chip_ack_parent()
- * irq_move_irq(); // No EOI
+ * intel_ack_posted_msi_irq(); // No EOI
* handle_irq_event()
* driver_handler()
* handle_edge_irq()
* irq_chip_ack_parent()
- * irq_move_irq(); // No EOI
+ * intel_ack_posted_msi_irq(); // No EOI
* handle_irq_event()
* driver_handler()
* handle_edge_irq()
* irq_chip_ack_parent()
- * irq_move_irq(); // No EOI
+ * intel_ack_posted_msi_irq(); // No EOI
* handle_irq_event()
* driver_handler()
* apic_eoi()
@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ static struct irq_chip intel_ir_chip = {
*/
static struct irq_chip intel_ir_chip_post_msi = {
.name = "INTEL-IR-POST",
- .irq_ack = irq_move_irq,
+ .irq_ack = intel_ack_posted_msi_irq,
.irq_set_affinity = intel_ir_set_affinity,
.irq_compose_msi_msg = intel_ir_compose_msi_msg,
.irq_set_vcpu_affinity = intel_ir_set_vcpu_affinity,
The USB OTG port of the RK3308 exibits a bug when:
- configured as peripheral, and
- used in gadget mode, and
- the USB cable is connected since before booting
The symptom is: about 6 seconds after configuring gadget mode the device is
disconnected and then re-enumerated. This happens only once per boot.
Investigation showed that in this configuration the charger detection code
turns off the PHY after 6 seconds. Patch 1 avoids this when a cable is
connected (VBUS present).
After patch 1 the connection is stable but communication stops after 6
seconds. this is addressed by patch 2.
The topic had been discussed in [0]. Thanks Alan and Minas for the
discussion and Louis for having found the 1st issue, leading to patch 1.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250414185458.7767aabc@booty/
Luca
Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli(a)bootlin.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Patch 1: Fixed Co-developed-by: and SoB line order
- Added missing Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
- Added Théo's Reviewed-by
- Improved commit message
- Patch 2: trimmed discussion about "there is no disconnection" from
commit message to not distract from the actual issue (writes to
chg_det.opmode)
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250722-rk3308-fix-usb-gadget-phy-disconnect-v1-…
---
Louis Chauvet (1):
phy: rockchip: inno-usb2: fix disconnection in gadget mode
Luca Ceresoli (1):
phy: rockchip: inno-usb2: fix communication disruption in gadget mode
drivers/phy/rockchip/phy-rockchip-inno-usb2.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: cabb748c4b98ef67bbb088be61a2e0c850ebf70d
change-id: 20250718-rk3308-fix-usb-gadget-phy-disconnect-d7de71fb28b4
Best regards,
--
Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli(a)bootlin.com>
The mmio regmap that may be allocated during probe is never freed.
Switch to using the device managed allocator so that the regmap is
released on probe failures (e.g. probe deferral) and on driver unbind.
Fixes: 5ab90f40121a ("phy: ti: gmii-sel: Do not use syscon helper to build regmap")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.14
Cc: Andrew Davis <afd(a)ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/phy/ti/phy-gmii-sel.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/ti/phy-gmii-sel.c b/drivers/phy/ti/phy-gmii-sel.c
index 50adabb867cb..26209a89703a 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/ti/phy-gmii-sel.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/ti/phy-gmii-sel.c
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ static int phy_gmii_sel_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(base),
"failed to get base memory resource\n");
- priv->regmap = regmap_init_mmio(dev, base, &phy_gmii_sel_regmap_cfg);
+ priv->regmap = devm_regmap_init_mmio(dev, base, &phy_gmii_sel_regmap_cfg);
if (IS_ERR(priv->regmap))
return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(priv->regmap),
"Failed to get syscon\n");
--
2.51.2
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 3e54d3b4a8437b6783d4145c86962a2aa51022f3
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122306-hurry-upstream-964e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 3e54d3b4a8437b6783d4145c86962a2aa51022f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 19:26:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] can: gs_usb: gs_can_open(): fix error handling
Commit 2603be9e8167 ("can: gs_usb: gs_can_open(): improve error handling")
added missing error handling to the gs_can_open() function.
The driver uses 2 USB anchors to track the allocated URBs: the TX URBs in
struct gs_can::tx_submitted for each netdev and the RX URBs in struct
gs_usb::rx_submitted for the USB device. gs_can_open() allocates the RX
URBs, while TX URBs are allocated during gs_can_start_xmit().
The cleanup in gs_can_open() kills all anchored dev->tx_submitted
URBs (which is not necessary since the netdev is not yet registered), but
misses the parent->rx_submitted URBs.
Fix the problem by killing the rx_submitted instead of the tx_submitted.
Fixes: 2603be9e8167 ("can: gs_usb: gs_can_open(): improve error handling")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251210-gs_usb-fix-error-handling-v1-1-d6a5a03f10…
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
index e29e85b67fd4..a0233e550a5a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
@@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ static int gs_can_open(struct net_device *netdev)
usb_free_urb(urb);
out_usb_kill_anchored_urbs:
if (!parent->active_channels) {
- usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->tx_submitted);
+ usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&parent->rx_submitted);
if (dev->feature & GS_CAN_FEATURE_HW_TIMESTAMP)
gs_usb_timestamp_stop(parent);
From: Franz Schnyder <franz.schnyder(a)toradex.com>
Currently, the PHY only registers the typec orientation switch when it
is built in. If the typec driver is built as a module, the switch
registration is skipped due to the preprocessor condition, causing
orientation detection to fail.
With commit
45fe729be9a6 ("usb: typec: Stub out typec_switch APIs when CONFIG_TYPEC=n")
the preprocessor condition is not needed anymore and the orientation
switch is correctly registered for both built-in and module builds.
Fixes: b58f0f86fd61 ("phy: fsl-imx8mq-usb: add tca function driver for imx95")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Xu Yang <xu.yang_2(a)nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Franz Schnyder <franz.schnyder(a)toradex.com>
---
v2: Drop the preprocessor condition after a better suggestion.
Reviewed-by Neil tag not added as patch is different
---
drivers/phy/freescale/phy-fsl-imx8mq-usb.c | 14 --------------
1 file changed, 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/freescale/phy-fsl-imx8mq-usb.c b/drivers/phy/freescale/phy-fsl-imx8mq-usb.c
index b94f242420fc..72e8aff38b92 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/freescale/phy-fsl-imx8mq-usb.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/freescale/phy-fsl-imx8mq-usb.c
@@ -124,8 +124,6 @@ struct imx8mq_usb_phy {
static void tca_blk_orientation_set(struct tca_blk *tca,
enum typec_orientation orientation);
-#ifdef CONFIG_TYPEC
-
static int tca_blk_typec_switch_set(struct typec_switch_dev *sw,
enum typec_orientation orientation)
{
@@ -173,18 +171,6 @@ static void tca_blk_put_typec_switch(struct typec_switch_dev *sw)
typec_switch_unregister(sw);
}
-#else
-
-static struct typec_switch_dev *tca_blk_get_typec_switch(struct platform_device *pdev,
- struct imx8mq_usb_phy *imx_phy)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static void tca_blk_put_typec_switch(struct typec_switch_dev *sw) {}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_TYPEC */
-
static void tca_blk_orientation_set(struct tca_blk *tca,
enum typec_orientation orientation)
{
--
2.43.0
The patch titled
Subject: buildid: validate page-backed file before parsing build ID
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
buildid-validate-page-backed-file-before-parsing-build-id.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via various
branches at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there most days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Jinchao Wang <wangjinchao600(a)gmail.com>
Subject: buildid: validate page-backed file before parsing build ID
Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2025 18:32:07 +0800
__build_id_parse() only works on page-backed storage. Its helper paths
eventually call mapping->a_ops->read_folio(), so explicitly reject VMAs
that do not map a regular file or lack valid address_space operations.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251223103214.2412446-1-wangjinchao600@gmail.com
Fixes: ad41251c290d ("lib/buildid: implement sleepable build_id_parse() API")
Signed-off-by: Jinchao Wang <wangjinchao600(a)gmail.com>
Reported-by: <syzbot+e008db2ac01e282550ee(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Tested-by: <syzbot+e008db2ac01e282550ee(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/694a67ab.050a0220.19928e.001c.GAE@google.com
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/693540fe.a70a0220.38f243.004c.GAE@google.com
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen(a)google.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand (Red Hat) <david(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Wei Xu <weixugc(a)google.com>
Cc: Yuanchu Xie <yuanchu(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov(a)fb.com>
Cc: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkman <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo(a)google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa(a)kernel.org>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Song Liu <song(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf(a)fomichev.me>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
lib/buildid.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/lib/buildid.c~buildid-validate-page-backed-file-before-parsing-build-id
+++ a/lib/buildid.c
@@ -288,7 +288,10 @@ static int __build_id_parse(struct vm_ar
int ret;
/* only works for page backed storage */
- if (!vma->vm_file)
+ if (!vma->vm_file ||
+ !S_ISREG(file_inode(vma->vm_file)->i_mode) ||
+ !vma->vm_file->f_mapping->a_ops ||
+ !vma->vm_file->f_mapping->a_ops->read_folio)
return -EINVAL;
freader_init_from_file(&r, buf, sizeof(buf), vma->vm_file, may_fault);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from wangjinchao600(a)gmail.com are
buildid-validate-page-backed-file-before-parsing-build-id.patch
There is a use-after-free error in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces found
by syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112a78d98 by task kworker/0:5/5326
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5326 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events cfg80211_rfkill_block_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0
print_report+0xcd/0x630
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220
cfg80211_rfkill_block_work+0x1e/0x30
process_one_work+0x9cf/0x1b70
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10
kthread+0x3c5/0x780
ret_from_fork+0x56d/0x700
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
The problem arises due to the rfkill_block work is not cancelled when
cfg80211 device is being freed. In order to fix the issue cancel the
corresponding work before destroying rfkill in cfg80211_dev_free().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: 1f87f7d3a3b4 ("cfg80211: add rfkill support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniil Dulov <d.dulov(a)aladdin.ru>
---
net/wireless/core.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/wireless/core.c b/net/wireless/core.c
index 54a34d8d356e..e94f69205f50 100644
--- a/net/wireless/core.c
+++ b/net/wireless/core.c
@@ -1226,6 +1226,7 @@ void cfg80211_dev_free(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rdev->wiphy_work_lock, flags);
cancel_work_sync(&rdev->wiphy_work);
+ cancel_work_sync(&rdev->rfkill_block);
rfkill_destroy(rdev->wiphy.rfkill);
list_for_each_entry_safe(reg, treg, &rdev->beacon_registrations, list) {
list_del(®->list);
--
2.34.1
From: Rafael Beims <rafael.beims(a)toradex.com>
After U-Boot initializes PCIe with "pcie enum", Linux fails to detect
an NVMe disk on some boot cycles with:
phy phy-32f00000.pcie-phy.0: phy poweron failed --> -110
Discussion with NXP identified that the iMX8MP PCIe PHY PLL may fail to
lock when re-initialized without a reset cycle [1].
The issue reproduces on 7% of tested hardware platforms, with a 30-40%
failure rate per affected device across boot cycles.
Insert a reset cycle in the power-on routine to ensure the PHY is
initialized from a known state.
[1] https://community.nxp.com/t5/i-MX-Processors/iMX8MP-PCIe-initialization-in-…
Signed-off-by: Rafael Beims <rafael.beims(a)toradex.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/phy/freescale/phy-fsl-imx8m-pcie.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/freescale/phy-fsl-imx8m-pcie.c b/drivers/phy/freescale/phy-fsl-imx8m-pcie.c
index 68fcc8114d75..7f5600103a00 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/freescale/phy-fsl-imx8m-pcie.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/freescale/phy-fsl-imx8m-pcie.c
@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ static int imx8_pcie_phy_power_on(struct phy *phy)
writel(imx8_phy->tx_deemph_gen2,
imx8_phy->base + PCIE_PHY_TRSV_REG6);
break;
- case IMX8MP: /* Do nothing. */
+ case IMX8MP:
+ reset_control_assert(imx8_phy->reset);
break;
}
--
2.51.0
From: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj(a)bp.renesas.com>
Both rz_dmac_disable_hw() and rz_dmac_irq_handle_channel() update the
CHCTRL register. To avoid concurrency issues when configuring
functionalities exposed by this registers, take the virtual channel lock.
All other CHCTRL updates were already protected by the same lock.
Previously, rz_dmac_disable_hw() disabled and re-enabled local IRQs, before
accessing CHCTRL registers but this does not ensure race-free access.
Remove the local IRQ disable/enable code as well.
Fixes: 5000d37042a6 ("dmaengine: sh: Add DMAC driver for RZ/G2L SoC")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj(a)bp.renesas.com>
---
Changes in v6:
- update patch title and description
- in rz_dmac_irq_handle_channel() lock only around the
updates for the error path and continued using the vc lock
as this is the error path and the channel will anyway be
stopped; this avoids updating the code with another lock
as it was suggested in the review process of v5 and the code
remain simpler for a fix, w/o any impact on performance
Changes in v5:
- none, this patch is new
drivers/dma/sh/rz-dmac.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/dma/sh/rz-dmac.c b/drivers/dma/sh/rz-dmac.c
index c8e3d9f77b8a..818d1ef6f0bf 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/sh/rz-dmac.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/sh/rz-dmac.c
@@ -298,13 +298,10 @@ static void rz_dmac_disable_hw(struct rz_dmac_chan *channel)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = &channel->vc.chan;
struct rz_dmac *dmac = to_rz_dmac(chan->device);
- unsigned long flags;
dev_dbg(dmac->dev, "%s channel %d\n", __func__, channel->index);
- local_irq_save(flags);
rz_dmac_ch_writel(channel, CHCTRL_DEFAULT, CHCTRL, 1);
- local_irq_restore(flags);
}
static void rz_dmac_set_dmars_register(struct rz_dmac *dmac, int nr, u32 dmars)
@@ -569,8 +566,8 @@ static int rz_dmac_terminate_all(struct dma_chan *chan)
unsigned int i;
LIST_HEAD(head);
- rz_dmac_disable_hw(channel);
spin_lock_irqsave(&channel->vc.lock, flags);
+ rz_dmac_disable_hw(channel);
for (i = 0; i < DMAC_NR_LMDESC; i++)
lmdesc[i].header = 0;
@@ -707,7 +704,9 @@ static void rz_dmac_irq_handle_channel(struct rz_dmac_chan *channel)
if (chstat & CHSTAT_ER) {
dev_err(dmac->dev, "DMAC err CHSTAT_%d = %08X\n",
channel->index, chstat);
- rz_dmac_ch_writel(channel, CHCTRL_DEFAULT, CHCTRL, 1);
+
+ scoped_guard(spinlock_irqsave, &channel->vc.lock)
+ rz_dmac_ch_writel(channel, CHCTRL_DEFAULT, CHCTRL, 1);
goto done;
}
--
2.43.0