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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mtd: rawnand: stm32_fmc2: avoid overlapping mappings on ECC" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 513c40e59d5a414ab763a9c84797534b5e8c208d # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091309-quote-graves-e875@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 513c40e59d5a414ab763a9c84797534b5e8c208d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Kerello <christophe.kerello(a)foss.st.com> Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2025 09:26:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mtd: rawnand: stm32_fmc2: avoid overlapping mappings on ECC buffer Avoid below overlapping mappings by using a contiguous non-cacheable buffer. [ 4.077708] DMA-API: stm32_fmc2_nfc 48810000.nand-controller: cacheline tracking EEXIST, overlapping mappings aren't supported [ 4.089103] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 44 at kernel/dma/debug.c:568 add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.097071] Modules linked in: [ 4.100101] CPU: 1 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 6.1.82 #1 [ 4.106346] Hardware name: STMicroelectronics STM32MP257F VALID1 SNOR / MB1704 (LPDDR4 Power discrete) + MB1703 + MB1708 (SNOR MB1730) (DT) [ 4.118824] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 4.124674] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 4.131624] pc : add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.135658] lr : add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.139792] sp : ffff800009dbb490 [ 4.143016] x29: ffff800009dbb4a0 x28: 0000000004008022 x27: ffff8000098a6000 [ 4.150174] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff8000099e7000 x24: ffff8000099e7de8 [ 4.157231] x23: 00000000ffffffff x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff8000098a6a20 [ 4.164388] x20: ffff000080964180 x19: ffff800009819ba0 x18: 0000000000000006 [ 4.171545] x17: 6361727420656e69 x16: 6c6568636163203a x15: 72656c6c6f72746e [ 4.178602] x14: 6f632d646e616e2e x13: ffff800009832f58 x12: 00000000000004ec [ 4.185759] x11: 00000000000001a4 x10: ffff80000988af58 x9 : ffff800009832f58 [ 4.192916] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff80000988af58 x6 : 80000000fffff000 [ 4.199972] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 4.207128] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000812d2c40 [ 4.214185] Call trace: [ 4.216605] add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.220338] debug_dma_map_sg+0x198/0x350 [ 4.224373] __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xa0/0x110 [ 4.228411] dma_map_sg_attrs+0x10/0x2c [ 4.232247] stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer.isra.0+0x1c8/0x3fc [ 4.237088] stm32_fmc2_nfc_seq_read_page+0xc8/0x174 [ 4.242127] nand_read_oob+0x1d4/0x8e0 [ 4.245861] mtd_read_oob_std+0x58/0x84 [ 4.249596] mtd_read_oob+0x90/0x150 [ 4.253231] mtd_read+0x68/0xac Signed-off-by: Christophe Kerello <christophe.kerello(a)foss.st.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2cd457f328c1 ("mtd: rawnand: stm32_fmc2: add STM32 FMC2 NAND flash controller driver") Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal(a)bootlin.com> diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/stm32_fmc2_nand.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/stm32_fmc2_nand.c index a960403081f1..222c3c3b6848 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/stm32_fmc2_nand.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/stm32_fmc2_nand.c @@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ struct stm32_fmc2_nfc { struct sg_table dma_data_sg; struct sg_table dma_ecc_sg; u8 *ecc_buf; + dma_addr_t dma_ecc_addr; int dma_ecc_len; u32 tx_dma_max_burst; u32 rx_dma_max_burst; @@ -902,17 +903,10 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, if (!write_data && !raw) { /* Configure DMA ECC status */ - p = nfc->ecc_buf; for_each_sg(nfc->dma_ecc_sg.sgl, sg, eccsteps, s) { - sg_set_buf(sg, p, nfc->dma_ecc_len); - p += nfc->dma_ecc_len; - } - - ret = dma_map_sg(nfc->dev, nfc->dma_ecc_sg.sgl, - eccsteps, dma_data_dir); - if (!ret) { - ret = -EIO; - goto err_unmap_data; + sg_dma_address(sg) = nfc->dma_ecc_addr + + s * nfc->dma_ecc_len; + sg_dma_len(sg) = nfc->dma_ecc_len; } desc_ecc = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(nfc->dma_ecc_ch, @@ -921,7 +915,7 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT); if (!desc_ecc) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto err_unmap_ecc; + goto err_unmap_data; } reinit_completion(&nfc->dma_ecc_complete); @@ -929,7 +923,7 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, desc_ecc->callback_param = &nfc->dma_ecc_complete; ret = dma_submit_error(dmaengine_submit(desc_ecc)); if (ret) - goto err_unmap_ecc; + goto err_unmap_data; dma_async_issue_pending(nfc->dma_ecc_ch); } @@ -949,7 +943,7 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, if (!write_data && !raw) dmaengine_terminate_all(nfc->dma_ecc_ch); ret = -ETIMEDOUT; - goto err_unmap_ecc; + goto err_unmap_data; } /* Wait DMA data transfer completion */ @@ -969,11 +963,6 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, } } -err_unmap_ecc: - if (!write_data && !raw) - dma_unmap_sg(nfc->dev, nfc->dma_ecc_sg.sgl, - eccsteps, dma_data_dir); - err_unmap_data: dma_unmap_sg(nfc->dev, nfc->dma_data_sg.sgl, eccsteps, dma_data_dir); @@ -1610,7 +1599,8 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_dma_setup(struct stm32_fmc2_nfc *nfc) return ret; /* Allocate a buffer to store ECC status registers */ - nfc->ecc_buf = devm_kzalloc(nfc->dev, FMC2_MAX_ECC_BUF_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); + nfc->ecc_buf = dmam_alloc_coherent(nfc->dev, FMC2_MAX_ECC_BUF_LEN, + &nfc->dma_ecc_addr, GFP_KERNEL); if (!nfc->ecc_buf) return -ENOMEM;

1 day, 12 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mtd: nand: raw: atmel: Respect tAR, tCLR in read setup timing" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x fd779eac2d659668be4d3dbdac0710afd5d6db12 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091346-museum-immunity-ab3d@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From fd779eac2d659668be4d3dbdac0710afd5d6db12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 14:00:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mtd: nand: raw: atmel: Respect tAR, tCLR in read setup timing Having setup time 0 violates tAR, tCLR of some chips, for instance TOSHIBA TC58NVG2S3ETAI0 cannot be detected successfully (first ID byte being read duplicated, i.e. 98 98 dc 90 15 76 14 03 instead of 98 dc 90 15 76 ...). Atmel Application Notes postulated 1 cycle NRD_SETUP without explanation [1], but it looks more appropriate to just calculate setup time properly. [1] Link: https://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/aemDocuments/documents/MPU32/Applicatio… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: f9ce2eddf176 ("mtd: nand: atmel: Add ->setup_data_interface() hooks") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> Tested-by: Alexander Dahl <ada(a)thorsis.com> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal(a)bootlin.com> diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c index 84ab4a83cbd6..db94d14a3807 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c @@ -1377,14 +1377,24 @@ static int atmel_smc_nand_prepare_smcconf(struct atmel_nand *nand, if (ret) return ret; + /* + * Read setup timing depends on the operation done on the NAND: + * + * NRD_SETUP = max(tAR, tCLR) + */ + timeps = max(conf->timings.sdr.tAR_min, conf->timings.sdr.tCLR_min); + ncycles = DIV_ROUND_UP(timeps, mckperiodps); + totalcycles += ncycles; + ret = atmel_smc_cs_conf_set_setup(smcconf, ATMEL_SMC_NRD_SHIFT, ncycles); + if (ret) + return ret; + /* * The read cycle timing is directly matching tRC, but is also * dependent on the setup and hold timings we calculated earlier, * which gives: * - * NRD_CYCLE = max(tRC, NRD_PULSE + NRD_HOLD) - * - * NRD_SETUP is always 0. + * NRD_CYCLE = max(tRC, NRD_SETUP + NRD_PULSE + NRD_HOLD) */ ncycles = DIV_ROUND_UP(conf->timings.sdr.tRC_min, mckperiodps); ncycles = max(totalcycles, ncycles);

1 day, 12 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mtd: nand: raw: atmel: Respect tAR, tCLR in read setup timing" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x fd779eac2d659668be4d3dbdac0710afd5d6db12 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091346-coral-alphabet-9d67@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From fd779eac2d659668be4d3dbdac0710afd5d6db12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 14:00:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mtd: nand: raw: atmel: Respect tAR, tCLR in read setup timing Having setup time 0 violates tAR, tCLR of some chips, for instance TOSHIBA TC58NVG2S3ETAI0 cannot be detected successfully (first ID byte being read duplicated, i.e. 98 98 dc 90 15 76 14 03 instead of 98 dc 90 15 76 ...). Atmel Application Notes postulated 1 cycle NRD_SETUP without explanation [1], but it looks more appropriate to just calculate setup time properly. [1] Link: https://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/aemDocuments/documents/MPU32/Applicatio… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: f9ce2eddf176 ("mtd: nand: atmel: Add ->setup_data_interface() hooks") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> Tested-by: Alexander Dahl <ada(a)thorsis.com> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal(a)bootlin.com> diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c index 84ab4a83cbd6..db94d14a3807 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c @@ -1377,14 +1377,24 @@ static int atmel_smc_nand_prepare_smcconf(struct atmel_nand *nand, if (ret) return ret; + /* + * Read setup timing depends on the operation done on the NAND: + * + * NRD_SETUP = max(tAR, tCLR) + */ + timeps = max(conf->timings.sdr.tAR_min, conf->timings.sdr.tCLR_min); + ncycles = DIV_ROUND_UP(timeps, mckperiodps); + totalcycles += ncycles; + ret = atmel_smc_cs_conf_set_setup(smcconf, ATMEL_SMC_NRD_SHIFT, ncycles); + if (ret) + return ret; + /* * The read cycle timing is directly matching tRC, but is also * dependent on the setup and hold timings we calculated earlier, * which gives: * - * NRD_CYCLE = max(tRC, NRD_PULSE + NRD_HOLD) - * - * NRD_SETUP is always 0. + * NRD_CYCLE = max(tRC, NRD_SETUP + NRD_PULSE + NRD_HOLD) */ ncycles = DIV_ROUND_UP(conf->timings.sdr.tRC_min, mckperiodps); ncycles = max(totalcycles, ncycles);

1 day, 13 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mtd: rawnand: stm32_fmc2: avoid overlapping mappings on ECC" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 513c40e59d5a414ab763a9c84797534b5e8c208d # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091308-trio-unedited-6b17@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 513c40e59d5a414ab763a9c84797534b5e8c208d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Kerello <christophe.kerello(a)foss.st.com> Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2025 09:26:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mtd: rawnand: stm32_fmc2: avoid overlapping mappings on ECC buffer Avoid below overlapping mappings by using a contiguous non-cacheable buffer. [ 4.077708] DMA-API: stm32_fmc2_nfc 48810000.nand-controller: cacheline tracking EEXIST, overlapping mappings aren't supported [ 4.089103] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 44 at kernel/dma/debug.c:568 add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.097071] Modules linked in: [ 4.100101] CPU: 1 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 6.1.82 #1 [ 4.106346] Hardware name: STMicroelectronics STM32MP257F VALID1 SNOR / MB1704 (LPDDR4 Power discrete) + MB1703 + MB1708 (SNOR MB1730) (DT) [ 4.118824] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 4.124674] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 4.131624] pc : add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.135658] lr : add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.139792] sp : ffff800009dbb490 [ 4.143016] x29: ffff800009dbb4a0 x28: 0000000004008022 x27: ffff8000098a6000 [ 4.150174] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff8000099e7000 x24: ffff8000099e7de8 [ 4.157231] x23: 00000000ffffffff x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff8000098a6a20 [ 4.164388] x20: ffff000080964180 x19: ffff800009819ba0 x18: 0000000000000006 [ 4.171545] x17: 6361727420656e69 x16: 6c6568636163203a x15: 72656c6c6f72746e [ 4.178602] x14: 6f632d646e616e2e x13: ffff800009832f58 x12: 00000000000004ec [ 4.185759] x11: 00000000000001a4 x10: ffff80000988af58 x9 : ffff800009832f58 [ 4.192916] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff80000988af58 x6 : 80000000fffff000 [ 4.199972] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 4.207128] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000812d2c40 [ 4.214185] Call trace: [ 4.216605] add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.220338] debug_dma_map_sg+0x198/0x350 [ 4.224373] __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xa0/0x110 [ 4.228411] dma_map_sg_attrs+0x10/0x2c [ 4.232247] stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer.isra.0+0x1c8/0x3fc [ 4.237088] stm32_fmc2_nfc_seq_read_page+0xc8/0x174 [ 4.242127] nand_read_oob+0x1d4/0x8e0 [ 4.245861] mtd_read_oob_std+0x58/0x84 [ 4.249596] mtd_read_oob+0x90/0x150 [ 4.253231] mtd_read+0x68/0xac Signed-off-by: Christophe Kerello <christophe.kerello(a)foss.st.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2cd457f328c1 ("mtd: rawnand: stm32_fmc2: add STM32 FMC2 NAND flash controller driver") Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal(a)bootlin.com> diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/stm32_fmc2_nand.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/stm32_fmc2_nand.c index a960403081f1..222c3c3b6848 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/stm32_fmc2_nand.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/stm32_fmc2_nand.c @@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ struct stm32_fmc2_nfc { struct sg_table dma_data_sg; struct sg_table dma_ecc_sg; u8 *ecc_buf; + dma_addr_t dma_ecc_addr; int dma_ecc_len; u32 tx_dma_max_burst; u32 rx_dma_max_burst; @@ -902,17 +903,10 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, if (!write_data && !raw) { /* Configure DMA ECC status */ - p = nfc->ecc_buf; for_each_sg(nfc->dma_ecc_sg.sgl, sg, eccsteps, s) { - sg_set_buf(sg, p, nfc->dma_ecc_len); - p += nfc->dma_ecc_len; - } - - ret = dma_map_sg(nfc->dev, nfc->dma_ecc_sg.sgl, - eccsteps, dma_data_dir); - if (!ret) { - ret = -EIO; - goto err_unmap_data; + sg_dma_address(sg) = nfc->dma_ecc_addr + + s * nfc->dma_ecc_len; + sg_dma_len(sg) = nfc->dma_ecc_len; } desc_ecc = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(nfc->dma_ecc_ch, @@ -921,7 +915,7 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT); if (!desc_ecc) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto err_unmap_ecc; + goto err_unmap_data; } reinit_completion(&nfc->dma_ecc_complete); @@ -929,7 +923,7 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, desc_ecc->callback_param = &nfc->dma_ecc_complete; ret = dma_submit_error(dmaengine_submit(desc_ecc)); if (ret) - goto err_unmap_ecc; + goto err_unmap_data; dma_async_issue_pending(nfc->dma_ecc_ch); } @@ -949,7 +943,7 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, if (!write_data && !raw) dmaengine_terminate_all(nfc->dma_ecc_ch); ret = -ETIMEDOUT; - goto err_unmap_ecc; + goto err_unmap_data; } /* Wait DMA data transfer completion */ @@ -969,11 +963,6 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer(struct nand_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, } } -err_unmap_ecc: - if (!write_data && !raw) - dma_unmap_sg(nfc->dev, nfc->dma_ecc_sg.sgl, - eccsteps, dma_data_dir); - err_unmap_data: dma_unmap_sg(nfc->dev, nfc->dma_data_sg.sgl, eccsteps, dma_data_dir); @@ -1610,7 +1599,8 @@ static int stm32_fmc2_nfc_dma_setup(struct stm32_fmc2_nfc *nfc) return ret; /* Allocate a buffer to store ECC status registers */ - nfc->ecc_buf = devm_kzalloc(nfc->dev, FMC2_MAX_ECC_BUF_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); + nfc->ecc_buf = dmam_alloc_coherent(nfc->dev, FMC2_MAX_ECC_BUF_LEN, + &nfc->dma_ecc_addr, GFP_KERNEL); if (!nfc->ecc_buf) return -ENOMEM;

1 day, 13 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mtd: nand: raw: atmel: Respect tAR, tCLR in read setup timing" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x fd779eac2d659668be4d3dbdac0710afd5d6db12 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091345-prewar-jump-dad8@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From fd779eac2d659668be4d3dbdac0710afd5d6db12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 14:00:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mtd: nand: raw: atmel: Respect tAR, tCLR in read setup timing Having setup time 0 violates tAR, tCLR of some chips, for instance TOSHIBA TC58NVG2S3ETAI0 cannot be detected successfully (first ID byte being read duplicated, i.e. 98 98 dc 90 15 76 14 03 instead of 98 dc 90 15 76 ...). Atmel Application Notes postulated 1 cycle NRD_SETUP without explanation [1], but it looks more appropriate to just calculate setup time properly. [1] Link: https://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/aemDocuments/documents/MPU32/Applicatio… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: f9ce2eddf176 ("mtd: nand: atmel: Add ->setup_data_interface() hooks") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> Tested-by: Alexander Dahl <ada(a)thorsis.com> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal(a)bootlin.com> diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c index 84ab4a83cbd6..db94d14a3807 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c @@ -1377,14 +1377,24 @@ static int atmel_smc_nand_prepare_smcconf(struct atmel_nand *nand, if (ret) return ret; + /* + * Read setup timing depends on the operation done on the NAND: + * + * NRD_SETUP = max(tAR, tCLR) + */ + timeps = max(conf->timings.sdr.tAR_min, conf->timings.sdr.tCLR_min); + ncycles = DIV_ROUND_UP(timeps, mckperiodps); + totalcycles += ncycles; + ret = atmel_smc_cs_conf_set_setup(smcconf, ATMEL_SMC_NRD_SHIFT, ncycles); + if (ret) + return ret; + /* * The read cycle timing is directly matching tRC, but is also * dependent on the setup and hold timings we calculated earlier, * which gives: * - * NRD_CYCLE = max(tRC, NRD_PULSE + NRD_HOLD) - * - * NRD_SETUP is always 0. + * NRD_CYCLE = max(tRC, NRD_SETUP + NRD_PULSE + NRD_HOLD) */ ncycles = DIV_ROUND_UP(conf->timings.sdr.tRC_min, mckperiodps); ncycles = max(totalcycles, ncycles);

1 day, 13 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] netlink: specs: mptcp: fix if-idx attribute type" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 7094b84863e5832cb1cd9c4b9d648904775b6bd9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091346-avenue-afterglow-5b42@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 7094b84863e5832cb1cd9c4b9d648904775b6bd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2025 23:27:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] netlink: specs: mptcp: fix if-idx attribute type This attribute is used as a signed number in the code in pm_netlink.c: nla_put_s32(skb, MPTCP_ATTR_IF_IDX, ssk->sk_bound_dev_if)) The specs should then reflect that. Note that other 'if-idx' attributes from the same .yaml file use a signed number as well. Fixes: bc8aeb2045e2 ("Documentation: netlink: add a YAML spec for mptcp") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250908-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-17-rc5-v1-1-5f2168… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/Documentation/netlink/specs/mptcp_pm.yaml b/Documentation/netlink/specs/mptcp_pm.yaml index 02f1ddcfbf1c..d15335684ec3 100644 --- a/Documentation/netlink/specs/mptcp_pm.yaml +++ b/Documentation/netlink/specs/mptcp_pm.yaml @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ attribute-sets: type: u32 - name: if-idx - type: u32 + type: s32 - name: reset-reason type: u32

1 day, 13 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: fix corruption reading compressed range when block" failed to apply to 6.16-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.16-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.16.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9786531399a679fc2f4630d2c0a186205282ab2f # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091344-hardly-system-b1fb@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.16.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9786531399a679fc2f4630d2c0a186205282ab2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2025 16:06:13 +0930 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: fix corruption reading compressed range when block size is smaller than page size [BUG] With 64K page size (aarch64 with 64K page size config) and 4K btrfs block size, the following workload can easily lead to a corrupted read: mkfs.btrfs -f -s 4k $dev > /dev/null mount -o compress $dev $mnt xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 64k" $mnt/base > /dev/null echo "correct result:" od -Ad -t x1 $mnt/base xfs_io -f -c "reflink $mnt/base 32k 0 32k" \ -c "reflink $mnt/base 0 32k 32k" \ -c "pwrite -S 0xff 60k 4k" $mnt/new > /dev/null echo "incorrect result:" od -Ad -t x1 $mnt/new umount $mnt This shows the following result: correct result: 0000000 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff * 0065536 incorrect result: 0000000 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff * 0032768 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 * 0061440 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff * 0065536 Notice the zero in the range [32K, 60K), which is incorrect. [CAUSE] With extra trace printk, it shows the following events during od: (some unrelated info removed like CPU and context) od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: enter r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) prev_em_start=0000000000000000 The "r/i" is indicating the root and inode number. In our case the file "new" is using ino 258 from fs tree (root 5). Here notice the @prev_em_start pointer is NULL. This means the btrfs_do_readpage() is called from btrfs_read_folio(), not from btrfs_readahead(). od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=0 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=4096 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=8192 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=12288 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=16384 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=20480 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=24576 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=28672 got em start=0 len=32768 These above 32K blocks will be read from the first half of the compressed data extent. od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=32768 got em start=32768 len=32768 Note here there is no btrfs_submit_compressed_read() call. Which is incorrect now. Although both extent maps at 0 and 32K are pointing to the same compressed data, their offsets are different thus can not be merged into the same read. So this means the compressed data read merge check is doing something wrong. od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=36864 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=40960 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=45056 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=49152 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=53248 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=57344 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=61440 skip uptodate od-3457 btrfs_submit_compressed_read: cb orig_bio: file off=0 len=61440 The function btrfs_submit_compressed_read() is only called at the end of folio read. The compressed bio will only have an extent map of range [0, 32K), but the original bio passed in is for the whole 64K folio. This will cause the decompression part to only fill the first 32K, leaving the rest untouched (aka, filled with zero). This incorrect compressed read merge leads to the above data corruption. There were similar problems that happened in the past, commit 808f80b46790 ("Btrfs: update fix for read corruption of compressed and shared extents") is doing pretty much the same fix for readahead. But that's back to 2015, where btrfs still only supports bs (block size) == ps (page size) cases. This means btrfs_do_readpage() only needs to handle a folio which contains exactly one block. Only btrfs_readahead() can lead to a read covering multiple blocks. Thus only btrfs_readahead() passes a non-NULL @prev_em_start pointer. With v5.15 kernel btrfs introduced bs < ps support. This breaks the above assumption that a folio can only contain one block. Now btrfs_read_folio() can also read multiple blocks in one go. But btrfs_read_folio() doesn't pass a @prev_em_start pointer, thus the existing bio force submission check will never be triggered. In theory, this can also happen for btrfs with large folios, but since large folio is still experimental, we don't need to bother it, thus only bs < ps support is affected for now. [FIX] Instead of passing @prev_em_start to do the proper compressed extent check, introduce one new member, btrfs_bio_ctrl::last_em_start, so that the existing bio force submission logic will always be triggered. CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c index c953297aa89a..b21cb72835cc 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c @@ -111,6 +111,24 @@ struct btrfs_bio_ctrl { */ unsigned long submit_bitmap; struct readahead_control *ractl; + + /* + * The start offset of the last used extent map by a read operation. + * + * This is for proper compressed read merge. + * U64_MAX means we are starting the read and have made no progress yet. + * + * The current btrfs_bio_is_contig() only uses disk_bytenr as + * the condition to check if the read can be merged with previous + * bio, which is not correct. E.g. two file extents pointing to the + * same extent but with different offset. + * + * So here we need to do extra checks to only merge reads that are + * covered by the same extent map. + * Just extent_map::start will be enough, as they are unique + * inside the same inode. + */ + u64 last_em_start; }; static void submit_one_bio(struct btrfs_bio_ctrl *bio_ctrl) @@ -909,7 +927,7 @@ static void btrfs_readahead_expand(struct readahead_control *ractl, * return 0 on success, otherwise return error */ static int btrfs_do_readpage(struct folio *folio, struct extent_map **em_cached, - struct btrfs_bio_ctrl *bio_ctrl, u64 *prev_em_start) + struct btrfs_bio_ctrl *bio_ctrl) { struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host; struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = inode_to_fs_info(inode); @@ -1019,12 +1037,11 @@ static int btrfs_do_readpage(struct folio *folio, struct extent_map **em_cached, * non-optimal behavior (submitting 2 bios for the same extent). */ if (compress_type != BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE && - prev_em_start && *prev_em_start != (u64)-1 && - *prev_em_start != em->start) + bio_ctrl->last_em_start != U64_MAX && + bio_ctrl->last_em_start != em->start) force_bio_submit = true; - if (prev_em_start) - *prev_em_start = em->start; + bio_ctrl->last_em_start = em->start; btrfs_free_extent_map(em); em = NULL; @@ -1238,12 +1255,15 @@ int btrfs_read_folio(struct file *file, struct folio *folio) const u64 start = folio_pos(folio); const u64 end = start + folio_size(folio) - 1; struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL; - struct btrfs_bio_ctrl bio_ctrl = { .opf = REQ_OP_READ }; + struct btrfs_bio_ctrl bio_ctrl = { + .opf = REQ_OP_READ, + .last_em_start = U64_MAX, + }; struct extent_map *em_cached = NULL; int ret; lock_extents_for_read(inode, start, end, &cached_state); - ret = btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl, NULL); + ret = btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl); btrfs_unlock_extent(&inode->io_tree, start, end, &cached_state); btrfs_free_extent_map(em_cached); @@ -2583,7 +2603,8 @@ void btrfs_readahead(struct readahead_control *rac) { struct btrfs_bio_ctrl bio_ctrl = { .opf = REQ_OP_READ | REQ_RAHEAD, - .ractl = rac + .ractl = rac, + .last_em_start = U64_MAX, }; struct folio *folio; struct btrfs_inode *inode = BTRFS_I(rac->mapping->host); @@ -2591,12 +2612,11 @@ void btrfs_readahead(struct readahead_control *rac) const u64 end = start + readahead_length(rac) - 1; struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL; struct extent_map *em_cached = NULL; - u64 prev_em_start = (u64)-1; lock_extents_for_read(inode, start, end, &cached_state); while ((folio = readahead_folio(rac)) != NULL) - btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl, &prev_em_start); + btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl); btrfs_unlock_extent(&inode->io_tree, start, end, &cached_state);

1 day, 14 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mtd: nand: raw: atmel: Respect tAR, tCLR in read setup timing" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x fd779eac2d659668be4d3dbdac0710afd5d6db12 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091345-disinfect-afterlife-38dd@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From fd779eac2d659668be4d3dbdac0710afd5d6db12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 14:00:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mtd: nand: raw: atmel: Respect tAR, tCLR in read setup timing Having setup time 0 violates tAR, tCLR of some chips, for instance TOSHIBA TC58NVG2S3ETAI0 cannot be detected successfully (first ID byte being read duplicated, i.e. 98 98 dc 90 15 76 14 03 instead of 98 dc 90 15 76 ...). Atmel Application Notes postulated 1 cycle NRD_SETUP without explanation [1], but it looks more appropriate to just calculate setup time properly. [1] Link: https://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/aemDocuments/documents/MPU32/Applicatio… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: f9ce2eddf176 ("mtd: nand: atmel: Add ->setup_data_interface() hooks") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> Tested-by: Alexander Dahl <ada(a)thorsis.com> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal(a)bootlin.com> diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c index 84ab4a83cbd6..db94d14a3807 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c @@ -1377,14 +1377,24 @@ static int atmel_smc_nand_prepare_smcconf(struct atmel_nand *nand, if (ret) return ret; + /* + * Read setup timing depends on the operation done on the NAND: + * + * NRD_SETUP = max(tAR, tCLR) + */ + timeps = max(conf->timings.sdr.tAR_min, conf->timings.sdr.tCLR_min); + ncycles = DIV_ROUND_UP(timeps, mckperiodps); + totalcycles += ncycles; + ret = atmel_smc_cs_conf_set_setup(smcconf, ATMEL_SMC_NRD_SHIFT, ncycles); + if (ret) + return ret; + /* * The read cycle timing is directly matching tRC, but is also * dependent on the setup and hold timings we calculated earlier, * which gives: * - * NRD_CYCLE = max(tRC, NRD_PULSE + NRD_HOLD) - * - * NRD_SETUP is always 0. + * NRD_CYCLE = max(tRC, NRD_SETUP + NRD_PULSE + NRD_HOLD) */ ncycles = DIV_ROUND_UP(conf->timings.sdr.tRC_min, mckperiodps); ncycles = max(totalcycles, ncycles);

1 day, 14 hours

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New September Order. 90785 Saturday, September 13, 2025 at 03:25:27 PM

by Info - Albinayah 102

Hi Stable, Please provide a quote for your products: Include: 1.Pricing (per unit) 2.Delivery cost & timeline 3.Quote expiry date Deadline: September Thanks! Kamal Prasad Albinayah Trading

1 day, 14 hours

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[regression] 1a8953f4f774 ("HID: Add IGNORE quirk for SMARTLINKTECHNOLOGY") causes issue with ID 4c4a:4155 Jieli Technology USB Composite Device

by Salvatore Bonaccorso

Hi Zhang, hi Jiri, In Debian Staffan Melin reported that after an update containing the commit 1a8953f4f774 ("HID: Add IGNORE quirk for SMARTLINKTECHNOLOGY"), the input device with same idVendor and idProduct, the Jieli Technology USB Composite Device, does not get recognized anymore. The full Debian report is at: https://bugs.debian.org/1114557 The issue is not specific to the 6.12.y series and confirmed in 6.16.3 as well. Staffan Melin did bisect the kernels between 6.12.38 (which was still working) and 6.1.41 (which was not), confirming by bisection that the offending commit is 1a8953f4f774 ("HID: Add IGNORE quirk for SMARTLINKTECHNOLOGY") #regzbot introduced: 1a8953f4f774 #regzbot monitor: https://bugs.debian.org/1114557 So it looks that the quirk applied is unfortunately affecting negatively as well Staffan Melin case. Can you have a look? Regards, Salvatore

1 day, 15 hours

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[PATCH v3] arm64: dts: qcom: sdm845-shift-axolotl: Fix typo of compatible

by Tamura Dai

Fix typo in the compatible string for the touchscreen node. According to Documentation/devicetree/bindings/input/touchscreen/edt-ft5x06.yaml, the correct compatible is "focaltech,ft8719", but the device tree used "focaltech,fts8719". Fixes: 45882459159d ("arm64: dts: qcom: sdm845: add device tree for SHIFT6mq") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tamura Dai <kirinode0(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-shift-axolotl.dts | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-shift-axolotl.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-shift-axolotl.dts index 2cf7b5e1243c..a0b288d6162f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-shift-axolotl.dts +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-shift-axolotl.dts @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ &i2c5 { status = "okay"; touchscreen@38 { - compatible = "focaltech,fts8719"; + compatible = "focaltech,ft8719"; reg = <0x38>; wakeup-source; interrupt-parent = <&tlmm>; -- 2.34.1

1 day, 15 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/vmalloc, mm/kasan: respect gfp mask in" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 79357cd06d41d0f5a11b17d7c86176e395d10ef2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091304-headdress-handsfree-22cc@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 79357cd06d41d0f5a11b17d7c86176e395d10ef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2025 14:10:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mm/vmalloc, mm/kasan: respect gfp mask in kasan_populate_vmalloc() kasan_populate_vmalloc() and its helpers ignore the caller's gfp_mask and always allocate memory using the hardcoded GFP_KERNEL flag. This makes them inconsistent with vmalloc(), which was recently extended to support GFP_NOFS and GFP_NOIO allocations. Page table allocations performed during shadow population also ignore the external gfp_mask. To preserve the intended semantics of GFP_NOFS and GFP_NOIO, wrap the apply_to_page_range() calls into the appropriate memalloc scope. xfs calls vmalloc with GFP_NOFS, so this bug could lead to deadlock. There was a report here https://lkml.kernel.org/r/686ea951.050a0220.385921.0016.GAE@google.com This patch: - Extends kasan_populate_vmalloc() and helpers to take gfp_mask; - Passes gfp_mask down to alloc_pages_bulk() and __get_free_page(); - Enforces GFP_NOFS/NOIO semantics with memalloc_*_save()/restore() around apply_to_page_range(); - Updates vmalloc.c and percpu allocator call sites accordingly. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250831121058.92971-1-urezki@gmail.com Fixes: 451769ebb7e7 ("mm/vmalloc: alloc GFP_NO{FS,IO} for vmalloc") Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+3470c9ffee63e4abafeb(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h index 890011071f2b..fe5ce9215821 100644 --- a/include/linux/kasan.h +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static inline void kasan_init_hw_tags(void) { } #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size); -int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size); +int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask); void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long free_region_start, unsigned long free_region_end, @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) { } static inline int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, - unsigned long size) + unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask) { return 0; } @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) { } static inline int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, - unsigned long size) + unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask) { return 0; } diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c index e2ceebf737ef..11d472a5c4e8 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c @@ -336,13 +336,13 @@ static void ___free_pages_bulk(struct page **pages, int nr_pages) } } -static int ___alloc_pages_bulk(struct page **pages, int nr_pages) +static int ___alloc_pages_bulk(struct page **pages, int nr_pages, gfp_t gfp_mask) { unsigned long nr_populated, nr_total = nr_pages; struct page **page_array = pages; while (nr_pages) { - nr_populated = alloc_pages_bulk(GFP_KERNEL, nr_pages, pages); + nr_populated = alloc_pages_bulk(gfp_mask, nr_pages, pages); if (!nr_populated) { ___free_pages_bulk(page_array, nr_total - nr_pages); return -ENOMEM; @@ -354,25 +354,42 @@ static int ___alloc_pages_bulk(struct page **pages, int nr_pages) return 0; } -static int __kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) +static int __kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask) { unsigned long nr_pages, nr_total = PFN_UP(end - start); struct vmalloc_populate_data data; + unsigned int flags; int ret = 0; - data.pages = (struct page **)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + data.pages = (struct page **)__get_free_page(gfp_mask | __GFP_ZERO); if (!data.pages) return -ENOMEM; while (nr_total) { nr_pages = min(nr_total, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(data.pages[0])); - ret = ___alloc_pages_bulk(data.pages, nr_pages); + ret = ___alloc_pages_bulk(data.pages, nr_pages, gfp_mask); if (ret) break; data.start = start; + + /* + * page tables allocations ignore external gfp mask, enforce it + * by the scope API + */ + if ((gfp_mask & (__GFP_FS | __GFP_IO)) == __GFP_IO) + flags = memalloc_nofs_save(); + else if ((gfp_mask & (__GFP_FS | __GFP_IO)) == 0) + flags = memalloc_noio_save(); + ret = apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, start, nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE, kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte, &data); + + if ((gfp_mask & (__GFP_FS | __GFP_IO)) == __GFP_IO) + memalloc_nofs_restore(flags); + else if ((gfp_mask & (__GFP_FS | __GFP_IO)) == 0) + memalloc_noio_restore(flags); + ___free_pages_bulk(data.pages, nr_pages); if (ret) break; @@ -386,7 +403,7 @@ static int __kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) return ret; } -int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) +int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask) { unsigned long shadow_start, shadow_end; int ret; @@ -415,7 +432,7 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) shadow_start = PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(shadow_start); shadow_end = PAGE_ALIGN(shadow_end); - ret = __kasan_populate_vmalloc(shadow_start, shadow_end); + ret = __kasan_populate_vmalloc(shadow_start, shadow_end, gfp_mask); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c index 6dbcdceecae1..5edd536ba9d2 100644 --- a/mm/vmalloc.c +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -2026,6 +2026,8 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size, if (unlikely(!vmap_initialized)) return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY); + /* Only reclaim behaviour flags are relevant. */ + gfp_mask = gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK; might_sleep(); /* @@ -2038,8 +2040,6 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size, */ va = node_alloc(size, align, vstart, vend, &addr, &vn_id); if (!va) { - gfp_mask = gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK; - va = kmem_cache_alloc_node(vmap_area_cachep, gfp_mask, node); if (unlikely(!va)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -2089,7 +2089,7 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size, BUG_ON(va->va_start < vstart); BUG_ON(va->va_end > vend); - ret = kasan_populate_vmalloc(addr, size); + ret = kasan_populate_vmalloc(addr, size, gfp_mask); if (ret) { free_vmap_area(va); return ERR_PTR(ret); @@ -4826,7 +4826,7 @@ struct vm_struct **pcpu_get_vm_areas(const unsigned long *offsets, /* populate the kasan shadow space */ for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++) { - if (kasan_populate_vmalloc(vas[area]->va_start, sizes[area])) + if (kasan_populate_vmalloc(vas[area]->va_start, sizes[area], GFP_KERNEL)) goto err_free_shadow; }

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/vmalloc, mm/kasan: respect gfp mask in" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 79357cd06d41d0f5a11b17d7c86176e395d10ef2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091303-frill-pacemaker-0871@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 79357cd06d41d0f5a11b17d7c86176e395d10ef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2025 14:10:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mm/vmalloc, mm/kasan: respect gfp mask in kasan_populate_vmalloc() kasan_populate_vmalloc() and its helpers ignore the caller's gfp_mask and always allocate memory using the hardcoded GFP_KERNEL flag. This makes them inconsistent with vmalloc(), which was recently extended to support GFP_NOFS and GFP_NOIO allocations. Page table allocations performed during shadow population also ignore the external gfp_mask. To preserve the intended semantics of GFP_NOFS and GFP_NOIO, wrap the apply_to_page_range() calls into the appropriate memalloc scope. xfs calls vmalloc with GFP_NOFS, so this bug could lead to deadlock. There was a report here https://lkml.kernel.org/r/686ea951.050a0220.385921.0016.GAE@google.com This patch: - Extends kasan_populate_vmalloc() and helpers to take gfp_mask; - Passes gfp_mask down to alloc_pages_bulk() and __get_free_page(); - Enforces GFP_NOFS/NOIO semantics with memalloc_*_save()/restore() around apply_to_page_range(); - Updates vmalloc.c and percpu allocator call sites accordingly. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250831121058.92971-1-urezki@gmail.com Fixes: 451769ebb7e7 ("mm/vmalloc: alloc GFP_NO{FS,IO} for vmalloc") Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+3470c9ffee63e4abafeb(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h index 890011071f2b..fe5ce9215821 100644 --- a/include/linux/kasan.h +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static inline void kasan_init_hw_tags(void) { } #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size); -int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size); +int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask); void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long free_region_start, unsigned long free_region_end, @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) { } static inline int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, - unsigned long size) + unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask) { return 0; } @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) { } static inline int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, - unsigned long size) + unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask) { return 0; } diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c index e2ceebf737ef..11d472a5c4e8 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c @@ -336,13 +336,13 @@ static void ___free_pages_bulk(struct page **pages, int nr_pages) } } -static int ___alloc_pages_bulk(struct page **pages, int nr_pages) +static int ___alloc_pages_bulk(struct page **pages, int nr_pages, gfp_t gfp_mask) { unsigned long nr_populated, nr_total = nr_pages; struct page **page_array = pages; while (nr_pages) { - nr_populated = alloc_pages_bulk(GFP_KERNEL, nr_pages, pages); + nr_populated = alloc_pages_bulk(gfp_mask, nr_pages, pages); if (!nr_populated) { ___free_pages_bulk(page_array, nr_total - nr_pages); return -ENOMEM; @@ -354,25 +354,42 @@ static int ___alloc_pages_bulk(struct page **pages, int nr_pages) return 0; } -static int __kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) +static int __kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask) { unsigned long nr_pages, nr_total = PFN_UP(end - start); struct vmalloc_populate_data data; + unsigned int flags; int ret = 0; - data.pages = (struct page **)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + data.pages = (struct page **)__get_free_page(gfp_mask | __GFP_ZERO); if (!data.pages) return -ENOMEM; while (nr_total) { nr_pages = min(nr_total, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(data.pages[0])); - ret = ___alloc_pages_bulk(data.pages, nr_pages); + ret = ___alloc_pages_bulk(data.pages, nr_pages, gfp_mask); if (ret) break; data.start = start; + + /* + * page tables allocations ignore external gfp mask, enforce it + * by the scope API + */ + if ((gfp_mask & (__GFP_FS | __GFP_IO)) == __GFP_IO) + flags = memalloc_nofs_save(); + else if ((gfp_mask & (__GFP_FS | __GFP_IO)) == 0) + flags = memalloc_noio_save(); + ret = apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, start, nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE, kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte, &data); + + if ((gfp_mask & (__GFP_FS | __GFP_IO)) == __GFP_IO) + memalloc_nofs_restore(flags); + else if ((gfp_mask & (__GFP_FS | __GFP_IO)) == 0) + memalloc_noio_restore(flags); + ___free_pages_bulk(data.pages, nr_pages); if (ret) break; @@ -386,7 +403,7 @@ static int __kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) return ret; } -int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) +int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask) { unsigned long shadow_start, shadow_end; int ret; @@ -415,7 +432,7 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) shadow_start = PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(shadow_start); shadow_end = PAGE_ALIGN(shadow_end); - ret = __kasan_populate_vmalloc(shadow_start, shadow_end); + ret = __kasan_populate_vmalloc(shadow_start, shadow_end, gfp_mask); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c index 6dbcdceecae1..5edd536ba9d2 100644 --- a/mm/vmalloc.c +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -2026,6 +2026,8 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size, if (unlikely(!vmap_initialized)) return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY); + /* Only reclaim behaviour flags are relevant. */ + gfp_mask = gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK; might_sleep(); /* @@ -2038,8 +2040,6 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size, */ va = node_alloc(size, align, vstart, vend, &addr, &vn_id); if (!va) { - gfp_mask = gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK; - va = kmem_cache_alloc_node(vmap_area_cachep, gfp_mask, node); if (unlikely(!va)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -2089,7 +2089,7 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size, BUG_ON(va->va_start < vstart); BUG_ON(va->va_end > vend); - ret = kasan_populate_vmalloc(addr, size); + ret = kasan_populate_vmalloc(addr, size, gfp_mask); if (ret) { free_vmap_area(va); return ERR_PTR(ret); @@ -4826,7 +4826,7 @@ struct vm_struct **pcpu_get_vm_areas(const unsigned long *offsets, /* populate the kasan shadow space */ for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++) { - if (kasan_populate_vmalloc(vas[area]->va_start, sizes[area])) + if (kasan_populate_vmalloc(vas[area]->va_start, sizes[area], GFP_KERNEL)) goto err_free_shadow; }

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] riscv: kexec: initialize kexec_buf struct" failed to apply to 6.16-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.16-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.16.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 8afbd0045922b8146acf1a78ae818693e0468dbd # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091310-tuition-parameter-2cd6@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.16.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 8afbd0045922b8146acf1a78ae818693e0468dbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2025 03:42:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] riscv: kexec: initialize kexec_buf struct The kexec_buf structure was previously declared without initialization. commit bf454ec31add ("kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly") added a field that is always read but not consistently populated by all architectures. This un-initialized field will contain garbage. This is also triggering a UBSAN warning when the uninitialized data was accessed: ------------[ cut here ]------------ UBSAN: invalid-load in ./include/linux/kexec.h:210:10 load of value 252 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' Zero-initializing kexec_buf at declaration ensures all fields are cleanly set, preventing future instances of uninitialized memory being used. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250827-kbuf_all-v1-2-1df9882bb01a@debian.org Fixes: bf454ec31add ("kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly") Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Cc: Albert Ou <aou(a)eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alex(a)ghiti.fr> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Coiby Xu <coxu(a)redhat.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer(a)dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley(a)sifive.com> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/kexec_elf.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/kexec_elf.c index 56444c7bd34e..531d348db84d 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/kexec_elf.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/kexec_elf.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static int riscv_kexec_elf_load(struct kimage *image, struct elfhdr *ehdr, int i; int ret = 0; size_t size; - struct kexec_buf kbuf; + struct kexec_buf kbuf = {}; const struct elf_phdr *phdr; kbuf.image = image; @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static int elf_find_pbase(struct kimage *image, unsigned long kernel_len, { int i; int ret; - struct kexec_buf kbuf; + struct kexec_buf kbuf = {}; const struct elf_phdr *phdr; unsigned long lowest_paddr = ULONG_MAX; unsigned long lowest_vaddr = ULONG_MAX; diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/kexec_image.c index 26a81774a78a..8f2eb900910b 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/kexec_image.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/kexec_image.c @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image, struct riscv_image_header *h; u64 flags; bool be_image, be_kernel; - struct kexec_buf kbuf; + struct kexec_buf kbuf = {}; int ret; /* Check Image header */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c index e36104af2e24..b9eb41b0a975 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ int load_extra_segments(struct kimage *image, unsigned long kernel_start, int ret; void *fdt; unsigned long initrd_pbase = 0UL; - struct kexec_buf kbuf; + struct kexec_buf kbuf = {}; char *modified_cmdline = NULL; kbuf.image = image;

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: fix corruption reading compressed range when block" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9786531399a679fc2f4630d2c0a186205282ab2f # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091348-sublet-racism-4910@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9786531399a679fc2f4630d2c0a186205282ab2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2025 16:06:13 +0930 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: fix corruption reading compressed range when block size is smaller than page size [BUG] With 64K page size (aarch64 with 64K page size config) and 4K btrfs block size, the following workload can easily lead to a corrupted read: mkfs.btrfs -f -s 4k $dev > /dev/null mount -o compress $dev $mnt xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 64k" $mnt/base > /dev/null echo "correct result:" od -Ad -t x1 $mnt/base xfs_io -f -c "reflink $mnt/base 32k 0 32k" \ -c "reflink $mnt/base 0 32k 32k" \ -c "pwrite -S 0xff 60k 4k" $mnt/new > /dev/null echo "incorrect result:" od -Ad -t x1 $mnt/new umount $mnt This shows the following result: correct result: 0000000 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff * 0065536 incorrect result: 0000000 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff * 0032768 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 * 0061440 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff * 0065536 Notice the zero in the range [32K, 60K), which is incorrect. [CAUSE] With extra trace printk, it shows the following events during od: (some unrelated info removed like CPU and context) od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: enter r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) prev_em_start=0000000000000000 The "r/i" is indicating the root and inode number. In our case the file "new" is using ino 258 from fs tree (root 5). Here notice the @prev_em_start pointer is NULL. This means the btrfs_do_readpage() is called from btrfs_read_folio(), not from btrfs_readahead(). od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=0 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=4096 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=8192 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=12288 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=16384 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=20480 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=24576 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=28672 got em start=0 len=32768 These above 32K blocks will be read from the first half of the compressed data extent. od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=32768 got em start=32768 len=32768 Note here there is no btrfs_submit_compressed_read() call. Which is incorrect now. Although both extent maps at 0 and 32K are pointing to the same compressed data, their offsets are different thus can not be merged into the same read. So this means the compressed data read merge check is doing something wrong. od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=36864 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=40960 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=45056 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=49152 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=53248 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=57344 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=61440 skip uptodate od-3457 btrfs_submit_compressed_read: cb orig_bio: file off=0 len=61440 The function btrfs_submit_compressed_read() is only called at the end of folio read. The compressed bio will only have an extent map of range [0, 32K), but the original bio passed in is for the whole 64K folio. This will cause the decompression part to only fill the first 32K, leaving the rest untouched (aka, filled with zero). This incorrect compressed read merge leads to the above data corruption. There were similar problems that happened in the past, commit 808f80b46790 ("Btrfs: update fix for read corruption of compressed and shared extents") is doing pretty much the same fix for readahead. But that's back to 2015, where btrfs still only supports bs (block size) == ps (page size) cases. This means btrfs_do_readpage() only needs to handle a folio which contains exactly one block. Only btrfs_readahead() can lead to a read covering multiple blocks. Thus only btrfs_readahead() passes a non-NULL @prev_em_start pointer. With v5.15 kernel btrfs introduced bs < ps support. This breaks the above assumption that a folio can only contain one block. Now btrfs_read_folio() can also read multiple blocks in one go. But btrfs_read_folio() doesn't pass a @prev_em_start pointer, thus the existing bio force submission check will never be triggered. In theory, this can also happen for btrfs with large folios, but since large folio is still experimental, we don't need to bother it, thus only bs < ps support is affected for now. [FIX] Instead of passing @prev_em_start to do the proper compressed extent check, introduce one new member, btrfs_bio_ctrl::last_em_start, so that the existing bio force submission logic will always be triggered. CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c index c953297aa89a..b21cb72835cc 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c @@ -111,6 +111,24 @@ struct btrfs_bio_ctrl { */ unsigned long submit_bitmap; struct readahead_control *ractl; + + /* + * The start offset of the last used extent map by a read operation. + * + * This is for proper compressed read merge. + * U64_MAX means we are starting the read and have made no progress yet. + * + * The current btrfs_bio_is_contig() only uses disk_bytenr as + * the condition to check if the read can be merged with previous + * bio, which is not correct. E.g. two file extents pointing to the + * same extent but with different offset. + * + * So here we need to do extra checks to only merge reads that are + * covered by the same extent map. + * Just extent_map::start will be enough, as they are unique + * inside the same inode. + */ + u64 last_em_start; }; static void submit_one_bio(struct btrfs_bio_ctrl *bio_ctrl) @@ -909,7 +927,7 @@ static void btrfs_readahead_expand(struct readahead_control *ractl, * return 0 on success, otherwise return error */ static int btrfs_do_readpage(struct folio *folio, struct extent_map **em_cached, - struct btrfs_bio_ctrl *bio_ctrl, u64 *prev_em_start) + struct btrfs_bio_ctrl *bio_ctrl) { struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host; struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = inode_to_fs_info(inode); @@ -1019,12 +1037,11 @@ static int btrfs_do_readpage(struct folio *folio, struct extent_map **em_cached, * non-optimal behavior (submitting 2 bios for the same extent). */ if (compress_type != BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE && - prev_em_start && *prev_em_start != (u64)-1 && - *prev_em_start != em->start) + bio_ctrl->last_em_start != U64_MAX && + bio_ctrl->last_em_start != em->start) force_bio_submit = true; - if (prev_em_start) - *prev_em_start = em->start; + bio_ctrl->last_em_start = em->start; btrfs_free_extent_map(em); em = NULL; @@ -1238,12 +1255,15 @@ int btrfs_read_folio(struct file *file, struct folio *folio) const u64 start = folio_pos(folio); const u64 end = start + folio_size(folio) - 1; struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL; - struct btrfs_bio_ctrl bio_ctrl = { .opf = REQ_OP_READ }; + struct btrfs_bio_ctrl bio_ctrl = { + .opf = REQ_OP_READ, + .last_em_start = U64_MAX, + }; struct extent_map *em_cached = NULL; int ret; lock_extents_for_read(inode, start, end, &cached_state); - ret = btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl, NULL); + ret = btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl); btrfs_unlock_extent(&inode->io_tree, start, end, &cached_state); btrfs_free_extent_map(em_cached); @@ -2583,7 +2603,8 @@ void btrfs_readahead(struct readahead_control *rac) { struct btrfs_bio_ctrl bio_ctrl = { .opf = REQ_OP_READ | REQ_RAHEAD, - .ractl = rac + .ractl = rac, + .last_em_start = U64_MAX, }; struct folio *folio; struct btrfs_inode *inode = BTRFS_I(rac->mapping->host); @@ -2591,12 +2612,11 @@ void btrfs_readahead(struct readahead_control *rac) const u64 end = start + readahead_length(rac) - 1; struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL; struct extent_map *em_cached = NULL; - u64 prev_em_start = (u64)-1; lock_extents_for_read(inode, start, end, &cached_state); while ((folio = readahead_folio(rac)) != NULL) - btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl, &prev_em_start); + btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl); btrfs_unlock_extent(&inode->io_tree, start, end, &cached_state);

1 day, 15 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: fix corruption reading compressed range when block" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9786531399a679fc2f4630d2c0a186205282ab2f # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091347-universal-shiftless-5973@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9786531399a679fc2f4630d2c0a186205282ab2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2025 16:06:13 +0930 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: fix corruption reading compressed range when block size is smaller than page size [BUG] With 64K page size (aarch64 with 64K page size config) and 4K btrfs block size, the following workload can easily lead to a corrupted read: mkfs.btrfs -f -s 4k $dev > /dev/null mount -o compress $dev $mnt xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 64k" $mnt/base > /dev/null echo "correct result:" od -Ad -t x1 $mnt/base xfs_io -f -c "reflink $mnt/base 32k 0 32k" \ -c "reflink $mnt/base 0 32k 32k" \ -c "pwrite -S 0xff 60k 4k" $mnt/new > /dev/null echo "incorrect result:" od -Ad -t x1 $mnt/new umount $mnt This shows the following result: correct result: 0000000 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff * 0065536 incorrect result: 0000000 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff * 0032768 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 * 0061440 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff * 0065536 Notice the zero in the range [32K, 60K), which is incorrect. [CAUSE] With extra trace printk, it shows the following events during od: (some unrelated info removed like CPU and context) od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: enter r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) prev_em_start=0000000000000000 The "r/i" is indicating the root and inode number. In our case the file "new" is using ino 258 from fs tree (root 5). Here notice the @prev_em_start pointer is NULL. This means the btrfs_do_readpage() is called from btrfs_read_folio(), not from btrfs_readahead(). od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=0 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=4096 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=8192 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=12288 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=16384 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=20480 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=24576 got em start=0 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=28672 got em start=0 len=32768 These above 32K blocks will be read from the first half of the compressed data extent. od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=32768 got em start=32768 len=32768 Note here there is no btrfs_submit_compressed_read() call. Which is incorrect now. Although both extent maps at 0 and 32K are pointing to the same compressed data, their offsets are different thus can not be merged into the same read. So this means the compressed data read merge check is doing something wrong. od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=36864 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=40960 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=45056 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=49152 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=53248 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=57344 got em start=32768 len=32768 od-3457 btrfs_do_readpage: r/i=5/258 folio=0(65536) cur=61440 skip uptodate od-3457 btrfs_submit_compressed_read: cb orig_bio: file off=0 len=61440 The function btrfs_submit_compressed_read() is only called at the end of folio read. The compressed bio will only have an extent map of range [0, 32K), but the original bio passed in is for the whole 64K folio. This will cause the decompression part to only fill the first 32K, leaving the rest untouched (aka, filled with zero). This incorrect compressed read merge leads to the above data corruption. There were similar problems that happened in the past, commit 808f80b46790 ("Btrfs: update fix for read corruption of compressed and shared extents") is doing pretty much the same fix for readahead. But that's back to 2015, where btrfs still only supports bs (block size) == ps (page size) cases. This means btrfs_do_readpage() only needs to handle a folio which contains exactly one block. Only btrfs_readahead() can lead to a read covering multiple blocks. Thus only btrfs_readahead() passes a non-NULL @prev_em_start pointer. With v5.15 kernel btrfs introduced bs < ps support. This breaks the above assumption that a folio can only contain one block. Now btrfs_read_folio() can also read multiple blocks in one go. But btrfs_read_folio() doesn't pass a @prev_em_start pointer, thus the existing bio force submission check will never be triggered. In theory, this can also happen for btrfs with large folios, but since large folio is still experimental, we don't need to bother it, thus only bs < ps support is affected for now. [FIX] Instead of passing @prev_em_start to do the proper compressed extent check, introduce one new member, btrfs_bio_ctrl::last_em_start, so that the existing bio force submission logic will always be triggered. CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c index c953297aa89a..b21cb72835cc 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c @@ -111,6 +111,24 @@ struct btrfs_bio_ctrl { */ unsigned long submit_bitmap; struct readahead_control *ractl; + + /* + * The start offset of the last used extent map by a read operation. + * + * This is for proper compressed read merge. + * U64_MAX means we are starting the read and have made no progress yet. + * + * The current btrfs_bio_is_contig() only uses disk_bytenr as + * the condition to check if the read can be merged with previous + * bio, which is not correct. E.g. two file extents pointing to the + * same extent but with different offset. + * + * So here we need to do extra checks to only merge reads that are + * covered by the same extent map. + * Just extent_map::start will be enough, as they are unique + * inside the same inode. + */ + u64 last_em_start; }; static void submit_one_bio(struct btrfs_bio_ctrl *bio_ctrl) @@ -909,7 +927,7 @@ static void btrfs_readahead_expand(struct readahead_control *ractl, * return 0 on success, otherwise return error */ static int btrfs_do_readpage(struct folio *folio, struct extent_map **em_cached, - struct btrfs_bio_ctrl *bio_ctrl, u64 *prev_em_start) + struct btrfs_bio_ctrl *bio_ctrl) { struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host; struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = inode_to_fs_info(inode); @@ -1019,12 +1037,11 @@ static int btrfs_do_readpage(struct folio *folio, struct extent_map **em_cached, * non-optimal behavior (submitting 2 bios for the same extent). */ if (compress_type != BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE && - prev_em_start && *prev_em_start != (u64)-1 && - *prev_em_start != em->start) + bio_ctrl->last_em_start != U64_MAX && + bio_ctrl->last_em_start != em->start) force_bio_submit = true; - if (prev_em_start) - *prev_em_start = em->start; + bio_ctrl->last_em_start = em->start; btrfs_free_extent_map(em); em = NULL; @@ -1238,12 +1255,15 @@ int btrfs_read_folio(struct file *file, struct folio *folio) const u64 start = folio_pos(folio); const u64 end = start + folio_size(folio) - 1; struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL; - struct btrfs_bio_ctrl bio_ctrl = { .opf = REQ_OP_READ }; + struct btrfs_bio_ctrl bio_ctrl = { + .opf = REQ_OP_READ, + .last_em_start = U64_MAX, + }; struct extent_map *em_cached = NULL; int ret; lock_extents_for_read(inode, start, end, &cached_state); - ret = btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl, NULL); + ret = btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl); btrfs_unlock_extent(&inode->io_tree, start, end, &cached_state); btrfs_free_extent_map(em_cached); @@ -2583,7 +2603,8 @@ void btrfs_readahead(struct readahead_control *rac) { struct btrfs_bio_ctrl bio_ctrl = { .opf = REQ_OP_READ | REQ_RAHEAD, - .ractl = rac + .ractl = rac, + .last_em_start = U64_MAX, }; struct folio *folio; struct btrfs_inode *inode = BTRFS_I(rac->mapping->host); @@ -2591,12 +2612,11 @@ void btrfs_readahead(struct readahead_control *rac) const u64 end = start + readahead_length(rac) - 1; struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL; struct extent_map *em_cached = NULL; - u64 prev_em_start = (u64)-1; lock_extents_for_read(inode, start, end, &cached_state); while ((folio = readahead_folio(rac)) != NULL) - btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl, &prev_em_start); + btrfs_do_readpage(folio, &em_cached, &bio_ctrl); btrfs_unlock_extent(&inode->io_tree, start, end, &cached_state);

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] netlink: specs: mptcp: fix if-idx attribute type" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 7094b84863e5832cb1cd9c4b9d648904775b6bd9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025091347-favorably-couch-3e8f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 7094b84863e5832cb1cd9c4b9d648904775b6bd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2025 23:27:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] netlink: specs: mptcp: fix if-idx attribute type This attribute is used as a signed number in the code in pm_netlink.c: nla_put_s32(skb, MPTCP_ATTR_IF_IDX, ssk->sk_bound_dev_if)) The specs should then reflect that. Note that other 'if-idx' attributes from the same .yaml file use a signed number as well. Fixes: bc8aeb2045e2 ("Documentation: netlink: add a YAML spec for mptcp") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <geliang(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250908-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-17-rc5-v1-1-5f2168… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/Documentation/netlink/specs/mptcp_pm.yaml b/Documentation/netlink/specs/mptcp_pm.yaml index 02f1ddcfbf1c..d15335684ec3 100644 --- a/Documentation/netlink/specs/mptcp_pm.yaml +++ b/Documentation/netlink/specs/mptcp_pm.yaml @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ attribute-sets: type: u32 - name: if-idx - type: u32 + type: s32 - name: reset-reason type: u32

1 day, 15 hours

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Mate dar vo vyske dva miliony patsto tisic euro

by Dr Leonard Valentinovic Blavatnik.

1 day, 16 hours

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Backport rcu-tasks fix to stable kernel version 6.6.y

by Tahera Fahimi

Dear Stable Kernel Maintainers, I am writing to request the backport of the following patches to stable kernel versions 6.6.y, addressing a deadlock issue in RCU Tasks related to do_exit() on preemptible systems. Issue Description: The kernel may experience deadlocks due to shared locking between exit_tasks_rcu_start() and rcu_tasks_postscan() via synchronize_srcu(), when multiple processes exit concurrently. The problem manifests as stalls in the RCU tasks grace period. This issue manifest as a deadlock in WSL kernel which uses the stable kernel 6.6.87 (Please see the issue on https://github.com/microsoft/WSL/issues/13480) Patches to Apply: Patch 1: Subject: rcu-tasks: Maintain lists to eliminate RCU-tasks/do_exit() deadlocks Commit ID: 6b70399f9ef3809f6e308fd99dd78b072c1bd05c Justification: Introduces per-CPU lists for exiting tasks, replacing SRCU-based waits and eliminating deadlocks during concurrent exits. Patch 2: Subject: rcu-tasks: Eliminate deadlocks involving do_exit() and RCU tasks Commit ID: 1612160b91272f5b1596f499584d6064bf5be794 Justification: Ensures all exiting tasks are properly gathered and synchronized, preventing missed synchronizations and further deadlocks. Patch 3: Subject: rcu-tasks: Maintain real-time response in rcu_tasks_postscan() Commit ID: 0bb11a372fc8d7006b4d0f42a2882939747bdbff Justification: Periodically enables interrupts during per-CPU list traversal to maintain system responsiveness, especially when many tasks are present. Kernel version: latest kernel version in 6.6.y branch Thank you for your consideration. Best regards, Tahera Fahimi

1 day, 16 hours

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[PATCH v3 0/4 5.10.y] overflow: Allow mixed type arguments in overflow macros

by Eliav Farber

This series backports four commits to bring include/linux/overflow.h in line with v5.15.193: - 4578be130a64 ("overflow: Correct check_shl_overflow() comment") - 4eb6bd55cfb2 ("compiler.h: drop fallback overflow checkers") - 53f2cd86a81c ("overflow: Allow mixed type arguments") - ed6e37e30826 ("tracing: Define the is_signed_type() macro once") The motivation is to fix build failures such as: drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ethtool.c: In function ‘e1000_set_eeprom’: ./include/linux/overflow.h:71:15: error: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast [-Werror] 71 | (void) (&__a == __d); \ | ^~ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ethtool.c:582:6: note: in expansion of macro ‘check_add_overflow’ 582 | if (check_add_overflow(eeprom->offset, eeprom->len, &total_len) || | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This regression was triggered by commit ce8829d3d44b ("e1000e: fix heap overflow in e1000_set_eeprom"). check_add_overflow() requires the first two operands and the result pointer to be of identical type. On 64-bit builds, using size_t for the result conflicted with the u32 fields eeprom->offset and eeprom->len, resulting in type check failures. Bart Van Assche (1): tracing: Define the is_signed_type() macro once Kees Cook (1): overflow: Allow mixed type arguments Keith Busch (1): overflow: Correct check_shl_overflow() comment Nick Desaulniers (1): compiler.h: drop fallback overflow checkers include/linux/compiler-clang.h | 13 -- include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 4 - include/linux/compiler.h | 6 + include/linux/overflow.h | 209 ++++++----------------------- include/linux/trace_events.h | 2 - tools/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 4 - tools/include/linux/overflow.h | 140 +------------------ 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 326 deletions(-) --- Changes in v3: - Fixed SHA1 of commits mentioned in cover letter Changes in v2: - Added missing sign-off in all patches -- 2.47.3

1 day, 16 hours

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[PATCH v2] net: rfkill: gpio: Fix crash due to dereferencering uninitialized pointer

by Hans de Goede

Since commit 7d5e9737efda ("net: rfkill: gpio: get the name and type from device property") rfkill_find_type() gets called with the possibly uninitialized "const char *type_name;" local variable. On x86 systems when rfkill-gpio binds to a "BCM4752" or "LNV4752" acpi_device, the rfkill->type is set based on the ACPI acpi_device_id: rfkill->type = (unsigned)id->driver_data; and there is no "type" property so device_property_read_string() will fail and leave type_name uninitialized, leading to a potential crash. rfkill_find_type() does accept a NULL pointer, fix the potential crash by initializing type_name to NULL. Note likely sofar this has not been caught because: 1. Not many x86 machines actually have a "BCM4752"/"LNV4752" acpi_device 2. The stack happened to contain NULL where type_name is stored Fixes: 7d5e9737efda ("net: rfkill: gpio: get the name and type from device property") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hansg(a)kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - Fix typo in stable email address --- net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c b/net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c index 41e657e97761..cf2dcec6ce5a 100644 --- a/net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c +++ b/net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c @@ -94,10 +94,10 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id rfkill_gpio_deny_table[] = { static int rfkill_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct rfkill_gpio_data *rfkill; - struct gpio_desc *gpio; + const char *type_name = NULL; const char *name_property; const char *type_property; - const char *type_name; + struct gpio_desc *gpio; int ret; if (dmi_check_system(rfkill_gpio_deny_table)) -- 2.51.0

1 day, 16 hours

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[PATCH net v1 1/1] net: usb: asix: ax88772: drop phylink use in PM to avoid MDIO runtime PM wakeups

by Oleksij Rempel

Drop phylink_{suspend,resume}() from ax88772 PM callbacks. MDIO bus accesses have their own runtime-PM handling and will try to wake the device if it is suspended. Such wake attempts must not happen from PM callbacks while the device PM lock is held. Since phylink {sus|re}sume may trigger MDIO, it must not be called in PM context. No extra phylink PM handling is required for this driver: - .ndo_open/.ndo_stop control the phylink start/stop lifecycle. - ethtool/phylib entry points run in process context, not PM. - phylink MAC ops program the MAC on link changes after resume. Fixes: e0bffe3e6894 ("net: asix: ax88772: migrate to phylink") Reported-by: Hubert Wiśniewski <hubert.wisniewski.25632(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel(a)pengutronix.de> --- drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c | 13 ------------- 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c b/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c index 792ddda1ad49..1e8f7089f5e8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c @@ -607,15 +607,8 @@ static const struct net_device_ops ax88772_netdev_ops = { static void ax88772_suspend(struct usbnet *dev) { - struct asix_common_private *priv = dev->driver_priv; u16 medium; - if (netif_running(dev->net)) { - rtnl_lock(); - phylink_suspend(priv->phylink, false); - rtnl_unlock(); - } - /* Stop MAC operation */ medium = asix_read_medium_status(dev, 1); medium &= ~AX_MEDIUM_RE; @@ -644,12 +637,6 @@ static void ax88772_resume(struct usbnet *dev) for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (!priv->reset(dev, 1)) break; - - if (netif_running(dev->net)) { - rtnl_lock(); - phylink_resume(priv->phylink); - rtnl_unlock(); - } } static int asix_resume(struct usb_interface *intf) -- 2.47.3

1 day, 21 hours

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[PATCH v2] iommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table level

by Vasant Hegde

The AMD IOMMU host page table implementation supports dynamic page table levels (up to 6 levels), starting with a 3-level configuration that expands based on IOVA address. The kernel maintains a root pointer and current page table level to enable proper page table walks in alloc_pte()/fetch_pte() operations. The IOMMU IOVA allocator initially starts with 32-bit address and onces its exhuasted it switches to 64-bit address (max address is determined based on IOMMU and device DMA capability). To support larger IOVA, AMD IOMMU driver increases page table level. But in unmap path (iommu_v1_unmap_pages()), fetch_pte() reads pgtable->[root/mode] without lock. So its possible that in exteme corner case, when increase_address_space() is updating pgtable->[root/mode], fetch_pte() reads wrong page table level (pgtable->mode). It does compare the value with level encoded in page table and returns NULL. This will result is iommu_unmap ops to fail and upper layer may retry/log WARN_ON. CPU 0 CPU 1 ------ ------ map pages unmap pages alloc_pte() -> increase_address_space() iommu_v1_unmap_pages() -> fetch_pte() pgtable->root = pte (new root value) READ pgtable->[mode/root] Reads new root, old mode Updates mode (pgtable->mode += 1) Since Page table level updates are infrequent and already synchronized with a spinlock, implement seqcount to enable lock-free read operations on the read path. Fixes: 754265bcab7 ("iommu/amd: Fix race in increase_address_space()") Reported-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez(a)oracle.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins(a)oracle.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> --- drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h | 1 + drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h index 5219d7ddfdaa..95f63c5f6159 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h @@ -555,6 +555,7 @@ struct gcr3_tbl_info { }; struct amd_io_pgtable { + seqcount_t seqcount; /* Protects root/mode update */ struct io_pgtable pgtbl; int mode; u64 *root; diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c index a91e71f981ef..70c2f5b1631b 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <linux/seqlock.h> #include <asm/barrier.h> @@ -130,8 +131,11 @@ static bool increase_address_space(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, *pte = PM_LEVEL_PDE(pgtable->mode, iommu_virt_to_phys(pgtable->root)); + write_seqcount_begin(&pgtable->seqcount); pgtable->root = pte; pgtable->mode += 1; + write_seqcount_end(&pgtable->seqcount); + amd_iommu_update_and_flush_device_table(domain); pte = NULL; @@ -153,6 +157,7 @@ static u64 *alloc_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, { unsigned long last_addr = address + (page_size - 1); struct io_pgtable_cfg *cfg = &pgtable->pgtbl.cfg; + unsigned int seqcount; int level, end_lvl; u64 *pte, *page; @@ -170,8 +175,14 @@ static u64 *alloc_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, } - level = pgtable->mode - 1; - pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + do { + seqcount = read_seqcount_begin(&pgtable->seqcount); + + level = pgtable->mode - 1; + pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + } while (read_seqcount_retry(&pgtable->seqcount, seqcount)); + + address = PAGE_SIZE_ALIGN(address, page_size); end_lvl = PAGE_SIZE_LEVEL(page_size); @@ -249,6 +260,7 @@ static u64 *fetch_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, unsigned long *page_size) { int level; + unsigned int seqcount; u64 *pte; *page_size = 0; @@ -256,8 +268,12 @@ static u64 *fetch_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, if (address > PM_LEVEL_SIZE(pgtable->mode)) return NULL; - level = pgtable->mode - 1; - pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + do { + seqcount = read_seqcount_begin(&pgtable->seqcount); + level = pgtable->mode - 1; + pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + } while (read_seqcount_retry(&pgtable->seqcount, seqcount)); + *page_size = PTE_LEVEL_PAGE_SIZE(level); while (level > 0) { @@ -541,6 +557,7 @@ static struct io_pgtable *v1_alloc_pgtable(struct io_pgtable_cfg *cfg, void *coo if (!pgtable->root) return NULL; pgtable->mode = PAGE_MODE_3_LEVEL; + seqcount_init(&pgtable->seqcount); cfg->pgsize_bitmap = amd_iommu_pgsize_bitmap; cfg->ias = IOMMU_IN_ADDR_BIT_SIZE; -- 2.31.1

1 day, 21 hours

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[PATCH] iommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table level

by Vasant Hegde

The AMD IOMMU host page table implementation supports dynamic page table levels (up to 6 levels), starting with a 3-level configuration that expands based on IOVA address. The kernel maintains a root pointer and current page table level to enable proper page table walks in alloc_pte()/fetch_pte() operations. The IOMMU IOVA allocator initially starts with 32-bit address and onces its exhuasted it switches to 64-bit address (max address is determined based on IOMMU and device DMA capability). To support larger IOVA, AMD IOMMU driver increases page table level. But in unmap path (iommu_v1_unmap_pages()), fetch_pte() reads pgtable->[root/mode] without lock. So its possible that in exteme corner case, when increase_address_space() is updating pgtable->[root/mode], fetch_pte() reads wrong page table level (pgtable->mode). It does compare the value with level encoded in page table and returns NULL. This will result is iommu_unmap ops to fail and upper layer may retry/log WARN_ON. CPU 0 CPU 1 ------ ------ map pages unmap pages alloc_pte() -> increase_address_space() iommu_v1_unmap_pages() -> fetch_pte() pgtable->root = pte (new root value) READ pgtable->[mode/root] Reads new root, old mode Updates mode (pgtable->mode += 1) Since Page table level updates are infrequent and already synchronized with a spinlock, implement seqcount to enable lock-free read operations on the read path. Reported-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez(a)oracle.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins(a)oracle.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> --- drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h | 1 + drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h index 5219d7ddfdaa..95f63c5f6159 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h @@ -555,6 +555,7 @@ struct gcr3_tbl_info { }; struct amd_io_pgtable { + seqcount_t seqcount; /* Protects root/mode update */ struct io_pgtable pgtbl; int mode; u64 *root; diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c index a91e71f981ef..70c2f5b1631b 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <linux/seqlock.h> #include <asm/barrier.h> @@ -130,8 +131,11 @@ static bool increase_address_space(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, *pte = PM_LEVEL_PDE(pgtable->mode, iommu_virt_to_phys(pgtable->root)); + write_seqcount_begin(&pgtable->seqcount); pgtable->root = pte; pgtable->mode += 1; + write_seqcount_end(&pgtable->seqcount); + amd_iommu_update_and_flush_device_table(domain); pte = NULL; @@ -153,6 +157,7 @@ static u64 *alloc_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, { unsigned long last_addr = address + (page_size - 1); struct io_pgtable_cfg *cfg = &pgtable->pgtbl.cfg; + unsigned int seqcount; int level, end_lvl; u64 *pte, *page; @@ -170,8 +175,14 @@ static u64 *alloc_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, } - level = pgtable->mode - 1; - pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + do { + seqcount = read_seqcount_begin(&pgtable->seqcount); + + level = pgtable->mode - 1; + pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + } while (read_seqcount_retry(&pgtable->seqcount, seqcount)); + + address = PAGE_SIZE_ALIGN(address, page_size); end_lvl = PAGE_SIZE_LEVEL(page_size); @@ -249,6 +260,7 @@ static u64 *fetch_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, unsigned long *page_size) { int level; + unsigned int seqcount; u64 *pte; *page_size = 0; @@ -256,8 +268,12 @@ static u64 *fetch_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, if (address > PM_LEVEL_SIZE(pgtable->mode)) return NULL; - level = pgtable->mode - 1; - pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + do { + seqcount = read_seqcount_begin(&pgtable->seqcount); + level = pgtable->mode - 1; + pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + } while (read_seqcount_retry(&pgtable->seqcount, seqcount)); + *page_size = PTE_LEVEL_PAGE_SIZE(level); while (level > 0) { @@ -541,6 +557,7 @@ static struct io_pgtable *v1_alloc_pgtable(struct io_pgtable_cfg *cfg, void *coo if (!pgtable->root) return NULL; pgtable->mode = PAGE_MODE_3_LEVEL; + seqcount_init(&pgtable->seqcount); cfg->pgsize_bitmap = amd_iommu_pgsize_bitmap; cfg->ias = IOMMU_IN_ADDR_BIT_SIZE; -- 2.31.1

1 day, 21 hours

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[PATCH] comedi: fix divide-by-zero in comedi_buf_munge()

by Deepanshu Kartikey

The comedi_buf_munge() function performs a modulo operation `async->munge_chan %= async->cmd.chanlist_len` without first checking if chanlist_len is zero. If a user program submits a command with chanlist_len set to zero, this causes a divide-by-zero error when the device processes data in the interrupt handler path. Add a check for zero chanlist_len at the beginning of the function, similar to the existing checks for !map and CMDF_RAWDATA flag. When chanlist_len is zero, update munge_count and return early, indicating the data was handled without munging. This prevents potential kernel panics from malformed user commands. Reported-by: syzbot+f6c3c066162d2c43a66c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f6c3c066162d2c43a66c Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/comedi/comedi_buf.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/comedi/comedi_buf.c b/drivers/comedi/comedi_buf.c index 002c0e76baff..786f888299ce 100644 --- a/drivers/comedi/comedi_buf.c +++ b/drivers/comedi/comedi_buf.c @@ -321,6 +321,11 @@ static unsigned int comedi_buf_munge(struct comedi_subdevice *s, async->munge_count += num_bytes; return num_bytes; } + + if (async->cmd.chanlist_len == 0) { + async->munge_count += num_bytes; + return num_bytes; + } /* don't munge partial samples */ num_bytes -= num_bytes % num_sample_bytes; -- 2.43.0

1 day, 22 hours

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