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Patch "x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-speculation-move-firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_-from-c-to-cpp.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From d72f4e29e6d84b7ec02ae93088aa459ac70e733b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 09:20:37 +0100 Subject: x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP From: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> commit d72f4e29e6d84b7ec02ae93088aa459ac70e733b upstream. firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() recently started using preempt_enable()/disable(), but those are relatively high level primitives and cause build failures on some 32-bit builds. Since we want to keep <asm/nospec-branch.h> low level, convert them to macros to avoid header hell... Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: jmattson(a)google.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: rkrcmar(a)redhat.com Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -257,20 +257,22 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction * before calling into firmware. + * + * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.) */ -static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(void) -{ - preempt_disable(); - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, - X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); -} +#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \ +do { \ + preempt_disable(); \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \ + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ +} while (0) -static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(void) -{ - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0, - X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); - preempt_enable(); -} +#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \ +do { \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0, \ + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ + preempt_enable(); \ +} while (0) #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from mingo(a)kernel.org are queue-4.15/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.15/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.15/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.15/bug-use-pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure.patch queue-4.15/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.15/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.15/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.15/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-move-firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_-from-c-to-cpp.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.15/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.15/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.15/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch queue-4.15/x86-io-apic-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-speculation-move-firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_-from-c-to-cpp.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From d72f4e29e6d84b7ec02ae93088aa459ac70e733b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 09:20:37 +0100 Subject: x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP From: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> commit d72f4e29e6d84b7ec02ae93088aa459ac70e733b upstream. firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() recently started using preempt_enable()/disable(), but those are relatively high level primitives and cause build failures on some 32-bit builds. Since we want to keep <asm/nospec-branch.h> low level, convert them to macros to avoid header hell... Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: jmattson(a)google.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: rkrcmar(a)redhat.com Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -257,20 +257,22 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction * before calling into firmware. + * + * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.) */ -static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(void) -{ - preempt_disable(); - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, - X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); -} +#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \ +do { \ + preempt_disable(); \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \ + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ +} while (0) -static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(void) -{ - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0, - X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); - preempt_enable(); -} +#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \ +do { \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0, \ + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ + preempt_enable(); \ +} while (0) #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from mingo(a)kernel.org are queue-4.14/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.14/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.14/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.14/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.14/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.14/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-move-firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_-from-c-to-cpp.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.14/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.14/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.14/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Re: [alsa-devel] Applied "ASoC: topology: Fix logical inversion in set_link_hw_format()" to the asoc tree

by Pierre-Louis Bossart

On 3/12/18 11:14 AM, Mark Brown wrote: > On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 07:34:07PM +0100, Kirill Marinushkin wrote: >> Hello Mark Brown, Pan Xiuli, >> >> As far as I understand, the suggested commit *breaks* the functionality instead >> of fixing it, and should not be applied. Please correct me if I am wrong. > > This discussion ground to a halt a bit (nobody from Intel seems to have > looked at Kirill's patches?) so I'm going to drop this patch for now, > I'll keep a copy around at test/topology. Sorry, we did look at Kirill's patches but wanted to test further, and of course we are caught in the middle of a release. It's fine to drop this for now.

7 years, 3 months

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[PATCH v2 01/14] mmc: jz4740: Fix race condition in IRQ mask update

by Ezequiel Garcia

From: Alex Smith <alex.smith(a)imgtec.com> A spinlock is held while updating the internal copy of the IRQ mask, but not while writing it to the actual IMASK register. After the lock is released, an IRQ can occur before the IMASK register is written. If handling this IRQ causes the mask to be changed, when the handler returns back to the middle of the first mask update, a stale value will be written to the mask register. If this causes an IRQ to become unmasked that cannot have its status cleared by writing a 1 to it in the IREG register, e.g. the SDIO IRQ, then we can end up stuck with the same IRQ repeatedly being fired but not handled. Normally the MMC IRQ handler attempts to clear any unexpected IRQs by writing IREG, but for those that cannot be cleared in this way then the IRQ will just repeatedly fire. This was resulting in lockups after a while of using Wi-Fi on the CI20 (GitHub issue #19). Resolve by holding the spinlock until after the IMASK register has been updated. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/MIPS/CI20_linux/issues/19 Fixes: 61bfbdb85687 ("MMC: Add support for the controller on JZ4740 SoCs.") Tested-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat(a)debian.org> Signed-off-by: Alex Smith <alex.smith(a)imgtec.com> --- drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c b/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c index 712e08d9a45e..a0168e9e4fce 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c @@ -362,9 +362,9 @@ static void jz4740_mmc_set_irq_enabled(struct jz4740_mmc_host *host, host->irq_mask &= ~irq; else host->irq_mask |= irq; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&host->lock, flags); writew(host->irq_mask, host->base + JZ_REG_MMC_IMASK); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&host->lock, flags); } static void jz4740_mmc_clock_enable(struct jz4740_mmc_host *host, -- 2.16.2

7 years, 3 months

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[merged] mm-page_alloc-fix-memmap_init_zone-pageblock-alignment.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: mm/page_alloc: fix memmap_init_zone pageblock alignment has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was mm-page_alloc-fix-memmap_init_zone-pageblock-alignment.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Daniel Vacek <neelx(a)redhat.com> Subject: mm/page_alloc: fix memmap_init_zone pageblock alignment b92df1de5d28 ("mm: page_alloc: skip over regions of invalid pfns where possible") introduced a bug where move_freepages() triggers a VM_BUG_ON() on uninitialized page structure due to pageblock alignment. To fix this, simply align the skipped pfns in memmap_init_zone() the same way as in move_freepages_block(). Seen in one of the RHEL reports: crash> log | grep -e BUG -e RIP -e Call.Trace -e move_freepages_block -e rmqueue -e freelist -A1 kernel BUG at mm/page_alloc.c:1389! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP -- RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8118833e>] [<ffffffff8118833e>] move_freepages+0x15e/0x160 RSP: 0018:ffff88054d727688 EFLAGS: 00010087 -- Call Trace: [<ffffffff811883b3>] move_freepages_block+0x73/0x80 [<ffffffff81189e63>] __rmqueue+0x263/0x460 [<ffffffff8118c781>] get_page_from_freelist+0x7e1/0x9e0 [<ffffffff8118caf6>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x176/0x420 -- RIP [<ffffffff8118833e>] move_freepages+0x15e/0x160 RSP <ffff88054d727688> crash> page_init_bug -v | grep RAM <struct resource 0xffff88067fffd2f8> 1000 - 9bfff System RAM (620.00 KiB) <struct resource 0xffff88067fffd3a0> 100000 - 430bffff System RAM ( 1.05 GiB = 1071.75 MiB = 1097472.00 KiB) <struct resource 0xffff88067fffd410> 4b0c8000 - 4bf9cfff System RAM ( 14.83 MiB = 15188.00 KiB) <struct resource 0xffff88067fffd480> 4bfac000 - 646b1fff System RAM (391.02 MiB = 400408.00 KiB) <struct resource 0xffff88067fffd560> 7b788000 - 7b7fffff System RAM (480.00 KiB) <struct resource 0xffff88067fffd640> 100000000 - 67fffffff System RAM ( 22.00 GiB) crash> page_init_bug | head -6 <struct resource 0xffff88067fffd560> 7b788000 - 7b7fffff System RAM (480.00 KiB) <struct page 0xffffea0001ede200> 1fffff00000000 0 <struct pglist_data 0xffff88047ffd9000> 1 <struct zone 0xffff88047ffd9800> DMA32 4096 1048575 <struct page 0xffffea0001ede200> 505736 505344 <struct page 0xffffea0001ed8000> 505855 <struct page 0xffffea0001edffc0> <struct page 0xffffea0001ed8000> 0 0 <struct pglist_data 0xffff88047ffd9000> 0 <struct zone 0xffff88047ffd9000> DMA 1 4095 <struct page 0xffffea0001edffc0> 1fffff00000400 0 <struct pglist_data 0xffff88047ffd9000> 1 <struct zone 0xffff88047ffd9800> DMA32 4096 1048575 BUG, zones differ! Note that this range follows two not populated sections 68000000-77ffffff in this zone. 7b788000-7b7fffff is the first one after a gap. This makes memmap_init_zone() skip all the pfns up to the beginning of this range. But this range is not pageblock (2M) aligned. In fact no range has to be. crash> kmem -p 77fff000 78000000 7b5ff000 7b600000 7b787000 7b788000 PAGE PHYSICAL MAPPING INDEX CNT FLAGS ffffea0001e00000 78000000 0 0 0 0 ffffea0001ed7fc0 7b5ff000 0 0 0 0 ffffea0001ed8000 7b600000 0 0 0 0 <<<< ffffea0001ede1c0 7b787000 0 0 0 0 ffffea0001ede200 7b788000 0 0 1 1fffff00000000 Top part of page flags should contain nodeid and zonenr, which is not the case for page ffffea0001ed8000 here (<<<<). crash> log | grep -o fffea0001ed[^\ ]* | sort -u fffea0001ed8000 fffea0001eded20 fffea0001edffc0 crash> bt -r | grep -o fffea0001ed[^\ ]* | sort -u fffea0001ed8000 fffea0001eded00 fffea0001eded20 fffea0001edffc0 Initialization of the whole beginning of the section is skipped up to the start of the range due to the commit b92df1de5d28. Now any code calling move_freepages_block() (like reusing the page from a freelist as in this example) with a page from the beginning of the range will get the page rounded down to start_page ffffea0001ed8000 and passed to move_freepages() which crashes on assertion getting wrong zonenr. > VM_BUG_ON(page_zone(start_page) != page_zone(end_page)); Note, page_zone() derives the zone from page flags here. >From similar machine before commit b92df1de5d28: crash> kmem -p 77fff000 78000000 7b5ff000 7b600000 7b7fe000 7b7ff000 PAGE PHYSICAL MAPPING INDEX CNT FLAGS fffff73941e00000 78000000 0 0 1 1fffff00000000 fffff73941ed7fc0 7b5ff000 0 0 1 1fffff00000000 fffff73941ed8000 7b600000 0 0 1 1fffff00000000 fffff73941edff80 7b7fe000 0 0 1 1fffff00000000 fffff73941edffc0 7b7ff000 ffff8e67e04d3ae0 ad84 1 1fffff00020068 uptodate,lru,active,mappedtodisk All the pages since the beginning of the section are initialized. move_freepages()' not gonna blow up. The same machine with this fix applied: crash> kmem -p 77fff000 78000000 7b5ff000 7b600000 7b7fe000 7b7ff000 PAGE PHYSICAL MAPPING INDEX CNT FLAGS ffffea0001e00000 78000000 0 0 0 0 ffffea0001e00000 7b5ff000 0 0 0 0 ffffea0001ed8000 7b600000 0 0 1 1fffff00000000 ffffea0001edff80 7b7fe000 0 0 1 1fffff00000000 ffffea0001edffc0 7b7ff000 ffff88017fb13720 8 2 1fffff00020068 uptodate,lru,active,mappedtodisk At least the bare minimum of pages is initialized preventing the crash as well. Customers started to report this as soon as 7.4 (where b92df1de5d28 was merged in RHEL) was released. I remember reports from September/October-ish times. It's not easily reproduced and happens on a handful of machines only. I guess that's why. But that does not make it less serious, I think. Though there actually is a report here: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196443 And there are reports for Fedora from July: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1473242 and CentOS: https://bugs.centos.org/view.php?id=13964 and we internally track several dozens reports for RHEL bug https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525121 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0485727b2e82da7efbce5f6ba42524b429d0391a.152001194… Fixes: b92df1de5d28 ("mm: page_alloc: skip over regions of invalid pfns where possible") Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx(a)redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)techsingularity.net> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton(a)imgtec.com> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin(a)oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/page_alloc.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff -puN mm/page_alloc.c~mm-page_alloc-fix-memmap_init_zone-pageblock-alignment mm/page_alloc.c --- a/mm/page_alloc.c~mm-page_alloc-fix-memmap_init_zone-pageblock-alignment +++ a/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -5359,9 +5359,14 @@ void __meminit memmap_init_zone(unsigned /* * Skip to the pfn preceding the next valid one (or * end_pfn), such that we hit a valid pfn (or end_pfn) - * on our next iteration of the loop. + * on our next iteration of the loop. Note that it needs + * to be pageblock aligned even when the region itself + * is not. move_freepages_block() can shift ahead of + * the valid region but still depends on correct page + * metadata. */ - pfn = memblock_next_valid_pfn(pfn, end_pfn) - 1; + pfn = (memblock_next_valid_pfn(pfn, end_pfn) & + ~(pageblock_nr_pages-1)) - 1; #endif continue; } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from neelx(a)redhat.com are

7 years, 3 months

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[merged] mm-memblock-hardcode-the-end_pfn-being-1.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: mm/memblock.c: hardcode the end_pfn being -1 has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was mm-memblock-hardcode-the-end_pfn-being-1.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Daniel Vacek <neelx(a)redhat.com> Subject: mm/memblock.c: hardcode the end_pfn being -1 This is just a cleanup. It aids handling the special end case in the next commit. [akpm(a)linux-foundation.org: make it work against current -linus, not against -mm] [akpm(a)linux-foundation.org: make it work against current -linus, not against -mm some more] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1ca478d4269125a99bcfb1ca04d7b88ac1aee924.152001194… Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx(a)redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)techsingularity.net> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin(a)oracle.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton(a)imgtec.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/memblock.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff -puN mm/memblock.c~mm-memblock-hardcode-the-end_pfn-being-1 mm/memblock.c --- a/mm/memblock.c~mm-memblock-hardcode-the-end_pfn-being-1 +++ a/mm/memblock.c @@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@ unsigned long __init_memblock memblock_n struct memblock_type *type = &memblock.memory; unsigned int right = type->cnt; unsigned int mid, left = 0; - phys_addr_t addr = PFN_PHYS(pfn + 1); + phys_addr_t addr = PFN_PHYS(++pfn); do { mid = (right + left) / 2; @@ -1118,15 +1118,15 @@ unsigned long __init_memblock memblock_n type->regions[mid].size)) left = mid + 1; else { - /* addr is within the region, so pfn + 1 is valid */ - return min(pfn + 1, max_pfn); + /* addr is within the region, so pfn is valid */ + return pfn; } } while (left < right); if (right == type->cnt) - return max_pfn; + return -1UL; else - return min(PHYS_PFN(type->regions[right].base), max_pfn); + return PHYS_PFN(type->regions[right].base); } /** _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from neelx(a)redhat.com are

7 years, 3 months

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[merged] bug-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: lib/bug.c: exclude non-BUG/WARN exceptions from report_bug() has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was bug-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Subject: lib/bug.c: exclude non-BUG/WARN exceptions from report_bug() b8347c219649 ("x86/debug: Handle warnings before the notifier chain, to fix KGDB crash") changed the ordering of fixups, and did not take into account the case of x86 processing non-WARN() and non-BUG() exceptions. This would lead to output of a false BUG line with no other information. In the case of a refcount exception, it would be immediately followed by the refcount WARN(), producing very strange double-"cut here": lkdtm: attempting bad refcount_inc() overflow ------------[ cut here ]------------ Kernel BUG at 0000000065f29de5 [verbose debug info unavailable] ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t overflow at lkdtm_REFCOUNT_INC_OVERFLOW+0x6b/0x90 in cat[3065], uid/euid: 0/0 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3065 at kernel/panic.c:657 refcount_error_report+0x9a/0xa4 ... In the prior ordering, exceptions were searched first: do_trap_no_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int trapnr, char *str, ... if (fixup_exception(regs, trapnr)) return 0; - if (fixup_bug(regs, trapnr)) - return 0; - As a result, fixup_bugs()'s is_valid_bugaddr() didn't take into account needing to search the exception list first, since that had already happened. So, instead of searching the exception list twice (once in is_valid_bugaddr() and then again in fixup_exception()), just add a simple sanity check to report_bug() that will immediately bail out if a BUG() (or WARN()) entry is not found. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180301225934.GA34350@beast Fixes: b8347c219649 ("x86/debug: Handle warnings before the notifier chain, to fix KGDB crash") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger(a)gmail.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- lib/bug.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff -puN lib/bug.c~bug-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug lib/bug.c --- a/lib/bug.c~bug-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug +++ a/lib/bug.c @@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ enum bug_trap_type report_bug(unsigned l return BUG_TRAP_TYPE_NONE; bug = find_bug(bugaddr); + if (!bug) + return BUG_TRAP_TYPE_NONE; file = NULL; line = 0; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from keescook(a)chromium.org are taint-convert-to-indexed-initialization.patch taint-consolidate-documentation.patch taint-add-taint-for-randstruct.patch kernelh-skip-single-eval-logic-on-literals-in-min-max.patch kernelh-skip-single-eval-logic-on-literals-in-min-max-v2.patch kernelh-skip-single-eval-logic-on-literals-in-min-max-v3.patch test_bitmap-do-not-accidentally-use-stack-vla.patch fork-unconditionally-clear-stack-on-fork.patch exec-pass-stack-rlimit-into-mm-layout-functions.patch exec-introduce-finalize_exec-before-start_thread.patch exec-pin-stack-limit-during-exec.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[merged] bug-use-%pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure.patch removed from -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: bug: use %pB in BUG and stack protector failure has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was bug-use-%pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Subject: bug: use %pB in BUG and stack protector failure The BUG and stack protector reports were still using a raw %p. This changes it to %pB for more meaningful output. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180301225704.GA34198@beast Fixes: ad67b74d2469 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger(a)gmail.com>, Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/panic.c | 2 +- lib/bug.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff -puN kernel/panic.c~bug-use-%pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure kernel/panic.c --- a/kernel/panic.c~bug-use-%pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure +++ a/kernel/panic.c @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ device_initcall(register_warn_debugfs); */ __visible void __stack_chk_fail(void) { - panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %p\n", + panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %pB\n", __builtin_return_address(0)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail); diff -puN lib/bug.c~bug-use-%pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure lib/bug.c --- a/lib/bug.c~bug-use-%pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure +++ a/lib/bug.c @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ enum bug_trap_type report_bug(unsigned l if (file) pr_crit("kernel BUG at %s:%u!\n", file, line); else - pr_crit("Kernel BUG at %p [verbose debug info unavailable]\n", + pr_crit("Kernel BUG at %pB [verbose debug info unavailable]\n", (void *)bugaddr); return BUG_TRAP_TYPE_BUG; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from keescook(a)chromium.org are taint-convert-to-indexed-initialization.patch taint-consolidate-documentation.patch taint-add-taint-for-randstruct.patch kernelh-skip-single-eval-logic-on-literals-in-min-max.patch kernelh-skip-single-eval-logic-on-literals-in-min-max-v2.patch kernelh-skip-single-eval-logic-on-literals-in-min-max-v3.patch test_bitmap-do-not-accidentally-use-stack-vla.patch fork-unconditionally-clear-stack-on-fork.patch exec-pass-stack-rlimit-into-mm-layout-functions.patch exec-introduce-finalize_exec-before-start_thread.patch exec-pin-stack-limit-during-exec.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[PATCH] Fix NULL pointer exception in find_bio_stripe()

by Dmitriy Gorokh

On detaching of a disk which is a part of a RAID6 filesystem, the following kernel OOPS may happen: [63122.680461] BTRFS error (device sdo): bdev /dev/sdo errs: wr 0, rd 0, flush 1, corrupt 0, gen 0 [63122.719584] BTRFS warning (device sdo): lost page write due to IO error on /dev/sdo [63122.719587] BTRFS error (device sdo): bdev /dev/sdo errs: wr 1, rd 0, flush 1, corrupt 0, gen 0 [63122.803516] BTRFS warning (device sdo): lost page write due to IO error on /dev/sdo [63122.803519] BTRFS error (device sdo): bdev /dev/sdo errs: wr 2, rd 0, flush 1, corrupt 0, gen 0 [63122.863902] BTRFS critical (device sdo): fatal error on device /dev/sdo [63122.935338] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080 [63122.946554] IP: fail_bio_stripe+0x58/0xa0 [btrfs] [63122.958185] PGD 9ecda067 P4D 9ecda067 PUD b2b37067 PMD 0 [63122.971202] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [63122.990786] Modules linked in: libcrc32c dlm configfs cpufreq_userspace cpufreq_powersave cpufreq_conservative softdog nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc bonding ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler joydev snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec snd_pcm snd_timer snd psmouse evdev parport_pc soundcore serio_raw battery pcspkr video ac97_bus ac parport ohci_pci ohci_hcd i2c_piix4 button crc32c_generic crc32c_intel btrfs xor zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid6_pq dm_mod dax raid1 md_mod hid_generic usbhid hid xhci_pci xhci_hcd ehci_pci ehci_hcd usbcore sg sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic ahci libahci ata_piix libata e1000 scsi_mod [last unloaded: scst] [63123.006760] CPU: 0 PID: 3979 Comm: kworker/u8:9 Tainted: G W 4.14.2-16-scst34x+ #8 [63123.007091] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [63123.007402] Workqueue: btrfs-worker btrfs_worker_helper [btrfs] [63123.007595] task: ffff880036ea4040 task.stack: ffffc90006384000 [63123.007796] RIP: 0010:fail_bio_stripe+0x58/0xa0 [btrfs] [63123.007968] RSP: 0018:ffffc90006387ad8 EFLAGS: 00010287 [63123.008140] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88004beaa0b8 RCX: ffff8800b2bd5690 [63123.008359] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88007bb43500 RDI: ffff88004beaa000 [63123.008621] RBP: ffffc90006387ae8 R08: 0000000099100000 R09: ffff8800b2bd5600 [63123.008840] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000010000 R12: ffff88007bb43500 [63123.009059] R13: 00000000fffffffb R14: ffff880036fc5180 R15: 0000000000000004 [63123.009278] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8800b7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [63123.009564] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [63123.009748] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 00000000b0866000 CR4: 00000000000406f0 [63123.009969] Call Trace: [63123.010085] raid_write_end_io+0x7e/0x80 [btrfs] [63123.010251] bio_endio+0xa1/0x120 [63123.010378] generic_make_request+0x218/0x270 [63123.010921] submit_bio+0x66/0x130 [63123.011073] finish_rmw+0x3fc/0x5b0 [btrfs] [63123.011245] full_stripe_write+0x96/0xc0 [btrfs] [63123.011428] raid56_parity_write+0x117/0x170 [btrfs] [63123.011604] btrfs_map_bio+0x2ec/0x320 [btrfs] [63123.011759] ? ___cache_free+0x1c5/0x300 [63123.011909] __btrfs_submit_bio_done+0x26/0x50 [btrfs] [63123.012087] run_one_async_done+0x9c/0xc0 [btrfs] [63123.012257] normal_work_helper+0x19e/0x300 [btrfs] [63123.012429] btrfs_worker_helper+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] [63123.012656] process_one_work+0x14d/0x350 [63123.012888] worker_thread+0x4d/0x3a0 [63123.013026] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x15/0x20 [63123.013192] kthread+0x109/0x140 [63123.013315] ? process_scheduled_works+0x40/0x40 [63123.013472] ? kthread_stop+0x110/0x110 [63123.013610] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 [63123.013741] Code: 7e 43 31 c0 48 63 d0 48 8d 14 52 49 8d 4c d1 60 48 8b 51 08 49 39 d0 72 1f 4c 63 1b 4c 01 da 49 39 d0 73 14 48 8b 11 48 8b 52 68 <48> 8b 8a 80 00 00 00 48 39 4e 08 74 14 83 c0 01 44 39 d0 75 c4 [63123.014469] RIP: fail_bio_stripe+0x58/0xa0 [btrfs] RSP: ffffc90006387ad8 [63123.014678] CR2: 0000000000000080 [63123.016590] ---[ end trace a295ea7259c17880 ]— This is reproducible in a cycle, where a series of writes is followed by SCSI device delete command. The test may take up to few minutes. Fixes: commit 74d46992e0d9dee7f1f376de0d56d31614c8a17a ("block: replace bi_bdev with a gendisk pointer and partitions index") --- fs/btrfs/raid56.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c index dec0907dfb8a..fcfc20de2df3 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c @@ -1370,6 +1370,7 @@ static int find_bio_stripe(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio, stripe_start = stripe->physical; if (physical >= stripe_start && physical < stripe_start + rbio->stripe_len && + stripe->dev->bdev && bio->bi_disk == stripe->dev->bdev->bd_disk && bio->bi_partno == stripe->dev->bdev->bd_partno) { return i; -- 2.14.2

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64()" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64() to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From bd89004f6305cbf7352238f61da093207ee518d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 10:38:09 +0100 Subject: x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64() From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit bd89004f6305cbf7352238f61da093207ee518d6 upstream. The objtool retpoline validation found this indirect jump. Seeing how it's on CPU bringup before we run userspace it should be safe, annotate it. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <asm/nops.h> #include "../entry/calling.h" #include <asm/export.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> @@ -200,6 +201,7 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64) /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */ movq $1f, %rax + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE jmp *%rax 1: Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.9/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.9/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.9/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 3010a0663fd949d122eca0561b06b0a9453f7866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 16:58:11 +0100 Subject: x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 3010a0663fd949d122eca0561b06b0a9453f7866 upstream. Paravirt emits indirect calls which get flagged by objtool retpoline checks, annotate it away because all these indirect calls will be patched out before we start userspace. This patching happens through alternative_instructions() -> apply_paravirt() -> pv_init_ops.patch() which will eventually end up in paravirt_patch_default(). This function _will_ write direct alternatives. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 16 ++++++++++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> #include <asm/asm.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/paravirt_types.h> @@ -869,23 +870,27 @@ extern void default_banner(void); #define INTERRUPT_RETURN \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_iret), CLBR_NONE, \ - jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret);) #define DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_disable), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_disable); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #define ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_enable), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_enable); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 #define GET_CR0_INTO_EAX \ push %ecx; push %edx; \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_read_cr0); \ pop %edx; pop %ecx #else /* !CONFIG_X86_32 */ @@ -907,11 +912,13 @@ extern void default_banner(void); */ #define SWAPGS \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_swapgs), CLBR_NONE, \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs) \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs); \ ) #define GET_CR2_INTO_RAX \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2); #define PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_adjust_exception_frame), \ @@ -921,7 +928,8 @@ extern void default_banner(void); #define USERGS_SYSRET64 \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64), \ CLBR_NONE, \ - jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64);) #endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include <asm/desc_defs.h> #include <asm/kmap_types.h> #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> struct page; struct thread_struct; @@ -391,7 +392,9 @@ int paravirt_disable_iospace(void); * offset into the paravirt_patch_template structure, and can therefore be * freely converted back into a structure offset. */ -#define PARAVIRT_CALL "call *%c[paravirt_opptr];" +#define PARAVIRT_CALL \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "call *%c[paravirt_opptr];" /* * These macros are intended to wrap calls through one of the paravirt Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.9/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.9/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.9/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 3010a0663fd949d122eca0561b06b0a9453f7866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 16:58:11 +0100 Subject: x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 3010a0663fd949d122eca0561b06b0a9453f7866 upstream. Paravirt emits indirect calls which get flagged by objtool retpoline checks, annotate it away because all these indirect calls will be patched out before we start userspace. This patching happens through alternative_instructions() -> apply_paravirt() -> pv_init_ops.patch() which will eventually end up in paravirt_patch_default(). This function _will_ write direct alternatives. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 17 +++++++++++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> #include <asm/asm.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/paravirt_types.h> @@ -879,23 +880,27 @@ extern void default_banner(void); #define INTERRUPT_RETURN \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_iret), CLBR_NONE, \ - jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret);) #define DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_disable), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_disable); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #define ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_enable), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_enable); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 #define GET_CR0_INTO_EAX \ push %ecx; push %edx; \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_read_cr0); \ pop %edx; pop %ecx #else /* !CONFIG_X86_32 */ @@ -917,21 +922,25 @@ extern void default_banner(void); */ #define SWAPGS \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_swapgs), CLBR_NONE, \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs) \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs); \ ) #define GET_CR2_INTO_RAX \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2); #define USERGS_SYSRET64 \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64), \ CLBR_NONE, \ - jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64);) #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY #define SAVE_FLAGS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_save_fl), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_save_fl); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #endif --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include <asm/desc_defs.h> #include <asm/kmap_types.h> #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> struct page; struct thread_struct; @@ -392,7 +393,9 @@ int paravirt_disable_iospace(void); * offset into the paravirt_patch_template structure, and can therefore be * freely converted back into a structure offset. */ -#define PARAVIRT_CALL "call *%c[paravirt_opptr];" +#define PARAVIRT_CALL \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "call *%c[paravirt_opptr];" /* * These macros are intended to wrap calls through one of the paravirt Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.15/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.15/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.15/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.15/bug-use-pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure.patch queue-4.15/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.15/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.15/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.15/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.15/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.15/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.15/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch queue-4.15/x86-io-apic-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute()" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute() to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 531bb52a869a9c6e08c8d17ba955fcbfc18037ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 16:18:50 +0100 Subject: x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute() From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 531bb52a869a9c6e08c8d17ba955fcbfc18037ad upstream. This is boot code and thus Spectre-safe: we run this _way_ before userspace comes along to have a chance to poison our branch predictor. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> .text .code64 @@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute) movq %rax, %r8 /* Workarea encryption routine */ addq $PAGE_SIZE, %r8 /* Workarea intermediate copy buffer */ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE call *%rax /* Call the encryption routine */ pop %r12 Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.15/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.15/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.15/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.15/bug-use-pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure.patch queue-4.15/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.15/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.15/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.15/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.15/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.15/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.15/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch queue-4.15/x86-io-apic-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64()" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64() to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From bd89004f6305cbf7352238f61da093207ee518d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 10:38:09 +0100 Subject: x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64() From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit bd89004f6305cbf7352238f61da093207ee518d6 upstream. The objtool retpoline validation found this indirect jump. Seeing how it's on CPU bringup before we run userspace it should be safe, annotate it. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <asm/nops.h> #include "../entry/calling.h" #include <asm/export.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> @@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64) /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */ movq $1f, %rax + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE jmp *%rax 1: UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.15/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.15/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.15/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.15/bug-use-pb-in-bug-and-stack-protector-failure.patch queue-4.15/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.15/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.15/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.15/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.15/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.15/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.15/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.15/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.15/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch queue-4.15/x86-io-apic-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute()" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute() to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 531bb52a869a9c6e08c8d17ba955fcbfc18037ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 16:18:50 +0100 Subject: x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute() From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 531bb52a869a9c6e08c8d17ba955fcbfc18037ad upstream. This is boot code and thus Spectre-safe: we run this _way_ before userspace comes along to have a chance to poison our branch predictor. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> .text .code64 @@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute) movq %rax, %r8 /* Workarea encryption routine */ addq $PAGE_SIZE, %r8 /* Workarea intermediate copy buffer */ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE call *%rax /* Call the encryption routine */ pop %r12 Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.14/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.14/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.14/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.14/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.14/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.14/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.14/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.14/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.14/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 3010a0663fd949d122eca0561b06b0a9453f7866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 16:58:11 +0100 Subject: x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 3010a0663fd949d122eca0561b06b0a9453f7866 upstream. Paravirt emits indirect calls which get flagged by objtool retpoline checks, annotate it away because all these indirect calls will be patched out before we start userspace. This patching happens through alternative_instructions() -> apply_paravirt() -> pv_init_ops.patch() which will eventually end up in paravirt_patch_default(). This function _will_ write direct alternatives. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 17 +++++++++++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> #include <asm/asm.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/paravirt_types.h> @@ -879,23 +880,27 @@ extern void default_banner(void); #define INTERRUPT_RETURN \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_iret), CLBR_NONE, \ - jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret);) #define DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_disable), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_disable); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #define ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_enable), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_enable); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 #define GET_CR0_INTO_EAX \ push %ecx; push %edx; \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_read_cr0); \ pop %edx; pop %ecx #else /* !CONFIG_X86_32 */ @@ -917,21 +922,25 @@ extern void default_banner(void); */ #define SWAPGS \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_swapgs), CLBR_NONE, \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs) \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs); \ ) #define GET_CR2_INTO_RAX \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2); #define USERGS_SYSRET64 \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64), \ CLBR_NONE, \ - jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ + jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64);) #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY #define SAVE_FLAGS(clobbers) \ PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_save_fl), clobbers, \ PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE); \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_save_fl); \ PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);) #endif --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include <asm/desc_defs.h> #include <asm/kmap_types.h> #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> struct page; struct thread_struct; @@ -392,7 +393,9 @@ int paravirt_disable_iospace(void); * offset into the paravirt_patch_template structure, and can therefore be * freely converted back into a structure offset. */ -#define PARAVIRT_CALL "call *%c[paravirt_opptr];" +#define PARAVIRT_CALL \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "call *%c[paravirt_opptr];" /* * These macros are intended to wrap calls through one of the paravirt Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.14/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.14/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.14/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.14/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.14/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.14/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.14/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.14/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.14/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64()" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64() to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From bd89004f6305cbf7352238f61da093207ee518d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 10:38:09 +0100 Subject: x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64() From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit bd89004f6305cbf7352238f61da093207ee518d6 upstream. The objtool retpoline validation found this indirect jump. Seeing how it's on CPU bringup before we run userspace it should be safe, annotate it. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <asm/nops.h> #include "../entry/calling.h" #include <asm/export.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> @@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64) /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */ movq $1f, %rax + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE jmp *%rax 1: UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.14/x86-boot-objtool-annotate-indirect-jump-in-secondary_startup_64.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.14/x86-ldt-avoid-warning-in-32-bit-builds-with-older-gcc.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-reduce-the-code-footprint-of-the-idtentry-macro.patch queue-4.14/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.14/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-remove-stale-comment-about-kmemcheck.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-sme-objtool-annotate-indirect-call-in-sme_encrypt_execute.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.14/x86-asm-improve-how-gen_-_suffixed_rmwcc-specify-clobbers.patch queue-4.14/x86-64-realmode-add-instruction-suffix.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.14/x86-paravirt-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls.patch queue-4.14/x86-entry-64-use-xorl-for-faster-register-clearing.patch queue-4.14/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch queue-4.14/lib-bug.c-exclude-non-bug-warn-exceptions-from-report_bug.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[PATCH 3.16 00/76] 3.16.56-rc1 review

by Ben Hutchings

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.16.56 release. There are 76 patches in this series, which will be posted as responses to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know. Responses should be made by Wed Mar 14 12:00:00 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late. All the patches have also been committed to the linux-3.16.y-rc branch of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bwh/linux-stable-rc.git . A shortlog and diffstat can be found below. Ben. ------------- Andi Kleen (3): module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module [caf7501a1b4ec964190f31f9c3f163de252273b8] x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps [7614e913db1f40fff819b36216484dc3808995d4] x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB [3f7d875566d8e79c5e0b2c9a413e91b2c29e0854] Andrey Ryabinin (1): x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value [196bd485ee4f03ce4c690bfcf38138abfcd0a4bc] Andy Lutomirski (3): x86/asm: Make asm/alternative.h safe from assembly [f005f5d860e0231fe212cfda8c1a3148b99609f4] x86/cpu: Factor out application of forced CPU caps [8bf1ebca215c262e48c15a4a15f175991776f57f] x86: Clean up current_stack_pointer [83653c16da91112236292871b820cb8b367220e3] Arnd Bergmann (1): x86: fix build warnign with 32-bit PAE [not upstream; specific to KAISER] Ben Hutchings (1): x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation [2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681] Borislav Petkov (6): x86/alternatives: Fix ALTERNATIVE_2 padding generation properly [dbe4058a6a44af4ca5d146aebe01b0a1f9b7fd2a] x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking [612e8e9350fd19cae6900cf36ea0c6892d1a0dca] x86/alternatives: Guard NOPs optimization [69df353ff305805fc16082d0c5bfa6e20fa8b863] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg [55fa19d3e51f33d9cd4056d25836d93abf9438db] x86/cpu: Merge bugs.c and bugs_64.c [62a67e123e058a67db58bc6a14354dd037bafd0a] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names [7a32fc51ca938e67974cbb9db31e1a43f98345a9] Colin Ian King (1): x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" [e698dcdfcda41efd0984de539767b4cddd235f1e] Dan Carpenter (1): x86/spectre: Fix an error message [9de29eac8d2189424d81c0d840cd0469aa3d41c8] Dan Williams (13): array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references [f3804203306e098dae9ca51540fcd5eb700d7f40] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params [259d8c1e984318497c84eef547bbb6b1d9f4eb05] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency [eb6174f6d1be16b19cfa43dac296bfed003ce1a6] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() [1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution [56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation [c7f631cb07e7da06ac1d231ca178452339e32a94] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation [085331dfc6bbe3501fb936e657331ca943827600] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 [edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec [304ec1b050310548db33063e567123fae8fd0301] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} [b5c4ae4f35325d520b230bab6eb3310613b72ac1] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec [babdde2698d482b6c0de1eab4f697cf5856c5859] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec [b3bbfb3fb5d25776b8e3f361d2eedaabb0b496cd] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec [b3d7ad85b80bbc404635dca80f5b129f6242bc7a] Darren Kenny (1): x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL [af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881] Dave Hansen (2): x86/Documentation: Add PTI description [01c9b17bf673b05bb401b76ec763e9730ccf1376] x86/cpu/intel: Introduce macros for Intel family numbers [970442c599b22ccd644ebfe94d1d303bf6f87c05] David Woodhouse (14): sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation [9ecccfaa7cb5249bd31bdceb93fcf5bedb8a24d8] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12] [99c6fa2511d8a683e61468be91b83f85452115fa] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags [2961298efe1ea1b6fc0d7ee8b76018fa6c0bcef2] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps [5096732f6f695001fa2d6f1335a2680b37912c69] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps [9697fa39efd3fc3692f2949d4045f393ec58450b] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps [2641f08bb7fc63a636a2b18173221d7040a3512e] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps [9351803bd803cdbeb9b5a7850b7b6f464806e3db] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps [e70e5892b28c18f517f29ab6e83bd57705104b31] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps [ea08816d5b185ab3d09e95e393f265af54560350] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support [76b043848fd22dbf7f8bf3a1452f8c70d557b860] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions [66f793099a636862a71c59d4a6ba91387b155e0c] x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs [c995efd5a740d9cbafbf58bde4973e8b50b4d761] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit [117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation [da285121560e769cc31797bba6422eea71d473e0] Dou Liyang (1): x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser [9471eee9186a46893726e22ebb54cade3f9bc043] Gustavo A. R. Silva (1): x86/cpu: Change type of x86_cache_size variable to unsigned int [24dbc6000f4b9b0ef5a9daecb161f1907733765a] Jim Mattson (1): kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit [0cb5b30698fdc8f6b4646012e3acb4ddce430788] Josh Poimboeuf (1): x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option [12c69f1e94c89d40696e83804dd2f0965b5250cd] KarimAllah Ahmed (1): x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing [9005c6834c0ffdfe46afa76656bd9276cca864f6] Linus Torvalds (2): x86: fix SMAP in 32-bit environments [de9e478b9d49f3a0214310d921450cf5bb4a21e6] x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses [11f1a4b9755f5dbc3e822a96502ebe9b044b14d8] Mark Rutland (1): Documentation: Document array_index_nospec [f84a56f73dddaeac1dba8045b007f742f61cd2da] Masahiro Yamada (1): kconfig.h: use __is_defined() to check if MODULE is defined [4f920843d248946545415c1bf6120942048708ed] Masami Hiramatsu (3): kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes [c1804a236894ecc942da7dc6c5abe209e56cba93] kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk [c86a32c09f8ced67971a2310e3b0dda4d1749007] retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk [736e80a4213e9bbce40a7c050337047128b472ac] Peter Zijlstra (2): KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe [c940a3fb1e2e9b7d03228ab28f375fb5a47ff699] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe [1a29b5b7f347a1a9230c1e0af5b37e3e571588ab] Thomas Gleixner (8): sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder [87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9] x86/alternatives: Make optimize_nops() interrupt safe and synced [66c117d7fa2ae429911e60d84bf31a90b2b96189] x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional [e383095c7fe8d218e00ec0f83e4b95ed4e627b02] x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions [61dc0f555b5c761cdafb0ba5bd41ecf22d68a4c4] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE [a89f040fa34ec9cd682aed98b8f04e3c47d998bd] x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky [6cbd2171e89b13377261d15e64384df60ecb530e] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN [de791821c295cc61419a06fe5562288417d1bc58] x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning [b8b9ce4b5aec8de9e23cabb0a26b78641f9ab1d6] Tom Lendacky (4): x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors [694d99d40972f12e59a3696effee8a376b79d7c8] x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction [e4d0e84e490790798691aaa0f2e598637f1867ec] x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC [9c6a73c75864ad9fa49e5fa6513e4c4071c0e29f] x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros [28d437d550e1e39f805d99f9f8ac399c778827b7] Waiman Long (1): x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk [1df37383a8aeabb9b418698f0bcdffea01f4b1b2] Will Deacon (1): nospec: Move array_index_nospec() parameter checking into separate macro [8fa80c503b484ddc1abbd10c7cb2ab81f3824a50] Zhenwei.Pi (1): x86/pti: Document fix wrong index [98f0fceec7f84d80bc053e49e596088573086421] Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 16 ++ Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 51 +++- Documentation/speculation.txt | 90 +++++++ Documentation/x86/pti.txt | 186 +++++++++++++ Makefile | 4 +- arch/x86/Kconfig | 14 + arch/x86/Makefile | 8 + arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 5 +- arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S | 3 +- arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S | 3 +- arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h | 14 +- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 20 +- arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 11 + arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 31 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 8 + arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 68 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 198 ++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 38 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 64 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 24 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 94 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 5 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/msr-index.h | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 29 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 28 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 299 ++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs_64.c | 33 --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 32 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S | 15 +- arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 29 +- arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 16 +- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 23 +- arch/x86/kernel/mcount_64.S | 8 +- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 6 + arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 46 ++-- arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 7 +- arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 10 + arch/x86/lib/retpoline-export.c | 24 ++ arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 47 ++++ arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 20 +- drivers/base/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/base/cpu.c | 48 ++++ drivers/hv/hv.c | 25 +- include/linux/cpu.h | 7 + include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 +- include/linux/init.h | 9 +- include/linux/kaiser.h | 2 +- include/linux/kconfig.h | 9 +- include/linux/module.h | 9 + include/linux/nospec.h | 59 ++++ kernel/module.c | 11 + net/wireless/nl80211.c | 9 +- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 + 61 files changed, 1662 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-) -- Ben Hutchings Design a system any fool can use, and only a fool will want to use it.

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From dd84441a797150dcc49298ec95c459a8891d8bb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 10:50:54 +0000 Subject: x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit dd84441a797150dcc49298ec95c459a8891d8bb1 upstream. Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS for firmware calls if it's available. Block preemption while IBRS is set, although in practice the call sites already had to be doing that. Ignore hpwdt.c for now. It's taking spinlocks and calling into firmware code, from an NMI handler. I don't want to touch that with a bargepole. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: jmattson(a)google.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: rkrcmar(a)redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519037457-7643-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h | 6 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 17 +++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++++- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_MACH_DEFAULT_APM_H #define _ASM_X86_MACH_DEFAULT_APM_H +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> + #ifdef APM_ZERO_SEGS # define APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS \ "pushl %%ds\n\t" \ @@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 * N.B. We do NOT need a cld after the BIOS call * because we always save and restore the flags. */ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS "pushl %%edi\n\t" "pushl %%ebp\n\t" @@ -43,6 +46,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 "=S" (*esi) : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in) : "memory", "cc"); + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); } static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in, @@ -55,6 +59,7 @@ static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_ * N.B. We do NOT need a cld after the BIOS call * because we always save and restore the flags. */ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS "pushl %%edi\n\t" "pushl %%ebp\n\t" @@ -67,6 +72,7 @@ static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_ "=S" (si) : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in) : "memory", "cc"); + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); return error; } --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ +#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h> #include <asm/tlb.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> /* * We map the EFI regions needed for runtime services non-contiguously, @@ -35,8 +36,18 @@ extern unsigned long asmlinkage efi_call_phys(void *, ...); -#define arch_efi_call_virt_setup() kernel_fpu_begin() -#define arch_efi_call_virt_teardown() kernel_fpu_end() +#define arch_efi_call_virt_setup() \ +({ \ + kernel_fpu_begin(); \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \ +}) + +#define arch_efi_call_virt_teardown() \ +({ \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \ + kernel_fpu_end(); \ +}) + /* * Wrap all the virtual calls in a way that forces the parameters on the stack. @@ -72,6 +83,7 @@ struct efi_scratch { efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(); \ preempt_disable(); \ __kernel_fpu_begin(); \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \ \ if (efi_scratch.use_pgd) { \ efi_scratch.prev_cr3 = read_cr3(); \ @@ -90,6 +102,7 @@ struct efi_scratch { __flush_tlb_all(); \ } \ \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \ __kernel_fpu_end(); \ preempt_enable(); \ }) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -219,17 +219,38 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) #endif } +#define alternative_msr_write(_msr, _val, _feature) \ + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", \ + "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" \ + "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" \ + "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" \ + "wrmsr", \ + _feature) \ + : : [msr] "i" (_msr), [val] "i" (_val) \ + : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory") + static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) { - asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", - "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" - "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" - "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" - "wrmsr", - X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) - : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD), - [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB) - : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"); + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); +} + +/* + * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction + * before calling into firmware. + */ +static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); +} + +static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(void) +{ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0, + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); + preempt_enable(); } #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -299,6 +299,15 @@ retpoline_auto: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); } + + /* + * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect + * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); + pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); + } } #undef pr_fmt @@ -325,8 +334,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.9/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/speculation, objtool: Annotate indirect calls/jumps for objtool" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation, objtool: Annotate indirect calls/jumps for objtool to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 9e0e3c5130e949c389caabc8033e9799b129e429 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 22:34:34 +0100 Subject: x86/speculation, objtool: Annotate indirect calls/jumps for objtool From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> commit 9e0e3c5130e949c389caabc8033e9799b129e429 upstream. Annotate the indirect calls/jumps in the CALL_NOSPEC/JUMP_NOSPEC alternatives. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -68,6 +68,18 @@ .endm /* + * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells + * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline + * builds. + */ +.macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + .Lannotate_\@: + .pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe + _ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@ + .popsection +.endm + +/* * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call. * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE * invocation below less ugly. @@ -103,9 +115,9 @@ .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg), \ + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), \ __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ - __stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD + __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD #else jmp *\reg #endif @@ -114,9 +126,9 @@ .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(call *\reg), \ + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), \ __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\ - __stringify(lfence; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD + __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD #else call *\reg #endif @@ -144,6 +156,12 @@ ".long 999b - .\n\t" \ ".popsection\n\t" +#define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "999:\n\t" \ + ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t" \ + _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \ + ".popsection\n\t" + #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE) /* @@ -153,6 +171,7 @@ # define CALL_NOSPEC \ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ ALTERNATIVE( \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.9/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.9/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "x86/retpoline: Support retpoline builds with Clang" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline: Support retpoline builds with Clang to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 87358710c1fb4f1bf96bbe2349975ff9953fc9b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 10:50:57 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline: Support retpoline builds with Clang From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit 87358710c1fb4f1bf96bbe2349975ff9953fc9b2 upstream. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: jmattson(a)google.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: rkrcmar(a)redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519037457-7643-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/Makefile | 5 ++++- include/linux/compiler-clang.h | 5 +++++ include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/init.h | 8 ++++---- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -184,7 +184,10 @@ KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(mflags-y) # Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) + RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_GCC := -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register + RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_CLANG := -mretpoline-external-thunk + + RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_GCC),$(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_CLANG))) ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),) KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE endif --- a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h @@ -15,3 +15,8 @@ * with any version that can compile the kernel */ #define __UNIQUE_ID(prefix) __PASTE(__PASTE(__UNIQUE_ID_, prefix), __COUNTER__) + +/* Clang doesn't have a way to turn it off per-function, yet. */ +#ifdef __noretpoline +#undef __noretpoline +#endif --- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h @@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ #define __weak __attribute__((weak)) #define __alias(symbol) __attribute__((alias(#symbol))) +#ifdef RETPOLINE +#define __noretpoline __attribute__((indirect_branch("keep"))) +#endif + /* * it doesn't make sense on ARM (currently the only user of __naked) * to trace naked functions because then mcount is called without --- a/include/linux/init.h +++ b/include/linux/init.h @@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ #include <linux/types.h> /* Built-in __init functions needn't be compiled with retpoline */ -#if defined(RETPOLINE) && !defined(MODULE) -#define __noretpoline __attribute__((indirect_branch("keep"))) +#if defined(__noretpoline) && !defined(MODULE) +#define __noinitretpoline __noretpoline #else -#define __noretpoline +#define __noinitretpoline #endif /* These macros are used to mark some functions or @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ /* These are for everybody (although not all archs will actually discard it in modules) */ -#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold notrace __latent_entropy __noretpoline +#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold notrace __latent_entropy __noinitretpoline #define __initdata __section(.init.data) #define __initconst __section(.init.rodata) #define __exitdata __section(.exit.data) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.9/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "Revert "x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()"" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled Revert "x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()" to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From d1c99108af3c5992640aa2afa7d2e88c3775c06e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 10:50:56 +0000 Subject: Revert "x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()" From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit d1c99108af3c5992640aa2afa7d2e88c3775c06e upstream. This reverts commit 1dde7415e99933bb7293d6b2843752cbdb43ec11. By putting the RSB filling out of line and calling it, we waste one RSB slot for returning from the function itself, which means one fewer actual function call we can make if we're doing the Skylake abomination of call-depth counting. It also changed the number of RSB stuffings we do on vmexit from 32, which was correct, to 16. Let's just stop with the bikeshedding; it didn't actually *fix* anything anyway. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: jmattson(a)google.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: rkrcmar(a)redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519037457-7643-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 3 - arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3 - arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 3 - arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 56 --------------------------- 6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -237,8 +237,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - /* Clobbers %ebx */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -331,8 +331,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - /* Clobbers %rbx */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -37,7 +37,4 @@ INDIRECT_THUNK(dx) INDIRECT_THUNK(si) INDIRECT_THUNK(di) INDIRECT_THUNK(bp) -asmlinkage void __fill_rsb(void); -asmlinkage void __clear_rsb(void); - #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -8,6 +8,50 @@ #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h> +/* + * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. + * + * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an + * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. + * + * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based + * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to + * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes + * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would + * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. + * + * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and + * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that + * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there. + */ + +#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ +#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ + +/* + * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be + * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation + * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. + */ +#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ + mov $(nr/2), reg; \ +771: \ + call 772f; \ +773: /* speculation trap */ \ + pause; \ + lfence; \ + jmp 773b; \ +772: \ + call 774f; \ +775: /* speculation trap */ \ + pause; \ + lfence; \ + jmp 775b; \ +774: \ + dec reg; \ + jnz 771b; \ + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; + #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ /* @@ -78,10 +122,17 @@ #endif .endm -/* This clobbers the BX register */ -.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER nr:req ftr:req + /* + * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP + * monstrosity above, manually. + */ +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ALTERNATIVE "", "call __clear_rsb", \ftr + ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ + __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ + \ftr +.Lskip_rsb_\@: #endif .endm @@ -156,10 +207,15 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - alternative_input("", - "call __fill_rsb", - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, - ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER(_ASM_BX, "memory")); + unsigned long loops; + + asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", + __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) + "910:" + : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT + : : "memory" ); #endif } --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o -OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_retpoline.o :=y obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/export.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> -#include <asm/bitsperlong.h> .macro THUNK reg .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk @@ -47,58 +46,3 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(r13) GENERATE_THUNK(r14) GENERATE_THUNK(r15) #endif - -/* - * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. - * - * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an - * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. - * - * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based - * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to - * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes - * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would - * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. - * - * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be - * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation - * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. - */ -.macro STUFF_RSB nr:req sp:req - mov $(\nr / 2), %_ASM_BX - .align 16 -771: - call 772f -773: /* speculation trap */ - pause - lfence - jmp 773b - .align 16 -772: - call 774f -775: /* speculation trap */ - pause - lfence - jmp 775b - .align 16 -774: - dec %_ASM_BX - jnz 771b - add $((BITS_PER_LONG/8) * \nr), \sp -.endm - -#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ - -ENTRY(__fill_rsb) - STUFF_RSB RSB_FILL_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP - ret -END(__fill_rsb) -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fill_rsb) - -#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ - -ENTRY(__clear_rsb) - STUFF_RSB RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP - ret -END(__clear_rsb) -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__clear_rsb) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch queue-4.9/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check()" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 13:20:42 -0800 Subject: nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> commit 1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da upstream. There are multiple problems with the dynamic sanity checking in array_index_nospec_mask_check(): * It causes unnecessary overhead in the 32-bit case since integer sized @index values will no longer cause the check to be compiled away like in the 64-bit case. * In the 32-bit case it may trigger with user controllable input when the expectation is that should only trigger during development of new kernel enabling. * The macro reuses the input parameter in multiple locations which is broken if someone passes an expression like 'index++' to array_index_nospec(). Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881604278.17395.6605847763178076520.stgit@dwill… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/nospec.h | 22 +--------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 21 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/nospec.h +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h @@ -30,26 +30,6 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_ #endif /* - * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage. - * - * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the - * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the - * mask. - * - * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that - * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX. - */ -#define array_index_mask_nospec_check(index, size) \ -({ \ - if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX, \ - "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n")) \ - _mask = 0; \ - else \ - _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(index, size); \ - _mask; \ -}) - -/* * array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check * * For a code sequence like: @@ -67,7 +47,7 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_ ({ \ typeof(index) _i = (index); \ typeof(size) _s = (size); \ - unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec_check(_i, _s); \ + unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \ \ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.9/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From eb6174f6d1be16b19cfa43dac296bfed003ce1a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 13:20:54 -0800 Subject: nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> commit eb6174f6d1be16b19cfa43dac296bfed003ce1a6 upstream. The nospec.h header expects the per-architecture header file <asm/barrier.h> to optionally define array_index_mask_nospec(). Include that dependency to prevent inadvertent fallback to the default array_index_mask_nospec() implementation. The default implementation may not provide a full mitigation on architectures that perform data value speculation. Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881605404.17395.1341935530792574707.stgit@dwill… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/nospec.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/include/linux/nospec.h +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H #define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H +#include <asm/barrier.h> /** * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch queue-4.9/nospec-kill-array_index_nospec_mask_check.patch

7 years, 3 months

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Patch "nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From eb6174f6d1be16b19cfa43dac296bfed003ce1a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 13:20:54 -0800 Subject: nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> commit eb6174f6d1be16b19cfa43dac296bfed003ce1a6 upstream. The nospec.h header expects the per-architecture header file <asm/barrier.h> to optionally define array_index_mask_nospec(). Include that dependency to prevent inadvertent fallback to the default array_index_mask_nospec() implementation. The default implementation may not provide a full mitigation on architectures that perform data value speculation. Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881605404.17395.1341935530792574707.stgit@dwill… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/nospec.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/include/linux/nospec.h +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H #define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H +#include <asm/barrier.h> /** * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.4/nospec-include-asm-barrier.h-dependency.patch

7 years, 3 months

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