This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
MIPS: Factor out NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From a03fe72572c12e98f4173f8a535f32468e48b6ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro(a)mips.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 22:51:35 +0000
Subject: MIPS: Factor out NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
commit a03fe72572c12e98f4173f8a535f32468e48b6ec upstream.
In preparation to fix a commit 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit
FP registers for FP regset") FCSR access regression factor out
NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers for the non-MSA and the MSA variants
respectively, to avoid having to deal with excessive indentation in the
actual fix.
No functional change, however use `target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]' rather
than `target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]' for FGR holding type size determination
as there's no `i' variable to refer to anymore, and for the factored out
`i' variable declaration use `unsigned int' rather than `unsigned' as
its type, following the common style.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
Fixes: 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for FP regset")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan(a)mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton(a)mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex(a)alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin(a)arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips(a)linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17925/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf(a)linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 82 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -400,25 +400,36 @@ static int gpr64_set(struct task_struct
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
-static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
- const struct user_regset *regset,
- unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
- void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
+ * !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. FP context's general register slots
+ * correspond 1:1 to buffer slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ void **kbuf, void __user **ubuf)
{
- unsigned i;
- int err;
- u64 fpr_val;
-
- /* XXX fcr31 */
+ return user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
+ &target->thread.fpu,
+ 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+}
- if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
- return user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
- &target->thread.fpu,
- 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
+ * CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Only lower 64 bits of FP context's
+ * general register slots are copied to buffer slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ void **kbuf, void __user **ubuf)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ u64 fpr_val;
+ int err;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS; i++) {
fpr_val = get_fpr64(&target->thread.fpu.fpr[i], 0);
- err = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+ err = user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
if (err)
@@ -428,25 +439,54 @@ static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *t
return 0;
}
-static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
+/* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer. */
+static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
- const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
+ void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
- unsigned i;
int err;
- u64 fpr_val;
/* XXX fcr31 */
- if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
- return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
- &target->thread.fpu,
- 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+ if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
+ err = fpr_get_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+ else
+ err = fpr_get_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
+ * !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots correspond 1:1 to FP
+ * context's general register slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ const void **kbuf, const void __user **ubuf)
+{
+ return user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
+ &target->thread.fpu,
+ 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
+ * CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots are copied to lower 64
+ * bits only of FP context's general register slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ const void **kbuf, const void __user **ubuf)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ u64 fpr_val;
+ int err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
- err = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
+ err = user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
if (err)
@@ -457,6 +497,24 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
return 0;
}
+/* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context. */
+static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
+ const struct user_regset *regset,
+ unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
+ const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /* XXX fcr31 */
+
+ if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
+ err = fpr_set_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+ else
+ err = fpr_set_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
enum mips_regset {
REGSET_GPR,
REGSET_FPR,
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from macro(a)mips.com are
queue-3.18/mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
queue-3.18/mips-guard-against-any-partial-write-attempt-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-also-verify-sizeof-elf_fpreg_t-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
queue-3.18/mips-fix-an-fcsr-access-api-regression-with-nt_prfpreg-and-msa.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
MIPS: Disallow outsized PTRACE_SETREGSET NT_PRFPREG regset accesses
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From c8c5a3a24d395b14447a9a89d61586a913840a3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro(a)mips.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 22:56:54 +0000
Subject: MIPS: Disallow outsized PTRACE_SETREGSET NT_PRFPREG regset accesses
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
commit c8c5a3a24d395b14447a9a89d61586a913840a3b upstream.
Complement commit c23b3d1a5311 ("MIPS: ptrace: Change GP regset to use
correct core dump register layout") and also reject outsized
PTRACE_SETREGSET requests to the NT_PRFPREG regset, like with the
NT_PRSTATUS regset.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
Fixes: c23b3d1a5311 ("MIPS: ptrace: Change GP regset to use correct core dump register layout")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan(a)mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton(a)mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex(a)alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin(a)arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips(a)linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17930/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf(a)linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -530,6 +530,9 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
+ if (pos + count > sizeof(elf_fpregset_t))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
err = fpr_set_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
else
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from macro(a)mips.com are
queue-3.18/mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
queue-3.18/mips-guard-against-any-partial-write-attempt-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-also-verify-sizeof-elf_fpreg_t-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
queue-3.18/mips-fix-an-fcsr-access-api-regression-with-nt_prfpreg-and-msa.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
MIPS: Consistently handle buffer counter with PTRACE_SETREGSET
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 80b3ffce0196ea50068885d085ff981e4b8396f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro(a)mips.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 22:53:14 +0000
Subject: MIPS: Consistently handle buffer counter with PTRACE_SETREGSET
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
commit 80b3ffce0196ea50068885d085ff981e4b8396f4 upstream.
Update commit d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous registers
for short regset write") bug and consistently consume all data supplied
to `fpr_set_msa' with the ptrace(2) PTRACE_SETREGSET request, such that
a zero data buffer counter is returned where insufficient data has been
given to fill a whole number of FP general registers.
In reality this is not going to happen, as the caller is supposed to
only supply data covering a whole number of registers and it is verified
in `ptrace_regset' and again asserted in `fpr_set', however structuring
code such that the presence of trailing partial FP general register data
causes `fpr_set_msa' to return with a non-zero data buffer counter makes
it appear that this trailing data will be used if there are subsequent
writes made to FP registers, which is going to be the case with the FCSR
once the missing write to that register has been fixed.
Fixes: d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous registers for short regset write")
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)mips.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan(a)mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton(a)mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex(a)alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin(a)arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips(a)linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.11+
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17927/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf(a)linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struc
int err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count > 0; i++) {
err = user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from macro(a)mips.com are
queue-3.18/mips-consistently-handle-buffer-counter-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-disallow-outsized-ptrace_setregset-nt_prfpreg-regset-accesses.patch
queue-3.18/mips-guard-against-any-partial-write-attempt-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-also-verify-sizeof-elf_fpreg_t-with-ptrace_setregset.patch
queue-3.18/mips-factor-out-nt_prfpreg-regset-access-helpers.patch
queue-3.18/mips-fix-an-fcsr-access-api-regression-with-nt_prfpreg-and-msa.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 22:19:26 -0800
Subject: target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c upstream.
This patch fixes bug where early se_cmd exceptions that occur
before backend execution can result in use-after-free if/when
a subsequent ABORT_TASK occurs for the same tag.
Since an early se_cmd exception will have had se_cmd added to
se_session->sess_cmd_list via target_get_sess_cmd(), it will
not have CMD_T_COMPLETE set by the usual target_complete_cmd()
backend completion path.
This causes a subsequent ABORT_TASK + __target_check_io_state()
to signal ABORT_TASK should proceed. As core_tmr_abort_task()
executes, it will bring the outstanding se_cmd->cmd_kref count
down to zero releasing se_cmd, after se_cmd has already been
queued with error status into fabric driver response path code.
To address this bug, introduce a CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE bit that is
set at target_get_sess_cmd() time, and cleared immediately before
backend driver dispatch in target_execute_cmd() once CMD_T_ACTIVE
is set.
Then, check CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE within __target_check_io_state() to
determine when an early exception has occured, and avoid aborting
this se_cmd since it will have already been queued into fabric
driver response path code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -133,6 +133,15 @@ static bool __target_check_io_state(stru
spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
return false;
}
+ if (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE) {
+ if (se_cmd->scsi_status) {
+ pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %llu early failure"
+ " status: 0x%02x\n", se_cmd->tag,
+ se_cmd->scsi_status);
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
if (sess->sess_tearing_down || se_cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %llu already shutdown,"
" skipping\n", se_cmd->tag);
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -1939,6 +1939,7 @@ void target_execute_cmd(struct se_cmd *c
}
cmd->t_state = TRANSPORT_PROCESSING;
+ cmd->transport_state &= ~CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ACTIVE|CMD_T_BUSY|CMD_T_SENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
@@ -2592,6 +2593,7 @@ int target_get_sess_cmd(struct se_cmd *s
ret = -ESHUTDOWN;
goto out;
}
+ se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
list_add_tail(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list, &se_sess->sess_cmd_list);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
--- a/include/target/target_core_base.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_base.h
@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ struct se_cmd {
#define CMD_T_BUSY (1 << 9)
#define CMD_T_TAS (1 << 10)
#define CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP (1 << 11)
+#define CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE (1 << 12)
spinlock_t t_state_lock;
struct kref cmd_kref;
struct completion t_transport_stop_comp;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-4.9/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-4.9/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 12:32:59 -0700
Subject: iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 upstream.
Since commit 59b6986dbf fixed a potential NULL pointer dereference
by allocating a se_tmr_req for ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN, the
se_tmr_req is currently leaked by iscsit_free_cmd() because no
iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo was associated.
To address this, treat ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN like any other
TMR and call transport_init_se_cmd() + target_get_sess_cmd() to
setup iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo with se_cmd->cmd_kref of 2.
This will ensure normal release operation once se_cmd->cmd_kref
reaches zero and target_release_cmd_kref() is invoked, se_tmr_req
will be released via existing target_free_cmd_mem() and
core_tmr_release_req() code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 20 +++++++-------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -1940,7 +1940,6 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
struct iscsi_tmr_req *tmr_req;
struct iscsi_tm *hdr;
int out_of_order_cmdsn = 0, ret;
- bool sess_ref = false;
u8 function, tcm_function = TMR_UNKNOWN;
hdr = (struct iscsi_tm *) buf;
@@ -1982,18 +1981,17 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
buf);
}
+ transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &iscsi_ops,
+ conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
+ TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
+
+ target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
+
/*
* TASK_REASSIGN for ERL=2 / connection stays inside of
* LIO-Target $FABRIC_MOD
*/
if (function != ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN) {
- transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &iscsi_ops,
- conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
- TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
-
- target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
- sess_ref = true;
-
switch (function) {
case ISCSI_TM_FUNC_ABORT_TASK:
tcm_function = TMR_ABORT_TASK;
@@ -2132,12 +2130,8 @@ attach:
* For connection recovery, this is also the default action for
* TMR TASK_REASSIGN.
*/
- if (sess_ref) {
- pr_debug("Handle TMR, using sess_ref=true check\n");
- target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
- }
-
iscsit_add_cmd_to_response_queue(cmd, conn, cmd->i_state);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-4.9/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-4.9/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Hi Greg-KH,
Here are two target patches for v4.9.y stable, which did not apply
due to minor context changes.
The series has been cut against v4.9.76. Please apply at your earliest
convenience.
Thank you,
--nab
Nicholas Bellinger (2):
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 20 +++++++-------------
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
1.8.5.3
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 22:19:26 -0800
Subject: target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c upstream.
This patch fixes bug where early se_cmd exceptions that occur
before backend execution can result in use-after-free if/when
a subsequent ABORT_TASK occurs for the same tag.
Since an early se_cmd exception will have had se_cmd added to
se_session->sess_cmd_list via target_get_sess_cmd(), it will
not have CMD_T_COMPLETE set by the usual target_complete_cmd()
backend completion path.
This causes a subsequent ABORT_TASK + __target_check_io_state()
to signal ABORT_TASK should proceed. As core_tmr_abort_task()
executes, it will bring the outstanding se_cmd->cmd_kref count
down to zero releasing se_cmd, after se_cmd has already been
queued with error status into fabric driver response path code.
To address this bug, introduce a CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE bit that is
set at target_get_sess_cmd() time, and cleared immediately before
backend driver dispatch in target_execute_cmd() once CMD_T_ACTIVE
is set.
Then, check CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE within __target_check_io_state() to
determine when an early exception has occured, and avoid aborting
this se_cmd since it will have already been queued into fabric
driver response path code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -133,6 +133,15 @@ static bool __target_check_io_state(stru
spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
return false;
}
+ if (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE) {
+ if (se_cmd->scsi_status) {
+ pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %llu early failure"
+ " status: 0x%02x\n", se_cmd->tag,
+ se_cmd->scsi_status);
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
if (sess->sess_tearing_down || se_cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %llu already shutdown,"
" skipping\n", se_cmd->tag);
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -1933,6 +1933,7 @@ void target_execute_cmd(struct se_cmd *c
}
cmd->t_state = TRANSPORT_PROCESSING;
+ cmd->transport_state &= ~CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ACTIVE|CMD_T_BUSY|CMD_T_SENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
@@ -2572,6 +2573,7 @@ int target_get_sess_cmd(struct se_cmd *s
ret = -ESHUTDOWN;
goto out;
}
+ se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
list_add_tail(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list, &se_sess->sess_cmd_list);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
--- a/include/target/target_core_base.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_base.h
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ struct se_cmd {
#define CMD_T_BUSY (1 << 9)
#define CMD_T_TAS (1 << 10)
#define CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP (1 << 11)
+#define CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE (1 << 12)
spinlock_t t_state_lock;
struct kref cmd_kref;
struct completion t_transport_stop_comp;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-4.4/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-4.4/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 12:32:59 -0700
Subject: iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 upstream.
Since commit 59b6986dbf fixed a potential NULL pointer dereference
by allocating a se_tmr_req for ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN, the
se_tmr_req is currently leaked by iscsit_free_cmd() because no
iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo was associated.
To address this, treat ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN like any other
TMR and call transport_init_se_cmd() + target_get_sess_cmd() to
setup iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo with se_cmd->cmd_kref of 2.
This will ensure normal release operation once se_cmd->cmd_kref
reaches zero and target_release_cmd_kref() is invoked, se_tmr_req
will be released via existing target_free_cmd_mem() and
core_tmr_release_req() code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 20 +++++++-------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -1759,7 +1759,6 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
struct iscsi_tmr_req *tmr_req;
struct iscsi_tm *hdr;
int out_of_order_cmdsn = 0, ret;
- bool sess_ref = false;
u8 function, tcm_function = TMR_UNKNOWN;
hdr = (struct iscsi_tm *) buf;
@@ -1801,18 +1800,17 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
buf);
}
+ transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &iscsi_ops,
+ conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
+ TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
+
+ target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
+
/*
* TASK_REASSIGN for ERL=2 / connection stays inside of
* LIO-Target $FABRIC_MOD
*/
if (function != ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN) {
- transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &iscsi_ops,
- conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
- TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
-
- target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
- sess_ref = true;
-
switch (function) {
case ISCSI_TM_FUNC_ABORT_TASK:
tcm_function = TMR_ABORT_TASK;
@@ -1951,12 +1949,8 @@ attach:
* For connection recovery, this is also the default action for
* TMR TASK_REASSIGN.
*/
- if (sess_ref) {
- pr_debug("Handle TMR, using sess_ref=true check\n");
- target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
- }
-
iscsit_add_cmd_to_response_queue(cmd, conn, cmd->i_state);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-4.4/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-4.4/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Hi Greg-KH,
Here are two target patches for v4.4.y stable, which did not apply
due to minor context changes.
The series has been cut against v4.4.111. Please apply at your earliest
convenience.
Thank you,
--nab
Nicholas Bellinger (2):
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 20 +++++++-------------
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
1.8.5.3
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Hi Greg-KH,
Here are two target patches for v3.18.y stable, which did not apply
due to minor context changes.
The series has been cut against v3.18.91. Please apply at your earliest
convenience.
Thank you,
--nab
Nicholas Bellinger (2):
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 21 +++++++--------------
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--
1.8.5.3
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 22:19:26 -0800
Subject: target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c upstream.
This patch fixes bug where early se_cmd exceptions that occur
before backend execution can result in use-after-free if/when
a subsequent ABORT_TASK occurs for the same tag.
Since an early se_cmd exception will have had se_cmd added to
se_session->sess_cmd_list via target_get_sess_cmd(), it will
not have CMD_T_COMPLETE set by the usual target_complete_cmd()
backend completion path.
This causes a subsequent ABORT_TASK + __target_check_io_state()
to signal ABORT_TASK should proceed. As core_tmr_abort_task()
executes, it will bring the outstanding se_cmd->cmd_kref count
down to zero releasing se_cmd, after se_cmd has already been
queued with error status into fabric driver response path code.
To address this bug, introduce a CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE bit that is
set at target_get_sess_cmd() time, and cleared immediately before
backend driver dispatch in target_execute_cmd() once CMD_T_ACTIVE
is set.
Then, check CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE within __target_check_io_state() to
determine when an early exception has occured, and avoid aborting
this se_cmd since it will have already been queued into fabric
driver response path code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -137,6 +137,15 @@ static bool __target_check_io_state(stru
spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
return false;
}
+ if (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE) {
+ if (se_cmd->scsi_status) {
+ pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %u early failure"
+ " status: 0x%02x\n", se_cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(se_cmd),
+ se_cmd->scsi_status);
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
if (sess->sess_tearing_down || se_cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %u already shutdown,"
" skipping\n", se_cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(se_cmd));
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -1796,6 +1796,7 @@ void target_execute_cmd(struct se_cmd *c
}
cmd->t_state = TRANSPORT_PROCESSING;
+ cmd->transport_state &= ~CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ACTIVE|CMD_T_BUSY|CMD_T_SENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
/*
@@ -2436,6 +2437,7 @@ int target_get_sess_cmd(struct se_cmd *s
ret = -ESHUTDOWN;
goto out;
}
+ se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
list_add_tail(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list, &se_sess->sess_cmd_list);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
--- a/include/target/target_core_base.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_base.h
@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct se_cmd {
#define CMD_T_BUSY (1 << 9)
#define CMD_T_TAS (1 << 10)
#define CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP (1 << 11)
+#define CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE (1 << 12)
spinlock_t t_state_lock;
struct completion t_transport_stop_comp;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-3.18/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-3.18/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 12:32:59 -0700
Subject: iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
commit ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 upstream.
Since commit 59b6986dbf fixed a potential NULL pointer dereference
by allocating a se_tmr_req for ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN, the
se_tmr_req is currently leaked by iscsit_free_cmd() because no
iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo was associated.
To address this, treat ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN like any other
TMR and call transport_init_se_cmd() + target_get_sess_cmd() to
setup iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo with se_cmd->cmd_kref of 2.
This will ensure normal release operation once se_cmd->cmd_kref
reaches zero and target_release_cmd_kref() is invoked, se_tmr_req
will be released via existing target_free_cmd_mem() and
core_tmr_release_req() code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew(a)datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab(a)linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 21 +++++++--------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -1750,7 +1750,6 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
struct iscsi_tmr_req *tmr_req;
struct iscsi_tm *hdr;
int out_of_order_cmdsn = 0, ret;
- bool sess_ref = false;
u8 function, tcm_function = TMR_UNKNOWN;
hdr = (struct iscsi_tm *) buf;
@@ -1792,19 +1791,17 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
buf);
}
+ transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &lio_target_fabric_configfs->tf_ops,
+ conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
+ MSG_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
+
+ target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
+
/*
* TASK_REASSIGN for ERL=2 / connection stays inside of
* LIO-Target $FABRIC_MOD
*/
if (function != ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN) {
- transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd,
- &lio_target_fabric_configfs->tf_ops,
- conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
- MSG_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
-
- target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
- sess_ref = true;
-
switch (function) {
case ISCSI_TM_FUNC_ABORT_TASK:
tcm_function = TMR_ABORT_TASK;
@@ -1943,12 +1940,8 @@ attach:
* For connection recovery, this is also the default action for
* TMR TASK_REASSIGN.
*/
- if (sess_ref) {
- pr_debug("Handle TMR, using sess_ref=true check\n");
- target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
- }
-
iscsit_add_cmd_to_response_queue(cmd, conn, cmd->i_state);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from nab(a)linux-iscsi.org are
queue-3.18/iscsi-target-make-task_reassign-use-proper-se_cmd-cmd_kref.patch
queue-3.18/target-avoid-early-cmd_t_pre_execute-failures-during-abort_task.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 23:25:05 +0100
Subject: bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
commit bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 upstream.
syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.
However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.
Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.
This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
struct bpf_array *array;
- u64 array_size;
+ u64 array_size, mask64;
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -70,13 +70,25 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
max_entries = attr->max_entries;
- index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
- if (unpriv)
+ /* On 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() with max_entries that has
+ * upper most bit set in u32 space is undefined behavior due to
+ * resulting 1U << 32, so do it manually here in u64 space.
+ */
+ mask64 = fls_long(max_entries - 1);
+ mask64 = 1ULL << mask64;
+ mask64 -= 1;
+
+ index_mask = mask64;
+ if (unpriv) {
/* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
* since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
*/
max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+ /* Check for overflows. */
+ if (max_entries < attr->max_entries)
+ return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+ }
array_size = sizeof(*array);
if (percpu)
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel(a)iogearbox.net are
queue-4.14/bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-arsh-is-not-supported-in-32-bit-alu-thus-reject-it.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: arsh is not supported in 32 bit alu thus reject it
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-arsh-is-not-supported-in-32-bit-alu-thus-reject-it.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 7891a87efc7116590eaba57acc3c422487802c6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 20:04:37 +0100
Subject: bpf: arsh is not supported in 32 bit alu thus reject it
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
commit 7891a87efc7116590eaba57acc3c422487802c6f upstream.
The following snippet was throwing an 'unknown opcode cc' warning
in BPF interpreter:
0: (18) r0 = 0x0
2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0
3: (cc) (u32) r0 s>>= (u32) r0
4: (95) exit
Although a number of JITs do support BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_{K,X}
generation, not all of them do and interpreter does neither. We can
leave existing ones and implement it later in bpf-next for the
remaining ones, but reject this properly in verifier for the time
being.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Reported-by: syzbot+93c4904c5c70348a6890(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2493,6 +2493,11 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verif
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (opcode == BPF_ARSH && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
+ verbose("BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -273,6 +273,46 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
.result = REJECT,
},
{
+ "arsh32 on imm",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+ BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, 5),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .errstr = "BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU",
+ },
+ {
+ "arsh32 on reg",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 5),
+ BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .errstr = "BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU",
+ },
+ {
+ "arsh64 on imm",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, 5),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ },
+ {
+ "arsh64 on reg",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 5),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ },
+ {
"no bpf_exit",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel(a)iogearbox.net are
queue-4.14/bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-arsh-is-not-supported-in-32-bit-alu-thus-reject-it.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 79741b3bdec01a8628368fbcfccc7d189ed606cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:26:40 -0700
Subject: bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
commit 79741b3bdec01a8628368fbcfccc7d189ed606cb upstream.
reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to
convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
[Backported to 4.9.y - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3362,55 +3362,50 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct b
return 0;
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
- * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else ...
+/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions
*
* this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
*/
-static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
+ struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
+ const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
- struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
-
- if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
- /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
- * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
- * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
- */
- BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
-
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
- prog->dst_needed = 1;
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
- bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
- /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
- * to avoid conditional branch in
- * interpeter for every normal call
- * and to prevent accidental JITing by
- * JIT compiler that doesn't support
- * bpf_tail_call yet
- */
- insn->imm = 0;
- insn->code |= BPF_X;
- continue;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+ if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
+ continue;
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
+ prog->dst_needed = 1;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
+ bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
+ * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
+ * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
+ * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
+ */
+ insn->imm = 0;
+ insn->code |= BPF_X;
+ continue;
+ }
- fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
- /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
- * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
- */
- BUG_ON(!fn->func);
- insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
+ fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
+ /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
+ * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
+ */
+ if (!fn->func) {
+ verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %d\n",
+ insn->imm);
+ return -EFAULT;
}
+ insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
}
+
+ return 0;
}
static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
@@ -3515,7 +3510,7 @@ skip_full_check:
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
if (ret == 0)
- fixup_bpf_calls(env->prog);
+ ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)fb.com are
queue-4.9/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.9/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From e245c5c6a5656e4d61aa7bb08e9694fd6e5b2b9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:26:39 -0700
Subject: bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
commit e245c5c6a5656e4d61aa7bb08e9694fd6e5b2b9d upstream.
no functional change.
move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c
it's being refactored in the next patch
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
[backported to 4.9 - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 54 --------------------------------------------------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -565,57 +565,6 @@ void bpf_register_prog_type(struct bpf_p
list_add(&tl->list_node, &bpf_prog_types);
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
- * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else ...
- *
- * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
- */
-static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
-{
- const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
- struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
-
- if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
- /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
- * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
- * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
- */
- BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
-
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
- prog->dst_needed = 1;
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
- bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
- /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
- * to avoid conditional branch in
- * interpeter for every normal call
- * and to prevent accidental JITing by
- * JIT compiler that doesn't support
- * bpf_tail_call yet
- */
- insn->imm = 0;
- insn->code |= BPF_X;
- continue;
- }
-
- fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
- /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
- * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
- */
- BUG_ON(!fn->func);
- insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
- }
- }
-}
-
/* drop refcnt on maps used by eBPF program and free auxilary data */
static void free_used_maps(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{
@@ -808,9 +757,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr
if (err < 0)
goto free_used_maps;
- /* fixup BPF_CALL->imm field */
- fixup_bpf_calls(prog);
-
/* eBPF program is ready to be JITed */
prog = bpf_prog_select_runtime(prog, &err);
if (err < 0)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3362,6 +3362,57 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct b
return 0;
}
+/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
+ * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
+ * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
+ * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
+ * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
+ * else ...
+ *
+ * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
+ */
+static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
+
+ if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
+ /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
+ * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
+ * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
+ prog->dst_needed = 1;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
+ bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
+ * to avoid conditional branch in
+ * interpeter for every normal call
+ * and to prevent accidental JITing by
+ * JIT compiler that doesn't support
+ * bpf_tail_call yet
+ */
+ insn->imm = 0;
+ insn->code |= BPF_X;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
+ /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
+ * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!fn->func);
+ insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
@@ -3463,6 +3514,9 @@ skip_full_check:
/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ fixup_bpf_calls(env->prog);
+
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
/* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)fb.com are
queue-4.9/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.9/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: io_edgeport: fix possible sleep-in-atomic
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-next branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will also be merged in the next major kernel release
during the merge window.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From c7b8f77872c73f69a16528a9eb87afefcccdc18b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990(a)gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 20:34:36 +0800
Subject: USB: serial: io_edgeport: fix possible sleep-in-atomic
According to drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c, the driver may sleep
under a spinlock.
The function call path is:
edge_bulk_in_callback (acquire the spinlock)
process_rcvd_data
process_rcvd_status
change_port_settings
send_iosp_ext_cmd
write_cmd_usb
usb_kill_urb --> may sleep
To fix it, the redundant usb_kill_urb() is removed from the error path
after usb_submit_urb() fails.
This possible bug is found by my static analysis tool (DSAC) and checked
by my code review.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990(a)gmail.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c b/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c
index 219265ce3711..17283f4b4779 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_edgeport.c
@@ -2282,7 +2282,6 @@ static int write_cmd_usb(struct edgeport_port *edge_port,
/* something went wrong */
dev_err(dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb(write command) failed, status = %d\n",
__func__, status);
- usb_kill_urb(urb);
usb_free_urb(urb);
atomic_dec(&CmdUrbs);
return status;
--
2.15.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 79741b3bdec01a8628368fbcfccc7d189ed606cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:26:40 -0700
Subject: bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
commit 79741b3bdec01a8628368fbcfccc7d189ed606cb upstream.
reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to
convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2158,57 +2158,51 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
return 0;
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
- * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else ...
+/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions
*
* this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
*/
-static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct verifier_env *env)
{
+ struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
+ const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
- struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
-
- if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
- /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
- * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
- * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
+ for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+ if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
+ continue;
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
+ prog->dst_needed = 1;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
+ bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
+ * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
+ * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
+ * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
*/
- BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
-
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
- prog->dst_needed = 1;
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
- bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
- /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
- * to avoid conditional branch in
- * interpeter for every normal call
- * and to prevent accidental JITing by
- * JIT compiler that doesn't support
- * bpf_tail_call yet
- */
- insn->imm = 0;
- insn->code |= BPF_X;
- continue;
- }
+ insn->imm = 0;
+ insn->code |= BPF_X;
+ continue;
+ }
- fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
- /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
- * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
- */
- BUG_ON(!fn->func);
- insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
+ fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
+ /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
+ * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
+ */
+ if (!fn->func) {
+ verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %d\n",
+ insn->imm);
+ return -EFAULT;
}
+ insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
}
-}
+ return 0;
+}
static void free_states(struct verifier_env *env)
{
@@ -2309,7 +2303,7 @@ skip_full_check:
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
if (ret == 0)
- fixup_bpf_calls(env->prog);
+ ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)fb.com are
queue-4.4/bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 17:33:02 -0800
Subject: bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
commit b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 upstream.
Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.
To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index
after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load
either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area.
Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries
are not rounded to power of 2 for root user.
When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns
that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes
the same 'index & index_mask' operation.
If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace
bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
with
if (index >= max_entries) {
index &= map->index_mask;
bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
}
(along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation.
There is secondary redundant 'if (index >= max_entries)' in the interpreter
and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary.
Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array)
cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there.
That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on
all architectures with and without JIT.
v2->v3:
Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands
without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 ++
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ struct bpf_map {
u32 value_size;
u32 max_entries;
u32 pages;
+ bool unpriv_array;
struct user_struct *user;
const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
struct work_struct work;
@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {
struct bpf_array {
struct bpf_map map;
u32 elem_size;
+ u32 index_mask;
/* 'ownership' of prog_array is claimed by the first program that
* is going to use this map or by the first program which FD is stored
* in the map to make sure that all callers and callees have the same
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@
/* Called from syscall */
static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
+ u32 elem_size, array_size, index_mask, max_entries;
+ bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
struct bpf_array *array;
- u32 elem_size, array_size;
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -36,12 +37,21 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
+ max_entries = attr->max_entries;
+ index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
+
+ if (unpriv)
+ /* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
+ * since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
+ */
+ max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+
/* check round_up into zero and u32 overflow */
if (elem_size == 0 ||
- attr->max_entries > (U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*array)) / elem_size)
+ max_entries > (U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*array)) / elem_size)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- array_size = sizeof(*array) + attr->max_entries * elem_size;
+ array_size = sizeof(*array) + max_entries * elem_size;
/* allocate all map elements and zero-initialize them */
array = kzalloc(array_size, GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN);
@@ -50,6 +60,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
if (!array)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
+ array->index_mask = index_mask;
+ array->map.unpriv_array = unpriv;
/* copy mandatory map attributes */
array->map.key_size = attr->key_size;
@@ -70,7 +82,7 @@ static void *array_map_lookup_elem(struc
if (index >= array->map.max_entries)
return NULL;
- return array->value + array->elem_size * index;
+ return array->value + array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask);
}
/* Called from syscall */
@@ -111,7 +123,9 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct
/* all elements already exist */
return -EEXIST;
- memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, map->value_size);
+ memcpy(array->value +
+ array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask),
+ value, map->value_size);
return 0;
}
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -187,7 +187,10 @@ struct verifier_stack_elem {
};
struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
- enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
+ union {
+ enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
+ struct bpf_map *map_ptr; /* pointer for call insn into lookup_elem */
+ };
};
#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
@@ -950,7 +953,7 @@ error:
return -EINVAL;
}
-static int check_call(struct verifier_env *env, int func_id)
+static int check_call(struct verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
{
struct verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
@@ -986,6 +989,13 @@ static int check_call(struct verifier_en
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &map);
if (err)
return err;
+ if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ if (map == NULL) {
+ verbose("verifier bug\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].map_ptr = map;
+ }
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &map);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -1911,7 +1921,7 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
return -EINVAL;
}
- err = check_call(env, insn->imm);
+ err = check_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -2202,7 +2212,10 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct verifi
struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
- int i;
+ struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
+ struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
+ struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
+ int i, cnt, delta = 0;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
@@ -2220,6 +2233,31 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct verifi
*/
insn->imm = 0;
insn->code |= BPF_X;
+
+ /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call
+ * emit two extra insns:
+ * if (index >= max_entries) goto out;
+ * index &= array->index_mask;
+ * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation
+ */
+ map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr;
+ if (!map_ptr->unpriv_array)
+ continue;
+ insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
+ map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
+ insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
+ container_of(map_ptr,
+ struct bpf_array,
+ map)->index_mask);
+ insn_buf[2] = *insn;
+ cnt = 3;
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
+ if (!new_prog)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ delta += cnt - 1;
+ env->prog = prog = new_prog;
+ insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
continue;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)kernel.org are
queue-4.4/bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-don-t-ab-use-instructions-to-store-state.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-add-bpf_patch_insn_single-helper.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From e245c5c6a5656e4d61aa7bb08e9694fd6e5b2b9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:26:39 -0700
Subject: bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
commit e245c5c6a5656e4d61aa7bb08e9694fd6e5b2b9d upstream.
no functional change.
move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c
it's being refactored in the next patch
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 54 -------------------------------------------------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -447,57 +447,6 @@ void bpf_register_prog_type(struct bpf_p
list_add(&tl->list_node, &bpf_prog_types);
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
- * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else ...
- *
- * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
- */
-static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
-{
- const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
- struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
-
- if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
- /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
- * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
- * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
- */
- BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
-
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
- prog->dst_needed = 1;
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
- bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
- /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
- * to avoid conditional branch in
- * interpeter for every normal call
- * and to prevent accidental JITing by
- * JIT compiler that doesn't support
- * bpf_tail_call yet
- */
- insn->imm = 0;
- insn->code |= BPF_X;
- continue;
- }
-
- fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
- /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
- * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
- */
- BUG_ON(!fn->func);
- insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
- }
- }
-}
-
/* drop refcnt on maps used by eBPF program and free auxilary data */
static void free_used_maps(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{
@@ -680,9 +629,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr
if (err < 0)
goto free_used_maps;
- /* fixup BPF_CALL->imm field */
- fixup_bpf_calls(prog);
-
/* eBPF program is ready to be JITed */
err = bpf_prog_select_runtime(prog);
if (err < 0)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2158,6 +2158,58 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
return 0;
}
+/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
+ * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
+ * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
+ * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
+ * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
+ * else ...
+ *
+ * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
+ */
+static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
+
+ if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
+ /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
+ * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
+ * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
+ prog->dst_needed = 1;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
+ bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
+ * to avoid conditional branch in
+ * interpeter for every normal call
+ * and to prevent accidental JITing by
+ * JIT compiler that doesn't support
+ * bpf_tail_call yet
+ */
+ insn->imm = 0;
+ insn->code |= BPF_X;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
+ /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
+ * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!fn->func);
+ insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
static void free_states(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
@@ -2256,6 +2308,9 @@ skip_full_check:
/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ fixup_bpf_calls(env->prog);
+
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
/* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)fb.com are
queue-4.4/bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-don-t-ab-use-instructions-to-store-state.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 3df126f35f88dc76eea33769f85a3c3bb8ce6c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 11:43:56 +0100
Subject: bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state
From: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com>
commit 3df126f35f88dc76eea33769f85a3c3bb8ce6c6b upstream.
Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes
it impossible to run verifier on programs already
marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of
per-instruction state instead.
While touching the error path rename and move existing
jump target.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -186,6 +186,10 @@ struct verifier_stack_elem {
struct verifier_stack_elem *next;
};
+struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
+ enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
+};
+
#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
/* single container for all structs
@@ -200,6 +204,7 @@ struct verifier_env {
struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */
u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */
bool allow_ptr_leaks;
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
};
/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
@@ -1784,7 +1789,7 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
return err;
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
- enum bpf_reg_type src_reg_type;
+ enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
/* check for reserved fields is already done */
@@ -1813,16 +1818,18 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
continue;
}
- if (insn->imm == 0) {
+ prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
+
+ if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
/* saw a valid insn
* dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
- * use reserved 'imm' field to mark this insn
+ * save type to validate intersecting paths
*/
- insn->imm = src_reg_type;
+ *prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
- } else if (src_reg_type != insn->imm &&
+ } else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type &&
(src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
- insn->imm == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
+ *prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
/* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
* dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
* with different pointer types:
@@ -1835,7 +1842,7 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
}
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
- enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type;
+ enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
err = check_xadd(env, insn);
@@ -1863,11 +1870,13 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
if (err)
return err;
- if (insn->imm == 0) {
- insn->imm = dst_reg_type;
- } else if (dst_reg_type != insn->imm &&
+ prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
+
+ if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
+ *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
+ } else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type &&
(dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
- insn->imm == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
+ *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2104,17 +2113,17 @@ static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(stru
static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
- int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
+ const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
enum bpf_access_type type;
- int i;
+ int i, delta = 0;
if (!env->prog->aux->ops->convert_ctx_access)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
- u32 insn_delta, cnt;
+ u32 cnt;
if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W))
type = BPF_READ;
@@ -2123,11 +2132,8 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
else
continue;
- if (insn->imm != PTR_TO_CTX) {
- /* clear internal mark */
- insn->imm = 0;
+ if (env->insn_aux_data[i].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
continue;
- }
cnt = env->prog->aux->ops->
convert_ctx_access(type, insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg,
@@ -2137,18 +2143,16 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
return -EINVAL;
}
- new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, i, insn_buf, cnt);
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, i + delta, insn_buf,
+ cnt);
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
- insn_delta = cnt - 1;
+ delta += cnt - 1;
/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
env->prog = new_prog;
- insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + insn_delta;
-
- insn_cnt += insn_delta;
- i += insn_delta;
+ insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
}
return 0;
@@ -2192,6 +2196,11 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, un
if (!env)
return -ENOMEM;
+ env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
+ (*prog)->len);
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!env->insn_aux_data)
+ goto err_free_env;
env->prog = *prog;
/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
@@ -2210,12 +2219,12 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, un
/* log_* values have to be sane */
if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
- goto free_env;
+ goto err_unlock;
ret = -ENOMEM;
log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
if (!log_buf)
- goto free_env;
+ goto err_unlock;
} else {
log_level = 0;
}
@@ -2284,14 +2293,16 @@ skip_full_check:
free_log_buf:
if (log_level)
vfree(log_buf);
-free_env:
if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
/* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
* them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
*/
release_maps(env);
*prog = env->prog;
- kfree(env);
+err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
+ vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
+err_free_env:
+ kfree(env);
return ret;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com are
queue-4.4/bpf-don-t-ab-use-instructions-to-store-state.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 8041902dae5299c1f194ba42d14383f734631009 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:26:41 -0700
Subject: bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)fb.com>
commit 8041902dae5299c1f194ba42d14383f734631009 upstream.
convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of
instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching.
It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops
have matching insn and insn_aux_data.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2107,6 +2107,41 @@ static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(stru
insn->src_reg = 0;
}
+/* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range
+ * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying
+ * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero
+ */
+static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
+ u32 off, u32 cnt)
+{
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
+
+ if (cnt == 1)
+ return 0;
+ new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len);
+ if (!new_data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
+ memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
+ sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
+ env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
+ vfree(old_data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct verifier_env *env, u32 off,
+ const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
+{
+ struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
+
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
+ if (!new_prog)
+ return NULL;
+ if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len))
+ return NULL;
+ return new_prog;
+}
+
/* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff'
* into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff'
*/
@@ -2132,7 +2167,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
else
continue;
- if (env->insn_aux_data[i].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
+ if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
continue;
cnt = env->prog->aux->ops->
@@ -2143,8 +2178,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
return -EINVAL;
}
- new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, i + delta, insn_buf,
- cnt);
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ast(a)fb.com are
queue-4.4/bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From b94b7373317164402ff7728d10f7023127a02b60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Jan 2018 10:04:47 +0800
Subject: x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check
From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
commit b94b7373317164402ff7728d10f7023127a02b60 upstream.
Instead of blacklisting all model 79 CPUs when attempting a late
microcode loading, limit that only to CPUs with microcode revisions <
0x0b000021 because only on those late loading may cause a system hang.
For such processors either:
a) a BIOS update which might contain a newer microcode revision
or
b) the early microcode loading method
should be considered.
Processors with revisions 0x0b000021 or higher will not experience such
hangs.
For more details, see erratum BDF90 in document #334165 (Intel Xeon
Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family Specification Update) from
September 2017.
[ bp: Heavily massage commit message and pr_* statements. ]
Fixes: 723f2828a98c ("x86/microcode/intel: Disable late loading on model 79")
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86(a)kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514772287-92959-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@aliba…
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -1051,8 +1051,17 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
- if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X) {
- pr_err_once("late loading on model 79 is disabled.\n");
+ /*
+ * Late loading on model 79 with microcode revision less than 0x0b000021
+ * may result in a system hang. This behavior is documented in item
+ * BDF90, #334165 (Intel Xeon Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family).
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 &&
+ c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X &&
+ c->x86_mask == 0x01 &&
+ c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
+ pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
+ pr_err_once("Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
return true;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from qianyue.zj(a)alibaba-inc.com are
queue-4.9/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
rbd-set-max_segments-to-ushrt_max.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 21acdf45f4958135940f0b4767185cf911d4b010 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2017 15:35:11 +0100
Subject: rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
commit 21acdf45f4958135940f0b4767185cf911d4b010 upstream.
Commit d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments") bumped
max_segments (unsigned short) to max_hw_sectors (unsigned int).
max_hw_sectors is set to the number of 512-byte sectors in an object
and overflows unsigned short for 32M (largest possible) objects, making
the block layer resort to handing us single segment (i.e. single page
or even smaller) bios in that case.
Fixes: d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/block/rbd.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/block/rbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c
@@ -4511,7 +4511,7 @@ static int rbd_init_disk(struct rbd_devi
segment_size = rbd_obj_bytes(&rbd_dev->header);
blk_queue_max_hw_sectors(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
q->limits.max_sectors = queue_max_hw_sectors(q);
- blk_queue_max_segments(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
+ blk_queue_max_segments(q, USHRT_MAX);
blk_queue_max_segment_size(q, segment_size);
blk_queue_io_min(q, segment_size);
blk_queue_io_opt(q, segment_size);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from idryomov(a)gmail.com are
queue-4.9/rbd-set-max_segments-to-ushrt_max.patch