The patch titled
Subject: ocfs2: fix a misuse a of brelse after failing ocfs2_check_dir_entry
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
ocfs2-fix-a-misuse-a-of-brelse-after-failing-ocfs2_check_dir_entry.patch
This patch should soon appear at
http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/ocfs2-fix-a-misuse-a-of-brelse-aft…
and later at
http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/ocfs2-fix-a-misuse-a-of-brelse-aft…
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated
there every 3-4 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei(a)h3c.com>
Subject: ocfs2: fix a misuse a of brelse after failing ocfs2_check_dir_entry
Somehow, file system metadata was corrupted, which causes
ocfs2_check_dir_entry() to fail in function ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el().
According to the original design intention, if above happens we should
skip the problematic block and continue to retrieve dir entry. But there
is obviouse misuse of brelse around related code.
After failure of ocfs2_check_dir_entry(), currunt code just moves to next
position and uses the problematic buffer head again and again during which
the problematic buffer head is released for multiple times. I suppose,
this a serious issue which is long-lived in ocfs2. This may cause other
file systems which is also used in a the same host insane.
So we should also consider about bakcporting this patch into
linux -stable.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/HK2PR06MB045211675B43EED794E597B6D56E0@HK2PR06MB04…
Signed-off-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei(a)h3c.com>
Suggested-by: Changkuo Shi <shi.changkuo(a)h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark(a)fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec(a)evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/ocfs2/dir.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff -puN fs/ocfs2/dir.c~ocfs2-fix-a-misuse-a-of-brelse-after-failing-ocfs2_check_dir_entry fs/ocfs2/dir.c
--- a/fs/ocfs2/dir.c~ocfs2-fix-a-misuse-a-of-brelse-after-failing-ocfs2_check_dir_entry
+++ a/fs/ocfs2/dir.c
@@ -1897,8 +1897,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(stru
/* On error, skip the f_pos to the
next block. */
ctx->pos = (ctx->pos | (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) + 1;
- brelse(bh);
- continue;
+ break;
}
if (le64_to_cpu(de->inode)) {
unsigned char d_type = DT_UNKNOWN;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from ge.changwei(a)h3c.com are
ocfs2-fix-a-misuse-a-of-brelse-after-failing-ocfs2_check_dir_entry.patch
ocfs2-dont-put-and-assign-null-to-bh-allocated-outside.patch
ocfs2-dont-use-iocb-when-eiocbqueued-returns.patch
The patch titled
Subject: kasan: fix memory hotplug during boot
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
kasan-fix-memory-hotplug-during-boot.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Subject: kasan: fix memory hotplug during boot
Using module_init() is wrong. E.g. ACPI adds and onlines memory before
our memory notifier gets registered.
This makes sure that ACPI memory detected during boot up will not result
in a kernel crash.
Easily reproducible with QEMU, just specify a DIMM when starting up.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180522100756.18478-3-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 786a8959912e ("kasan: disable memory hotplug")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/kasan/kasan.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff -puN mm/kasan/kasan.c~kasan-fix-memory-hotplug-during-boot mm/kasan/kasan.c
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c~kasan-fix-memory-hotplug-during-boot
+++ a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -898,5 +898,5 @@ static int __init kasan_memhotplug_init(
return 0;
}
-module_init(kasan_memhotplug_init);
+core_initcall(kasan_memhotplug_init);
#endif
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from david(a)redhat.com are
The patch titled
Subject: kasan: free allocated shadow memory on MEM_CANCEL_ONLINE
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
kasan-free-allocated-shadow-memory-on-mem_cancel_online.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Subject: kasan: free allocated shadow memory on MEM_CANCEL_ONLINE
We have to free memory again when we cancel onlining, otherwise a later
onlining attempt will fail.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180522100756.18478-2-david@redhat.com
Fixes: fa69b5989bb0 ("mm/kasan: add support for memory hotplug")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/kasan/kasan.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff -puN mm/kasan/kasan.c~kasan-free-allocated-shadow-memory-on-mem_cancel_online mm/kasan/kasan.c
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c~kasan-free-allocated-shadow-memory-on-mem_cancel_online
+++ a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -866,6 +866,7 @@ static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(
kmemleak_ignore(ret);
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
+ case MEM_CANCEL_ONLINE:
case MEM_OFFLINE: {
struct vm_struct *vm;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from david(a)redhat.com are
The patch titled
Subject: kernel/sys.c: fix potential Spectre v1 issue
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
kernel-sys-fix-potential-spectre-v1.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo(a)embeddedor.com>
Subject: kernel/sys.c: fix potential Spectre v1 issue
`resource' can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential
spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue
'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index
current->signal->rlim
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to
kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515030038.GA11822@embeddedor.com
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo(a)embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/sys.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff -puN kernel/sys.c~kernel-sys-fix-potential-spectre-v1 kernel/sys.c
--- a/kernel/sys.c~kernel-sys-fix-potential-spectre-v1
+++ a/kernel/sys.c
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
+/* Hardening for Spectre-v1 */
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#include "uid16.h"
#ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
@@ -1453,6 +1456,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
return -EINVAL;
+ resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
task_lock(current->group_leader);
x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
@@ -1472,6 +1476,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, un
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
return -EINVAL;
+ resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
task_lock(current->group_leader);
r = current->signal->rlim[resource];
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from gustavo(a)embeddedor.com are
The patch titled
Subject: mm/kasan: don't vfree() nonexistent vm_area
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-kasan-dont-vfree-nonexistent-vm_area.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com>
Subject: mm/kasan: don't vfree() nonexistent vm_area
KASAN uses different routines to map shadow for hot added memory and
memory obtained in boot process. Attempt to offline memory onlined by
normal boot process leads to this:
Trying to vfree() nonexistent vm area (000000005d3b34b9)
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 13215 at mm/vmalloc.c:1525 __vunmap+0x147/0x190
Call Trace:
kasan_mem_notifier+0xad/0xb9
notifier_call_chain+0x166/0x260
__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xdb/0x140
__offline_pages+0x96a/0xb10
memory_subsys_offline+0x76/0xc0
device_offline+0xb8/0x120
store_mem_state+0xfa/0x120
kernfs_fop_write+0x1d5/0x320
__vfs_write+0xd4/0x530
vfs_write+0x105/0x340
SyS_write+0xb0/0x140
Obviously we can't call vfree() to free memory that wasn't allocated via
vmalloc(). Use find_vm_area() to see if we can call vfree().
Unfortunately it's a bit tricky to properly unmap and free shadow
allocated during boot, so we'll have to keep it. If memory will come
online again that shadow will be reused.
Matthew asked: how can you call vfree() on something that isn't a
vmalloc address?
vfree() is able to free any address returned by
__vmalloc_node_range(). And __vmalloc_node_range() gives you any
address you ask. It doesn't have to be an address in [VMALLOC_START,
VMALLOC_END] range.
That's also how the module_alloc()/module_memfree() works on
architectures that have designated area for modules.
[aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com: improve comments]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dabee6ab-3a7a-51cd-3b86-5468718e0390@virtuozzo.com
[akpm(a)linux-foundation.org: fix typos, reflow comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180201163349.8700-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Fixes: fa69b5989bb0 ("mm/kasan: add support for memory hotplug")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel+linux-kasan-dev(a)molgen.mpg.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/kasan/kasan.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff -puN mm/kasan/kasan.c~mm-kasan-dont-vfree-nonexistent-vm_area mm/kasan/kasan.c
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c~mm-kasan-dont-vfree-nonexistent-vm_area
+++ a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -792,6 +792,40 @@ DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f5);
DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f8);
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
+static bool shadow_mapped(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+ p4d_t *p4d;
+ pud_t *pud;
+ pmd_t *pmd;
+ pte_t *pte;
+
+ if (pgd_none(*pgd))
+ return false;
+ p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+ if (p4d_none(*p4d))
+ return false;
+ pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+ if (pud_none(*pud))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * We can't use pud_large() or pud_huge(), the first one is
+ * arch-specific, the last one depends on HUGETLB_PAGE. So let's abuse
+ * pud_bad(), if pud is bad then it's bad because it's huge.
+ */
+ if (pud_bad(*pud))
+ return true;
+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+ if (pmd_none(*pmd))
+ return false;
+
+ if (pmd_bad(*pmd))
+ return true;
+ pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
+ return !pte_none(*pte);
+}
+
static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
unsigned long action, void *data)
{
@@ -813,6 +847,14 @@ static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(
case MEM_GOING_ONLINE: {
void *ret;
+ /*
+ * If shadow is mapped already than it must have been mapped
+ * during the boot. This could happen if we onlining previously
+ * offlined memory.
+ */
+ if (shadow_mapped(shadow_start))
+ return NOTIFY_OK;
+
ret = __vmalloc_node_range(shadow_size, PAGE_SIZE, shadow_start,
shadow_end, GFP_KERNEL,
PAGE_KERNEL, VM_NO_GUARD,
@@ -824,8 +866,25 @@ static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(
kmemleak_ignore(ret);
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
- case MEM_OFFLINE:
- vfree((void *)shadow_start);
+ case MEM_OFFLINE: {
+ struct vm_struct *vm;
+
+ /*
+ * shadow_start was either mapped during boot by kasan_init()
+ * or during memory online by __vmalloc_node_range().
+ * In the latter case we can use vfree() to free shadow.
+ * Non-NULL result of the find_vm_area() will tell us if
+ * that was the second case.
+ *
+ * Currently it's not possible to free shadow mapped
+ * during boot by kasan_init(). It's because the code
+ * to do that hasn't been written yet. So we'll just
+ * leak the memory.
+ */
+ vm = find_vm_area((void *)shadow_start);
+ if (vm)
+ vfree((void *)shadow_start);
+ }
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com are
The patch titled
Subject: ipc/shm: fix shmat() nil address after round-down when remapping
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
ipc-shm-fix-shmat-nil-address-after-round-down-when-remapping.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net>
Subject: ipc/shm: fix shmat() nil address after round-down when remapping
shmat()'s SHM_REMAP option forbids passing a nil address for; this is in
fact the very first thing we check for. Andrea reported that for
SHM_RND|SHM_REMAP cases we can end up bypassing the initial addr check,
but we need to check again if the address was rounded down to nil. As of
this patch, such cases will return -EINVAL.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503204934.kk63josdu6u53fbd@linux-n805
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso(a)suse.de>
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred(a)colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
ipc/shm.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff -puN ipc/shm.c~ipc-shm-fix-shmat-nil-address-after-round-down-when-remapping ipc/shm.c
--- a/ipc/shm.c~ipc-shm-fix-shmat-nil-address-after-round-down-when-remapping
+++ a/ipc/shm.c
@@ -1363,9 +1363,17 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *sh
if (addr) {
if (addr & (shmlba - 1)) {
- if (shmflg & SHM_RND)
+ if (shmflg & SHM_RND) {
addr &= ~(shmlba - 1); /* round down */
- else
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that the round-down is non-nil
+ * when remapping. This can happen for
+ * cases when addr < shmlba.
+ */
+ if (!addr && (shmflg & SHM_REMAP))
+ goto out;
+ } else
#ifndef __ARCH_FORCE_SHMLBA
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
#endif
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from dave(a)stgolabs.net are
ipc-sem-mitigate-semnum-index-against-spectre-v1.patch
The patch titled
Subject: Revert "ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection"
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
revert-ipc-shm-fix-shmat-mmap-nil-page-protection.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net>
Subject: Revert "ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection"
Patch series "ipc/shm: shmat() fixes around nil-page".
These patches fix two issues reported[1] a while back by Joe and Andrea
around how shmat(2) behaves with nil-page.
The first reverts a commit that it was incorrectly thought that mapping
nil-page (address=0) was a no no with MAP_FIXED. This is not the case,
with the exception of SHM_REMAP; which is address in the second patch.
I chose two patches because it is easier to backport and it explicitly
reverts bogus behaviour. Both patches ought to be in -stable and ltp
testcases need updated (the added testcase around the cve can be modified
to just test for SHM_RND|SHM_REMAP).
[1] lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430172152.nfa564pvgpk3ut7p@linux-n805
This patch (of 2):
95e91b831f87 ("ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection") worked on the
idea that we should not be mapping as root addr=0 and MAP_FIXED. However,
it was reported that this scenario is in fact valid, thus making the patch
both bogus and breaks userspace as well. For example X11's libint10.so
relies on shmat(1, SHM_RND) for lowmem initialization[1].
[1] https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/tree/hw/xfree86/os-support/linux/…
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503203243.15045-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Fixes: 95e91b831f87 ("ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection")
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso(a)suse.de>
Reported-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence(a)redhat.com>
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred(a)colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
ipc/shm.c | 9 ++-------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff -puN ipc/shm.c~revert-ipc-shm-fix-shmat-mmap-nil-page-protection ipc/shm.c
--- a/ipc/shm.c~revert-ipc-shm-fix-shmat-mmap-nil-page-protection
+++ a/ipc/shm.c
@@ -1363,13 +1363,8 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *sh
if (addr) {
if (addr & (shmlba - 1)) {
- /*
- * Round down to the nearest multiple of shmlba.
- * For sane do_mmap_pgoff() parameters, avoid
- * round downs that trigger nil-page and MAP_FIXED.
- */
- if ((shmflg & SHM_RND) && addr >= shmlba)
- addr &= ~(shmlba - 1);
+ if (shmflg & SHM_RND)
+ addr &= ~(shmlba - 1); /* round down */
else
#ifndef __ARCH_FORCE_SHMLBA
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from dave(a)stgolabs.net are
ipc-sem-mitigate-semnum-index-against-spectre-v1.patch
The patch titled
Subject: idr: fix invalid ptr dereference on item delete
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
idr-fix-invalid-ptr-dereference-on-item-delete.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox(a)microsoft.com>
Subject: idr: fix invalid ptr dereference on item delete
If the radix tree underlying the IDR happens to be full and we attempt to
remove an id which is larger than any id in the IDR, we will call
__radix_tree_delete() with an uninitialised 'slot' pointer, at which point
anything could happen. This was easiest to hit with a single entry at id
0 and attempting to remove a non-0 id, but it could have happened with 64
entries and attempting to remove an id >= 64.
Roman said:
The syzcaller test boils down to opening /dev/kvm, creating an
eventfd, and calling a couple of KVM ioctls. None of this requires
superuser. And the result is dereferencing an uninitialized pointer
which is likely a crash. The specific path caught by syzbot is via
KVM_HYPERV_EVENTD ioctl which is new in 4.17. But I guess there are
other user-triggerable paths, so cc:stable is probably justified.
Matthew added:
We have around 250 calls to idr_remove() in the kernel today. Many
of them pass an ID which is embedded in the object they're removing,
so they're safe. Picking a few likely candidates:
drivers/firewire/core-cdev.c looks unsafe; the ID comes from an ioctl.
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ctx.c is similar
drivers/atm/nicstar.c could be taken down by a handcrafted packet
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518175025.GD6361@bombadil.infradead.org
Fixes: 0a835c4f090a ("Reimplement IDR and IDA using the radix tree")
Reported-by: <syzbot+35666cba7f0a337e2e79(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Debugged-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan(a)virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox(a)microsoft.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
lib/radix-tree.c | 4 +++-
tools/testing/radix-tree/idr-test.c | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff -puN lib/radix-tree.c~idr-fix-invalid-ptr-dereference-on-item-delete lib/radix-tree.c
--- a/lib/radix-tree.c~idr-fix-invalid-ptr-dereference-on-item-delete
+++ a/lib/radix-tree.c
@@ -2034,10 +2034,12 @@ void *radix_tree_delete_item(struct radi
unsigned long index, void *item)
{
struct radix_tree_node *node = NULL;
- void __rcu **slot;
+ void __rcu **slot = NULL;
void *entry;
entry = __radix_tree_lookup(root, index, &node, &slot);
+ if (!slot)
+ return NULL;
if (!entry && (!is_idr(root) || node_tag_get(root, node, IDR_FREE,
get_slot_offset(node, slot))))
return NULL;
diff -puN tools/testing/radix-tree/idr-test.c~idr-fix-invalid-ptr-dereference-on-item-delete tools/testing/radix-tree/idr-test.c
--- a/tools/testing/radix-tree/idr-test.c~idr-fix-invalid-ptr-dereference-on-item-delete
+++ a/tools/testing/radix-tree/idr-test.c
@@ -252,6 +252,13 @@ void idr_checks(void)
idr_remove(&idr, 3);
idr_remove(&idr, 0);
+ assert(idr_alloc(&idr, DUMMY_PTR, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL) == 0);
+ idr_remove(&idr, 1);
+ for (i = 1; i < RADIX_TREE_MAP_SIZE; i++)
+ assert(idr_alloc(&idr, DUMMY_PTR, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL) == i);
+ idr_remove(&idr, 1 << 30);
+ idr_destroy(&idr);
+
for (i = INT_MAX - 3UL; i < INT_MAX + 1UL; i++) {
struct item *item = item_create(i, 0);
assert(idr_alloc(&idr, item, i, i + 10, GFP_KERNEL) == i);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from mawilcox(a)microsoft.com are
slab-__gfp_zero-is-incompatible-with-a-constructor.patch
s390-use-_refcount-for-pgtables.patch
mm-split-page_type-out-from-_mapcount.patch
mm-mark-pages-in-use-for-page-tables.patch
mm-switch-s_mem-and-slab_cache-in-struct-page.patch
mm-move-private-union-within-struct-page.patch
mm-move-_refcount-out-of-struct-page-union.patch
mm-combine-first-three-unions-in-struct-page.patch
mm-use-page-deferred_list.patch
mm-move-lru-union-within-struct-page.patch
mm-combine-lru-and-main-union-in-struct-page.patch
mm-improve-struct-page-documentation.patch
mm-add-pt_mm-to-struct-page.patch
mm-add-hmm_data-to-struct-page.patch
slabslub-remove-rcu_head-size-checks.patch
slub-remove-kmem_cache-reserved.patch
slub-remove-reserved-file-from-sysfs.patch
ida-remove-simple_ida_lock.patch