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Patch "xfrm_user: uncoditionally validate esn replay attribute struct" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled xfrm_user: uncoditionally validate esn replay attribute struct to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From d97ca5d714a5334aecadadf696875da40f1fbf3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 14:42:01 +0100 Subject: xfrm_user: uncoditionally validate esn replay attribute struct From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> commit d97ca5d714a5334aecadadf696875da40f1fbf3e upstream. The sanity test added in ecd7918745234 can be bypassed, validation only occurs if XFRM_STATE_ESN flag is set, but rest of code doesn't care and just checks if the attribute itself is present. So always validate. Alternative is to reject if we have the attribute without the flag but that would change abi. Reported-by: syzbot+0ab777c27d2bb7588f73(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)googlemail.com> Fixes: ecd7918745234 ("xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid") Fixes: d8647b79c3b7e ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 21 ++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -121,22 +121,17 @@ static inline int verify_replay(struct x struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL]; struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *rs; - if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) { - if (!rt) - return -EINVAL; - - rs = nla_data(rt); + if (!rt) + return (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) ? -EINVAL : 0; - if (rs->bmp_len > XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_MAX / sizeof(rs->bmp[0]) / 8) - return -EINVAL; + rs = nla_data(rt); - if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(rs) && - nla_len(rt) != sizeof(*rs)) - return -EINVAL; - } + if (rs->bmp_len > XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_MAX / sizeof(rs->bmp[0]) / 8) + return -EINVAL; - if (!rt) - return 0; + if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(rs) && + nla_len(rt) != sizeof(*rs)) + return -EINVAL; /* As only ESP and AH support ESN feature. */ if ((p->id.proto != IPPROTO_ESP) && (p->id.proto != IPPROTO_AH)) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from fw(a)strlen.de are queue-4.14/xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch

7 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Introduce safer rdma_addr_size() variants" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Introduce safer rdma_addr_size() variants to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-introduce-safer-rdma_addr_size-variants.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 84652aefb347297aa08e91e283adf7b18f77c2d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roland Dreier <roland(a)purestorage.com> Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 11:27:22 -0700 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Introduce safer rdma_addr_size() variants From: Roland Dreier <roland(a)purestorage.com> commit 84652aefb347297aa08e91e283adf7b18f77c2d5 upstream. There are several places in the ucma ABI where userspace can pass in a sockaddr but set the address family to AF_IB. When that happens, rdma_addr_size() will return a size bigger than sizeof struct sockaddr_in6, and the ucma kernel code might end up copying past the end of a buffer not sized for a struct sockaddr_ib. Fix this by introducing new variants int rdma_addr_size_in6(struct sockaddr_in6 *addr); int rdma_addr_size_kss(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage *addr); that are type-safe for the types used in the ucma ABI and return 0 if the size computed is bigger than the size of the type passed in. We can use these new variants to check what size userspace has passed in before copying any addresses. Reported-by: <syzbot+6800425d54ed3ed8135d(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland(a)purestorage.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- include/rdma/ib_addr.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c @@ -207,6 +207,22 @@ int rdma_addr_size(struct sockaddr *addr } EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_addr_size); +int rdma_addr_size_in6(struct sockaddr_in6 *addr) +{ + int ret = rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *) addr); + + return ret <= sizeof(*addr) ? ret : 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_addr_size_in6); + +int rdma_addr_size_kss(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage *addr) +{ + int ret = rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *) addr); + + return ret <= sizeof(*addr) ? ret : 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_addr_size_kss); + static struct rdma_addr_client self; void rdma_addr_register_client(struct rdma_addr_client *client) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -632,6 +632,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_bind_ip(struct ucma_ if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; + if (!rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.addr)) + return -EINVAL; + ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); @@ -645,22 +648,21 @@ static ssize_t ucma_bind(struct ucma_fil int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_bind cmd; - struct sockaddr *addr; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr; - if (cmd.reserved || !cmd.addr_size || (cmd.addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))) + if (cmd.reserved || !cmd.addr_size || + cmd.addr_size != rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.addr)) return -EINVAL; ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, addr); + ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -670,23 +672,22 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_ip(struct uc int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_resolve_ip cmd; - struct sockaddr *src, *dst; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - src = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr; - dst = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr; - if (!rdma_addr_size(src) || !rdma_addr_size(dst)) + if (!rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.src_addr) || + !rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.dst_addr)) return -EINVAL; ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, src, dst, cmd.timeout_ms); + ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, + (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, cmd.timeout_ms); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -696,24 +697,23 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_addr(struct int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_resolve_addr cmd; - struct sockaddr *src, *dst; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - src = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr; - dst = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr; - if (cmd.reserved || (cmd.src_size && (cmd.src_size != rdma_addr_size(src))) || - !cmd.dst_size || (cmd.dst_size != rdma_addr_size(dst))) + if (cmd.reserved || + (cmd.src_size && (cmd.src_size != rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.src_addr))) || + !cmd.dst_size || (cmd.dst_size != rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.dst_addr))) return -EINVAL; ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, src, dst, cmd.timeout_ms); + ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, + (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, cmd.timeout_ms); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1432,7 +1432,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_join_ip_multicast(st join_cmd.response = cmd.response; join_cmd.uid = cmd.uid; join_cmd.id = cmd.id; - join_cmd.addr_size = rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr); + join_cmd.addr_size = rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.addr); if (!join_cmd.addr_size) return -EINVAL; @@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_join_multicast(struc if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - if (!rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *)&cmd.addr)) + if (!rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.addr)) return -EINVAL; return ucma_process_join(file, &cmd, out_len); --- a/include/rdma/ib_addr.h +++ b/include/rdma/ib_addr.h @@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ int rdma_copy_addr(struct rdma_dev_addr const unsigned char *dst_dev_addr); int rdma_addr_size(struct sockaddr *addr); +int rdma_addr_size_in6(struct sockaddr_in6 *addr); +int rdma_addr_size_kss(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage *addr); int rdma_addr_find_smac_by_sgid(union ib_gid *sgid, u8 *smac, u16 *vlan_id); int rdma_addr_find_l2_eth_by_grh(const union ib_gid *sgid, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from roland(a)purestorage.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-introduce-safer-rdma_addr_size-variants.patch

7 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Fix use-after-free access in ucma_close" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Fix use-after-free access in ucma_close to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ed65a4dc22083e73bac599ded6a262318cad7baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 14:20:15 +0200 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Fix use-after-free access in ucma_close From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> commit ed65a4dc22083e73bac599ded6a262318cad7baf upstream. The error in ucma_create_id() left ctx in the list of contexts belong to ucma file descriptor. The attempt to close this file descriptor causes to use-after-free accesses while iterating over such list. Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Reported-by: <syzbot+dcfd344365a56fbebd0f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Hefty <sean.hefty(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -497,6 +497,9 @@ err1: mutex_lock(&mut); idr_remove(&ctx_idr, ctx->id); mutex_unlock(&mut); + mutex_lock(&file->mut); + list_del(&ctx->list); + mutex_unlock(&file->mut); kfree(ctx); return ret; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

7 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Ensure that CM_ID exists prior to access it" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Ensure that CM_ID exists prior to access it to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From e8980d67d6017c8eee8f9c35f782c4bd68e004c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 17:05:13 +0200 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Ensure that CM_ID exists prior to access it From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> commit e8980d67d6017c8eee8f9c35f782c4bd68e004c9 upstream. Prior to access UCMA commands, the context should be initialized and connected to CM_ID with ucma_create_id(). In case user skips this step, he can provide non-valid ctx without CM_ID and cause to multiple NULL dereferences. Also there are situations where the create_id can be raced with other user access, ensure that the context is only shared to other threads once it is fully initialized to avoid the races. [ 109.088108] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 [ 109.090315] IP: ucma_connect+0x138/0x1d0 [ 109.092595] PGD 80000001dc02d067 P4D 80000001dc02d067 PUD 1da9ef067 PMD 0 [ 109.095384] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 109.097834] CPU: 0 PID: 663 Comm: uclose Tainted: G B 4.16.0-rc1-00062-g2975d5de6428 #45 [ 109.100816] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 109.105943] RIP: 0010:ucma_connect+0x138/0x1d0 [ 109.108850] RSP: 0018:ffff8801c8567a80 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 109.111484] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff100390acf50 RCX: ffffffff9d7812e2 [ 109.114496] RDX: 1ffffffff3f507a5 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297 [ 109.117490] RBP: ffff8801daa15600 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed00390aceeb [ 109.120429] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed00390aceea R12: 0000000000000000 [ 109.123318] R13: 0000000000000120 R14: ffff8801de6459c0 R15: 0000000000000118 [ 109.126221] FS: 00007fabb68d6700(0000) GS:ffff8801e5c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 109.129468] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 109.132523] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000001d45d8003 CR4: 00000000003606b0 [ 109.135573] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 109.138716] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 109.142057] Call Trace: [ 109.144160] ? ucma_listen+0x110/0x110 [ 109.146386] ? wake_up_q+0x59/0x90 [ 109.148853] ? futex_wake+0x10b/0x2a0 [ 109.151297] ? save_stack+0x89/0xb0 [ 109.153489] ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90 [ 109.155500] ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0 [ 109.157933] ? ucma_resolve_route+0xf0/0xf0 [ 109.160389] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x1d/0x80 [ 109.162706] __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350 [ 109.164911] ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0 [ 109.167121] ? path_openat+0x1b10/0x1b10 [ 109.169355] ? fsnotify+0x899/0x8f0 [ 109.171567] ? fsnotify_unmount_inodes+0x170/0x170 [ 109.174145] ? __fget+0xa8/0xf0 [ 109.177110] vfs_write+0xf7/0x280 [ 109.179532] SyS_write+0xa1/0x120 [ 109.181885] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 109.184482] ? compat_start_thread+0x60/0x60 [ 109.187124] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 109.189548] do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250 [ 109.192178] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 [ 109.194725] RIP: 0033:0x7fabb61ebe99 [ 109.197040] RSP: 002b:00007fabb68d5e98 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 109.200294] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fabb61ebe99 [ 109.203399] RDX: 0000000000000120 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 109.206548] RBP: 00007fabb68d5ec0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 109.209902] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fabb68d5fc0 [ 109.213327] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff40ab2430 R15: 00007fabb68d69c0 [ 109.216613] Code: 88 44 24 2c 0f b6 84 24 6e 01 00 00 88 44 24 2d 0f b6 84 24 69 01 00 00 88 44 24 2e 8b 44 24 60 89 44 24 30 e8 da f6 06 ff 31 c0 <66> 41 83 7c 24 20 1b 75 04 8b 44 24 64 48 8d 74 24 20 4c 89 e7 [ 109.223602] RIP: ucma_connect+0x138/0x1d0 RSP: ffff8801c8567a80 [ 109.226256] CR2: 0000000000000020 Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Reported-by: <syzbot+36712f50b0552615bf59(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static inline struct ucma_context *_ucma ctx = idr_find(&ctx_idr, id); if (!ctx) ctx = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); - else if (ctx->file != file) + else if (ctx->file != file || !ctx->cm_id) ctx = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return ctx; } @@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_create_id(struct ucm struct rdma_ucm_create_id cmd; struct rdma_ucm_create_id_resp resp; struct ucma_context *ctx; + struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id; enum ib_qp_type qp_type; int ret; @@ -476,10 +477,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_create_id(struct ucm return -ENOMEM; ctx->uid = cmd.uid; - ctx->cm_id = rdma_create_id(current->nsproxy->net_ns, - ucma_event_handler, ctx, cmd.ps, qp_type); - if (IS_ERR(ctx->cm_id)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(ctx->cm_id); + cm_id = rdma_create_id(current->nsproxy->net_ns, + ucma_event_handler, ctx, cmd.ps, qp_type); + if (IS_ERR(cm_id)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(cm_id); goto err1; } @@ -489,10 +490,12 @@ static ssize_t ucma_create_id(struct ucm ret = -EFAULT; goto err2; } + + ctx->cm_id = cm_id; return 0; err2: - rdma_destroy_id(ctx->cm_id); + rdma_destroy_id(cm_id); err1: mutex_lock(&mut); idr_remove(&ctx_idr, ctx->id); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

7 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Check that device is connected prior to access it" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Check that device is connected prior to access it to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 4b658d1bbc16605330694bb3ef2570c465ef383d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2018 11:23:55 +0300 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Check that device is connected prior to access it From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> commit 4b658d1bbc16605330694bb3ef2570c465ef383d upstream. Add missing check that device is connected prior to access it. [ 55.358652] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in rdma_init_qp_attr+0x4a/0x2c0 [ 55.359389] Read of size 8 at addr 00000000000000b0 by task qp/618 [ 55.360255] [ 55.360432] CPU: 1 PID: 618 Comm: qp Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-00071-gcaf61b1b8b88 #91 [ 55.361693] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 55.363264] Call Trace: [ 55.363833] dump_stack+0x5c/0x77 [ 55.364215] kasan_report+0x163/0x380 [ 55.364610] ? rdma_init_qp_attr+0x4a/0x2c0 [ 55.365238] rdma_init_qp_attr+0x4a/0x2c0 [ 55.366410] ucma_init_qp_attr+0x111/0x200 [ 55.366846] ? ucma_notify+0xf0/0xf0 [ 55.367405] ? _get_random_bytes+0xea/0x1b0 [ 55.367846] ? urandom_read+0x2f0/0x2f0 [ 55.368436] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xd2/0x1e0 [ 55.369104] ? refcount_inc_not_zero+0x9/0x60 [ 55.369583] ? refcount_inc+0x5/0x30 [ 55.370155] ? rdma_create_id+0x215/0x240 [ 55.370937] ? _copy_to_user+0x4f/0x60 [ 55.371620] ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x1f5/0x290 [ 55.372127] ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90 [ 55.372720] ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0 [ 55.373090] ? ucma_close_id+0x40/0x40 [ 55.373805] ? __lru_cache_add+0xa8/0xd0 [ 55.374403] __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350 [ 55.374774] ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0 [ 55.375173] ? fsnotify+0x899/0x8f0 [ 55.375544] ? fsnotify_unmount_inodes+0x170/0x170 [ 55.376689] ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x30/0x30 [ 55.377522] ? handle_mm_fault+0x174/0x320 [ 55.378169] vfs_write+0xf7/0x280 [ 55.378864] SyS_write+0xa1/0x120 [ 55.379270] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 55.379643] ? mm_fault_error+0x180/0x180 [ 55.380071] ? task_work_run+0x7d/0xd0 [ 55.380910] ? __task_pid_nr_ns+0x120/0x140 [ 55.381366] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 55.381739] do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250 [ 55.382143] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 [ 55.382841] RIP: 0033:0x7fc2ef803e99 [ 55.383227] RSP: 002b:00007fffcc5f3be8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 55.384173] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc2ef803e99 [ 55.386145] RDX: 0000000000000057 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 55.388418] RBP: 00007fffcc5f3c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 55.390542] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000400480 [ 55.392916] R13: 00007fffcc5f3cf0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 55.521088] Code: e5 4d 1e ff 48 89 df 44 0f b6 b3 b8 01 00 00 e8 65 50 1e ff 4c 8b 2b 49 8d bd b0 00 00 00 e8 56 50 1e ff 41 0f b6 c6 48 c1 e0 04 <49> 03 85 b0 00 00 00 48 8d 78 08 48 89 04 24 e8 3a 4f 1e ff 48 [ 55.525980] RIP: rdma_init_qp_attr+0x52/0x2c0 RSP: ffff8801e2c2f9d8 [ 55.532648] CR2: 00000000000000b0 [ 55.534396] ---[ end trace 70cee64090251c0b ]--- Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Fixes: d541e45500bd ("IB/core: Convert ah_attr from OPA to IB when copying to user") Reported-by: <syzbot+7b62c837c2516f8f38c8(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -1165,6 +1165,11 @@ static ssize_t ucma_init_qp_attr(struct if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + if (!ctx->cm_id->device) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + resp.qp_attr_mask = 0; memset(&qp_attr, 0, sizeof qp_attr); qp_attr.qp_state = cmd.qp_state; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

7 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Check that device exists prior to accessing it" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Check that device exists prior to accessing it to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From c8d3bcbfc5eab3f01cf373d039af725f3b488813 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2018 11:39:05 +0300 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Check that device exists prior to accessing it From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> commit c8d3bcbfc5eab3f01cf373d039af725f3b488813 upstream. Ensure that device exists prior to accessing its properties. Reported-by: <syzbot+71655d44855ac3e76366(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_notify(struct ucma_f { struct rdma_ucm_notify cmd; struct ucma_context *ctx; - int ret; + int ret = -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; @@ -1344,7 +1344,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_notify(struct ucma_f if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_notify(ctx->cm_id, (enum ib_event_type) cmd.event); + if (ctx->cm_id->device) + ret = rdma_notify(ctx->cm_id, (enum ib_event_type)cmd.event); + ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

7 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Check AF family prior resolving address" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Check AF family prior resolving address to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 2975d5de6428ff6d9317e9948f0968f7d42e5d74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 15:33:02 +0200 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Check AF family prior resolving address From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> commit 2975d5de6428ff6d9317e9948f0968f7d42e5d74 upstream. Garbage supplied by user will cause to UCMA module provide zero memory size for memcpy(), because it wasn't checked, it will produce unpredictable results in rdma_resolve_addr(). [ 42.873814] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in rdma_resolve_addr+0xc8/0xfb0 [ 42.874816] Write of size 28 at addr 00000000000000a0 by task resaddr/1044 [ 42.876765] [ 42.876960] CPU: 1 PID: 1044 Comm: resaddr Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-00057-gaa56a5293d7e #34 [ 42.877840] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 42.879691] Call Trace: [ 42.880236] dump_stack+0x5c/0x77 [ 42.880664] kasan_report+0x163/0x380 [ 42.881354] ? rdma_resolve_addr+0xc8/0xfb0 [ 42.881864] memcpy+0x34/0x50 [ 42.882692] rdma_resolve_addr+0xc8/0xfb0 [ 42.883366] ? deref_stack_reg+0x88/0xd0 [ 42.883856] ? vsnprintf+0x31a/0x770 [ 42.884686] ? rdma_bind_addr+0xc40/0xc40 [ 42.885327] ? num_to_str+0x130/0x130 [ 42.885773] ? deref_stack_reg+0x88/0xd0 [ 42.886217] ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.6+0x10/0x10 [ 42.887698] ? unwind_get_return_address_ptr+0x50/0x50 [ 42.888302] ? replace_slot+0x147/0x170 [ 42.889176] ? delete_node+0x12c/0x340 [ 42.890223] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0xa9/0x160 [ 42.891196] ? ucma_resolve_ip+0xb7/0x110 [ 42.891917] ucma_resolve_ip+0xb7/0x110 [ 42.893003] ? ucma_resolve_addr+0x190/0x190 [ 42.893531] ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90 [ 42.894204] ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0 [ 42.895162] ? ucma_resolve_route+0xf0/0xf0 [ 42.896309] ? dequeue_task_fair+0x67e/0xd90 [ 42.897192] ? put_prev_entity+0x7d/0x170 [ 42.897870] ? ring_buffer_record_is_on+0xd/0x20 [ 42.898439] ? tracing_record_taskinfo_skip+0x20/0x50 [ 42.899686] __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350 [ 42.900142] ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0 [ 42.900602] ? firmware_map_remove+0xdf/0xdf [ 42.901135] ? do_task_dead+0x5d/0x60 [ 42.901598] ? do_exit+0xcc6/0x1220 [ 42.902789] ? __fget+0xa8/0xf0 [ 42.903190] vfs_write+0xf7/0x280 [ 42.903600] SyS_write+0xa1/0x120 [ 42.904206] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 42.905710] ? compat_start_thread+0x60/0x60 [ 42.906423] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 42.908716] do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250 [ 42.910760] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 [ 42.912735] RIP: 0033:0x7f138b0afe99 [ 42.914734] RSP: 002b:00007f138b799e98 EFLAGS: 00000287 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 42.917134] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f138b0afe99 [ 42.919487] RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020000c40 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 42.922393] RBP: 00007f138b799ec0 R08: 00007f138b79a700 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 42.925266] R10: 00007f138b79a700 R11: 0000000000000287 R12: 00007f138b799fc0 [ 42.927570] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdbae757c0 R15: 00007f138b79a9c0 [ 42.930047] [ 42.932681] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 42.934795] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0 [ 42.936939] IP: memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 42.938864] PGD 80000001bea92067 P4D 80000001bea92067 PUD 1bea96067 PMD 0 [ 42.941576] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 42.943952] CPU: 1 PID: 1044 Comm: resaddr Tainted: G B 4.16.0-rc1-00057-gaa56a5293d7e #34 [ 42.946964] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 42.952336] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 42.954707] RSP: 0018:ffff8801c8b479c8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 42.957227] RAX: 00000000000000a0 RBX: ffff8801c8b47ba0 RCX: 000000000000001c [ 42.960543] RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: ffff8801c8b47bbc RDI: 00000000000000a0 [ 42.963867] RBP: ffff8801c8b47b60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed0039168ed1 [ 42.967303] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0039168ed0 R12: ffff8801c8b47bbc [ 42.970685] R13: 00000000000000a0 R14: 1ffff10039168f4a R15: 0000000000000000 [ 42.973631] FS: 00007f138b79a700(0000) GS:ffff8801e5d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 42.976831] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 42.979239] CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 00000001be908002 CR4: 00000000003606a0 [ 42.982060] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 42.984877] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 42.988033] Call Trace: [ 42.990487] rdma_resolve_addr+0xc8/0xfb0 [ 42.993202] ? deref_stack_reg+0x88/0xd0 [ 42.996055] ? vsnprintf+0x31a/0x770 [ 42.998707] ? rdma_bind_addr+0xc40/0xc40 [ 43.000985] ? num_to_str+0x130/0x130 [ 43.003410] ? deref_stack_reg+0x88/0xd0 [ 43.006302] ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.6+0x10/0x10 [ 43.008780] ? unwind_get_return_address_ptr+0x50/0x50 [ 43.011178] ? replace_slot+0x147/0x170 [ 43.013517] ? delete_node+0x12c/0x340 [ 43.016019] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0xa9/0x160 [ 43.018755] ? ucma_resolve_ip+0xb7/0x110 [ 43.021270] ucma_resolve_ip+0xb7/0x110 [ 43.023968] ? ucma_resolve_addr+0x190/0x190 [ 43.026312] ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90 [ 43.029384] ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0 [ 43.031861] ? ucma_resolve_route+0xf0/0xf0 [ 43.034782] ? dequeue_task_fair+0x67e/0xd90 [ 43.037483] ? put_prev_entity+0x7d/0x170 [ 43.040215] ? ring_buffer_record_is_on+0xd/0x20 [ 43.042990] ? tracing_record_taskinfo_skip+0x20/0x50 [ 43.045595] __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350 [ 43.048624] ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0 [ 43.051604] ? firmware_map_remove+0xdf/0xdf [ 43.055379] ? do_task_dead+0x5d/0x60 [ 43.058000] ? do_exit+0xcc6/0x1220 [ 43.060783] ? __fget+0xa8/0xf0 [ 43.063133] vfs_write+0xf7/0x280 [ 43.065677] SyS_write+0xa1/0x120 [ 43.068647] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 43.071179] ? compat_start_thread+0x60/0x60 [ 43.074025] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 43.076705] do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250 [ 43.079006] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 [ 43.081606] RIP: 0033:0x7f138b0afe99 [ 43.083679] RSP: 002b:00007f138b799e98 EFLAGS: 00000287 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 43.086802] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f138b0afe99 [ 43.089989] RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020000c40 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 43.092866] RBP: 00007f138b799ec0 R08: 00007f138b79a700 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 43.096233] R10: 00007f138b79a700 R11: 0000000000000287 R12: 00007f138b799fc0 [ 43.098913] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdbae757c0 R15: 00007f138b79a9c0 [ 43.101809] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 eb 1e 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 83 e2 07 f3 48 a5 89 d1 f3 a4 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 <f3> a4 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 83 fa 20 72 7e 40 38 [ 43.107950] RIP: memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 RSP: ffff8801c8b479c8 Reported-by: <syzbot+1d8c43206853b369d00c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Hefty <sean.hefty(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -664,19 +664,23 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_ip(struct uc int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_resolve_ip cmd; + struct sockaddr *src, *dst; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; + src = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr; + dst = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr; + if (!rdma_addr_size(src) || !rdma_addr_size(dst)) + return -EINVAL; + ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, - (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, - cmd.timeout_ms); + ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, src, dst, cmd.timeout_ms); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

7 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/rdma_cm: Fix use after free race with process_one_req" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/rdma_cm: Fix use after free race with process_one_req to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-rdma_cm-fix-use-after-free-race-with-process_one_req.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 9137108cc3d64ade13e753108ec611a0daed16a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 14:04:23 -0600 Subject: RDMA/rdma_cm: Fix use after free race with process_one_req From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> commit 9137108cc3d64ade13e753108ec611a0daed16a0 upstream. process_one_req() can race with rdma_addr_cancel(): CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== process_one_work() debug_work_deactivate(work); process_one_req() rdma_addr_cancel() mutex_lock(&lock); set_timeout(&req->work,..); __queue_work() debug_work_activate(work); mutex_unlock(&lock); mutex_lock(&lock); [..] list_del(&req->list); mutex_unlock(&lock); [..] // ODEBUG explodes since the work is still queued. kfree(req); Causing ODEBUG to detect the use after free: ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: work_struct hint: process_one_req+0x0/0x6c0 include/net/dst.h:165 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 79 at lib/debugobjects.c:291 debug_print_object+0x166/0x220 lib/debugobjects.c:288 kvm: emulating exchange as write Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 79 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc6+ #361 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: ib_addr process_one_req Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:183 __warn+0x1dc/0x200 kernel/panic.c:547 report_bug+0x1f4/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug.part.11+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline] do_error_trap+0x2d7/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296 do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315 invalid_op+0x1b/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:986 RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x166/0x220 lib/debugobjects.c:288 RSP: 0000:ffff8801d966f210 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ffffffff815acd6e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 1ffff1003b2cddf2 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8801d966f250 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 1ffff1003b2cddc8 R10: ffffed003b2cde71 R11: ffffffff86f39a98 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffff86f15540 R14: ffffffff86408700 R15: ffffffff8147c0a0 __debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:745 [inline] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x662/0xf1f lib/debugobjects.c:774 kfree+0xc7/0x260 mm/slab.c:3799 process_one_req+0x2e7/0x6c0 drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c:592 process_one_work+0xc47/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2113 worker_thread+0x223/0x1990 kernel/workqueue.c:2247 kthread+0x33c/0x400 kernel/kthread.c:238 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:406 Fixes: 5fff41e1f89d ("IB/core: Fix race condition in resolving IP to MAC") Reported-by: <syzbot+3b4acab09b6463472d0a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c @@ -597,6 +597,15 @@ static void process_one_req(struct work_ list_del(&req->list); mutex_unlock(&lock); + /* + * Although the work will normally have been canceled by the + * workqueue, it can still be requeued as long as it is on the + * req_list, so it could have been requeued before we grabbed &lock. + * We need to cancel it after it is removed from req_list to really be + * sure it is safe to free. + */ + cancel_delayed_work(&req->work); + req->callback(req->status, (struct sockaddr *)&req->src_addr, req->addr, req->context); put_client(req->client); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jgg(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-rdma_cm-fix-use-after-free-race-with-process_one_req.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-introduce-safer-rdma_addr_size-variants.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

7 years, 2 months

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Patch "xfrm_user: uncoditionally validate esn replay attribute struct" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled xfrm_user: uncoditionally validate esn replay attribute struct to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From d97ca5d714a5334aecadadf696875da40f1fbf3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 14:42:01 +0100 Subject: xfrm_user: uncoditionally validate esn replay attribute struct From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> commit d97ca5d714a5334aecadadf696875da40f1fbf3e upstream. The sanity test added in ecd7918745234 can be bypassed, validation only occurs if XFRM_STATE_ESN flag is set, but rest of code doesn't care and just checks if the attribute itself is present. So always validate. Alternative is to reject if we have the attribute without the flag but that would change abi. Reported-by: syzbot+0ab777c27d2bb7588f73(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)googlemail.com> Fixes: ecd7918745234 ("xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid") Fixes: d8647b79c3b7e ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 21 ++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -121,22 +121,17 @@ static inline int verify_replay(struct x struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL]; struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *rs; - if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) { - if (!rt) - return -EINVAL; - - rs = nla_data(rt); + if (!rt) + return (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) ? -EINVAL : 0; - if (rs->bmp_len > XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_MAX / sizeof(rs->bmp[0]) / 8) - return -EINVAL; + rs = nla_data(rt); - if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(rs) && - nla_len(rt) != sizeof(*rs)) - return -EINVAL; - } + if (rs->bmp_len > XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_MAX / sizeof(rs->bmp[0]) / 8) + return -EINVAL; - if (!rt) - return 0; + if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(rs) && + nla_len(rt) != sizeof(*rs)) + return -EINVAL; /* As only ESP and AH support ESN feature. */ if ((p->id.proto != IPPROTO_ESP) && (p->id.proto != IPPROTO_AH)) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from fw(a)strlen.de are queue-4.15/xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch

7 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Introduce safer rdma_addr_size() variants" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Introduce safer rdma_addr_size() variants to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-introduce-safer-rdma_addr_size-variants.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 84652aefb347297aa08e91e283adf7b18f77c2d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roland Dreier <roland(a)purestorage.com> Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 11:27:22 -0700 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Introduce safer rdma_addr_size() variants From: Roland Dreier <roland(a)purestorage.com> commit 84652aefb347297aa08e91e283adf7b18f77c2d5 upstream. There are several places in the ucma ABI where userspace can pass in a sockaddr but set the address family to AF_IB. When that happens, rdma_addr_size() will return a size bigger than sizeof struct sockaddr_in6, and the ucma kernel code might end up copying past the end of a buffer not sized for a struct sockaddr_ib. Fix this by introducing new variants int rdma_addr_size_in6(struct sockaddr_in6 *addr); int rdma_addr_size_kss(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage *addr); that are type-safe for the types used in the ucma ABI and return 0 if the size computed is bigger than the size of the type passed in. We can use these new variants to check what size userspace has passed in before copying any addresses. Reported-by: <syzbot+6800425d54ed3ed8135d(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland(a)purestorage.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- include/rdma/ib_addr.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c @@ -207,6 +207,22 @@ int rdma_addr_size(struct sockaddr *addr } EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_addr_size); +int rdma_addr_size_in6(struct sockaddr_in6 *addr) +{ + int ret = rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *) addr); + + return ret <= sizeof(*addr) ? ret : 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_addr_size_in6); + +int rdma_addr_size_kss(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage *addr) +{ + int ret = rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *) addr); + + return ret <= sizeof(*addr) ? ret : 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_addr_size_kss); + static struct rdma_addr_client self; void rdma_addr_register_client(struct rdma_addr_client *client) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -632,6 +632,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_bind_ip(struct ucma_ if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; + if (!rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.addr)) + return -EINVAL; + ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); @@ -645,22 +648,21 @@ static ssize_t ucma_bind(struct ucma_fil int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_bind cmd; - struct sockaddr *addr; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr; - if (cmd.reserved || !cmd.addr_size || (cmd.addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))) + if (cmd.reserved || !cmd.addr_size || + cmd.addr_size != rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.addr)) return -EINVAL; ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, addr); + ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -670,23 +672,22 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_ip(struct uc int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_resolve_ip cmd; - struct sockaddr *src, *dst; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - src = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr; - dst = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr; - if (!rdma_addr_size(src) || !rdma_addr_size(dst)) + if (!rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.src_addr) || + !rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.dst_addr)) return -EINVAL; ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, src, dst, cmd.timeout_ms); + ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, + (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, cmd.timeout_ms); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -696,24 +697,23 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_addr(struct int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_resolve_addr cmd; - struct sockaddr *src, *dst; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - src = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr; - dst = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr; - if (cmd.reserved || (cmd.src_size && (cmd.src_size != rdma_addr_size(src))) || - !cmd.dst_size || (cmd.dst_size != rdma_addr_size(dst))) + if (cmd.reserved || + (cmd.src_size && (cmd.src_size != rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.src_addr))) || + !cmd.dst_size || (cmd.dst_size != rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.dst_addr))) return -EINVAL; ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, src, dst, cmd.timeout_ms); + ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, + (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, cmd.timeout_ms); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1432,7 +1432,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_join_ip_multicast(st join_cmd.response = cmd.response; join_cmd.uid = cmd.uid; join_cmd.id = cmd.id; - join_cmd.addr_size = rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr); + join_cmd.addr_size = rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.addr); if (!join_cmd.addr_size) return -EINVAL; @@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_join_multicast(struc if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - if (!rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *)&cmd.addr)) + if (!rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.addr)) return -EINVAL; return ucma_process_join(file, &cmd, out_len); --- a/include/rdma/ib_addr.h +++ b/include/rdma/ib_addr.h @@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ void rdma_copy_addr(struct rdma_dev_addr const unsigned char *dst_dev_addr); int rdma_addr_size(struct sockaddr *addr); +int rdma_addr_size_in6(struct sockaddr_in6 *addr); +int rdma_addr_size_kss(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage *addr); int rdma_addr_find_smac_by_sgid(union ib_gid *sgid, u8 *smac, u16 *vlan_id); int rdma_addr_find_l2_eth_by_grh(const union ib_gid *sgid, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from roland(a)purestorage.com are queue-4.15/rdma-ucma-introduce-safer-rdma_addr_size-variants.patch

7 years, 2 months

1
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