The patch titled
Subject: hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
hwpoison-memory_hotplug-allow-hwpoisoned-pages-to-be-offlined.patch
This patch should soon appear at
http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/hwpoison-memory_hotplug-allow-hwpo…
and later at
http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/hwpoison-memory_hotplug-allow-hwpo…
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*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated
there every 3-4 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Subject: hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined
We have received a bug report that an injected MCE about faulty memory
prevents memory offline to succeed on 4.4 base kernel. The underlying
reason was that the HWPoison page has an elevated reference count and the
migration keeps failing. There are two problems with that. First of all
it is dubious to migrate the poisoned page because we know that accessing
that memory is possible to fail. Secondly it doesn't make any sense to
migrate a potentially broken content and preserve the memory corruption
over to a new location.
Oscar has found out that 4.4 and the current upstream kernels behave
slightly differently with his simply testcase
===
int main(void)
{
int ret;
int i;
int fd;
char *array = malloc(4096);
char *array_locked = malloc(4096);
fd = open("/tmp/data", O_RDONLY);
read(fd, array, 4095);
for (i = 0; i < 4096; i++)
array_locked[i] = 'd';
ret = mlock((void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)array_locked), sizeof(array_locked));
if (ret)
perror("mlock");
sleep (20);
ret = madvise((void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)array_locked), 4096, MADV_HWPOISON);
if (ret)
perror("madvise");
for (i = 0; i < 4096; i++)
array_locked[i] = 'd';
return 0;
}
===
+ offline this memory.
In 4.4 kernels he saw the hwpoisoned page to be returned back to the LRU
list
kernel: [<ffffffff81019ac9>] dump_trace+0x59/0x340
kernel: [<ffffffff81019e9a>] show_stack_log_lvl+0xea/0x170
kernel: [<ffffffff8101ac71>] show_stack+0x21/0x40
kernel: [<ffffffff8132bb90>] dump_stack+0x5c/0x7c
kernel: [<ffffffff810815a1>] warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xb0
kernel: [<ffffffff811a275c>] __pagevec_lru_add_fn+0x14c/0x160
kernel: [<ffffffff811a2eed>] pagevec_lru_move_fn+0xad/0x100
kernel: [<ffffffff811a334c>] __lru_cache_add+0x6c/0xb0
kernel: [<ffffffff81195236>] add_to_page_cache_lru+0x46/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffffa02b4373>] extent_readpages+0xc3/0x1a0 [btrfs]
kernel: [<ffffffff811a16d7>] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x177/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff811a18c8>] ondemand_readahead+0x168/0x2a0
kernel: [<ffffffff8119673f>] generic_file_read_iter+0x41f/0x660
kernel: [<ffffffff8120e50d>] __vfs_read+0xcd/0x140
kernel: [<ffffffff8120e9ea>] vfs_read+0x7a/0x120
kernel: [<ffffffff8121404b>] kernel_read+0x3b/0x50
kernel: [<ffffffff81215c80>] do_execveat_common.isra.29+0x490/0x6f0
kernel: [<ffffffff81215f08>] do_execve+0x28/0x30
kernel: [<ffffffff81095ddb>] call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xfb/0x130
kernel: [<ffffffff8161c045>] ret_from_fork+0x55/0x80
And that latter confuses the hotremove path because an LRU page is
attempted to be migrated and that fails due to an elevated reference
count. It is quite possible that the reuse of the HWPoisoned page is some
kind of fixed race condition but I am not really sure about that.
With the upstream kernel the failure is slightly different. The page
doesn't seem to have LRU bit set but isolate_movable_page simply fails and
do_migrate_range simply puts all the isolated pages back to LRU and
therefore no progress is made and scan_movable_pages finds same set of
pages over and over again.
Fix both cases by explicitly checking HWPoisoned pages before we even try
to get reference on the page, try to unmap it if it is still mapped. As
explained by Naoya:
: Hwpoison code never unmapped those for no big reason because
: Ksm pages never dominate memory, so we simply didn't have strong
: motivation to save the pages.
Also put WARN_ON(PageLRU) in case there is a race and we can hit LRU
HWPoison pages which shouldn't happen but I couldn't convince myself about
that. Naoya has noted the following:
: Theoretically no such gurantee, because try_to_unmap() doesn't have a
: guarantee of success and then memory_failure() returns immediately
: when hwpoison_user_mappings fails.
: Or the following code (comes after hwpoison_user_mappings block) also impli=
: es
: that the target page can still have PageLRU flag.
:
: /*
: * Torn down by someone else?
: */
: if (PageLRU(p) && !PageSwapCache(p) && p->mapping =3D=3D NULL) {
: action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_TRUNCATED_LRU, MF_IGNORED);
: res =3D -EBUSY;
: goto out;
: }
:
: So I think it's OK to keep "if (WARN_ON(PageLRU(page)))" block in
: current version of your patch.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206120135.14079-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.com>
Debugged-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.com>
Tested-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi(a)ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memory_hotplug.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
--- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c~hwpoison-memory_hotplug-allow-hwpoisoned-pages-to-be-offlined
+++ a/mm/memory_hotplug.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/compaction.h>
+#include <linux/rmap.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
@@ -1343,6 +1344,21 @@ do_migrate_range(unsigned long start_pfn
pfn = page_to_pfn(compound_head(page))
+ hpage_nr_pages(page) - 1;
+ /*
+ * HWPoison pages have elevated reference counts so the migration would
+ * fail on them. It also doesn't make any sense to migrate them in the
+ * first place. Still try to unmap such a page in case it is still mapped
+ * (e.g. current hwpoison implementation doesn't unmap KSM pages but keep
+ * the unmap as the catch all safety net).
+ */
+ if (PageHWPoison(page)) {
+ if (WARN_ON(PageLRU(page)))
+ isolate_lru_page(page);
+ if (page_mapped(page))
+ try_to_unmap(page, TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK | TTU_IGNORE_ACCESS);
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (!get_page_unless_zero(page))
continue;
/*
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from mhocko(a)suse.com are
mm-print-more-information-about-mapping-in-__dump_page.patch
mm-lower-the-printk-loglevel-for-__dump_page-messages.patch
mm-memory_hotplug-drop-pointless-block-alignment-checks-from-__offline_pages.patch
mm-memory_hotplug-print-reason-for-the-offlining-failure.patch
mm-memory_hotplug-be-more-verbose-for-memory-offline-failures.patch
mm-memory_hotplug-be-more-verbose-for-memory-offline-failures-update.patch
mm-memory_hotplug-do-not-clear-numa_node-association-after-hot_remove.patch
hwpoison-memory_hotplug-allow-hwpoisoned-pages-to-be-offlined.patch
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
commit 400e22499dd92613821374c8c6c88c7225359980 upstream.
Commit 63f53dea0c98 ("mm: warn about allocations which stall for too
long") was a great step for reducing possibility of silent hang up
problem caused by memory allocation stalls. But this commit reverts it,
for it is possible to trigger OOM lockup and/or soft lockups when many
threads concurrently called warn_alloc() (in order to warn about memory
allocation stalls) due to current implementation of printk(), and it is
difficult to obtain useful information due to limitation of synchronous
warning approach.
Current printk() implementation flushes all pending logs using the
context of a thread which called console_unlock(). printk() should be
able to flush all pending logs eventually unless somebody continues
appending to printk() buffer.
Since warn_alloc() started appending to printk() buffer while waiting
for oom_kill_process() to make forward progress when oom_kill_process()
is processing pending logs, it became possible for warn_alloc() to force
oom_kill_process() loop inside printk(). As a result, warn_alloc()
significantly increased possibility of preventing oom_kill_process()
from making forward progress.
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
Before warn_alloc() was introduced:
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
}
goto retry;
After warn_alloc() was introduced:
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else if (waited_for_10seconds()) {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
Although waited_for_10seconds() becomes true once per 10 seconds,
unbounded number of threads can call waited_for_10seconds() at the same
time. Also, since threads doing waited_for_10seconds() keep doing
almost busy loop, the thread doing print_one_log() can use little CPU
resource. Therefore, this situation can be simplified like
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
when printk() is called faster than print_one_log() can process a log.
One of possible mitigation would be to introduce a new lock in order to
make sure that no other series of printk() (either oom_kill_process() or
warn_alloc()) can append to printk() buffer when one series of printk()
(either oom_kill_process() or warn_alloc()) is already in progress.
Such serialization will also help obtaining kernel messages in readable
form.
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
mutex_lock(&oom_printk_lock);
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_printk_lock);
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else {
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_printk_lock)) {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
mutex_unlock(&oom_printk_lock);
}
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
But this commit does not go that direction, for we don't want to
introduce a new lock dependency, and we unlikely be able to obtain
useful information even if we serialized oom_kill_process() and
warn_alloc().
Synchronous approach is prone to unexpected results (e.g. too late [1],
too frequent [2], overlooked [3]). As far as I know, warn_alloc() never
helped with providing information other than "something is going wrong".
I want to consider asynchronous approach which can obtain information
during stalls with possibly relevant threads (e.g. the owner of
oom_lock and kswapd-like threads) and serve as a trigger for actions
(e.g. turn on/off tracepoints, ask libvirt daemon to take a memory dump
of stalling KVM guest for diagnostic purpose).
This commit temporarily loses ability to report e.g. OOM lockup due to
unable to invoke the OOM killer due to !__GFP_FS allocation request.
But asynchronous approach will be able to detect such situation and emit
warning. Thus, let's remove warn_alloc().
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192981
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAM_iQpWuPVGc2ky8M-9yukECtS+zKjiDasNymX7rMcBjBFyM_…
[3] commit db73ee0d46379922 ("mm, vmscan: do not loop on too_many_isolated for ever"))
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509017339-4802-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-…
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com>
Reported-by: yuwang.yuwang <yuwang.yuwang(a)alibaba-inc.com>
Reported-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek(a)suse.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
[Resolved backport conflict due to missing 8225196, a8e9925, 9e80c71 and
9a67f64 in 4.9 -- all of which modified this hunk being removed.]
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit(a)kernel.org>
---
mm/page_alloc.c | 10 ----------
1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index 28240ce475d6..3af727d95c17 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -3530,8 +3530,6 @@ __alloc_pages_slowpath(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order,
enum compact_result compact_result;
int compaction_retries;
int no_progress_loops;
- unsigned long alloc_start = jiffies;
- unsigned int stall_timeout = 10 * HZ;
unsigned int cpuset_mems_cookie;
/*
@@ -3704,14 +3702,6 @@ __alloc_pages_slowpath(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order,
if (order > PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER && !(gfp_mask & __GFP_REPEAT))
goto nopage;
- /* Make sure we know about allocations which stall for too long */
- if (time_after(jiffies, alloc_start + stall_timeout)) {
- warn_alloc(gfp_mask,
- "page allocation stalls for %ums, order:%u",
- jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies-alloc_start), order);
- stall_timeout += 10 * HZ;
- }
-
if (should_reclaim_retry(gfp_mask, order, ac, alloc_flags,
did_some_progress > 0, &no_progress_loops))
goto retry;
--
2.15.3.AMZN
On Wed, 2018-08-22 at 09:19 +0200, gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
>
> x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit
>
> to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
> http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
>
> The filename of the patch is:
> x86-entry-64-remove-ebx-handling-from-error_entry-exit.patch
> and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
Can we have it for 4.4 too, please?
> [ Note to stable maintainers: this should probably get applied to all
> kernels. If you're nervous about that, a more conservative fix to
> add xorl %ebx,%ebx; incl %ebx before the jump to error_exit should
> also fix the problem. ]
Can we assume it's always from kernel? The Xen code definitely seems to
handle invoking this from both kernel and userspace contexts.
Shouldn't %ebx get set to !(regs->rsp & 3) ?
Either way, let's just do it in the stable tree exactly the same way
it's done upstream.
> - * On entry, EBX is a "return to kernel mode" flag:
Re-introduce the typo 'EBS' here, to make the patch apply cleanly to
4.4. It's only removing that line anyway.
Or just cherry-pick upstream commit 75ca5b22260ef7 first.
Since commit 3b8c9f1cdfc50 ("arm64: IPI each CPU after invalidating the
I-cache for kernel mappings"), a call to flush_icache_range() will use
an IPI to cross-call other online CPUs so that any stale instructions
are flushed from their pipelines. This triggers a WARN during the
hibernation resume path, where flush_icache_range() is called with
interrupts disabled and is therefore prone to deadlock:
| Disabling non-boot CPUs ...
| CPU1: shutdown
| psci: CPU1 killed.
| CPU2: shutdown
| psci: CPU2 killed.
| CPU3: shutdown
| psci: CPU3 killed.
| WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at ../kernel/smp.c:416 smp_call_function_many+0xd4/0x350
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc4 #1
Since all secondary CPUs have been taken offline prior to invalidating
the I-cache, there's actually no need for an IPI and we can simply call
__flush_icache_range() instead.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 3b8c9f1cdfc50 ("arm64: IPI each CPU after invalidating the I-cache for kernel mappings")
Reported-by: Kunihiko Hayashi <hayashi.kunihiko(a)socionext.com>
Tested-by: Kunihiko Hayashi <hayashi.kunihiko(a)socionext.com>
Tested-by: James Morse <james.morse(a)arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c
index 6b2686d54411..29cdc99688f3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int create_safe_exec_page(void *src_start, size_t length,
}
memcpy((void *)dst, src_start, length);
- flush_icache_range(dst, dst + length);
+ __flush_icache_range(dst, dst + length);
pgdp = pgd_offset_raw(allocator(mask), dst_addr);
if (pgd_none(READ_ONCE(*pgdp))) {
--
2.1.4
There is a TM Bad Thing bug that can be caused when you return from a
signal context in a suspended transaction but with ucontext MSR[TS] unset.
This forces regs->msr[TS] to be set at syscall entrance (since the CPU
state is transactional). It also calls treclaim() to flush the transaction
state, which is done based on the live (mfmsr) MSR state.
Since user context MSR[TS] is not set, then restore_tm_sigcontexts() is not
called, thus, not executing recheckpoint, keeping the CPU state as not
transactional. When calling rfid, SRR1 will have MSR[TS] set, but the CPU
state is non transactional, causing the TM Bad Thing with the following
stack:
[ 33.862316] Bad kernel stack pointer 3fffd9dce3e0 at c00000000000c47c
cpu 0x8: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ff7fd40]
pc: c00000000000c47c: fast_exception_return+0xac/0xb4
lr: 00003fff865f442c
sp: 3fffd9dce3e0
msr: 8000000102a03031
current = 0xc00000041f68b700
paca = 0xc00000000fb84800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 1721, comm = tm-signal-sigre
Linux version 4.9.0-3-powerpc64le (debian-kernel(a)lists.debian.org) (gcc version 6.3.0 20170516 (Debian 6.3.0-18) ) #1 SMP Debian 4.9.30-2+deb9u2 (2017-06-26)
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The same problem happens on 32-bits signal handler, and the fix is very
similar, if tm_recheckpoint() is not executed, then regs->msr[TS] should be
zeroed.
This patch also fixes a sparse warning related to lack of indentation when
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is set.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0e ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
CC: Stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 3.10+
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org>
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
index e6474a45cef5..6327fd79b0fb 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
@@ -1140,11 +1140,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
{
struct rt_sigframe __user *rt_sf;
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
+ int tm_restore = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
struct ucontext __user *uc_transact;
unsigned long msr_hi;
unsigned long tmp;
- int tm_restore = 0;
#endif
/* Always make any pending restarted system calls return -EINTR */
current->restart_block.fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
@@ -1192,11 +1192,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
goto bad;
}
}
- if (!tm_restore)
- /* Fall through, for non-TM restore */
+ if (!tm_restore) {
+ /*
+ * Unset regs->msr because ucontext MSR TS is not
+ * set, and recheckpoint was not called. This avoid
+ * hitting a TM Bad thing at RFID
+ */
+ regs->msr &= ~MSR_TS_MASK;
+ }
+ /* Fall through, for non-TM restore */
#endif
- if (do_setcontext(&rt_sf->uc, regs, 1))
- goto bad;
+ if (!tm_restore)
+ if (do_setcontext(&rt_sf->uc, regs, 1))
+ goto bad;
/*
* It's not clear whether or why it is desirable to save the
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
index 83d51bf586c7..daa28cb72272 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -740,11 +740,23 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
&uc_transact->uc_mcontext))
goto badframe;
}
- else
- /* Fall through, for non-TM restore */
#endif
- if (restore_sigcontext(current, NULL, 1, &uc->uc_mcontext))
- goto badframe;
+ /* Fall through, for non-TM restore */
+ if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(msr)) {
+ /*
+ * Unset MSR[TS] on the thread regs since MSR from user
+ * context does not have MSR active, and recheckpoint was
+ * not called since restore_tm_sigcontexts() was not called
+ * also.
+ *
+ * If not unsetting it, the code can RFID to userspace with
+ * MSR[TS] set, but without CPU in the proper state,
+ * causing a TM bad thing.
+ */
+ current->thread.regs->msr &= ~MSR_TS_MASK;
+ if (restore_sigcontext(current, NULL, 1, &uc->uc_mcontext))
+ goto badframe;
+ }
if (restore_altstack(&uc->uc_stack))
goto badframe;
--
2.19.0