Hi Greg/Sasha:
Please apply this series to v4.9.y stable tree. The reason is that v4.9-stable
branch has this patch for stmmac ethernet driver:
"6f37f7b62baa net: stmmac: socfpga: add additional ocp reset line for
Stratix10"
This patch calls devm_reset_control_get_optional(). This call ultimately
fails without this reset patch, becuase the call to
devm_reset_control_get_optional() is returning an error code, which causes the
ethernet driver to fail to load. This patch fixes the call to *_get_optional_*
in that any call to the reset driver with *_optional_* will return 0 instead of
an error value.
Patches 2-6 are needed as well because those patches fix patch 1/6.
Thanks..
Dinh
Heiner Kallweit (1):
reset: core: fix reset_control_put
Masahiro Yamada (2):
reset: make device_reset_optional() really optional
reset: remove remaining WARN_ON() in <linux/reset.h>
Philipp Zabel (2):
reset: fix optional reset_control_get stubs to return NULL
reset: add exported __reset_control_get, return NULL if optional
Ramiro Oliveira (1):
reset: make optional functions really optional
drivers/reset/core.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
include/linux/reset.h | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
2 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
--
2.17.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
kgdboc: fix KASAN global-out-of-bounds bug in param_set_kgdboc_var()
to my tty git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty.git
in the tty-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From dada6a43b0402eba438a17ac86fdc64ac56a4607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Macpaul Lin <macpaul(a)gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 23:08:38 +0800
Subject: kgdboc: fix KASAN global-out-of-bounds bug in param_set_kgdboc_var()
This patch is trying to fix KE issue due to
"BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in param_set_kgdboc_var+0x194/0x198"
reported by Syzkaller scan."
[26364:syz-executor0][name:report8t]BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in param_set_kgdboc_var+0x194/0x198
[26364:syz-executor0][name:report&]Read of size 1 at addr ffffff900e44f95f by task syz-executor0/26364
[26364:syz-executor0][name:report&]
[26364:syz-executor0]CPU: 7 PID: 26364 Comm: syz-executor0 Tainted: G W 0
[26364:syz-executor0]Call trace:
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff9008095cf8>] dump_bacIctrace+Ox0/0x470
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff9008096de0>] show_stack+0x20/0x30
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff90089cc9c8>] dump_stack+Oxd8/0x128
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff90084edb38>] print_address_description +0x80/0x4a8
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff90084ee270>] kasan_report+Ox178/0x390
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff90084ee4a0>] _asan_report_loadi_noabort+Ox18/0x20
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff9008b092ac>] param_set_kgdboc_var+Ox194/0x198
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff900813af64>] param_attr_store+Ox14c/0x270
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff90081394c8>] module_attr_store+0x60/0x90
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff90086690c0>] sysfs_kl_write+Ox100/0x158
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff9008666d84>] kernfs_fop_write+0x27c/0x3a8
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff9008508264>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x114/0x1b0
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff9008509ac8>] do_readv_writev+0x4f8/0x5e0
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff9008509ce4>] vfs_writev+0x7c/Oxb8
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff900850ba64>] SyS_writev+Oxcc/0x208
[26364:syz-executor0][<ffffff90080883f0>] elO_svc_naked +0x24/0x28
[26364:syz-executor0][name:report&]
[26364:syz-executor0][name:report&]The buggy address belongs to the variable:
[26364:syz-executor0][name:report&] kgdb_tty_line+Ox3f/0x40
[26364:syz-executor0][name:report&]
[26364:syz-executor0][name:report&]Memory state around the buggy address:
[26364:syz-executor0] ffffff900e44f800: 00 00 00 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa
[26364:syz-executor0] ffffff900e44f880: fa fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa
[26364:syz-executor0]> ffffff900e44f900: fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
[26364:syz-executor0][name:report&] ^
[26364:syz-executor0] ffffff900e44f980: 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
[26364:syz-executor0] ffffff900e44fa00: 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
[26364:syz-executor0][name:report&]
[26364:syz-executor0][name:panic&]Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[26364:syz-executor0]------------[cut here]------------
After checking the source code, we've found there might be an out-of-bounds
access to "config[len - 1]" array when the variable "len" is zero.
Signed-off-by: Macpaul Lin <macpaul(a)gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson(a)linaro.org>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c b/drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c
index baeeeaec3f03..6fb312e7af71 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static void kgdboc_put_char(u8 chr)
static int param_set_kgdboc_var(const char *kmessage,
const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- int len = strlen(kmessage);
+ size_t len = strlen(kmessage);
if (len >= MAX_CONFIG_LEN) {
pr_err("config string too long\n");
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static int param_set_kgdboc_var(const char *kmessage,
strcpy(config, kmessage);
/* Chop out \n char as a result of echo */
- if (config[len - 1] == '\n')
+ if (len && config[len - 1] == '\n')
config[len - 1] = '\0';
if (configured == 1)
--
2.19.2
The driver defines three states for a cppi channel.
- idle: .chan_busy == 0 && not in .pending list
- pending: .chan_busy == 0 && in .pending list
- busy: .chan_busy == 1 && not in .pending list
There are cases in which the cppi channel could be in the pending state
when cppi41_dma_issue_pending() is called after cppi41_runtime_suspend()
is called.
cppi41_stop_chan() has a bug for these cases to set channels to idle state.
It only checks the .chan_busy flag, but not the .pending list, then later
when cppi41_runtime_resume() is called the channels in .pending list will
be transitioned to busy state.
Removing channels from the .pending list solves the problem.
Fixes: 975faaeb9985 ("dma: cppi41: start tear down only if channel is busy")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu(a)ti.com>
---
drivers/dma/ti/cppi41.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/dma/ti/cppi41.c b/drivers/dma/ti/cppi41.c
index 1497da367710..e507ec36c0d3 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/ti/cppi41.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/ti/cppi41.c
@@ -723,8 +723,22 @@ static int cppi41_stop_chan(struct dma_chan *chan)
desc_phys = lower_32_bits(c->desc_phys);
desc_num = (desc_phys - cdd->descs_phys) / sizeof(struct cppi41_desc);
- if (!cdd->chan_busy[desc_num])
+ if (!cdd->chan_busy[desc_num]) {
+ struct cppi41_channel *cc, *_ct;
+
+ /*
+ * channels might still be in the pendling list if
+ * cppi41_dma_issue_pending() is called after
+ * cppi41_runtime_suspend() is called
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(cc, _ct, &cdd->pending, node) {
+ if (cc != c)
+ continue;
+ list_del(&cc->node);
+ break;
+ }
return 0;
+ }
ret = cppi41_tear_down_chan(c);
if (ret)
--
2.17.1
I've backported a number of fixes for security issues affecting 4.9-
stable. All of these are already fixed in 4.14-stable and 4.19-stable.
Most of the issues involve filesystem validation, and I tested with the
reproducers where available.
For the BPF fix, I verified that the self-tests (taken from 4.14)
didn't regress and temporarily added logging to check that the
mitigation is applied when needed.
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings, Software Developer Codethink Ltd
https://www.codethink.co.uk/ Dale House, 35 Dale Street
Manchester, M1 2HF, United Kingdom
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
We have received a bug report that an injected MCE about faulty memory
prevents memory offline to succeed. The underlying reason is that the
HWPoison page has an elevated reference count and the migration keeps
failing. There are two problems with that. First of all it is dubious
to migrate the poisoned page because we know that accessing that memory
is possible to fail. Secondly it doesn't make any sense to migrate a
potentially broken content and preserve the memory corruption over to a
new location.
Oscar has found out that it is the elevated reference count from
memory_failure that is confusing the offlining path. HWPoisoned pages
are isolated from the LRU list but __offline_pages might still try to
migrate them if there is any preceding migrateable pages in the pfn
range. Such a migration would fail due to the reference count but
the migration code would put it back on the LRU list. This is quite
wrong in itself but it would also make scan_movable_pages stumble over
it again without any way out.
This means that the hotremove with hwpoisoned pages has never really
worked (without a luck). HWPoisoning really needs a larger surgery
but an immediate and backportable fix is to skip over these pages during
offlining. Even if they are still mapped for some reason then
try_to_unmap should turn those mappings into hwpoison ptes and cause
SIGBUS on access. Nobody should be really touching the content of the
page so it should be safe to ignore them even when there is a pending
reference count.
Debugged-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.com>
Cc: stable
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
---
Hi,
I am sending this as an RFC now because I am not fully sure I see all
the consequences myself yet. This has passed a testing by Oscar but I
would highly appreciate a review from Naoya about my assumptions about
hwpoisoning. E.g. it is not entirely clear to me whether there is a
potential case where the page might be still mapped. I have put
try_to_unmap just to be sure. It would be really great if I could drop
that part because then it is not really great which of the TTU flags to
use to cover all potential cases.
I have marked the patch for stable but I have no idea how far back it
should go. Probably everything that already has hotremove and hwpoison
code.
Thanks in advance!
mm/memory_hotplug.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/memory_hotplug.c b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
index c6c42a7425e5..08c576d5a633 100644
--- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c
+++ b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/compaction.h>
+#include <linux/rmap.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
@@ -1366,6 +1367,17 @@ do_migrate_range(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
pfn = page_to_pfn(compound_head(page))
+ hpage_nr_pages(page) - 1;
+ /*
+ * HWPoison pages have elevated reference counts so the migration would
+ * fail on them. It also doesn't make any sense to migrate them in the
+ * first place. Still try to unmap such a page in case it is still mapped.
+ */
+ if (PageHWPoison(page)) {
+ if (page_mapped(page))
+ try_to_unmap(page, TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK | TTU_IGNORE_ACCESS);
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (!get_page_unless_zero(page))
continue;
/*
--
2.19.1
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
We have received a bug report that an injected MCE about faulty memory
prevents memory offline to succeed on 4.4 base kernel. The underlying
reason was that the HWPoison page has an elevated reference count and
the migration keeps failing. There are two problems with that. First
of all it is dubious to migrate the poisoned page because we know that
accessing that memory is possible to fail. Secondly it doesn't make any
sense to migrate a potentially broken content and preserve the memory
corruption over to a new location.
Oscar has found out that 4.4 and the current upstream kernels behave
slightly differently with his simply testcase
===
int main(void)
{
int ret;
int i;
int fd;
char *array = malloc(4096);
char *array_locked = malloc(4096);
fd = open("/tmp/data", O_RDONLY);
read(fd, array, 4095);
for (i = 0; i < 4096; i++)
array_locked[i] = 'd';
ret = mlock((void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)array_locked), sizeof(array_locked));
if (ret)
perror("mlock");
sleep (20);
ret = madvise((void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)array_locked), 4096, MADV_HWPOISON);
if (ret)
perror("madvise");
for (i = 0; i < 4096; i++)
array_locked[i] = 'd';
return 0;
}
===
+ offline this memory.
In 4.4 kernels he saw the hwpoisoned page to be returned back to the LRU
list
kernel: [<ffffffff81019ac9>] dump_trace+0x59/0x340
kernel: [<ffffffff81019e9a>] show_stack_log_lvl+0xea/0x170
kernel: [<ffffffff8101ac71>] show_stack+0x21/0x40
kernel: [<ffffffff8132bb90>] dump_stack+0x5c/0x7c
kernel: [<ffffffff810815a1>] warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xb0
kernel: [<ffffffff811a275c>] __pagevec_lru_add_fn+0x14c/0x160
kernel: [<ffffffff811a2eed>] pagevec_lru_move_fn+0xad/0x100
kernel: [<ffffffff811a334c>] __lru_cache_add+0x6c/0xb0
kernel: [<ffffffff81195236>] add_to_page_cache_lru+0x46/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffffa02b4373>] extent_readpages+0xc3/0x1a0 [btrfs]
kernel: [<ffffffff811a16d7>] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x177/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff811a18c8>] ondemand_readahead+0x168/0x2a0
kernel: [<ffffffff8119673f>] generic_file_read_iter+0x41f/0x660
kernel: [<ffffffff8120e50d>] __vfs_read+0xcd/0x140
kernel: [<ffffffff8120e9ea>] vfs_read+0x7a/0x120
kernel: [<ffffffff8121404b>] kernel_read+0x3b/0x50
kernel: [<ffffffff81215c80>] do_execveat_common.isra.29+0x490/0x6f0
kernel: [<ffffffff81215f08>] do_execve+0x28/0x30
kernel: [<ffffffff81095ddb>] call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xfb/0x130
kernel: [<ffffffff8161c045>] ret_from_fork+0x55/0x80
And that later confuses the hotremove path because an LRU page is
attempted to be migrated and that fails due to an elevated reference
count. It is quite possible that the reuse of the HWPoisoned page is
some kind of fixed race condition but I am not really sure about that.
With the upstream kernel the failure is slightly different. The page
doesn't seem to have LRU bit set but isolate_movable_page simply fails
and do_migrate_range simply puts all the isolated pages back to LRU and
therefore no progress is made and scan_movable_pages finds same set of
pages over and over again.
Fix both cases by explicitly checking HWPoisoned pages before we even
try to get a reference on the page, try to unmap it if it is still
mapped. As explained by Naoya
: Hwpoison code never unmapped those for no big reason because
: Ksm pages never dominate memory, so we simply didn't have strong
: motivation to save the pages.
Also put WARN_ON(PageLRU) in case there is a race and we can hit LRU
HWPoison pages which shouldn't happen but I couldn't convince myself
about that. Naoya has noted the following
: Theoretically no such gurantee, because try_to_unmap() doesn't have a
: guarantee of success and then memory_failure() returns immediately
: when hwpoison_user_mappings fails.
: Or the following code (comes after hwpoison_user_mappings block) also impli=
: es
: that the target page can still have PageLRU flag.
:
: /*
: * Torn down by someone else?
: */
: if (PageLRU(p) && !PageSwapCache(p) && p->mapping =3D=3D NULL) {
: action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_TRUNCATED_LRU, MF_IGNORED);
: res =3D -EBUSY;
: goto out;
: }
:
: So I think it's OK to keep "if (WARN_ON(PageLRU(page)))" block in
: current version of your patch.
Debugged-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.com>
Cc: stable
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.com>
Tested-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi(a)ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
---
Hi Andrew,
this has been posted as an RFC [1] previously. It took 2 versions to get
the patch right but it seems that this one should work reasonably well.
I guess we want to have it in linux-next for some time but I do not
expect many people do test MCEs + hotremove considering the breakage is
old and nobody has noticed so far.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181203100309.14784-1-mhocko@kernel.org
mm/memory_hotplug.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/memory_hotplug.c b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
index c6c42a7425e5..cfa1a2736876 100644
--- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c
+++ b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/compaction.h>
+#include <linux/rmap.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
@@ -1366,6 +1367,21 @@ do_migrate_range(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
pfn = page_to_pfn(compound_head(page))
+ hpage_nr_pages(page) - 1;
+ /*
+ * HWPoison pages have elevated reference counts so the migration would
+ * fail on them. It also doesn't make any sense to migrate them in the
+ * first place. Still try to unmap such a page in case it is still mapped
+ * (e.g. current hwpoison implementation doesn't unmap KSM pages but keep
+ * the unmap as the catch all safety net).
+ */
+ if (PageHWPoison(page)) {
+ if (WARN_ON(PageLRU(page)))
+ isolate_lru_page(page);
+ if (page_mapped(page))
+ try_to_unmap(page, TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK | TTU_IGNORE_ACCESS);
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (!get_page_unless_zero(page))
continue;
/*
--
2.19.2
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
xhci: Prevent U1/U2 link pm states if exit latency is too long
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 0472bf06c6fd33c1a18aaead4c8f91e5a03d8d7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 14:22:39 +0200
Subject: xhci: Prevent U1/U2 link pm states if exit latency is too long
Don't allow USB3 U1 or U2 if the latency to wake up from the U-state
reaches the service interval for a periodic endpoint.
This is according to xhci 1.1 specification section 4.23.5.2 extra note:
"Software shall ensure that a device is prevented from entering a U-state
where its worst case exit latency approaches the ESIT."
Allowing too long exit latencies for periodic endpoint confuses xHC
internal scheduling, and new devices may fail to enumerate with a
"Not enough bandwidth for new device state" error from the host.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c
index c20b85e28d81..dae3be1b9c8f 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c
@@ -4514,6 +4514,14 @@ static u16 xhci_calculate_u1_timeout(struct xhci_hcd *xhci,
{
unsigned long long timeout_ns;
+ /* Prevent U1 if service interval is shorter than U1 exit latency */
+ if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(desc) || usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(desc)) {
+ if (xhci_service_interval_to_ns(desc) <= udev->u1_params.mel) {
+ dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Disable U1, ESIT shorter than exit latency\n");
+ return USB3_LPM_DISABLED;
+ }
+ }
+
if (xhci->quirks & XHCI_INTEL_HOST)
timeout_ns = xhci_calculate_intel_u1_timeout(udev, desc);
else
@@ -4570,6 +4578,14 @@ static u16 xhci_calculate_u2_timeout(struct xhci_hcd *xhci,
{
unsigned long long timeout_ns;
+ /* Prevent U2 if service interval is shorter than U2 exit latency */
+ if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(desc) || usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(desc)) {
+ if (xhci_service_interval_to_ns(desc) <= udev->u2_params.mel) {
+ dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Disable U2, ESIT shorter than exit latency\n");
+ return USB3_LPM_DISABLED;
+ }
+ }
+
if (xhci->quirks & XHCI_INTEL_HOST)
timeout_ns = xhci_calculate_intel_u2_timeout(udev, desc);
else
--
2.19.2
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
xhci: workaround CSS timeout on AMD SNPS 3.0 xHC
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From a7d57abcc8a5bdeb53bbf8e87558e8e0a2c2a29d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sandeep Singh <sandeep.singh(a)amd.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 14:22:38 +0200
Subject: xhci: workaround CSS timeout on AMD SNPS 3.0 xHC
Occasionally AMD SNPS 3.0 xHC does not respond to
CSS when set, also it does not flag anything on SRE and HCE
to point the internal xHC errors on USBSTS register. This stalls
the entire system wide suspend and there is no point in stalling
just because of xHC CSS is not responding.
To work around this problem, if the xHC does not flag
anything on SRE and HCE, we can skip the CSS
timeout and allow the system to continue the suspend. Once the
system resume happens we can internally reset the controller
using XHCI_RESET_ON_RESUME quirk
Signed-off-by: Shyam Sundar S K <Shyam-sundar.S-k(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Singh <Sandeep.Singh(a)amd.com>
cc: Nehal Shah <Nehal-bakulchandra.Shah(a)amd.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng(a)canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c | 4 ++++
drivers/usb/host/xhci.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
drivers/usb/host/xhci.h | 3 +++
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c
index a9515265db4d..a9ec7051f286 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c
@@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ static void xhci_pci_quirks(struct device *dev, struct xhci_hcd *xhci)
pdev->device == 0x43bb))
xhci->quirks |= XHCI_SUSPEND_DELAY;
+ if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD &&
+ (pdev->device == 0x15e0 || pdev->device == 0x15e1))
+ xhci->quirks |= XHCI_SNPS_BROKEN_SUSPEND;
+
if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD)
xhci->quirks |= XHCI_TRUST_TX_LENGTH;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c
index c928dbbff881..c20b85e28d81 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c
@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ int xhci_suspend(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, bool do_wakeup)
unsigned int delay = XHCI_MAX_HALT_USEC;
struct usb_hcd *hcd = xhci_to_hcd(xhci);
u32 command;
+ u32 res;
if (!hcd->state)
return 0;
@@ -1021,11 +1022,28 @@ int xhci_suspend(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, bool do_wakeup)
command = readl(&xhci->op_regs->command);
command |= CMD_CSS;
writel(command, &xhci->op_regs->command);
+ xhci->broken_suspend = 0;
if (xhci_handshake(&xhci->op_regs->status,
STS_SAVE, 0, 10 * 1000)) {
- xhci_warn(xhci, "WARN: xHC save state timeout\n");
- spin_unlock_irq(&xhci->lock);
- return -ETIMEDOUT;
+ /*
+ * AMD SNPS xHC 3.0 occasionally does not clear the
+ * SSS bit of USBSTS and when driver tries to poll
+ * to see if the xHC clears BIT(8) which never happens
+ * and driver assumes that controller is not responding
+ * and times out. To workaround this, its good to check
+ * if SRE and HCE bits are not set (as per xhci
+ * Section 5.4.2) and bypass the timeout.
+ */
+ res = readl(&xhci->op_regs->status);
+ if ((xhci->quirks & XHCI_SNPS_BROKEN_SUSPEND) &&
+ (((res & STS_SRE) == 0) &&
+ ((res & STS_HCE) == 0))) {
+ xhci->broken_suspend = 1;
+ } else {
+ xhci_warn(xhci, "WARN: xHC save state timeout\n");
+ spin_unlock_irq(&xhci->lock);
+ return -ETIMEDOUT;
+ }
}
spin_unlock_irq(&xhci->lock);
@@ -1078,7 +1096,7 @@ int xhci_resume(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, bool hibernated)
set_bit(HCD_FLAG_HW_ACCESSIBLE, &xhci->shared_hcd->flags);
spin_lock_irq(&xhci->lock);
- if (xhci->quirks & XHCI_RESET_ON_RESUME)
+ if ((xhci->quirks & XHCI_RESET_ON_RESUME) || xhci->broken_suspend)
hibernated = true;
if (!hibernated) {
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h
index 260b259b72bc..c3515bad5dbb 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h
@@ -1850,6 +1850,7 @@ struct xhci_hcd {
#define XHCI_ZERO_64B_REGS BIT_ULL(32)
#define XHCI_DEFAULT_PM_RUNTIME_ALLOW BIT_ULL(33)
#define XHCI_RESET_PLL_ON_DISCONNECT BIT_ULL(34)
+#define XHCI_SNPS_BROKEN_SUSPEND BIT_ULL(35)
unsigned int num_active_eps;
unsigned int limit_active_eps;
@@ -1879,6 +1880,8 @@ struct xhci_hcd {
void *dbc;
/* platform-specific data -- must come last */
unsigned long priv[0] __aligned(sizeof(s64));
+ /* Broken Suspend flag for SNPS Suspend resume issue */
+ u8 broken_suspend;
};
/* Platform specific overrides to generic XHCI hc_driver ops */
--
2.19.2