We need that to adjust the len of the 2nd transfer (called data in spi-mem)
if it's too long to fit in a SPI message or SPI transfer.
Fixes: c36ff266dc82 ("spi: Extend the core to ease integration of SPI memory controllers")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuanhua Han <chuanhua.han(a)nxp.com>
Suggested-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)bootlin.com>
---
Changes in v5:
-Add the validation check after the op->data.nbytes assignment
-Assign the "len" variable after defining it
-Remove the brackets on both sides of "opt-> data.nbytes"
Changes in v4:
-Rename variable name "opcode_addr_dummy_sum" to "len".
-The comparison of "spi_max_message_size(mem->spi)" and "len" was removed.
-Adjust their order when comparing the sizes of "spi_max_message_size(mem->spi)" and "len"
-Changing the "unsigned long" type in the code to "size_t"
Changes in v3:
-Rename variable name "val" to "opcode_addr_dummy_sum".
-Place the legitimacy of the transfer size(i.e., "spi_max_message_size(mem->spi)" and
-"opcode_addr_dummy_sum") into "if (! ctlr - > mem_ops | |! ctlr-> mem_ops->exec_op) {"
structure and add "spi_max_transfer_size(mem->spi) and opcode_addr_dummy_sum".
-Adjust the formatting alignment of the code.
-"(unsigned long)op->data.nbytes" was modified to "(unsigned long)(op->data.nbytes)".
Changes in v2:
-Place the adjusted transfer bytes code in spi_mem_adjust_op_size() and check
spi_max_message_size(mem->spi) value before subtracting opcode, addr and dummy bytes.
-Change the code from fsl-espi controller to generic code(The adjustment of spi transmission
length was originally modified in the "drivers/spi/spi-fsl-espi.c" file, and now the adjustment
of transfer length is made in the "drivers/spi/spi-mem.c" file)
drivers/spi/spi-mem.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-mem.c b/drivers/spi/spi-mem.c
index 990770d..6184fa1 100644
--- a/drivers/spi/spi-mem.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-mem.c
@@ -328,10 +328,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spi_mem_exec_op);
int spi_mem_adjust_op_size(struct spi_mem *mem, struct spi_mem_op *op)
{
struct spi_controller *ctlr = mem->spi->controller;
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = sizeof(op->cmd.opcode) + op->addr.nbytes + op->dummy.nbytes;
if (ctlr->mem_ops && ctlr->mem_ops->adjust_op_size)
return ctlr->mem_ops->adjust_op_size(mem, op);
+ if (!ctlr->mem_ops || !ctlr->mem_ops->exec_op) {
+ if (len > spi_max_transfer_size(mem->spi))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ op->data.nbytes = min3((size_t)op->data.nbytes,
+ spi_max_transfer_size(mem->spi),
+ spi_max_message_size(mem->spi) -
+ len);
+
+ if (!op->data.nbytes)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spi_mem_adjust_op_size);
--
2.7.4
Hi Greg,
Kindly consider/review following net/sched fixes for stable 4.9.y.
This patchset is a follow-up of upstream fix
87b60cfacf9f ("net_sched: fix error recovery at qdisc creation")
cherry-picked on stable 4.9.y.
It fix null pointer dereferences due to uninitialized timer
(qdisc watchdog) or double frees due to ->destroy cleaning up a
second time. Here is the original submission
https://www.mail-archive.com/netdev@vger.kernel.org/msg186003.html
Cherry-picked and build tested on Linux 4.9.116 for ARCH=arm/arm64.
These fixes are applicable for stable 4.4.y kernel as well, but
one of the patches needed a minor rebasing, so I'm resending this
series for 4.4.y in a separate thread to avoid any confusion.
Regards,
Amit Pundir
Nikolay Aleksandrov (5):
sch_htb: fix crash on init failure
sch_multiq: fix double free on init failure
sch_hhf: fix null pointer dereference on init failure
sch_netem: avoid null pointer deref on init failure
sch_tbf: fix two null pointer dereferences on init failure
net/sched/sch_hhf.c | 3 +++
net/sched/sch_htb.c | 5 +++--
net/sched/sch_multiq.c | 7 +------
net/sched/sch_netem.c | 4 ++--
net/sched/sch_tbf.c | 5 +++--
5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--
2.7.4
commit b3681dd548d06deb2e1573890829dff4b15abf46 upstream.
This version applies to v4.9.
>From Andy Lutomirski, original author:
error_entry and error_exit communicate the user vs kernel status of
the frame using %ebx. This is unnecessary -- the information is in
regs->cs. Just use regs->cs.
This makes error_entry simpler and makes error_exit more robust.
It also fixes a nasty bug. Before all the Spectre nonsense, The
xen_failsafe_callback entry point returned like this:
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
SAVE_C_REGS
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
jmp error_exit
And it did not go through error_entry. This was bogus: RBX
contained garbage, and error_exit expected a flag in RBX.
Fortunately, it generally contained *nonzero* garbage, so the
correct code path was used. As part of the Spectre fixes, code was
added to clear RBX to mitigate certain speculation attacks. Now,
depending on kernel configuration, RBX got zeroed and, when running
some Wine workloads, the kernel crashes. This was introduced by:
commit 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for
exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")
With this patch applied, RBX is no longer needed as a flag, and the
problem goes away.
I suspect that malicious userspace could use this bug to crash the
kernel even without the offending patch applied, though.
[Historical note: I wrote this patch as a cleanup before I was aware
of the bug it fixed.]
[Note to stable maintainers: this should probably get applied to all
kernels.]
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux(a)dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com>
Cc: xen-devel(a)lists.xenproject.org
Cc: x86(a)kernel.org
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
Fixes: 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")
Reported-and-tested-by: "M. Vefa Bicakci" <m.v.b(a)runbox.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sarah Newman <srn(a)prgmr.com>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 20 ++++----------------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index d58d8dc..76c1d85e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
call \do_sym
- jmp error_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */
+ jmp error_exit
.endif
END(\sym)
.endm
@@ -1043,7 +1043,6 @@ END(paranoid_exit)
/*
* Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch gs if needed.
- * Return: EBX=0: came from user mode; EBX=1: otherwise
*/
ENTRY(error_entry)
cld
@@ -1056,7 +1055,6 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* the kernel CR3 here.
*/
SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3
- xorl %ebx, %ebx
testb $3, CS+8(%rsp)
jz .Lerror_kernelspace
@@ -1087,7 +1085,6 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* for these here too.
*/
.Lerror_kernelspace:
- incl %ebx
leaq native_irq_return_iret(%rip), %rcx
cmpq %rcx, RIP+8(%rsp)
je .Lerror_bad_iret
@@ -1119,28 +1116,19 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
/*
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
- * as if we faulted immediately after IRET and clear EBX so that
- * error_exit knows that we will be returning to user mode.
+ * as if we faulted immediately after IRET.
*/
mov %rsp, %rdi
call fixup_bad_iret
mov %rax, %rsp
- decl %ebx
jmp .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs
END(error_entry)
-
-/*
- * On entry, EBX is a "return to kernel mode" flag:
- * 1: already in kernel mode, don't need SWAPGS
- * 0: user gsbase is loaded, we need SWAPGS and standard preparation for return to usermode
- */
ENTRY(error_exit)
- movl %ebx, %eax
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
- testl %eax, %eax
- jnz retint_kernel
+ testb $3, CS(%rsp)
+ jz retint_kernel
jmp retint_user
END(error_exit)
--
1.9.1
