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[Linux-stable-mirror] FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ALSA: timer: Limit max instances per timer" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 9b7d869ee5a77ed4a462372bb89af622e705bfb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 10:07:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: timer: Limit max instances per timer MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Currently we allow unlimited number of timer instances, and it may bring the system hogging way too much CPU when too many timer instances are opened and processed concurrently. This may end up with a soft-lockup report as triggered by syzkaller, especially when hrtimer backend is deployed. Since such insane number of instances aren't demanded by the normal use case of ALSA sequencer and it merely opens a risk only for abuse, this patch introduces the upper limit for the number of instances per timer backend. As default, it's set to 1000, but for the fine-grained timer like hrtimer, it's set to 100. Reported-by: syzbot Tested-by: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> diff --git a/include/sound/timer.h b/include/sound/timer.h index c4d76ff056c6..7ae226ab6990 100644 --- a/include/sound/timer.h +++ b/include/sound/timer.h @@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ struct snd_timer { struct list_head ack_list_head; struct list_head sack_list_head; /* slow ack list head */ struct tasklet_struct task_queue; + int max_instances; /* upper limit of timer instances */ + int num_instances; /* current number of timer instances */ }; struct snd_timer_instance { diff --git a/sound/core/hrtimer.c b/sound/core/hrtimer.c index 1ac0c423903e..6e47b823bcaa 100644 --- a/sound/core/hrtimer.c +++ b/sound/core/hrtimer.c @@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static int __init snd_hrtimer_init(void) timer->hw = hrtimer_hw; timer->hw.resolution = resolution; timer->hw.ticks = NANO_SEC / resolution; + timer->max_instances = 100; /* lower the limit */ err = snd_timer_global_register(timer); if (err < 0) { diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c index 6cdd04a45962..15e82a656d96 100644 --- a/sound/core/timer.c +++ b/sound/core/timer.c @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static void snd_timer_request(struct snd_timer_id *tid) * * call this with register_mutex down. */ -static void snd_timer_check_slave(struct snd_timer_instance *slave) +static int snd_timer_check_slave(struct snd_timer_instance *slave) { struct snd_timer *timer; struct snd_timer_instance *master; @@ -190,16 +190,21 @@ static void snd_timer_check_slave(struct snd_timer_instance *slave) list_for_each_entry(master, &timer->open_list_head, open_list) { if (slave->slave_class == master->slave_class && slave->slave_id == master->slave_id) { + if (master->timer->num_instances >= + master->timer->max_instances) + return -EBUSY; list_move_tail(&slave->open_list, &master->slave_list_head); + master->timer->num_instances++; spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock); slave->master = master; slave->timer = master->timer; spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock); - return; + return 0; } } } + return 0; } /* @@ -208,7 +213,7 @@ static void snd_timer_check_slave(struct snd_timer_instance *slave) * * call this with register_mutex down. */ -static void snd_timer_check_master(struct snd_timer_instance *master) +static int snd_timer_check_master(struct snd_timer_instance *master) { struct snd_timer_instance *slave, *tmp; @@ -216,7 +221,11 @@ static void snd_timer_check_master(struct snd_timer_instance *master) list_for_each_entry_safe(slave, tmp, &snd_timer_slave_list, open_list) { if (slave->slave_class == master->slave_class && slave->slave_id == master->slave_id) { + if (master->timer->num_instances >= + master->timer->max_instances) + return -EBUSY; list_move_tail(&slave->open_list, &master->slave_list_head); + master->timer->num_instances++; spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock); spin_lock(&master->timer->lock); slave->master = master; @@ -228,8 +237,11 @@ static void snd_timer_check_master(struct snd_timer_instance *master) spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock); } } + return 0; } +static int snd_timer_close_locked(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri); + /* * open a timer instance * when opening a master, the slave id must be here given. @@ -240,6 +252,7 @@ int snd_timer_open(struct snd_timer_instance **ti, { struct snd_timer *timer; struct snd_timer_instance *timeri = NULL; + int err; if (tid->dev_class == SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_SLAVE) { /* open a slave instance */ @@ -259,10 +272,14 @@ int snd_timer_open(struct snd_timer_instance **ti, timeri->slave_id = tid->device; timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE; list_add_tail(&timeri->open_list, &snd_timer_slave_list); - snd_timer_check_slave(timeri); + err = snd_timer_check_slave(timeri); + if (err < 0) { + snd_timer_close_locked(timeri); + timeri = NULL; + } mutex_unlock(&register_mutex); *ti = timeri; - return 0; + return err; } /* open a master instance */ @@ -288,6 +305,10 @@ int snd_timer_open(struct snd_timer_instance **ti, return -EBUSY; } } + if (timer->num_instances >= timer->max_instances) { + mutex_unlock(&register_mutex); + return -EBUSY; + } timeri = snd_timer_instance_new(owner, timer); if (!timeri) { mutex_unlock(&register_mutex); @@ -314,25 +335,27 @@ int snd_timer_open(struct snd_timer_instance **ti, } list_add_tail(&timeri->open_list, &timer->open_list_head); - snd_timer_check_master(timeri); + timer->num_instances++; + err = snd_timer_check_master(timeri); + if (err < 0) { + snd_timer_close_locked(timeri); + timeri = NULL; + } mutex_unlock(&register_mutex); *ti = timeri; - return 0; + return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_timer_open); /* * close a timer instance + * call this with register_mutex down. */ -int snd_timer_close(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri) +static int snd_timer_close_locked(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri) { struct snd_timer *timer = NULL; struct snd_timer_instance *slave, *tmp; - if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri)) - return -ENXIO; - - mutex_lock(&register_mutex); list_del(&timeri->open_list); /* force to stop the timer */ @@ -340,6 +363,7 @@ int snd_timer_close(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri) timer = timeri->timer; if (timer) { + timer->num_instances--; /* wait, until the active callback is finished */ spin_lock_irq(&timer->lock); while (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK) { @@ -355,6 +379,7 @@ int snd_timer_close(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri) list_for_each_entry_safe(slave, tmp, &timeri->slave_list_head, open_list) { list_move_tail(&slave->open_list, &snd_timer_slave_list); + timer->num_instances--; slave->master = NULL; slave->timer = NULL; list_del_init(&slave->ack_list); @@ -382,9 +407,24 @@ int snd_timer_close(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri) module_put(timer->module); } - mutex_unlock(&register_mutex); return 0; } + +/* + * close a timer instance + */ +int snd_timer_close(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri) +{ + int err; + + if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri)) + return -ENXIO; + + mutex_lock(&register_mutex); + err = snd_timer_close_locked(timeri); + mutex_unlock(&register_mutex); + return err; +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_timer_close); unsigned long snd_timer_resolution(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri) @@ -856,6 +896,7 @@ int snd_timer_new(struct snd_card *card, char *id, struct snd_timer_id *tid, spin_lock_init(&timer->lock); tasklet_init(&timer->task_queue, snd_timer_tasklet, (unsigned long)timer); + timer->max_instances = 1000; /* default limit per timer */ if (card != NULL) { timer->module = card->module; err = snd_device_new(card, SNDRV_DEV_TIMER, timer, &ops);

6 years, 11 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] Backport of ACPI GPE fixes for v4.13

by Greg KH

On Mon, Nov 06, 2017 at 12:11:36PM +0200, Mika Westerberg wrote: > Hi, > > Currently there is an issue in v4.13 where booting system with > Thunderbolt device connected causes problems. Typically the device will > not be tunneled properly and will not function as expected. > > The issue has been root caused to the way Linux initializes and handles > ACPI GPEs (General Purpose Events). In summary we enable them too late > and that results the PCI core finds upstream PCIe port of the > Thunderbolt host controller too early (it is not fully configured by the > BIOS SMI handler yet). > > This has been fixed in mainline starting from v4.14-rc1 by the following > commits: > > ecc1165b8b74 ("ACPICA: Dispatch active GPEs at init time") > 1312b7e0caca ("ACPICA: Make it possible to enable runtime GPEs earlier") > eb7f43c4adb4 ("ACPI / scan: Enable GPEs before scanning the namespace") > > In order to get Thunderbolt working even when there is a device > connected during boot, can the above 3 commits be included in stable for > v4.13? Now all queued up, thanks. greg k-h

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 4/4] can: ifi: Fix transmitter delay calculation

by Marc Kleine-Budde

From: Marek Vasut <marex(a)denx.de> The CANFD transmitter delay calculation formula was updated in the latest software drop from IFI and improves the behavior of the IFI CANFD core during bitrate switching. Use the new formula to improve stability of the CANFD operation. Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex(a)denx.de> Cc: Markus Marb <markus(a)marb.org> Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> --- drivers/net/can/ifi_canfd/ifi_canfd.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/ifi_canfd/ifi_canfd.c b/drivers/net/can/ifi_canfd/ifi_canfd.c index 4d1fe8d95042..2772d05ff11c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/ifi_canfd/ifi_canfd.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/ifi_canfd/ifi_canfd.c @@ -670,9 +670,9 @@ static void ifi_canfd_set_bittiming(struct net_device *ndev) priv->base + IFI_CANFD_FTIME); /* Configure transmitter delay */ - tdc = (dbt->brp * (dbt->phase_seg1 + 1)) & IFI_CANFD_TDELAY_MASK; - writel(IFI_CANFD_TDELAY_EN | IFI_CANFD_TDELAY_ABS | tdc, - priv->base + IFI_CANFD_TDELAY); + tdc = dbt->brp * (dbt->prop_seg + dbt->phase_seg1); + tdc &= IFI_CANFD_TDELAY_MASK; + writel(IFI_CANFD_TDELAY_EN | tdc, priv->base + IFI_CANFD_TDELAY); } static void ifi_canfd_set_filter(struct net_device *ndev, const u32 id, -- 2.15.0

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 3/4] can: peak: Add support for new PCIe/M2 CAN FD interfaces

by Marc Kleine-Budde

From: Stephane Grosjean <s.grosjean(a)peak-system.com> This adds support for the following PEAK-System CAN FD interfaces: PCAN-cPCIe FD CAN FD Interface for cPCI Serial (2 or 4 channels) PCAN-PCIe/104-Express CAN FD Interface for PCIe/104-Express (1, 2 or 4 ch.) PCAN-miniPCIe FD CAN FD Interface for PCIe Mini (1, 2 or 4 channels) PCAN-PCIe FD OEM CAN FD Interface for PCIe OEM version (1, 2 or 4 ch.) PCAN-M.2 CAN FD Interface for M.2 (1 or 2 channels) Like the PCAN-PCIe FD interface, all of these boards run the same IP Core that is able to handle CAN FD (see also http://www.peak-system.com). Signed-off-by: Stephane Grosjean <s.grosjean(a)peak-system.com> Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> --- drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_pciefd_main.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_pciefd_main.c b/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_pciefd_main.c index 51c2d182a33a..b4efd711f824 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_pciefd_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_pciefd_main.c @@ -29,14 +29,19 @@ #include "peak_canfd_user.h" MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephane Grosjean <s.grosjean(a)peak-system.com>"); -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Socket-CAN driver for PEAK PCAN PCIe FD family cards"); -MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE("PEAK PCAN PCIe FD CAN cards"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Socket-CAN driver for PEAK PCAN PCIe/M.2 FD family cards"); +MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE("PEAK PCAN PCIe/M.2 FD CAN cards"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); #define PCIEFD_DRV_NAME "peak_pciefd" #define PEAK_PCI_VENDOR_ID 0x001c /* The PCI device and vendor IDs */ #define PEAK_PCIEFD_ID 0x0013 /* for PCIe slot cards */ +#define PCAN_CPCIEFD_ID 0x0014 /* for Compact-PCI Serial slot cards */ +#define PCAN_PCIE104FD_ID 0x0017 /* for PCIe-104 Express slot cards */ +#define PCAN_MINIPCIEFD_ID 0x0018 /* for mini-PCIe slot cards */ +#define PCAN_PCIEFD_OEM_ID 0x0019 /* for PCIe slot OEM cards */ +#define PCAN_M2_ID 0x001a /* for M2 slot cards */ /* PEAK PCIe board access description */ #define PCIEFD_BAR0_SIZE (64 * 1024) @@ -203,6 +208,11 @@ struct pciefd_board { /* supported device ids. */ static const struct pci_device_id peak_pciefd_tbl[] = { {PEAK_PCI_VENDOR_ID, PEAK_PCIEFD_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID,}, + {PEAK_PCI_VENDOR_ID, PCAN_CPCIEFD_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID,}, + {PEAK_PCI_VENDOR_ID, PCAN_PCIE104FD_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID,}, + {PEAK_PCI_VENDOR_ID, PCAN_MINIPCIEFD_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID,}, + {PEAK_PCI_VENDOR_ID, PCAN_PCIEFD_OEM_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID,}, + {PEAK_PCI_VENDOR_ID, PCAN_M2_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID,}, {0,} }; -- 2.15.0

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 2/4] can: sun4i: handle overrun in RX FIFO

by Marc Kleine-Budde

From: Gerhard Bertelsmann <info(a)gerhard-bertelsmann.de> SUN4Is CAN IP has a 64 byte deep FIFO buffer. If the buffer is not drained fast enough (overrun) it's getting mangled. Already received frames are dropped - the data can't be restored. Signed-off-by: Gerhard Bertelsmann <info(a)gerhard-bertelsmann.de> Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> --- drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c b/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c index b0c80859f746..1ac2090a1721 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c @@ -539,6 +539,13 @@ static int sun4i_can_err(struct net_device *dev, u8 isrc, u8 status) } stats->rx_over_errors++; stats->rx_errors++; + + /* reset the CAN IP by entering reset mode + * ignoring timeout error + */ + set_reset_mode(dev); + set_normal_mode(dev); + /* clear bit */ sun4i_can_write_cmdreg(priv, SUN4I_CMD_CLEAR_OR_FLAG); } @@ -653,8 +660,9 @@ static irqreturn_t sun4i_can_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) netif_wake_queue(dev); can_led_event(dev, CAN_LED_EVENT_TX); } - if (isrc & SUN4I_INT_RBUF_VLD) { - /* receive interrupt */ + if ((isrc & SUN4I_INT_RBUF_VLD) && + !(isrc & SUN4I_INT_DATA_OR)) { + /* receive interrupt - don't read if overrun occurred */ while (status & SUN4I_STA_RBUF_RDY) { /* RX buffer is not empty */ sun4i_can_rx(dev); -- 2.15.0

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 1/4] can: c_can: don't indicate triple sampling support for D_CAN

by Marc Kleine-Budde

From: Richard Schütz <rschuetz(a)uni-koblenz.de> The D_CAN controller doesn't provide a triple sampling mode, so don't set the CAN_CTRLMODE_3_SAMPLES flag in ctrlmode_supported. Currently enabling triple sampling is a no-op. Signed-off-by: Richard Schütz <rschuetz(a)uni-koblenz.de> Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # >= v3.6 Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> --- drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c | 1 - drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c | 1 - 2 files changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c b/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c index cf7c18947189..d065c0e2d18e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c @@ -178,7 +178,6 @@ static int c_can_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, break; case BOSCH_D_CAN: priv->regs = reg_map_d_can; - priv->can.ctrlmode_supported |= CAN_CTRLMODE_3_SAMPLES; break; default: ret = -EINVAL; diff --git a/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c b/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c index 46a746ee80bb..b5145a7f874c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c @@ -320,7 +320,6 @@ static int c_can_plat_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) break; case BOSCH_D_CAN: priv->regs = reg_map_d_can; - priv->can.ctrlmode_supported |= CAN_CTRLMODE_3_SAMPLES; priv->read_reg = c_can_plat_read_reg_aligned_to_16bit; priv->write_reg = c_can_plat_write_reg_aligned_to_16bit; priv->read_reg32 = d_can_plat_read_reg32; -- 2.15.0

6 years, 11 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] Request for stable 4.13.x inclusion: netfilter: nft_set_hash: disable fast_ops for 2-len keys

by Greg KH

On Fri, Nov 10, 2017 at 12:56:46PM +0100, Thomas Deutschmann wrote: > Hi, > > please consider to add > > > From 0414c78f14861cb704d6e6888efd53dd36e3bdde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Just added it 5 minutes ago :) thanks, greg k-h

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "platform/x86: hp-wmi: Fix detection for dock and tablet mode" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled platform/x86: hp-wmi: Fix detection for dock and tablet mode to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: platform-x86-hp-wmi-fix-detection-for-dock-and-tablet-mode.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 298747b7579f5bbbced793d997b333fd10a24921 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlo Caione <carlo(a)endlessm.com> Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2017 15:56:08 +0200 Subject: platform/x86: hp-wmi: Fix detection for dock and tablet mode From: Carlo Caione <carlo(a)endlessm.com> commit 298747b7579f5bbbced793d997b333fd10a24921 upstream. The current driver code is not checking for the error values returned by 'hp_wmi_dock_state()' and 'hp_wmi_tablet_state()' before passing the returned values down to 'input_report_switch()'. This error code is being translated to '1' in the input subsystem, reporting the wrong status. The biggest problem caused by this issue is that several laptops are wrongly reported by the driver as docked, preventing them to be put to sleep using the LID (and in most cases they are not even dockable). With this patch we create the report switches only if we are able to read the dock and tablet mode status correctly from ACPI. Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <carlo(a)endlessm.com> Signed-off-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart(a)infradead.org> Cc: Philip Müller <philm(a)manjaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c @@ -572,10 +572,12 @@ static void hp_wmi_notify(u32 value, voi switch (event_id) { case HPWMI_DOCK_EVENT: - input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK, - hp_wmi_dock_state()); - input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE, - hp_wmi_tablet_state()); + if (test_bit(SW_DOCK, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit)) + input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK, + hp_wmi_dock_state()); + if (test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit)) + input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE, + hp_wmi_tablet_state()); input_sync(hp_wmi_input_dev); break; case HPWMI_PARK_HDD: @@ -644,6 +646,7 @@ static int __init hp_wmi_input_setup(voi { acpi_status status; int err; + int val; hp_wmi_input_dev = input_allocate_device(); if (!hp_wmi_input_dev) @@ -654,17 +657,26 @@ static int __init hp_wmi_input_setup(voi hp_wmi_input_dev->id.bustype = BUS_HOST; __set_bit(EV_SW, hp_wmi_input_dev->evbit); - __set_bit(SW_DOCK, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit); - __set_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit); + + /* Dock */ + val = hp_wmi_dock_state(); + if (!(val < 0)) { + __set_bit(SW_DOCK, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit); + input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK, val); + } + + /* Tablet mode */ + val = hp_wmi_tablet_state(); + if (!(val < 0)) { + __set_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit); + input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE, val); + } err = sparse_keymap_setup(hp_wmi_input_dev, hp_wmi_keymap, NULL); if (err) goto err_free_dev; /* Set initial hardware state */ - input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK, hp_wmi_dock_state()); - input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE, - hp_wmi_tablet_state()); input_sync(hp_wmi_input_dev); if (!hp_wmi_bios_2009_later() && hp_wmi_bios_2008_later()) @@ -950,10 +962,12 @@ static int hp_wmi_resume_handler(struct * changed. */ if (hp_wmi_input_dev) { - input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK, - hp_wmi_dock_state()); - input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE, - hp_wmi_tablet_state()); + if (test_bit(SW_DOCK, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit)) + input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK, + hp_wmi_dock_state()); + if (test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit)) + input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE, + hp_wmi_tablet_state()); input_sync(hp_wmi_input_dev); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from carlo(a)endlessm.com are queue-4.9/platform-x86-hp-wmi-fix-detection-for-dock-and-tablet-mode.patch

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read()" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read() to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: keys-trusted-fix-writing-past-end-of-buffer-in-trusted_read.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From a3c812f7cfd80cf51e8f5b7034f7418f6beb56c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2017 00:47:12 +0000 Subject: KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read() From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit a3c812f7cfd80cf51e8f5b7034f7418f6beb56c1 upstream. When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting userspace memory. Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per the documentation for keyctl_read(). We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either behavior appears to be permitted. It also makes it match the behavior of the "encrypted" key type. Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben(a)decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- security/keys/trusted.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1147,20 +1147,21 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct ke p = rcu_dereference_key(key); if (!p) return -EINVAL; - if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) - return 2 * p->blob_len; - ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - bufp = ascii_buf; - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { + ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { + kzfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; } - kzfree(ascii_buf); return 2 * p->blob_len; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.9/keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch queue-4.9/keys-trusted-fix-writing-past-end-of-buffer-in-trusted_read.patch

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ee618b4619b72527aaed765f0f0b74072b281159 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 14:49:18 +0100 Subject: KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit ee618b4619b72527aaed765f0f0b74072b281159 upstream. As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Safford <safford(a)us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- security/keys/trusted.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char } ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *di if (!ret) ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest); out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *d paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0); out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) ret = -EINVAL; out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) ret = -EINVAL; out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, *bloblen = storedsize; } out: - kfree(td); + kzfree(td); return ret; } @@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_p if (ret < 0) pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree(tb); + kzfree(tb); return ret; } @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len]; - kfree(tb); + kzfree(tb); return ret; } @@ -1037,12 +1037,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct ke if (!ret && options->pcrlock) ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); out: - kfree(datablob); - kfree(options); + kzfree(datablob); + kzfree(options); if (!ret) rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload); else - kfree(payload); + kzfree(payload); return ret; } @@ -1051,8 +1051,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_ struct trusted_key_payload *p; p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); - memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); - kfree(p); + kzfree(p); } /* @@ -1094,13 +1093,13 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); if (ret != Opt_update) { ret = -EINVAL; - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } if (!new_o->keyhandle) { ret = -EINVAL; - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } @@ -1114,22 +1113,22 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } if (new_o->pcrlock) { ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } } rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p); call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); out: - kfree(datablob); - kfree(new_o); + kzfree(datablob); + kzfree(new_o); return ret; } @@ -1158,24 +1157,19 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct ke for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { - kfree(ascii_buf); + kzfree(ascii_buf); return -EFAULT; } - kfree(ascii_buf); + kzfree(ascii_buf); return 2 * p->blob_len; } /* - * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data + * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload */ static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0]; - - if (!p) - return; - memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); - kfree(key->payload.data[0]); + kzfree(key->payload.data[0]); } struct key_type key_type_trusted = { Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.9/keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch queue-4.9/keys-trusted-fix-writing-past-end-of-buffer-in-trusted_read.patch

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