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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86: Introduce barrier_nospec" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86: Introduce barrier_nospec to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86_Introduce_barrier_nospec.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86: Introduce barrier_nospec From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:33 2018 -0800 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com commit b3d7ad85b80bbc404635dca80f5b129f6242bc7a Rename the open coded form of this instruction sequence from rdtsc_ordered() into a generic barrier primitive, barrier_nospec(). One of the mitigations for Spectre variant1 vulnerabilities is to fence speculative execution after successfully validating a bounds check. I.e. force the result of a bounds check to resolve in the instruction pipeline to ensure speculative execution honors that result before potentially operating on out-of-bounds data. No functional changes. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727415361.33451.9049453007262764675.stgit@dwil… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_ /* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */ #define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec +/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */ +#define barrier_nospec() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \ + "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC) + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE #define dma_rmb() rmb() #else --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h @@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long lon * that some other imaginary CPU is updating continuously with a * time stamp. */ - alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, - "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC); + barrier_nospec(); return rdtsc(); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org are queue-4.15/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86_Introduce_barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.15/x86get_user_Use_pointer_masking_to_limit_speculation.patch queue-4.15/x86_Introduce___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch queue-4.15/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/array_index_nospec_Sanitize_speculative_array_de-references.patch queue-4.15/Documentation_Document_array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86entry64_Remove_the_SYSCALL64_fast_path.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.15/x86asm_Move_status_from_thread_struct_to_thread_info.patch queue-4.15/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.15/x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.15/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.15/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch queue-4.15/moduleretpoline_Warn_about_missing_retpoline_in_module.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86uaccess_Use___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86entry64_Push_extra_regs_right_away.patch queue-4.15/x86usercopy_Replace_open_coded_stacclac_with___uaccess_begin_end.patch queue-4.15/vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch queue-4.15/x86spectre_Report_get_user_mitigation_for_spectre_v1.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.15/x86syscall_Sanitize_syscall_table_de-references_under_speculation.patch queue-4.15/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86_Introduce___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:39 2018 -0800 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com commit b3bbfb3fb5d25776b8e3f361d2eedaabb0b496cd For __get_user() paths, do not allow the kernel to speculate on the value of a user controlled pointer. In addition to the 'stac' instruction for Supervisor Mode Access Protection (SMAP), a barrier_nospec() causes the access_ok() result to resolve in the pipeline before the CPU might take any speculative action on the pointer value. Given the cost of 'stac' the speculation barrier is placed after 'stac' to hopefully overlap the cost of disabling SMAP with the cost of flushing the instruction pipeline. Since __get_user is a major kernel interface that deals with user controlled pointers, the __uaccess_begin_nospec() mechanism will prevent speculative execution past an access_ok() permission check. While speculative execution past access_ok() is not enough to lead to a kernel memory leak, it is a necessary precondition. To be clear, __uaccess_begin_nospec() is addressing a class of potential problems near __get_user() usages. Note, that while the barrier_nospec() in __uaccess_begin_nospec() is used to protect __get_user(), pointer masking similar to array_index_nospec() will be used for get_user() since it incorporates a bounds check near the usage. uaccess_try_nospec provides the same mechanism for get_user_try. No functional changes. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727415922.33451.5796614273104346583.stgit@dwil… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -124,6 +124,11 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void); #define __uaccess_begin() stac() #define __uaccess_end() clac() +#define __uaccess_begin_nospec() \ +({ \ + stac(); \ + barrier_nospec(); \ +}) /* * This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into @@ -487,6 +492,10 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long bu __uaccess_begin(); \ barrier(); +#define uaccess_try_nospec do { \ + current->thread.uaccess_err = 0; \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ + #define uaccess_catch(err) \ __uaccess_end(); \ (err) |= (current->thread.uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org are queue-4.15/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86_Introduce_barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.15/x86get_user_Use_pointer_masking_to_limit_speculation.patch queue-4.15/x86_Introduce___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch queue-4.15/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/array_index_nospec_Sanitize_speculative_array_de-references.patch queue-4.15/Documentation_Document_array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86entry64_Remove_the_SYSCALL64_fast_path.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.15/x86asm_Move_status_from_thread_struct_to_thread_info.patch queue-4.15/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.15/x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.15/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.15/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch queue-4.15/moduleretpoline_Warn_about_missing_retpoline_in_module.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86uaccess_Use___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86entry64_Push_extra_regs_right_away.patch queue-4.15/x86usercopy_Replace_open_coded_stacclac_with___uaccess_begin_end.patch queue-4.15/vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch queue-4.15/x86spectre_Report_get_user_mitigation_for_spectre_v1.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.15/x86syscall_Sanitize_syscall_table_de-references_under_speculation.patch queue-4.15/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:28 2018 -0800 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com commit babdde2698d482b6c0de1eab4f697cf5856c5859 array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software. The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the control flow. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414808.33451.1873237130672785331.stgit@dwil… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -24,6 +24,30 @@ #define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory") #endif +/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the + * bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * Returns: + * 0 - (index < size) + */ +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long mask; + + asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;" + :"=r" (mask) + :"r"(size),"r" (index) + :"cc"); + return mask; +} + +/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */ +#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE #define dma_rmb() rmb() #else Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org are queue-4.15/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86_Introduce_barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.15/x86get_user_Use_pointer_masking_to_limit_speculation.patch queue-4.15/x86_Introduce___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch queue-4.15/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/array_index_nospec_Sanitize_speculative_array_de-references.patch queue-4.15/Documentation_Document_array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86entry64_Remove_the_SYSCALL64_fast_path.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.15/x86asm_Move_status_from_thread_struct_to_thread_info.patch queue-4.15/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.15/x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.15/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.15/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch queue-4.15/moduleretpoline_Warn_about_missing_retpoline_in_module.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86uaccess_Use___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86entry64_Push_extra_regs_right_away.patch queue-4.15/x86usercopy_Replace_open_coded_stacclac_with___uaccess_begin_end.patch queue-4.15/vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch queue-4.15/x86spectre_Report_get_user_mitigation_for_spectre_v1.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.15/x86syscall_Sanitize_syscall_table_de-references_under_speculation.patch queue-4.15/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:03:05 2018 -0800 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com commit 56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507 'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to read from the 'fdt->fd' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from __fcheck_files. Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727418500.33451.17392199002892248656.stgit@dwi… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/include/linux/fdtable.h +++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/fs.h> @@ -82,8 +83,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_file { struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt); - if (fd < fdt->max_fds) + if (fd < fdt->max_fds) { + fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds); return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]); + } return NULL; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from elena.reshetova(a)intel.com are queue-4.15/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch queue-4.15/vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe(a)redhat.com Date: Mon Jan 29 22:00:41 2018 -0600 From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe(a)redhat.com commit 830c1e3d16b2c1733cd1ec9c8f4d47a398ae31bc With the following fix: 2a0098d70640 ("objtool: Fix seg fault with gold linker") ... a seg fault was avoided, but the original seg fault condition in objtool wasn't fixed. Replace the seg fault with an error message. Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dc4585a70d6b975c99fc51d1957ccdde7bd52f3a.151728434… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- tools/objtool/orc_gen.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c +++ b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c @@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static int create_orc_entry(struct secti struct orc_entry *orc; struct rela *rela; + if (!insn_sec->sym) { + WARN("missing symbol for section %s", insn_sec->name); + return -1; + } + /* populate ORC data */ orc = (struct orc_entry *)u_sec->data->d_buf + idx; memcpy(orc, o, sizeof(*orc)); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from mingo(a)kernel.org are queue-4.15/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch queue-4.15/x86entry64_Remove_the_SYSCALL64_fast_path.patch queue-4.15/x86asm_Move_status_from_thread_struct_to_thread_info.patch queue-4.15/x86entry64_Push_extra_regs_right_away.patch queue-4.15/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch queue-4.15/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe(a)redhat.com Date: Mon Jan 29 22:00:39 2018 -0600 From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe(a)redhat.com commit a845c7cf4b4cb5e9e3b2823867892b27646f3a98 Currently objtool requires all retpolines to be: a) patched in with alternatives; and b) annotated with ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE. If you forget to do both of the above, objtool segfaults trying to dereference a NULL 'insn->call_dest' pointer. Avoid that situation and print a more helpful error message: quirks.o: warning: objtool: efi_delete_dummy_variable()+0x99: unsupported intra-function call quirks.o: warning: objtool: If this is a retpoline, please patch it in with alternatives and annotate it with ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE. Future improvements can be made to make objtool smarter with respect to retpolines, but this is a good incremental improvement for now. Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/819e50b6d9c2e1a22e34c1a636c0b2057cc8c6e5.151728434… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -543,18 +543,14 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct dest_off = insn->offset + insn->len + insn->immediate; insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, dest_off); - /* - * FIXME: Thanks to retpolines, it's now considered - * normal for a function to call within itself. So - * disable this warning for now. - */ -#if 0 - if (!insn->call_dest) { - WARN_FUNC("can't find call dest symbol at offset 0x%lx", - insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_off); + + if (!insn->call_dest && !insn->ignore) { + WARN_FUNC("unsupported intra-function call", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + WARN("If this is a retpoline, please patch it in with alternatives and annotate it with ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE."); return -1; } -#endif + } else if (rela->sym->type == STT_SECTION) { insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(rela->sym->sec, rela->addend+4); @@ -648,6 +644,8 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objto last_new_insn = insn; + insn->ignore = orig_insn->ignore_alts; + if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL && insn->type != INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL) continue; @@ -729,10 +727,6 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(stru goto out; } - /* Ignore retpoline alternatives. */ - if (orig_insn->ignore_alts) - continue; - new_insn = NULL; if (!special_alt->group || special_alt->new_len) { new_insn = find_insn(file, special_alt->new_sec, @@ -1089,11 +1083,11 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtoo if (ret) return ret; - ret = add_call_destinations(file); + ret = add_special_section_alts(file); if (ret) return ret; - ret = add_special_section_alts(file); + ret = add_call_destinations(file); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1720,10 +1714,12 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo insn->visited = true; - list_for_each_entry(alt, &insn->alts, list) { - ret = validate_branch(file, alt->insn, state); - if (ret) - return 1; + if (!insn->ignore_alts) { + list_for_each_entry(alt, &insn->alts, list) { + ret = validate_branch(file, alt->insn, state); + if (ret) + return 1; + } } switch (insn->type) { Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from linux(a)roeck-us.net are queue-4.15/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch queue-4.15/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch queue-4.15/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe(a)redhat.com Date: Mon Jan 29 22:00:40 2018 -0600 From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe(a)redhat.com commit 17bc33914bcc98ba3c6b426fd1c49587a25c0597 Now that the previous patch gave objtool the ability to read retpoline alternatives, it shows a new warning: arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o: warning: objtool: .entry_trampoline: don't know how to handle alternatives at end of section This is due to the JMP_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline(). Previously, objtool ignored this situation because it wasn't needed, and it would have required a bit of extra code. Now that this case exists, add proper support for it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2a30a3c2158af47d891a76e69bb1ef347e0443fd.151728434… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objto struct instruction *orig_insn, struct instruction **new_insn) { - struct instruction *last_orig_insn, *last_new_insn, *insn, *fake_jump; + struct instruction *last_orig_insn, *last_new_insn, *insn, *fake_jump = NULL; unsigned long dest_off; last_orig_insn = NULL; @@ -610,28 +610,30 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objto last_orig_insn = insn; } - if (!next_insn_same_sec(file, last_orig_insn)) { - WARN("%s: don't know how to handle alternatives at end of section", - special_alt->orig_sec->name); - return -1; - } - - fake_jump = malloc(sizeof(*fake_jump)); - if (!fake_jump) { - WARN("malloc failed"); - return -1; + if (next_insn_same_sec(file, last_orig_insn)) { + fake_jump = malloc(sizeof(*fake_jump)); + if (!fake_jump) { + WARN("malloc failed"); + return -1; + } + memset(fake_jump, 0, sizeof(*fake_jump)); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fake_jump->alts); + clear_insn_state(&fake_jump->state); + + fake_jump->sec = special_alt->new_sec; + fake_jump->offset = -1; + fake_jump->type = INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL; + fake_jump->jump_dest = list_next_entry(last_orig_insn, list); + fake_jump->ignore = true; } - memset(fake_jump, 0, sizeof(*fake_jump)); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fake_jump->alts); - clear_insn_state(&fake_jump->state); - - fake_jump->sec = special_alt->new_sec; - fake_jump->offset = -1; - fake_jump->type = INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL; - fake_jump->jump_dest = list_next_entry(last_orig_insn, list); - fake_jump->ignore = true; if (!special_alt->new_len) { + if (!fake_jump) { + WARN("%s: empty alternative at end of section", + special_alt->orig_sec->name); + return -1; + } + *new_insn = fake_jump; return 0; } @@ -654,8 +656,14 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objto continue; dest_off = insn->offset + insn->len + insn->immediate; - if (dest_off == special_alt->new_off + special_alt->new_len) + if (dest_off == special_alt->new_off + special_alt->new_len) { + if (!fake_jump) { + WARN("%s: alternative jump to end of section", + special_alt->orig_sec->name); + return -1; + } insn->jump_dest = fake_jump; + } if (!insn->jump_dest) { WARN_FUNC("can't find alternative jump destination", @@ -670,7 +678,8 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objto return -1; } - list_add(&fake_jump->list, &last_new_insn->list); + if (fake_jump) + list_add(&fake_jump->list, &last_new_insn->list); return 0; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jpoimboe(a)redhat.com are queue-4.15/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch queue-4.15/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch queue-4.15/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch queue-4.15/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:03:15 2018 -0800 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com commit 259d8c1e984318497c84eef547bbb6b1d9f4eb05 Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that txq_params->ac is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level driver's ->conf_tx() handler is called. Use a new helper, array_index_nospec(), to sanitize txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that any speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS). Reported-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes(a)sipsolutions.net> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: linux-wireless(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem(a)davemloft.net> Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727419584.33451.7700736761686184303.stgit@dwil… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/nl80211.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/netlink.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/etherdevice.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/genetlink.h> @@ -2056,20 +2057,22 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_param static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[], struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params) { + u8 ac; + if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]) return -EINVAL; - txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]); + ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]); txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]); txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]); txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]); txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]); - if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS) + if (ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS) return -EINVAL; - + txq_params->ac = array_index_nospec(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS); return 0; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from chunkeey(a)gmail.com are queue-4.15/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: array_index_nospec_Sanitize_speculative_array_de-references.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:22 2018 -0800 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com commit f3804203306e098dae9ca51540fcd5eb700d7f40 array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov(a)lynx.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Cc: Russell King <linux(a)armlinux.org.uk> Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414229.33451.18411580953862676575.stgit@dwi… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/nospec.h | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+) --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +// Copyright(c) 2018 Linus Torvalds. All rights reserved. +// Copyright(c) 2018 Alexei Starovoitov. All rights reserved. +// Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. + +#ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H +#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H + +/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * When @index is out of bounds (@index >= @size), the sign bit will be + * set. Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of + * zero for an out of bounds index, or ~0 if within bounds [0, @size). + */ +#ifndef array_index_mask_nospec +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + /* + * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage. + * + * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the + * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the + * mask. + * + * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that + * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX. + */ + if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX, + "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n")) + return 0; + + /* + * Always calculate and emit the mask even if the compiler + * thinks the mask is not needed. The compiler does not take + * into account the value of @index under speculation. + */ + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(index); + return ~(long)(index | (size - 1UL - index)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1); +} +#endif + +/* + * array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check + * + * For a code sequence like: + * + * if (index < size) { + * index = array_index_nospec(index, size); + * val = array[index]; + * } + * + * ...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then + * array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0, + * size). + */ +#define array_index_nospec(index, size) \ +({ \ + typeof(index) _i = (index); \ + typeof(size) _s = (size); \ + unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \ + \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \ + \ + _i &= _mask; \ + _i; \ +}) +#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org are queue-4.15/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86_Introduce_barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.15/x86get_user_Use_pointer_masking_to_limit_speculation.patch queue-4.15/x86_Introduce___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch queue-4.15/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.15/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/array_index_nospec_Sanitize_speculative_array_de-references.patch queue-4.15/Documentation_Document_array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86entry64_Remove_the_SYSCALL64_fast_path.patch queue-4.15/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.15/x86asm_Move_status_from_thread_struct_to_thread_info.patch queue-4.15/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.15/x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.15/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.15/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch queue-4.15/moduleretpoline_Warn_about_missing_retpoline_in_module.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.15/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.15/x86uaccess_Use___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.15/x86entry64_Push_extra_regs_right_away.patch queue-4.15/x86usercopy_Replace_open_coded_stacclac_with___uaccess_begin_end.patch queue-4.15/vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch queue-4.15/x86spectre_Report_get_user_mitigation_for_spectre_v1.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.15/x86syscall_Sanitize_syscall_table_de-references_under_speculation.patch queue-4.15/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: KVMx86_Update_the_reverse_cpuid_list_to_include_CPUID_7_EDX.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed(a)amazon.de Date: Thu Feb 1 22:59:42 2018 +0100 From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed(a)amazon.de commit b7b27aa011a1df42728d1768fc181d9ce69e6911 [dwmw2: Stop using KF() for bits in it, too] Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-2-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 8 +++----- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -67,9 +67,7 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void) #define F(x) bit(X86_FEATURE_##x) -/* These are scattered features in cpufeatures.h. */ -#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4VNNIW 2 -#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4FMAPS 3 +/* For scattered features from cpufeatures.h; we currently expose none */ #define KF(x) bit(KVM_CPUID_BIT_##x) int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -392,7 +390,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/ const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features = - KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS); + F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS); /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */ get_cpu(); @@ -477,7 +475,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct if (!tdp_enabled || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) entry->ecx &= ~F(PKU); entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features; - entry->edx &= get_scattered_cpuid_leaf(7, 0, CPUID_EDX); + cpuid_mask(&entry->edx, CPUID_7_EDX); } else { entry->ebx = 0; entry->ecx = 0; --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cp [CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX}, [CPUID_7_ECX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_ECX}, [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, + [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX}, }; static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned x86_feature) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from karahmed(a)amazon.de are queue-4.15/x86spectre_Simplify_spectre_v2_command_line_parsing.patch queue-4.15/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.15/x86cpuid_Fix_up_virtual_IBRSIBPBSTIBP_feature_bits_on_Intel.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.15/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.15/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.15/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.15/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.15/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.15/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.15/KVMx86_Update_the_reverse_cpuid_list_to_include_CPUID_7_EDX.patch queue-4.15/x86retpoline_Avoid_retpolines_for_built-in___init_functions.patch

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