The presence of a CLM file is described as optional, but missing the clm
blob causes the preinit to return unsuccessfully. Fix this by ignoring
the return value of the brcmf_c_process_clm_blob().
Also remove the extra debug print, as brcmf_c_process_clm_blob() already
did print a useful error message before returning.
Fixes: fdd0bd88ceae ("brcmfmac: add CLM download support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson(a)linaro.org>
---
This regression was introduced in v4.15-rc1, but I unfortunately didn't test
WiFi until now. Included a Cc to stable@ in case you choose to pick this up
after v4.15.
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/common.c | 8 ++------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/common.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/common.c
index 6a59d0609d30..0c67ba6ae135 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/common.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/common.c
@@ -278,12 +278,8 @@ int brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds(struct brcmf_if *ifp)
}
ri->result = err;
- /* Do any CLM downloading */
- err = brcmf_c_process_clm_blob(ifp);
- if (err < 0) {
- brcmf_err("download CLM blob file failed, %d\n", err);
- goto done;
- }
+ /* Do any optional CLM downloading */
+ brcmf_c_process_clm_blob(ifp);
/* query for 'ver' to get version info from firmware */
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
--
2.15.0
The page table order must be increased for EFI table in order to avoid a
bug where NMI tries to change the page table to kernel page table, while
efi page table is active.
For more disccussion about this bug, see this thread:
http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1801.1/00951.html
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin(a)oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare(a)oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina(a)suse.cz>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h | 11 +++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 7 -------
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Changelog:
v1 - v2: Fixed compiling warning
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
index b6d425999f99..1178a51b77f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
@@ -27,6 +27,17 @@ static inline void paravirt_release_pud(unsigned long pfn) {}
*/
extern gfp_t __userpte_alloc_gfp;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+/*
+ * Instead of one PGD, we acquire two PGDs. Being order-1, it is
+ * both 8k in size and 8k-aligned. That lets us just flip bit 12
+ * in a pointer to swap between the two 4k halves.
+ */
+#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER 1
+#else
+#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER 0
+#endif
+
/*
* Allocate and free page tables.
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 5aaec8effc5f..209b9465e97a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -345,13 +345,6 @@ static inline void _pgd_free(pgd_t *pgd)
}
#else
-/*
- * Instead of one pgd, Kaiser acquires two pgds. Being order-1, it is
- * both 8k in size and 8k-aligned. That lets us just flip bit 12
- * in a pointer to swap between the two 4k halves.
- */
-#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER kaiser_enabled
-
static inline pgd_t *_pgd_alloc(void)
{
return (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(PGALLOC_GFP, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 2f25a363068c..dcb2d9d185a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ int __init efi_alloc_page_tables(void)
return 0;
gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO;
- efi_pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_page(gfp_mask);
+ efi_pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
if (!efi_pgd)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.15.1
On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 12:55:11PM +0100, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Mon, 2018-01-15 at 10:06 +0100, gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> > This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
> >
> > objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored
> >
> > to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
> > http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
> >
> > The filename of the patch is:
> > objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch
> > and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
>
> Hm... they aren't being ignored entirely.
>
> arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0xf: return instruction outside of a callable function
>
> Josh?
This should fix it (to be applied on top):
----
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH] objtool: Fix retpoline support for pre-ORC objtool
Objtool 1.0 (pre-ORC) produces the following warning when it encounters
a retpoline:
arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0xf: return instruction outside of a callable function
That warning is meant to catch GCC bugs and missing ENTRY/ENDPROC
annotations, neither of which are applicable to alternatives. Silence
the warning for alternative instructions, just like objtool 2.0 already
does.
Reported-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com>
---
tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
index f789621cbdba..a688a857a7ae 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
@@ -1230,6 +1230,14 @@ static int validate_uncallable_instructions(struct objtool_file *file)
for_each_insn(file, insn) {
if (!insn->visited && insn->type == INSN_RETURN) {
+
+ /*
+ * Don't warn about call instructions in unvisited
+ * retpoline alternatives.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".altinstr_replacement"))
+ continue;
+
WARN_FUNC("return instruction outside of a callable function",
insn->sec, insn->offset);
warnings++;
--
2.14.3
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From de791821c295cc61419a06fe5562288417d1bc58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 15:27:34 +0100
Subject: x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
commit de791821c295cc61419a06fe5562288417d1bc58 upstream.
Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table
isolation for mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801051525300.1724@nanos
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete <rga(a)amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@
#define X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK X86_BUG(6) /* FXSAVE leaks FOP/FIP/FOP */
#define X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR X86_BUG(7) /* AAI65, CLFLUSH required before MONITOR */
#define X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS X86_BUG(8) /* SYSRET doesn't fix up SS attrs */
-#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
#if defined(__KERNEL__) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
fpu__init_system(c);
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tglx(a)linutronix.de are
queue-4.4/x86-mm-pat-dev-mem-remove-superfluous-error-message.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch
queue-4.4/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch
queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch
queue-4.4/locking-mutex-allow-next-waiter-lockless-wakeup.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch
queue-4.4/x86-vsdo-fix-build-on-paravirt_clock-y-kvm_guest-n.patch
queue-4.4/x86-pti-efi-broken-conversion-from-efi-to-kernel-page-table.patch
queue-4.4/x86-documentation-add-pti-description.patch
queue-4.4/x86-acpi-handle-sci-interrupts-above-legacy-space-gracefully.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch
queue-4.4/futex-replace-barrier-in-unqueue_me-with-read_once.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch
queue-4.4/selftests-x86-add-test_vsyscall.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-merge-bugs.c-and-bugs_64.c.patch
queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch
queue-4.4/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch
queue-4.4/x86-acpi-reduce-code-duplication-in-mp_override_legacy_irq.patch
queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 6cbd2171e89b13377261d15e64384df60ecb530e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 15:07:32 +0100
Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
commit 6cbd2171e89b13377261d15e64384df60ecb530e upstream.
There is currently no way to force CPU bug bits like CPU feature bits. That
makes it impossible to set a bug bit once at boot and have it stick for all
upcoming CPUs.
Extend the force set/clear arrays to handle bug bits as well.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov(a)suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight(a)aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval(a)amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com>
Cc: aliguori(a)amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss(a)iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd(a)google.com
Cc: keescook(a)google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.992156574@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 +++---
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -359,6 +359,8 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[
set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_set); \
} while (0)
+#define setup_force_cpu_bug(bit) setup_force_cpu_cap(bit)
+
#define cpu_has_fpu boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU)
#define cpu_has_de boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DE)
#define cpu_has_pse boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSE)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -156,8 +156,8 @@ extern struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data;
extern struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data;
extern struct tss_struct doublefault_tss;
-extern __u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS];
-extern __u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS];
+extern __u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS];
+extern __u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS];
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct cpuinfo_x86, cpu_info);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -432,8 +432,8 @@ static const char *table_lookup_model(st
return NULL; /* Not found */
}
-__u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS];
-__u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS];
+__u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS];
+__u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS];
void load_percpu_segment(int cpu)
{
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpu
{
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS; i++) {
c->x86_capability[i] &= ~cpu_caps_cleared[i];
c->x86_capability[i] |= cpu_caps_set[i];
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tglx(a)linutronix.de are
queue-4.4/x86-mm-pat-dev-mem-remove-superfluous-error-message.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch
queue-4.4/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch
queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch
queue-4.4/locking-mutex-allow-next-waiter-lockless-wakeup.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch
queue-4.4/x86-vsdo-fix-build-on-paravirt_clock-y-kvm_guest-n.patch
queue-4.4/x86-pti-efi-broken-conversion-from-efi-to-kernel-page-table.patch
queue-4.4/x86-documentation-add-pti-description.patch
queue-4.4/x86-acpi-handle-sci-interrupts-above-legacy-space-gracefully.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch
queue-4.4/futex-replace-barrier-in-unqueue_me-with-read_once.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch
queue-4.4/selftests-x86-add-test_vsyscall.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-merge-bugs.c-and-bugs_64.c.patch
queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch
queue-4.4/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch
queue-4.4/x86-acpi-reduce-code-duplication-in-mp_override_legacy_irq.patch
queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 99c6fa2511d8a683e61468be91b83f85452115fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 11:49:23 +0000
Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk>
commit 99c6fa2511d8a683e61468be91b83f85452115fa upstream.
Add the bug bits for spectre v1/2 and force them unconditionally for all
cpus.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt(a)google.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515239374-23361-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.…
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete <rga(a)amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@
#define X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR X86_BUG(7) /* AAI65, CLFLUSH required before MONITOR */
#define X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS X86_BUG(8) /* SYSRET doesn't fix up SS attrs */
#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
#if defined(__KERNEL__) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -834,6 +834,9 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+
fpu__init_system(c);
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch
queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch
queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch
queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch
queue-4.4/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch
queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
The filename of the patch is:
x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From a89f040fa34ec9cd682aed98b8f04e3c47d998bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 15:07:33 +0100
Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
commit a89f040fa34ec9cd682aed98b8f04e3c47d998bd upstream.
Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of
user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented
ways to exploit that.
The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space
page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime
conditional.
Add the BUG bits which indicates that the CPU is affected and add a feature
bit which indicates that the software migitation is enabled.
Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be
made later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight(a)aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval(a)amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com>
Cc: aliguori(a)amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss(a)iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd(a)google.com
Cc: keescook(a)google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -277,6 +277,7 @@
#define X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK X86_BUG(6) /* FXSAVE leaks FOP/FIP/FOP */
#define X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR X86_BUG(7) /* AAI65, CLFLUSH required before MONITOR */
#define X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS X86_BUG(8) /* SYSRET doesn't fix up SS attrs */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */
#if defined(__KERNEL__) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -830,6 +830,10 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
}
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
+
+ /* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
+
fpu__init_system(c);
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tglx(a)linutronix.de are
queue-4.4/x86-mm-pat-dev-mem-remove-superfluous-error-message.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch
queue-4.4/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch
queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch
queue-4.4/locking-mutex-allow-next-waiter-lockless-wakeup.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch
queue-4.4/x86-vsdo-fix-build-on-paravirt_clock-y-kvm_guest-n.patch
queue-4.4/x86-pti-efi-broken-conversion-from-efi-to-kernel-page-table.patch
queue-4.4/x86-documentation-add-pti-description.patch
queue-4.4/x86-acpi-handle-sci-interrupts-above-legacy-space-gracefully.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch
queue-4.4/futex-replace-barrier-in-unqueue_me-with-read_once.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch
queue-4.4/selftests-x86-add-test_vsyscall.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-merge-bugs.c-and-bugs_64.c.patch
queue-4.4/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch
queue-4.4/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch
queue-4.4/x86-acpi-reduce-code-duplication-in-mp_override_legacy_irq.patch
queue-4.4/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch