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[Linux-stable-mirror] FAILED: patch "[PATCH] kernel: make groups_sort calling a responsibility group_info" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From bdcf0a423ea1c40bbb40e7ee483b50fc8aa3d758 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Rafael Becker <thiago.becker(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2017 15:33:12 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] kernel: make groups_sort calling a responsibility group_info allocators In testing, we found that nfsd threads may call set_groups in parallel for the same entry cached in auth.unix.gid, racing in the call of groups_sort, corrupting the groups for that entry and leading to permission denials for the client. This patch: - Make groups_sort globally visible. - Move the call to groups_sort to the modifiers of group_info - Remove the call to groups_sort from set_groups Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171211151420.18655-1-thiago.becker@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thiago Rafael Becker <thiago.becker(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox(a)microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.com> Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields(a)fieldses.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky(a)de.ibm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c index f04db3779b34..59eea9c65d3e 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c @@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(s390_setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, u16 __user *, grouplis return retval; } + groups_sort(group_info); retval = set_current_groups(group_info); put_group_info(group_info); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c index 697f8ae7792d..f650e475d8f0 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c @@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp) gi->gid[i] = exp->ex_anon_gid; else gi->gid[i] = rqgi->gid[i]; + + /* Each thread allocates its own gi, no race */ + groups_sort(gi); } } else { gi = get_group_info(rqgi); diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index 099058e1178b..631286535d0f 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *); extern void set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *); extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t); extern bool may_setgroups(void); +extern void groups_sort(struct group_info *); /* * The security context of a task diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c index e357bc800111..daae2f2dc6d4 100644 --- a/kernel/groups.c +++ b/kernel/groups.c @@ -86,11 +86,12 @@ static int gid_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) return gid_gt(a, b) - gid_lt(a, b); } -static void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info) +void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info) { sort(group_info->gid, group_info->ngroups, sizeof(*group_info->gid), gid_cmp, NULL); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_sort); /* a simple bsearch */ int groups_search(const struct group_info *group_info, kgid_t grp) @@ -122,7 +123,6 @@ int groups_search(const struct group_info *group_info, kgid_t grp) void set_groups(struct cred *new, struct group_info *group_info) { put_group_info(new->group_info); - groups_sort(group_info); get_group_info(group_info); new->group_info = group_info; } @@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist) return retval; } + groups_sort(group_info); retval = set_current_groups(group_info); put_group_info(group_info); diff --git a/kernel/uid16.c b/kernel/uid16.c index ce74a4901d2b..ef1da2a5f9bd 100644 --- a/kernel/uid16.c +++ b/kernel/uid16.c @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *, grouplist) return retval; } + groups_sort(group_info); retval = set_current_groups(group_info); put_group_info(group_info); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c index c4778cae58ef..444380f968f1 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c @@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ static int gssx_dec_linux_creds(struct xdr_stream *xdr, goto out_free_groups; creds->cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid; } + groups_sort(creds->cr_group_info); return 0; out_free_groups: diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index 5dd4e6c9fef2..26531193fce4 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, goto out; rsci.cred.cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid; } + groups_sort(rsci.cred.cr_group_info); /* mech name */ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c b/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c index 740b67d5a733..af7f28fb8102 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c @@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ static int unix_gid_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, ug.gi->gid[i] = kgid; } + groups_sort(ug.gi); ugp = unix_gid_lookup(cd, uid); if (ugp) { struct cache_head *ch; @@ -819,6 +820,7 @@ svcauth_unix_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) kgid_t kgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, svc_getnl(argv)); cred->cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid; } + groups_sort(cred->cr_group_info); if (svc_getu32(argv) != htonl(RPC_AUTH_NULL) || svc_getu32(argv) != 0) { *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; return SVC_DENIED;

7 years, 6 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm: rework delayed connector cleanup in connector_iter" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From ea497bb92064875497554ee7cdf10df7fb7393fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)ffwll.ch> Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 13:49:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] drm: rework delayed connector cleanup in connector_iter PROBE_DEFER also uses system_wq to reprobe drivers, which means when that again fails, and we try to flush the overall system_wq (to get all the delayed connectore cleanup work_struct completed), we deadlock. Fix this by using just a single cleanup work, so that we can only flush that one and don't block on anything else. That means a free list plus locking, a standard pattern. v2: - Correctly free connectors only on last ref. Oops (Chris). - use llist_head/node (Chris). v3 - Add init_llist_head (Chris). Fixes: a703c55004e1 ("drm: safely free connectors from connector_iter") Fixes: 613051dac40d ("drm: locking&new iterators for connector_list") Cc: Ben Widawsky <ben(a)bwidawsk.net> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied(a)gmail.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+: 613051dac40d ("drm: locking&new iterators for connector_list" Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+ Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)intel.com> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo(a)padovan.org> Cc: David Airlie <airlied(a)linux.ie> Cc: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier(a)dowhile0.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com> Cc: Guillaume Tucker <guillaume.tucker(a)collabora.com> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Cc: Kevin Hilman <khilman(a)baylibre.com> Cc: Matt Hart <matthew.hart(a)linaro.org> Cc: Thierry Escande <thierry.escande(a)collabora.co.uk> Cc: Tomeu Vizoso <tomeu.vizoso(a)collabora.com> Cc: Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo(a)collabora.com> Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski(a)samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20171213124936.17914-1-daniel… diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c index c4dfcbc861a1..9ae236036e32 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c @@ -152,14 +152,23 @@ static void drm_connector_free(struct kref *kref) connector->funcs->destroy(connector); } -static void drm_connector_free_work_fn(struct work_struct *work) +void drm_connector_free_work_fn(struct work_struct *work) { - struct drm_connector *connector = - container_of(work, struct drm_connector, free_work); - struct drm_device *dev = connector->dev; + struct drm_connector *connector, *n; + struct drm_device *dev = + container_of(work, struct drm_device, mode_config.connector_free_work); + struct drm_mode_config *config = &dev->mode_config; + unsigned long flags; + struct llist_node *freed; - drm_mode_object_unregister(dev, &connector->base); - connector->funcs->destroy(connector); + spin_lock_irqsave(&config->connector_list_lock, flags); + freed = llist_del_all(&config->connector_free_list); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&config->connector_list_lock, flags); + + llist_for_each_entry_safe(connector, n, freed, free_node) { + drm_mode_object_unregister(dev, &connector->base); + connector->funcs->destroy(connector); + } } /** @@ -191,8 +200,6 @@ int drm_connector_init(struct drm_device *dev, if (ret) return ret; - INIT_WORK(&connector->free_work, drm_connector_free_work_fn); - connector->base.properties = &connector->properties; connector->dev = dev; connector->funcs = funcs; @@ -547,10 +554,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_connector_list_iter_begin); * actually release the connector when dropping our final reference. */ static void -drm_connector_put_safe(struct drm_connector *conn) +__drm_connector_put_safe(struct drm_connector *conn) { - if (refcount_dec_and_test(&conn->base.refcount.refcount)) - schedule_work(&conn->free_work); + struct drm_mode_config *config = &conn->dev->mode_config; + + lockdep_assert_held(&config->connector_list_lock); + + if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&conn->base.refcount.refcount)) + return; + + llist_add(&conn->free_node, &config->connector_free_list); + schedule_work(&config->connector_free_work); } /** @@ -582,10 +596,10 @@ drm_connector_list_iter_next(struct drm_connector_list_iter *iter) /* loop until it's not a zombie connector */ } while (!kref_get_unless_zero(&iter->conn->base.refcount)); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&config->connector_list_lock, flags); if (old_conn) - drm_connector_put_safe(old_conn); + __drm_connector_put_safe(old_conn); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&config->connector_list_lock, flags); return iter->conn; } @@ -602,9 +616,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_connector_list_iter_next); */ void drm_connector_list_iter_end(struct drm_connector_list_iter *iter) { + struct drm_mode_config *config = &iter->dev->mode_config; + unsigned long flags; + iter->dev = NULL; - if (iter->conn) - drm_connector_put_safe(iter->conn); + if (iter->conn) { + spin_lock_irqsave(&config->connector_list_lock, flags); + __drm_connector_put_safe(iter->conn); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&config->connector_list_lock, flags); + } lock_release(&connector_list_iter_dep_map, 0, _RET_IP_); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_connector_list_iter_end); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc_internal.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc_internal.h index 9ebb8841778c..af00f42ba269 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc_internal.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc_internal.h @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ int drm_mode_connector_set_obj_prop(struct drm_mode_object *obj, uint64_t value); int drm_connector_create_standard_properties(struct drm_device *dev); const char *drm_get_connector_force_name(enum drm_connector_force force); +void drm_connector_free_work_fn(struct work_struct *work); /* IOCTL */ int drm_mode_connector_property_set_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c index cc78b3d9e5e4..256de7313612 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c @@ -382,6 +382,9 @@ void drm_mode_config_init(struct drm_device *dev) ida_init(&dev->mode_config.connector_ida); spin_lock_init(&dev->mode_config.connector_list_lock); + init_llist_head(&dev->mode_config.connector_free_list); + INIT_WORK(&dev->mode_config.connector_free_work, drm_connector_free_work_fn); + drm_mode_create_standard_properties(dev); /* Just to be sure */ @@ -432,7 +435,7 @@ void drm_mode_config_cleanup(struct drm_device *dev) } drm_connector_list_iter_end(&conn_iter); /* connector_iter drops references in a work item. */ - flush_scheduled_work(); + flush_work(&dev->mode_config.connector_free_work); if (WARN_ON(!list_empty(&dev->mode_config.connector_list))) { drm_connector_list_iter_begin(dev, &conn_iter); drm_for_each_connector_iter(connector, &conn_iter) diff --git a/include/drm/drm_connector.h b/include/drm/drm_connector.h index a4649c56ca2f..5971577016a2 100644 --- a/include/drm/drm_connector.h +++ b/include/drm/drm_connector.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #define __DRM_CONNECTOR_H__ #include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/llist.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/hdmi.h> #include <drm/drm_mode_object.h> @@ -918,12 +919,13 @@ struct drm_connector { uint16_t tile_h_size, tile_v_size; /** - * @free_work: + * @free_node: * - * Work used only by &drm_connector_iter to be able to clean up a - * connector from any context. + * List used only by &drm_connector_iter to be able to clean up a + * connector from any context, in conjunction with + * &drm_mode_config.connector_free_work. */ - struct work_struct free_work; + struct llist_node free_node; }; #define obj_to_connector(x) container_of(x, struct drm_connector, base) diff --git a/include/drm/drm_mode_config.h b/include/drm/drm_mode_config.h index b21e827c5c78..b0ce26d71296 100644 --- a/include/drm/drm_mode_config.h +++ b/include/drm/drm_mode_config.h @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/idr.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include <linux/llist.h> #include <drm/drm_modeset_lock.h> @@ -393,7 +394,7 @@ struct drm_mode_config { /** * @connector_list_lock: Protects @num_connector and - * @connector_list. + * @connector_list and @connector_free_list. */ spinlock_t connector_list_lock; /** @@ -413,6 +414,21 @@ struct drm_mode_config { * &struct drm_connector_list_iter to walk this list. */ struct list_head connector_list; + /** + * @connector_free_list: + * + * List of connector objects linked with &drm_connector.free_head. + * Protected by @connector_list_lock. Used by + * drm_for_each_connector_iter() and + * &struct drm_connector_list_iter to savely free connectors using + * @connector_free_work. + */ + struct llist_head connector_free_list; + /** + * @connector_free_work: Work to clean up @connector_free_list. + */ + struct work_struct connector_free_work; + /** * @num_encoder: *

7 years, 6 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ecaaab5649781c5a0effdaf298a925063020500e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 20:56:59 -0800 Subject: crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit ecaaab5649781c5a0effdaf298a925063020500e upstream. When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86 implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)', because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized. The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided. The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization" and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do. Reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <unistd.h> int main() { int algfd, reqfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "skcipher", .salg_name = "salsa20", }; char key[16] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key)); } Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Fixes: eb6f13eb9f81 ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c | 7 ------- crypto/salsa20_generic.c | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 14 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c @@ -59,13 +59,6 @@ static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv); - if (likely(walk.nbytes == nbytes)) - { - salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, - walk.dst.virt.addr, nbytes); - return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0); - } - while (walk.nbytes >= 64) { salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr, --- a/crypto/salsa20_generic.c +++ b/crypto/salsa20_generic.c @@ -188,13 +188,6 @@ static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv); - if (likely(walk.nbytes == nbytes)) - { - salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, - walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes); - return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0); - } - while (walk.nbytes >= 64) { salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.9/crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch queue-4.9/crypto-rsa-fix-buffer-overread-when-stripping-leading-zeroes.patch queue-4.9/crypto-hmac-require-that-the-underlying-hash-algorithm-is-unkeyed.patch

7 years, 6 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroes" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroes to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-rsa-fix-buffer-overread-when-stripping-leading-zeroes.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From d2890c3778b164fde587bc16583f3a1c87233ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Sun, 26 Nov 2017 23:16:49 -0800 Subject: crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroes From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit d2890c3778b164fde587bc16583f3a1c87233ec5 upstream. In rsa_get_n(), if the buffer contained all 0's and "FIPS mode" is enabled, we would read one byte past the end of the buffer while scanning the leading zeroes. Fix it by checking 'n_sz' before '!*ptr'. This bug was reachable by adding a specially crafted key of type "asymmetric" (requires CONFIG_RSA and CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER). KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003501a708 by task keyctl/196 CPU: 1 PID: 196 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33 asn1_ber_decoder+0x82a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:328 rsa_set_pub_key+0xd3/0x320 crypto/rsa.c:278 crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline] pkcs1pad_set_pub_key+0xae/0x200 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:117 crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline] public_key_verify_signature+0x270/0x9d0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c:106 x509_check_for_self_signed+0x2ea/0x480 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:141 x509_cert_parse+0x46a/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:129 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Allocated by task 196: __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3711 [inline] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x118/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726 kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118 kmemdup ./include/linux/string.h:414 [inline] x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 5a7de97309f5 ("crypto: rsa - return raw integers for the ASN.1 parser") Cc: Tudor Ambarus <tudor-dan.ambarus(a)nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- crypto/rsa_helper.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/crypto/rsa_helper.c +++ b/crypto/rsa_helper.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ int rsa_get_n(void *context, size_t hdrl return -EINVAL; if (fips_enabled) { - while (!*ptr && n_sz) { + while (n_sz && !*ptr) { ptr++; n_sz--; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.9/crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch queue-4.9/crypto-rsa-fix-buffer-overread-when-stripping-leading-zeroes.patch queue-4.9/crypto-hmac-require-that-the-underlying-hash-algorithm-is-unkeyed.patch

7 years, 6 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-hmac-require-that-the-underlying-hash-algorithm-is-unkeyed.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From af3ff8045bbf3e32f1a448542e73abb4c8ceb6f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 18:01:38 -0800 Subject: crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit af3ff8045bbf3e32f1a448542e73abb4c8ceb6f1 upstream. Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))" through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow. This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer, and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that, but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything. Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed. Here is a reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main() { int algfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "hash", .salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))", }; char key[4096] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); } Here was the KASAN report from syzbot: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044 CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline] check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109 shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172 crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186 hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66 crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64 shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207 crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200 hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446 alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline] alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- crypto/hmac.c | 6 +++++- crypto/shash.c | 5 +++-- include/crypto/internal/hash.h | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/crypto/hmac.c +++ b/crypto/hmac.c @@ -194,11 +194,15 @@ static int hmac_create(struct crypto_tem salg = shash_attr_alg(tb[1], 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(salg)) return PTR_ERR(salg); + alg = &salg->base; + /* The underlying hash algorithm must be unkeyed */ err = -EINVAL; + if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(salg)) + goto out_put_alg; + ds = salg->digestsize; ss = salg->statesize; - alg = &salg->base; if (ds > alg->cra_blocksize || ss < alg->cra_blocksize) goto out_put_alg; --- a/crypto/shash.c +++ b/crypto/shash.c @@ -24,11 +24,12 @@ static const struct crypto_type crypto_shash_type; -static int shash_no_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) +int shash_no_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) { return -ENOSYS; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shash_no_setkey); static int shash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) --- a/include/crypto/internal/hash.h +++ b/include/crypto/internal/hash.h @@ -80,6 +80,14 @@ int ahash_register_instance(struct crypt struct ahash_instance *inst); void ahash_free_instance(struct crypto_instance *inst); +int shash_no_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen); + +static inline bool crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(struct shash_alg *alg) +{ + return alg->setkey != shash_no_setkey; +} + int crypto_init_ahash_spawn(struct crypto_ahash_spawn *spawn, struct hash_alg_common *alg, struct crypto_instance *inst); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.9/crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch queue-4.9/crypto-rsa-fix-buffer-overread-when-stripping-leading-zeroes.patch queue-4.9/crypto-hmac-require-that-the-underlying-hash-algorithm-is-unkeyed.patch

7 years, 6 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ecaaab5649781c5a0effdaf298a925063020500e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 20:56:59 -0800 Subject: crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit ecaaab5649781c5a0effdaf298a925063020500e upstream. When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86 implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)', because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized. The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided. The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization" and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do. Reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <unistd.h> int main() { int algfd, reqfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "skcipher", .salg_name = "salsa20", }; char key[16] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key)); } Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Fixes: eb6f13eb9f81 ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c | 7 ------- crypto/salsa20_generic.c | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 14 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c @@ -59,13 +59,6 @@ static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv); - if (likely(walk.nbytes == nbytes)) - { - salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, - walk.dst.virt.addr, nbytes); - return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0); - } - while (walk.nbytes >= 64) { salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr, --- a/crypto/salsa20_generic.c +++ b/crypto/salsa20_generic.c @@ -188,13 +188,6 @@ static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv); - if (likely(walk.nbytes == nbytes)) - { - salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, - walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes); - return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0); - } - while (walk.nbytes >= 64) { salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.4/crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch queue-4.4/crypto-hmac-require-that-the-underlying-hash-algorithm-is-unkeyed.patch

7 years, 6 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-hmac-require-that-the-underlying-hash-algorithm-is-unkeyed.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From af3ff8045bbf3e32f1a448542e73abb4c8ceb6f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 18:01:38 -0800 Subject: crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit af3ff8045bbf3e32f1a448542e73abb4c8ceb6f1 upstream. Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))" through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow. This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer, and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that, but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything. Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed. Here is a reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main() { int algfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "hash", .salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))", }; char key[4096] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); } Here was the KASAN report from syzbot: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044 CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline] check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109 shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172 crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186 hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66 crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64 shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207 crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200 hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446 alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline] alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- crypto/hmac.c | 6 +++++- crypto/shash.c | 5 +++-- include/crypto/internal/hash.h | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/crypto/hmac.c +++ b/crypto/hmac.c @@ -194,11 +194,15 @@ static int hmac_create(struct crypto_tem salg = shash_attr_alg(tb[1], 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(salg)) return PTR_ERR(salg); + alg = &salg->base; + /* The underlying hash algorithm must be unkeyed */ err = -EINVAL; + if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(salg)) + goto out_put_alg; + ds = salg->digestsize; ss = salg->statesize; - alg = &salg->base; if (ds > alg->cra_blocksize || ss < alg->cra_blocksize) goto out_put_alg; --- a/crypto/shash.c +++ b/crypto/shash.c @@ -24,11 +24,12 @@ static const struct crypto_type crypto_shash_type; -static int shash_no_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) +int shash_no_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) { return -ENOSYS; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shash_no_setkey); static int shash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) --- a/include/crypto/internal/hash.h +++ b/include/crypto/internal/hash.h @@ -83,6 +83,14 @@ int ahash_register_instance(struct crypt struct ahash_instance *inst); void ahash_free_instance(struct crypto_instance *inst); +int shash_no_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen); + +static inline bool crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(struct shash_alg *alg) +{ + return alg->setkey != shash_no_setkey; +} + int crypto_init_ahash_spawn(struct crypto_ahash_spawn *spawn, struct hash_alg_common *alg, struct crypto_instance *inst); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.4/crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch queue-4.4/crypto-hmac-require-that-the-underlying-hash-algorithm-is-unkeyed.patch

7 years, 6 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "string.h: workaround for increased stack usage" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled string.h: workaround for increased stack usage to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: string.h-workaround-for-increased-stack-usage.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 146734b091430c80d80bb96b1139a96fb4bc830e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2017 15:32:34 -0800 Subject: string.h: workaround for increased stack usage From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> commit 146734b091430c80d80bb96b1139a96fb4bc830e upstream. The hardened strlen() function causes rather large stack usage in at least one file in the kernel, in particular when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled: drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c: In function 'em28xx_dvb_init': drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c:2062:1: error: the frame size of 3256 bytes is larger than 204 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=] Analyzing this problem led to the discovery that gcc fails to merge the stack slots for the i2c_board_info[] structures after we strlcpy() into them, due to the 'noreturn' attribute on the source string length check. I reported this as a gcc bug, but it is unlikely to get fixed for gcc-8, since it is relatively easy to work around, and it gets triggered rarely. An earlier workaround I did added an empty inline assembly statement before the call to fortify_panic(), which works surprisingly well, but is really ugly and unintuitive. This is a new approach to the same problem, this time addressing it by not calling the 'extern __real_strnlen()' function for string constants where __builtin_strlen() is a compile-time constant and therefore known to be safe. We do this by checking if the last character in the string is a compile-time constant '\0'. If it is, we can assume that strlen() of the string is also constant. As a side-effect, this should also improve the object code output for any other call of strlen() on a string constant. [akpm(a)linux-foundation.org: add comment] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171205215143.3085755-1-arnd@arndb.de Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=82365 Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9980413/ Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9974047/ Fixes: 6974f0c4555 ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay(a)gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Martin Wilck <mwilck(a)suse.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/string.h | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/include/linux/string.h +++ b/include/linux/string.h @@ -259,7 +259,10 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen( { __kernel_size_t ret; size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1) + + /* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */ + if (p_size == (size_t)-1 || + (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0')) return __builtin_strlen(p); ret = strnlen(p, p_size); if (p_size <= ret) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are queue-4.14/string.h-workaround-for-increased-stack-usage.patch

7 years, 6 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ecaaab5649781c5a0effdaf298a925063020500e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 20:56:59 -0800 Subject: crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit ecaaab5649781c5a0effdaf298a925063020500e upstream. When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86 implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)', because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized. The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided. The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization" and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do. Reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <unistd.h> int main() { int algfd, reqfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "skcipher", .salg_name = "salsa20", }; char key[16] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key)); } Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Fixes: eb6f13eb9f81 ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c | 7 ------- crypto/salsa20_generic.c | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 14 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c @@ -59,13 +59,6 @@ static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv); - if (likely(walk.nbytes == nbytes)) - { - salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, - walk.dst.virt.addr, nbytes); - return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0); - } - while (walk.nbytes >= 64) { salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr, --- a/crypto/salsa20_generic.c +++ b/crypto/salsa20_generic.c @@ -188,13 +188,6 @@ static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv); - if (likely(walk.nbytes == nbytes)) - { - salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, - walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes); - return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0); - } - while (walk.nbytes >= 64) { salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.14/crypto-algif_aead-fix-reference-counting-of-null-skcipher.patch queue-4.14/crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch queue-4.14/crypto-rsa-fix-buffer-overread-when-stripping-leading-zeroes.patch queue-4.14/crypto-hmac-require-that-the-underlying-hash-algorithm-is-unkeyed.patch queue-4.14/crypto-af_alg-fix-null-pointer-dereference-in.patch

7 years, 6 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroes" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroes to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-rsa-fix-buffer-overread-when-stripping-leading-zeroes.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From d2890c3778b164fde587bc16583f3a1c87233ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Sun, 26 Nov 2017 23:16:49 -0800 Subject: crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroes From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit d2890c3778b164fde587bc16583f3a1c87233ec5 upstream. In rsa_get_n(), if the buffer contained all 0's and "FIPS mode" is enabled, we would read one byte past the end of the buffer while scanning the leading zeroes. Fix it by checking 'n_sz' before '!*ptr'. This bug was reachable by adding a specially crafted key of type "asymmetric" (requires CONFIG_RSA and CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER). KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003501a708 by task keyctl/196 CPU: 1 PID: 196 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33 asn1_ber_decoder+0x82a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:328 rsa_set_pub_key+0xd3/0x320 crypto/rsa.c:278 crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline] pkcs1pad_set_pub_key+0xae/0x200 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:117 crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline] public_key_verify_signature+0x270/0x9d0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c:106 x509_check_for_self_signed+0x2ea/0x480 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:141 x509_cert_parse+0x46a/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:129 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Allocated by task 196: __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3711 [inline] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x118/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726 kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118 kmemdup ./include/linux/string.h:414 [inline] x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 5a7de97309f5 ("crypto: rsa - return raw integers for the ASN.1 parser") Cc: Tudor Ambarus <tudor-dan.ambarus(a)nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- crypto/rsa_helper.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/crypto/rsa_helper.c +++ b/crypto/rsa_helper.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ int rsa_get_n(void *context, size_t hdrl return -EINVAL; if (fips_enabled) { - while (!*ptr && n_sz) { + while (n_sz && !*ptr) { ptr++; n_sz--; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-4.14/crypto-algif_aead-fix-reference-counting-of-null-skcipher.patch queue-4.14/crypto-salsa20-fix-blkcipher_walk-api-usage.patch queue-4.14/crypto-rsa-fix-buffer-overread-when-stripping-leading-zeroes.patch queue-4.14/crypto-hmac-require-that-the-underlying-hash-algorithm-is-unkeyed.patch queue-4.14/crypto-af_alg-fix-null-pointer-dereference-in.patch

7 years, 6 months

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