- Linux-stable-mirror - lists.linaro.org

[PATCH] nfs: Make NFS_FSCACHE select NETFS_SUPPORT instead of depending on it

by Dragan Simic

Having the NFS_FSCACHE option depend on the NETFS_SUPPORT options makes selecting NFS_FSCACHE impossible unless another option that additionally selects NETFS_SUPPORT is already selected. As a result, for example, being able to reach and select the NFS_FSCACHE option requires the CEPH_FS or CIFS option to be selected beforehand, which obviously doesn't make much sense. Let's correct this by making the NFS_FSCACHE option actually select the NETFS_SUPPORT option, instead of depending on it. Fixes: 915cd30cdea8 ("netfs, fscache: Combine fscache with netfs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Diederik de Haas <didi.debian(a)cknow.org> Signed-off-by: Dragan Simic <dsimic(a)manjaro.org> --- fs/nfs/Kconfig | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig index 0eb20012792f..d3f76101ad4b 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig @@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ config ROOT_NFS config NFS_FSCACHE bool "Provide NFS client caching support" - depends on NFS_FS=m && NETFS_SUPPORT || NFS_FS=y && NETFS_SUPPORT=y + depends on NFS_FS + select NETFS_SUPPORT select FSCACHE help Say Y here if you want NFS data to be cached locally on disc through

10 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH] KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix improper sg use with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y

by David Gstir

With vmalloc stack addresses enabled (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y) DCP trusted keys can crash during en- and decryption of the blob encryption key via the DCP crypto driver. This is caused by improperly using sg_init_one() with vmalloc'd stack buffers (plain_key_blob). Fix this by always using kmalloc() for buffers we give to the DCP crypto driver. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 0e28bf61a5f9 ("KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key") Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david(a)sigma-star.at> --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c index e908c53a803c..7b6eb655df0c 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c @@ -201,12 +201,16 @@ static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) { struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob; int blen, ret; - u8 plain_blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + u8 *plain_blob_key; blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len); if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) return -E2BIG; + plain_blob_key = kmalloc(AES_KEYSIZE_128, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!plain_blob_key) + return -ENOMEM; + b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION; get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128); get_random_bytes(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128); @@ -229,7 +233,8 @@ static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) ret = 0; out: - memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, sizeof(plain_blob_key)); + memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + kfree(plain_blob_key); return ret; } @@ -238,7 +243,7 @@ static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) { struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob; int blen, ret; - u8 plain_blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + u8 *plain_blob_key = NULL; if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) { pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n", @@ -256,6 +261,12 @@ static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out; } + plain_blob_key = kmalloc(AES_KEYSIZE_128, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!plain_blob_key) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key, plain_blob_key); if (ret) { pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret); @@ -271,7 +282,10 @@ static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) ret = 0; out: - memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, sizeof(plain_blob_key)); + if (plain_blob_key) { + memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + kfree(plain_blob_key); + } return ret; } -- 2.47.0

10 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH] ACPI: resource: Add TongFang GM5HG0A to irq1_edge_low_force_override[]

by Hans de Goede

The TongFang GM5HG0A is a TongFang barebone design which is sold under various brand names. The ACPI IRQ override for the keyboard IRQ must be used on these AMD Zen laptops in order for the IRQ to work. At least on the SKIKK Vanaheim variant the DMI product- and board-name strings have been replaced by the OEM with "Vanaheim" so checking that board-name contains "GM5HG0A" as is usually done for TongFang barebones quirks does not work. The DMI OEM strings do contain "GM5HG0A". I have looked at the dmidecode for a few other TongFang devices and the TongFang code-name string being in the OEM strings seems to be something which is consistently true. Add a quirk checking one of the DMI_OEM_STRING(s) is "GM5HG0A" in the hope that this will work for other OEM versions of the "GM5HG0A" too. Link: https://www.skikk.eu/en/laptops/vanaheim-15-rtx-4060 Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219614 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> --- drivers/acpi/resource.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/resource.c b/drivers/acpi/resource.c index 7d6537ea176f..90aaec923889 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/resource.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/resource.c @@ -653,6 +653,17 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id irq1_edge_low_force_override[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "GMxHGxx"), }, }, + { + /* + * TongFang GM5HG0A in case of the SKIKK Vanaheim relabel the + * board-name is changed, so check OEM strings instead. Note + * OEM string matches are always exact matches. + * https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219614 + */ + .matches = { + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_OEM_STRING, "GM5HG0A"), + }, + }, { } }; -- 2.47.1

10 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH] ACPI: resource: Add Asus Vivobook X1504VAP to irq1_level_low_skip_override[]

by Hans de Goede

Like the Vivobook X1704VAP the X1504VAP has its keyboard IRQ (1) described as ActiveLow in the DSDT, which the kernel overrides to EdgeHigh which breaks the keyboard. Add the X1504VAP to the irq1_level_low_skip_override[] quirk table to fix this. Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219224 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> --- drivers/acpi/resource.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/resource.c b/drivers/acpi/resource.c index 821867de43be..ab4c0e0b6b8e 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/resource.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/resource.c @@ -440,6 +440,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id irq1_level_low_skip_override[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "S5602ZA"), }, }, + { + /* Asus Vivobook X1504VAP */ + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC."), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "X1504VAP"), + }, + }, { /* Asus Vivobook X1704VAP */ .matches = { -- 2.47.1

10 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH 6.1.y] sched/task_stack: fix object_is_on_stack() for KASAN tagged pointers

by Alva Lan

From: Qun-Wei Lin <qun-wei.lin(a)mediatek.com> [ Upstream commit fd7b4f9f46d46acbc7af3a439bb0d869efdc5c58 ] When CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK are enabled, the object_is_on_stack() function may produce incorrect results due to the presence of tags in the obj pointer, while the stack pointer does not have tags. This discrepancy can lead to incorrect stack object detection and subsequently trigger warnings if CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS is also enabled. Example of the warning: ODEBUG: object 3eff800082ea7bb0 is NOT on stack ffff800082ea0000, but annotated. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at lib/debugobjects.c:557 __debug_object_init+0x330/0x364 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5 #4 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __debug_object_init+0x330/0x364 lr : __debug_object_init+0x330/0x364 sp : ffff800082ea7b40 x29: ffff800082ea7b40 x28: 98ff0000c0164518 x27: 98ff0000c0164534 x26: ffff800082d93ec8 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: 1cff0000c00172a0 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff800082d93ed0 x21: ffff800081a24418 x20: 3eff800082ea7bb0 x19: efff800000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 00000000000000ff x16: 0000000000000047 x15: 206b63617473206e x14: 0000000000000018 x13: ffff800082ea7780 x12: 0ffff800082ea78e x11: 0ffff800082ea790 x10: 0ffff800082ea79d x9 : 34d77febe173e800 x8 : 34d77febe173e800 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : feff800082ea74b8 x4 : ffff800082870a90 x3 : ffff80008018d3c4 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffff800082858810 x0 : 0000000000000050 Call trace: __debug_object_init+0x330/0x364 debug_object_init_on_stack+0x30/0x3c schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock+0xac/0x26c schedule_hrtimeout+0x1c/0x30 wait_task_inactive+0x1d4/0x25c kthread_bind_mask+0x28/0x98 init_rescuer+0x1e8/0x280 workqueue_init+0x1a0/0x3cc kernel_init_freeable+0x118/0x200 kernel_init+0x28/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ODEBUG: object 3eff800082ea7bb0 is NOT on stack ffff800082ea0000, but annotated. ------------[ cut here ]------------ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241113042544.19095-1-qun-wei.lin@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Qun-Wei Lin <qun-wei.lin(a)mediatek.com> Cc: Andrew Yang <andrew.yang(a)mediatek.com> Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno(a)collabora.com> Cc: Casper Li <casper.li(a)mediatek.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Cc: Chinwen Chang <chinwen.chang(a)mediatek.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet(a)linux.dev> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg(a)gmail.com> Cc: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin(a)soleen.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt(a)linux.dev> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9(a)foxmail.com> --- include/linux/sched/task_stack.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/sched/task_stack.h b/include/linux/sched/task_stack.h index f158b025c175..d2117e1c8fa5 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched/task_stack.h +++ b/include/linux/sched/task_stack.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/magic.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> #ifdef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK @@ -88,6 +89,7 @@ static inline int object_is_on_stack(const void *obj) { void *stack = task_stack_page(current); + obj = kasan_reset_tag(obj); return (obj >= stack) && (obj < (stack + THREAD_SIZE)); } -- 2.39.4

10 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH 5.10.y] scripts/sorttable: fix orc_sort_cmp() to maintain symmetry and transitivity

by Kuan-Wei Chiu

The orc_sort_cmp() function, used with qsort(), previously violated the symmetry and transitivity rules required by the C standard. Specifically, when both entries are ORC_REG_UNDEFINED, it could result in both a < b and b < a, which breaks the required symmetry and transitivity. This can lead to undefined behavior and incorrect sorting results, potentially causing memory corruption in glibc implementations [1]. Symmetry: If x < y, then y > x. Transitivity: If x < y and y < z, then x < z. Fix the comparison logic to return 0 when both entries are ORC_REG_UNDEFINED, ensuring compliance with qsort() requirements. Link: https://www.qualys.com/2024/01/30/qsort.txt [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241226140332.2670689-1-visitorckw@gmail.com Fixes: 57fa18994285 ("scripts/sorttable: Implement build-time ORC unwind table sorting") Fixes: fb799447ae29 ("x86,objtool: Split UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY in two") Signed-off-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw(a)gmail.com> Cc: Ching-Chun (Jim) Huang <jserv(a)ccns.ncku.edu.tw> Cc: <chuang(a)cs.nycu.edu.tw> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Shile Zhang <shile.zhang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 0210d251162f4033350a94a43f95b1c39ec84a90) Signed-off-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw(a)gmail.com> --- scripts/sorttable.h | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/sorttable.h b/scripts/sorttable.h index a2baa2fefb13..fb385d0f3cc2 100644 --- a/scripts/sorttable.h +++ b/scripts/sorttable.h @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline unsigned long orc_ip(const int *ip) static int orc_sort_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) { - struct orc_entry *orc_a; + struct orc_entry *orc_a, *orc_b; const int *a = g_orc_ip_table + *(int *)_a; const int *b = g_orc_ip_table + *(int *)_b; unsigned long a_val = orc_ip(a); @@ -120,8 +120,12 @@ static int orc_sort_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) * These terminator entries exist to handle any gaps created by * whitelisted .o files which didn't get objtool generation. */ - orc_a = g_orc_table + (a - g_orc_ip_table); - return orc_a->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED && !orc_a->end ? -1 : 1; + orc_a = g_orc_table + (a - g_orc_ip_table); + orc_b = g_orc_table + (b - g_orc_ip_table); + if (orc_a->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED && !orc_a->end && + orc_b->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED && !orc_b->end) + return 0; + return orc_a->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED && !orc_a->end ? -1 : 1; } static void *sort_orctable(void *arg) -- 2.34.1

10 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH 6.1.y] scripts/sorttable: fix orc_sort_cmp() to maintain symmetry and transitivity

by Kuan-Wei Chiu

The orc_sort_cmp() function, used with qsort(), previously violated the symmetry and transitivity rules required by the C standard. Specifically, when both entries are ORC_REG_UNDEFINED, it could result in both a < b and b < a, which breaks the required symmetry and transitivity. This can lead to undefined behavior and incorrect sorting results, potentially causing memory corruption in glibc implementations [1]. Symmetry: If x < y, then y > x. Transitivity: If x < y and y < z, then x < z. Fix the comparison logic to return 0 when both entries are ORC_REG_UNDEFINED, ensuring compliance with qsort() requirements. Link: https://www.qualys.com/2024/01/30/qsort.txt [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241226140332.2670689-1-visitorckw@gmail.com Fixes: 57fa18994285 ("scripts/sorttable: Implement build-time ORC unwind table sorting") Fixes: fb799447ae29 ("x86,objtool: Split UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY in two") Signed-off-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw(a)gmail.com> Cc: Ching-Chun (Jim) Huang <jserv(a)ccns.ncku.edu.tw> Cc: <chuang(a)cs.nycu.edu.tw> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Shile Zhang <shile.zhang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 0210d251162f4033350a94a43f95b1c39ec84a90) Signed-off-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw(a)gmail.com> --- scripts/sorttable.h | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/sorttable.h b/scripts/sorttable.h index deb7c1d3e979..f0ba2bf5a886 100644 --- a/scripts/sorttable.h +++ b/scripts/sorttable.h @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static inline unsigned long orc_ip(const int *ip) static int orc_sort_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) { - struct orc_entry *orc_a; + struct orc_entry *orc_a, *orc_b; const int *a = g_orc_ip_table + *(int *)_a; const int *b = g_orc_ip_table + *(int *)_b; unsigned long a_val = orc_ip(a); @@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ static int orc_sort_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) * whitelisted .o files which didn't get objtool generation. */ orc_a = g_orc_table + (a - g_orc_ip_table); + orc_b = g_orc_table + (b - g_orc_ip_table); + if (orc_a->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED && !orc_a->end && + orc_b->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED && !orc_b->end) + return 0; return orc_a->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED && !orc_a->end ? -1 : 1; } -- 2.34.1

10 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH stable 6.6 1/1] Revert "bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking"

by Shung-Hsi Yu

Levi reported that commit ecc2aeeaa08a ("bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking") cause eBPF program that previously loads successfully in stable 6.6 now fails to load, when the same program also loads successfully in v6.13-rc5. Revert ecc2aeeaa08a until the problem has been probably figured out and resolved. Fixes: ecc2aeeaa08a ("bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking") Reported-by: Levi Zim <rsworktech(a)outlook.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/MEYP282MB2312C3C8801476C4F262D6E1C6162@MEYP2… Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu(a)suse.com> --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 31 +--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 175 ++++++++---------- .../bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c | 23 +-- .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c | 38 ++-- 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index cb8e97665eaa..92919d52f7e1 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -319,34 +319,12 @@ struct bpf_func_state { struct bpf_stack_state *stack; }; -#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8 - -/* instruction history flags, used in bpf_jmp_history_entry.flags field */ -enum { - /* instruction references stack slot through PTR_TO_STACK register; - * we also store stack's frame number in lower 3 bits (MAX_CALL_FRAMES is 8) - * and accessed stack slot's index in next 6 bits (MAX_BPF_STACK is 512, - * 8 bytes per slot, so slot index (spi) is [0, 63]) - */ - INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK = 0x7, /* 3 bits */ - - INSN_F_SPI_MASK = 0x3f, /* 6 bits */ - INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT = 3, /* shifted 3 bits to the left */ - - INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS = BIT(9), /* we need 10 bits total */ -}; - -static_assert(INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES); -static_assert(INSN_F_SPI_MASK + 1 >= MAX_BPF_STACK / 8); - -struct bpf_jmp_history_entry { +struct bpf_idx_pair { + u32 prev_idx; u32 idx; - /* insn idx can't be bigger than 1 million */ - u32 prev_idx : 22; - /* special flags, e.g., whether insn is doing register stack spill/load */ - u32 flags : 10; }; +#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8 /* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */ #define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) * MAX_CALL_FRAMES) struct bpf_verifier_state { @@ -429,7 +407,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state { * For most states jmp_history_cnt is [0-3]. * For loops can go up to ~40. */ - struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *jmp_history; + struct bpf_idx_pair *jmp_history; u32 jmp_history_cnt; u32 dfs_depth; u32 callback_unroll_depth; @@ -662,7 +640,6 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env { int cur_stack; } cfg; struct backtrack_state bt; - struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *cur_hist_ent; u32 pass_cnt; /* number of times do_check() was called */ u32 subprog_cnt; /* number of instructions analyzed by the verifier */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index a3c3c66ca047..d6a4102312fa 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1762,8 +1762,8 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, int i, err; dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, - src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(*dst_state->jmp_history), - GFP_USER); + src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair), + GFP_USER); if (!dst_state->jmp_history) return -ENOMEM; dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; @@ -3397,21 +3397,6 @@ static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, return __check_reg_arg(env, state->regs, regno, t); } -static int insn_stack_access_flags(int frameno, int spi) -{ - return INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS | (spi << INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT) | frameno; -} - -static int insn_stack_access_spi(int insn_flags) -{ - return (insn_flags >> INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT) & INSN_F_SPI_MASK; -} - -static int insn_stack_access_frameno(int insn_flags) -{ - return insn_flags & INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK; -} - static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) { env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true; @@ -3423,51 +3408,28 @@ static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) } /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ -static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, - int insn_flags) +static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) { u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; - struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *p; + struct bpf_idx_pair *p; size_t alloc_size; - /* combine instruction flags if we already recorded this instruction */ - if (env->cur_hist_ent) { - /* atomic instructions push insn_flags twice, for READ and - * WRITE sides, but they should agree on stack slot - */ - WARN_ONCE((env->cur_hist_ent->flags & insn_flags) && - (env->cur_hist_ent->flags & insn_flags) != insn_flags, - "verifier insn history bug: insn_idx %d cur flags %x new flags %x\n", - env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->flags, insn_flags); - env->cur_hist_ent->flags |= insn_flags; + if (!is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) return 0; - } cnt++; alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p))); p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_USER); if (!p) return -ENOMEM; + p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; + p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; cur->jmp_history = p; - - p = &cur->jmp_history[cnt - 1]; - p->idx = env->insn_idx; - p->prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; - p->flags = insn_flags; cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; - env->cur_hist_ent = p; - return 0; } -static struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *get_jmp_hist_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, - u32 hist_end, int insn_idx) -{ - if (hist_end > 0 && st->jmp_history[hist_end - 1].idx == insn_idx) - return &st->jmp_history[hist_end - 1]; - return NULL; -} - /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. * Return -ENOENT if we exhausted all instructions within given state. @@ -3629,14 +3591,9 @@ static inline bool bt_is_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame] & (1 << reg); } -static inline bool bt_is_frame_slot_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) -{ - return bt->stack_masks[frame] & (1ull << slot); -} - static inline bool bt_is_slot_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot) { - return bt_is_frame_slot_set(bt, bt->frame, slot); + return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame] & (1ull << slot); } /* format registers bitmask, e.g., "r0,r2,r4" for 0x15 mask */ @@ -3690,7 +3647,7 @@ static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); * - *was* processed previously during backtracking. */ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, - struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist, struct backtrack_state *bt) + struct backtrack_state *bt) { const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, @@ -3703,7 +3660,7 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); u32 dreg = insn->dst_reg; u32 sreg = insn->src_reg; - u32 spi, i, fr; + u32 spi, i; if (insn->code == 0) return 0; @@ -3766,15 +3723,20 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. * No further tracking necessary. */ - if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS)) + if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) return 0; + /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be * tracked with precision */ - spi = insn_stack_access_spi(hist->flags); - fr = insn_stack_access_frameno(hist->flags); - bt_set_frame_slot(bt, fr, spi); + spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; + if (spi >= 64) { + verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); + WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); + return -EFAULT; + } + bt_set_slot(bt, spi); } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg @@ -3783,13 +3745,17 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, */ return -ENOTSUPP; /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ - if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS)) + if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) return 0; - spi = insn_stack_access_spi(hist->flags); - fr = insn_stack_access_frameno(hist->flags); - if (!bt_is_frame_slot_set(bt, fr, spi)) + spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; + if (spi >= 64) { + verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); + WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); + return -EFAULT; + } + if (!bt_is_slot_set(bt, spi)) return 0; - bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, spi); + bt_clear_slot(bt, spi); if (class == BPF_STX) bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { @@ -3833,14 +3799,10 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); return -EFAULT; } - /* we are now tracking register spills correctly, - * so any instance of leftover slots is a bug - */ - if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) { - verbose(env, "BUG stack slots %llx\n", bt_stack_mask(bt)); - WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug (subprog leftover stack slots)"); - return -EFAULT; - } + /* we don't track register spills perfectly, + * so fallback to force-precise instead of failing */ + if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) + return -ENOTSUPP; /* propagate r1-r5 to the caller */ for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, i)) { @@ -3865,11 +3827,8 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); return -EFAULT; } - if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) { - verbose(env, "BUG stack slots %llx\n", bt_stack_mask(bt)); - WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug (callback leftover stack slots)"); - return -EFAULT; - } + if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) + return -ENOTSUPP; /* clear r1-r5 in callback subprog's mask */ for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) bt_clear_reg(bt, i); @@ -4306,7 +4265,6 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) for (;;) { DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; - struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist; if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: last_idx %d first_idx %d subseq_idx %d \n", @@ -4370,8 +4328,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) err = 0; skip_first = false; } else { - hist = get_jmp_hist_entry(st, history, i); - err = backtrack_insn(env, i, subseq_idx, hist, bt); + err = backtrack_insn(env, i, subseq_idx, bt); } if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); @@ -4424,10 +4381,22 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { - verbose(env, "BUG backtracking (stack slot %d, total slots %d)\n", - i, func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE); - WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug (stack slot out of bounds)"); - return -EFAULT; + /* the sequence of instructions: + * 2: (bf) r3 = r10 + * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0 + * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) + * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked + * as a single block. + * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as + * stack access, so at the end of backtracking + * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask. + * However the parent state may not have accessed + * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. + * In such case fallback to conservative. + */ + mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); + bt_reset(bt); + return 0; } if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) { @@ -4592,7 +4561,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; - int insn_flags = insn_stack_access_flags(state->frameno, spi); + u32 dst_reg = insn->dst_reg; /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits @@ -4631,6 +4600,17 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) && !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { + if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { + /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit + * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of + * scalar via different register has to be conservative. + * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise + * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. + */ + err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); + if (err) + return err; + } save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); /* Break the relation on a narrowing spill. */ if (fls64(reg->umax_value) > BITS_PER_BYTE * size) @@ -4642,7 +4622,6 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, insn->imm); fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; save_register_state(state, spi, &fake_reg, size); - insn_flags = 0; /* not a register spill */ } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { @@ -4688,12 +4667,9 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) - state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = type; - insn_flags = 0; /* not a register spill */ + state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = + type; } - - if (insn_flags) - return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags); return 0; } @@ -4882,7 +4858,6 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; struct bpf_reg_state *reg; u8 *stype, type; - int insn_flags = insn_stack_access_flags(reg_state->frameno, spi); stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; reg = &reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; @@ -4928,10 +4903,12 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return -EACCES; } mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); - insn_flags = 0; /* not restoring original register state */ } state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; - } else if (dst_regno >= 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (dst_regno >= 0) { /* restore register state from stack */ copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely @@ -4967,10 +4944,7 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); if (dst_regno >= 0) mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); - insn_flags = 0; /* we are not restoring spilled register */ } - if (insn_flags) - return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags); return 0; } @@ -7054,6 +7028,7 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_i BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true, false); if (err) return err; + return 0; } @@ -16802,8 +16777,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) * the precision needs to be propagated back in * the current state. */ - if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) - err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur, 0); + err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); if (err) return err; @@ -17027,9 +17001,6 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) u8 class; int err; - /* reset current history entry on each new instruction */ - env->cur_hist_ent = NULL; - env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", @@ -17069,7 +17040,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { - err = push_jmp_history(env, state, 0); + err = push_jmp_history(env, state); if (err) return err; } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c index f87365f7599b..f61d623b1ce8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c @@ -541,24 +541,11 @@ static __u64 subprog_spill_reg_precise(void) SEC("?raw_tp") __success __log_level(2) -__msg("10: (0f) r1 += r7") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 10 first_idx 7 subseq_idx -1") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r7 stack= before 9: (bf) r1 = r8") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r7 stack= before 8: (27) r7 *= 4") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r7 stack= before 7: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-8: R0_w=2 R6_w=1 R8_rw=map_value(map=.data.vals,ks=4,vs=16) R10=fp0 fp-8_rw=P1") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 18 first_idx 0 subseq_idx 7") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 18: (95) exit") -__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 17: (0f) r0 += r2") -__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 16: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)") -__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 15: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)") -__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 14: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2") -__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 13: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = r2") -__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2 stack= before 6: (85) call pc+6") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 5: (bf) r2 = r6") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 4: (07) r1 += -8") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 3: (bf) r1 = r10") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 2: (b7) r6 = 1") +/* precision backtracking can't currently handle stack access not through r10, + * so we won't be able to mark stack slot fp-8 as precise, and so will + * fallback to forcing all as precise + */ +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: falling back to forcing all scalars precise") __naked int subprog_spill_into_parent_stack_slot_precise(void) { asm volatile ( diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c index 8a2ff81d8350..0d84dd1f38b6 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/precise.c @@ -140,11 +140,10 @@ .result = REJECT, }, { - "precise: ST zero to stack insn is supported", + "precise: ST insn causing spi > allocated_stack", .insns = { BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_10), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_3, 123, 0), - /* not a register spill, so we stop precision propagation for R4 here */ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, -8, 0), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10, -8), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -1), @@ -158,11 +157,11 @@ mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 4 first_idx 2\ mark_precise: frame0: regs=r4 stack= before 4\ mark_precise: frame0: regs=r4 stack= before 3\ + mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 2\ + mark_precise: frame0: falling back to forcing all scalars precise\ + force_precise: frame0: forcing r0 to be precise\ mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 5\ - mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r0 stack=:\ - mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 4 first_idx 2\ - mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 4\ - 5: R0=-1 R4=0", + mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=:", .result = VERBOSE_ACCEPT, .retval = -1, }, @@ -170,8 +169,6 @@ "precise: STX insn causing spi > allocated_stack", .insns = { BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32), - /* make later reg spill more interesting by having somewhat known scalar */ - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_0, 0xff), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_10), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_3, 123, 0), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, -8), @@ -182,21 +179,18 @@ }, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, .flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ, - .errstr = "mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 7 first_idx 7\ + .errstr = "mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 6 first_idx 6\ mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r4 stack=:\ - mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 6 first_idx 4\ - mark_precise: frame0: regs=r4 stack= before 6: (b7) r0 = -1\ - mark_precise: frame0: regs=r4 stack= before 5: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)\ - mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 4: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0\ - mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r0 stack=:\ - mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 3 first_idx 3\ - mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 3: (55) if r3 != 0x7b goto pc+0\ - mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 2: (bf) r3 = r10\ - mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (57) r0 &= 255\ - mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r0 stack=:\ - mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 0 first_idx 0\ - mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 0: (85) call bpf_get_prandom_u32#7\ - mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 7 first_idx 7\ + mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 3\ + mark_precise: frame0: regs=r4 stack= before 5\ + mark_precise: frame0: regs=r4 stack= before 4\ + mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 3\ + mark_precise: frame0: falling back to forcing all scalars precise\ + force_precise: frame0: forcing r0 to be precise\ + force_precise: frame0: forcing r0 to be precise\ + force_precise: frame0: forcing r0 to be precise\ + force_precise: frame0: forcing r0 to be precise\ + mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 6 first_idx 6\ mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=:", .result = VERBOSE_ACCEPT, .retval = -1, -- 2.47.1

10 months, 2 weeks

2
1
0 0

[PATCH 5.15.y] scripts/sorttable: fix orc_sort_cmp() to maintain symmetry and transitivity

by Kuan-Wei Chiu

The orc_sort_cmp() function, used with qsort(), previously violated the symmetry and transitivity rules required by the C standard. Specifically, when both entries are ORC_REG_UNDEFINED, it could result in both a < b and b < a, which breaks the required symmetry and transitivity. This can lead to undefined behavior and incorrect sorting results, potentially causing memory corruption in glibc implementations [1]. Symmetry: If x < y, then y > x. Transitivity: If x < y and y < z, then x < z. Fix the comparison logic to return 0 when both entries are ORC_REG_UNDEFINED, ensuring compliance with qsort() requirements. Link: https://www.qualys.com/2024/01/30/qsort.txt [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241226140332.2670689-1-visitorckw@gmail.com Fixes: 57fa18994285 ("scripts/sorttable: Implement build-time ORC unwind table sorting") Fixes: fb799447ae29 ("x86,objtool: Split UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY in two") Signed-off-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw(a)gmail.com> Cc: Ching-Chun (Jim) Huang <jserv(a)ccns.ncku.edu.tw> Cc: <chuang(a)cs.nycu.edu.tw> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Shile Zhang <shile.zhang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 0210d251162f4033350a94a43f95b1c39ec84a90) Signed-off-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw(a)gmail.com> --- scripts/sorttable.h | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/sorttable.h b/scripts/sorttable.h index a2baa2fefb13..9013b6984d68 100644 --- a/scripts/sorttable.h +++ b/scripts/sorttable.h @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline unsigned long orc_ip(const int *ip) static int orc_sort_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) { - struct orc_entry *orc_a; + struct orc_entry *orc_a, *orc_b; const int *a = g_orc_ip_table + *(int *)_a; const int *b = g_orc_ip_table + *(int *)_b; unsigned long a_val = orc_ip(a); @@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ static int orc_sort_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) * whitelisted .o files which didn't get objtool generation. */ orc_a = g_orc_table + (a - g_orc_ip_table); + orc_b = g_orc_table + (b - g_orc_ip_table); + if (orc_a->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED && !orc_a->end && + orc_b->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED && !orc_b->end) + return 0; return orc_a->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED && !orc_a->end ? -1 : 1; } -- 2.34.1

10 months, 2 weeks

2
1
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[PATCH] misc: microchip: pci1xxxx: Fix possible double free in error handling path

by Ma Ke

When auxiliary_device_add() returns error and then calls auxiliary_device_uninit(), the callback function gp_auxiliary_device_release() calls kfree() to free memory. Do not call kfree() again in the error handling path. Fix this by skipping the redundant kfree(). Found by code review. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 393fc2f5948f ("misc: microchip: pci1xxxx: load auxiliary bus driver for the PIO function in the multi-function endpoint of pci1xxxx device.") Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- drivers/misc/mchp_pci1xxxx/mchp_pci1xxxx_gp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/misc/mchp_pci1xxxx/mchp_pci1xxxx_gp.c b/drivers/misc/mchp_pci1xxxx/mchp_pci1xxxx_gp.c index 32af2b14ff34..fbd712938bdc 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/mchp_pci1xxxx/mchp_pci1xxxx_gp.c +++ b/drivers/misc/mchp_pci1xxxx/mchp_pci1xxxx_gp.c @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ static int gp_aux_bus_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id err_aux_dev_add_1: auxiliary_device_uninit(&aux_bus->aux_device_wrapper[1]->aux_dev); + goto err_aux_dev_add_0; err_aux_dev_init_1: ida_free(&gp_client_ida, aux_bus->aux_device_wrapper[1]->aux_dev.id); @@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ static int gp_aux_bus_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id err_aux_dev_add_0: auxiliary_device_uninit(&aux_bus->aux_device_wrapper[0]->aux_dev); + goto err_ret; err_aux_dev_init_0: ida_free(&gp_client_ida, aux_bus->aux_device_wrapper[0]->aux_dev.id); -- 2.25.1

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