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[PATCH] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section

by Roberto Sassu

From: GUO Zihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> (cherry picked from commit 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34) Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> --- Backporting notes: - Remove security_audit_rule_init() documentation changes - Add default return value parameter to call_int_hook() in security_audit_rule_init() - Can be backported to 6.1.x, 5.15.x, 5.10.x include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++-- security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +++--- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------ security/security.c | 6 ++++-- security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +++- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 +++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++- 11 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 6239a378c0ea..0b4f7289951a 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_getsecurity, struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 2772f6375f14..c33c95f409eb 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1921,7 +1921,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); @@ -1929,7 +1930,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); #else static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 42d99896e7a6..6c9a4d322309 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f_val; f->lsm_str = str; err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + (void **)&f->lsm_rule, + GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { @@ -798,7 +799,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 704b0c895605..963df28584ee 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) { struct aa_audit_rule *rule; @@ -186,14 +186,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp); if (!rule) return -ENOMEM; /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, - GFP_KERNEL, true, false); + gfp, true, false); if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); aa_audit_rule_free(rule); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index 18519a4eb67e..f325f1bef8d6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error) } void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule); -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule); +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp); int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule); int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index be965a8715e4..c80bc15b4486 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) #else static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index bdc40535ff48..1f930711db76 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -377,7 +377,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) kfree(entry); } -static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, + gfp_t gfp) { struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; int i; @@ -386,7 +387,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only * lsm rules can change */ - nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL); + nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp); if (!nentry) return NULL; @@ -401,7 +402,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + &nentry->lsm[i].rule, + gfp); if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", nentry->lsm[i].args_p); @@ -414,7 +416,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) int i; struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; - nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); + nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL); if (!nentry) return -ENOMEM; @@ -638,7 +640,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, } if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { - lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC); if (lsm_rule) { rule_reinitialized = true; goto retry; @@ -1113,7 +1115,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 1b504c296551..fb1692254851 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2617,9 +2617,11 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp) { - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, + gfp); } int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h index 406bceb90c6c..ef54f61a3066 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ * @op: the operator the rule uses * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule, + gfp_t gfp); /** * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 64a6a37dc36d..2b8ebd390e37 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -3563,7 +3563,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; struct selinux_policy *policy; @@ -3604,7 +3605,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp); if (!tmprule) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index feba69549d08..b0a483e40c82 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4552,11 +4552,13 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...) * @rulestr: smack label to be audited * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation * * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. * The label to be audited is created if necessay. */ -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct smack_known *skp; char **rule = (char **)vrule; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section

by Mimi Zohar

From: GUO Zihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> (cherry picked from commit 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> --- Backport notes: - Restore default return value parameter to call_int_hook() in security_audit_rule_init() in lieu of backporting commit 260017f31a8c ("lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()"). - Applies to linux-6.8.y -> linux-6.4.y include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++-- security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +++--- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------ security/security.c | 6 ++++-- security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +++- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 +++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++- 11 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index f9b5baf1b5f4..4903a724e344 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_getsecurity, struct key *key, char **buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 3180d823e023..3f23438a0a4d 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1988,7 +1988,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); @@ -1996,7 +1997,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); #else static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 8317a37dea0b..685bccb20b6f 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f_val; f->lsm_str = str; err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + (void **)&f->lsm_rule, + GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { @@ -799,7 +800,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 45beb1c5f747..6b5181c668b5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) { struct aa_audit_rule *rule; @@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp); if (!rule) return -ENOMEM; /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, - GFP_KERNEL, true, false); + gfp, true, false); if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); aa_audit_rule_free(rule); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index acbb03b9bd25..0c8cc86b417b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error) } void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule); -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule); +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp); int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule); int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c29db699c996..07a4586e129c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) #else static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index f69062617754..f3f46c6186c0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) kfree(entry); } -static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, + gfp_t gfp) { struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; int i; @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only * lsm rules can change */ - nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL); + nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp); if (!nentry) return NULL; @@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + &nentry->lsm[i].rule, + gfp); if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", nentry->lsm[i].args_p); @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) int i; struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; - nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); + nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL); if (!nentry) return -ENOMEM; @@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, } if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { - lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC); if (lsm_rule) { rule_reinitialized = true; goto retry; @@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index a344b8fa5530..e0ef2ac7600f 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -5350,15 +5350,17 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer) * @op: rule operator * @rulestr: rule context * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. * * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of * an invalid rule. */ -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp) { - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp); } /** diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h index 52aca71210b4..29c7d4c86f6d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ * @op: the operator the rule uses * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule, + gfp_t gfp); /** * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index e88b1b6c4adb..ded250e525e9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -3508,7 +3508,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; struct selinux_policy *policy; @@ -3549,7 +3550,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp); if (!tmprule) return -ENOMEM; context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 6f9a80783a5a..8cc3a6764379 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4690,11 +4690,13 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...) * @rulestr: smack label to be audited * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation * * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. * The label to be audited is created if necessay. */ -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct smack_known *skp; char **rule = (char **)vrule; -- 2.43.0

12 months

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[PATCH backport 5.10.y] bpf, sockmap: Fix sk->sk_forward_alloc warn_on in sk_stream_kill_queues

by Wen Gu

From: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> [ Upstream commit d8616ee2affcff37c5d315310da557a694a3303d ] During TCP sockmap redirect pressure test, the following warning is triggered: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2145 at net/core/stream.c:205 sk_stream_kill_queues+0xbc/0xd0 CPU: 3 PID: 2145 Comm: iperf Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.10.0+ #9 Call Trace: inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x55/0x110 inet_csk_listen_stop+0xbb/0x380 tcp_close+0x41b/0x480 inet_release+0x42/0x80 __sock_release+0x3d/0xa0 sock_close+0x11/0x20 __fput+0x9d/0x240 task_work_run+0x62/0x90 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x110/0x120 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The reason we observed is that: When the listener is closing, a connection may have completed the three-way handshake but not accepted, and the client has sent some packets. The child sks in accept queue release by inet_child_forget()->inet_csk_destroy_sock(), but psocks of child sks have not released. To fix, add sock_map_destroy to release psocks. Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub(a)cloudflare.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220524075311.649153-1-wangyufen@huawei.com Stable-dep-of: 8bbabb3fddcd ("bpf, sock_map: Move cancel_work_sync() out of sock lock") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> [Conflict in include/linux/bpf.h due to function declaration position and remove non-existed sk_psock_stop helper from sock_map_destroy.] Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen(a)linux.alibaba.com> --- background: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/d11bc7e6-a2c7-445a-8561-3599eafb07b0@linux.a… @stable team: This backport has 2 changes compared to the original patch: - fix conflict due to sock_map_destroy declaration position in include/linux/bpf.h; - remove the non-existed sk_psock_stop helper from sock_map_destroy. This helper is introduced by 799aa7f98d53 ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") after v5.10, it is not a fix and hard to backport. Considering that what did in sk_psock_stop is done in sk_psock_drop and neither sock_map_close nor sock_map_unhash in v5.10 introduces sk_psock_stop, I removed it from sock_map_destroy too. I tested it in my environment, the regression was gone. Cc: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> @Yufen, if I missed anything, please point it out, thanks! --- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + include/linux/skmsg.h | 1 + net/core/skmsg.c | 1 + net/core/sock_map.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index a75faf437e75..340f4fef5b5a 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -1800,6 +1800,7 @@ int sock_map_get_from_fd(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog); int sock_map_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr, enum bpf_prog_type ptype); int sock_map_update_elem_sys(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, u64 flags); void sock_map_unhash(struct sock *sk); +void sock_map_destroy(struct sock *sk); void sock_map_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout); #else static inline int sock_map_prog_update(struct bpf_map *map, diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h index 1138dd3071db..e2af013ec05f 100644 --- a/include/linux/skmsg.h +++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct sk_psock { spinlock_t link_lock; refcount_t refcnt; void (*saved_unhash)(struct sock *sk); + void (*saved_destroy)(struct sock *sk); void (*saved_close)(struct sock *sk, long timeout); void (*saved_write_space)(struct sock *sk); struct proto *sk_proto; diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c index bb4fbc60b272..51792dda1b73 100644 --- a/net/core/skmsg.c +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c @@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ struct sk_psock *sk_psock_init(struct sock *sk, int node) psock->eval = __SK_NONE; psock->sk_proto = prot; psock->saved_unhash = prot->unhash; + psock->saved_destroy = prot->destroy; psock->saved_close = prot->close; psock->saved_write_space = sk->sk_write_space; diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c index 52e395a189df..d1d0ee2dbfaa 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_map.c +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c @@ -1566,6 +1566,28 @@ void sock_map_unhash(struct sock *sk) saved_unhash(sk); } +void sock_map_destroy(struct sock *sk) +{ + void (*saved_destroy)(struct sock *sk); + struct sk_psock *psock; + + rcu_read_lock(); + psock = sk_psock_get(sk); + if (unlikely(!psock)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (sk->sk_prot->destroy) + sk->sk_prot->destroy(sk); + return; + } + + saved_destroy = psock->saved_destroy; + sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + sk_psock_put(sk, psock); + saved_destroy(sk); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sock_map_destroy); + void sock_map_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) { void (*saved_close)(struct sock *sk, long timeout); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c index d0ca1fc325cd..f909e440bb22 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c @@ -582,6 +582,7 @@ static void tcp_bpf_rebuild_protos(struct proto prot[TCP_BPF_NUM_CFGS], struct proto *base) { prot[TCP_BPF_BASE] = *base; + prot[TCP_BPF_BASE].destroy = sock_map_destroy; prot[TCP_BPF_BASE].close = sock_map_close; prot[TCP_BPF_BASE].recvmsg = tcp_bpf_recvmsg; prot[TCP_BPF_BASE].stream_memory_read = tcp_bpf_stream_read; -- 2.32.0.3.g01195cf9f

12 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] riscv: dts: starfive: Set EMMC vqmmc maximum voltage to 3.3V" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3c1f81a1b554f49e99b34ca45324b35948c885db # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024070822-unfixed-paced-a31d@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 3c1f81a1b554 ("riscv: dts: starfive: Set EMMC vqmmc maximum voltage to 3.3V on JH7110 boards") ac9a37e2d6b6 ("riscv: dts: starfive: introduce a common board dtsi for jh7110 based boards") 07da6ddf510b ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: add "disable-wp" for tfcard") 0ffce9d49abd ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: add tf cd-gpios") ffddddf4aa8d ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: use cpus label for timebase freq") b9a1481f259c ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: update sound and codec dt node name") e0503d47e93d ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: Remove non-existing I2S hardware") dcde4e97b122 ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: Remove non-existing TDM hardware") 0f74c64f0a9f ("riscv: dts: starfive: Remove PMIC interrupt info for Visionfive 2 board") 28ecaaa5af19 ("riscv: dts: starfive: jh7110: Add camera subsystem nodes") 8d01f741a046 ("riscv: dts: starfive: jh7110: Add PWM node and pins configuration") 79384a047535 ("Merge tag 'riscv-dt-for-v6.7' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/conor/linux into soc/dt") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3c1f81a1b554f49e99b34ca45324b35948c885db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shengyu Qu <wiagn233(a)outlook.com> Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 18:33:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] riscv: dts: starfive: Set EMMC vqmmc maximum voltage to 3.3V on JH7110 boards Currently, for JH7110 boards with EMMC slot, vqmmc voltage for EMMC is fixed to 1.8V, while the spec needs it to be 3.3V on low speed mode and should support switching to 1.8V when using higher speed mode. Since there are no other peripherals using the same voltage source of EMMC's vqmmc(ALDO4) on every board currently supported by mainline kernel, regulator-max-microvolt of ALDO4 should be set to 3.3V. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shengyu Qu <wiagn233(a)outlook.com> Fixes: 7dafcfa79cc9 ("riscv: dts: starfive: enable DCDC1&ALDO4 node in axp15060") Signed-off-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley(a)microchip.com> diff --git a/arch/riscv/boot/dts/starfive/jh7110-common.dtsi b/arch/riscv/boot/dts/starfive/jh7110-common.dtsi index 8ff6ea64f048..68d16717db8c 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/boot/dts/starfive/jh7110-common.dtsi +++ b/arch/riscv/boot/dts/starfive/jh7110-common.dtsi @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ emmc_vdd: aldo4 { regulator-boot-on; regulator-always-on; regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>; - regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>; + regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>; regulator-name = "emmc_vdd"; }; };

12 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] riscv: dts: starfive: Set EMMC vqmmc maximum voltage to 3.3V" failed to apply to 6.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.9.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3c1f81a1b554f49e99b34ca45324b35948c885db # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024070821-ascent-stiffen-9101@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.9.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 3c1f81a1b554 ("riscv: dts: starfive: Set EMMC vqmmc maximum voltage to 3.3V on JH7110 boards") ac9a37e2d6b6 ("riscv: dts: starfive: introduce a common board dtsi for jh7110 based boards") 07da6ddf510b ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: add "disable-wp" for tfcard") 0ffce9d49abd ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: add tf cd-gpios") ffddddf4aa8d ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: use cpus label for timebase freq") b9a1481f259c ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: update sound and codec dt node name") e0503d47e93d ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: Remove non-existing I2S hardware") dcde4e97b122 ("riscv: dts: starfive: visionfive 2: Remove non-existing TDM hardware") 0f74c64f0a9f ("riscv: dts: starfive: Remove PMIC interrupt info for Visionfive 2 board") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3c1f81a1b554f49e99b34ca45324b35948c885db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shengyu Qu <wiagn233(a)outlook.com> Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 18:33:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] riscv: dts: starfive: Set EMMC vqmmc maximum voltage to 3.3V on JH7110 boards Currently, for JH7110 boards with EMMC slot, vqmmc voltage for EMMC is fixed to 1.8V, while the spec needs it to be 3.3V on low speed mode and should support switching to 1.8V when using higher speed mode. Since there are no other peripherals using the same voltage source of EMMC's vqmmc(ALDO4) on every board currently supported by mainline kernel, regulator-max-microvolt of ALDO4 should be set to 3.3V. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shengyu Qu <wiagn233(a)outlook.com> Fixes: 7dafcfa79cc9 ("riscv: dts: starfive: enable DCDC1&ALDO4 node in axp15060") Signed-off-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley(a)microchip.com> diff --git a/arch/riscv/boot/dts/starfive/jh7110-common.dtsi b/arch/riscv/boot/dts/starfive/jh7110-common.dtsi index 8ff6ea64f048..68d16717db8c 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/boot/dts/starfive/jh7110-common.dtsi +++ b/arch/riscv/boot/dts/starfive/jh7110-common.dtsi @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ emmc_vdd: aldo4 { regulator-boot-on; regulator-always-on; regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>; - regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>; + regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>; regulator-name = "emmc_vdd"; }; };

12 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mtd: rawnand: Ensure ECC configuration is propagated to upper" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3a1b777eb9fb75d09c45ae5dd1d007eddcbebf1f # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024070824-sprint-steadying-855b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 3a1b777eb9fb ("mtd: rawnand: Ensure ECC configuration is propagated to upper layers") 80fe603160a4 ("mtd: nand: ecc-bch: Stop using raw NAND structures") ea146d7fbf50 ("mtd: nand: ecc-bch: Update the prototypes to be more generic") 127aae607756 ("mtd: nand: ecc-bch: Drop mtd_nand_has_bch()") 3c0fe36abebe ("mtd: nand: ecc-bch: Stop exporting the private structure") 8c5c20921856 ("mtd: nand: ecc-bch: Cleanup and style fixes") cdbe8df5e28e ("mtd: nand: ecc-bch: Move BCH code to the generic NAND layer") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3a1b777eb9fb75d09c45ae5dd1d007eddcbebf1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal(a)bootlin.com> Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 10:58:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mtd: rawnand: Ensure ECC configuration is propagated to upper layers Until recently the "upper layer" was MTD. But following incremental reworks to bring spi-nand support and more recently generic ECC support, there is now an intermediate "generic NAND" layer that also needs to get access to some values. When using "converted" ECC engines, like the software ones, these values are already propagated correctly. But otherwise when using good old raw NAND controller drivers, we need to manually set these values ourselves at the end of the "scan" operation, once these values have been negotiated. Without this propagation, later (generic) checks like the one warning users that the ECC strength is not high enough might simply no longer work. Fixes: 8c126720fe10 ("mtd: rawnand: Use the ECC framework nand_ecc_is_strong_enough() helper") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer(a)pengutronix.de> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zhe2JtvvN1M4Ompw@pengutronix.de/ Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal(a)bootlin.com> Tested-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer(a)pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20240507085842.108844-1-miquel.raynal@boo… diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nand_base.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nand_base.c index d7dbbd469b89..acd137dd0957 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nand_base.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nand_base.c @@ -6301,6 +6301,7 @@ static const struct nand_ops rawnand_ops = { static int nand_scan_tail(struct nand_chip *chip) { struct mtd_info *mtd = nand_to_mtd(chip); + struct nand_device *base = &chip->base; struct nand_ecc_ctrl *ecc = &chip->ecc; int ret, i; @@ -6445,9 +6446,13 @@ static int nand_scan_tail(struct nand_chip *chip) if (!ecc->write_oob_raw) ecc->write_oob_raw = ecc->write_oob; - /* propagate ecc info to mtd_info */ + /* Propagate ECC info to the generic NAND and MTD layers */ mtd->ecc_strength = ecc->strength; + if (!base->ecc.ctx.conf.strength) + base->ecc.ctx.conf.strength = ecc->strength; mtd->ecc_step_size = ecc->size; + if (!base->ecc.ctx.conf.step_size) + base->ecc.ctx.conf.step_size = ecc->size; /* * Set the number of read / write steps for one page depending on ECC @@ -6455,6 +6460,8 @@ static int nand_scan_tail(struct nand_chip *chip) */ if (!ecc->steps) ecc->steps = mtd->writesize / ecc->size; + if (!base->ecc.ctx.nsteps) + base->ecc.ctx.nsteps = ecc->steps; if (ecc->steps * ecc->size != mtd->writesize) { WARN(1, "Invalid ECC parameters\n"); ret = -EINVAL;

12 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3cad1bc010416c6dd780643476bc59ed742436b9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024070803-gummy-tuition-6ac3@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 3cad1bc01041 ("filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected") 4ca52f539865 ("filelock: have fs/locks.c deal with file_lock_core directly") a69ce85ec9af ("filelock: split common fields into struct file_lock_core") 3d40f78169a0 ("filelock: drop the IS_* macros") 75cabec0111b ("filelock: add some new helper functions") 587a67b6830b ("filelock: rename some fields in tracepoints") 0e9876d8e88d ("filelock: fl_pid field should be signed int") 6c9007f65d14 ("fs/locks: F_UNLCK extension for F_OFD_GETLK") dc592190a554 ("fs/locks: Remove redundant assignment to cmd") 3822a7c40997 ("Merge tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3cad1bc010416c6dd780643476bc59ed742436b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2024 18:26:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected When fcntl_setlk() races with close(), it removes the created lock with do_lock_file_wait(). However, LSMs can allow the first do_lock_file_wait() that created the lock while denying the second do_lock_file_wait() that tries to remove the lock. In theory (but AFAIK not in practice), posix_lock_file() could also fail to remove a lock due to GFP_KERNEL allocation failure (when splitting a range in the middle). After the bug has been triggered, use-after-free reads will occur in lock_get_status() when userspace reads /proc/locks. This can likely be used to read arbitrary kernel memory, but can't corrupt kernel memory. This only affects systems with SELinux / Smack / AppArmor / BPF-LSM in enforcing mode and only works from some security contexts. Fix it by calling locks_remove_posix() instead, which is designed to reliably get rid of POSIX locks associated with the given file and files_struct and is also used by filp_flush(). Fixes: c293621bbf67 ("[PATCH] stale POSIX lock handling") Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Link: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2563 Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240702-fs-lock-recover-2-v1-1-edd456f63789@goog… Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c index 90c8746874de..c360d1992d21 100644 --- a/fs/locks.c +++ b/fs/locks.c @@ -2448,8 +2448,9 @@ int fcntl_setlk(unsigned int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, error = do_lock_file_wait(filp, cmd, file_lock); /* - * Attempt to detect a close/fcntl race and recover by releasing the - * lock that was just acquired. There is no need to do that when we're + * Detect close/fcntl races and recover by zapping all POSIX locks + * associated with this file and our files_struct, just like on + * filp_flush(). There is no need to do that when we're * unlocking though, or for OFD locks. */ if (!error && file_lock->c.flc_type != F_UNLCK && @@ -2464,9 +2465,7 @@ int fcntl_setlk(unsigned int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, f = files_lookup_fd_locked(files, fd); spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); if (f != filp) { - file_lock->c.flc_type = F_UNLCK; - error = do_lock_file_wait(filp, cmd, file_lock); - WARN_ON_ONCE(error); + locks_remove_posix(filp, files); error = -EBADF; } }

12 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3cad1bc010416c6dd780643476bc59ed742436b9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024070802-nebula-stir-11eb@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 3cad1bc01041 ("filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected") 4ca52f539865 ("filelock: have fs/locks.c deal with file_lock_core directly") a69ce85ec9af ("filelock: split common fields into struct file_lock_core") 3d40f78169a0 ("filelock: drop the IS_* macros") 75cabec0111b ("filelock: add some new helper functions") 587a67b6830b ("filelock: rename some fields in tracepoints") 0e9876d8e88d ("filelock: fl_pid field should be signed int") 6c9007f65d14 ("fs/locks: F_UNLCK extension for F_OFD_GETLK") dc592190a554 ("fs/locks: Remove redundant assignment to cmd") 3822a7c40997 ("Merge tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3cad1bc010416c6dd780643476bc59ed742436b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2024 18:26:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected When fcntl_setlk() races with close(), it removes the created lock with do_lock_file_wait(). However, LSMs can allow the first do_lock_file_wait() that created the lock while denying the second do_lock_file_wait() that tries to remove the lock. In theory (but AFAIK not in practice), posix_lock_file() could also fail to remove a lock due to GFP_KERNEL allocation failure (when splitting a range in the middle). After the bug has been triggered, use-after-free reads will occur in lock_get_status() when userspace reads /proc/locks. This can likely be used to read arbitrary kernel memory, but can't corrupt kernel memory. This only affects systems with SELinux / Smack / AppArmor / BPF-LSM in enforcing mode and only works from some security contexts. Fix it by calling locks_remove_posix() instead, which is designed to reliably get rid of POSIX locks associated with the given file and files_struct and is also used by filp_flush(). Fixes: c293621bbf67 ("[PATCH] stale POSIX lock handling") Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Link: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2563 Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240702-fs-lock-recover-2-v1-1-edd456f63789@goog… Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c index 90c8746874de..c360d1992d21 100644 --- a/fs/locks.c +++ b/fs/locks.c @@ -2448,8 +2448,9 @@ int fcntl_setlk(unsigned int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, error = do_lock_file_wait(filp, cmd, file_lock); /* - * Attempt to detect a close/fcntl race and recover by releasing the - * lock that was just acquired. There is no need to do that when we're + * Detect close/fcntl races and recover by zapping all POSIX locks + * associated with this file and our files_struct, just like on + * filp_flush(). There is no need to do that when we're * unlocking though, or for OFD locks. */ if (!error && file_lock->c.flc_type != F_UNLCK && @@ -2464,9 +2465,7 @@ int fcntl_setlk(unsigned int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, f = files_lookup_fd_locked(files, fd); spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); if (f != filp) { - file_lock->c.flc_type = F_UNLCK; - error = do_lock_file_wait(filp, cmd, file_lock); - WARN_ON_ONCE(error); + locks_remove_posix(filp, files); error = -EBADF; } }

12 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3cad1bc010416c6dd780643476bc59ed742436b9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024070801-hatbox-ripple-b0ef@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 3cad1bc01041 ("filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected") 4ca52f539865 ("filelock: have fs/locks.c deal with file_lock_core directly") a69ce85ec9af ("filelock: split common fields into struct file_lock_core") 3d40f78169a0 ("filelock: drop the IS_* macros") 75cabec0111b ("filelock: add some new helper functions") 587a67b6830b ("filelock: rename some fields in tracepoints") 0e9876d8e88d ("filelock: fl_pid field should be signed int") 6c9007f65d14 ("fs/locks: F_UNLCK extension for F_OFD_GETLK") dc592190a554 ("fs/locks: Remove redundant assignment to cmd") 3822a7c40997 ("Merge tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3cad1bc010416c6dd780643476bc59ed742436b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2024 18:26:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected When fcntl_setlk() races with close(), it removes the created lock with do_lock_file_wait(). However, LSMs can allow the first do_lock_file_wait() that created the lock while denying the second do_lock_file_wait() that tries to remove the lock. In theory (but AFAIK not in practice), posix_lock_file() could also fail to remove a lock due to GFP_KERNEL allocation failure (when splitting a range in the middle). After the bug has been triggered, use-after-free reads will occur in lock_get_status() when userspace reads /proc/locks. This can likely be used to read arbitrary kernel memory, but can't corrupt kernel memory. This only affects systems with SELinux / Smack / AppArmor / BPF-LSM in enforcing mode and only works from some security contexts. Fix it by calling locks_remove_posix() instead, which is designed to reliably get rid of POSIX locks associated with the given file and files_struct and is also used by filp_flush(). Fixes: c293621bbf67 ("[PATCH] stale POSIX lock handling") Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Link: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2563 Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240702-fs-lock-recover-2-v1-1-edd456f63789@goog… Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c index 90c8746874de..c360d1992d21 100644 --- a/fs/locks.c +++ b/fs/locks.c @@ -2448,8 +2448,9 @@ int fcntl_setlk(unsigned int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, error = do_lock_file_wait(filp, cmd, file_lock); /* - * Attempt to detect a close/fcntl race and recover by releasing the - * lock that was just acquired. There is no need to do that when we're + * Detect close/fcntl races and recover by zapping all POSIX locks + * associated with this file and our files_struct, just like on + * filp_flush(). There is no need to do that when we're * unlocking though, or for OFD locks. */ if (!error && file_lock->c.flc_type != F_UNLCK && @@ -2464,9 +2465,7 @@ int fcntl_setlk(unsigned int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, f = files_lookup_fd_locked(files, fd); spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); if (f != filp) { - file_lock->c.flc_type = F_UNLCK; - error = do_lock_file_wait(filp, cmd, file_lock); - WARN_ON_ONCE(error); + locks_remove_posix(filp, files); error = -EBADF; } }

12 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3cad1bc010416c6dd780643476bc59ed742436b9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024070800-certainly-antibody-ea44@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 3cad1bc01041 ("filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected") 4ca52f539865 ("filelock: have fs/locks.c deal with file_lock_core directly") a69ce85ec9af ("filelock: split common fields into struct file_lock_core") 3d40f78169a0 ("filelock: drop the IS_* macros") 75cabec0111b ("filelock: add some new helper functions") 587a67b6830b ("filelock: rename some fields in tracepoints") 0e9876d8e88d ("filelock: fl_pid field should be signed int") 6c9007f65d14 ("fs/locks: F_UNLCK extension for F_OFD_GETLK") dc592190a554 ("fs/locks: Remove redundant assignment to cmd") 3822a7c40997 ("Merge tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3cad1bc010416c6dd780643476bc59ed742436b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2024 18:26:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected When fcntl_setlk() races with close(), it removes the created lock with do_lock_file_wait(). However, LSMs can allow the first do_lock_file_wait() that created the lock while denying the second do_lock_file_wait() that tries to remove the lock. In theory (but AFAIK not in practice), posix_lock_file() could also fail to remove a lock due to GFP_KERNEL allocation failure (when splitting a range in the middle). After the bug has been triggered, use-after-free reads will occur in lock_get_status() when userspace reads /proc/locks. This can likely be used to read arbitrary kernel memory, but can't corrupt kernel memory. This only affects systems with SELinux / Smack / AppArmor / BPF-LSM in enforcing mode and only works from some security contexts. Fix it by calling locks_remove_posix() instead, which is designed to reliably get rid of POSIX locks associated with the given file and files_struct and is also used by filp_flush(). Fixes: c293621bbf67 ("[PATCH] stale POSIX lock handling") Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Link: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2563 Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240702-fs-lock-recover-2-v1-1-edd456f63789@goog… Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c index 90c8746874de..c360d1992d21 100644 --- a/fs/locks.c +++ b/fs/locks.c @@ -2448,8 +2448,9 @@ int fcntl_setlk(unsigned int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, error = do_lock_file_wait(filp, cmd, file_lock); /* - * Attempt to detect a close/fcntl race and recover by releasing the - * lock that was just acquired. There is no need to do that when we're + * Detect close/fcntl races and recover by zapping all POSIX locks + * associated with this file and our files_struct, just like on + * filp_flush(). There is no need to do that when we're * unlocking though, or for OFD locks. */ if (!error && file_lock->c.flc_type != F_UNLCK && @@ -2464,9 +2465,7 @@ int fcntl_setlk(unsigned int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, f = files_lookup_fd_locked(files, fd); spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); if (f != filp) { - file_lock->c.flc_type = F_UNLCK; - error = do_lock_file_wait(filp, cmd, file_lock); - WARN_ON_ONCE(error); + locks_remove_posix(filp, files); error = -EBADF; } }

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