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[PATCH] firewire: nosy: break circular locking with misc_mtx in ->open()

by Guangshuo Li

Lockdep reports a circular dependency between card_mutex and misc_mtx: misc_open() holds misc_mtx and calls ->open(): misc_mtx -> nosy_open() add_card()/remove_card() hold card_mutex and (de)register the miscdev: card_mutex -> misc_register()/misc_deregister() -> misc_mtx nosy_open() only used card_mutex to map the minor to the pcilynx instance by scanning card_list. However, misc_open() already sets file->private_data to the struct miscdevice of the opened minor, so we can obtain the pcilynx pointer via container_of() and take a kref, without taking card_mutex in the open path. This removes the misc_mtx -> card_mutex edge and breaks the cycle. The crash info is below： ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.18.0-rc1 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.1/1374 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8f8bb4e8 (card_mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nosy_open+0x55/0x480 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8ef78a88 (misc_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: misc_open+0x5a/0x3f0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (misc_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x138/0x2450 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 misc_register+0x95/0x490 foo_misc_register+0x3a/0x50 add_card+0xd38/0x1250 local_pci_probe+0x140/0x200 pci_device_probe+0x345/0x770 really_probe+0x2d1/0x990 __driver_probe_device+0x1a7/0x270 driver_probe_device+0x54/0x370 __driver_attach+0x430/0x590 bus_for_each_dev+0x125/0x190 bus_add_driver+0x32c/0x530 driver_register+0x309/0x410 do_one_initcall+0x104/0x250 do_initcall_level+0x102/0x132 do_initcalls+0x46/0x74 kernel_init_freeable+0x28f/0x393 kernel_init+0x14/0x1a0 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 -> #0 (card_mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x3607/0x7930 lock_acquire+0xff/0x2d0 __mutex_lock_common+0x138/0x2450 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 nosy_open+0x55/0x480 misc_open+0x363/0x3f0 chrdev_open+0x407/0x490 do_dentry_open+0x5b4/0xc20 path_openat+0x1d7a/0x2300 do_filp_open+0x1cb/0x3e0 do_sys_openat2+0x96/0x350 __x64_sys_openat+0x186/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(misc_mtx); lock(card_mutex#2); lock(misc_mtx); lock(card_mutex#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.1/1374: #0: ffffffff8ef78a88 (misc_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: misc_open+0x5a/0x3f0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1374 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x74 check_noncircular+0x223/0x2d0 __lock_acquire+0x3607/0x7930 lock_acquire+0xff/0x2d0 __mutex_lock_common+0x138/0x2450 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 nosy_open+0x55/0x480 misc_open+0x363/0x3f0 chrdev_open+0x407/0x490 do_dentry_open+0x5b4/0xc20 path_openat+0x1d7a/0x2300 do_filp_open+0x1cb/0x3e0 do_sys_openat2+0x96/0x350 __x64_sys_openat+0x186/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fbaab4abbcd Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fbaaac1cbe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fbaab5c9f80 RCX: 00007fbaab4abbcd RDX: 0000000000062803 RSI: 0000000020003080 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c RBP: 00007fbaab519edb R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffe62540a6f R14: 00007ffe62540c10 R15: 00007fbaaac1cd80 </TASK> ====================================================== Fixes: 424d66cedae8 ("firewire: nosy: fix device shutdown with active client") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/firewire/nosy.c | 16 +++++----------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firewire/nosy.c b/drivers/firewire/nosy.c index b0d671db178a..726d5f15ff08 100644 --- a/drivers/firewire/nosy.c +++ b/drivers/firewire/nosy.c @@ -263,19 +263,13 @@ set_phy_reg(struct pcilynx *lynx, int addr, int val) static int nosy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - int minor = iminor(inode); + struct miscdevice *misc = file->private_data; struct client *client; - struct pcilynx *tmp, *lynx = NULL; + struct pcilynx *lynx; - mutex_lock(&card_mutex); - list_for_each_entry(tmp, &card_list, link) - if (tmp->misc.minor == minor) { - lynx = lynx_get(tmp); - break; - } - mutex_unlock(&card_mutex); - if (lynx == NULL) - return -ENODEV; + /* misc_open() set file->private_data to the miscdevice already. */ + lynx = container_of(misc, struct pcilynx, misc); + lynx_get(lynx); client = kmalloc(sizeof *client, GFP_KERNEL); if (client == NULL) -- 2.43.0

1 month, 1 week

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[PATCH] mount: fix duplicate mounts using the new mount API

by GuangFei Luo

When using the new mount API, invoking the same mount command multiple times such as: mount /dev/mapper/mydevice /mnt/mydisk2 results in multiple identical mount entries being created: /dev/mapper/mydevice on /mnt/mydisk2 type ext4 (rw,relatime) /dev/mapper/mydevice on /mnt/mydisk2 type ext4 (rw,relatime) /dev/mapper/mydevice on /mnt/mydisk2 type ext4 (rw,relatime) ... Fixes: 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around") Signed-off-by: GuangFei Luo <luogf2025(a)163.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 5.2+ --- fs/namespace.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index d82910f33dc4..9436471955ce 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -4427,6 +4427,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(move_mount, { struct path to_path __free(path_put) = {}; struct path from_path __free(path_put) = {}; + struct path path __free(path_put) = {}; struct filename *to_name __free(putname) = NULL; struct filename *from_name __free(putname) = NULL; unsigned int lflags, uflags; @@ -4472,6 +4473,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(move_mount, return ret; } + ret = user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, to_pathname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Refuse the same filesystem on the same mount point */ + if (path.mnt->mnt_sb == to_path.mnt->mnt_sb && path_mounted(&path)) + return -EBUSY; + uflags = 0; if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH) uflags = AT_EMPTY_PATH; -- 2.43.0

1 month, 1 week

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[PATCH v2] ASoC: da7213: Use component driver suspend/resume

by Claudiu

From: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj(a)bp.renesas.com> Since snd_soc_suspend() is invoked through snd_soc_pm_ops->suspend(), and snd_soc_pm_ops is associated with the soc_driver (defined in sound/soc/soc-core.c), and there is no parent-child relationship between the soc_driver and the DA7213 codec driver, the power management subsystem does not enforce a specific suspend/resume order between the DA7213 driver and the soc_driver. Because of this, the different codec component functionalities, called from snd_soc_resume() to reconfigure various functions, can race with the DA7213 struct dev_pm_ops::resume function, leading to misapplied configuration. This occasionally results in clipped sound. Fix this by dropping the struct dev_pm_ops::{suspend, resume} and use instead struct snd_soc_component_driver::{suspend, resume}. This ensures the proper configuration sequence is handled by the ASoC subsystem. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 431e040065c8 ("ASoC: da7213: Add suspend to RAM support") Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj(a)bp.renesas.com> --- Changes in v2: - kept runtime PM ops unchanged and re-use them on struct snd_soc_component_driver::{suspend, resume} - updated the patch description to reflect the new approach - fixed the patch title - dropped patch 2/2 from v1 along with the cover letter sound/soc/codecs/da7213.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- sound/soc/codecs/da7213.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/da7213.c b/sound/soc/codecs/da7213.c index c1657f348ad9..81bd5b03e2b6 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/da7213.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/da7213.c @@ -2124,11 +2124,50 @@ static int da7213_probe(struct snd_soc_component *component) return 0; } +static int da7213_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev) +{ + struct da7213_priv *da7213 = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + + regcache_cache_only(da7213->regmap, true); + regcache_mark_dirty(da7213->regmap); + regulator_bulk_disable(DA7213_NUM_SUPPLIES, da7213->supplies); + + return 0; +} + +static int da7213_runtime_resume(struct device *dev) +{ + struct da7213_priv *da7213 = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + int ret; + + ret = regulator_bulk_enable(DA7213_NUM_SUPPLIES, da7213->supplies); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + regcache_cache_only(da7213->regmap, false); + return regcache_sync(da7213->regmap); +} + +static int da7213_suspend(struct snd_soc_component *component) +{ + struct da7213_priv *da7213 = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component); + + return da7213_runtime_suspend(da7213->dev); +} + +static int da7213_resume(struct snd_soc_component *component) +{ + struct da7213_priv *da7213 = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component); + + return da7213_runtime_resume(da7213->dev); +} + static const struct snd_soc_component_driver soc_component_dev_da7213 = { .probe = da7213_probe, .set_bias_level = da7213_set_bias_level, .controls = da7213_snd_controls, .num_controls = ARRAY_SIZE(da7213_snd_controls), + .suspend = da7213_suspend, + .resume = da7213_resume, .dapm_widgets = da7213_dapm_widgets, .num_dapm_widgets = ARRAY_SIZE(da7213_dapm_widgets), .dapm_routes = da7213_audio_map, @@ -2175,6 +2214,8 @@ static int da7213_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *i2c) if (!da7213->fin_min_rate) return -EINVAL; + da7213->dev = &i2c->dev; + i2c_set_clientdata(i2c, da7213); /* Get required supplies */ @@ -2224,31 +2265,9 @@ static void da7213_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *i2c) pm_runtime_disable(&i2c->dev); } -static int da7213_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev) -{ - struct da7213_priv *da7213 = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - - regcache_cache_only(da7213->regmap, true); - regcache_mark_dirty(da7213->regmap); - regulator_bulk_disable(DA7213_NUM_SUPPLIES, da7213->supplies); - - return 0; -} - -static int da7213_runtime_resume(struct device *dev) -{ - struct da7213_priv *da7213 = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - int ret; - - ret = regulator_bulk_enable(DA7213_NUM_SUPPLIES, da7213->supplies); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - regcache_cache_only(da7213->regmap, false); - return regcache_sync(da7213->regmap); -} - -static DEFINE_RUNTIME_DEV_PM_OPS(da7213_pm, da7213_runtime_suspend, - da7213_runtime_resume, NULL); +static const struct dev_pm_ops da7213_pm = { + RUNTIME_PM_OPS(da7213_runtime_suspend, da7213_runtime_resume, NULL) +}; static const struct i2c_device_id da7213_i2c_id[] = { { "da7213" }, diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/da7213.h b/sound/soc/codecs/da7213.h index b9ab791d6b88..29cbf0eb6124 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/da7213.h +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/da7213.h @@ -595,6 +595,7 @@ enum da7213_supplies { /* Codec private data */ struct da7213_priv { struct regmap *regmap; + struct device *dev; struct mutex ctrl_lock; struct regulator_bulk_data supplies[DA7213_NUM_SUPPLIES]; struct clk *mclk; -- 2.43.0

1 month, 1 week

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[PATCH v6 1/5] vfat: fix missing sb_min_blocksize() return value checks

by Yongpeng Yang

From: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng(a)xiaomi.com> When emulating an nvme device on qemu with both logical_block_size and physical_block_size set to 8 KiB, but without format, a kernel panic was triggered during the early boot stage while attempting to mount a vfat filesystem. [95553.682035] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.684326] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.686501] EXT4-fs (nvme0n1): unable to set blocksize [95553.696448] ISOFS: unsupported/invalid hardware sector size 8192 [95553.697117] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [95553.697567] kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:1582! [95553.697984] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [95553.698602] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7212 Comm: mount Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2+ #38 PREEMPT(voluntary) [95553.699511] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [95553.700534] RIP: 0010:folio_alloc_buffers+0x1bb/0x1c0 [95553.701018] Code: 48 8b 15 e8 93 18 02 65 48 89 35 e0 93 18 02 48 83 c4 10 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 90 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f [95553.702648] RSP: 0018:ffffd1b0c676f990 EFLAGS: 00010246 [95553.703132] RAX: ffff8cfc4176d820 RBX: 0000000000508c48 RCX: 0000000000000001 [95553.703805] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [95553.704481] RBP: ffffd1b0c676f9c8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [95553.705148] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [95553.705816] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: fffff8bc8257e800 R15: 0000000000000000 [95553.706483] FS: 000072ee77315840(0000) GS:ffff8cfdd2c8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [95553.707248] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [95553.707782] CR2: 00007d8f2a9e5a20 CR3: 0000000039d0c006 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [95553.708439] PKRU: 55555554 [95553.708734] Call Trace: [95553.709015] <TASK> [95553.709266] __getblk_slow+0xd2/0x230 [95553.709641] ? find_get_block_common+0x8b/0x530 [95553.710084] bdev_getblk+0x77/0xa0 [95553.710449] __bread_gfp+0x22/0x140 [95553.710810] fat_fill_super+0x23a/0xfc0 [95553.711216] ? __pfx_setup+0x10/0x10 [95553.711580] ? __pfx_vfat_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [95553.712014] vfat_fill_super+0x15/0x30 [95553.712401] get_tree_bdev_flags+0x141/0x1e0 [95553.712817] get_tree_bdev+0x10/0x20 [95553.713177] vfat_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [95553.713550] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100 [95553.713910] vfs_cmd_create+0x62/0xf0 [95553.714273] __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4e7/0x660 [95553.714669] __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.715062] x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.715453] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x670 [95553.715816] ? __fs_parse+0x65/0x1e0 [95553.716172] ? fat_parse_param+0x103/0x4b0 [95553.716587] ? vfs_parse_fs_param_source+0x21/0xa0 [95553.717034] ? __do_sys_fsconfig+0x3d9/0x660 [95553.717548] ? __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.717957] ? x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.718360] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.718734] ? __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x20/0x40 [95553.719141] ? x64_sys_call+0x21ee/0x26a0 [95553.719545] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.719922] ? x64_sys_call+0x1405/0x26a0 [95553.720317] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.720702] ? __x64_sys_close+0x3e/0x90 [95553.721080] ? x64_sys_call+0x1b5e/0x26a0 [95553.721478] ? do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x670 [95553.721841] ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 [95553.722211] ? exc_page_fault+0x90/0x1b0 [95553.722681] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [95553.723166] RIP: 0033:0x72ee774f3afe [95553.723562] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 0a 33 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 af 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d da 32 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [95553.725188] RSP: 002b:00007ffe97148978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001af [95553.725892] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005dcfe53d0080 RCX: 000072ee774f3afe [95553.726526] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000003 [95553.727176] RBP: 00007ffe97148ac0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000072ee775e7ac0 [95553.727818] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [95553.728459] R13: 00005dcfe53d04b0 R14: 000072ee77670b00 R15: 00005dcfe53d1a28 [95553.729086] </TASK> The panic occurs as follows: 1. logical_block_size is 8KiB, causing {struct super_block *sb}->s_blocksize is initialized to 0. vfat_fill_super - fat_fill_super - sb_min_blocksize - sb_set_blocksize //return 0 when size is 8KiB. 2. __bread_gfp is called with size == 0, causing folio_alloc_buffers() to compute an offset equal to folio_size(folio), which triggers a BUG_ON. fat_fill_super - sb_bread - __bread_gfp // size == {struct super_block *sb}->s_blocksize == 0 - bdev_getblk - __getblk_slow - grow_buffers - grow_dev_folio - folio_alloc_buffers // size == 0 - folio_set_bh //offset == folio_size(folio) and panic To fix this issue, add proper return value checks for sb_min_blocksize(). Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.15 Fixes: a64e5a596067bd ("bdev: add back PAGE_SIZE block size validation for sb_set_blocksize()") Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng(a)xiaomi.com> --- v6: - fix 'Fixes tag' format error - drop the pointless extern and spell out the parameter of sb_set_blocksize and sb_set_blocksize v5: - add cc tag for 5th patch v4: - split the changes into 5 patches v3: - remove the unnecessary blocksize variable definition v2: - add the __must_check mark to sb_min_blocksize() and include the Fixes tag --- fs/fat/inode.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fat/inode.c b/fs/fat/inode.c index 9648ed097816..9cfe20a3daaf 100644 --- a/fs/fat/inode.c +++ b/fs/fat/inode.c @@ -1595,8 +1595,12 @@ int fat_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc, setup(sb); /* flavour-specific stuff that needs options */ + error = -EINVAL; + if (!sb_min_blocksize(sb, 512)) { + fat_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize"); + goto out_fail; + } error = -EIO; - sb_min_blocksize(sb, 512); bh = sb_bread(sb, 0); if (bh == NULL) { fat_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read boot sector"); -- 2.43.0

1 month, 1 week

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[PATCH v1 2/2] kasan: Unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag

by Maciej Wieczor-Retman

From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in the following points: 1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk. 2. Chunk's base address has a tag. 3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits the tag of the first chunk. 4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the first chunk. 5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to match that of the first chunk. Unpoison all vm_structs after allocating them for the percpu allocator. Use the same tag to resolve the pcpu chunk address mismatch. Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> --- Changelog v1 (after splitting of from the KASAN series): - Rewrite the patch message to point at the user impact of the issue. - Move helper to common.c so it can be compiled in all KASAN modes. mm/kasan/common.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index c63544a98c24..a6bbc68984cd 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -584,12 +584,20 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip) return true; } +/* + * A tag mismatch happens when calculating per-cpu chunk addresses, because + * they all inherit the tag from vms[0]->addr, even when nr_vms is bigger + * than 1. This is a problem because all the vms[]->addr come from separate + * allocations and have different tags so while the calculated address is + * correct the tag isn't. + */ void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms) { int area; for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) { kasan_poison(vms[area]->addr, vms[area]->size, - arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[area]->addr), false); + arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[0]->addr), false); + arch_kasan_set_tag(vms[area]->addr, arch_kasan_get_tag(vms[0]->addr)); } } -- 2.51.0

1 month, 1 week

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[PATCH] ALSA: wavefront: Fix use-after-free in MIDI operations

by moonafterrain＠outlook.com

From: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> Clear substream pointers in close functions to prevent use-after-free when timer callbacks or interrupt handlers access them after close. Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> --- sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_midi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_midi.c b/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_midi.c index 1250ecba659a..69d87c4cafae 100644 --- a/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_midi.c +++ b/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_midi.c @@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ static int snd_wavefront_midi_input_close(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substrea return -EIO; guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&midi->open); + midi->substream_input[mpu] = NULL; midi->mode[mpu] &= ~MPU401_MODE_INPUT; return 0; @@ -300,6 +301,7 @@ static int snd_wavefront_midi_output_close(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substre return -EIO; guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&midi->open); + midi->substream_output[mpu] = NULL; midi->mode[mpu] &= ~MPU401_MODE_OUTPUT; return 0; } -- 2.51.1.dirty

1 month, 1 week

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[PATCH] ALSA: wavefront: Fix integer overflow in sample size validation

by moonafterrain＠outlook.com

From: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> The wavefront_send_sample() function has an integer overflow issue when validating sample size. The header->size field is u32 but gets cast to int for comparison with dev->freemem Fix by using unsigned comparison to avoid integer overflow. Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> --- sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c b/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c index cd5c177943aa..4a8c507eae71 100644 --- a/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c +++ b/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c @@ -950,9 +950,9 @@ wavefront_send_sample (snd_wavefront_t *dev, if (header->size) { dev->freemem = wavefront_freemem (dev); - if (dev->freemem < (int)header->size) { + if ((unsigned int)dev->freemem < header->size) { dev_err(dev->card->dev, - "insufficient memory to load %d byte sample.\n", + "insufficient memory to load %u byte sample.\n", header->size); return -ENOMEM; } -- 2.51.1.dirty

1 month, 1 week

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[PATCH v2] ALSA: wavefront: use scnprintf for longname construction

by moonafterrain＠outlook.com

From: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> Replace sprintf() calls with scnprintf() and a new scnprintf_append() helper function when constructing card->longname. This improves code readability and provides bounds checking for the 80-byte buffer. While the current parameter ranges don't cause overflow in practice, using safer string functions follows kernel best practices and makes the code more maintainable. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> --- Changes in v2: - Replace sprintf() calls with scnprintf() and a new scnprintf_append() - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ME2PR01MB3156CEC4F31F253C9B540FB7AFFDA@ME2PR01M… --- sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront.c b/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront.c index 07c68568091d..047dd54f77d4 100644 --- a/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront.c +++ b/sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront.c @@ -333,6 +333,19 @@ static int snd_wavefront_card_new(struct device *pdev, int dev, return 0; } +__printf(3, 4) static int scnprintf_append(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + size_t len = strlen(buf); + + if (len >= size) + return len; + va_start(args, fmt); + len = vscnprintf(buf + len, size - len, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + return len; +} + static int snd_wavefront_probe (struct snd_card *card, int dev) { @@ -492,26 +505,27 @@ snd_wavefront_probe (struct snd_card *card, int dev) length restrictions */ - sprintf(card->longname, "%s PCM 0x%lx irq %d dma %d", - card->driver, - chip->port, - cs4232_pcm_irq[dev], - dma1[dev]); + scnprintf(card->longname, sizeof(card->longname), + "%s PCM 0x%lx irq %d dma %d", + card->driver, + chip->port, + cs4232_pcm_irq[dev], + dma1[dev]); if (dma2[dev] >= 0 && dma2[dev] < 8) - sprintf(card->longname + strlen(card->longname), "&%d", dma2[dev]); - - if (cs4232_mpu_port[dev] > 0 && cs4232_mpu_port[dev] != SNDRV_AUTO_PORT) { - sprintf (card->longname + strlen (card->longname), - " MPU-401 0x%lx irq %d", - cs4232_mpu_port[dev], - cs4232_mpu_irq[dev]); - } - - sprintf (card->longname + strlen (card->longname), - " SYNTH 0x%lx irq %d", - ics2115_port[dev], - ics2115_irq[dev]); + scnprintf_append(card->longname, sizeof(card->longname), + "&%d", dma2[dev]); + + if (cs4232_mpu_port[dev] > 0 && cs4232_mpu_port[dev] != SNDRV_AUTO_PORT) + scnprintf_append(card->longname, sizeof(card->longname), + " MPU-401 0x%lx irq %d", + cs4232_mpu_port[dev], + cs4232_mpu_irq[dev]); + + scnprintf_append(card->longname, sizeof(card->longname), + " SYNTH 0x%lx irq %d", + ics2115_port[dev], + ics2115_irq[dev]); return snd_card_register(card); } -- 2.51.1.dirty

1 month, 1 week

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[PATCH net V2] virtio_net: fix alignment for virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash

by Jason Wang

From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst(a)redhat.com> Changing alignment of header would mean it's no longer safe to cast a 2 byte aligned pointer between formats. Use two 16 bit fields to make it 2 byte aligned as previously. This fixes the performance regression since commit ("virtio_net: enable gso over UDP tunnel support.") as it uses virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel which embeds virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash. Pktgen in guest + XDP_DROP on TAP + vhost_net shows the TX PPS is recovered from 2.4Mpps to 4.45Mpps. Fixes: 56a06bd40fab ("virtio_net: enable gso over UDP tunnel support.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> --- Changes since V1: - Fix build issues of virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- include/linux/virtio_net.h | 3 ++- include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index 8e8a179aaa49..e6e650bc3bc3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -2539,6 +2539,13 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable(struct net_device *dev, return NULL; } +static inline u32 +virtio_net_hash_value(const struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash *hdr_hash) +{ + return __le16_to_cpu(hdr_hash->hash_value_lo) | + (__le16_to_cpu(hdr_hash->hash_value_hi) << 16); +} + static void virtio_skb_set_hash(const struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash *hdr_hash, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -2565,7 +2572,7 @@ static void virtio_skb_set_hash(const struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash *hdr_hash, default: rss_hash_type = PKT_HASH_TYPE_NONE; } - skb_set_hash(skb, __le32_to_cpu(hdr_hash->hash_value), rss_hash_type); + skb_set_hash(skb, virtio_net_hash_value(hdr_hash), rss_hash_type); } static void virtnet_receive_done(struct virtnet_info *vi, struct receive_queue *rq, @@ -3311,6 +3318,10 @@ static int xmit_skb(struct send_queue *sq, struct sk_buff *skb, bool orphan) pr_debug("%s: xmit %p %pM\n", vi->dev->name, skb, dest); + /* Make sure it's safe to cast between formats */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(*hdr) != __alignof__(hdr->hash_hdr)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(*hdr) != __alignof__(hdr->hash_hdr.hdr)); + can_push = vi->any_header_sg && !((unsigned long)skb->data & (__alignof__(*hdr) - 1)) && !skb_header_cloned(skb) && skb_headroom(skb) >= hdr_len; @@ -6750,7 +6761,7 @@ static int virtnet_xdp_rx_hash(const struct xdp_md *_ctx, u32 *hash, hash_report = VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_NONE; *rss_type = virtnet_xdp_rss_type[hash_report]; - *hash = __le32_to_cpu(hdr_hash->hash_value); + *hash = virtio_net_hash_value(hdr_hash); return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h index 4d1780848d0e..b673c31569f3 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb(const struct sk_buff *skb, if (!tnl_hdr_negotiated) return -EINVAL; - vhdr->hash_hdr.hash_value = 0; + vhdr->hash_hdr.hash_value_lo = 0; + vhdr->hash_hdr.hash_value_hi = 0; vhdr->hash_hdr.hash_report = 0; vhdr->hash_hdr.padding = 0; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h index 8bf27ab8bcb4..1db45b01532b 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -193,7 +193,8 @@ struct virtio_net_hdr_v1 { struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash { struct virtio_net_hdr_v1 hdr; - __le32 hash_value; + __le16 hash_value_lo; + __le16 hash_value_hi; #define VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_NONE 0 #define VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_IPv4 1 #define VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_TCPv4 2 -- 2.31.1

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Ready to Grow? We Can Help.

by sales＠d5-cloud.ink

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