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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: fix space cache inconsistency after error loading it" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0004ff15ea26015a0a3a6182dca3b9d1df32e2b7 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2023051358-embattled-detest-37ff@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 0004ff15ea26 ("btrfs: fix space cache inconsistency after error loading it from disk") fa598b069640 ("btrfs: remove recalc_thresholds from free space ops") cd79909bc7cd ("btrfs: load free space cache into a temporary ctl") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0004ff15ea26015a0a3a6182dca3b9d1df32e2b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Date: Thu, 4 May 2023 12:04:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: fix space cache inconsistency after error loading it from disk When loading a free space cache from disk, at __load_free_space_cache(), if we fail to insert a bitmap entry, we still increment the number of total bitmaps in the btrfs_free_space_ctl structure, which is incorrect since we failed to add the bitmap entry. On error we then empty the cache by calling __btrfs_remove_free_space_cache(), which will result in getting the total bitmaps counter set to 1. A failure to load a free space cache is not critical, so if a failure happens we just rebuild the cache by scanning the extent tree, which happens at block-group.c:caching_thread(). Yet the failure will result in having the total bitmaps of the btrfs_free_space_ctl always bigger by 1 then the number of bitmap entries we have. So fix this by having the total bitmaps counter be incremented only if we successfully added the bitmap entry. Fixes: a67509c30079 ("Btrfs: add a io_ctl struct and helpers for dealing with the space cache") Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain(a)oracle.com> CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c b/fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c index d84cef89cdff..cf98a3c05480 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c @@ -870,15 +870,16 @@ static int __load_free_space_cache(struct btrfs_root *root, struct inode *inode, } spin_lock(&ctl->tree_lock); ret = link_free_space(ctl, e); - ctl->total_bitmaps++; - recalculate_thresholds(ctl); - spin_unlock(&ctl->tree_lock); if (ret) { + spin_unlock(&ctl->tree_lock); btrfs_err(fs_info, "Duplicate entries in free space cache, dumping"); kmem_cache_free(btrfs_free_space_cachep, e); goto free_cache; } + ctl->total_bitmaps++; + recalculate_thresholds(ctl); + spin_unlock(&ctl->tree_lock); list_add_tail(&e->list, &bitmaps); }

2 years, 7 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: fix encoded write i_size corruption with no-holes" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x e7db9e5c6b9615b287d01f0231904fbc1fbde9c5 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2023051355-such-snowfall-6415@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: e7db9e5c6b96 ("btrfs: fix encoded write i_size corruption with no-holes") 76aea5379678 ("btrfs: make btrfs_inode_safe_disk_i_size_write take btrfs_inode") 2766ff61762c ("btrfs: update the number of bytes used by an inode atomically") 5893dfb98f25 ("btrfs: refactor btrfs_drop_extents() to make it easier to extend") ac5887c8e013 ("btrfs: locking: remove all the blocking helpers") a14b78ad06ab ("btrfs: introduce btrfs_inode_lock()/unlock()") b8d8e1fd570a ("btrfs: introduce btrfs_write_check()") c86537a42f86 ("btrfs: check FS error state bit early during write") 5e8b9ef30392 ("btrfs: move pos increment and pagecache extension to btrfs_buffered_write") 4e4cabece9f9 ("btrfs: split btrfs_direct_IO to read and write") 196d59ab9ccc ("btrfs: switch extent buffer tree lock to rw_semaphore") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From e7db9e5c6b9615b287d01f0231904fbc1fbde9c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Boris Burkov <boris(a)bur.io> Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2023 14:02:11 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: fix encoded write i_size corruption with no-holes We have observed a btrfs filesystem corruption on workloads using no-holes and encoded writes via send stream v2. The symptom is that a file appears to be truncated to the end of its last aligned extent, even though the final unaligned extent and even the file extent and otherwise correctly updated inode item have been written. So if we were writing out a 1MiB+X file via 8 128K extents and one extent of length X, i_size would be set to 1MiB, but the ninth extent, nbyte, etc. would all appear correct otherwise. The source of the race is a narrow (one line of code) window in which a no-holes fs has read in an updated i_size, but has not yet set a shared disk_i_size variable to write. Therefore, if two ordered extents run in parallel (par for the course for receive workloads), the following sequence can play out: (following "threads" a bit loosely, since there are callbacks involved for endio but extra threads aren't needed to cause the issue) ENC-WR1 (second to last) ENC-WR2 (last) ------- ------- btrfs_do_encoded_write set i_size = 1M submit bio B1 ending at 1M endio B1 btrfs_inode_safe_disk_i_size_write local i_size = 1M falls off a cliff for some reason btrfs_do_encoded_write set i_size = 1M+X submit bio B2 ending at 1M+X endio B2 btrfs_inode_safe_disk_i_size_write local i_size = 1M+X disk_i_size = 1M+X disk_i_size = 1M btrfs_delayed_update_inode btrfs_delayed_update_inode And the delayed inode ends up filled with nbytes=1M+X and isize=1M, and writes respect i_size and present a corrupted file missing its last extents. Fix this by holding the inode lock in the no-holes case so that a thread can't sneak in a write to disk_i_size that gets overwritten with an out of date i_size. Fixes: 41a2ee75aab0 ("btrfs: introduce per-inode file extent tree") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris(a)bur.io> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/file-item.c b/fs/btrfs/file-item.c index 018c711a0bc8..cd4cce9ba443 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/file-item.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/file-item.c @@ -52,13 +52,13 @@ void btrfs_inode_safe_disk_i_size_write(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u64 new_i_siz u64 start, end, i_size; int ret; + spin_lock(&inode->lock); i_size = new_i_size ?: i_size_read(&inode->vfs_inode); if (btrfs_fs_incompat(fs_info, NO_HOLES)) { inode->disk_i_size = i_size; - return; + goto out_unlock; } - spin_lock(&inode->lock); ret = find_contiguous_extent_bit(&inode->file_extent_tree, 0, &start, &end, EXTENT_DIRTY); if (!ret && start == 0) @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ void btrfs_inode_safe_disk_i_size_write(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u64 new_i_siz else i_size = 0; inode->disk_i_size = i_size; +out_unlock: spin_unlock(&inode->lock); }

2 years, 7 months

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[PATCH netfilter -stable,4.14 0/6] stable fixes for 4.14

by Pablo Neira Ayuso

Hi Greg, Sasha, This is a backport of c1592a89942e ("netfilter: nf_tables: deactivate anonymous set from preparation phase") which fixes CVE-2023-32233. This patch requires dependency fixes which are not currently in the 4.14 branch. The following list shows the backported patches, I am using original commit IDs for reference: 1) cd5125d8f518 ("netfilter: nf_tables: split set destruction in deactivate and destroy phase") 2) f6ac85858976 ("netfilter: nf_tables: unbind set in rule from commit path") 3) 7f4dae2d7f03 ("netfilter: nft_hash: fix nft_hash_deactivate") 4) 6a0a8d10a366 ("netfilter: nf_tables: use-after-free in failing rule with bound set") 5) 273fe3f1006e ("netfilter: nf_tables: bogus EBUSY when deleting set after flush") 6) c1592a89942e ("netfilter: nf_tables: deactivate anonymous set from preparation phase") Please apply to 4.14-stable. Thanks. Florian Westphal (1): netfilter: nf_tables: split set destruction in deactivate and destroy phase Pablo Neira Ayuso (5): netfilter: nf_tables: unbind set in rule from commit path netfilter: nft_hash: fix nft_hash_deactivate netfilter: nf_tables: use-after-free in failing rule with bound set netfilter: nf_tables: bogus EBUSY when deleting set after flush netfilter: nf_tables: deactivate anonymous set from preparation phase include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 30 ++++++- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c | 22 ++++- net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c | 21 ++++- net/netfilter/nft_objref.c | 21 ++++- net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 194 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) -- 2.30.2

2 years, 7 months

4
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[PATCH] ext4: Avoid a potential slab-out-of-bounds in ext4_group_desc_csum

by Tudor Ambarus

When modifying the block device while it is mounted by the filesystem, syzbot reported the following: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc16+0x206/0x280 lib/crc16.c:58 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888075f5c0a8 by task syz-executor.2/15586 CPU: 1 PID: 15586 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5-syzkaller-00205-gc96618275234 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:517 crc16+0x206/0x280 lib/crc16.c:58 ext4_group_desc_csum+0x81b/0xb20 fs/ext4/super.c:3187 ext4_group_desc_csum_set+0x195/0x230 fs/ext4/super.c:3210 ext4_mb_clear_bb fs/ext4/mballoc.c:6027 [inline] ext4_free_blocks+0x191a/0x2810 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:6173 ext4_remove_blocks fs/ext4/extents.c:2527 [inline] ext4_ext_rm_leaf fs/ext4/extents.c:2710 [inline] ext4_ext_remove_space+0x24ef/0x46a0 fs/ext4/extents.c:2958 ext4_ext_truncate+0x177/0x220 fs/ext4/extents.c:4416 ext4_truncate+0xa6a/0xea0 fs/ext4/inode.c:4342 ext4_setattr+0x10c8/0x1930 fs/ext4/inode.c:5622 notify_change+0xe50/0x1100 fs/attr.c:482 do_truncate+0x200/0x2f0 fs/open.c:65 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3216 [inline] do_open fs/namei.c:3561 [inline] path_openat+0x272b/0x2dd0 fs/namei.c:3714 do_filp_open+0x264/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:3741 do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x4e0 fs/open.c:1310 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1326 [inline] __do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1402 [inline] __se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1396 [inline] __x64_sys_creat+0x11f/0x160 fs/open.c:1396 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f72f8a8c0c9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f72f97e3168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000055 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f72f8bac050 RCX: 00007f72f8a8c0c9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000280 RBP: 00007f72f8ae7ae9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd165348bf R14: 00007f72f97e3300 R15: 0000000000022000 Replace le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_desc_size) with sbi->s_desc_size It reduces ext4's compiled text size, and makes the code more efficient (we remove an extra indirect reference and a potential byte swap on big endian systems), and there is no downside. It also avoids the potential KASAN / syzkaller failure, as a bonus. Reported-by: syzbot+fc51227e7100c9294894(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=b85721b38583ecc6b5e72ff524c67302abbc30… Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000ece18705f3b20934@google.com/ Fixes: 717d50e4971b ("Ext4: Uninitialized Block Groups") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus(a)linaro.org> --- fs/ext4/super.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index d39f386e9baf..e3d0d3c04785 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -3238,11 +3238,9 @@ static __le16 ext4_group_desc_csum(struct super_block *sb, __u32 block_group, crc = crc16(crc, (__u8 *)gdp, offset); offset += sizeof(gdp->bg_checksum); /* skip checksum */ /* for checksum of struct ext4_group_desc do the rest...*/ - if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb) && - offset < le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_desc_size)) + if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb) && offset < sbi->s_desc_size) crc = crc16(crc, (__u8 *)gdp + offset, - le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_desc_size) - - offset); + sbi->s_desc_size - offset); out: return cpu_to_le16(crc); -- 2.40.1.495.gc816e09b53d-goog

2 years, 7 months

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[PATCH] ext4: Avoid deadlock in fs reclaim with page writeback

by Jan Kara

Ext4 has a filesystem wide lock protecting ext4_writepages() calls to avoid races with switching of journalled data flag or inode format. This lock can however cause a deadlock like: CPU0 CPU1 ext4_writepages() percpu_down_read(sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); ext4_change_inode_journal_flag() percpu_down_write(sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); - blocks, all readers block from now on ext4_do_writepages() ext4_init_io_end() kmem_cache_zalloc(io_end_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) fs_reclaim frees dentry... dentry_unlink_inode() iput() - last ref => iput_final() - inode dirty => write_inode_now()... ext4_writepages() tries to acquire sbi->s_writepages_rwsem and blocks forever Make sure we cannot recurse into filesystem reclaim from writeback code to avoid the deadlock. Reported-by: syzbot+6898da502aef574c5f8a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000004c66b405fa108e27@google.com Fixes: c8585c6fcaf2 ("ext4: fix races between changing inode journal mode and ext4_writepages") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- fs/ext4/migrate.c | 11 ++++++----- 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 18cb2680dc39..92df861227dd 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -1684,6 +1684,30 @@ static inline struct ext4_inode_info *EXT4_I(struct inode *inode) return container_of(inode, struct ext4_inode_info, vfs_inode); } +static inline int ext4_writepages_down_read(struct super_block *sb) +{ + percpu_down_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + return memalloc_nofs_save(); +} + +static inline void ext4_writepages_up_read(struct super_block *sb, int ctx) +{ + memalloc_nofs_restore(ctx); + percpu_up_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); +} + +static inline int ext4_writepages_down_write(struct super_block *sb) +{ + percpu_down_write(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + return memalloc_nofs_save(); +} + +static inline void ext4_writepages_up_write(struct super_block *sb, int ctx) +{ + memalloc_nofs_restore(ctx); + percpu_up_write(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); +} + static inline int ext4_valid_inum(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) { return ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO || diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index ffbbd9626bd8..b6dc795b61ad 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -2783,11 +2783,12 @@ static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, .can_map = 1, }; int ret; + int alloc_ctx; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(sb)))) return -EIO; - percpu_down_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_read(sb); ret = ext4_do_writepages(&mpd); /* * For data=journal writeback we could have come across pages marked @@ -2796,7 +2797,7 @@ static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, */ if (!ret && mpd.journalled_more_data) ret = ext4_do_writepages(&mpd); - percpu_up_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_read(sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } @@ -2824,17 +2825,18 @@ static int ext4_dax_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, long nr_to_write = wbc->nr_to_write; struct inode *inode = mapping->host; struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(mapping->host->i_sb); + int alloc_ctx; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)))) return -EIO; - percpu_down_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_read(inode->i_sb); trace_ext4_writepages(inode, wbc); ret = dax_writeback_mapping_range(mapping, sbi->s_daxdev, wbc); trace_ext4_writepages_result(inode, wbc, ret, nr_to_write - wbc->nr_to_write); - percpu_up_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_read(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } @@ -5925,7 +5927,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) journal_t *journal; handle_t *handle; int err; - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); + int alloc_ctx; /* * We have to be very careful here: changing a data block's @@ -5963,7 +5965,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) } } - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal); /* @@ -5980,7 +5982,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) err = jbd2_journal_flush(journal, 0); if (err < 0) { jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return err; } ext4_clear_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_JOURNAL_DATA); @@ -5988,7 +5990,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) ext4_set_aops(inode); jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); if (val) filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping); diff --git a/fs/ext4/migrate.c b/fs/ext4/migrate.c index a19a9661646e..d98ac2af8199 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/migrate.c +++ b/fs/ext4/migrate.c @@ -408,7 +408,6 @@ static int free_ext_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) { - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); handle_t *handle; int retval = 0, i; __le32 *i_data; @@ -418,6 +417,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) unsigned long max_entries; __u32 goal, tmp_csum_seed; uid_t owner[2]; + int alloc_ctx; /* * If the filesystem does not support extents, or the inode @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) */ return retval; - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); /* * Worst case we can touch the allocation bitmaps and a block @@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) unlock_new_inode(tmp_inode); iput(tmp_inode); out_unlock: - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return retval; } @@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) ext4_fsblk_t blk; handle_t *handle; int ret, ret2 = 0; + int alloc_ctx; if (!ext4_has_feature_extents(inode->i_sb) || (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) @@ -621,7 +622,7 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC)) ext4_alloc_da_blocks(inode); - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MIGRATE, 1); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { @@ -665,6 +666,6 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) ext4_journal_stop(handle); up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem); out_unlock: - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } -- 2.35.3

2 years, 7 months

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[PATCH 2/3] mm: Call arch_swap_restore() from arch_do_swap_page() and deprecate the latter

by Peter Collingbourne

The previous patch made it possible for MTE to restore tags before they are freed by hooking arch_do_swap_page(). However, the arch_do_swap_page() hook API is incompatible with swap restoration in circumstances where we do not have an mm or a vma, such as swapoff with swapped out shmem, and I expect that ADI will currently fail to restore tags in these circumstances. This implies that arch-specific metadata stores ought to be indexed by swap index, as MTE does, rather than by mm and vma, as ADI does, and we should discourage hooking arch_do_swap_page(), preferring to hook arch_swap_restore() instead, as MTE already does. Therefore, instead of directly hooking arch_do_swap_page() for MTE, deprecate that hook, change its default implementation to call arch_swap_restore() and rely on the existing implementation of the latter for MTE. Fixes: c145e0b47c77 ("mm: streamline COW logic in do_swap_page()") Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Id2f1ad76eaf606ae210e1d2dd0b7fe287… Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc(a)google.com> Reported-by: Qun-wei Lin (林群崴) <Qun-wei.Lin(a)mediatek.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/5050805753ac469e8d727c797c2218a9d780d434.camel@… Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.1 --- include/linux/pgtable.h | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h index c63cd44777ec..fc0259cf60fb 100644 --- a/include/linux/pgtable.h +++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h @@ -740,6 +740,12 @@ static inline int pgd_same(pgd_t pgd_a, pgd_t pgd_b) set_pgd(pgdp, pgd); \ }) +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_SWAP_RESTORE +static inline void arch_swap_restore(swp_entry_t entry, struct folio *folio) +{ +} +#endif + #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_DO_SWAP_PAGE /* * Some architectures support metadata associated with a page. When a @@ -748,14 +754,14 @@ static inline int pgd_same(pgd_t pgd_a, pgd_t pgd_b) * processors support an ADI (Application Data Integrity) tag for the * page as metadata for the page. arch_do_swap_page() can restore this * metadata when a page is swapped back in. + * + * This hook is deprecated. Architectures should hook arch_swap_restore() + * instead, because this hook is not called on all code paths that can + * swap in a page, particularly those where mm and vma are not available + * (e.g. swapoff for shmem pages). */ -static inline void arch_do_swap_page(struct mm_struct *mm, - struct vm_area_struct *vma, - unsigned long addr, - pte_t pte, pte_t oldpte) -{ - -} +#define arch_do_swap_page(mm, vma, addr, pte, oldpte) \ + arch_swap_restore(pte_to_swp_entry(oldpte), page_folio(pte_page(pte))) #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_UNMAP_ONE @@ -798,12 +804,6 @@ static inline void arch_swap_invalidate_area(int type) } #endif -#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_SWAP_RESTORE -static inline void arch_swap_restore(swp_entry_t entry, struct folio *folio) -{ -} -#endif - #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PGD_OFFSET_GATE #define pgd_offset_gate(mm, addr) pgd_offset(mm, addr) #endif -- 2.40.1.606.ga4b1b128d6-goog

2 years, 7 months

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[PATCH] arm64/mm: don't WARN when alloc/free-ing device private pages

by John Hubbard

Although CONFIG_DEVICE_PRIVATE and hmm_range_fault() and related functionality was first developed on x86, it also works on arm64. However, when trying this out on an arm64 system, it turns out that there is a massive slowdown during the setup and teardown phases. This slowdown is due to lots of calls to WARN_ON()'s that are checking for pages that are out of the physical range for the CPU. However, that's a design feature of device private pages: they are specfically chosen in order to be outside of the range of the CPU's true physical pages. x86 doesn't have this warning. It only checks that pages are properly aligned. I've shown a comparison below between x86 (which works well) and arm64 (which has these warnings). memunmap_pages() pageunmap_range() if (pgmap->type == MEMORY_DEVICE_PRIVATE) __remove_pages() __remove_section() sparse_remove_section() section_deactivate() depopulate_section_memmap() /* arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c */ vmemmap_free() { WARN_ON((start < VMEMMAP_START) || (end > VMEMMAP_END)); ... } /* arch/x86/mm/init_64.c */ vmemmap_free() { VM_BUG_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)); VM_BUG_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(end)); ... } So, the warning is a false positive for this case. Therefore, skip the warning if CONFIG_DEVICE_PRIVATE is set. Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard(a)nvidia.com> cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> --- arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c index 6f9d8898a025..d5c9b611a8d1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c @@ -1157,8 +1157,10 @@ int __meminit vmemmap_check_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, int node, int __meminit vmemmap_populate(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int node, struct vmem_altmap *altmap) { +/* Device private pages are outside of the CPU's physical page range. */ +#ifndef CONFIG_DEVICE_PRIVATE WARN_ON((start < VMEMMAP_START) || (end > VMEMMAP_END)); - +#endif if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_4K_PAGES)) return vmemmap_populate_basepages(start, end, node, altmap); else @@ -1169,8 +1171,10 @@ int __meminit vmemmap_populate(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int node, void vmemmap_free(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, struct vmem_altmap *altmap) { +/* Device private pages are outside of the CPU's physical page range. */ +#ifndef CONFIG_DEVICE_PRIVATE WARN_ON((start < VMEMMAP_START) || (end > VMEMMAP_END)); - +#endif unmap_hotplug_range(start, end, true, altmap); free_empty_tables(start, end, VMEMMAP_START, VMEMMAP_END); } -- 2.40.0

2 years, 7 months

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[PATCH 3/3] arm64: mte: Simplify swap tag restoration logic and fix uninitialized tag issue

by Peter Collingbourne

As a result of the previous two patches, there are no circumstances in which a swapped-in page is installed in a page table without first having arch_swap_restore() called on it. Therefore, we no longer need the logic in set_pte_at() that restores the tags, so remove it. Because we can now rely on the page being locked, we no longer need to handle the case where a page is having its tags restored by multiple tasks concurrently, so we can slightly simplify the logic in mte_restore_tags(). This patch also fixes an issue where a page can have PG_mte_tagged set with uninitialized tags. The issue is that the mte_sync_page_tags() function sets PG_mte_tagged if it initializes page tags. Then we return to mte_sync_tags(), which sets PG_mte_tagged again. At best, this is redundant. However, it is possible for mte_sync_page_tags() to return without having initialized tags for the page, i.e. in the case where check_swap is true (non-compound page), is_swap_pte(old_pte) is false and pte_is_tagged is false. So at worst, we set PG_mte_tagged on a page with uninitialized tags. This can happen if, for example, page migration causes a PTE for an untagged page to be replaced. If the userspace program subsequently uses mprotect() to enable PROT_MTE for that page, the uninitialized tags will be exposed to userspace. Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc(a)google.com> Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I8ad54476f3b2d0144ccd8ce0c1d7a2963… Fixes: e059853d14ca ("arm64: mte: Fix/clarify the PG_mte_tagged semantics") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.1 --- The Fixes: tag (and the commit message in general) are written assuming that this patch is landed in a maintainer tree instead of "arm64: mte: Do not set PG_mte_tagged if tags were not initialized". arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 14 ++------------ arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 32 +++----------------------------- arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c | 7 +++---- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h index 20dd06d70af5..dfea486a6a85 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static inline bool try_page_mte_tagging(struct page *page) } void mte_zero_clear_page_tags(void *addr); -void mte_sync_tags(pte_t old_pte, pte_t pte); +void mte_sync_tags(pte_t pte); void mte_copy_page_tags(void *kto, const void *kfrom); void mte_thread_init_user(void); void mte_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next); @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static inline bool try_page_mte_tagging(struct page *page) static inline void mte_zero_clear_page_tags(void *addr) { } -static inline void mte_sync_tags(pte_t old_pte, pte_t pte) +static inline void mte_sync_tags(pte_t pte) { } static inline void mte_copy_page_tags(void *kto, const void *kfrom) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h index b6ba466e2e8a..efdf48392026 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -337,18 +337,8 @@ static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, * don't expose tags (instruction fetches don't check tags). */ if (system_supports_mte() && pte_access_permitted(pte, false) && - !pte_special(pte)) { - pte_t old_pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep); - /* - * We only need to synchronise if the new PTE has tags enabled - * or if swapping in (in which case another mapping may have - * set tags in the past even if this PTE isn't tagged). - * (!pte_none() && !pte_present()) is an open coded version of - * is_swap_pte() - */ - if (pte_tagged(pte) || (!pte_none(old_pte) && !pte_present(old_pte))) - mte_sync_tags(old_pte, pte); - } + !pte_special(pte) && pte_tagged(pte)) + mte_sync_tags(pte); __check_safe_pte_update(mm, ptep, pte); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c index f5bcb0dc6267..c40728046fed 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c @@ -35,41 +35,15 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mte_async_or_asymm_mode); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mte_async_or_asymm_mode); #endif -static void mte_sync_page_tags(struct page *page, pte_t old_pte, - bool check_swap, bool pte_is_tagged) -{ - if (check_swap && is_swap_pte(old_pte)) { - swp_entry_t entry = pte_to_swp_entry(old_pte); - - if (!non_swap_entry(entry)) - mte_restore_tags(entry, page); - } - - if (!pte_is_tagged) - return; - - if (try_page_mte_tagging(page)) { - mte_clear_page_tags(page_address(page)); - set_page_mte_tagged(page); - } -} - -void mte_sync_tags(pte_t old_pte, pte_t pte) +void mte_sync_tags(pte_t pte) { struct page *page = pte_page(pte); long i, nr_pages = compound_nr(page); - bool check_swap = nr_pages == 1; - bool pte_is_tagged = pte_tagged(pte); - - /* Early out if there's nothing to do */ - if (!check_swap && !pte_is_tagged) - return; /* if PG_mte_tagged is set, tags have already been initialised */ for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++, page++) { - if (!page_mte_tagged(page)) { - mte_sync_page_tags(page, old_pte, check_swap, - pte_is_tagged); + if (try_page_mte_tagging(page)) { + mte_clear_page_tags(page_address(page)); set_page_mte_tagged(page); } } diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c index cd508ba80ab1..3a78bf1b1364 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c @@ -53,10 +53,9 @@ void mte_restore_tags(swp_entry_t entry, struct page *page) if (!tags) return; - if (try_page_mte_tagging(page)) { - mte_restore_page_tags(page_address(page), tags); - set_page_mte_tagged(page); - } + WARN_ON_ONCE(!try_page_mte_tagging(page)); + mte_restore_page_tags(page_address(page), tags); + set_page_mte_tagged(page); } void mte_invalidate_tags(int type, pgoff_t offset) -- 2.40.1.606.ga4b1b128d6-goog

2 years, 7 months

1
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+ kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins.patch added to mm-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: kasan: use internal prototypes matching gcc-13 builtins has been added to the -mm mm-unstable branch. Its filename is kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Subject: kasan: use internal prototypes matching gcc-13 builtins Date: Tue, 9 May 2023 16:57:21 +0200 gcc-13 warns about function definitions for builtin interfaces that have a different prototype, e.g.: In file included from kasan_test.c:31: kasan.h:574:6: error: conflicting types for built-in function '__asan_register_globals'; expected 'void(void *, long int)' [-Werror=builtin-declaration-mismatch] 574 | void __asan_register_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size); kasan.h:577:6: error: conflicting types for built-in function '__asan_alloca_poison'; expected 'void(void *, long int)' [-Werror=builtin-declaration-mismatch] 577 | void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size); kasan.h:580:6: error: conflicting types for built-in function '__asan_load1'; expected 'void(void *)' [-Werror=builtin-declaration-mismatch] 580 | void __asan_load1(unsigned long addr); kasan.h:581:6: error: conflicting types for built-in function '__asan_store1'; expected 'void(void *)' [-Werror=builtin-declaration-mismatch] 581 | void __asan_store1(unsigned long addr); kasan.h:643:6: error: conflicting types for built-in function '__hwasan_tag_memory'; expected 'void(void *, unsigned char, long int)' [-Werror=builtin-declaration-mismatch] 643 | void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size); The two problems are: - Addresses are passes as 'unsigned long' in the kernel, but gcc-13 expects a 'void *'. - sizes meant to use a signed ssize_t rather than size_t. Change all the prototypes to match these. Using 'void *' consistently for addresses gets rid of a couple of type casts, so push that down to the leaf functions where possible. This now passes all randconfig builds on arm, arm64 and x86, but I have not tested it on the other architectures that support kasan, since they tend to fail randconfig builds in other ways. This might fail if any of the 32-bit architectures expect a 'long' instead of 'int' for the size argument. The __asan_allocas_unpoison() function prototype is somewhat weird, since it uses a pointer for 'stack_top' and an size_t for 'stack_bottom'. This looks like it is meant to be 'addr' and 'size' like the others, but the implementation clearly treats them as 'top' and 'bottom'. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230509145735.9263-2-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 2 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 2 include/linux/kasan.h | 2 mm/kasan/common.c | 2 mm/kasan/generic.c | 72 ++++++++-------- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 156 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ mm/kasan/report.c | 17 +-- mm/kasan/report_generic.c | 12 +- mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c | 2 mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c | 2 mm/kasan/shadow.c | 36 ++++---- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 20 ++-- 12 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 163 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c @@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ static int kasan_handler(struct pt_regs bool recover = esr & KASAN_ESR_RECOVER; bool write = esr & KASAN_ESR_WRITE; size_t size = KASAN_ESR_SIZE(esr); - u64 addr = regs->regs[0]; + void *addr = (void *)regs->regs[0]; u64 pc = regs->pc; kasan_report(addr, size, write, pc); --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ static void report_tag_fault(unsigned lo * find out access size. */ bool is_write = !!(esr & ESR_ELx_WNR); - kasan_report(addr, 0, is_write, regs->pc); + kasan_report((void *)addr, 0, is_write, regs->pc); } #else /* Tag faults aren't enabled without CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS. */ --- a/include/linux/kasan.h~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static inline void *kasan_reset_tag(cons * @is_write: whether the bad access is a write or a read * @ip: instruction pointer for the accessibility check or the bad access itself */ -bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, +bool kasan_report(const void *addr, size_t size, bool is_write, unsigned long ip); #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ --- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(con bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip) { if (!kasan_byte_accessible(address)) { - kasan_report((unsigned long)address, 1, false, ip); + kasan_report(address, 1, false, ip); return false; } return true; --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/mm/kasan/generic.c @@ -40,39 +40,39 @@ * depending on memory access size X. */ -static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_1(unsigned long addr) +static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_1(const void *addr) { - s8 shadow_value = *(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr); + s8 shadow_value = *(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr); if (unlikely(shadow_value)) { - s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK; + s8 last_accessible_byte = (unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK; return unlikely(last_accessible_byte >= shadow_value); } return false; } -static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_2_4_8(unsigned long addr, +static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_2_4_8(const void *addr, unsigned long size) { - u8 *shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr); + u8 *shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr); /* * Access crosses 8(shadow size)-byte boundary. Such access maps * into 2 shadow bytes, so we need to check them both. */ - if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) < size - 1)) + if (unlikely((((unsigned long)addr + size - 1) & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) < size - 1)) return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1); return memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1); } -static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(unsigned long addr) +static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(const void *addr) { - u16 *shadow_addr = (u16 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr); + u16 *shadow_addr = (u16 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr); /* Unaligned 16-bytes access maps into 3 shadow bytes. */ - if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE))) + if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE))) return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15); return *shadow_addr; @@ -120,26 +120,25 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long mem return bytes_is_nonzero(start, (end - start) % 8); } -static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(unsigned long addr, - size_t size) +static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(const void *addr, size_t size) { unsigned long ret; - ret = memory_is_nonzero(kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr), - kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr + size - 1) + 1); + ret = memory_is_nonzero(kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr), + kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size - 1) + 1); if (unlikely(ret)) { - unsigned long last_byte = addr + size - 1; - s8 *last_shadow = (s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)last_byte); + const void *last_byte = addr + size - 1; + s8 *last_shadow = (s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(last_byte); if (unlikely(ret != (unsigned long)last_shadow || - ((long)(last_byte & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) >= *last_shadow))) + (((long)last_byte & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) >= *last_shadow))) return true; } return false; } -static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned(unsigned long addr, size_t size) +static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned(const void *addr, size_t size) { if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { switch (size) { @@ -159,7 +158,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_po return memory_is_poisoned_n(addr, size); } -static __always_inline bool check_region_inline(unsigned long addr, +static __always_inline bool check_region_inline(const void *addr, size_t size, bool write, unsigned long ret_ip) { @@ -172,7 +171,7 @@ static __always_inline bool check_region if (unlikely(addr + size < addr)) return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); - if (unlikely(!addr_has_metadata((void *)addr))) + if (unlikely(!addr_has_metadata(addr))) return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); if (likely(!memory_is_poisoned(addr, size))) @@ -181,7 +180,7 @@ static __always_inline bool check_region return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); } -bool kasan_check_range(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, +bool kasan_check_range(const void *addr, size_t size, bool write, unsigned long ret_ip) { return check_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip); @@ -221,36 +220,37 @@ static void register_global(struct kasan KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE, false); } -void __asan_register_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size) +void __asan_register_globals(void *ptr, ssize_t size) { int i; + struct kasan_global *globals = ptr; for (i = 0; i < size; i++) register_global(&globals[i]); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_register_globals); -void __asan_unregister_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size) +void __asan_unregister_globals(void *ptr, ssize_t size) { } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_unregister_globals); #define DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(size) \ - void __asan_load##size(unsigned long addr) \ + void __asan_load##size(void *addr) \ { \ check_region_inline(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_); \ } \ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_load##size); \ __alias(__asan_load##size) \ - void __asan_load##size##_noabort(unsigned long); \ + void __asan_load##size##_noabort(void *); \ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_load##size##_noabort); \ - void __asan_store##size(unsigned long addr) \ + void __asan_store##size(void *addr) \ { \ check_region_inline(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_); \ } \ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_store##size); \ __alias(__asan_store##size) \ - void __asan_store##size##_noabort(unsigned long); \ + void __asan_store##size##_noabort(void *); \ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_store##size##_noabort) DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(1); @@ -259,24 +259,24 @@ DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(4); DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(8); DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(16); -void __asan_loadN(unsigned long addr, size_t size) +void __asan_loadN(void *addr, ssize_t size) { kasan_check_range(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_loadN); __alias(__asan_loadN) -void __asan_loadN_noabort(unsigned long, size_t); +void __asan_loadN_noabort(void *, ssize_t); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_loadN_noabort); -void __asan_storeN(unsigned long addr, size_t size) +void __asan_storeN(void *addr, ssize_t size) { kasan_check_range(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_storeN); __alias(__asan_storeN) -void __asan_storeN_noabort(unsigned long, size_t); +void __asan_storeN_noabort(void *, ssize_t); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_storeN_noabort); /* to shut up compiler complaints */ @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ void __asan_handle_no_return(void) {} EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_handle_no_return); /* Emitted by compiler to poison alloca()ed objects. */ -void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size) +void __asan_alloca_poison(void *addr, ssize_t size) { size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); size_t padding_size = round_up(size, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE) - @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE); const void *right_redzone = (const void *)(addr + rounded_up_size); - WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE)); + WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)addr, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE)); kasan_unpoison((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size), size - rounded_down_size, false); @@ -307,18 +307,18 @@ void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_alloca_poison); /* Emitted by compiler to unpoison alloca()ed areas when the stack unwinds. */ -void __asan_allocas_unpoison(const void *stack_top, const void *stack_bottom) +void __asan_allocas_unpoison(void *stack_top, ssize_t stack_bottom) { - if (unlikely(!stack_top || stack_top > stack_bottom)) + if (unlikely(!stack_top || stack_top > (void *)stack_bottom)) return; - kasan_unpoison(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top, false); + kasan_unpoison(stack_top, (void *)stack_bottom - stack_top, false); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_allocas_unpoison); /* Emitted by the compiler to [un]poison local variables. */ #define DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(byte) \ - void __asan_set_shadow_##byte(const void *addr, size_t size) \ + void __asan_set_shadow_##byte(const void *addr, ssize_t size) \ { \ __memset((void *)addr, 0x##byte, size); \ } \ --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/mm/kasan/kasan.h @@ -198,13 +198,13 @@ enum kasan_report_type { struct kasan_report_info { /* Filled in by kasan_report_*(). */ enum kasan_report_type type; - void *access_addr; + const void *access_addr; size_t access_size; bool is_write; unsigned long ip; /* Filled in by the common reporting code. */ - void *first_bad_addr; + const void *first_bad_addr; struct kmem_cache *cache; void *object; size_t alloc_size; @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static __always_inline bool addr_has_met * @ret_ip: return address * @return: true if access was valid, false if invalid */ -bool kasan_check_range(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, +bool kasan_check_range(const void *addr, size_t size, bool write, unsigned long ret_ip); #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static __always_inline bool addr_has_met #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ -void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size); +const void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size); size_t kasan_get_alloc_size(void *object, struct kmem_cache *cache); void kasan_complete_mode_report_info(struct kasan_report_info *info); void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row); @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ void kasan_print_aux_stacks(struct kmem_ static inline void kasan_print_aux_stacks(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object) { } #endif -bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, +bool kasan_report(const void *addr, size_t size, bool is_write, unsigned long ip); void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, unsigned long ip, enum kasan_report_type type); @@ -571,82 +571,82 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabl */ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark); -void __asan_register_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size); -void __asan_unregister_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size); +void __asan_register_globals(void *globals, ssize_t size); +void __asan_unregister_globals(void *globals, ssize_t size); void __asan_handle_no_return(void); -void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size); -void __asan_allocas_unpoison(const void *stack_top, const void *stack_bottom); +void __asan_alloca_poison(void *, ssize_t size); +void __asan_allocas_unpoison(void *stack_top, ssize_t stack_bottom); -void __asan_load1(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_store1(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_load2(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_store2(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_load4(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_store4(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_load8(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_store8(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_load16(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_store16(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_loadN(unsigned long addr, size_t size); -void __asan_storeN(unsigned long addr, size_t size); - -void __asan_load1_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_store1_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_load2_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_store2_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_load4_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_store4_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_load8_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_store8_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_load16_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_store16_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_loadN_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size); -void __asan_storeN_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size); - -void __asan_report_load1_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_report_store1_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_report_load2_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_report_store2_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_report_load4_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_report_store4_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_report_load8_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_report_store8_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_report_load16_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_report_store16_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __asan_report_load_n_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size); -void __asan_report_store_n_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size); - -void __asan_set_shadow_00(const void *addr, size_t size); -void __asan_set_shadow_f1(const void *addr, size_t size); -void __asan_set_shadow_f2(const void *addr, size_t size); -void __asan_set_shadow_f3(const void *addr, size_t size); -void __asan_set_shadow_f5(const void *addr, size_t size); -void __asan_set_shadow_f8(const void *addr, size_t size); - -void *__asan_memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len); -void *__asan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len); -void *__asan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len); - -void __hwasan_load1_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __hwasan_store1_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __hwasan_load2_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __hwasan_store2_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __hwasan_load4_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __hwasan_store4_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __hwasan_load8_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __hwasan_store8_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __hwasan_load16_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __hwasan_store16_noabort(unsigned long addr); -void __hwasan_loadN_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size); -void __hwasan_storeN_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size); - -void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size); - -void *__hwasan_memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len); -void *__hwasan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len); -void *__hwasan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len); +void __asan_load1(void *); +void __asan_store1(void *); +void __asan_load2(void *); +void __asan_store2(void *); +void __asan_load4(void *); +void __asan_store4(void *); +void __asan_load8(void *); +void __asan_store8(void *); +void __asan_load16(void *); +void __asan_store16(void *); +void __asan_loadN(void *, ssize_t size); +void __asan_storeN(void *, ssize_t size); + +void __asan_load1_noabort(void *); +void __asan_store1_noabort(void *); +void __asan_load2_noabort(void *); +void __asan_store2_noabort(void *); +void __asan_load4_noabort(void *); +void __asan_store4_noabort(void *); +void __asan_load8_noabort(void *); +void __asan_store8_noabort(void *); +void __asan_load16_noabort(void *); +void __asan_store16_noabort(void *); +void __asan_loadN_noabort(void *, ssize_t size); +void __asan_storeN_noabort(void *, ssize_t size); + +void __asan_report_load1_noabort(void *); +void __asan_report_store1_noabort(void *); +void __asan_report_load2_noabort(void *); +void __asan_report_store2_noabort(void *); +void __asan_report_load4_noabort(void *); +void __asan_report_store4_noabort(void *); +void __asan_report_load8_noabort(void *); +void __asan_report_store8_noabort(void *); +void __asan_report_load16_noabort(void *); +void __asan_report_store16_noabort(void *); +void __asan_report_load_n_noabort(void *, ssize_t size); +void __asan_report_store_n_noabort(void *, ssize_t size); + +void __asan_set_shadow_00(const void *addr, ssize_t size); +void __asan_set_shadow_f1(const void *addr, ssize_t size); +void __asan_set_shadow_f2(const void *addr, ssize_t size); +void __asan_set_shadow_f3(const void *addr, ssize_t size); +void __asan_set_shadow_f5(const void *addr, ssize_t size); +void __asan_set_shadow_f8(const void *addr, ssize_t size); + +void *__asan_memset(void *addr, int c, ssize_t len); +void *__asan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len); +void *__asan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len); + +void __hwasan_load1_noabort(void *); +void __hwasan_store1_noabort(void *); +void __hwasan_load2_noabort(void *); +void __hwasan_store2_noabort(void *); +void __hwasan_load4_noabort(void *); +void __hwasan_store4_noabort(void *); +void __hwasan_load8_noabort(void *); +void __hwasan_store8_noabort(void *); +void __hwasan_load16_noabort(void *); +void __hwasan_store16_noabort(void *); +void __hwasan_loadN_noabort(void *, ssize_t size); +void __hwasan_storeN_noabort(void *, ssize_t size); + +void __hwasan_tag_memory(void *, u8 tag, ssize_t size); + +void *__hwasan_memset(void *addr, int c, ssize_t len); +void *__hwasan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len); +void *__hwasan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len); -void kasan_tag_mismatch(unsigned long addr, unsigned long access_info, +void kasan_tag_mismatch(void *addr, unsigned long access_info, unsigned long ret_ip); #endif /* __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H */ --- a/mm/kasan/report.c~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/mm/kasan/report.c @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static void start_report(unsigned long * pr_err("==================================================================\n"); } -static void end_report(unsigned long *flags, void *addr) +static void end_report(unsigned long *flags, const void *addr) { if (addr) trace_error_report_end(ERROR_DETECTOR_KASAN, @@ -450,8 +450,8 @@ static void print_memory_metadata(const static void print_report(struct kasan_report_info *info) { - void *addr = kasan_reset_tag(info->access_addr); - u8 tag = get_tag(info->access_addr); + void *addr = kasan_reset_tag((void *)info->access_addr); + u8 tag = get_tag((void *)info->access_addr); print_error_description(info); if (addr_has_metadata(addr)) @@ -468,12 +468,12 @@ static void print_report(struct kasan_re static void complete_report_info(struct kasan_report_info *info) { - void *addr = kasan_reset_tag(info->access_addr); + void *addr = kasan_reset_tag((void *)info->access_addr); struct slab *slab; if (info->type == KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS) info->first_bad_addr = kasan_find_first_bad_addr( - info->access_addr, info->access_size); + (void *)info->access_addr, info->access_size); else info->first_bad_addr = addr; @@ -544,11 +544,10 @@ void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *ptr * user_access_save/restore(): kasan_report_invalid_free() cannot be called * from a UACCESS region, and kasan_report_async() is not used on x86. */ -bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write, +bool kasan_report(const void *addr, size_t size, bool is_write, unsigned long ip) { bool ret = true; - void *ptr = (void *)addr; unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save(); unsigned long irq_flags; struct kasan_report_info info; @@ -562,7 +561,7 @@ bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, si memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); info.type = KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS; - info.access_addr = ptr; + info.access_addr = addr; info.access_size = size; info.is_write = is_write; info.ip = ip; @@ -571,7 +570,7 @@ bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, si print_report(&info); - end_report(&irq_flags, ptr); + end_report(&irq_flags, (void *)addr); out: user_access_restore(ua_flags); --- a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c @@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ #include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" -void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size) +const void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size) { - void *p = addr; + const void *p = addr; if (!addr_has_metadata(p)) return p; @@ -362,14 +362,14 @@ void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(con #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */ #define DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(size) \ -void __asan_report_load##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr) \ +void __asan_report_load##size##_noabort(void *addr) \ { \ kasan_report(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_); \ } \ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_report_load##size##_noabort) #define DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(size) \ -void __asan_report_store##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr) \ +void __asan_report_store##size##_noabort(void *addr) \ { \ kasan_report(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_); \ } \ @@ -386,13 +386,13 @@ DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(4); DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(8); DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(16); -void __asan_report_load_n_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size) +void __asan_report_load_n_noabort(void *addr, ssize_t size) { kasan_report(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_report_load_n_noabort); -void __asan_report_store_n_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size) +void __asan_report_store_n_noabort(void *addr, ssize_t size) { kasan_report(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_); } --- a/mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #include "kasan.h" -void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size) +const void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size) { /* * Hardware Tag-Based KASAN only calls this function for normal memory --- a/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ #include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" -void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size) +const void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size) { u8 tag = get_tag(addr); void *p = kasan_reset_tag(addr); --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/mm/kasan/shadow.c @@ -28,13 +28,13 @@ bool __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) { - return kasan_check_range((unsigned long)p, size, false, _RET_IP_); + return kasan_check_range((void *)p, size, false, _RET_IP_); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_read); bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) { - return kasan_check_range((unsigned long)p, size, true, _RET_IP_); + return kasan_check_range((void *)p, size, true, _RET_IP_); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write); @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write); #undef memset void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) { - if (!kasan_check_range((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_)) + if (!kasan_check_range(addr, len, true, _RET_IP_)) return NULL; return __memset(addr, c, len); @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t l #undef memmove void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) { - if (!kasan_check_range((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || - !kasan_check_range((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) + if (!kasan_check_range(src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || + !kasan_check_range(dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) return NULL; return __memmove(dest, src, len); @@ -71,17 +71,17 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *sr #undef memcpy void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) { - if (!kasan_check_range((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || - !kasan_check_range((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) + if (!kasan_check_range(src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || + !kasan_check_range(dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) return NULL; return __memcpy(dest, src, len); } #endif -void *__asan_memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) +void *__asan_memset(void *addr, int c, ssize_t len) { - if (!kasan_check_range((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_)) + if (!kasan_check_range(addr, len, true, _RET_IP_)) return NULL; return __memset(addr, c, len); @@ -89,10 +89,10 @@ void *__asan_memset(void *addr, int c, s EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_memset); #ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE -void *__asan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) +void *__asan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len) { - if (!kasan_check_range((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || - !kasan_check_range((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) + if (!kasan_check_range(src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || + !kasan_check_range(dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) return NULL; return __memmove(dest, src, len); @@ -100,10 +100,10 @@ void *__asan_memmove(void *dest, const v EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_memmove); #endif -void *__asan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) +void *__asan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len) { - if (!kasan_check_range((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || - !kasan_check_range((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) + if (!kasan_check_range(src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || + !kasan_check_range(dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) return NULL; return __memcpy(dest, src, len); @@ -111,13 +111,13 @@ void *__asan_memcpy(void *dest, const vo EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_memcpy); #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS -void *__hwasan_memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) __alias(__asan_memset); +void *__hwasan_memset(void *addr, int c, ssize_t len) __alias(__asan_memset); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_memset); #ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE -void *__hwasan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) __alias(__asan_memmove); +void *__hwasan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len) __alias(__asan_memmove); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_memmove); #endif -void *__hwasan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) __alias(__asan_memcpy); +void *__hwasan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len) __alias(__asan_memcpy); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_memcpy); #endif --- a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c~kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins +++ a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c @@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ u8 kasan_random_tag(void) return (u8)(state % (KASAN_TAG_MAX + 1)); } -bool kasan_check_range(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, - unsigned long ret_ip) +bool kasan_check_range(const void *addr, size_t size, bool write, + unsigned long ret_ip) { u8 tag; u8 *shadow_first, *shadow_last, *shadow; @@ -133,12 +133,12 @@ bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *a } #define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size) \ - void __hwasan_load##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr) \ + void __hwasan_load##size##_noabort(void *addr) \ { \ - kasan_check_range(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_); \ + kasan_check_range(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_); \ } \ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_load##size##_noabort); \ - void __hwasan_store##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr) \ + void __hwasan_store##size##_noabort(void *addr) \ { \ kasan_check_range(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_); \ } \ @@ -150,25 +150,25 @@ DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(4); DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(8); DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(16); -void __hwasan_loadN_noabort(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) +void __hwasan_loadN_noabort(void *addr, ssize_t size) { kasan_check_range(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_loadN_noabort); -void __hwasan_storeN_noabort(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) +void __hwasan_storeN_noabort(void *addr, ssize_t size) { kasan_check_range(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort); -void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size) +void __hwasan_tag_memory(void *addr, u8 tag, ssize_t size) { - kasan_poison((void *)addr, size, tag, false); + kasan_poison(addr, size, tag, false); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory); -void kasan_tag_mismatch(unsigned long addr, unsigned long access_info, +void kasan_tag_mismatch(void *addr, unsigned long access_info, unsigned long ret_ip) { kasan_report(addr, 1 << (access_info & 0xf), access_info & 0x10, _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are kasan-add-kasan_tag_mismatch-prototype.patch kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins.patch

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+ kasan-add-kasan_tag_mismatch-prototype.patch added to mm-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: kasan: add kasan_tag_mismatch prototype has been added to the -mm mm-unstable branch. Its filename is kasan-add-kasan_tag_mismatch-prototype.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Subject: kasan: add kasan_tag_mismatch prototype Date: Tue, 9 May 2023 16:57:20 +0200 The kasan sw-tags implementation contains one function that is only called from assembler and has no prototype in a header. This causes a W=1 warning: mm/kasan/sw_tags.c:171:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'kasan_tag_mismatch' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 171 | void kasan_tag_mismatch(unsigned long addr, unsigned long access_info, Add a prototype in the local header to get a clean build. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230509145735.9263-1-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h~kasan-add-kasan_tag_mismatch-prototype +++ a/mm/kasan/kasan.h @@ -646,4 +646,7 @@ void *__hwasan_memset(void *addr, int c, void *__hwasan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len); void *__hwasan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len); +void kasan_tag_mismatch(unsigned long addr, unsigned long access_info, + unsigned long ret_ip); + #endif /* __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H */ _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are kasan-add-kasan_tag_mismatch-prototype.patch kasan-use-internal-prototypes-matching-gcc-13-builtins.patch

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