- Linux-stable-mirror - lists.linaro.org

[PATCH] net: Fix error handling in netdev_register_kobject

by Ma Ke

After calling device_initialize(), the reference count of the device is set to 1. If device_add() fails or register_queue_kobjects() fails, the function returns without calling put_device() to release the initial reference, causing a memory leak of the device structure. Similarly, in netdev_unregister_kobject(), after calling device_del(), there is no call to put_device() to release the initial reference, leading to a memory leak. Add put_device() in the error paths of netdev_register_kobject() and after device_del() in netdev_unregister_kobject() to properly release the device references. Found by code review. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: a1b3f594dc5f ("net: Expose all network devices in a namespaces in sysfs") Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- net/core/net-sysfs.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c index ca878525ad7c..d3895f26a0c8 100644 --- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c +++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c @@ -2327,6 +2327,7 @@ void netdev_unregister_kobject(struct net_device *ndev) pm_runtime_set_memalloc_noio(dev, false); device_del(dev); + put_device(dev); } /* Create sysfs entries for network device. */ @@ -2357,7 +2358,7 @@ int netdev_register_kobject(struct net_device *ndev) error = device_add(dev); if (error) - return error; + goto out_put_device; error = register_queue_kobjects(ndev); if (error) { @@ -2367,6 +2368,10 @@ int netdev_register_kobject(struct net_device *ndev) pm_runtime_set_memalloc_noio(dev, true); + return 0; + +out_put_device: + put_device(dev); return error; } -- 2.17.1

1 week, 2 days

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[PATCH] arm64/pageattr: Propagate return value from __change_memory_common

by Dev Jain

Post a166563e7ec3 ("arm64: mm: support large block mapping when rodata=full"), __change_memory_common has a real chance of failing due to split failure. Before that commit, this line was introduced in c55191e96caa, still having a chance of failing if it needs to allocate pagetable memory in apply_to_page_range, although that has never been observed to be true. In general, we should always propagate the return value to the caller. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: c55191e96caa ("arm64: mm: apply r/o permissions of VM areas to its linear alias as well") Signed-off-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain(a)arm.com> --- Based on Linux 6.18-rc4. arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c index 5135f2d66958..b4ea86cd3a71 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ static int change_memory_common(unsigned long addr, int numpages, unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages; unsigned long end = start + size; struct vm_struct *area; + int ret; int i; if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(addr)) { @@ -185,8 +186,10 @@ static int change_memory_common(unsigned long addr, int numpages, if (rodata_full && (pgprot_val(set_mask) == PTE_RDONLY || pgprot_val(clear_mask) == PTE_RDONLY)) { for (i = 0; i < area->nr_pages; i++) { - __change_memory_common((u64)page_address(area->pages[i]), + ret = __change_memory_common((u64)page_address(area->pages[i]), PAGE_SIZE, set_mask, clear_mask); + if (ret) + return ret; } } -- 2.30.2

1 week, 2 days

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[PATCH v2 01/17] drm/xe/svm: Fix a debug printout

by Thomas Hellström

Avoid spamming the log with drm_info(). Use drm_dbg() instead. Fixes: cc795e041034 ("drm/xe/svm: Make xe_svm_range_needs_migrate_to_vram() public") Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com> Cc: Himal Prasad Ghimiray <himal.prasad.ghimiray(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.17+ Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c index 55c5a0eb82e1..894e8f092e3f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c @@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ bool xe_svm_range_needs_migrate_to_vram(struct xe_svm_range *range, struct xe_vm xe_assert(vm->xe, IS_DGFX(vm->xe)); if (xe_svm_range_in_vram(range)) { - drm_info(&vm->xe->drm, "Range is already in VRAM\n"); + drm_dbg(&vm->xe->drm, "Range is already in VRAM\n"); return false; } -- 2.51.1

1 week, 2 days

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[PATCH stable] notifiers: Add oops check in blocking_notifier_call_chain()

by Yi Yang

In hrtimer_interrupt(), interrupts are disabled when acquiring a spinlock, which subsequently triggers an oops. During the oops call chain, blocking_notifier_call_chain() invokes _cond_resched, ultimately leading to a hard lockup. Call Stack: hrtimer_interrupt//raw_spin_lock_irqsave __hrtimer_run_queues page_fault do_page_fault bad_area_nosemaphore no_context oops_end bust_spinlocks unblank_screen do_unblank_screen fbcon_blank fb_notifier_call_chain blocking_notifier_call_chain down_read _cond_resched If the system is in an oops state, use down_read_trylock instead of a blocking lock acquisition. If the trylock fails, skip executing the notifier callbacks to avoid potential deadlocks or unsafe operations during the oops handling process. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.6 Fixes: fe9d4f576324 ("Add kernel/notifier.c") Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/notifier.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/notifier.c b/kernel/notifier.c index b3ce28f39eb6..ebff2315fac2 100644 --- a/kernel/notifier.c +++ b/kernel/notifier.c @@ -384,9 +384,18 @@ int blocking_notifier_call_chain(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh, * is, we re-check the list after having taken the lock anyway: */ if (rcu_access_pointer(nh->head)) { - down_read(&nh->rwsem); - ret = notifier_call_chain(&nh->head, val, v, -1, NULL); - up_read(&nh->rwsem); + if (!oops_in_progress) { + down_read(&nh->rwsem); + ret = notifier_call_chain(&nh->head, val, v, -1, NULL); + up_read(&nh->rwsem); + } else { + if (down_read_trylock(&nh->rwsem)) { + ret = notifier_call_chain(&nh->head, val, v, -1, NULL); + up_read(&nh->rwsem); + } else { + ret = NOTIFY_BAD; + } + } } return ret; } -- 2.25.1

1 week, 2 days

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[PATCH net 0/6] selftests: mptcp: join: fix some flaky tests

by Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)

When looking at the recent CI results on NIPA and MPTCP CIs, a few MPTCP Join tests are marked as unstable. Here are some fixes for that. - Patch 1: a small fix for mptcp_connect.sh, printing a note as initially intended. For >=v5.13. - Patch 2: avoid unexpected reset when closing subflows. For >= 5.13. - Patches 3-4: longer transfer when not waiting for the end. For >=5.18. - Patch 5: read all received data when expecting a reset. For >= v6.1. - Patch 6: a fix to properly kill background tasks. For >= v6.5. Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> --- Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) (6): selftests: mptcp: connect: fix fallback note due to OoO selftests: mptcp: join: rm: set backup flag selftests: mptcp: join: endpoints: longer transfer selftests: mptcp: join: userspace: longer transfer selftests: mptcp: connect: trunc: read all recv data selftests: mptcp: join: properly kill background tasks tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.c | 18 +++-- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.sh | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh | 90 +++++++++++----------- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_lib.sh | 21 +++++ 4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 96a9178a29a6b84bb632ebeb4e84cf61191c73d5 change-id: 20251108-net-mptcp-sft-join-unstable-5a28cdb6ea54 Best regards, -- Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>

1 week, 2 days

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] rust: kbuild: treat `build_error` and `rustdoc` as kernel" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 16c43a56b79e2c3220b043236369a129d508c65a # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025110816-catalog-residency-716f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 16c43a56b79e2c3220b043236369a129d508c65a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org> Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2025 22:28:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] rust: kbuild: treat `build_error` and `rustdoc` as kernel objects Even if normally `build_error` isn't a kernel object, it should still be treated as such so that we pass the same flags. Similarly, `rustdoc` targets are never kernel objects, but we need to treat them as such. Otherwise, starting with Rust 1.91.0 (released 2025-10-30), `rustc` will complain about missing sanitizer flags since `-Zsanitizer` is a target modifier too [1]: error: mixing `-Zsanitizer` will cause an ABI mismatch in crate `build_error` --> rust/build_error.rs:3:1 | 3 | //! Build-time error. | ^ | = help: the `-Zsanitizer` flag modifies the ABI so Rust crates compiled with different values of this flag cannot be used together safely = note: unset `-Zsanitizer` in this crate is incompatible with `-Zsanitizer=kernel-address` in dependency `core` = help: set `-Zsanitizer=kernel-address` in this crate or unset `-Zsanitizer` in `core` = help: if you are sure this will not cause problems, you may use `-Cunsafe-allow-abi-mismatch=sanitizer` to silence this error Thus explicitly mark them as kernel objects. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # Needed in 6.12.y and later (Rust is pinned in older LTSs). Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/138736 [1] Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com> Tested-by: Justin M. Forbes <jforbes(a)fedoraproject.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251102212853.1505384-1-ojeda@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/rust/Makefile b/rust/Makefile index 23c7ae905bd2..a9fb9354b659 100644 --- a/rust/Makefile +++ b/rust/Makefile @@ -127,9 +127,14 @@ rustdoc-core: private rustc_target_flags = --edition=$(core-edition) $(core-cfgs rustdoc-core: $(RUST_LIB_SRC)/core/src/lib.rs rustdoc-clean FORCE +$(call if_changed,rustdoc) +# Even if `rustdoc` targets are not kernel objects, they should still be +# treated as such so that we pass the same flags. Otherwise, for instance, +# `rustdoc` will complain about missing sanitizer flags causing an ABI mismatch. +rustdoc-compiler_builtins: private is-kernel-object := y rustdoc-compiler_builtins: $(src)/compiler_builtins.rs rustdoc-core FORCE +$(call if_changed,rustdoc) +rustdoc-ffi: private is-kernel-object := y rustdoc-ffi: $(src)/ffi.rs rustdoc-core FORCE +$(call if_changed,rustdoc) @@ -147,6 +152,7 @@ rustdoc-pin_init: $(src)/pin-init/src/lib.rs rustdoc-pin_init_internal \ rustdoc-macros FORCE +$(call if_changed,rustdoc) +rustdoc-kernel: private is-kernel-object := y rustdoc-kernel: private rustc_target_flags = --extern ffi --extern pin_init \ --extern build_error --extern macros \ --extern bindings --extern uapi @@ -522,6 +528,10 @@ $(obj)/pin_init.o: $(src)/pin-init/src/lib.rs $(obj)/compiler_builtins.o \ $(obj)/$(libpin_init_internal_name) $(obj)/$(libmacros_name) FORCE +$(call if_changed_rule,rustc_library) +# Even if normally `build_error` is not a kernel object, it should still be +# treated as such so that we pass the same flags. Otherwise, for instance, +# `rustc` will complain about missing sanitizer flags causing an ABI mismatch. +$(obj)/build_error.o: private is-kernel-object := y $(obj)/build_error.o: private skip_gendwarfksyms = 1 $(obj)/build_error.o: $(src)/build_error.rs $(obj)/compiler_builtins.o FORCE +$(call if_changed_rule,rustc_library)

1 week, 2 days

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[merged mm-nonmm-stable] crash-let-architecture-decide-crash-memory-export-to-iomem_resource.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: crash: let architecture decide crash memory export to iomem_resource has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was crash-let-architecture-decide-crash-memory-export-to-iomem_resource.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-nonmm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm ------------------------------------------------------ From: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain(a)linux.ibm.com> Subject: crash: let architecture decide crash memory export to iomem_resource Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2025 19:58:31 +0530 With the generic crashkernel reservation, the kernel emits the following warning on powerpc: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c:341 add_system_ram_resources+0xfc/0x180 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.17.0-auto-12607-g5472d60c129f #1 VOLUNTARY Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX Power11 (architected) 0x820200 0xf000007 of:IBM,FW1110.01 (NH1110_069) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c00000000201de3c LR: c00000000201de34 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c000000127cef8a0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.17.0-auto-12607-g5472d60c129f) MSR: 8000000002029033 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 84000840 XER: 20040010 CFAR: c00000000017eed0 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00000000201de34 c000000127cefb40 c0000000016a8100 0000000000000001 GPR04: c00000012005aa00 0000000020000000 c000000002b705c8 0000000000000000 GPR08: 000000007fffffff fffffffffffffff0 c000000002db8100 000000011fffffff GPR12: c00000000201dd40 c000000002ff0000 c0000000000112bc 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000015a3808 GPR24: c00000000200468c c000000001699888 0000000000000106 c0000000020d1950 GPR28: c0000000014683f8 0000000081000200 c0000000015c1868 c000000002b9f710 NIP [c00000000201de3c] add_system_ram_resources+0xfc/0x180 LR [c00000000201de34] add_system_ram_resources+0xf4/0x180 Call Trace: add_system_ram_resources+0xf4/0x180 (unreliable) do_one_initcall+0x60/0x36c do_initcalls+0x120/0x220 kernel_init_freeable+0x23c/0x390 kernel_init+0x34/0x26c ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c This warning occurs due to a conflict between crashkernel and System RAM iomem resources. The generic crashkernel reservation adds the crashkernel memory range to /proc/iomem during early initialization. Later, all memblock ranges are added to /proc/iomem as System RAM. If the crashkernel region overlaps with any memblock range, it causes a conflict while adding those memblock regions as iomem resources, triggering the above warning. The conflicting memblock regions are then omitted from /proc/iomem. For example, if the following crashkernel region is added to /proc/iomem: 20000000-11fffffff : Crash kernel then the following memblock regions System RAM regions fail to be inserted: 00000000-7fffffff : System RAM 80000000-257fffffff : System RAM Fix this by not adding the crashkernel memory to /proc/iomem on powerpc. Introduce an architecture hook to let each architecture decide whether to export the crashkernel region to /proc/iomem. For more info checkout commit c40dd2f766440 ("powerpc: Add System RAM to /proc/iomem") and commit bce074bdbc36 ("powerpc: insert System RAM resource to prevent crashkernel conflict") Note: Before switching to the generic crashkernel reservation, powerpc never exported the crashkernel region to /proc/iomem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251016142831.144515-1-sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com Fixes: e3185ee438c2 ("powerpc/crash: use generic crashkernel reservation"). Signed-off-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain(a)linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/90937fe0-2e76-4c82-b27e-7b8a7fe3ac69@linux.ibm.… Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan he <bhe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Cc: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung(a)redhat.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/crash_reserve.h | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/crash_reserve.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/crash_reserve.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+) --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/crash_reserve.h~crash-let-architecture-decide-crash-memory-export-to-iomem_resource +++ a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/crash_reserve.h @@ -5,4 +5,12 @@ /* crash kernel regions are Page size agliged */ #define CRASH_ALIGN PAGE_SIZE +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_GENERIC_CRASHKERNEL_RESERVATION +static inline bool arch_add_crash_res_to_iomem(void) +{ + return false; +} +#define arch_add_crash_res_to_iomem arch_add_crash_res_to_iomem +#endif + #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_CRASH_RESERVE_H */ --- a/include/linux/crash_reserve.h~crash-let-architecture-decide-crash-memory-export-to-iomem_resource +++ a/include/linux/crash_reserve.h @@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ int __init parse_crashkernel(char *cmdli void __init reserve_crashkernel_cma(unsigned long long cma_size); #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_GENERIC_CRASHKERNEL_RESERVATION +#ifndef arch_add_crash_res_to_iomem +static inline bool arch_add_crash_res_to_iomem(void) +{ + return true; +} +#endif #ifndef DEFAULT_CRASH_KERNEL_LOW_SIZE #define DEFAULT_CRASH_KERNEL_LOW_SIZE (128UL << 20) #endif --- a/kernel/crash_reserve.c~crash-let-architecture-decide-crash-memory-export-to-iomem_resource +++ a/kernel/crash_reserve.c @@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ void __init reserve_crashkernel_cma(unsi #ifndef HAVE_ARCH_ADD_CRASH_RES_TO_IOMEM_EARLY static __init int insert_crashkernel_resources(void) { + if (!arch_add_crash_res_to_iomem()) + return 0; + if (crashk_res.start < crashk_res.end) insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &crashk_res); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from sourabhjain(a)linux.ibm.com are crash-fix-crashkernel-resource-shrink.patch

1 week, 2 days

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[merged mm-nonmm-stable] scs-fix-a-wrong-parameter-in-__scs_magic.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: scs: fix a wrong parameter in __scs_magic has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was scs-fix-a-wrong-parameter-in-__scs_magic.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-nonmm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm ------------------------------------------------------ From: Zhichi Lin <zhichi.lin(a)vivo.com> Subject: scs: fix a wrong parameter in __scs_magic Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2025 16:22:22 +0800 __scs_magic() needs a 'void *' variable, but a 'struct task_struct *' is given. 'task_scs(tsk)' is the starting address of the task's shadow call stack, and '__scs_magic(task_scs(tsk))' is the end address of the task's shadow call stack. Here should be '__scs_magic(task_scs(tsk))'. The user-visible effect of this bug is that when CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE is enabled, the shadow call stack usage checking function (scs_check_usage) would scan an incorrect memory range. This could lead to: 1. **Inaccurate stack usage reporting**: The function would calculate wrong usage statistics for the shadow call stack, potentially showing incorrect value in kmsg. 2. **Potential kernel crash**: If the value of __scs_magic(tsk)is greater than that of __scs_magic(task_scs(tsk)), the for loop may access unmapped memory, potentially causing a kernel panic. However, this scenario is unlikely because task_struct is allocated via the slab allocator (which typically returns lower addresses), while the shadow call stack returned by task_scs(tsk) is allocated via vmalloc(which typically returns higher addresses). However, since this is purely a debugging feature (CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE), normal production systems should be not unaffected. The bug only impacts developers and testers who are actively debugging stack usage with this configuration enabled. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251011082222.12965-1-zhichi.lin@vivo.com Fixes: 5bbaf9d1fcb9 ("scs: Add support for stack usage debugging") Signed-off-by: Jiyuan Xie <xiejiyuan(a)vivo.com> Signed-off-by: Zhichi Lin <zhichi.lin(a)vivo.com> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen(a)google.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Cc: Yee Lee <yee.lee(a)mediatek.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/scs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/kernel/scs.c~scs-fix-a-wrong-parameter-in-__scs_magic +++ a/kernel/scs.c @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static void scs_check_usage(struct task_ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE)) return; - for (p = task_scs(tsk); p < __scs_magic(tsk); ++p) { + for (p = task_scs(tsk); p < __scs_magic(task_scs(tsk)); ++p) { if (!READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*p)) break; used += sizeof(*p); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from zhichi.lin(a)vivo.com are

1 week, 2 days

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[PATCH v2] f2fs: invalidate dentry cache on failed whiteout creation

by Deepanshu Kartikey

F2FS can mount filesystems with corrupted directory depth values that get runtime-clamped to MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH. When RENAME_WHITEOUT operations are performed on such directories, f2fs_rename performs directory modifications (updating target entry and deleting source entry) before attempting to add the whiteout entry via f2fs_add_link. If f2fs_add_link fails due to the corrupted directory structure, the function returns an error to VFS, but the partial directory modifications have already been committed to disk. VFS assumes the entire rename operation failed and does not update the dentry cache, leaving stale mappings. In the error path, VFS does not call d_move() to update the dentry cache. This results in new_dentry still pointing to the old inode (new_inode) which has already had its i_nlink decremented to zero. The stale cache causes subsequent operations to incorrectly reference the freed inode. This causes subsequent operations to use cached dentry information that no longer matches the on-disk state. When a second rename targets the same entry, VFS attempts to decrement i_nlink on the stale inode, which may already have i_nlink=0, triggering a WARNING in drop_nlink(). Example sequence: 1. First rename (RENAME_WHITEOUT): file2 → file1 - f2fs updates file1 entry on disk (points to inode 8) - f2fs deletes file2 entry on disk - f2fs_add_link(whiteout) fails (corrupted directory) - Returns error to VFS - VFS does not call d_move() due to error - VFS cache still has: file1 → inode 7 (stale!) - inode 7 has i_nlink=0 (already decremented) 2. Second rename: file3 → file1 - VFS uses stale cache: file1 → inode 7 - Tries to drop_nlink on inode 7 (i_nlink already 0) - WARNING in drop_nlink() Fix this by explicitly invalidating old_dentry and new_dentry when f2fs_add_link fails during whiteout creation. This forces VFS to refresh from disk on subsequent operations, ensuring cache consistency even when the rename partially succeeds. Reproducer: 1. Mount F2FS image with corrupted i_current_depth 2. renameat2(file2, file1, RENAME_WHITEOUT) 3. renameat2(file3, file1, 0) 4. System triggers WARNING in drop_nlink() Fixes: 7e01e7ad746b ("f2fs: support RENAME_WHITEOUT") Reported-by: syzbot+632cf32276a9a564188d(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=632cf32276a9a564188d Suggested-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022233349.102728-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/ [v1] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406(a)gmail.com> --- Changes in v2: - Added detailed explanation about VFS not calling d_move() in error path, resulting in new_dentry still pointing to inode with zeroed i_nlink (suggested by Chao Yu) - Added Fixes tag pointing to commit 7e01e7ad746b - Added Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org for backporting to stable kernels --- fs/f2fs/namei.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c index b882771e4699..712479b7b93d 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c @@ -1053,9 +1053,11 @@ static int f2fs_rename(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *old_dir, if (whiteout) { set_inode_flag(whiteout, FI_INC_LINK); err = f2fs_add_link(old_dentry, whiteout); - if (err) + if (err) { + d_invalidate(old_dentry); + d_invalidate(new_dentry); goto put_out_dir; - + } spin_lock(&whiteout->i_lock); whiteout->i_state &= ~I_LINKABLE; spin_unlock(&whiteout->i_lock); -- 2.43.0

1 week, 2 days

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[PATCH 2/6] KVM: nSVM: Always recalculate LBR MSR intercepts in svm_update_lbrv()

by Yosry Ahmed

svm_update_lbrv() is called when MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is updated, and on nested transitions where LBRV is used. It checks whether LBRV enablement needs to be changed in the current VMCB, and if it does, it also recalculate intercepts to LBR MSRs. However, there are cases where intercepts need to be updated even when LBRV enablement doesn't. Example scenario: - L1 has MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR cleared. - L1 runs L2 without LBR_CTL_ENABLE (no LBRV). - L2 sets DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR in MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, svm_update_lbrv() sets LBR_CTL_ENABLE in VMCB02 and disables intercepts to LBR MSRs. - L2 exits to L1, svm_update_lbrv() is not called on this transition. - L1 clears MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, svm_update_lbrv() finds that LBR_CTL_ENABLE is already cleared in VMCB01 and does nothing. - Intercepts remain disabled, L1 reads to LBR MSRs read the host MSRs. Fix it by always recalculating intercepts in svm_update_lbrv(). Fixes: 1d5a1b5860ed ("KVM: x86: nSVM: correctly virtualize LBR msrs when L2 is running") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index d25c56b30b4e2..26ab75ecf1c67 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -806,25 +806,29 @@ void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb) vmcb_mark_dirty(to_vmcb, VMCB_LBR); } -void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static void __svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu); /* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr); } -static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + __svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu); + svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu); +} + +static void __svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); KVM_BUG_ON(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm), vcpu->kvm); svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu); /* * Move the LBR msrs back to the vmcb01 to avoid copying them @@ -853,13 +857,18 @@ void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)); - if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv) - return; + if (enable_lbrv && !current_enable_lbrv) + __svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu); + else if (!enable_lbrv && current_enable_lbrv) + __svm_disable_lbrv(vcpu); - if (enable_lbrv) - svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu); - else - svm_disable_lbrv(vcpu); + /* + * During nested transitions, it is possible that the current VMCB has + * LBR_CTL set, but the previous LBR_CTL had it cleared (or vice versa). + * In this case, even though LBR_CTL does not need an update, intercepts + * do, so always recalculate the intercepts here. + */ + svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu); } void disable_nmi_singlestep(struct vcpu_svm *svm) -- 2.51.2.1041.gc1ab5b90ca-goog

1 week, 2 days

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