As we reset the GPMI block at resume, the timing parameters setup by a
previous exec_op is lost. Rewriting GPMI timing registers on first exec_op
after resume fixes the problem.
Fixes: ef347c0cfd61 ("mtd: rawnand: gpmi: Implement exec_op")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal <esben(a)geanix.com>
---
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c
index 879df8402446..b9d5d55a5edb 100644
--- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/gpmi-nand/gpmi-nand.c
@@ -2727,6 +2727,10 @@ static int gpmi_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
return ret;
}
+ /* Set flag to get timing setup restored for next exec_op */
+ if (this->hw.clk_rate)
+ this->hw.must_apply_timings = true;
+
/* re-init the BCH registers */
ret = bch_set_geometry(this);
if (ret) {
--
2.25.0
Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
introduced the ability to opt out of audit messages for accesses to
various proc files since they are not violations of policy.
While doing so it somehow switched the check from ns_capable() to
has_ns_capability{_noaudit}(). That means it switched from checking the
subjective credentials of the task to using the objective credentials. I
couldn't find the original lkml thread and so I don't know why this switch
was done. But it seems wrong since ptrace_has_cap() is currently only used
in ptrace_may_access(). And it's used to check whether the calling task
(subject) has the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in the provided user namespace
to operate on the target task (object). According to the cred.h comments
this would mean the subjective credentials of the calling task need to be
used.
This switches it to use security_capable() because we only call
ptrace_has_cap() in ptrace_may_access() and in there we already have a
stable reference to the calling tasks creds under rcu_read_lock() so
there's no need to go through another series of dereferences and rcu
locking done in ns_capable{_noaudit}().
As one example where this might be particularly problematic, Jann pointed
out that in combination with the upcoming IORING_OP_OPENAT feature, this
bug might allow unprivileged users to bypass the capability checks while
asynchronously opening files like /proc/*/mem, because the capability
checks for this would be performed against kernel credentials.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Fixes: 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner(a)ubuntu.com>
---
/* v1 */
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200115171736.16994-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.c…
/* v2 */
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200116224518.30598-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.c…
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner(a)ubuntu.com>:
- fix incorrect CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, CAPT_OPT_NONE order
/* v3 */
- Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>:
- remove misleading reference to cread guard mutex from commit message
- replace if-branches with ternary ?: operator
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 14 +++++++-------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index cb9ddcc08119..6eb3ccf180e0 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
return ret;
}
-static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+static int ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ unsigned int mode)
{
- if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
- return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
- else
- return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ return security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+ (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) ? CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT :
+ CAP_OPT_NONE);
}
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
- if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
+ if (ptrace_has_cap(cred, tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
mm = task->mm;
if (mm &&
((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
base-commit: b3a987b0264d3ddbb24293ebff10eddfc472f653
--
2.25.0
Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
introduced the ability to opt out of audit messages for accesses to
various proc files since they are not violations of policy.
While doing so it somehow switched the check from ns_capable() to
has_ns_capability{_noaudit}(). That means it switched from checking the
subjective credentials of the task to using the objective credentials. I
couldn't find the original lkml thread and so I don't know why this switch
was done. But it seems wrong since ptrace_has_cap() is currently only used
in ptrace_may_access(). And it's used to check whether the calling task
(subject) has the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in the provided user namespace
to operate on the target task (object). According to the cred.h comments
this would mean the subjective credentials of the calling task need to be
used.
This switches it to use security_capable() because we only call
ptrace_has_cap() in ptrace_may_access() and in there we already have a
stable reference to the calling tasks creds under cred_guard_mutex so
there's no need to go through another series of dereferences and rcu
locking done in ns_capable{_noaudit}().
As one example where this might be particularly problematic, Jann pointed
out that in combination with the upcoming IORING_OP_OPENAT feature, this
bug might allow unprivileged users to bypass the capability checks while
asynchronously opening files like /proc/*/mem, because the capability
checks for this would be performed against kernel credentials.
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Fixes: 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner(a)ubuntu.com>
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index cb9ddcc08119..d146133e97f1 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -264,12 +264,13 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
return ret;
}
-static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+static int ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ unsigned int mode)
{
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
- return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ return security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
else
- return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ return security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NONE);
}
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
@@ -321,7 +322,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
- if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
+ if (ptrace_has_cap(cred, tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
@@ -340,7 +341,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
mm = task->mm;
if (mm &&
((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
base-commit: b3a987b0264d3ddbb24293ebff10eddfc472f653
--
2.25.0
Hello,
We ran automated tests on a recent commit from this kernel tree:
Kernel repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Commit: 3c8b6cdc962e - Linux 5.4.13-rc1
The results of these automated tests are provided below.
Overall result: PASSED
Merge: OK
Compile: OK
Tests: OK
All kernel binaries, config files, and logs are available for download here:
https://artifacts.cki-project.org/pipelines/387541
Please reply to this email if you have any questions about the tests that we
ran or if you have any suggestions on how to make future tests more effective.
,-. ,-.
( C ) ( K ) Continuous
`-',-.`-' Kernel
( I ) Integration
`-'
______________________________________________________________________________
Compile testing
---------------
We compiled the kernel for 3 architectures:
aarch64:
make options: -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
ppc64le:
make options: -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
x86_64:
make options: -j30 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg
Hardware testing
----------------
We booted each kernel and ran the following tests:
aarch64:
Host 1:
✅ Boot test
✅ Podman system integration test (as root)
✅ Podman system integration test (as user)
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
✅ Networking MACsec: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking sctp-auth: sockopts test
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func: local
✅ Networking route_func: forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns tunnel
✅ audit: audit testsuite test
✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity
✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ jvm test suite
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ LTP: openposix test suite
🚧 ✅ Networking vnic: ipvlan/basic
🚧 ✅ iotop: sanity
🚧 ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29
🚧 ✅ storage: dm/common
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ xfstests: ext4
✅ xfstests: xfs
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ lvm thinp sanity
⚡⚡⚡ storage: software RAID testing
⚡⚡⚡ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
Host 3:
✅ Boot test
✅ xfstests: ext4
✅ xfstests: xfs
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ lvm thinp sanity
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
ppc64le:
Host 1:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ xfstests: ext4
⚡⚡⚡ xfstests: xfs
⚡⚡⚡ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
⚡⚡⚡ lvm thinp sanity
⚡⚡⚡ storage: software RAID testing
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMI driver test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
⚡⚡⚡ Boot test
⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test (as root)
⚡⚡⚡ Podman system integration test (as user)
⚡⚡⚡ LTP
⚡⚡⚡ Loopdev Sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: memfd_create
⚡⚡⚡ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
⚡⚡⚡ Networking bridge: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Ethernet drivers sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking MACsec: sanity
⚡⚡⚡ Networking socket: fuzz
⚡⚡⚡ Networking sctp-auth: sockopts test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route: pmtu
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func: local
⚡⚡⚡ Networking route_func: forward
⚡⚡⚡ Networking TCP: keepalive test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking UDP: socket
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: gre basic
⚡⚡⚡ L2TP basic test
⚡⚡⚡ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
⚡⚡⚡ Networking ipsec: basic netns tunnel
⚡⚡⚡ audit: audit testsuite test
⚡⚡⚡ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity
⚡⚡⚡ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA PCM loopback test
⚡⚡⚡ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
⚡⚡⚡ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ jvm test suite
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ LTP: openposix test suite
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Networking vnic: ipvlan/basic
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ iotop: sanity
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Usex - version 1.9-29
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ storage: dm/common
Host 3:
✅ Boot test
✅ Podman system integration test (as root)
✅ Podman system integration test (as user)
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
✅ Networking MACsec: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking sctp-auth: sockopts test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func: local
✅ Networking route_func: forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns tunnel
✅ audit: audit testsuite test
✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity
✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ jvm test suite
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ LTP: openposix test suite
🚧 ✅ Networking vnic: ipvlan/basic
🚧 ✅ iotop: sanity
🚧 ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29
🚧 ✅ storage: dm/common
Host 4:
✅ Boot test
✅ xfstests: ext4
✅ xfstests: xfs
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ lvm thinp sanity
✅ storage: software RAID testing
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ✅ Storage blktests
x86_64:
Host 1:
⏱ Boot test
⏱ Storage SAN device stress - mpt3sas driver
Host 2:
⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests (marked
with ⚡⚡⚡) from running on this architecture.
This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested.
✅ Boot test
✅ xfstests: ext4
✅ xfstests: xfs
✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite
✅ lvm thinp sanity
✅ storage: software RAID testing
✅ stress: stress-ng
🚧 ✅ IOMMU boot test
🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test
🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test
🚧 ⚡⚡⚡ Storage blktests
Host 3:
⏱ Boot test
⏱ Storage SAN device stress - megaraid_sas
Host 4:
✅ Boot test
✅ Podman system integration test (as root)
✅ Podman system integration test (as user)
✅ LTP
✅ Loopdev Sanity
✅ Memory function: memfd_create
✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility)
✅ Networking bridge: sanity
✅ Ethernet drivers sanity
✅ Networking MACsec: sanity
✅ Networking socket: fuzz
✅ Networking sctp-auth: sockopts test
✅ Networking: igmp conformance test
✅ Networking route: pmtu
✅ Networking route_func: local
✅ Networking route_func: forward
✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test
✅ Networking UDP: socket
✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic
✅ L2TP basic test
✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns transport
✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns tunnel
✅ audit: audit testsuite test
✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity
✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf
✅ pciutils: sanity smoke test
✅ ALSA PCM loopback test
✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test
✅ storage: SCSI VPD
✅ trace: ftrace/tracer
🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon
🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites
🚧 ✅ jvm test suite
🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr
🚧 ✅ LTP: openposix test suite
🚧 ✅ Networking vnic: ipvlan/basic
🚧 ✅ iotop: sanity
🚧 ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29
🚧 ✅ storage: dm/common
Test sources: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker
💚 Pull requests are welcome for new tests or improvements to existing tests!
Waived tests
------------
If the test run included waived tests, they are marked with 🚧. Such tests are
executed but their results are not taken into account. Tests are waived when
their results are not reliable enough, e.g. when they're just introduced or are
being fixed.
Testing timeout
---------------
We aim to provide a report within reasonable timeframe. Tests that haven't
finished running are marked with ⏱. Reports for non-upstream kernels have
a Beaker recipe linked to next to each host.
From: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org>
On HDCP disable, clear the repeater bit. This ensures if we connect a
non-repeater sink after a repeater, the bit is in the state we expect.
Fixes: ee5e5e7a5e0f (drm/i915: Add HDCP framework + base implementation)
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Ramalingam C <ramalingam.c(a)intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)ffwll.ch>
Cc: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
Cc: intel-gfx(a)lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Reviewed-by: Ramalingam C <ramalingam.c(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191212190230.188505-3-sean@… #v2
Changes in v2:
-Added to the set
Changes in v3:
-None
I had previously agreed that clearing the rep_ctl bits on enable would
also be a good idea. However when I committed that idea to code, it
didn't look right. So let's rely on enables and disables being paired
and everything outside of that will be considered a bug
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c
index eaab9008feef..c4394c8e10eb 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c
@@ -773,6 +773,7 @@ static int _intel_hdcp_disable(struct intel_connector *connector)
struct intel_digital_port *intel_dig_port = conn_to_dig_port(connector);
enum port port = intel_dig_port->base.port;
enum transcoder cpu_transcoder = hdcp->cpu_transcoder;
+ u32 repeater_ctl;
int ret;
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("[%s:%d] HDCP is being disabled...\n",
@@ -787,6 +788,10 @@ static int _intel_hdcp_disable(struct intel_connector *connector)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
}
+ repeater_ctl = intel_hdcp_get_repeater_ctl(dev_priv, cpu_transcoder,
+ port);
+ I915_WRITE(HDCP_REP_CTL, I915_READ(HDCP_REP_CTL) & ~repeater_ctl);
+
ret = hdcp->shim->toggle_signalling(intel_dig_port, false);
if (ret) {
DRM_ERROR("Failed to disable HDCP signalling\n");
--
Sean Paul, Software Engineer, Google / Chromium OS
From: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org>
This patch fixes a few bugs:
1- We weren't taking into account sha_leftovers when adding multiple
ksvs to sha_text. As such, we were or'ing the end of ksv[j - 1] with
the beginning of ksv[j]
2- In the sha_leftovers == 2 and sha_leftovers == 3 case, bstatus was
being placed on the wrong half of sha_text, overlapping the leftover
ksv value
3- In the sha_leftovers == 2 case, we need to manually terminate the
byte stream with 0x80 since the hardware doesn't have enough room to
add it after writing M0
The upside is that all of the HDCP supported HDMI repeaters I could
find on Amazon just strip HDCP anyways, so it turns out to be _really_
hard to hit any of these cases without an MST hub, which is not (yet)
supported. Oh, and the sha_leftovers == 1 case works perfectly!
Fixes: ee5e5e7a5e0f (drm/i915: Add HDCP framework + base implementation)
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Ramalingam C <ramalingam.c(a)intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)ffwll.ch>
Cc: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
Cc: intel-gfx(a)lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Reviewed-by: Ramalingam C <ramalingam.c(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul(a)chromium.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191203173638.94919-2-sean@p… #v1
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191212190230.188505-2-sean@… #v2
Changes in v2:
-None
Changes in v3:
-None
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++------
include/drm/drm_hdcp.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c
index 0fdbd39f6641..eaab9008feef 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_hdcp.c
@@ -335,8 +335,10 @@ int intel_hdcp_validate_v_prime(struct intel_connector *connector,
/* Fill up the empty slots in sha_text and write it out */
sha_empty = sizeof(sha_text) - sha_leftovers;
- for (j = 0; j < sha_empty; j++)
- sha_text |= ksv[j] << ((sizeof(sha_text) - j - 1) * 8);
+ for (j = 0; j < sha_empty; j++) {
+ u8 off = ((sizeof(sha_text) - j - 1 - sha_leftovers) * 8);
+ sha_text |= ksv[j] << off;
+ }
ret = intel_write_sha_text(dev_priv, sha_text);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -426,7 +428,7 @@ int intel_hdcp_validate_v_prime(struct intel_connector *connector,
} else if (sha_leftovers == 2) {
/* Write 32 bits of text */
I915_WRITE(HDCP_REP_CTL, rep_ctl | HDCP_SHA1_TEXT_32);
- sha_text |= bstatus[0] << 24 | bstatus[1] << 16;
+ sha_text |= bstatus[0] << 8 | bstatus[1];
ret = intel_write_sha_text(dev_priv, sha_text);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -440,16 +442,27 @@ int intel_hdcp_validate_v_prime(struct intel_connector *connector,
return ret;
sha_idx += sizeof(sha_text);
}
+
+ /*
+ * Terminate the SHA-1 stream by hand. For the other leftover
+ * cases this is appended by the hardware.
+ */
+ I915_WRITE(HDCP_REP_CTL, rep_ctl | HDCP_SHA1_TEXT_32);
+ sha_text = DRM_HDCP_SHA1_TERMINATOR << 24;
+ ret = intel_write_sha_text(dev_priv, sha_text);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ sha_idx += sizeof(sha_text);
} else if (sha_leftovers == 3) {
- /* Write 32 bits of text */
+ /* Write 32 bits of text (filled from LSB) */
I915_WRITE(HDCP_REP_CTL, rep_ctl | HDCP_SHA1_TEXT_32);
- sha_text |= bstatus[0] << 24;
+ sha_text |= bstatus[0];
ret = intel_write_sha_text(dev_priv, sha_text);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
sha_idx += sizeof(sha_text);
- /* Write 8 bits of text, 24 bits of M0 */
+ /* Write 8 bits of text (filled from LSB), 24 bits of M0 */
I915_WRITE(HDCP_REP_CTL, rep_ctl | HDCP_SHA1_TEXT_8);
ret = intel_write_sha_text(dev_priv, bstatus[1]);
if (ret < 0)
diff --git a/include/drm/drm_hdcp.h b/include/drm/drm_hdcp.h
index 06a11202a097..20498c822204 100644
--- a/include/drm/drm_hdcp.h
+++ b/include/drm/drm_hdcp.h
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
/* Slave address for the HDCP registers in the receiver */
#define DRM_HDCP_DDC_ADDR 0x3A
+/* Value to use at the end of the SHA-1 bytestream used for repeaters */
+#define DRM_HDCP_SHA1_TERMINATOR 0x80
+
/* HDCP register offsets for HDMI/DVI devices */
#define DRM_HDCP_DDC_BKSV 0x00
#define DRM_HDCP_DDC_RI_PRIME 0x08
--
Sean Paul, Software Engineer, Google / Chromium OS
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: keyspan: handle unbound ports
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 3018dd3fa114b13261e9599ddb5656ef97a1fa17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 10:50:25 +0100
Subject: USB: serial: keyspan: handle unbound ports
Check for NULL port data in the control URB completion handlers to avoid
dereferencing a NULL pointer in the unlikely case where a port device
isn't bound to a driver (e.g. after an allocation failure on port
probe()).
Fixes: 0ca1268e109a ("USB Serial Keyspan: add support for USA-49WG & USA-28XG")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/keyspan.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/keyspan.c b/drivers/usb/serial/keyspan.c
index e66a59ef43a1..aa3dbce22cfb 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/keyspan.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/keyspan.c
@@ -1058,6 +1058,8 @@ static void usa49_glocont_callback(struct urb *urb)
for (i = 0; i < serial->num_ports; ++i) {
port = serial->port[i];
p_priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
+ if (!p_priv)
+ continue;
if (p_priv->resend_cont) {
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - sending setup\n", __func__);
@@ -1459,6 +1461,8 @@ static void usa67_glocont_callback(struct urb *urb)
for (i = 0; i < serial->num_ports; ++i) {
port = serial->port[i];
p_priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
+ if (!p_priv)
+ continue;
if (p_priv->resend_cont) {
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - sending setup\n", __func__);
--
2.25.0
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: serial: quatech2: handle unbound ports
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 9715a43eea77e42678a1002623f2d9a78f5b81a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 15:35:26 +0100
Subject: USB: serial: quatech2: handle unbound ports
Check for NULL port data in the modem- and line-status handlers to avoid
dereferencing a NULL pointer in the unlikely case where a port device
isn't bound to a driver (e.g. after an allocation failure on port
probe).
Note that the other (stubbed) event handlers qt2_process_xmit_empty()
and qt2_process_flush() would need similar sanity checks in case they
are ever implemented.
Fixes: f7a33e608d9a ("USB: serial: add quatech2 usb to serial driver")
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 3.5
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/quatech2.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/quatech2.c b/drivers/usb/serial/quatech2.c
index a62981ca7a73..f93b81a297d6 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/quatech2.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/quatech2.c
@@ -841,7 +841,10 @@ static void qt2_update_msr(struct usb_serial_port *port, unsigned char *ch)
u8 newMSR = (u8) *ch;
unsigned long flags;
+ /* May be called from qt2_process_read_urb() for an unbound port. */
port_priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
+ if (!port_priv)
+ return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&port_priv->lock, flags);
port_priv->shadowMSR = newMSR;
@@ -869,7 +872,10 @@ static void qt2_update_lsr(struct usb_serial_port *port, unsigned char *ch)
unsigned long flags;
u8 newLSR = (u8) *ch;
+ /* May be called from qt2_process_read_urb() for an unbound port. */
port_priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
+ if (!port_priv)
+ return;
if (newLSR & UART_LSR_BI)
newLSR &= (u8) (UART_LSR_OE | UART_LSR_BI);
--
2.25.0