6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@linaro.org
commit aab98e2dbd648510f8f51b83fbf4721206ccae45 upstream.
On 32bit systems the addition operations in ipc_msg_alloc() can potentially overflow leading to memory corruption. Add bounds checking using KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD to avoid overflow.
Fixes: 0626e6641f6b ("cifsd: add server handler for central processing and tranport layers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon linkinjeon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French stfrench@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c @@ -626,6 +626,9 @@ ksmbd_ipc_spnego_authen_request(const ch struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_request *req; struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response *resp;
+ if (blob_len > KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD) + return NULL; + msg = ipc_msg_alloc(sizeof(struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_request) + blob_len + 1); if (!msg) @@ -805,6 +808,9 @@ struct ksmbd_rpc_command *ksmbd_rpc_writ struct ksmbd_rpc_command *req; struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp;
+ if (payload_sz > KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD) + return NULL; + msg = ipc_msg_alloc(sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + payload_sz + 1); if (!msg) return NULL; @@ -853,6 +859,9 @@ struct ksmbd_rpc_command *ksmbd_rpc_ioct struct ksmbd_rpc_command *req; struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp;
+ if (payload_sz > KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD) + return NULL; + msg = ipc_msg_alloc(sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + payload_sz + 1); if (!msg) return NULL;