On 6/6/2019 4:49 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Thu, 2019-06-06 at 13:43 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
On 6/6/2019 1:26 PM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
Previous versions included the patch 'ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN EVM status'. However, I realized that this patch cannot be accepted alone because IMA-Appraisal would deny access to new files created during the boot. With the current behavior, those files are accessible because they have a valid security.ima (not protected by EVM) created after the first write.
A solution for this problem is to initialize EVM very early with a random key. Access to created files will be granted, even with the strict appraisal, because after the first write those files will have both security.ima and security.evm (HMAC calculated with the random key).
Strict appraisal will work only if it is done with signatures until the persistent HMAC key is loaded.
Changelog
v2:
- remove patch 1/3 (evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()); already accepted
- remove patch 3/3 (ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly); already accepted
- add new patch (evm: add option to set a random HMAC key at early boot)
- patch 2/3: modify patch description
Roberto, as I tried explaining previously, this feature is not a simple bug fix. These patches, if upstreamed, will be upstreamed the normal way, during an open window. Whether they are classified as a bug fix has yet to be decided.
Sorry, I understood that I can claim that there is a bug. I provided a motivation in patch 2/2.
Please stop Cc'ing stable. If I don't Cc stable before sending the pull request, then Greg and Sasha have been really good about deciding which patches should be backported. (Please refer to the comment on "Cc'ing stable" in section "5) Select the recipients for your patch" in Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.)
I'll review these patches, but in the future please use an appropriate patch set cover letter title in the subject line.
Ok.
Thanks
Roberto