6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org
commit 1cea8a280dfd1016148a3820676f2f03e3f5b898 upstream.
The ARCH_CAP_RRSBA check isn't correct: RRSBA may have already been disabled by the Spectre v2 mitigation (or can otherwise be disabled by the BHI mitigation itself if needed). In that case retpolines are fine.
Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6f56f13da34a0834b69163467449be7f58f253dc.171281347... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1537,20 +1537,25 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; }
+static bool __ro_after_init rrsba_disabled; + /* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void) { - u64 x86_arch_cap_msr; + if (rrsba_disabled) + return;
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL)) + if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) { + rrsba_disabled = true; return; + }
- x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL)) + return;
- if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) { - x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S; - update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base); - } + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S; + update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + rrsba_disabled = true; }
static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) @@ -1651,9 +1656,11 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation return;
/* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */ - if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && - !(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) - return; + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) { + spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(); + if (rrsba_disabled) + return; + }
if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis()) return; @@ -2808,8 +2815,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(voi return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP)) return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop"; - else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && - !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled) return "; BHI: Retpoline"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT)) return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop";