The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to stable@vger.kernel.org.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x a414016218ca97140171aa3bb926b02e1f68c2cc # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to 'stable@vger.kernel.org' --in-reply-to '2025041739-props-huff-8deb@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From a414016218ca97140171aa3bb926b02e1f68c2cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.ibm.com Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 10:45:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] ima: limit the number of ToMToU integrity violations
Each time a file in policy, that is already opened for read, is opened for write, a Time-of-Measure-Time-of-Use (ToMToU) integrity violation audit message is emitted and a violation record is added to the IMA measurement list. This occurs even if a ToMToU violation has already been recorded.
Limit the number of ToMToU integrity violations per file open for read.
Note: The IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU atomic flag must be set from the reader side based on policy. This may result in a per file open for read ToMToU violation.
Since IMA_MUST_MEASURE is only used for violations, rename the atomic IMA_MUST_MEASURE flag to IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # applies cleanly up to linux-6.6 Tested-by: Stefan Berger stefanb@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel pvorel@suse.cz Tested-by: Petr Vorel pvorel@suse.cz Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.ibm.com
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3423b3088de5..e0489c6f7f59 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr { #define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR 1 #define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2 #define IMA_DIGSIG 3 -#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4 +#define IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU 4 #define IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS 5
/* IMA integrity metadata associated with an inode */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 95118c1887cb..f3e7ac513db3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -129,14 +129,15 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) { if (!iint) iint = ima_iint_find(inode); + /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */ - if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, - &iint->atomic_flags)) + if (iint && test_and_clear_bit(IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU, + &iint->atomic_flags)) send_tomtou = true; } } else { if (must_measure) - set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags); + set_bit(IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU, &iint->atomic_flags);
/* Limit number of open_writers violations */ if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure) {