On Tue, 2022-11-22 at 14:39 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
Hi Roberto,
On Fri, 2022-11-04 at 13:20 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
From: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com
Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear mapping") requires that both the signature and the digest resides in the linear mapping area.
However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support"), made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, which could make the requirement of the first commit not satisfied anymore.
If CONFIG_SG=y and CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y, the following BUG() is triggered:
^CONFIG_DEBUG_SG
[ 467.077359] kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:163! [ 467.077939] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[...]
[ 467.095225] Call Trace: [ 467.096088] <TASK> [ 467.096928] ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0xe/0x50 [ 467.097569] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x13/0x70 [ 467.098123] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2c/0xd0 [ 467.098647] ? public_key_verify_signature+0x470/0x470 [ 467.099237] asymmetric_verify+0x14c/0x300 [ 467.099869] evm_verify_hmac+0x245/0x360 [ 467.100391] evm_inode_setattr+0x43/0x190
The failure happens only for the digest, as the pointer comes from the stack, and not for the signature, which instead was allocated by vfs_getxattr_alloc().
Only after enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_SG does EVM fail.
Fix this by making a copy of both in asymmetric_verify(), so that the linear mapping requirement is always satisfied, regardless of the caller.
As only EVM is affected, it would make more sense to limit the change to EVM.
I found another occurrence:
static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause) {
[...]
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, (const char *)xattr_value, xattr_len, hash.digest, hash.hdr.length);
Should I do two patches?
Thanks
Roberto