5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: James Morse james.morse@arm.com
[ Upstream commit 0dfefc2ea2f29ced2416017d7e5b1253a54c2735 ]
A malicious BPF program may manipulate the branch history to influence what the hardware speculates will happen next.
On exit from a BPF program, emit the BHB mititgation sequence.
This is only applied for 'classic' cBPF programs that are loaded by seccomp.
Signed-off-by: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h | 1 arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 2 - arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(s
enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void); bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope); +extern bool __nospectre_bhb; u8 get_spectre_bhb_loop_value(void); bool is_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigated(void); void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c @@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const cha #endif /* CONFIG_KVM */
static bool spectre_bhb_fw_mitigated; -static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb; +bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb; static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str) { __nospectre_bhb = true; --- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -7,14 +7,17 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "bpf_jit: " fmt
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/filter.h> #include <linux/printk.h> #include <linux/slab.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/debug-monitors.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
@@ -328,7 +331,48 @@ static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit #undef jmp_offset }
-static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx) +/* Clobbers BPF registers 1-4, aka x0-x3 */ +static void __maybe_unused build_bhb_mitigation(struct jit_ctx *ctx) +{ + const u8 r1 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_1]; /* aka x0 */ + u8 k = get_spectre_bhb_loop_value(); + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY) || + cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb || + arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) + return; + + if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) { + emit(aarch64_insn_gen_hint(AARCH64_INSN_HINT_CLEARBHB), ctx); + return; + } + + if (k) { + emit_a64_mov_i64(r1, k, ctx); + emit(A64_B(1), ctx); + emit(A64_SUBS_I(true, r1, r1, 1), ctx); + emit(A64_B_(A64_COND_NE, -2), ctx); + emit(aarch64_insn_gen_dsb(AARCH64_INSN_MB_ISH), ctx); + emit(aarch64_insn_get_isb_value(), ctx); + } + + if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigated()) { + emit(A64_ORR_I(false, r1, AARCH64_INSN_REG_ZR, + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3), ctx); + switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) { + case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC: + emit(aarch64_insn_get_hvc_value(), ctx); + break; + case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC: + emit(aarch64_insn_get_smc_value(), ctx); + break; + default: + pr_err_once("Firmware mitigation enabled with unknown conduit\n"); + } + } +} + +static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool was_classic) { const u8 r0 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_0]; const u8 r6 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_6]; @@ -347,10 +391,13 @@ static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ct emit(A64_POP(r8, r9, A64_SP), ctx); emit(A64_POP(r6, r7, A64_SP), ctx);
+ if (was_classic) + build_bhb_mitigation(ctx); + /* Restore FP/LR registers */ emit(A64_POP(A64_FP, A64_LR, A64_SP), ctx);
- /* Set return value */ + /* Move the return value from bpf:r0 (aka x7) to x0 */ emit(A64_MOV(1, A64_R(0), r0), ctx);
emit(A64_RET(A64_LR), ctx); @@ -1057,7 +1104,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(str }
ctx.epilogue_offset = ctx.idx; - build_epilogue(&ctx); + build_epilogue(&ctx, was_classic);
extable_size = prog->aux->num_exentries * sizeof(struct exception_table_entry); @@ -1089,7 +1136,7 @@ skip_init_ctx: goto out_off; }
- build_epilogue(&ctx); + build_epilogue(&ctx, was_classic);
/* 3. Extra pass to validate JITed code. */ if (validate_code(&ctx)) {