From: Mathias Krause minipli@grsecurity.net
[ Upstream commit fb509f76acc8d42bed11bca308404f81c2be856a ]
Guests like grsecurity that make heavy use of CR0.WP to implement kernel level W^X will suffer from the implied VMEXITs.
With EPT there is no need to intercept a guest change of CR0.WP, so simply make it a guest owned bit if we can do so.
This implies that a read of a guest's CR0.WP bit might need a VMREAD. However, the only potentially affected user seems to be kvm_init_mmu() which is a heavy operation to begin with. But also most callers already cache the full value of CR0 anyway, so no additional VMREAD is needed. The only exception is nested_vmx_load_cr3().
This change is VMX-specific, as SVM has no such fine grained control register intercept control.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause minipli@grsecurity.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230322013731.102955-7-minipli@grsecurity.net Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause minipli@grsecurity.net # backport to v6.1.x Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h index 3febc342360cc..896cc73949442 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
-#define KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS X86_CR0_TS +#define KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS (X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_WP) #define KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS \ (X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_DE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR \ | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_TSD | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 8e56ec6e72e9d..9d683b6067c7b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -4460,7 +4460,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, * CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK is already set in the original vmcs01 * (KVM doesn't change it); */ - vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS; + vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = vmx_l1_guest_owned_cr0_bits(); vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr0);
/* Same as above - no reason to call set_cr4_guest_host_mask(). */ @@ -4611,7 +4611,7 @@ static void nested_vmx_restore_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) */ vmx_set_efer(vcpu, nested_vmx_get_vmcs01_guest_efer(vmx));
- vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS; + vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = vmx_l1_guest_owned_cr0_bits(); vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs_readl(CR0_READ_SHADOW));
vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = ~vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 4984357c5d441..07aab85922441 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -4695,7 +4695,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) /* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */ vm_entry_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmentry_ctrl());
- vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS; + vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = vmx_l1_guest_owned_cr0_bits(); vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits);
set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index a3da84f4ea456..e2b04f4c0fef3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -640,6 +640,24 @@ BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(tertiary_exec, TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 64) (1 << VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1) | \ (1 << VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2))
+static inline unsigned long vmx_l1_guest_owned_cr0_bits(void) +{ + unsigned long bits = KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS; + + /* + * CR0.WP needs to be intercepted when KVM is shadowing legacy paging + * in order to construct shadow PTEs with the correct protections. + * Note! CR0.WP technically can be passed through to the guest if + * paging is disabled, but checking CR0.PG would generate a cyclical + * dependency of sorts due to forcing the caller to ensure CR0 holds + * the correct value prior to determining which CR0 bits can be owned + * by L1. Keep it simple and limit the optimization to EPT. + */ + if (!enable_ept) + bits &= ~X86_CR0_WP; + return bits; +} + static inline struct kvm_vmx *to_kvm_vmx(struct kvm *kvm) { return container_of(kvm, struct kvm_vmx, kvm);