3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com
commit df7342b240185d58d3d9665c0bbf0a0f5570ec29 upstream.
Jonathan Calmels from NVIDIA reported that he's able to bypass the mount visibility security check in place in the Linux kernel by using a combination of the unbindable property along with the private mount propagation option to allow a unprivileged user to see a path which was purposefully hidden by the root user.
Reproducer: # Hide a path to all users using a tmpfs root@castiana:~# mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /sys/devices/ root@castiana:~#
# As an unprivileged user, unshare user namespace and mount namespace stgraber@castiana:~$ unshare -U -m -r
# Confirm the path is still not accessible root@castiana:~# ls /sys/devices/
# Make /sys recursively unbindable and private root@castiana:~# mount --make-runbindable /sys root@castiana:~# mount --make-private /sys
# Recursively bind-mount the rest of /sys over to /mnnt root@castiana:~# mount --rbind /sys/ /mnt
# Access our hidden /sys/device as an unprivileged user root@castiana:~# ls /mnt/devices/ breakpoint cpu cstate_core cstate_pkg i915 intel_pt isa kprobe LNXSYSTM:00 msr pci0000:00 platform pnp0 power software system tracepoint uncore_arb uncore_cbox_0 uncore_cbox_1 uprobe virtual
Solve this by teaching copy_tree to fail if a mount turns out to be both unbindable and locked.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5ff9d8a65ce8 ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users") Reported-by: Jonathan Calmels jcalmels@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- fs/namespace.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -1661,8 +1661,14 @@ struct mount *copy_tree(struct mount *mn struct mount *t = NULL; if (!(flag & CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(s)) { - s = skip_mnt_tree(s); - continue; + if (s->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) { + /* Both unbindable and locked. */ + q = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + goto out; + } else { + s = skip_mnt_tree(s); + continue; + } } if (!(flag & CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE) && is_mnt_ns_file(s->mnt.mnt_root)) {