On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 04:31:45PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 3:09 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 12:14 PM Tycho Andersen tycho@tycho.ws wrote:
As the comment notes, the return codes for TSYNC and NEW_LISTENER conflict, because they both return positive values, one in the case of success and one in the case of error. So, let's disallow both of these flags together.
While this is technically a userspace break, all the users I know of are still waiting on me to land this feature in libseccomp, so I think it'll be safe. Also, at present my use case doesn't require TSYNC at all, so this isn't a big deal to disallow. If someone wanted to support this, a path forward would be to add a new flag like TSYNC_AND_LISTENER_YES_I_UNDERSTAND_THAT_TSYNC_WILL_JUST_RETURN_EAGAIN, but the use cases are so different I don't see it really happening.
Finally, it's worth noting that this does actually fix a UAF issue: at the end of seccomp_set_mode_filter(), we have:
if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) { if (ret < 0) { listener_f->private_data = NULL; fput(listener_f); put_unused_fd(listener); } else { fd_install(listener, listener_f); ret = listener; } }out_free: seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
But if ret > 0 because TSYNC raced, we'll install the listener fd and then free the filter out from underneath it, causing a UAF when the task closes it or dies. This patch also switches the condition to be simply if (ret), so that if someone does add the flag mentioned above, they won't have to remember to fix this too.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen tycho@tycho.ws Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.0+
Thanks! Sorry I missed this. James, can you take this for Linus's fixes for v5.1? (Or should I send a pull request to you?)
Acked-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
Let's also add:
Reported-by: syzbot+b562969adb2e04af3442@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
kernel/seccomp.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index d0d355ded2f4..79bada51091b 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -500,7 +500,10 @@ seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter)
- Caller must be holding current->sighand->siglock lock.
- Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
- Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or
- in TSYNC mode: the pid of a thread which was either not in the correct
seccomp mode or did not have an ancestral seccomp filter*/
- in NEW_LISTENER mode: the fd of the new listener
static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags, struct seccomp_filter *filter) @@ -1256,6 +1259,16 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK) return -EINVAL;
/** In the successful case, NEW_LISTENER returns the new listener fd.* But in the failure case, TSYNC returns the thread that died. If you* combine these two flags, there's no way to tell whether something* succeded or failed. So, let's disallow this combination.also a tiny typo: succeeded
*/if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) &&(flags && SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER))also a typo: && should be &
Oh, yes. Do you want me to send another version?
Tycho