The patch below does not apply to the 6.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to stable@vger.kernel.org.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.9.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 7ca110f2679b7d1f3ac1afc90e6ffbf0af3edf0d # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to 'stable@vger.kernel.org' --in-reply-to '2024070837-moonlike-computing-e29c@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.9.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
7ca110f2679b ("tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()") a61809a33239 ("tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name()") f09fc6cee0dc ("tpm: Rename TPM2_OA_TMPL to TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY and make it local") eb24c9788cd9 ("tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes") 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append") 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") 033ee84e5f01 ("tpm: Add TCG mandated Key Derivation Functions (KDFs)") d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation") 17d89b2e2f76 ("tpm: Move buffer handling from static inlines to real functions") cf792e903aff ("tpm: Remove unused tpm_buf_tag()")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 7ca110f2679b7d1f3ac1afc90e6ffbf0af3edf0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2024 18:47:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()
Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_hmac_session*(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_hmac_session*() and remove the fallback implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger stefanb@linux.ibm.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@lin... Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Tested-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au # ppc Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index b3ed35e7ec00..2281d55df545 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -272,6 +272,110 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
+/** + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @attributes: The session attributes + * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) + * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) + * + * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except + * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is + * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, + * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the + * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), + * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be + * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the + * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, + * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). + * + * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect + * and the TPM will reject the command. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, + int passphrase_len) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct tpm2_auth *auth; + u32 len; +#endif + + if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { + /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ + int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len; + + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) { + /* not the first session so update the existing length */ + len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); + } + /* auth handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); + /* nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); + /* attributes */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); + /* passphrase */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len); + tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len); + return; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + /* + * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros + * before computing the HMAC + */ + while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') + passphrase_len--; + + auth = chip->auth; + auth->attrs = attributes; + auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; + if (passphrase_len) + memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); + + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + /* we're not the first session */ + len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); + if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); + return; + } + + /* add our new session */ + len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + } + + /* random number for our nonce */ + get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); + /* our new nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); + /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); +#endif +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); + #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy, @@ -457,82 +561,6 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) crypto_free_kpp(kpp); }
-/** - * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @attributes: The session attributes - * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) - * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) - * - * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except - * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is - * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, - * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the - * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), - * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be - * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the - * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, - * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). - * - * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling - * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect - * and the TPM will reject the command. - * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, - int passphrase_len) -{ - u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; - u32 len; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - - /* - * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros - * before computing the HMAC - */ - while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 - && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') - passphrase_len--; - - auth->attrs = attributes; - auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; - if (passphrase_len) - memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); - - if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { - /* we're not the first session */ - len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); - if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { - WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); - return; - } - - /* add our new session */ - len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; - put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - } - - /* random number for our nonce */ - get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); - /* our new nonce */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); - /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); - /** * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() - finalize the session HMAC * @chip: the TPM chip structure @@ -563,6 +591,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_state sctx;
+ if (!auth) + return; + /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal;
@@ -721,6 +752,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal); int parm_len, len, i, handles;
+ if (!auth) + return rc; + if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n"); goto out; diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 4d3071e885a0..e93ee8d936a9 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -502,10 +502,6 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip)
void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle, u8 *name); - -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC - -int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -515,9 +511,27 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen) { - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, - passphraselen); + struct tpm_header *head; + int offset; + + if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, passphraselen); + } else { + offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + + /* + * If the only sessions are optional, the command tag must change to + * TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. + */ + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset) + head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); + } } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); @@ -532,48 +546,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, - int passphraselen) -{ - /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ - int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 len = 9 + passphraselen; - - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) { - /* not the first session so update the existing length */ - len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); - put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); - } - /* auth handle */ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); - /* nonce */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); - /* attributes */ - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); - /* passphrase */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphraselen); - tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphraselen); -} -static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, - u8 *passphrase, - int passphraselen) -{ - int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *) buf->data; - - /* - * if the only sessions are optional, the command tag - * must change to TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS - */ - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset) - head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); -} static inline void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) {