4.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Willem de Bruijn willemb@google.com
[ Upstream commit 2efd4fca703a6707cad16ab486eaab8fc7f0fd49 ]
Syzbot reported a read beyond the end of the skb head when returning IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242 CPU: 0 PID: 4501 Comm: syz-executor128 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #9 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1125 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x138/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1219 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1261 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline] put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242 ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl+0x1cf3/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:719 ip6_datagram_recv_ctl+0x41c/0x450 net/ipv6/datagram.c:733 rawv6_recvmsg+0x10fb/0x1460 net/ipv6/raw.c:521 [..]
This logic and its ipv4 counterpart read the destination port from the packet at skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4.
With MSG_MORE and a local SOCK_RAW sender, syzbot was able to cook a packet that stores headers exactly up to skb_transport_offset(skb) in the head and the remainder in a frag.
Call pskb_may_pull before accessing the pointer to ensure that it lies in skb head.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAF=yD-LEJwZj5a1-bAAj2Oy_hKmGygV6rsJ_WOrAYnv-fnayiQ... Reported-by: syzbot+9adb4b567003cac781f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn willemb@google.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 7 +++++-- net/ipv6/datagram.c | 7 +++++-- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c @@ -148,15 +148,18 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct { struct sockaddr_in sin; const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb); - __be16 *ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb); + __be16 *ports; + int end;
- if (skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4 > (int)skb->len) + end = skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4; + if (end > 0 && !pskb_may_pull(skb, end)) return;
/* All current transport protocols have the port numbers in the * first four bytes of the transport header and this function is * written with this assumption in mind. */ + ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
sin.sin_family = AF_INET; sin.sin_addr.s_addr = iph->daddr; --- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c +++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c @@ -700,13 +700,16 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(stru } if (np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr) { struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; - __be16 *ports = (__be16 *) skb_transport_header(skb); + __be16 *ports; + int end;
- if (skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4 <= (int)skb->len) { + end = skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4; + if (end <= 0 || pskb_may_pull(skb, end)) { /* All current transport protocols have the port numbers in the * first four bytes of the transport header and this function is * written with this assumption in mind. */ + ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; sin6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;