This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...
The filename of the patch is: x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.
Subject: x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:28 2018 -0800
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
commit babdde2698d482b6c0de1eab4f697cf5856c5859
array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software.
The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the control flow.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414808.33451.1873237130672785331.stgit@dwill... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -24,6 +24,30 @@ #define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory") #endif
+/** + * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the + * bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise + * @index: array element index + * @size: number of elements in array + * + * Returns: + * 0 - (index < size) + */ +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, + unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long mask; + + asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;" + :"=r" (mask) + :"r"(size),"r" (index) + :"cc"); + return mask; +} + +/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */ +#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE #define dma_rmb() rmb() #else
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from torvalds@linux-foundation.org are
queue-4.14/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.14/x86_Introduce_barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.14/x86get_user_Use_pointer_masking_to_limit_speculation.patch queue-4.14/x86_Introduce___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch queue-4.14/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.14/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.14/array_index_nospec_Sanitize_speculative_array_de-references.patch queue-4.14/Documentation_Document_array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86entry64_Remove_the_SYSCALL64_fast_path.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Remove_the_esprsp_thunk.patch queue-4.14/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/scripts-faddr2line-fix-cross_compile-unset-error.patch queue-4.14/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/x86asm_Move_status_from_thread_struct_to_thread_info.patch queue-4.14/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.14/x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.14/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch queue-4.14/moduleretpoline_Warn_about_missing_retpoline_in_module.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.14/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.14/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86uaccess_Use___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86entry64_Push_extra_regs_right_away.patch queue-4.14/x86usercopy_Replace_open_coded_stacclac_with___uaccess_begin_end.patch queue-4.14/vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.14/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch queue-4.14/x86spectre_Report_get_user_mitigation_for_spectre_v1.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.14/x86syscall_Sanitize_syscall_table_de-references_under_speculation.patch queue-4.14/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch