From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
commit bf30ca922a0c0176007e074b0acc77ed345e9990 upstream.
As pointed out by Mathy Vanhoef, we implement the RX PN check on fragmented frames incorrectly - we check against the last received PN prior to the new frame, rather than to the one in this frame itself.
Prior patches addressed the security issue here, but in order to be able to reason better about the code, fix it to really compare against the current frame's PN, not the last stored one.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.bfbc340ff071.Id0b690e581da7d03d76df... Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 11 +++++++++-- net/mac80211/rx.c | 5 ++--- net/mac80211/wpa.c | 12 ++++++++---- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index f38748efb98a..790c771e8108 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -223,8 +223,15 @@ struct ieee80211_rx_data { */ int security_idx;
- u32 tkip_iv32; - u16 tkip_iv16; + union { + struct { + u32 iv32; + u16 iv16; + } tkip; + struct { + u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN]; + } ccm_gcm; + }; };
struct ieee80211_csa_settings { diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 39bc3d78f71a..a00ec2ccb363 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2082,7 +2082,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (entry->check_sequential_pn) { int i; u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn; - int queue;
if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; @@ -2097,8 +2096,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (pn[i]) break; } - queue = rx->security_idx; - rpn = rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue]; + + rpn = rx->ccm_gcm.pn; if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index e3bb69ba6887..09b4f913e20b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
update_iv: /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ - rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32; - rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16; + rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32; + rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16;
return RX_CONTINUE;
@@ -289,8 +289,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) key, skb->data + hdrlen, skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr, hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx, - &rx->tkip_iv32, - &rx->tkip_iv16); + &rx->tkip.iv32, + &rx->tkip.iv16); if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
@@ -548,6 +548,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, }
memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); + if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) + memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); }
/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ @@ -777,6 +779,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) }
memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); + if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) + memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); }
/* Remove GCMP header and MIC */