5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com
commit c3b704d4a4a265660e665df51b129e8425216ed1 upstream.
This is a follow up of commit 915d975b2ffa ("net: deal with integer overflows in kmalloc_reserve()") based on David Laight feedback.
Back in 2010, I failed to realize malicious users could set dev->mtu to arbitrary values. This mtu has been since limited to 0x7fffffff but regardless of how big dev->mtu is, it makes no sense for igmpv3_newpack() to allocate more than IP_MAX_MTU and risk various skb fields overflows.
Fixes: 57e1ab6eaddc ("igmp: refine skb allocations") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/d273628df80f45428e739274ab9ecb72@AcuMS.aculab... Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: David Laight David.Laight@ACULAB.COM Cc: Kyle Zeng zengyhkyle@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Simon Horman horms@kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -355,8 +355,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *igmpv3_newpack(st struct flowi4 fl4; int hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); int tlen = dev->needed_tailroom; - unsigned int size = mtu; + unsigned int size;
+ size = min(mtu, IP_MAX_MTU); while (1) { skb = alloc_skb(size + hlen + tlen, GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN);