3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit ce402f044e4e432c296f90eaabb8dbe8f3624391 ]
When auth is enabled for cookie-ack chunk, in sctp_inq_pop, sctp processes auth chunk first, then continues to the next chunk in this packet if chunk_end + chunk_hdr size < skb_tail_pointer(). Otherwise, it will go to the next packet or discard this chunk.
However, it missed the fact that cookie-ack chunk's size is equal to chunk_hdr size, which couldn't match that check, and thus this chunk would not get processed.
This patch fixes it by changing the check to chunk_end + chunk_hdr size <= skb_tail_pointer().
Fixes: 26b87c788100 ("net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing") Signed-off-by: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com Acked-by: Neil Horman nhorman@tuxdriver.com Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner marcelo.leitner@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/sctp/inqueue.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c +++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct s skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid. */
- if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) < + if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) <= skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) { /* This is not a singleton */ chunk->singleton = 0;