3.16.52-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com
commit 7fc0786d956d9e59b68d282be9b156179846ea3d upstream.
In keyctl_read_key(), if key_permission() were to return an error code other than EACCES, we would leak a the reference to the key. This can't actually happen currently because key_permission() can only return an error code other than EACCES if security_key_permission() does, only SELinux and Smack implement that hook, and neither can return an error code other than EACCES. But it should still be fixed, as it is a bug waiting to happen.
Fixes: 29db91906340 ("[PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, if (ret == 0) goto can_read_key; if (ret != -EACCES) - goto error; + goto error2;
/* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be