From: Jeremy Linton jeremy.linton@arm.com
commit de19055564c8f8f9d366f8db3395836da0b2176c upstream.
For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the documentation reflects that.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton jeremy.linton@arm.com Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara andre.przywara@arm.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet corbet@lwn.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1845,6 +1845,12 @@ Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y, the default is off.
+ kpti= [ARM64] Control page table isolation of user + and kernel address spaces. + Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation. + 0: force disabled + 1: force enabled + kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs. Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)