On 2018/11/27 10:16, David Long wrote:
On 11/23/18 6:09 AM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
Hi Hanjun,
On 23/11/2018 09:40, Hanjun Guo wrote:
Hi Marc,
On 2018/11/23 17:10, Marc Zyngier wrote:
On 23/11/2018 01:25, Hanjun Guo wrote:
On 2018/10/31 22:04, David Long wrote:
From: "David A. Long" dave.long@linaro.org
V4.4 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch. Most KVM patches are excluded. Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.
I tested this patch set on top of stable 4.4 kernel, running on boards with A9 and A15 based Hisilicon SoCs, didn't see boot regression and other function regressions in our CI system,
Tested-by: Hanjun Guo hanjun.guo@linaro.org
Since this patch set didn't include PSCI based hardening for arm32, so bugfix 6282e916f774 ("ARM: 8809/1: proc-v7: fix Thumb annotation of cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm") is not needed for this patch set and this patch set is in a good shape I think. So what's the plan for this patch set?
Well, not having these patches means that a 32bit kernel won't be get any Spectre-v2 mitigation when run as a guest on an arm64 platform. It turns out that this is a pretty common setup among people building large pieces of SW, such as distributions.
I almost miss this point, that makes sense to me :)
I've been watching arm32 spectre patches appear since September and I have a work item to backport these too in the near future. I've been trying to focus on backporting 64-bit security patches to v4.4 in the shortterm though.
It's great, I'm happy to test your patches, please cc me for next version.
Thanks Hanjun