4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de
commit b617cfc858161140d69cc0b5cc211996b557a1c7 upstream
Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance impacting mitigations.
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with the following meaning:
Bit Define Description 0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is disabled 2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is enabled
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will fail.
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
The common return values are:
EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl() arguments are not 0 ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled
The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between architectures.
Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk konrad.wilk@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/nospec.h | 5 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 11 +++ kernel/sys.c | 22 +++++++ 5 files changed, 125 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ place where this information is gathered no_new_privs seccomp_filter unshare + spec_ctrl
.. only:: subproject and html
--- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +=================== +Speculation Control +=================== + +Quite some CPUs have speculation related misfeatures which are in fact +vulnerabilites causing data leaks in various forms even accross privilege +domains. + +The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various +forms. Some of these mitigations are compile time configurable and some on +the kernel command line. + +There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can +be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled +environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via +:manpage:`prctl(2)`. + +There are two prctl options which are related to this: + + * PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL + + * PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL + +PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL +----------------------- + +PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature +which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-2 with +the following meaning: + +==== ================ =================================================== +Bit Define Description +==== ================ =================================================== +0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by + PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL +1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is + disabled +2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is + enabled +==== ================ =================================================== + +If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. + +If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is +available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation +misfeature will fail. + +PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL +----------------------- +PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which +is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand +in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE. + +Common error codes +------------------ +======= ================================================================= +Value Meaning +======= ================================================================= +EINVAL The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused + prctl(2) arguments are not 0 + +ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature +======= ================================================================= + +PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes +----------------------------------- +======= ================================================================= +Value Meaning +======= ================================================================= +0 Success + +ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor + PR_SPEC_DISABLE + +ENXIO Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible. + See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL. +======= ================================================================= + +Speculation misfeature controls +------------------------------- +- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass + + Invocations: + * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); --- a/include/linux/nospec.h +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h @@ -55,4 +55,9 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_ \ (typeof(_i)) (_i & _mask); \ }) + +/* Speculation control prctl */ +int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which); +int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl); + #endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */ --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -198,4 +198,15 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4
+/* Per task speculation control */ +#define PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL 52 +#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53 +/* Speculation control variants */ +# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0 +/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */ +# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0 +# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0) +# define PR_SPEC_ENABLE (1UL << 1) +# define PR_SPEC_DISABLE (1UL << 2) + #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ #include <linux/uidgid.h> #include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h> + #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> /* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */ #include <generated/utsrelease.h> @@ -2184,6 +2186,16 @@ static int propagate_has_child_subreaper return 1; }
+int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) { @@ -2386,6 +2398,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsi case PR_GET_FP_MODE: error = GET_FP_MODE(me); break; + case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL: + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) + return -EINVAL; + error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(arg2); + break; + case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL: + if (arg4 || arg5) + return -EINVAL; + error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(arg2, arg3); + break; default: error = -EINVAL; break;