From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit 2961298efe1ea1b6fc0d7ee8b76018fa6c0bcef2)
We want to expose the hardware features simply in /proc/cpuinfo as "ibrs", "ibpb" and "stibp". Since AMD has separate CPUID bits for those, use them as the user-visible bits.
When the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit is set which indicates both IBRS and IBPB capability, set those (AMD) bits accordingly. Likewise if the Intel STIBP bit is set, set the AMD STIBP that's used for the generic hardware capability.
Hide the rest from /proc/cpuinfo by putting "" in the comments. Including RETPOLINE and RETPOLINE_AMD which shouldn't be visible there. There are patches to make the sysfs vulnerabilities information non-readable by non-root, and the same should apply to all information about which mitigations are actually in use. Those *shouldn't* appear in /proc/cpuinfo.
The feature bit for whether IBPB is actually used, which is needed for ALTERNATIVEs, is renamed to X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB.
Originally-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: karahmed@amazon.de Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.u... Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat srivatsa@csail.mit.edu Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) matt.helsley@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov amakhalov@vmware.com Reviewed-by: Bo Gan ganb@vmware.com ---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 18 +++++++++--------- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++---------- 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index b4e370b..782005d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -194,14 +194,14 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+29) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+30) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+29) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+30) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ /* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */ #define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/ +#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ @@ -253,9 +253,9 @@
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */ #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD (13*32+12) /* Prediction Command MSR (AMD) */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL (13*32+14) /* Speculation Control MSR only (AMD) */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (AMD) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */ @@ -293,8 +293,8 @@ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ -#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (18*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
/* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 41851af..8dcecb9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" "wrmsr", - X86_FEATURE_IBPB) + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD), [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB) : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 7def33a..1968baf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -298,9 +298,8 @@ retpoline_auto: }
/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) { - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); } } @@ -333,7 +332,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index 23ba9cc..fee94ee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -105,17 +105,28 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) rdmsr(MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV, lower_word, c->microcode); }
- if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || - cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || - cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL) || - cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD) || - cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { - pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling SPEC_CTRL\n"); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + /* + * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support, + * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also, + * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on + * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available. + */ + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) { + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + } + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); + + /* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */ + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { + pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n"); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB); clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD); - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); }
/*