Hi Mimi,
This patch set could probably go through KEYS/KEYRINGS_INTEGRITY, but it's kind of late to be asking. Has it been in linux-next? Should I assume this patch set has been fully tested or can we get some "tags"?
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IIRC, Coiby has tested it on x86_64/arm64, not sure if he took test on s390. No, this hasn't been in linux-next.
For arm64, recently I did a new round of test and the patches works as expected, 1. Build 5.19.0-rc2 2. generate keys and add them to .secondary_trusted_keys, MOK, UEFI db; 3. sign different kernel images with different keys including keys from .builtin_trusted_key, .secondary_trusted_keys keyring, UEFI db key and MOK key 4. Without lockdown, all kernel images can be kexec'ed; with lockdown enabled, only the kernel image signed by the key from .builtin_trusted_key can be kexec'ed
Then I build a new kernel with the patches applied and confirm all kernel images can be kexec'ed.
I used the s390 code on powerpc and there it did not work because the built-in key was needed to verify the kernel.
I did not really run this on s390, only ported the fix I needed on powerpc back to s390.
For 390, I commented out the code that skips signature verification when secure boot is not enabled since I couldn't find a machine that supports secure boot and confirm before applying the patch, kernel images signed by keys from .builtin_trusted_key, .secondary_trusted_keys couldn't be kexec'ed when lockdown is enabled; after applying the patch, those kernel images could be kexec'ed.
Thanks
Michal