4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu
commit 5369a762c882c0b6e9599e4ebbb3a9ba9eee7e2d upstream.
In theory this should have been caught earlier when the xattr list was verified, but in case it got missed, it's simple enough to add check to make sure we don't overrun the xattr buffer.
This addresses CVE-2018-10879.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200001
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger adilger@dilger.ca Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -1559,7 +1559,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_set_entry(struct e handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, bool is_block) { - struct ext4_xattr_entry *last; + struct ext4_xattr_entry *last, *next; struct ext4_xattr_entry *here = s->here; size_t min_offs = s->end - s->base, name_len = strlen(i->name); int in_inode = i->in_inode; @@ -1594,7 +1594,13 @@ static int ext4_xattr_set_entry(struct e
/* Compute min_offs and last. */ last = s->first; - for (; !IS_LAST_ENTRY(last); last = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(last)) { + for (; !IS_LAST_ENTRY(last); last = next) { + next = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(last); + if ((void *)next >= s->end) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "corrupted xattr entries"); + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto out; + } if (!last->e_value_inum && last->e_value_size) { size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(last->e_value_offs); if (offs < min_offs)