This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...
The filename of the patch is: KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.
Subject: KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de Date: Sat Feb 3 15:56:23 2018 +0100
From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de
commit b2ac58f90540e39324e7a29a7ad471407ae0bf48
[ Based on a patch from Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com ]
... basically doing exactly what we do for VMX:
- Passthrough SPEC_CTRL to guests (if enabled in guest CPUID) - Save and restore SPEC_CTRL around VMExit and VMEntry only if the guest actually used it.
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny darren.kenny@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk konrad.wilk@oracle.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli aarcange@redhat.com Cc: Andi Kleen ak@linux.intel.com Cc: Jun Nakajima jun.nakajima@intel.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: Tim Chen tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com Cc: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Cc: Asit Mallick asit.k.mallick@intel.com Cc: Arjan Van De Ven arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com Cc: Greg KH gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Ashok Raj ashok.raj@intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517669783-20732-1-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 88 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm { u64 gs_base; } host;
+ u64 spec_ctrl; + u32 *msrpm;
ulong nmi_iret_rip; @@ -249,6 +251,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_ms { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true }, { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true }, #endif + { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false }, @@ -882,6 +885,25 @@ static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 inde return false; }
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned msr) +{ + u8 bit_write; + unsigned long tmp; + u32 offset; + u32 *msrpm; + + msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm: + to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm; + + offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr); + bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1; + tmp = msrpm[offset]; + + BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID); + + return !!test_bit(bit_write, &tmp); +} + static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr, int read, int write) { @@ -1587,6 +1609,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vc u32 dummy; u32 eax = 1;
+ svm->spec_ctrl = 0; + if (!init_event) { svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE; @@ -3591,6 +3615,13 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_VM_CR: msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr; break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl; + break; case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV: msr_info->data = 0x01000065; break; @@ -3682,6 +3713,33 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr); break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + return 1; + + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) + return 1; + + svm->spec_ctrl = data; + + if (!data) + break; + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm. + * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up + * touching the MSR anyway now. + */ + set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1); + break; case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: if (!msr->host_initiated && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) @@ -4950,6 +5008,15 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
local_irq_enable();
+ /* + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr + * being speculatively taken. + */ + if (svm->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + asm volatile ( "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t" "mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t" @@ -5042,6 +5109,27 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu #endif );
+ /* + * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the + * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and + * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding + * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former + * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. + * + * For non-nested case: + * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + * + * For nested case: + * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to + * save it. + */ + if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + + if (svm->spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB();
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from pbonzini@redhat.com are
queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.14/x86kvm_Update_spectre-v1_mitigation.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.14/KVM_VMX_introduce_alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch queue-4.14/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.14/KVM_nVMX_Eliminate_vmcs02_pool.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.14/KVM_VMX_make_MSR_bitmaps_per-VCPU.patch queue-4.14/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.14/KVMx86_Update_the_reverse_cpuid_list_to_include_CPUID_7_EDX.patch